Small Wars Journal

A Timely Lesson from the Korean War

Sat, 11/06/2010 - 1:43pm
A Timely Lesson from the Korean War

by Lee Lacy

Download the Full Article: A Timely Lesson from the Korean War

The recent removal of General Stanley McChrystal by President Barack Obama as NATO Commander in Afghanistan sheds some light on the complex relationship of the civilian government with the military in U.S. society. The issue reminds us of a similar disagreement during the Korean War between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. The essay explores the background of this complex relationship, makes comparisons between the two incidents and puts forth lessons learned. An analysis of the two incidents affirms the Constitutional provision of the primacy of civilian elected leaders over military authority. Drawing on archived material from the Truman Presidential Library, historical accounts of the Truman-MacArthur affair and current events, the essay continues the important dialogue of how civil authority and the military establishment interact. Although, first-hand accounts of the Obama-McChrystal affair will not likely be written until the President leaves office, this project serves a reference to study the doctrine of civilian control of the military, for

future generations.

Download the Full Article: A Timely Lesson from the Korean War

Lee Lacy is an Instructor for the Advanced Operations Course at the U.S. Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Additionally, he is a Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army Reserve, currently in command of Detachment 3, 2100 Military Intelligence Group.

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Richard W Sims (not verified)

Fri, 11/12/2010 - 11:48pm

Colonel Lacey has written a very good article that explains the why and how civilians are in Command of our Military Forces.
Our Founding Fathers produced a good blueprint for our young nation to follow. To insure freedom and democracy continue in our nation, it must always be so.

COIN waged by a democracy places exacting demands on IO-on-self. McChrystal, for all his prowess in many an art, effed up royally -- and not just per way of the Rolling Stone piece (heck, that was chump change that could have played well if he was keeping domestic opinion in check). McChrystal did not understand IO, particularly IO vis-à-vis a domestic opinion accommodating quickly to the fog of war and not liking what was coming into acute focus.

Petraeus is the rainmaker.

Petraeus is the go-to-man when it comes to creating the space to fight on -- or lose while looking like the depressing end game is what we were aiming for all along.

So "complex relationship of the civilian government with the military in U.S. society" in all honor -- the McChrystal saga boils down to something a bit more visceral than the highly relevant esoterica of applied PolSci. All said as imho, of course.

Keep up the most solid of work!

While I firmly believe that studying history is a good foundation for understanding and addressing current challenges, I believe the strength of the approach is in seeing the inherent complexity of each situation and how the actors arrived at decisions and how events affected one another. Drawing parallels is worthwhile, but as the author points out, the parallels must be balanced with the differences.

In terms of MacArthur vs. Truman, by focusing on the events of 1950-51 is to miss the influence of the role MacArthur played on the national stage since 1933. As many point out, MacArthur was a General officer longer than most officers whole careers (1918-51). His insubordination and obvious political ambitions were apparent early on. An adroit political player, FDR removed him from the domestic scene by giving him the retirement job in the Philippines, but this directly led to his key role in the Pacific in WWII, and really political role in post-war Northeast Asia from 1945-50. In a way, FDR and Trumans treatment and deference to MacArthur from 1941 onwards (he was always too busy to leave the theater and come to Washington) contributed to Trumans problem in 1951 far beyond Obamas strategy decisions and selection of commanders in 2009-10.

I think its important to understand as many of the variables and factors at play when making comparisons to historic events so the "lessons" we may draw are not superficial, or really mistaken.