


SMALL WARS

JOURNAL

MAY, 2011 - VOL 7, No. 5



IN THIS ISSUE

Us and Them: A Personal Essay <i>by Phat Doan</i>	2
Introspection and Emotional Vulnerability as Leader Development and Team Building Tools by Colonel (Ret.) Steven Rotkoff	8
What Constitutes Terrorist Network Resiliency? <i>by Major David N. Santos</i>	12
United States-Haitian Relations from 1791 to 1810. How Slavery And Commerce Shaped American Foreign Policy <i>by Philip K. Abbott</i>	18
The Wrong War: An Interview with Bing West, A Sequel <i>by Octavian Manea</i>	23
Book Review: Identity in Algerian Politics The Legacy of Colonial Rule <i>by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein</i>	25
Index of Articles Published in May, 2011	26

Cover Photo: U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Teresa Noble, right, a civil affairs specialist with 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 1, interacts with Afghan children during an Afghan National Army-led medical outreach in Marjah, Afghanistan.
Photo by LCpl James Noble, US DoD public domain.

Us and Them

A Personal Essay

by Phat Doan

Published online 31 May 2011

THE JOURNEY...

July 6th, 2010, there was no turning back. We resigned our full-time jobs, put our educations on hold, said goodbye to our family and friends and prepared for the unknown adventure to come. Two months later, dusts swallowed the plane combat landing from the empty sky. Our hearts sunk as we raced off the plane under the cover of darkness. Thoughts of snipers and mortar observers, from the million stories we've heard, immediately crossed our minds. Picking up our rucksacks, reality finally hit us as we walked through the quiet, lifeless land. The moon shined with little light reflecting; grasping our weapons tightly, we tried to make out the familiar faces of our friends looking for any little comfort. *So it began...*

THEM...

A five-year-old child was in agony. Every part of him described malnutrition but there was something about his tiny body that caught the eyes: his oddly large stomach. He was living with Thalassemia, a type of sickle cell disease, causing his spleen to enlarge, expand a little every day, push and crush his internal organs. Thus, he could eat only two fingers of bread a day. Though hunger always lingered on his mind, anything more could only cause pain to his fragile body. His livers started to fail. He was on his last few months. His two older brothers passed away from the same illness a couple years ago. Every day was a struggle for him and his parents. He received dialysis twice a year and each treatment was a quest by itself. He had to travel to Pakistan for the dialysis and most times he was given the first available blood, not necessary the one matching his blood type. After all, he lived in the countryside of Afghanistan, not a place advanced medical care would exactly come to mind.

US...

We had a good Lieutenant in the platoon. He truly cared for his counterparts and the local na-

tionals. His actions reflected deep affection. He took times to learn the local language, Pashto. He put aside many hours to read and analyze the demographic and political geography of the area. He devoured any books that were related to military conflicts. While other American convoys blasted through Khost city, he took times to stop and talk to the locals, to learn about their concerns and to understand their troubles; it helped him to understand their struggles. In his beliefs, there must be a way to help these people. Many care packages were delivered. Many schools were visited. Many civil affairs missions were conducted. Many construction and reconstruction projects were initiated. One time, he wrote a promise of treatment note to an injured elderly man due to the situation constrained. The elder was able to receive medical care days later thanks to his note. He is an officer who deeply cared.

However, he was just a minority in an arrogant army. There were those, the majority, who didn't believe in his actions or counterinsurgency [COIN]. They deemed it unnecessary, that those he helped were unfaithful "creatures", only to accept his help with smiles and turn around stabbing him in the back. Their examples were the lethal buried Improvised Explosive Devices [IEDs] along the routes his convoy would travel. He did, after all, lose his best friend just two weeks into the deployment to insurgent IED. Three months later, another close friend of his was killed to dismount IED. These were his challengers' case in point of why this place should be nuclear bombed into a parking lot. Still, he stayed strong and kept caring.

US & THEM...

It was a long patrol in early October. We set out early to clear an unimproved [dirt] route along a hotspot village in Khost Province. The convoy slowly crept through the village scanning for IEDs while the dismount teams were on both sides of the convoy scanning for a triggerman or as we called them: the Taliban man.

A family hesitantly approached the Lieutenant. Their son was in a dire situation. The parents were

in tears begging the Lieutenant and his almighty American power to save their son and salvage a family's misery. The boy looked full of life but confined in an exhausted body.

The Lieutenant, without hesitation, was on full speed helping the family. The platoon medics were immediately dispatched to his location for an on spot medical evaluation, only in shock to see the boy's body. Bad news was delivered: there was nothing they could do to save the boy; only a surgeon could.

In America, the boy could be saved with a routine surgery available in most hospitals. However, there were only few in Afghanistan and most were out of reach to ordinary Afghanis. The Coalition Force operated surgical centers in many Forward Operating Bases [FOB]. However, accessibilities and treatments were mostly limited to Coalition Force and their counterparts. Local Nationals may be granted treatments on case-by-case basis.

"This is a severe case," the Lieutenant assessed. Immediately, he was on the radio calling command post requesting a U.S helicopter medical evacuation [Medevac]. His request was unorthodox; it was definitely not the first but not the norm either. Command post shot back a "Denied" to no one surprised. What followed was an hour long of high-level bureaucracy truly at work.

At each level, the authority argued the risk versus the benefit of evacuating a non-urgent medical [not life threatening at that exact moment] local national. Yet, none of them actually saw the boy's worn out body or the father's hysterical face. They only saw a concept, an abstract of the situation, presenting through waves of radio traffic. For a while, they wrestled the idea, negotiated and compromised with each other for the best approach to this rather unusual situation. Finally, a decision was made: the boy would be brought to the FOB Salerno hospital in a week for an evaluation. The medics knew this in no way would guarantee a treatment; however, at least the boy got a foot in the door, they reasoned. It took two more weeks of efforts by the medics, the Lieutenant and the company commander to justify and convince the higher commands and the field surgical team to fully come on board. "The father's show of faith and courage out to be rewarded by our best effort. If we don't reward that then what the hell are we doing here?" was the winning argument.

The father also had to fight his own bureaucracy battle to save his son. Knowing the village was heavily Taliban influenced and that approaching

SMALL WARS JOURNAL

Volume 7, No. 5. © 2011, Small Wars Foundation.

Editor in Chief Dave Dilegge
Publisher Bill Nagle
Editor Mike Few

Small Wars Journal is published by Small Wars Foundation, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit. If you value this material, please consider [supporting us](#) in our efforts to bring it to you.

Business Office

4938 Hampden Ln, #560
 Bethesda, MD 20814
office@smallwarsjournal.com

Permission is granted to print copies for personal, non-commercial use. Since we are in this together, Small Wars Journal publishes under the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license to provide for certain limited uses in the common good; all other rights reserved.

See <http://smallwarsjournal.com/site/terms/>.



No factual statement should be relied upon without further investigation on your part sufficient to satisfy you in your independent judgment that it is true.

ISSN 2156-227X (online), 2157-3239 (print)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to all authors for their contribution of content. It's what makes this all worthwhile.

Thanks to Abbie Evans, Marc Tyrrell, and Erich Simmers for their work to produce this issue, and to Karaka Pend for work on a future redesign.

This issue is published and our operations made possible through the support of Smith Richardson Foundation.



Watch for [Robert Haddick's](#) weekly editorial, [This Week at War](#). Friday evenings at Foreign Policy.

the Americans in broad daylight could bring death to his whole family, he still risked it all to give his son a chance. While the Americans were deliberating on how to best treat his son and the situation, he was convincing his village elders to allow the Americans to help his son.

Us...

The minority was mostly those of higher rankings in the company. Like the Lieutenant, they

showed affection for the locals. They wanted the local to be out of poverty, to be on their own feet fighting and building their own country. After all, helping the local is helping them. The sooner the country is on its own, the sooner they will come home to their family, many of them reasoned.

However, it was the majority that carried out the minority's orders. They were the grunts, the hard charging frontline Joe that did the work. They didn't bullshit around when it came to it. Their lives were on the line.

The average age was 20. They agreed to put their lives on hold for a year to proudly serve their country. In this place, there was no mom, no dad, only a band of brothers baptized by fire. They shared hungers, endured the sizzling sun and tolerated cold sleepless nights together. In addition, they got blown up ... together. It was just they and their brothers against the Taliban man. They carried each other through physical and emotional roller coasters that were caused by the stress of the deployment and sometimes the stress of broken families because of the deployment.

They had frustrations with this country. Almost 10 years have gone since the initial push; things were still the same. Mud huts were still the way of living. Dirt roads were still the main travel routes. Paved roads were still being blown up left and right with IED, leaving potholes and impassable culverts. Trashes scattered along the roads, filled the streams and obstructed the low water crossings. Little kids with no jackets in a fierce winter barefoot scavenging the local trash dumps. Men squatted and peed on the side of a road like it was their private outhouse. In the age of technology, where was a sign of modern civilization?

They had frustrations with this war. They were not fighting a million men army like their grandfather did. Rather, their opponents were elusive and mysterious. They could not tell who was good and who was bad. They could not distinguish a friendly pro-coalition villager and the Taliban man who wanted to cut their throats. They were not the one to blame either for their inability to distinguish friends and foes. The Taliban man chose to live among the friendly villagers and, well, he looked just like an Afghani. [Duh!]

They had frustrations with their counterparts, mostly to the apathy. Many of the Afghanistan National Army [ANA] soldiers showed an indifference attitude toward the American training efforts. The ANA soldiers didn't take trainings seriously and even joked around in serious situations. If the ANA soldiers die, it is *Inshallah* [Allah's Will.] The ANA

soldiers saw the war as the Americans' responsibility. Hence, they referred the ANA soldiers as "creatures", a kind that lives off others' efforts, not as "human" counterparts.

They also had frustrations with the way this war fought. They were constrained to the strict rules of engagement. They could not shoot without questions asked first. They sat helplessly watching their friends blown up and the Taliban man rode away on his little red Honda motorcycle. At that exact moment, their request for engagement was still working its way through the usual bureaucracy at a comfortable higher tactical command center, miles away. By the time it trickled back down the chain, they were mostly back at their respective FOB while the Taliban man was probably having a feast celebrating his feat against the almighty infidels.

It is hard to understand what they go through. Then again, how would you explain the feeling of telling your family you just got hit, suffering traumatic brain injury, on Christmas Eve, all thanks to the Taliban man? How would you explain the feeling of watching the dust cloud of an exploding IED swallows your brothers, knowing the locals standing nearby have prior knowledge of the buried IED but fail to warn you? How would you explain the feeling of losing your love one and seeing the locals with smirks on their faces? Only your brothers in arm could share those feelings and bear with you through it.

To them, the majority, it was madness. Why should they smile and wave at the locals that secretly support the Taliban man? Why should they care if the locals have foods, clean water, medical clinics and schools when the locals secretly signal the Taliban man of their coming? Why should they hand out care packages to the local children when it is their dad the Taliban man? To them, it didn't make sense.

THEM...

Sadat was a quiet man. Always cheerful with a grin on his face, he was the oldest of his troops. An Uzbek ethnic and a husband, father, brother, son, he answered his country call of duty. He would be away from home for months to years at a times, traveling with his unit across the Southern and Eastern part of his war torn country, fighting and hunting the Taliban man. Married, he left behind his wife and their two sons to fulfill his duty. At the time we met him, his youngest was only few months old. He is an Afghani.

Marx was an educated young man with a cripple footstep. No one really knew what happened to his right leg. No one dared to ask either. In his late twenties, he was wise and ambitious. He loved literature and his one wish was to study abroad in America, to read up on the world literature and immerse himself in its beautiful history. But for now, he put aside his dream [and his safety] to pay due for his country. A Pashtu ethnic and a son, brother, fiancé, he answered his country call of duty by being a translator for the Coalition Force. Many times he came home to death threats, drive by shootings or an explosive booby-trapped door by the Taliban man. Many times for many years, he got shot at or blown up while conducting missions with the Coalition Force. And every time without fail, he came back to work ready as ever to proudly contribute to Afghanistan's new future. He is an Afghani.

Then there were them, the ordinary citizens. They were father, mother, husband, wife, son, and daughter. They experienced tremendous hardships from the very early life. They worked from early dawn to humble dusk on their many generation farmlands. They raised herds of sheep and goats on the desert wastelands. They tended family, bear kids and cared for their elders with whatever resources they had. They are Afghanis.

Most Afghanis were ill-educated. Their main thought would be putting food on the table. Sure, they all heard about the Taliban man. Heck, they might even know one or two who are or were. Yet, they chose to either ignore or live with him. It was just a daily part of life. After all, what could they do? While the "Amrica", the Americans in their language, were also part of their life, they usually showed up five or ten minutes and then disappeared for days to weeks. The Taliban man, on the other hand, was there for days in end. And yes, he was there to stay.

How many three cups of tea have their village elders had with different Amrica commanders? First cup of tea, you are a stranger. Second cup of tea, you are a friend. Third cup of tea, you are family. That's what it would take for a trusted relationship to be established. Yet, a three cups of tea relationship only lasts until a new replacement arrives, usually within a year or so. With new faces every year, a new three cups of tea has to be redone and everything is back to square one.

How many times have their elders asked for help to be greeted with enthusiasm and a long wait of nothing? Empty promises seem to be normal business for the Amrica, *or so they thought.*

US & THEM...

We were instructed to mentor a platoon of ANA. Not many greeted the news with enthusiasm beside the minority. To them, this was why they came: to train ANA soldiers to fight and build Afghanistan's future. The majority, of course, thought it was harassment. Now they had to spend their "off days" [Xbox times] "interact" [baby-sitting] their "new counterparts." Now they had to go to breakfast, lunch, and dinner with these "oddly" strangers without even a common language.

Then, came the cultural shock. The ANA soldiers rarely showered. They used hands to eat instead of silverwares. They emitted rather unpleasant odors most of the times. "Why don't they use deodorant?" asked by a young soldier. They hold hands and hugged each other like a reunion of a long lost couple. They savored "chin chai" [China green tea] with sugars. Apparently, the "assumed" universal hand and sign language was not even universal after all with these guys. A "thump up" from us meant "up your behind" to them. No one could understand each other without an interpreter. Ironically, they all had to go on dangerous missions together. *"How the heck in the world would this work?" the majority asked.*

A group of 25 men, they came from all parts of life. The majority of them were Tajik, Uzbek and Hazarat with only two were Pashtuns. For many, this was the first time they interacted with the almighty Amrica. They heard many things about the invincible Amrica. They all had seen the Hollywood glorified infamous Amrica soldiers in Rambo, Predator or Black Hawk Down. They envied the Amrica soldiers with their modern technologies and finest equipment. They wondered when would their Army be advanced like that? They wanted to befriend and follow the Amrica into battle. They entrusted their lives in the Amricas' hands. *"When bullets fly, everyone will speak the same language!" they responded.*

The ANA soldiers were excited and ready to learn from their almighty counterparts. However, it was completely different than they could imagine. Their counterparts brought a couple of them out on mission at a time. They sat in a truck until called up to dismount to chase some kids or act as security cordoning off an area. *"Where is our hand on route clearances learning?" they asked.*

Conducting route clearances while mentoring without a common language was an oversight right from a start. We only had one interpreter with us at any given time while the convoy could be stretch-

ing up to 15 vehicles. While the Lieutenant talked the mission through with Sadat in his vehicle through Marx, his interpreter, other ANA soldiers could only sit in other vehicles without knowing due to language different. When situation rose, information started to flood from all directions, decisions had to be made within seconds, and million things would have to be done. Explaining what was going on to our counterpart would be the last on that list. On our off days, we conducted basic soldiering skills training to shape up our counterparts; however, there were not much we could teach about route clearance. It was kind of a hand on thing. *“Trials by fires, right?” we would answer.*

ME...

Living and working with ANA have brought me back to my father's experiences 35 years ago. All 35 years have passed but the majority still has not changed their way toward their counterparts and the local nationals. Yes, there are those who care but minority can only do so much.

My father served in the Army Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] as an infantry officer. He worked and fought along the side of the American Army. For many years he did not talk about his past, a time when he lost his youth to a "lost cause war" as perceived by the 1970s American population. A high school chemistry teacher, he got draft into the Army and became an officer in the surge of 1970. A humble man in a time of war, he sacrificed his youth to protect his love affair with his country. There, he was the few who believed in his country and her ideology, proudly fought and shamefully lost everything in that process. Like me, he was the few who cared.

I served as a team leader in a Sapper company, conducting route clearance across the Regional Command [RC] East of Afghanistan. On theory, my unit worked and fought along the side of the ANA. Of our 12 months deployment, we were only with our counterparts for less than two months, not that many in the company actually cared. To many in the company, this was a "lost cause", like 35 years ago. "COIN does not work" and the ANA are not doing their jobs" were common sayings among. They cited many reasons.

I feel related to my father who, 35 years ago, fought for his country's freedom. Like my father, most of the ANA soldiers fight for their country's freedom. They hate the Taliban just as my father hated the Vietcong [VC]. They put aside their fami-

ly, their times, and their youth so that their country can one day enjoy the prosperity it once had. They fight with any and everything they have. With or without the Americans' support, they still fight ... to the end, like my father did.

Yet, many American soldiers ignore those efforts or choose to look away. They argue that the Afghans are not doing their parts. But how, I ask? Isn't their sacrifice enough? Have they forgotten the bureaucracy was more than often the culprit, not the Afghani soldiers? Have they forgotten the saying "When there is bad, there is also good?"

I feel related because every day I see the ANA, I see my father 35 years ago, fighting proudly for his country freedom and in doing so, he was fighting for my freedom.

US AND THEM...

A family has a new future. Their son's life has been prolonged for another 20 years. For once, they would not have to stand helplessly watching their son in pain.

In the end, both sides compromised for the better, put aside their differences to save a life of an Afghani child. The surgery was a success. The boy was fully recovered and discharged to his family after three days. To the family, it was a miracle. To the doctors at FOB Salerno, it was just a routine surgery. They volunteered to help the boy even after they were told they were fully responsible for the outcome. Of course, bureaucracy got to have its say before anything can go forward. The outcome was worthy of the fight. They gave an Afghan child a new life, a new hope and a new future that just days ago, he could never dream of. Everyone who was involved can now breathe easy with a smile.

We saw Sadat again one afternoon in March by coincidence. It had been 4 months since his departure. Driving slowly down a mountain switchback to see outside the window our dearest friend, still cheerful with a grin on his face, guiding his men. It was a moment of long lost family reunion. He now led his platoon clearing the routes without the American guidance. Over the past month, they have defeated many Taliban IEDs and provided freedom of movement to American convoys. They were now on their own, more independent than ever and eager to take over the responsibilities from their American counterparts.

Slowly just like that, his civil affairs projects came to fruit. Just like that, schools and medical clinics were in better condition, stocking with full

supply. Wells and crickets fields construction were completed in many areas. Like that, his just will and determination slowly won the heart and mind of a many once hardcore Taliban-supported villagers. Hopefully, his replacement will have a heart like him.

SO IT ENDS...

The plane is fast approaching its final destination. Just as abruptly as the forming of our unit two years go, everyone, soon, will part different ways to start a new journey. Some will go back to their civilian jobs, some will return to their interrupted education; many will settle down, get married and start a family; most will finish their remaining military adventures in other units, and few will stay in for another tour in three years. Those few remaining will form a new foundation, prepping and preparing the new crops for the upcoming tour. They will tell the saga, recount the frustrations and proudly show their triumphs. Then, in three years, they will lead their green crops returning to this place. They will become the new "Us." There will be a new "Them." Hopefully, the new "Us" and "Them" will have better hearts, better relationships and better three cups of tea than their predecessors. However, to good faith, there will be no more "us & them" or "minority & majority," only "We: Americans and Afghanis" for a better Afghanistan.

FINAL WORDS...

A new warfare has emerged during the past twenty years as the military increasingly fights insurgency wars rather than big army's apocalypses. We took Baghdad in 30 days but more than seven years to suppress Iraqi insurgency and established a reasonably stable Iraq. We chased the Taliban out of Kabul in less than two months, yet ten years later we're still fighting insurgency in southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan with no end in sight. This warfare requires a different approach from our generation warriors.

Our soldiers now have become peace ambassadors more often than war fighters. They "supposedly" represent the US Government and its intention of helping Afghanistan and Afghanis building a democratic government and free country. However, they are struggling between the duties and responsibilities they are entrusted upon and the frustrations they encounter while serving. Only if the *minority* can paint a clear big picture of counterinsurgency and the *majority* is willing to put

aside their conservatives and accept the big picture, then together they'll have a better chance at charming their counterparts and winning the locals. Only when, together, they put whole hearts and minds into the operation despite all dissatisfactions then can they expect to win the hearts and minds of Afghanistan.

I wrote this essay not to criticize; rather, I wanted to present the many sides of the "lost cause," "wrong war" or the "Obama's war" [however the public perceived] that I've observed over my tour of duty.

I was someone who cared, and I was a Joe. Putting myself in danger to see little result was a frustration; yet, seeing my hard works bear fruits is worthy of the efforts. Not everyone is friendly but not everyone is an enemy either.

Many sides in an endless war, *how would you behave?*

Phat Doan is a graduate student at University of Utah, pursuing M.P.H. from the School of Medicine and M.P.A. from the Center for Public Policy & Administration. He is currently deployed to Afghanistan with 118th Engineer Co (SAPPER). This essay is dedicated in loving memory of SFC James E. Thode, KIA December 2nd, 2010 in Khost Province, Afghanistan.

Introspection and Emotional Vulnerability as Leader Development and Team Building Tools

by Steven Rotkoff

Published [online](#) 31 May 2011

All of us have gone through the process of changing stations and being confronted with the question “tell me a little about you”. Invariably our answer revolves around some form of our military resume, “I’ve served here, had these jobs, worked for these bosses, have this education and by the way I’m married, have 2.1 kids and a dog named fluffy.” While this approach conveys a lot of information in reality it tells someone almost nothing about what you believe, how you lead, or who you truly are. There is another more effective way of having this conversation. It is called ‘Who am I?’ (WAI).

WAI is a tool designed to help leaders and small groups to first raise individual member’s self-awareness through introspection, and then increase group-level trust through the intentional practice of emotional vulnerability. *FM 6-22, Army Leadership* describes self-awareness as a meta-competency that supports all other leadership competencies. Self-awareness requires serious introspection. It provides a single reference point for you about one’s own system of beliefs and values. The more confident you are of your reference point, the easier it is to “step outside yourself” and examine another’s frame of reference. This allows you to take another’s perspective long enough to begin to understand them and potentially trust and respect them more easily. Knowing your own culture, reflecting on your own experiences and understanding why you believe and value what you do, provides for an easier “compare and contrast” that enables one to better accept alternative perspectives. This short article describes what WAI is, how it evolved, how to run one, and what you can expect from this simple, leader facilitated exercise.

Six years ago the Army started a Red Team program to train and educate leaders who would be charged with providing alternative perspectives inside their organizations. The program leaders struggled with finding an ‘ice-breaking’ exercise that would create an atmosphere where participants would not only know each other better but also be more open to different ways of looking at problems. The complexity underlying the operational environment requires leaders who can look at problems through different lenses and under-

stand the inter-relationship among people and things effecting that environment. The exercise that evolved from this search was WAI. This exercise has proved to be an enormously powerful leader development and group networking tool because it allows participants to connect very quickly in a more meaningful way. It has migrated from the Red team program into the Army’s Starfish Program and informally into some sections within the Intermediate Leadership Education program, and is spreading to many organizations which Red Team or Starfish graduates have since moved on to.

Introspection and emotional vulnerability are fundamentally leader development tools. Admittedly, when we speak about leader development we don’t generally think of people sharing personal stories of deep challenges or emotionally trying experiences with those with whom they will subsequently work or even lead. Simply put, fully-evolved leadership requires knowing oneself and connecting with others to inspire and motivate. WAI enables this development. The basic premise of the exercise is that each participant share ‘watershed events’ in their life that shaped how they engage with the world.

THE TOOL

There is a relatively simple set of rules for conducting this exercise as described below:

1. There are two critical elements to the WAI exercise: Private preparation through solo reflection, and group sharing. Individuals first must do the hard work of reflection, of recalling the seminal life events that were critical in shaping their current personalities and deeper values. One might think of these events as the crucibles—both difficult and triumphant—that forged the individual’s character. In essence, this private preparation is intended to encourage them to be introspective. Such deep reflection takes time, and should be built into the structure of the entire exercise.

What exactly participants later choose to share with their classmates in the verbal WAI is a different question. It is important during preparation

that participants be completely honest with themselves as to how they developed into the person they are today. This preparation can take an hour or longer, and is ideally conducted at least one day prior to the group sharing.

2. In the second step of WAI the group sits together in a private setting, and one by one the individuals hold the floor, sharing aloud their “Who Am I?” story. Participants are allowed to take as long as they want and are uninterrupted while providing their WAI. This enables some degree of rambling which intentionally creates an environment where many people end up sharing more than they originally planned to. This open time frame can be very liberating, as for many this is the first opportunity they have ever had to share out loud with others why they are who they are.

As such, any interruptions in the form of questions or time limits tend to kill the magic of the moment. To mitigate the abuse of this open ended opportunity to talk, facilitators are encouraged to get their WAI down under 15 minutes, as this then sets an example that most others will naturally follow. WAI should be conducted entirely as narrative – no power point slides or film clips etc. – nothing to distract from the story each person is telling the group, and nothing to hide behind. This activity should be like telling stories around the campfire – but the story we tell is about ourselves.

3. There is no question and answer period following the WAI so as to avoid any semblance of ‘interrogation’, and also to keep the playing field even...i.e if the facilitator were to ask one participant three questions and another only one if might leave the impression that the first participant’s story was more interesting, etc.

4. Every member of the group who is not sharing is asked to practice ‘full-body’ listening by giving their complete and unfettered attention to the person speaking. Receiving this attention while sharing is extremely powerful and the facilitator can both model this and suggest that participants “give the kind of attention you yourself would want to receive.”

5. Every participant must provide a WAI narrative, but the order of presentation is purely voluntary, an important factor in creating safety. While every participant must share something, precisely how deep they go and how much they reveal about themselves is an individual decision. In this way the exercise entails individually manageable personal risk.

6. No more than three personal narratives are conducted in a row. If someone goes exceedingly long this may be shortened to two or even simply one. In order for the group to exercise ‘full-body’ listening and remain engaged, the entire group ‘who am I’ must be spaced out over time. Done right, WAI is often draining both for the listeners and the presenters. Each hour of WAI should be broken up with an hour or more of some other less emotionally investing activity.

7. It is highly recommended that the facilitator models their own WAI before the participants commence their solo reflection. (see my own WAI below for an example). What the facilitator shares will set the tone for what the participants share. Facilitators are urged to go out on a limb and reveal meaningful events in their life that genuinely shaped them as people. By taking action and modeling this openness first, the facilitator encourages participants to risk being personally vulnerable themselves.

During my experience with WAI, several participants have initially told the group that they had felt they did not know everyone well enough to completely share who they are and everything they had learned about themselves in preparing for the exercise. In most cases they came forward later and decided to redo WAI on their own initiative—sharing things they had learned through introspection but needed time to process. This methodology allows people to operate within their comfort zone while simultaneously establishing a group norm that encourages them to both reflect and share.

It should be clear by now that this exercise is most definitely NOT a normal biographical recitation. Positions held, size and composition of family, etc. are not important unless they are linked to some watershed event. In an army context, when someone commanded a company or held some other position of importance is not relevant UNLESS some critical event happened while in that position that has stayed with and continues to shape their daily outlook. Similarly, while the birth of a child is without question a significant event in anyone’s life it may or may not necessarily change your worldview about things like the nature of personal responsibility, what your values are, etc. Hence participants are ideally sharing events that were personally transformational on a fundamental level.

8. Finally, and most importantly, WAI requires a degree of confidentiality among the group. While not confession or protected speech, it is critical that if someone chooses to share personal vulnera-

bilities—e.g. current struggles at home or difficult events from the past—that this content does not become fodder for gossip. To gain buy-in on this, the facilitator should openly propose confidentiality as a WAI group norm, and foster a brief discussion about what this means. A good rule of thumb is “what happens in ‘Who Am I’, stays in ‘Who Am I’.”

WHY IT WORKS

WAI is a deceptively simple exercise that works on many levels simultaneously. Several outcomes are enumerated below:

1. Using introspection to better understand how one engages in the world allows participants to take time to think about themselves in profound ways at depths rarely encouraged in the Army. The result is sometimes scary for those unlocking doors in their head that may have long been closed but it universally results in better self-understanding.

2. When participants share their WAI and listen as others share their own, it invariably dawns on them that they are not alone in coping with problems in life such as grief, prejudice, disappointment, relationship issues etc. This leaves participants feeling significantly more connected with the group and less alone in the world.

3. Practicing active listening is not something we routinely do or reward in leader development. In fact in some cases people are penalized for not contributing in volume to class discussions. This creates an environment where we reward the loudest who frequently crowd out and undermine efforts at collaboration. WAI is an exercise that reinforces listening to what people say, and more importantly it reinforces listening for a deeper understanding of what they mean. This understanding promotes a connection on an emotional level. This is an exceedingly important skill for leaders to develop. Organizations where leaders and those led are emotionally connected have higher morale, are more committed to the mission, can better discern intent in the absence of explicit orders, and are more adaptable in extreme circumstances.

4. This exercise creates an environment where alternative perspectives can be valued. When a participant hears another tell a personal story about encountering direct prejudice and how that shaped them, they are less like to think of that participant as simply ‘hyper sensitive to race’. They understand *where* that person is coming from and *why*

they see the world as they do— elements foundational to actual communication and education.

5. Finally, WAI is a tremendous team building vehicle. Upon completion, each member of the group knows all other members in a deeper way and faster way than such knowledge normally develops. Often group members have expressed that they now know other participants of WAI better than long time neighbors or even some members of their own family.

WHERE IT FITS

To date, with the exception of the author’s personal use of this technique as a Battalion and Brigade commander, WAI has been introduced exclusively in academic environments where its success in achieving the outcomes described above are well documented. There is obviously some trepidation about sharing personal information or vulnerability among those with whom you are going into combat. However, feedback on WAI from the majority of the participants with extensive combat experience is that they intend to use this tool when they go back to the field.

Clearly the intensity and frequency of deployment in the current Army has resulted in myriad mental health problems reflected in statistics associated with suicide, divorce, spousal abuse, DUI/DWI, substance abuse etc. During his testimony on July 29, 2010 before the House Armed Services military personnel subcommittee, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli told lawmakers of his concerns regarding soldiers. GEN Chiarelli said “We’ve been at war for nearly eight years, which has undeniably put a strain on our people and our equipment. Unfortunately, in a growing segment of the Army’s population, we have seen increased stress and anxiety manifest itself through high-risk behavior, including acts of violence, excessive use of alcohol, drug abuse, and reckless driving.”

The Army is a chain of command centric organization. One of our challenges is providing tools to junior leaders that help maintain the mental health of the organization. We train our leaders how to maintain property, lead PT, inspect and manage the bureaucracy that is the Army. Isn’t it worth investing in training our CPTs, Majors, Commanders, 1SGs and Sergeants Major in how to monitor and guide the emotional and mental health of their organizations without providing each company a clinical psychologist? “Who Am I” introduces a simple leader led tool that allows for a personal or

public cathartic experience and is an idea worth introducing and tracking the resultant effect.

AN EXAMPLE

Obviously when shared orally my personal WAI is a little different than the outline I provide below. I try to lace my comments with some funny self-deprecating observations to break the tension. What is provided below is simply a bullet outline I use as a guide to key elements that make up my WAI. It is hard to capture the emotional content or the feedback loop from the others listening as I share the results of my introspection, but when experienced live what occurs is truly special. And each time I share my ‘Who Am I’ it is a little different, just as I am a little different for each rendition.

- Born and raised in NYC – a little rude, brusque, direct, in a hurry...I ‘get’ all the jokes in Seinfeld
- Grandparents lived the ‘Fiddler on the Roof’ story, escaping Pogroms in Eastern Europe
- Earliest memory is being told the story of my Grand uncle’s death in a Pogrom in Russia. Had my grandparents family been skilled artisans or professionals (verses unskilled labor) they would not have been herded into the streets by the Cossacks and my namesake would not have been killed – moral of the story – *study hard and achieve.*
- Parents were children of the Depression who learned to ‘spend it when you’ve got it’ verses scrimp and save. Made me want a steady guaranteed income and forced me to look for a college scholarship – ended up going to West Point.
- West Point changed my life. Took me out of a narrow NY Jewish community and exposed me to America – I’d be a 400lb lawyer or judge in NY had I not gone.
- After Brigade command served as the Deputy C2 for CFLCC June 02-August 03. During this time I was witness to leader’s repeated ignoring of highly informed people telling us of the insurgency to come. This event shapes my life today. I am emotionally driven to participate in programs that help decision makers listen better and be less captured by end state myopia and their own pre-conceived notions.

In sum, I am a ‘type A’ driven to excel to avoid the Pogrom. I believe in personal responsibility and am fiscally conservative. I’ve spent my career as somewhat of an outsider (relatively few NY Jews in our Army) with a different perspective than most of my peers. I am driven to make the Army

better by my sense of personal responsibility for our misreading what the war in Iraq would become.

To conclude, “Who Am I?” can be an extremely powerful tool for both team and leader development. It creates a rapid, palpable shift in a group’s culture, engendering emotional ties that foster the high-performance functionality detailed above. For it to be successful; facilitators must let participants know that this isn’t everyday work. Leaders have to set a liberating context (don’t do this in the Battalion conference room – an offsite location will work much better) and will need to set the example by being personally vulnerable themselves. This requires an expanded notion of what it means to be courageous, of what it means to be a leader. Give it a try—you may find it is exactly what you are looking for to rapidly build trust based teams. Good Luck.

COL (Ret.) Steven Rotkoff served as an S-2 or G-2 at every level from Infantry Battalion through Army G2 and commanded both Military Intelligence battalion and brigade as part of III Corps. His final position on active service was as the Deputy CFLCC G-2 for OIF 1. Upon retirement, Steven served as the lead for intelligence transformation efforts for the then Army G2, LTG Alexander. The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS), and integration of red team capability in the Army grew out of this transformation effort. Now, he serves as the deputy director of that program. In August 2009 Mr. Rotkoff was selected by GEN Dempsey then the TRADOC CDR to serve as the action officer to develop a course of instruction based upon The Starfish and Spider in conjunction with the author Ori Brafman.

What Constitutes Terrorist Network Resiliency?

by David N Santos

Published online 31 May 2011

Since the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001 there have been numerous discussions on the issue of terrorism and terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda, within the media and the intelligence community. At times these discussions have created an image of the terrorist phenomenon as one of a monolithic and unstoppable menace continuing to spread around the world unabated. Lost in these discussions is a basic understanding of what any organization needs to continue to exist. What are its basic needs? What are its sources of strength and resiliency? Most organizations, whether terrorist or not, rely on some basic essential elements that are used to help define, guide and maintain the organization. These elements allow an organization to develop strength in its structure as well as its cause in order to maintain a resilient mindset. These elements of strength and resiliency enable the organization to experience periods of adversity, look critically at the outcomes of those experiences and take the lessons learned to improve the organization's performance.

Every successful organization, to include terrorist organizations, has to identify what their most essential elements for survival are. These basic elements will vary to some degree based on an organization's unique qualities. However, there are some elements that are almost universal to all organizations and those identified as terrorist organizations in particular.

Some of the more universal elements that can contribute to a terrorist network's strength, longevity and resiliency involve the organization's ideology, social network apparatus and capability as well as the ability to maintain a source of funding for its operations. These are the key basic elements needed by any terrorist network to maintain and further a viable long lasting organization. If a terrorist organization were to fail to maintain a high level of proficiency in each of these elements, either individually or collectively, the organization could experience a degraded ability to achieve its desired objectives.

When analyzing the actions and motives of terrorist networks, specifically the current Islamic terrorist threat, an examination of what the driving ideology and principles at play influencing these organizations must be considered. It should be

understood that ideology is essentially a collection of ideas and principles an individual or group believes will enable them to achieve a specific goal or objective. The significance of the role ideology has in facilitating a terrorist organization in achieving its objectives can be explained through the concept of *ends, ways* and *means*. More specifically, the *ends* represent the objectives a terrorist organization is looking to achieve. The *ways* is the concept, or the why, the terrorist organization is conducting certain acts. The *means* is the how a terrorist organization will achieve its stated objectives. In the case of terrorist networks the means is commonly achieved through the use of fear created by acts of violence. The ideology a terrorist organization uses to explain these ends, ways and means to its members must be expressed as simply and clearly as possible. If an ideology is too intricate and cumbersome potential recruits may not be able to relate to the ideology's principles easily and thus find it difficult to accept and believe in.

In the case of the Middle East, religion is the primary influencing ideology for terrorist activity. This is not to say there aren't other concepts or principles that help to encourage terrorist violence. Rather, the Islamic religion provides a common baseline of principles which members of the Muslim world are already familiar with and give precedence to in their daily lives. It is this basic understanding of the Islamic religion that radical clerics use help infuse their violent message into the principles of Islamic law. The trend today of the continuing growth of radical interpretations of Islam is aided by another movement underway in the Muslim world. This movement is known as *Salafi* which translated from Arabic refers to the "ancient one" indicating a connection the movement seeks to make with the Prophet Mohammed. The Salafi movement tries to evoke an image of the period of Islam during the days of the Prophet Mohammed that glorifies the perceived purity of the religion at that time (Sageman, 2004). The Salafi movement is based upon the belief that "Islam became decadent because it strayed from the righteous path" (Sageman, 2004, p. 4) it was founded on. Adherents of the Salafi ideology believe Islam has become diluted and decadent due to the influence of non-Muslim and Western principles and practices. The Salafi solution to this problem is to remove the

corruption to the Islamic faith through the use of violence.

Once the corruptive influences are removed an Islamist state based on the Salafi perceived nature of Islamic law can be installed. The establishment of an Islamist state is clearly the Salafi goal or end-state and therefore the *ends* for their ideology. According to Sageman (2004), al Qaeda represents the most common example of a Salafi inspired terrorist organization. The Salafi belief that Islam has become corrupted by numerous non-Muslim influences is their justification for breaking with current modern Muslim traditions. Therefore Salafi opposition to those non-Muslim influences believed to be corrupt represents the *ways* for the Salafi ideology. The Salafi insistence on the use of violence as the primary method for achieving their objective of creating an Islamist state is the *means* of their ideology. Violence, although the more common tactic of the Salafi movement is not the only method used to continue the spread of Islam. In fact a more non-violent approach does exist through the process of spreading the meaning of Islam through contact face to face contact with individuals and groups. This process of preaching the word of Islam is known as *Dawa* which strives to incite change by exposing and converting individuals to Islam (Sageman, 2004).

As a non-violent approach to furthering Islam, the concept of *dawa* does not truly fit a terrorist organization's desire for achieving mass recruitment nor the ability to influence change in targeted populations and societies quickly. The concept of *dawa* is one that requires time and patience to bring change and further Islam's influence over a long period of time. However, the concept of *dawa* is not completely lost to Islamic inspired terrorist organizations and radicals. In fact as the concept of *dawa* expanded throughout history, so did its relationship with political activism. This relationship has been justified by Salafi leaders as a traditional principle within Islam (Sageman, 2004). Therefore as corruption grew within the governments of the Muslim world those within the Salafi movement believed the only solution to the corrupted Muslim states was the imposition of *Sharia Law* (Sageman, 2004). The Salafi movement saw the use of Sharia law as the only true law an individual was obligated to follow and obey. This belief in the supremacy of Sharia law took shape as a form of political activism, which according to Western standards violates a long standing principle of the separation of church and state (Sageman, 200).

With the infusion of Sharia law as well as other religious beliefs into a political context, Islamic clerics and leaders can ensure the presence of Islam in all aspects of an individual's life. With Islam's presence within a Muslim's daily life Islamic radical clerics and leaders make it difficult for other competing beliefs or ideologies to exist which would challenge Islam's hold on that society. Although, there are few states that are completely controlled and administered solely by Sharia law, the value placed on Islam's beliefs and principles as a defining social phenomenon for a society is no less significant. With the importance of Islam's role within a society as more than just a religion, radical clerics and leaders are able to demonstrate to potential recruits, through their own specific interpretation, how Islam continues to be an uncompromising and incorruptible part of their society. The ability to maintain this incorruptible image of Islam allows radical Islamic organizations to recruit new members who are either naïve to the greater society they live in or have become disheartened with the current government and society and seek some form of meaningful change. With this in mind the concept and value of *dawa* is not lost on terrorist organizations. They realize the need for getting their message (and subsequently their specific version of Islam) out to as many potential members as possible. The use of *dawa* in this manner by terrorist organizations is in keeping with the traditions envisioned by Muhammed Illyas who saw the spread of Islam to new places and individuals at the grassroots level (Sageman, 2004). This continued effort of bringing radical Islamic principles to new individuals and reinforcing those principles in those who have already accepted them serves to build strength and resiliency of the ideology of a terrorist organization.

The use of violence and fear allows a terrorist organization to rapidly gain the attention of the public and state governments to the objectives they are attempting to achieve. Acts of violence demonstrate to a targeted audience the dedication a terrorist organization has to its cause and ideology. No better example of this can be found than those acts of violence that involve suicide bombers. The death and destruction cause by the suicide bombing is not as important as the message it sends. The act of giving his or her life demonstrates to potential recruits the importance of the terrorist organization's cause. To the targeted audience, the suicide bomber shows the complexities that are involved in combating an individual devoted to a specific set of ideas. The act of giving one's life for a specific cause demonstrates the need for addressing the ideological commitment terrorists have for

their cause at the same time as addressing a physical threat. If the ideological threat is left unanswered new recruits will continue to take the place of those suicide bombers. The fear resulting from acts of violence like suicide bombings, though useful for inciting fear in a targeted audience, can also demonstrate to young terrorist recruits how to get instantaneous results for their cause.

Ideology provides the bonding material for a terrorist organization to ensure all members, regardless of demographic or location, are acting within the same set of principles to achieve the organization's desired endstate. Terrorist ideology looks to manipulate the importance Islam has not only within the Muslim world as a whole but specifically with the individual Muslim. Islam has a greater role in dictating how a Muslim should live his or her life than is commonly seen in Western states with other religions. Radical clerics and terrorist leaders use individual adherence to Islam as a means to push their message of hate without question by the individual. However, ideology alone cannot allow a terrorist organization to maintain itself against counterterrorist efforts or achieve its goals. Terrorist organizations need to have the ability to bring in new members on a continuous basis. One way for ensuring access to new members is a functioning social structure and network within targeted societies.

As Sageman (2004) suggests the current wave of extremist Islamic terrorist organizations are not a "specific organization, but a social movement consisting of a set of more or less formal organizations, linked in patterns of interaction" (p. 137). This description indicates that although terrorist organizations may appear to operate as autonomous entities they are in fact interconnected with numerous other types of organizations. Through the use of social networking terrorist organizations have attached themselves to both violent and non-violent organizations to acquire a variety of needed support and services. One of the prevailing images of terrorists when viewed from a social context is that they are either isolated individuals or small groups who have become radicalized in some fashion. This however, is not the case; terrorists are in fact linked not only to one another but to various individuals with a given society and at various levels either directly or indirectly (Sageman, 2004).

One of the key structural elements of terrorist organizations Sageman (2004) describes is the concept of *hubs*. These hubs serve as the brains, or nerve center, for terrorist activity. Although Sageman's (2004) description of terrorist hubs focuses on a global context depicting regional hubs this

same type of structure can be found at all levels of society where terrorist activity whether violent or non-violent takes place. As Sageman (2004) points out these regional hubs receive their guidance and direction along with funding from a *central staff* hub. The purpose of this central staff is to help direct and fund terrorist operations within the desired ideological direction of the overall movement. The influence of Sageman's (2004) description of terrorist networks involving the use of hubs can be seen today within the analysis provided by some U.S. intelligence organizations. A similar structure depicting terrorist structure and activity was devised by the United State Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG). Their analysis indicated a similar concept of a small core of terrorist leaders providing guidance and direction to smaller organizations. The AWG model also used the concept of a circular structure with a *central staff* type of element as the center of the model with successive rings of smaller groups insulating the central staff. These successive rings would also include groups that provided specific services such as logistics, intelligence, operations and recruitment.

This is a very practical structure in that each of the functions needed (funding, logistics, intelligence, operations, recruitment) can all be compartmentalized from one another. This compartmentalization allows strength to the overall organization and movement by minimizing potential damage to the network resulting from counterterrorist operations. However, some terrorist organizations have used a more traditional hierarchical structure for its command and control functions. Unfortunately, this form of structure has proved to be more vulnerable to state counterterrorist efforts (Sageman, 2004). One such organization is Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who's hierarchical structure was severely disrupted by the Indonesian security forces in the years following the October 2002 Bali nightclub bombing.

In order to maintain security and continue to gain access to resources terrorist organizations have to grow and adapt themselves to their environment as it changes (Sagmen, 2004). Not to change and adapt would result in the terrorist organization in becoming complicit in its activities and security measures. One element to maintaining a terrorist organization's resiliency is the adaptability of its members. The ability of a terrorist organization's members to integrate themselves into a society with no identifiable characteristics which could draw unwanted attention is imperative. This is a quality that would be of great im-

portance to those individuals who serve as recruiters, financiers or logisticians. These individuals need to maintain an appearance of full integration into a society to facilitate their efforts in gaining the trust of other individuals capable of providing some form of assistance. Once a terrorist member has gained the trust of a targeted group within a society they are then capable of sharing their specific radical beliefs, thus expanding the terrorist ideology to a greater audience. In this manner a single individual can serve as a hub for a terrorist organization, identifying new members and sources of support while expanding the reach and influence of the terrorist organization's ideology (Sageman, 2004).

Adaptability among the members of a terrorist organization allows that organization the ability to decentralize some of its leadership and operational control. The ability to operate in a decentralized manner allows a terrorist organization to withstand the loss of multiple hubs while not completely preventing the organization from continuing its operations (Sageman, 2004). This is in contrast to Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah which experienced a significant decline in its abilities to conduct operations in the short term following attacks specifically targeting the organization's hierarchy (Sageman, 2004). With the increase in the number of hubs a terrorist organization has in operation there is also an increase in the number of general purpose members (fighters) available as well. Counterterrorist efforts that would focus primarily on the threat posed by these general purpose members would not reduce the terrorist organization's overall capabilities. However, if these same counterterrorist efforts focus on identifying and targeting an organization's hubs and a sufficient number are destroyed a terrorist organization's capabilities could be severely restricted (Sageman, 2004). A robust social network affords a terrorist organization two key strengths 1) multiple lines of contact with individuals and groups which can provide a variety of support services, in return for which the terrorist organization shares their radical ideology and 2) a defense in depth concept as a protective measure against counterterrorist efforts. That is, the greater the number of subordinate hubs and general purpose members the more insulated the core organizational leadership and primary support structure becomes.

As important as ideology and social networking are, their benefits will only carry a terrorist organization to a certain extent. As with virtually any other organization or activity around the world, money, is the lifeblood of any organization or

movement. Without a reliable source of funding a terrorist organization loses its ability to be proactive in conducting operations as well as procure needed support services and material items. Since acquiring and maintaining sources of financing is vital to the existence of a terrorist organization, security for those sources of funding along with the methods of transferring and storing funds is equally vital. As a result, terrorist organizations have proved to be exceptionally agile in identifying and implementing numerous methods of funding and transferring money in order to prevent effective countermeasures by state governments (Williams, 2005).

The process of globalization has created unprecedented levels of interconnectivity among not only state governments but also among domestic and international financial institutions. As such, vast sums of money can be transferred from one part of the world to another nearly instantaneously. The sheer pace and vastness of the globalization process with developments in information and telecommunications technology has created a nearly impossible task to monitor effectively daily financial transactions to ensure there is no link to terrorist activity. Previous attempts to counter terrorist financing, such as in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, has been to freeze known or suspected terrorist financial assets. Yet this countermeasure has only yielded limited success. As Williams (2005) notes, current attempts to identify and attack terrorist financing has only served to increase the "capacity of terrorist organizations to adapt quickly to new regulations by adopting novel methods of circumventing rules and regulations" (pp. 6).

If Williams (2005) is correct in his analysis that current efforts to target terrorist funding are only resulting in making smarter and more efficient fiscally minded terrorist organizations than what is enabling this trend? One of the key issues is current international law is lacking in specificity and applicability to the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. One of the main deficiencies with international law is with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which had been created in 1989 by the G-7 states to counter money laundering activities conducted by international criminal and drug trafficking organizations (Williams, 2005). The FATF identified 40 recommendations to be implemented to counter money laundering activities.

However, no formal binding convention or treaty was created therefore consistent implementation of the FATF recommendations did not occur thus

leaving loop holes in international law for use by terrorist organizations to circumvent the FATF. Efforts like the FATF can only be successful if they receive the full support of the international community. Limited or no support provides opportunities for terrorist organizations to continue their financing operations relatively unmolested. The FATF was a lackluster effort to combat terrorist financing due to inefficiency in the manner in which it operated resulting in money laundering not being truly deterred but rather shifted to other areas around the globe where these activities could be conducted more freely (Williams, 2005). The FATF is only one example of inconsistencies in international economic law (as well as with state domestic law) which have inhibited effective terrorist financing countermeasures. The ineffectiveness of the FATF and other counter drug and organized crime measures which have been used to target terrorist financing has only served to actually create more experienced and smarter terrorist financing practices. Instead of preventing terrorist financing, efforts such as the FATF have only facilitated it to expand.

Current international law efforts to combat terrorist financing have primarily focused on terrorist funds once they have been obtained. So how does a terrorist organization receive its funds? Only a handful of terrorist organizations such as Hizbollah or Hamas and a variety of the Palestinian organizations have been able to receive direct funding from state sponsors. A more common system of terrorist funding is through the patronage of another terrorist organization like al Qaeda, direct funding through donations from sympathetic individuals or groups as well as the use of charitable organizations. The use of patronage is a common practice used by al Qaeda who provides support to religious centers and schools which promote their specific extremist Islamic ideology. In this way al Qaeda, through its financial support to these schools, is ensuring a continuous process of recruitment and indoctrination of new members while continuing to the spread of their violent message. One could say al Qaeda's support of these schools is a form of investment in their own future.

Just as with any typical business or company within the international community there is an individual or group that is responsible for securing sources of funding. Terrorist organizations have this same requirement for an individual to serve as a financial facilitator. For many organizations, such as al Qaeda, a financial facilitator is responsible for identifying those individuals or organizations that would be sympathetic to their group and

secure donations from them. So significant is the role of the facilitator that there are at any one moment numerous facilitators engaging different geographical regions simultaneously. The 9/11 commission concluded the use of facilitators has become so widespread that the funds for the attacks in New York City and Washington were generated by a core group of facilitators operating throughout the Persian Gulf region (Comras, 2005). The 9/11 Commission also indicated financial facilitators were the primary individuals within the al Qaeda network responsible for securing funding as well as moving those funds to various locations and cells and storing additional funds (Comras, 2005). Since the release of the 9/11 Commission's report numerous al Qaeda facilitators have been targeted but al Qaeda has been able to replace the loss of facilitators at an almost one to one ratio (Comras, 2005). Clearly, al Qaeda and arguably other terrorist organizations realize the importance of these facilitators. Having a dedicated individual(s) responsible for funding ensures security as well as continuity through maintaining institutional knowledge of the process of financing the organization.

Perhaps one of the most widely used methods of rising, moving and storing funds by terrorist organizations is through the use of charities. The concept of charity is an integral part of the Islamic faith and the responsibility of every Muslim to perform. According to Islamic law each Muslim is expected to donate a percentage of their own personal wealth (a process known as *zakat*) as well as provide assistance to charitable efforts through personal service of some kind (Comras, 2005). These donations are quite often collected by local religious centers or mosques and later distributed to other charitable organizations to support various social programs. However, terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, Hizbollah and Jemaah Islamiyah have gained access to these donations through their support of the religious centers and mosques where these donations are made. To complicate matters these donations, viewed as individual religious obligations, have little to no oversight by state governments, particularly within the Middle East (Comras, 2005). Therefore these donation sites provide in many ways a secure and continuous form of access to funds for terrorist organizations. Unfortunately, many of the individuals providing these donations do not know their funds will ultimately end up supporting terrorist violence.

Terrorist organizations like Hizbollah, Hamas, and Jemaah Islamiyah have used charities as a

means to improve and solidify their own public image with a local population. Through the use and support of charities terrorist organizations have been involved in providing essential social services and relief to targeted populations (Abuza, 2009). Through an active role in charities terrorist organizations have been able to bring themselves closer to the population while at the same time isolating a state government from that same population. In the case of Jemaah Islamiyah they worked hand in hand with the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia charity to provide relief to victims of the Tsunami disaster that hit Indonesia in December 2004 (Abuza, 2009). Although, support of charities does not in anyway reduce a terrorist organization's desire for the use of violence, it can have the affect of causing the populations they operate in to overlook that violence. A situation such as this only makes counterterrorist efforts for a state government that much more difficult. Thus the use and support of charities provides a nearly constant and almost secure method of raising, moving, and storing funds for terrorist organizations.

The threat of terrorism and those organizations dedicated to using violence to bring attention to their cause and to achieve a desired endstate is not likely to disappear anytime soon. Knowing this, state governments are wise to look at what are the key elements which allow these terrorist organizations to continue to exist. There are a few basic elements that all terrorist organizations need in order to exist. These elements allow terrorist organizations to build and maintain strength and longevity as well as foster a high level of resiliency to withstand set backs. Some of these elements are ideology which on one hand serves to ensure a common understanding of purpose of what the organization is trying to achieve and on the other hand, ideology can be used to maintain consistency of purpose and a unity of effort for a terrorist organization which is geographically dispersed.

Social networks are another key element. These networks allow terrorist organizations to expand their influence (ideology) to new and larger populations, thus exposing them to greater pools of po-

tential recruits as well as sympathetic supporters who may provide logistical, financial or intelligence support. These social networks provide depth to a terrorist organization creating a larger organization composed of numerous smaller semi-autonomous groups. This depth within the organization adds security to withstand counterterrorist efforts by a state government. Perhaps, the most important element though for terrorist organizations is financing. Even with a cohesive ideology which is maintained and expanded through robust social networks, if the organization does not have some form of funding little will be accomplished. The current state of international economic law is failing to meet the challenge of terrorist financing. A lack of coherent and robust international law has enabled terrorist organizations to use loop holes in the law to facilitate money laundering and transfers as well as use civilian charities, both legitimate and illegitimate, to collect, transfer and store money. This lack of focus on how terrorist organizations receive funding will continue to enable them to do so. Any counterterrorist effort looking to achieve success must first identify what the basic needs of any terrorist organization are, tailor those needs to specific organizations and regions and begin to target those areas. Failing to do this will only lead to continued limited success in combatting terrorism.

Major David N. Santos is an active duty Army Intelligence Officer currently attending the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College.

REFERENCES

- Abuza, Z. (2009). Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model. *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 16 Issue 1, p15-26.
- Comras, V. (2005). Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups. *Strategic Insights*, Vol IV, Issue 1.
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Williams, P. (2005). Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation. *Strategic Insights*, Vol IV, Issue 1.

United States-Haitian Relations from 1791 to 1810

How Slavery And Commerce Shaped American Foreign Policy

by Philip K. Abbott

Published online 31 May 2011

In 1789, on the eve of the French Revolution, Saint-Dominique (Haiti) was arguably the most valuable colony on earth. It was “an integral part of the economic life of the [agricultural] age, the greatest colony in the world, the pride of France, and the envy of every other imperialist nation.”¹ Producing more sugar than all the British Caribbean islands combined, Haiti supplied over forty percent of the world’s sugar.² For the United States, colonial Haiti was the second largest foreign trading partner, superseded only by Great Britain. As John Adams wrote in 1783, “[Haiti] is a part of the American system of commerce, they can neither do without us, nor we without them.”³ As a national commercial interest, trade with Haiti was especially important for New England merchants, where the French colony purchased sixty three percent of the dried fish and eighty percent of the pickled fish exported from the United States.⁴ It not only provided a dynamic outlet for American goods to keep the sugar plantations running, but many producers as well as shippers in America grew dependent on the island market.

However, in 1791, America’s founding fathers were faced with a strategic dilemma of a slave rebellion in nearby Haiti and the potential impact it posed on American commerce and the southern plantation system. We see President John Adams and President Thomas Jefferson struggle with how to address domestic pressures regarding the southern plantation system, how to protect America’s highly profitable trade with Haiti, and how to maintain its neutrality among the European powers.⁵ Having divergent views and radically different assumptions regarding the strategic environment, the formulation of national interests and the use of national power during both administrations

became a matter of bitter partisan controversy in shaping American-Haitian relations.

Notwithstanding the changing political environment from President Adam’s anti-slavery Federalist Party to President Jefferson’s pro-slavery Republican Party, “the most pressing problems were those of practical statecraft; of internal administration, and of foreign policy.”⁶ In this regard, I see a common trend in United States-Haitian relations from 1791 to 1810, where policymakers and their use of statecraft were heavily influenced by domestic factors, mainly the slave-based plantation system and the enduring vision of commerce as a defining instrument of American power.

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

As Dr. Terry Deibel outlined in his strategic framework model, the formulation of national strategy and foreign policy is a non-linear process and must carefully considered the implications of the strategic environment. This is true in the twenty-first century as it was in the eighteenth century. While it appears as though our founding fathers lived in a much simpler world, many of the same considerations regarding the strategic environment had tremendous impact on national decisions concerning American-Haitian relations in this period. In fact, the cornerstone of American foreign policy during the long and mostly troubled history with Haiti was shaped by the southern plantation system, the black slave revolt in Haiti, and the exhausting war between the European powers Britain, France, and Spain.⁷

Warring European states in a prolonged conflict over resources was the defining characteristic of the international landscape in the eighteenth century. Haiti and the other Caribbean islands became strategic liabilities as a result of the Anglo-French war; proving to be difficult to defend and increasingly more challenging to supply from distant Europe.⁸ In order to challenge England’s commercial

¹ C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint Overture and the San Domingo Revolution*, (London: Allison & Busby: 1980), vii.

² Patrick Bryan, *The Haitian Revolution and After*, (University of Minnesota Thesis: 1983), 6.

³ Gordon Brown, *Toussaint’s Clause: The Founding Fathers and the Haitian Revolution*, (University Press of Mississippi: 2005), 20.

⁴ James Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis, and Peter Onuf, edited by, *The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, and the New Republic*, (University of Virginia Press: 2002), 313.

⁵ Brown, *Toussaint’s Clause*, ix.

⁶ Samuel Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, (Cambridge University Press: 1963), 29.

⁷ Brown, *Toussaint’s Clause*, 7.

⁸ *ibid*, 191.

hegemony, Napoleon intended to expand French dominance in the hemisphere by reacquiring from Spain the vast Louisiana territory as the strategic answer to France's foreign policy objective—providing France with a regional logistical and operational base from which to finance Napoleon's military ventures and leverage against America's lucrative export industry in the region.

Remarkably, in the face of overwhelming international threats, the guiding principles of the young American republic remained “the pursuit of free trade with all other nations, abjure all political connection with foreign powers, and avoid entangling alliances.”⁹ And yet the American continent was surrounded by the three main European powers, constantly challenging America's capacity to match national objectives and resources in the pursuit of national interests.

On September 3, 1783, Great Britain finally recognized American independence by agreeing to terms of a long-awaited peace treaty. Though independence appeared to give the Americans access to wider markets and freedom from trade restrictions, its merchant vessels lost the benefit of British naval protection.¹⁰ Insisting on free-trade and open world markets, the United States was now perceived by the European powers as a legitimate economic threat to their mercantilist system, which put American commercial vessels in peril.

A commercial treaty was not in Great Britain's best interest nor did negotiating through British good offices prove to be a successful means in securing protection for American merchants. Understandably, for the European maritime powers, “the surest path to riches was for a nation to establish a closed trading system in which colonies shipped valuable commodities only to the mother country and brought manufactured goods exclusively from the mother country.”¹¹ By refusing to recognize America's neutrality both the French and the British routinely captured American ships, confiscated their cargo, and impressed their crews.¹² There was seemingly little hope of using only diplomatic persuasion to play off one superpower against the other. To make matters worse, the embarrassing demands imposed on America by the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean, only confirmed how most Europeans viewed American diplomacy, as naïve

and incompetent.¹³ Unable to balance available means to national objectives, America's instruments of national power during this period lacked the necessary cohesion and credibility to protect its commercial interests.

Perceived as a weak state that had neither the will, nor the power, nor the treasury to protect its merchant ships, America was in need of a credible deterrent. However, it was not until the ratification of the constitution in 1789 that would strengthen the central government enough to develop a coherent foreign trade policy and the necessary means to protect national interests.¹⁴ Despite threats to America's interests, as demonstrated by the European maritime powers, a navy was determined too costly given the uncertain state of fiscal concerns. This is particularly important because American diplomacy lacked credibility and without coercive instruments of national power, America would be unable to sustain the profitable trade it enjoyed with Haiti. “By the eve of the maritime “Quasi-War” with France in 1798, more than six hundred American vessels ran direct routes to Haiti, all of them dangerously vulnerable to French attack.”¹⁵

President Adams had good reason to be interested in American-Haitian relations, not least of which was foreign trade and the protection of New England shipping. On the other hand, however, southern slave owners had no direct commercial interest in Haiti, viewing the slave revolt more as a direct threat to the country's southern plantation system.¹⁶ As early as October 1791, there were enough Haitian refugees in the United States to create the impression of a national crisis, “the sack of Cap Francais in June 1793 sent some ten thousand more refugees to the United States.”¹⁷ In addition to the perceived danger posed by the slave revolt in nearby Haiti on the American southern plantation system, Napoleon's grand strategy to reestablish France's control over the vast Louisiana landmass constituted an existential threat to the territorial integrity of the United States and its economic interests.

Slow in developing more coercive instruments of national power, American statecraft would continue to rely on persuasion and commercial diplomacy as the principle ways and means to implement American foreign policy.

⁹ Robert Smith, *Keeping the Republic: Ideology and Early American Diplomacy*, (Northern Illinois University Press: 2004), ix.

¹⁰ Frank Lambert, *The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic*, (New York: 2005), 4.

¹¹ *ibid*, 6.

¹² *ibid*, 12.

¹³ *ibid*, 100.

¹⁴ *ibid*, 13.

¹⁵ Horn, Lewis, and Onuf, *The Revolution of 1800*, 313.

¹⁶ Ludwell Montague, *Haiti and the United States 1714-1938*, (Duke University Press: 1940), 33.

¹⁷ *ibid*, 34.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Haiti provided tremendous economic opportunities for the newly formed American republic. Its unique trading relationship with France's wealthiest slave colony secured employment for a great number of American seamen, port workers, and shipbuilders, while the flow of goods through American ports generated significant customs revenues for the newly formed government. Additionally, open trade with the West Indies islands was vital to the American economy in still another way—its favorable trade balance helped to pay for imports from Europe and to ease the country's foreign debt. While America's national objective of preserving a profitable trading system with Haiti was paramount, equally important, however, was the protection of a well-grounded southern plantation system from the perceived threat caused by the slave revolt in Haiti. Lastly, keeping France and the other European powers out of New Orleans was also viewed as a vital national security interest. Unfortunately, America's elements of national power and its will to build up the means to protect national interests during this period remained unconvincing.

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN STATECRAFT

During John Adams' single-term in office there was a measurable change in the strategic environment and the exercise of statecraft from that of President Washington. Recognizing the dynamic strategic context and the importance of American-Haitian trade relations, President Adams realized the urgency to place America in a more suitable defensive posture to better protect its merchant vessels from French and British depredations.¹⁸ While a military response appeared out of the question, political and economic diplomacy alone proved to be insufficient.¹⁹ In view of the maritime "Quasi War" with France from 1798 to 1800, where the French navy continued to plunder American trade, on April 27, Congress finally demonstrated the national will and passed an appropriation bill authorizing the purchase or construction of warships, and on April 30, 1798, the Department of Navy was created to manage naval affairs.²⁰

Now armed with more persuasive deterrence capability, Adams suspended trade relations with France, but wisely maintained diplomatic relations through special envoys. In the winter of 1798, the creation of American naval might paid off when a fleet of fourteen warships supplemented by about two hundred armed merchant vessels captured more than eighty French ships and drove France's warships from American waters.²¹ In support of other instruments of diplomacy, the young navy was now perceived as a credible and feasible instrument of national power.

Unlike Washington and Jefferson, President Adams welcomed cordial relations with Haiti and went so far as to lift the trade embargo imposed by President Washington. Driven by economic necessity, geopolitical realities, and a sense of racial injustice, President Adams successfully forged a more practical approach to United States-Haitian relations.²² He argued that protecting America's commercial interests in Haiti would require the perception that America was willing to use force to favorably shape international relations. Recognizing the shared interests and seizing on a strategic opportunity, the Haitian rebel leader, General Toussaint L'Ouverture offered to deny France the use of Haitian ports, in which to conduct regional maneuvers, if America promised to supply him with weapons and much needed logistics.

As a Federalist and an antislavery advocate from New England, Adams sympathized with the slave colony's aspirations for freedom. Thus, through political means, Adams extended an invitation for a diplomatic representative of General L'Ouverture to dine with him, marking the first time a man of African descent was the dinner guest of an American President.²³ Adams followed up this meeting by sending Edward Stevens to Haiti as a diplomatically accredited Minister with the instructions to "secure the total suppression of French privateering, the exclusion of French armed vessels from Haitian ports, the free use of Haitian ports by American warships, and the protection of American property from seizure as spoils of war."²⁴ To provide further assurances to protect America's commercial interests, Adams ordered Commodore Barry to deploy the greatest part of his fleet to Haiti.²⁵

On May 22, 1799, General L'Ouverture renewed a trade agreement with the United States and ob-

¹⁸ Lambert, *The Barbary Wars*, 98.

¹⁹ Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 92.

²⁰ Lambert, *The Barbary Wars*, 97.

²¹ *ibid.*, 124-125.

²² Horn, Lewis, and Onuf, *The Revolution of 1800*, 324.

²³ David McCullough, *John Adams*, 519.

²⁴ Montague, *Haiti and the United States*, 37.

²⁵ *ibid.*

served a secret treaty to block French ships from Haitian ports. Yet, considering Franco-American tensions, Adams would only give General L'Ouverture verbal assurances that trade between the United States and Haiti would be reopened, refusing to put this agreement in writing. Having a keen appreciation of domestic politics and of southern sensitivities toward a black slave revolt in nearby Haiti, Adams believed that American commerce would be best secured through perceived peace with France than through any official recognition of Haiti's independence. Moreover, although President Adams and Great Britain were occasionally acting in concert against France, Adams remained firmly grounded in the nation's guiding principles by avoiding war with France and not falling into an open alliance with England.²⁶

Adams, unlike Jefferson, had long assumed and expressed concern about French designs on New Orleans. He feared that if Napoleon succeeded in quashing the slave rebellion in Haiti and succeeded in gaining control of Louisiana territories, America would become another French satellite.²⁷ As a maritime nation, America depended on the waterways for its heavy and bulky agricultural and fisheries products to reach Haiti and other international markets. The vast Louisiana territory, not only controlled the Mississippi River valley, the highway for America's commerce, but was also envisaged as the future heartland for the American plantation system. One of the political and economic constraints imposed on the United States by England, Spain, and France was the trade barrier against American's desire to ship goods through New Orleans.²⁸

Conversely, during President Jefferson's two terms in office from 1801 to 1809, his political closeness toward France appeared to be based as much on the fear of the slave rebellion in Haiti and its potential influence on the southern plantation system as it was on a desire to acquire the Louisiana territories in support of his vision for western expansion. As a wealthy southern slave holder with an open affection for the French and vehemently anti-Great Britain, Thomas Jefferson's Republican Party viewed Haiti as an existential threat to America's southern plantation system and subsequently reversed Adams' foreign policy objectives with Haiti.

By way of diplomatic negotiations through good offices, and perhaps some "good fortune" made

possible by warring European powers and Haitian intransigence, Jefferson was able to appease both the French and Spanish nationals along the strategically important Mississippi River and keep Napoleon out of the Louisiana territory.²⁹ Additionally, where Adams sent a Minister to Haiti under full diplomatic commission, in effect recognizing General L'Ouverture's government, Jefferson appeared more diplomatically careful not to upset improving American-French relations; choosing to send a Consul to Haiti without as much as a perfunctory letter from the President of the United States.³⁰ This confirmed General L'Ouverture's suspicions of a changing American mindset that had no intention of recognizing Haiti's sovereignty.

Inasmuch as Adams had concluded that a week, independent Haiti under indigenous black leaders was preferable to a colony dominated by the French,³¹ Jefferson's assumptions regarding the strategic context did not come to the same conclusion regarding Haiti and the Louisiana territories. This is further illustrated in Jefferson's correspondence with the French *Charge d'Affairs* to Washington, Louis Andre Pichon, who claimed that Jefferson assured him "nothing would be simpler than to furnish your army and your fleet with everything and to starve out [Haiti]."³²

While President Jefferson initially endorsed variations of Adams' *realpolitik*-form of statecraft with Haiti, over time Jefferson's assumptions regarding the strategic context greatly differed from that of President Adams. Having witnessed Adams' political demise as perhaps a result of his perceived close relations with Haiti, Jefferson proceeded with more caution. As a slaveholder who was politically associated with a pro-slavery Republican party, Jefferson assumed that a successful slave rebellion in Haiti would not only pose a significant threat to America's national security, but would create a political and commercial vacuum easily exploitable by Great Britain. Moreover, Jefferson's policy towards Haiti had to account for the fears of the southern plantation owners in addition to their expansionist fervor for more land and slaves as a result of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.³³ The fact that "at the end of the eighteenth century there were more than seven hundred thousand slaves in the United

²⁶ *ibid.*, 39.

²⁷ Thomas Fleming, *The Louisiana Purchase*, (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey: 2003), 8.

²⁸ Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 17.

²⁹ Horn, Lewis, and Onuf, *The Revolution of 1800*, 324.

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ Tim Matthewson, *Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti*, (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 140, No. 1, March 1996), 25.

³² Horn, Lewis, and Onuf, *The Revolution of 1800*, 324.

³³ Matthewson, *Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti*, 25.

States,”³⁴ gave reason to believe that commerce and slavery would continue to shape United States-Haitian relations.

Although Haiti attempted to maintain the same close economic ties with Jefferson’s administration as it enjoyed with President Adams, there was a clear shift in U.S. foreign policy with Haiti as seen in a number of successive trade embargos from 1806 to 1810. The decision to impose an economic embargo on Haiti, despite favorable trade relations, can be interpreted as “domestic symbolism” to appease southern slave owners. Nevertheless, the policy change not only caused long-term, widespread economic disaster for Haiti, but succeeded in polarizing the United States over slavery. As New England merchants and exporters tried desperately to find ways around the embargo, the government found itself obliged to enforce an increasingly divisive and controversial political decision.³⁵ The trade embargo imposed on Haiti was finally lifted in 1809, but already weakened after twelve years of civil war; the economic damage on Haiti would prove irreversible.

When America’s foreign shipping to Haiti finally resumed in 1810, commercial interests had already shifted to more promising markets. With trade so diminished, there was no longer a powerful voice for Haiti in American politics.³⁶ As a nation polarized over slavery, apathy and hostility soon became the hallmarks of America’s domestic attitude towards Haiti, and would ultimately shape United States-Haitian relations for the next fifty years after the embargo was repealed. Perpetuating a policy of non-recognition, it would not be until after the southern states seceded from the Union in 1862, that the United States government would finally recognize Haiti’s independence.³⁷

CONCLUSION

For a brief period, America’s national interests coincided with Haiti’s, and domestic proponents of strong relations had a meaningful voice in shaping America’s foreign policy. However, as history makes painfully clear, America had never embraced a black, revolutionary state in its neighborhood, and it was only commercial profiteering that made Haiti so economically appealing. Even those like President Adams, who openly sympathized with the slave revolt and ventured so far as to

amend Washington’s trade embargo with Haiti, used statecraft pragmatically.

While American policy toward the Haitian revolution was heavily influenced by the warring European powers, it was primarily a domestic clash between the shipping and merchant interests from the north, and the slaveholding interests from the south that ultimately determined American-Haitian relations between 1791 and 1810. In fact, the ambiguities of U.S. foreign policy toward the emerging state of Haiti was a reflection of how closely balanced those competing interests groups were during this period in American history. It was not only when the combined effects of Jefferson’s trade embargo and the collapse of the Haitian export economy that caused the northern maritime interests to disappear from the political debate.³⁸ The diminished commercial incentive for close relations with Haiti essentially created the political space for American political opponents of the black republic to eventually craft a seemingly anti-Haitian policy.³⁹ It would take six decades and a civil war in the United States to finally break the stranglehold that anti-Haitian southerners had on U.S. foreign policy.

By accepting the merits of *Sun Tzu’s* argument that the acme of skill to subdue the enemy without fighting is the ultimate instrument of statecraft,⁴⁰ we must also accept the notion that the lack of strategic vision or a grand strategy can lead to the excessive and damaging use of one’s resources. Although Haiti survived the seemingly punitive economic embargo imposed on them by America during this period, the resulting long-term damages to its social structures, to its economic base, and to its prospects for peaceful coexistence with its neighbors, is a socioeconomic legacy Haiti has had to carry into the 21st century.

Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army, is currently the Chief, Americas Division on the Joint Staff, J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. He received a B.A. from Norwich University, an M.A. from Kansas University, and an M.S. from the National Defense University. He served in various Command & Staff positions in the United States and Europe and worked extensively throughout Latin America as a Foreign Area Officer.

³⁴ Ulrich Phillips, *American Negro Slavery*, (New York and London: 1918), 115-204.

³⁵ Brown, *Toussaint’s Clause*, 290.

³⁶ *ibid*, 291.

³⁷ Logan, *Diplomatic Relations*, 77.

³⁸ Brown, *Toussaint’s Clause*, 7.

³⁹ *ibid*, 295.

⁴⁰ Griffith, *Sun Tzu*, 77.

The Wrong War

An Interview with Bing West, A Sequel

by Octavian Manea

Published online 6 May 2011

*Bing West is the author of **The Wrong War, Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan**, New York: Random House, 2011, 307 pg, \$27.95*

What is wrong with the war strategy employed by ISAF forces?

The strategy's goal is "to serve and secure the people" (namely, the 11 million Pashtuns living in 7,000 villages.) This goal is too idealistic and too ambitious. We have 1,000 outposts; so what is happening in the other 6,000 villages? We do not patrol at night. We do not arrest. We do not speak Pashto or understand their Islamic tribal culture. How can we serve them? We can secure some of them as long as we are physically near at hand. But the people are the prize for winning the war, not the means of winning it. They are waiting to see whether the Taliban or the Afghan army wins. We are treading water with this strategy.

We are two months away from July 2011. Has the surge been capable in stopping the Taliban's momentum?

Yes. President Obama and General Petraeus will declare progress this summer and agree on some withdrawals.

To some extent Garmsir, but mainly Nawa are usually pointed out as the success stories or the role models in executing COIN in Afghanistan. What has worked in Nawa that can be highlighted as best practices in executing COIN?

Nawa and Garmsir are successes because Lt. Colonels McCollough (1/5 in Nawa) and Watson (3/1 in Garmsir) decentralized operations, dispersing their forces into 25 to 60 small outposts and patrolling constantly. The Taliban roots were deep in Garmsir, while they were shallow in Nawa, where McCollough became the governor, police chief, school principal, banker, etc. Success was due to the American effort, not the Afghan effort. We won't know if the success is permanent until we leave.

Should the local providing of governance be a concern for the US military?

This is the crux of the issue: must American commanders establish security, and then establish governance, plus give millions in aid, plus insist upon the rule of law? Our doctrine says yes. I believe this means that US forces must stay for another decade. Nation-building should not be a military mission. We don't know how to do it. Even if we did it would still take 50 years.

Why do you say "the theory of the social contract" professed by the US COIN Doctrine is flawed?

Our COIN contract stipulates that the US brings money and some security and in return the Pashtuns reject the Taliban. 21st Century Christian American soldiers cannot proffer the motivations to inspire 9th Century Islamic Pashtun tribes to rebel against the Taliban.

Starting from 2007, "You can't kill your way out to victory" became the hallmark of a military organization that until then was perceived as being too kinetic and enemy-centric. Has the US Military succeeded in overcoming this culture of being too enemy-centric and becoming more comfortable with the drinking-tea and doing windows side of the spectrum? Able to successfully manage both the governance building and war-fighting skills? Or is it in the danger of going too much into the other side?

The Pentagon has embraced Three Cups of Tea as, according to the Washington Post, "inspirational". Unfortunately, much of the story may also, according to CBS, be a hoax. I have been in many districts with our troops. I have only seen one instance where the villagers genuinely welcomed the Americans and invited us inside their compounds. Look, we invented a theory of COIN that suited our liberal, generous impulses. It did not relate to the realities of Afghanistan. It was put together by soldier-scholars with an eye toward Iraq, and then transported into Afghanistan.

General Nick Carter defined the metric to judge success in Helmand province as "the extent to which you can connect district governance to the population". With

this metric in mind, to what extent have you seen the farmers of Marjah as being willing to be connected with the district governance?

As long as American troops with plenty of money are in Marja, things will be OK. However, Karzai – and no American – appoints every provincial and district chief, and every police chief. His choices are as erratic as his personality: some choices are good and some are terrible. The future is not controlled by the American military.


To what extent is the Petraeus approach different from the McChrystal approach?

General McChrystal went too far with restrictive rules of engagement that caused the troops to

doubt his understanding of the grunt battlefield (as distinct from the Special Operations battlefield that had much better intelligence and precision targets). Gen Petraeus quietly brought more commonsense to the Rules of Engagement (though as a set they remain too directed from the top.) Ironically, it appears Gen Petraeus has brought the hammer, stressing more basic combat tactics than drinking tea. The only way out is to strengthen the Afghan army, not to win over the Pashtuns. The Pashtuns will take all the money we shove at them, and remain on the sideline.

Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.

BOOK REVIEW



Identity in Algerian Politics

The Legacy of Colonial Rule

Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Written by J.N.C. Hill

Published by Lynne Reinner Publishers, London, United Kingdom and Boulder, Colorado. 2009, 209 pages.

Published online 31 May 2011

With recent and rapid changes gripping the Middle East, it is vital to go beyond the headlines and read a few books to understand nuance and context. Jonathan N. C. Hill is a lecturer in the Defense Studies Department at King's College in London. His most recent book is an in-depth look into the complex political history of Algeria with a focus on the impact of colonialism on this nation that has seen more than its share of political violence. Algeria is home to al-Qaida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and therefore is of special interest in America's global counter-terrorism effort. The introduction offers an excellent essay on the betrayal of the French reason for colonizing Algeria in 1832, that the French has a civilizing mission. Yet no aspect of French liberty ever made to the Arab Algerian populace. What evolved, according to the book, are a series of laws and privileges that gave increasing civil liberties and outright power to the *pied-nior* (French settlers in Algeria). One ubiquitous law passed by the French, was the consideration of granting French citizenship to Muslim Algerians, only if they renounce their faith. The book does a marvelous job in laying out the imbalance of rights between the French settlers and the native Algerians. A zero-sum game developed in which any granting of rights to Algerians was perceived by French settlers of Algeria as an erosion of their privileges.

The book devotes an entire chapter to the evolution of the National Liberation Front (FLN), an organization created by nine men. Although the guerilla movement acquired independence from the French in 1962, the different founders of the FLN would digress into violent internal struggles, culminating with the take-over by Houari Boumediene. The book discusses how Islam, Arab

identity, and Socialism would be the slogans Boumediene used to establish an Algerian identity, which was severely marginalized by French authorities. He would rule from 1965 to 1978, and would oversee disastrous economic policies that would be compounded by his predecessors leading partly to the rise of the Islamist option starting in 1987. The book discusses the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), its leaders, and the differences within other Islamist groups. With the electoral dominance of the FIS in general elections, the Army would nullify the election in 1992 and declare a military junta. This led to the decade long civil war that claimed between 125,000 and 200,000 lives. A chapter takes us deep into the insurgency, and the increasing militancy of Islamist groups. The Islamic Army Group (GIA) would splinter into the Salafist Group for Propagation and Combat (GSPC), this would splinter into AQIM. This is a scholarly and deep dive into Algerian political history and personalities, it is highly recommended for counter-terrorism professionals, those interested in counter-insurgency, and North African affairs.

Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," published by Naval Institute Press (2010). He is Adjunct Chair of Islamic Studies at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Commander Aboul-Enein wishes to thank the National Defense University Library for providing the book and quiet place to read and write this review. In addition, the quality of this review was enhanced by the edits of YN1 Gavin Irby, USN currently serving with an aviation squadron at Oceana Naval Air Station in Virginia.

Index of All Articles Published in May

By Author (alphabetical by last name)

<u>Author - Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>link</u>
Abbott, Philip K. – Achieving a Peace Settlement between Abkhazia and Georgia: Lessons from Swiss Federalism	05/06	link
Abbott, Philip K. – The Use of Psychological Warfare and Direct Propaganda at the Turning Point of the Malayan Emergency, 1952-54	05/31	link
Anderson, David A. - Establishing a Banking System During Stability Operations – Roles for the Military? <i>The Kosovo and Afghanistan Experience</i>	05/22	link
Anderson, Gary – The Closers, Part IV: Civilians in the Build Phase	05/09	link
Brown, Heather M. – Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam	05/21	link
Bunker, Robert J. – Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and Holy Warriors in Mexico: <i>Societal Warfare South of the Border?</i>	05/22	link
Cassilly, Bob – Computer Aided Democracy (CAD)	05/09	link
Civins, Brian – FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique: A Civilian’s Comprehensive Critique of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual...In 5-6 Pages	05/05	link
Cole, Reyes Z. – Book Review: Past is Prologue: <i>The Ability to Modify Strategic Doctrine While Still at War</i>	05/19	link
Collins, Joseph – The April “Revolution” and the Soviet-Afghan War: Why neither is a Good Analog to Today’s War in Afghanistan	05/01	link
Corn, Tony – From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War	05/21	link
Dempsey, Scott – Is Spending the Strategy?	05/04	link
Doan, Phat – Us and Them: A Personal Essay	05/31	link
Fallon, Stephen J. – Mind Games from Above: The Use of Psychological Warfare and Direct Propaganda at the Turning Point of the Malayan Emergency, 1952-54	05/31	link
Hoffman, Frank – Book Review: <i>Adapting to the Utterly Unpredictable, the Entirely Unknown</i>	05/17	link
Houchin, Roy – Muffled Voices	05/22	link
Jan, Reza – After Bin Laden: Confronting the Haqqani Network in Kurram	05/12	link
Kalic, Sean N. – Deciphering Shades of Gray: Understanding Counterinsurgency	05/09	link
Kamena, Gene – Muffled Voices	05/22	link
Maas, Jan Willem – Establishing a Banking System During Stability Operations – Roles for the Military? <i>The Kosovo and Afghanistan Experience</i>	05/22	link
Manea, Octavian – <i>Small Wars Journal</i> Counterinsurgency Inquiry: Dr. John Nagl, COL Douglas Macgregor, Dr. Nadia Schadlow, COL Gian Gentile, COL Robert Cassidy, and Celeste Ward Gventer	05/10	link
Manea, Octavian – The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr.	05/24	link
Manea, Octavian – The Wrong War: Interview with Bing West: A Sequel	05/06	link
Maxwell, Dave – A Recommendation for Quite Professionals	05/13	link

<u>Author - Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>link</u>
Mikolashek, Jon – Deciphering Shades of Gray: Understanding Counterinsurgency	05/09	link
Miller, Daniel – Going Outside the Wire: Liaising with Special Operation Forces to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan	05/27	link
Munson, Peter J. – Iraq’s Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East	05/01	link
Olsen, Paul B. – U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project: <i>The Nature of War Theory</i>	05/11	link
Otero, Christopher – Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army	05/25	link
Overby, Paul – Are the Taliban and al Qaeda Allies?	05/11	link
Parker, Joe – The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s	05/16	link
Pedersen, Richard N. – Mission Command: Realizing Unified Action	05/15	link
Pierson, David S. – Bringing the Hurricane: The American Way of War	05/22	link
Reeves, Jeffrey – Arunachal Pradesh: A Crux of Sino-Indian Rivalry	05/27	link
Rotkoff, Steven – Introspection and Emotional Vulnerability as Leader Development and Team Building Tools	05/31	link
Santos, David N. – What Constitutes Terrorist Network Resiliency?	05/31	link
Sullivan, John P. – Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and Holy Warriors in Mexico: <i>Societal Warfare South of the Border?</i>	05/22	link
Udo-Jacob, Jacob Udo – Battling Radical Islamist Propaganda in Somalia: The Information Intervention Option	05/14	link
Williams, Thomas J. – U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project: <i>The Nature of War Theory</i>	05/11	link
Young, Mike – The End State	05/12	link
Zweibelson, Ben – To Design or Not to Design: In Conclusion	05/09	link

BY DATE

<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Author(s)</u>	<u>link</u>
05/01	Iraq’s Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East	Peter J. Munson	link
05/01	The April “Revolution” and the Soviet-Afghan War: Why neither is a Good Analog to Today’s War in Afghanistan	Joseph Collins	link
05/04	Is Spending the Strategy?	Scott Dempsey	link
05/05	FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique: A Civilian’s Comprehensive Critique of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual...In 5-6 Pages	Brian Civins	link
05/06	Achieving a Peace Settlement between Abkhazia and Georgia: Lessons from Swiss Federalism	Philip K. Abbott	link
05/06	The Wrong War: Interview with Bing West: A Sequel	Octavian Manea	link

<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Author(s)</u>	<u>link</u>
05/09	The Closers, Part IV: Civilians in the Build Phase	Colonel Gary Anderson	link
05/09	To Design or Not to Design: In Conclusion	Ben Zweibelson	link
05/09	Computer Aided Democracy (CAD)	Bob Cassilly	link
05/09	Deciphering Shades of Gray: Understanding Counterinsurgency	Jon Mikolashek Sean N. Kalic	link
05/10	<i>Small Wars Journal</i> Counterinsurgency Inquiry: Dr. John Nagl, COL Douglas Macgregor, Dr. Nadia Schadlow, COL Gian Gentile, COL Robert Cassidy, and Celeste Ward Gventer	Octavian Manea	link
05/11	Are the Taliban and al Qaeda Allies?	Paul Overby	link
05/11	U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project: <i>The Nature of War Theory</i>	LTC Paul B. Olsen, U.S. Army Dr. Thomas J. Williams	link
05/12	The End State	Mike Young	link
05/12	After Bin Laden: Confronting the Haqqani Network in Kurram	Reza Jan	link
05/13	A Recommendation for Quite Professionals	Dave Maxwell	link
05/14	Battling Radical Islamist Propaganda in Somalia: The Information Intervention Option	Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob	link
05/15	Mission Command: Realizing Unified Action	Richard N. Pedersen	link
05/16	The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT's	Joe Parker	link
05/17	Book Review: <i>Adapting to the Utterly Unpredictable, the Entirely Unknown</i>	Frank Hoffman	link
05/19	Book Review: Past is Prologue: <i>The Ability to Modify Strategic Doctrine While Still at War</i>	Reyes Z. Cole	link
05/21	Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam	Heather M. Brown	link
05/21	From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War	Tony Corn	link
05/22	Muffled Voices	Gene Kamena Roy Houchin	link
05/22	Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and Holy Warriors in Mexico: <i>Societal Warfare South of the Border?</i>	Dr. Robert J. Bunker John P. Sullivan	link
05/22	Bringing the Hurricane: The American Way of War	David S. Pierson	link
05/22	Establishing a Banking System During Stability Operations – Roles for the Military? <i>The Kosovo and Afghanistan Experience</i>	Lieutenant Colonel Jan Willem Maas Dr. David A. Anderson	link
05/24	The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr.	Octavian Manea	link
05/25	Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army	Christopher Otero	link
05/27	Arunachal Pradesh: A Crux of Sino-Indian Rivalry	Jeffrey Reeves	link
05/27	Mind Games from Above: The Use of Psychological Warfare and Direct Propaganda at the Turning Point of the Malayan Emergency, 1952-54	Stephen J. Fallon	link

<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Author(s)</u>	
05/27	Going Outside the Wire: Liaising with Special Operation Forces to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan	Daniel Miller	<u>link</u>
05/31	Us and Them: A Personal Essay	Phat Doan	<u>link</u>
05/31	Introspection and Emotional Vulnerability as Leader Development and Team Building Tools	Steven Rotkoff	<u>link</u>
05/31	What Constitutes Terrorist Network Resiliency?	David N. Santos	<u>link</u>
05/31	The Use of Psychological Warfare and Direct Propaganda at the Turning Point of the Malayan Emergency, 1952-54	Philip K. Abbott	<u>link</u>

