Editor's Comments

This has been a good month. We had a great conversation and book signing with Dr. David Kilcullen, author of Counterinsurgency, on October 14 in Fredericksburg, VA. We’ve published remedial issues of Small Wars Journal covering 2010 to date with article indices and select reprints of the good material we’ve been publishing in a steady flow of individual articles. We got good word on some future support that will partially sustain us for next year. And now we’re hitting our second month of publishing a monthly issue roughly on time.

This month’s issue presents material on two broad themes: 1. Defining the nature and environment of current warfare; 2. Negotiating the Peace. This issue collects three articles that were published during the month as individual articles, and adds three articles that make their debut in this issue. As we move forward, we plan to further flesh out the Journal with a mix of new articles, features, and archive reprints that illuminate issues relevant to the community.

Again, thanks for your participation with Small Wars Journal. Please move online to comment on the articles, or to strike up new topics on the discussion board. Authors and volunteers – thanks for making it all possible.

-- SWJ

Civil Society and Counterinsurgency

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Available online soon.

Since the end of the Cold War—and especially since 9/11—civil society has become an important potential strategic instrument for both foreign and national security policy. This is obvious from the logic of the new challenges that have appeared from the “weak states” that have become the new priorities for policy. Governments from Pakistan to Egypt are weak because they do not control—or command allegiance from—their largely independent, tribal societies, and they lack the capacity to provide effective leadership for change. The organizations that have an important role to play in influencing these societies are civil society organizations (CSOs), and they need to become active in order to promote significant change.

Despite the importance of CSOs and despite rhetoric to the contrary, both the military and non-military sides of the U.S. Government have made no effective effort to recruit CSOs as active partners in designing and implementing policy in areas where they could help. This failure occurs partly because CSOs are a new potential policy instrument, and the government lacks the knowledge and experiences to recruit them as partners. Policymakers do not know what they are capable of doing or how to cooperate with them. Even when they aim to implement a “CSO strategy”, as in Afghanistan, they often do not understand how to design a strategy for maximum impact, without in-

ternal inconsistencies, with different parts often canceling each other out. ²

The failure to implement an effective CSO strategy is also rooted in the fact that both the government’s foreign policy and national security institutions and policies were established to deal with governments or states, operating through formal mechanisms and addressing objective issues alone. They were not established to operate informally, in partnership with private organizations and non-state actors, often dealing with subjective issues of culture.

The same is true of private foreign policy and national security institutions that support governmental policymakers in a variety of ways. These include universities and private policy organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations and regional foreign policy organizations—and also their associated journals of foreign and national security policy. All of their research and relationships are with governments and states; they have nothing to do with civil society organizations that operate outside formal government systems. You can read years of articles in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, Orbis, and other journals and not find a single article about the crucial role that CSOs need to play in the new international environment. When they are discussed at all, it is often to complain about how they are taking power and authority away from governments.

In his fascinating and detailed chronicle of how the Obama Administration approached and engaged the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bob Woodward (in Obama’s Wars) writes absolutely nothing about how policymakers addressed CSOs as an important potential resource supporting foreign and national security policy. ³ The problem is not Woodward’s. He wrote nothing because there was nothing to write about—they completely ignored the issue, just as predecessor administrations did, and just as the organizations and journals continue to do.

Following both their training and their experiences, the foreign policy and national security communities know only about governments and how to interact with them. They know almost nothing about societies, culture, and especially civil society organizations, which have special knowledge of societies—and special capacities to interact with and influence them.

“To a man with a hammer, the whole world looks like a nail.” This old joke explains the problem: people approach the world in terms of what they know. Everyone says the geopolitical world has radically changed. There are many ways of describing how it has changed. One way is in terms of the shift from strong states to weak states. Perhaps the most revealing way for our purposes here is to say it has changed from a world best understood by the rational, objective analyses of law and economics to a world greatly influenced by subjective issues in anthropology.

Despite this enormous change in the world with which we must interact, the community of “experts” who analyze, research, and make and implement policy toward this new world, which is no longer a nail, is exactly the same as before. Despite some limited changes and protestations to the contrary, therefore, policy remains as before: focused on states. Although we know things are radically different, we keep doing what we have been doing—because “we” keep pretending the world is a nail.

Our failure to understand these societies renders us helpless to engage them. Trying to understand and engage the Arab and Muslim states from Pakistan to Egypt, for example, requires understanding their tribal cultures and sub-group loyalties, animated by preconscious, subjective relationships. These cultures are as antagonistic to law and economics as they are, at a personal level, to outsiders. Antagonism to outsiders is a major challenge for COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan because the U.S. and the central government in both countries are outsiders. It is also a challenge because the subgroup loyalties and the failure to communicate across those loyalties drive internal conflict and retard nation-building.

Recent Policy Misadventures

Recent efforts to engage this new world of weak states, relying on governments alone, and with no serious strategy for engaging societies, have been rife with misadventure and staggering costs. In Pakistan, for example, U.S. policymakers blamed President Musharraf, who took power illegally in 1999, for his failure to reform his government along lines of a Western democracy—by holding elections and respecting an independent judiciary. When Musharraf refused to hold elections and started interfering with the judicial system, Western observers concluded he was really a closet autocrat, with no real commitment to democracy.

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² For more on this subject, see my SWJ article, “Humanizing The Man: Strengthening Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan”, in SWJ, October 11, 2010.
The stage was set for a crudely controlled experiment. When Musharraf was gone, and a democratically-elected government had taken his place, we could see if the absence of formal institutions of democracy was really the problem. It was not, of course: Pakistan remained and remains a mess.

It should have been obvious then, as it is certainly obvious now, that the failure to reform formal democratic institutions was not and is not the real problem in Pakistan. The failure to reform was an effect of the fact that this tribal society, in which 60 percent of people marry their first cousins, lacks the national consensus and cohesion that support Western democracies and are essential to their effective functioning. Western governments pushing democratic reform on Pakistan without addressing the underlying issues of society and culture—especially the challenge of widespread, subgroup loyalties—doomed and doom the democratic project in Pakistan, just as failure to understand these issues and how to address them is undermining COIN in both Afghanistan and Iraq.4

Not only are we often giving them bad advice, Western officials and pundits then blame the leaders of these countries for their failure to accomplish in a matter of months changes the Western democracies took centuries to accomplish. How can one exaggerate the brutality of this treatment of people trying to do their best under impossible circumstances? It is all the more troubling when one considers that this kind of thing is built into our “highest idealism”. It would be no surprise to hear people in these countries say: “They [meaning us] not only give us bad advice. When we don’t follow it because we know it won’t work, they call us names. Why are they surprised that we hate them?” There is no reason at all to be surprised.

Pretending that weak states are strong and demanding they do things they cannot do is perhaps the single greatest failing in recent efforts to engage especially the Arab and Muslim world from Pakistan to Egypt, which has become the priority region of geopolitical concern.

The military failure precisely parallels the foreign policy failure, although the military has been forced to advance its thinking far ahead of the State Department. Following the army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the military has shifted its strategy to try to win support of the populace of countries threatened by insurgencies. But the military has only gone part way toward a policy that genuinely engages the societies of these weak states. While its primary concern is now about protecting people rather than killing insurgents, it follows the State Department in believing it is possible to build effective democratic governments in tribal societies by focusing on central governments alone—without engaging local communities, where tribal societies have their real existence and life.5


5 For a more complete statement of the need, see my SWJ article, “Humanizing ‘The Man’”, in SWJ, October 11, 2010.)
Mobilizing Civil Society for Empowerment

Although civil society issues—from broad issues of non-state sectors to specific CSO models—are strategically important, we do nothing to research them, refine models of action, and especially address key political challenges of working in other, very different cultures and political systems. Initiating a serious research initiative, supported, perhaps, by establishment of an institution like RAND for the purpose, should be a very high priority. The question remains, if we commit to do serious research in this area, who would do it? The answer certainly should not be the experts on “international relations and foreign policy”, who know only about states. A question in fact arises about why these “experts” would even support such research, which would challenge their worldview as the exclusive perspective for policy.

These remarks explain much of why our “civil society strategy” is failing in Afghanistan and is not beginning to accomplish what it needs to accomplish in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries. There are two essential problems with the current civil society strategy in Afghanistan. One is that it lacks clear guidelines and objectives—some programs promoting empowerment of people and others disempowering them—leaving no clear narrative guiding people’s perceptions of major issues there. The other problem is that the overall strategy is focused on reforming and marketing the central government, with insufficient attention being given to engagement with and empowerment of local communities—together with a strategy for connecting communities and the government.

The greatest impediment to implementing an effective civil society strategy supporting COIN is lack of clarity about objectives, as well as lack of clarity about how different models of civil society action will influence outcomes. A major problem arises when military (and sometimes CSO) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) move into communities without consulting anyone. Greg Mortenson’s book *Three Cups of Tea* should have made clear the importance of ceremony when engaging traditional communities, yet stories are widespread that PRTs often move into communities without understanding that how they engage communities will often be as important as what they do.

There is no space here to address these issues in depth. (For those interested, I explored them at greater length in a recent article in SWJ.) The central point is that CSOs need to focus on empowering people rather than “helping” them. The choice arises because help in some forms empowers people, but in other forms actually disempowers them. Understanding the difference is essential for designing and implementing an effective civil society strategy. At present, much of what we are doing in Afghanistan is disempowering people by helping them in the wrong way. In the process, we waste staggering amounts of money, while also actively undermining larger counterinsurgency objectives.

Some CSOs have proven records of accomplishment in addressing these issues of society, culture, and empowerment; and they have a crucial role to play in this new world of weak states and counterinsurgency warfare. To avoid future mega mistakes, beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, policymakers and their attendant, private communities need to understand the difference between helping and empowering—understanding how to help and empower. From such understanding we can start building the capacity to engage CSOs and develop new civil society instruments for supporting both foreign and national security policy.

Conclusion

Until 9/11, U.S. foreign policy focused on states that were strong in two senses: first, because they competed with the United States geopolitically; and second, because their governments controlled their countries. Until the past two decades, policy focused only on governments because they were the only significant players in international affairs.

After 9/11, things started to change in both ways. The countries that have become the new, priority concerns of foreign policy, such as the Arab and Muslim countries from Egypt to Pakistan, are not strong in the sense that they compete with the U.S. geopolitically, nor do they control their societies as even they did before. States that are now “weak” were strong fifty or even thirty years ago because they did control their societies. Egypt’s President Mubarak, flying in a private plane over Cairo’s City of the Dead, explained the difference to a friend as follows: pointing down at the forest of television antennae below, Mubarak said, “That explains why I cannot control this country as I did in the past.” Emerging indepen-

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6 Ibid.
7 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see David Ellis and James Sisco, “Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State”, SWJ, posted on October 13, 2010.
8 See A. Lawrence Chickering, op. cit.
9 See A. Lawrence Chickering, et. al., op. cit.
dent societies had become a force in their own right, and after 9/11 non-state actors became the principal threats to security.

These changes have created the need to develop new institutions and policies for non-state sectors and societies. This is especially true of civil society organizations, some of which have proven records of accomplishment. They can play a variety of important roles to engage these societies, empowering people by allowing them to share ownership—giving them a stake in the system. (When people have a stake, they have a reason to resist forces that are trying to bring the system down.) These roles include, as examples:

- Promoting property rights for the poor (CSO based in Lima, Peru, now operating in about a dozen countries in all global regions);
- Engaging groups in conflict with each other, empowering them to work together, increasing social trust, and reducing conflict (CSOs working in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and India);
- Engaging communities of people around government schools to become active stakeholders in the schools, and empowering the communities to reform the schools and do community projects (CSO based in California operating in India);
- Developing and promoting an agenda for economic and social policy reform (CSO based in Panama, with impacts in more than fifty countries);

The need to engage civil society in these and other ways is a very large, unsolved challenge in Afghanistan. The need is to identify models that are working and then invest at strategic scales in them. The challenge is evident in Afghanistan and in virtually all tribal societies threatened by insurgencies or potential insurgencies, which includes many countries in the world.

The question remains unanswered about how to encourage the community of people who dominate the public debate on foreign and national security policy and know only about states to open space for a new community of experts who understand societies and how to influence them. Opening up the debate to ideas that are really new, rather than the faux novelty in the state-centered strategies still coming out of the foreign policy community, will be crucial to solving many of the major challenges facing foreign and national security policy. How we succeed in opening up the debate may well determine how and even whether we can engage a new world we know very little about.

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy. He is founder and President of Educate Girls Globally (EGG), which has developed a powerful program for promoting girls’ education and empowering traditional communities by reforming government schools, partnering with the government of the very tribal state of Rajasthan in India. Before that, he founded the International Center for Economic Growth, which was headquartered in Panama and played a major role in promoting economic reform in the more than fifty countries over ten years.

**COIN, Complexity, and Full-Spectrum Warfare:**

Is it possible to have Center of Gravity given all the Fog and Friction?

by Grant M. Martin

The United States Army uses a concept called the Center of Gravity (CoG) to help determine where the focus of efforts should be during warfare. For instance, during recent U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) practical exercises, students many times identified an enemy’s most powerful corps or armored division as the Operational CoG that must be defeated in order for U.S. forces to be successful in a conventional fight. In counterinsurgency exercises the CoG was usually identified as “the will of the people”, in fact many instructors stifled debate by insinuating there was no alternative. Students took hours to debate CoGs and usually arrived at a consensual conclusion that was widely regarded as wrong by the students.10 This follows statements made by

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10 As evidenced in a 2008 CGSC exercise in which students conducted a CoG analysis to be presented by the group and then
senior-ranking field grade guest instructors such as, “CoG analysis has never helped me understand a problem” and “getting the CoG right isn’t important, doing the thinking is.”

The possibility that CoG analysis may offer no greater understanding of the true nature of a conflict should cause military professionals concern.

This paper will attempt to remedy the problem by tracing the history of how CoG went from a physics term borrowed by Carl von Clausewitz during the Enlightenment Period to a concept in U.S. Army doctrine. In the end, an argument will be made that new scientific concepts, such as complexity theory, offer better insights into unconventional warfare than does CoG analysis. Such methods could also facilitate a deeper understanding of the nature of warfare itself and be applicable at strategic levels of all forms of warfare.

Clausewitz to the Present

Carl von Clausewitz probably first arrived at the idea of a CoG while talking to a physicist friend of his. This was the Age of Enlightenment, and science was making huge leaps ahead in terms of how people understood the world around them. Clausewitz was not the only one influenced by science at the time: nineteenth-century economists started to describe their world in terms of Newtonian Physics as well. Upon hearing of this concept Clausewitz was reminded of a wrestler, who upon losing his literal CoG falls to the ground. A closer reading, however, of Clausewitz leads one to wonder whether or not he is being taken out of context today as the CoG concept is used to analyze an enemy’s theoretical focal point and develop a checklist of capabilities, weaknesses, and requirements that will facilitate surrender. Clausewitz, in his writings on the fog and friction of war and the complexity inherent in “the trinity”, seems to advocate the idea that warfare cannot be subdivided into pieces and parts, analyzed, and then reduced to a few bullets with which to place resources against. Indeed, one could argue that Clausewitz’s concept of a CoG might best be applied to the operational level of warfare and only to conventional warfare, especially in the context of unconventional operations that encompass much more than just military forces.

What is more intriguing from an American historical perspective is how Clausewitz’s ideas turned into the CoG analysis concepts that the U.S. Army uses today. Rudolph Janiczek has described the fascination with Clausewitz during the last decades of the Cold War; the thought process was that the U.S. should identify the one thing to focus resources upon in order to render the Soviet forces ineffective. Each service came up with their own ideas of what a CoG was and ended up tailoring it to their own capabilities, situation, and history. Joint publications attempted to draw a consensual position and thus, according to some, failed to come up with anything that made the concept more meaningful to military planners. Over time planners have come to use several concepts including CoG analysis as analytical tools at the strategic and operational levels. These include critical capabilities, requirements, vulnerabilities, and lines of operation and effort analysis. All of these contribute to a better understanding of the enemy and the effects required from friendly actions.

Enter Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom and the resultant ambiguous enemies, protracted warfare, instability and nation-building, and one may see where the CoG paradigm could come up short in preparing commands for the reality of what they will face. Modern disciplines such as complexity theory and systems thinking provide the holistic type answers needed in modern warfare rather than a narrow, reductionist statement or list from COG analysis.

were required to produce CoGs individually for the same scenario. None of the individual products matched the agreed-upon group CoG.

11 Discussions during exercises with observers revealed widely divergent views on how to incorporate CoG analysis into planning as an intellectual exercise or something that would drive the allocation of resources.


16 The further one gets away from conventional force operations, the more variables are in play, and thus the conceptual application of any one “center” of anything becomes problematic. As more and more centers are identified, at some point the CoG concept loses practical application.


19 From http://necsi.org/guide/concepts/reductionism.html: “...Reductionism is an approach to building descriptions of..."
Complexity Theory

Complexity theory has emerged relatively recently in response to a common observance: while linear, reductionist approaches work well in classrooms, the world outside of classrooms is full of complex phenomena that do not lend themselves to easily-measured, static, and pieces/parts study. To put it simply, a linear entity should, among other things, be the sum of its parts; a complex entity (non-linear), however, is best described as greater than the sum of its parts. Thus it would be easy to break a linear problem down into its parts, study it, and come to a conclusion. Non-linearities, however, lose most practical application if they are broken down into parts and studied outside of context. In addition, three other features of non-linearities are: 1- the impossibility of predicting future behavior of the system; 2- difficulty in locating and processing the data the system produces or that can describe the system and also difficulty in representing the system by a picture in order to better understand it; and 3- containing self-organizing properties such that knowledge of its components does not translate into an ability to predict future behavior of the system.

Some entities thought to be complex are evolution, the weather, the human body, economics, markets, and social networks. New studies have led to conclusions that can be drawn about complex systems in order for people to make more educated decisions than they have in the past, or at the least to understand the limitations that the linear, reductionist approaches of the past contain when applied to complex systems. Any entity or system that is composed of humans can be categorized as “complex”, and thus military operations (and subsequently the planning thereof) can be thought of as complex. The variables are enormous and arguably get more so the further they get away from conventional combat operations and into unconventional warfare. An understanding of how complex systems work could allow military commanders and planners to better approach the problems they face on the battlefield.

It is important to understand why complex systems cannot be analyzed effectively using metaphors, reductionist methods, or linear processes. The reason this is important is that there are still many disciplines that are arguably complex, such as economics, which still follow to some extent a linear-type approach. If one takes a complex system, breaks it into parts and tries to come to a better understanding of the system as a whole from that study, one frequently, runs the risk of arriving at conclusions wholly divorced from on-the-ground realities. If a student of military thought has ever wondered at the applicability of “lines of operation”, “lines of effort”, “center of gravity”, and other attempts to break complex subjects (like warfare) into parts in order to formulate a coherent plan to affect that subject, then that student would probably find common ground with the economics student studying the rational consumer behavior model which postulates that consumers buy things out of rational thought. Both of these concepts come from an application of Enlightenment science to disciplines far removed from the original-source discipline. It is time for other disciplines to catch up to the new kinds of physics that have been developed since the Enlightenment in order to understand the world as it is known in the twenty-first century.
“Complexity Economics” and “Complexity Warfare”

“Complexity Economics” was a term coined by the economist Brian Arthur and described in depth in Eric Beinhocker’s book, The Origin of Wealth. Beinhocker describes economics as a complex system, much the same as evolution, in the sense that economics is a process whereby designs are put through an evolutionary formula of “differentiate, select, and amplify” and this makes up the underpinnings of everything that we call economic activity. Beinhocker starts out by tracing the evolution of what he calls “traditional economics” from the same enlightened period that produced Clausewitz. Specifically, he tells the story of Léon Walras, an economist who saw similarities between equilibrium in economics and balancing forces in nature. He borrowed an equilibrium concept from an 1803 physics textbook that ended up providing the basis for many key concepts in economic theory and textbooks that are still in widespread use today.

Beinhocker goes on to list several other Enlightenment period economists who borrowed concepts from the physics of the period and showed how they influenced what is taught to economics students today. Beinhocker’s conclusion is damning of today’s study of economics: that “traditional economics” has changed very little for the last one-hundred years and has done very little to assist economists in a deeper understanding of the phenomena that make up the world of business, capital, and wealth creation. Since military theorists continue to invoke a similar authority from the same time period and an authority who also borrowed concepts from physics, military theory should be critically scrutinized similar to Beinhocker’s critique of economics. In his conclusion, Beinhocker recommends economists turn to evolutionary science to better understand economics and to throw out the old methods - the ways that are still taught to undergraduates and graduates today.

Central to Beinhocker’s theory are five characteristics of complex systems: dynamic, composed of agents (inductive, ignorant and fallible individuals making decisions and adapting to the perceived outcomes of those decisions), connected by networks (describing temporary interactions between the agents), having self-organization properties, and evolutionary (a process of “differentiating, selecting, and amplifying” which leads to further complexity). He contrasts these ideas with the unrealistic descriptions of economics that are still used in today’s textbooks and displays them in a table. A similar table to Beinhocker’s, but using “warfare” in place of “economics” and borrowing his use of the terms “complexity” and “traditional” is depicted below:

The table demonstrates that “traditional warfare” looks a lot like “conventional warfare”. In “traditional warfare” the enemy followed an order of battle, was monolithic, was controlled by a command structure, his actions were simplified to most likely and most dangerous, and second and third order effects (such as collateral destruction) were irrelevant. It should be readily apparent that these prescriptions could spell disaster in an unconventional environment and even in today’s contemporary environment of twenty-four-hour news coverage. The U.S. Army arguably gets many of these concepts in its embrace of “full-spectrum” operations. The reality of operations today is that non-military aspects of any action can mean much more than the traditional military aspects. In the spirit of the Army’s new doctrine, “Complexity warfare” could be taken as all forms of warfare along

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity “Warfare”</th>
<th>Traditional “Warfare”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Dynamic, nonlinear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy (and others on “the battlefield”)</td>
<td>Realize individual agents make decisions based on bias and incomplete information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkages</td>
<td>Interconnected and every interaction changes the network of relationships. Long-term and nuanced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro vs. Micro trends</td>
<td>Bottom-up interactions drive top-down picture (thus requiring small unit and decentralized vs. battalion and higher operations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Process</td>
<td>Differentiate, select, amplify (evolution), a much more complicated change mechanism that applies to ALL agents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regardless of whether or not conventional warfare is more complex than unconventional warfare (it is arguably semantics), the case can be made that a tremendous amount of variables affect both. It would thus be highly unlikely that one could, even after identifying most or even all of the variables that will be present, make any reasonably close predictions on how any plan will affect the enemy. The reasons for this might best be described by von Moltke, who stated, “No battle plan survives contact with the enemy;” one action upon the enemy will result in secondary effects on all of the other variables involved. The end result is that several days after the first action, the battlefield will often look vastly different than anything that could have been predicted.\textsuperscript{32} It follows that any portion of the battlefield whether broken up by time or battlefield function, will do very little in the way of helping one understand the full picture. The bottom line is a planner or commander will likely miss a nuance that could make all the difference.

As anyone who has spent one day inside the Joint Operations Center (JOC) of a major headquarters knows, the amount of data that is available to a commander is overwhelming. Situation reports are turned in by so many sub-units that even operational and tactical commanders are not able to process everything that is going on and routinely miss critical data. Because of the nature of a complex system, especially during an insurgency, centralized headquarters are systemically in a bad position in terms of being able to understand the battlefield in any timely and nuanced manner. Arguably the U.S. Army understands this phenomena since recent transformation initiatives have decentralized operations and pushed capabilities down to relatively lower levels.

Finally, warfare can turn all attendant variables and the landscape into something wholly unrecognizable and much more unpredictable than what was thought at the beginning of an operation. Surely few senior officers prior to 2003 thought that the U.S. Army would restructure itself and turn into a counterinsurgency-type force, sustaining BCTs on long deployments, stressing Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) as priority-fill slots for soldiers and officers, tapping into the Navy and Air Force to man Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and even some MTT positions, and arguing that the force needs to be prepared to do full spectrum operations, not just high intensity conflict (HIC) or Major Combat Operations (MCO). If the U.S. Army can change so radically, it follows that most other, if not all, entities (read: variables) involved in OEF/OIF have also changed, most in ways highly unimaginable.

Descriptions of today’s operating environment match the descriptions of a complex system and this raises numerous questions. If warfare is a complex system, then what does that mean? If military planners and commanders should not use reductionist and linear methods to understand and prepare for war, what should they use? And, a question that could be more contentious within the military, what is warfare, truly, if looked at through a holistic, systems-thinking prism?

\textbf{Implications of Complexity Theory to Military Operations}

The implications of these questions range from a different way in which to plan at the strategic and operational level to a vastly new way of conceptualizing warfare. One implication is that no matter how much informational-processing capability and battlefield situational awareness headquarters think they might have, it will never be enough to understand the complex, dynamic and evolving environment in which forces are operating. It would be like trying to manage all local and state governments, police forces, fire departments, education departments, judicial systems, etc. from Washington, D.C. There are reasons for efficiency and effectiveness to allow greater control and decision-making at the lowest levels possible. Commanders will need to gain an appreciation for how difficult any analysis of the battlefield and measurements of operational success will be in the contemporary environment. The reason for this is that the reality will have already changed by the time the commander puts out guidance; agents have adapted and can even use what the commander says publicly to force seeming contradictions. Even more important, and a lesson that the U.S. learned in Vietnam, is that metrics do very little in terms of measuring actual reality, it is probably more attune to the concept of “I’ll know it when I see it” - people will know when there is peace and stability and it probably will not be during a press conference wherein a commander is reporting statistics.

Taking Beinhocker’s advice for CEOs and translating it into military concepts, the first specific point would be that commanders cannot assume that certain strategies will be successful in the fu-

\textsuperscript{32} For an excellent example of this phenomenon see Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. Pantheon Books. New York. 2006.
ture and that strategic commitments will result in any sustainable stability. The takeaway from this is that much like markets, the linkages between networks of people drive innovation and change- not army units, although they can play a part in terms of their linkage. The trick is to bring that change inside the system of the Army, or, as Beinhocker describes it, “think of strategy as a portfolio of experiments”. To put it into military terms, the U.S. Army has to work better on becoming a learning organization, even to the detriment of “Traditional Warfare”. Many senior military leaders insist the Army is a learning organization while at the same time discounting contrarian views and turning defensive upon criticism. This is anathema to what a learning organization is. Instead of following the traditional way of leading a military unit with unquestioning discipline and an insular motivation based on loyalty to the unit, junior leaders have to be empowered to make decisions at the lowest level possible without repercussions, as long as their decisions are legal and do not lead to unacceptable levels of risk.

This could take the form of allowing infantry sergeants to approve of soldiers wearing local dress, growing beards, and living outside the firebase, for example. These kinds of decisions run counter to conventional, “Traditional Warfare” commanders who must foresee some kind of breaking-down of discipline, or, quite possibly a threat to their career and further promotion. Instead, results should be the overriding concept. Experiment and a certain level of failure should not just be tolerated, but should be encouraged and rewarded. At the higher level, this means that commanders and headquarters staff cannot allow themselves to think that “they have turned the corner” or that they have to keep fighting the course of action the commander first chooses. Planners and commanders must constantly assess whether their strategy is working, whether it must be modified at the ground level, and whether it needs to be changed based on success or failure at the lower levels. Commanders also have to fight the urge to require uniformity in results and approaches across the area of operations.

U.S. military commanders already provide their units with the keys to success through Battle Command. However, many units in Counterinsurgency environments have seen that more “give and take” is required throughout the entire command structure. As Beinhocker describes it, commanders should “create a context for strategy”, utilizing a “collective understanding of the current situation and shared aspirations” in the unit. Second, leaders must create a process that encourages and maintains experimentation. Third, units must have a system that rewards those experiments that produce results. This could be a system that rewards specific metrics on the ground, but should probably also incorporate a measurement that will be made in the future to reward long-term progress. Lastly, units have to establish a way to transfer the positive experiments to their subordinate units while simultaneously re-evaluating and ultimately ending any of the negative experiments without killing future experimentation.

Beinhocker does have a place for conventional strategic planning as it “prepares minds”. The headquarters staff that does the strategic planning spends an awful lot of time studying the variables involved in the fight- not to come up with a detailed plan that will predict the future, but to ensure that staffers are able to understand the situation quicker and adapt to changes more efficiently. As Beinhocker describes it, innovative thinkers are not those who have zero control and accept a lot of risk, but are instead more pragmatic; it is a mindset that is worried only about results and not about anything else.

One of the most surprising parts of Beinhocker’s book is when he concludes that CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model), a standard method for calculating the cost of capital, is based on faulty assumptions, one of those being the concept of equilibrium: previously discussed as having been borrowed from Newtonian physics. This theory, along with its accompanying formula, is used in finance to evaluate companies and help make buy and sell recommendations on shares of stock. Without getting into a deeper description of the

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33 Beinhocker, 334.
In terms of “Traditional Warfare”, some have argued that for every step the U.S. military takes towards conducting Unconventional Warfare there is a corresponding loss in conventional operations capability. I take the position that “Traditional Warfare” is a way of looking at warfare that does not apply anymore, if it ever did, and that any loss would simply be cultural vice actual capability.
35 Beinhocker, 333-348.
36 Ibid, 348.
concept, suffice it to say it would be like telling a military planner that the DIME model (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) of national power is based on faulty assumptions. If one of the main topics covered in Finance classes for MBA students is based on faulty assumptions, it naturally leads one to question whether there are similar faulty models within other disciplines, the military being one. If CoG and other processes are, as Beinhocker describes strategic planning, “a way to prepare minds”, then the analysis may have some usefulness. If, however, it leads planners and commanders down the wrong path to understanding the fundamental nature of the problems they face, then it could be worse than a waste of time: it could be counterproductive to stability efforts. Is it possible that a CoG of “the will of the people” means nothing, is fundamentally wrong, paints too monolithic a picture of what the U.S. military faces, and does not help planners focus on where resources should go in a counterinsurgency fight?

Beinhocker also calls into question the role of businesses and asks what the purpose of a business is, to make a profit or to continue its existence? These fundamental questions also apply to warfare. What is the purpose of war? To make a better peace? As Beinhocker alludes to in his book, the study of complex systems requires a holistic view and solutions that encompass all pieces/parts possible. Full-Spectrum Operations goes a long way to begin the process of thinking about the entire spectrum of conflict, but a deeper understanding of reality would be to start thinking of warfare as, as Clausewitz himself noted, an extension of other things - possibly politics, but maybe just human behavior. Warfare is not something that occurs in a vacuum and that is separate from everything else going on at the time or in the past or unaffected by changing events that will happen in the future. Warfare is really something that should be considered along with human interactions and behavior as something that exists to a certain extent at all times, even if it does not entail massive columns of troops shooting artillery barrages and moving in up-armored vehicles. Warfare is a complex system; it must be studied in the context of each of its individual instances, and must be looked at in a holistic way.

Conclusions

This paper attempts to question whether the CoG analysis offers a constructive tool for the military planner in the counterinsurgency fight. Warfare exists along a very wide and complex spectrum that includes many things that would not traditionally belong to the subject of conflict. To spend any time at the strategic level on what a CoG is in an unstable environment is something that seems to be an academic exercise in futility and confusion. Instead, it would be helpful for military planners to realize that lower-level units will have to experiment and constantly adapt in order to be successful against an enemy in the counterinsurgency fight. Higher level planners should facilitate lower level units’ experiments, reward those experiments that go well, and adapt lessons that can be transferred to other units.

At the operational level in a conventional fight CoG analysis could be useful, however in an unconventional environment it may not lend itself to a deeper understanding of the conflict. To this end, exercises in identifying CoGs at any level, although it may help to “prepare minds”, as Beinhocker postulates, probably should not be used as a formal analytical starting point from which resources are allocated towards endstates. Instead, planners should concentrate on five things: 1) recognizing the systems they are studying are dynamic, nonlinear systems and that for every action taken “against” (or within) the systems the systems will change (requiring constant reevaluation, adjustment, flexibility, and experimentation); 2) the systems are made up of individual people and groups, each using inductive reasoning, bias, and perceived self-interest to make daily decisions; 3) that these people and groups are connected by networks that describe their interactions and that these relationships change constantly; 4) that all of these seemingly random and chaotic activities on the parts of people and groups will lead to larger patterns that can be described as relative temporary “order” and can be measured to draw relatively short-lived conclusions (a static “snapshot” of the overall situation- more qualitative, than quantitative); and 5) that evolutionary forces (processes that differentiate, select, and amplify) will lead to further complexity and, counterintuitively, growth in order and that to fight these forces is an exercise in futility. To be productive, planners would identify how those forces affect the people, groups and networks within their unit’s area of operation and figure out how to act within those forces’ environmental reality in order to have the greatest, positive effect.

Rory Stewart, the British diplomat, author, and charity worker gives a good example during his presentations when he describes his work in Kabul as working with and through the people towards

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38 Ibid, 408-414.
making their lives better, but often in wholly different directions than he anticipated.  

At the strategic level it really becomes a matter of institutional reform, concentrating on becoming a “learning organization” in order to facilitate the lower units’ operations as well as creating a strategic understanding of the environment. Interestingly enough, Clausewitz probably would not have a problem with these conclusions. Much has been written lately of the compatibility of On War and recent complexity theories. In the end, Clausewitz’s concepts of fog and friction and “the trinity” reflect more complexity in the nature of warfare than does a concept as rigid as a CoG. For a theoretician who did not like checklists and did not think that warfare had any static principles, Clausewitz would probably be comfortable hearing of the breakthroughs in complexity and evolutionary theories that are now being applied to other complex subjects, such as economics and warfare.

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39 Rory Stewart has described in public statements how his charity had an objective of cleaning up streets and getting economic activity revived in an old sector of Kabul. In working towards those goals, his group has gotten involved in many more projects than just cleaning and economic revival, to include building a school and working with local “power-brokers”. In other words, his group did not approach the problems with a top-down, centralized planning style, but instead constantly learned about the dynamics of the situation and worked within the established system in order to make little changes and not wholesale change that was non-Afghan-oriented.


41 Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Howard and Paret translation. Princeton University Press. New York, 1976: 154-156. “...Earlier theorists aimed to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules, or even systems. ...interior lines.... ...All these attempts are objectionable... ...they aim at fixed values... „„In war everything is uncertain and variable, intertwined with psychological forces and effects, ... of a continuous interaction of opposites...”
Negotiating with the Taliban: Lessons from Vietnam

by Franz-Stefan Gady

Despite many critical voices of the overuse of the Vietnam War metaphor when talking about the war in Afghanistan there are many striking similarities between the last years of the Vietnam War and the Obama administrations attempt to extract US combat forces from Afghanistan. I therefore think it is important, given the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon in November and the looming withdrawal of NATO forces from the region, to examine the Nixon administration’s effort to win the Vietnam War on the negotiation table and to have in Nixon’s words “Peace with Honor”.

Just like President Obama in 2009, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon came into the White House in 1969 to end the War which at that point already was a “bone to the nations throat”, to quote a former White House speech writer. Talks with the North Vietnamese had already started under the Johnson administration in Paris but come to no satisfactory conclusion. The main objectives of the United States on the negotiation table were the territorial integrity and independence of South Vietnam, a withdrawal of all US combat troops from South East Asia and a withdrawal of Vietcong insurgents in South Vietnam.

Similar to today’s situation in Afghanistan the Nixon administration had to deal with a largely unpopular leader, Nguyen Van Thieu, who was reelected in 1969 after winning a fraudulent election and whose regime was infamous for its corruption. North Vietnam’s strategy in a nutshell, again similar to insurgents in Afghanistan, was to outlast the Americans, get rid of the Thieu regime and to take over the country once the United States withdrew.

Comparable to President Obama’s surge strategy, Nixon decided to increase military pressure on Vietnam. Henry Kissinger insisted that, “A fourth rate power like North Vietnam must have a breaking point.” Upon taking office in 1969 Nixon secretly conveyed to the North Vietnamese that he was seeking peace and willing to negotiate, but that the United States was willing to escalate the conflict should its demands not be met. Over a period of 15 months, the United States Air Force dropped more than 100,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. Nixon’s first attempt to gain concessions from the Vietnamese on the negotiating table failed. The major stumbling blocks, the integrity of South Vietnam and the preservation of the Thieu regime, were to stall negotiations for the next three years.

Despite what current proponents of escalating US engagement in Afghanistan claim, North Vietnam in 1969 shifted from an offensive to a defensive strategy. They did this by limiting offensive operations in the South and even withdrawing troops across the demilitarized zone, not due to military setbacks, but to wait Nixon out until public opinion at home forced the US to withdraw combat troops, something sources in Kabul claim is precisely the Taliban’s strategy.

Frustrated by North Vietnam’s unwillingness to make any substantial concessions at the secret negotiations in Paris, Nixon ordered the formation of a secret National Security Council Study Group to come up with “savage punishing blows” for the North Vietnamese. However, the conclusion of the Study Group, chaired by Henry Kissinger, showed that increased military pressure would not yield additional concessions from Hanoi.

The insurgents in Afghanistan, despite being battle weary, will certainly also not be willing to make any major concessions with US troop withdrawal a few months away. This is happening in spite of an increase in drone strikes and special forces operations activities throughout the country. The North Vietnamese, by cleverly manipulating US negotiators, essentially bought time by making vague proposals that amounted to little substance and complaining about procedural matters such as the size and set up of tables at the negotiations in Paris. Their real goal until 1972 was to buy time for North Vietnamese Forces to get resupplied and strengthened for the final military blow against the Thieu regime. The insurgents in Afghanistan, although in no way comparable in size, equipment and capabilities to the Vietcong and the regular North Vietnamese Army, will probably employ similar delaying tactics until the withdrawal of US led coalition forces. Any initial “willingness” by Taliban leaders to talk has to be seen in this critical light.
The famous Vietnamization policy was a direct consequence of the United States failed attempt to break the deadlock at the negotiating table with military force and domestic pressure to start withdrawing US combat troops. Without consulting his South Vietnamese ally Nixon unilaterally announced this policy frustrated by the lack of military progress and mounting US casualties. Within months the South Vietnamese Military became one of the largest and best equipped Armies in the World (by 1974 South Vietnam’s Air Force was the fourth largest in the world). At the same time the United States stepped up its Phoenix program headed by the CIA, and just like its modern successor, the Drone strike campaign, aimed at decapitating the leadership of the Vietcong and destroying Vietcong strongholds in the South. The United States claimed big successes and the elimination of over 20,000 Vietcong targets in South Vietnam. However, the Vietcong’s command structure and ability to conduct operations remained intact. So far the same is true for Taliban safe heavens in Pakistan which have been targets of drone strikes.

Indeed, there are also striking similarities between Obama’s decision to step up the drone strikes into Pakistan and Nixon’s controversial decision to invade and bomb Cambodia to buy time for Vietnamization, and destroy North Vietnamese safe havens. At the end despite having claimed to have killed 2000 insurgents and substantially disrupted North Vietnamese supply bases and “treasure troves” of intelligence (according to Henry Kissinger) it did not alter the outcome of the conflict, but led to the massive destabilization of Cambodia. Events in Pakistan today illustrate the danger of undermining a government’s authority on their own territory. The strategic military impact of recent drone strikes remains to be seen but so far have not influenced the Taliban’s offensive capabilities substantially.

In October of 1970 Nixon launched a “major new initiative for peace” which was promptly rejected by Hanoi. More US troops were withdrawn and the process of Vietnamization sped up. Nixon also expanded the war into Laos in 1971 to disrupt enemy supply line and to force a military decision. Talks failed over the same fundamental issue: the future of the South Vietnamese government under Thieu.

Later in 1971 Kissinger made yet another secret proposal to the North Vietnamese: Complete US withdrawal in exchange for US POWs held in Hanoi. Again North Vietnam rejected the offer. POWs were one of the few bargaining chips they had when negotiating with the United States and only would give it up last. North Vietnam again insisted on the removal of the Thieu regime which the US dismissed. North Vietnam proposed open elections in September 1971, on the condition that the United States withdraw support for Thieu. Kissinger and Nixon refused.

In March 1972 North Vietnam launched a large scale invasion of South Vietnam with conventional forces, having carefully prepared its offensive capabilities the previous two years and stalled negotiations in Paris. Despite some initial progress North Vietnam was beaten back by massive US air raids in the demilitarized zone on Hanoi and Haiphong. Kissinger for the first time made secret concessions to North Vietnam that it would allow North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam after a cease fire, undermining the sovereignty of South Vietnam, but still insisting on the future existence of the Thieu regime. North Vietnam rejected and Nixon even further escalated the air war, and mining Haiphong harbor. In June 1972 alone the US dropped 112,000 tons of bombs.

North Vietnam estimated that it would need three years to recover from the losses incurred during the Easter Offensive (which proved correct) and agreed to shift their war strategy to a “strategy of peace” to buy time and to guarantee the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam. A Tri-partite electoral commission comprising the Thieu regime, the Vietcong ( Provisionary Revolutionary Government), and neutralists such as the Buddhists was to come up with a political solution to the conflict after the US withdrawal. Nixon ordered additional bombing raids over North Vietnam over Christmas 1972 to force the Vietnamese to agree to a settlement and to save face vis-à-vis Thieu and the American people. Despite massive air raids it did not set back North Vietnam’s capacity to conduct war in the South. When the United States and North Vietnam finally came to an agreement in Paris in January and February 1973, Thieu who had the least interest in an agreement and withdrawal of US troops did not sign the treaty. The Paris agreement was a compromise agreement securing the return of the majority of US POWs, guaranteeing the US troop withdrawal from South Vietnam and leaving the Thieu regime in power. North Vietnam still had forces in the South and the large question of the political future of Vietnam was unresolved.

Describing the Nixon administration’s year long struggle to extract the United States from Vietnam holds some valuable lessons for the Obama Administration. First and foremost, it shows that there can be no solution to the conflict if the underlying
fundamentals causing the insurgency are not addressed. North Vietnam could not accept the Thieu regime. The Taliban will not accept the Karzai regime especially not with the looming withdrawal of NATO led forces. The only answer will be unconditional Afghan led talks between the warring factions should any agreement ever be reached.

Second, Military escalation of the conflict will not fundamentally influence the negotiation process; it will only prolong the fighting. Temporary military setbacks by either side may delay talks but the essential issues will remain unchanged: How can the United States extract itself with protecting its core security interests and how can Afghanistan be stabilized?

Third, one of the reasons why Thieu proved a very difficult partner in negotiations was because Nixon and Kissinger never consulted him on major changes in US foreign policy such as Vietnamization. President Karzai was also presented with a fait accompli with the July 2011 withdrawal deadline and voiced his deep concern that it will empower the Taliban in the long term. An increasingly insular perception of the White House is gaining a foothold in Kabul and among NATO allies.

Whether true or untrue when it comes to making peace allies and partners need to be informed of every aspects US strategy since any reconciliation of warring factions has to be based on consensus.

Fourth, the United States in any negotiation should stick to its core national security interests in Afghanistan. The United States made the critical mistake of equating the preservation of the Thieu regime with rolling back communism in South East Asia because it lacked a clear perception of its core national security interest in the region. Supporting Karzai may or may not guarantee the dismantling of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but the United States have to insist that a future government, which may include insurgent/Taliban representation, dissociate itself completely from Al Qaeda. Destroying Al Qaeda is the core national security interest of the United States in Afghanistan. Reconciliation on the other hand should be entirely left to the Afghans.

Last, and most important: Afghans on both sides, the government and the Taliban, know that Western Forces will eventually leave. This alone undermines any military credibility sought for the purpose of having a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the Taliban and guarantees that the United States and its allies may win every battle but at the end lose the war. Vietnamization had it limits as the United States painfully learned with the fall of Saigon in 1975 and the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army. The current capabilities of the Afghan National Army leave little doubt how the tide will turn once US forces have left Afghanistan.

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Afghanistan: It Never Hurts to Talk

by Gary Anderson

Published online Oct 18, 2010

Some pundits have questioned the wisdom of General David Petraeus’ decision that allows certain Taliban leaders safe passage to conduct preliminary peace negotiations with the Afghan government. He has been second guessed before and has generally proven the critics wrong; there are three good reasons to believe that his decision was the right one.

First, there is very little we could do to stop negotiations even if the leadership of the coalition forces in Afghanistan disagrees with the concept, which it apparently does not. The Afghan government is sovereign, and has come to the conclusion that negotiations are needed. Some critics contend that the Karzai government will not be negotiating with all of the Taliban. The answer to this is “so
what?” Fracturing the insurgency worked in Iraq, albeit in different circumstances. However, side changing is a time honored Afghan tradition.

Second, critics are wrong in saying that negotiations are premature, and that we should wait until we have a definitive battlefield success. If elements of the Taliban were confident that time is on their side, they would not be negotiating. Negotiations in that part of the world take time, and if we want to be in a position to meet President Obama’s decision to begin withdrawing by next summer, the process needs to start now. I don’t agree with the timeline, but General Petraeus and his command have no choice but to pursue the policies of the civilian leadership. If we expect to have any kind of plan in place by next summer that may involve a negotiated agreement, talks have to start now. We are probably already behind the power curve given the length of time such negotiations will likely take.

A third reason stems from a lesson from Vietnam. Although it never hurts to talk, negotiating from a position of strength is critical. We know that the North Vietnamese only started negotiating seriously when the 1972 bombing campaign began to seriously hurt their war fighting capability. This also held true during the surge in Iraq. The success of the surge and the Anbar Awakening accelerated the pace at which many insurgent leaders either switched sides or reached accommodations with the Iraqi government. If the Taliban leadership believed that they have the luxury of waiting us out, they would not be fighting as hard as they are at this time.

As with the surge in Iraq, the rise in casualties that has accompanied our recent offensive is a perverse indicator that this surge is having an impact. If NATO and Afghan forces succeed in their clear-hold-build strategy in critical Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Marjah, our first indication of success will likely be an eventual drop of in the friendly casualty rate in the spring. The onset of winter will make it harder for the Taliban to operate, so a winter drop-off can be expected and should not be used as a premature measure of success.

However, if the Taliban cannot launch a vigorous offensive when the campaign season in April comes around, it should be one indicator of effectiveness. Another indicator is a decline in the quality of Taliban operations, and that will be hard to quantify. In Iraq, we could generally recognize when the insurgent infrastructure had been degraded in any given locality by a general lowering of competence in the way they fought. IEDs be-
Planning a Military Campaign to Support Negotiations in Afghanistan

by Bernard I. Finel

The policy debate in Washington over Afghanistan periodically lurches from irrational exuberance over the prospects of defeating the insurgency to a sullen “throw the baby out with the bathwater” phase where everyone begins to talk about an “exit strategy” without much sense of what is left behind. In December 2009, the strategy was to defeat the insurgency, end corruption, and train up a viable Afghan national security apparatus. By later spring 2010, pessimism had set in and prominent analysts both inside and outside the government are now talking about much more modest goals focused on counter-terrorism and regional militias. With the firing of General Stanley McChrystal and his replacement with counterinsurgency guru General David Petraeus, enthusiasm is again on the upswing.

Unfortunately, neither the overly optimistic assessments nor the overly pessimist are likely to be borne out. As a practical matter the United States is unlikely to be able to fully defeat the insurgency – not necessarily because any shortfalls in military capacity, but rather because of the fundamental implausibility of the non-military elements of modern counterinsurgency doctrine. Economic development is hard enough to promote under ideal circumstances; it is virtually impossible under conditions of “opposed development” where an armed group is actively trying to prevent the initiative from being successful. Anti-corruption initiatives are rarely successful as well and anti-drug programs almost always fail. Clearing insurgent controlled areas is relatively easy. Holding those areas against insurgent activities is costly but not fundamentally impossible. Building responsive and resilient local governance is at this point purely in the realm of conjecture.

However, if the counterinsurgency model is flawed in its overly optimistic assessment of the non-military tools available, the alternative approach focusing on a rapid transition to a smaller footprint in Afghanistan is also flawed. A smaller footprint approach would have made sense back in 2009. While this may be the best long-term approach, for the next 12-24 months the United States is going to have nearly 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. The key is to use this deployment to the best effect.

The United States ought to use its temporary increase in combat power in a concerted effort to bludgeon, coerce, and cajole insurgent forces to the negotiating table. In the end, a small-footprint, counter-terrorism approach may be the most cost-effective hedge against disorder in Afghanistan. In the short-run, transitioning to that approach should not be main task of U.S. forces. Instead, the primary objective for the United States should be to promote the development of an inclusive political settlement – one that presumes a legitimate governance role for many current insurgent groups.

Peace talks in Afghanistan got off to a rocky start with a series of Taliban suicide attacks launched against President Karzai’s Peace Jirga. Nevertheless, the gathering of 1600 Afghan delegates to this conference was a significant development in the evolution of the conflict. While none of the major insurgent groups participated, the meeting clearly demonstrated that the preferred path for Karzai’s government is now one of reconcilia-


2 William Easterly, White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2007).


tion rather than military victory.5 Karzai’s formation of a 70-member “peace council” in September 2010 was another positive step6 as is the Taliban’s recent willingness to negotiate.7

Ultimately, stability can only come as a result of Afghan political choices, and the message from President Karzai government is clear: the time to begin negotiations to end the Afghan war is now. In part this is a function of skepticism on Karzai’s part about the ability of the NATO coalition to defeat the insurgency,8 but Karzai has been reaching out to the insurgents for several years now and clearly sees the possibility for some sort of compromise peace.9

The challenge for the United States, however, is that American interests and Afghan interests coincide only partially. Without any American input, a reconciliation process in Afghanistan could easily result in an agreement that maximizes the interests of various Afghan actors, while ignoring legitimate American security concerns. The essence of American strategy must now be to shape the negotiation process in such a way that it both increases the chances for a durable settlement, but also ensure that any such settlement take into account American security concerns.

Those American security concerns evolve primarily around the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups that once operated in Afghanistan and could conceivably return following a victory by radical Islamist forces.10 American interests require that such groups not be given a safe haven on Afghan soil, even if in practice such “safe havens” are less important to organizational capacity than most people realize. A secondary concern is the humanitarian plight of the Afghan people, in particular conditions for women and the possibility of reprisals against Afghans who have worked with the United States over the past decade.11 The United States must work to ensure minimal standards of human rights.

Leverage and the Timing of Negotiations

The introduction of significant new American forces has shifted the momentum on the battlefield. The expulsion of insurgent forces from Marja, though not institutionalized through the establishment of effective governance is nonetheless militarily significant.12 Similarly, the United States is now operating in force in Kandahar, a stronghold of the Taliban.13 For the next several months at least, the U.S-led coalition will maintain the initiatives and continue to expand its zone of control.

Some will argue that the United States ought to wait until its position is even stronger before talking.14 That is a mistake. Bargaining leverage right now is a function of the United States’ ability to introduce uncertainty into the minds of the insurgents. Because the insurgents don’t know how much worse their situation will get, they may be willing to settle for a compromise peace. If, on the other hand, the United States waits for a position of maximum strength, it is possible that the insurgents will see that situation as painful, but toler-

ble, and choose to wait out American willpower. Right now it is more risky for the insurgents to refuse to compromise. Once the escalation of forces has peaked, the balance of risk will shift and the United States and the Kabul government will need to make more concessions. Though it may seem paradoxical, the logic of the situation is to negotiate when our position is weak but strengthening rather than strong but stable or even weakening.

The challenge of tailoring military operations to support negotiations can be daunting. Indeed, any discussion of this issue requires listing things to avoid as much as options to pursue. Furthermore, the use of force in this context requires the ability to rapidly adjust and shift the focus of operations in response to developments at the negotiating table. Nonetheless, with sufficient planning, it is possible to wring maximum leverage from battlefield initiatives in order to create the best possible outcome. There are several key concepts to consider in crafting a “talk and fight” strategy.

**Pressuring the Insurgent Coalition**

First, military pressure can be used to create different incentives on the insurgents, potentially exacerbating tensions in the insurgent coalition. There are many challenges in negotiating with a coalition. Because there is no single overall leader, there is also no one who can make binding concessions for the rest of the coalition. As a result, it is likely that we need to conceive of the process not as a single negotiation, but as a linked series of multiple parallel discussions. The linkages between the processes are significant because the insurgents will get the best deal and terms the longer they are able to stand together. Removing any of the major parties – Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), or the Haqqani Network – from the fight will weaken the ability of the others to continue the struggle, both in terms of shifting perceptions inside Afghanistan and also in terms to providing much improved intelligence about the insurgency to NATO forces. And indeed, even within each group, differential pressure on factors and specific commanders could cause the organizations to splinter themselves. It is important not to overstate the potential of this approach. Even less than in a conventional conflict, a “bean counting” approach does not measure military capacity. Cleaving off insurgent groups will not necessarily provide a one-to-one correlation to weakening the military capacity of the insurgency on the whole, but by the same token we should not underestimate the political and intelligence benefits of inducing high-level defections.

As a consequence, it is possible to use military pressure to exacerbate the inherent tensions in the insurgent coalition. Each member of the insurgency will be suspicious that others are close to making a separate peace, so military pressure that makes one groups bear a disproportionate brunt of the fighting will create tensions and resentment. Combined with a bargaining posture that also seems to demonstrate favoritism, it may be possible to provoke or exacerbate rifts in the insurgency. The essence of this approach, however, requires a careful coordination of diplomatic initiatives with military operations.

An assessment of the various insurgent actors is key to this argument. Unfortunately, we do not really know a great deal about the strategic calculus of the various insurgent factions. There is significant debate about the level of coordination of the different actors. And there is even significant debate about their basic strategic goals. Indeed, one major rationale for negotiations is precisely to begin to fill in these informational lacunae.

Nevertheless, the insurgency in Afghanistan is composed not of upstarts with no track record, but rather by established power players, most of whom have been major actors in Afghan politics for a generation or more. Both the Haqqani Network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s HiG have roots in the anti-Soviet insurgency.

Hekmatyar’s situation is particularly intriguing. The notion that he is a committed ally to the Taliban seems fundamentally implausible. Indeed, it was Hekmatyar’s government that the Taliban overthrew in 1996 leading to his extended exile in Iran. Going back further, in March 1990, Hekmatyar actually made common cause with “hard-line communist defense minister, Shahnawaz Tanai” to try to overthrow former Soviet puppet Najibullah in a coup. Hekmatyar is a political opportunist. He may have strong Islamist beliefs, but has shown

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himself over the years more than willing to compromise his beliefs when doing so would benefit his political position. It is precisely for that reason that Hamid Karzai has repeatedly reached out to Hekmatyar to offer to bring him into the government. In this case, it seems reasonable to assume that Karzai has a better read on the man than we do.

The situation with the Haqqani network is more ambiguous, and is further complicated by the fact that leadership is currently divided between Maulavi Haqqani who has been a power player in Afghanistan since the 1980s and his son Sirajuddin who apparently manages military operations for the network. The Haqqanis have close ties with the Taliban and Pakistani intelligence, but their operations also have a heavy economic component with the Haqqanis extorting protection money, profiting from kidnappings, and generally exerting economic dominance over parts of Eastern Afghanistan. Precisely how the economic motives interact with the beliefs of the Haqqanis, which themselves may be divided between father and son, remains uncertain.

The challenge is that negotiation can only be successful if conducted by participants who are able to carry through on their commitments. While it may be tempting to break the insurgency into smaller and smaller groups, each with less capacity to resist, the reality is that even small splinter groups, remaining outside the process, can serve as a magnet for the most irreconcilable elements in Afghan society. A large and coherent insurgency compromised of many who might be willing to negotiate is more likely to lead to a durable settlement than one comprised of smaller, more radical fighters. In short, negotiations require a tight balancing act that puts sufficient pressure on insurgent leaders to bring them to the table without so severely weakening them that they can no longer implement any accords.

One significant way to balance these cross-cutting incentives is to eschew strikes on senior leadership targets. Ultimately, a settlement based on bringing major power brokers to the table is more likely to be successful than one that seeks to lure away a larger number of replaceable mid-level commanders. Furthermore, while we should resist calls for a general ceasefire, we also have to acknowledge that targeting senior leaders makes negotiations impossible, as seen with the fallout from the Pakistani capture of Mullah Baradar.

Second, military operations should be conceived to line up with negotiation phases. The culmination of negotiations will likely involve some sort of freezing of the then-current status quo. The key to a durable outcome is that the situation at that point be viable over the medium to long-term. For instance, a negotiated cessation of hostilities that leaves all the combatant parties intertwined militarily is likely to lead to tensions, challenges of authority, and a rapid unraveling. Patchwork quilt-style plans are always unstable, whereas the creation of viable and homogeneous entities promotes durable agreements. The Balkan wars and the failures of the Carrington-Cutileiro and Vance-Owen Bosnian peace plans in 1992 and 1993 demonstrate the challenges of fragmented political authority.

Similarly, negotiations that result in disconnect between political authority and effective military control are liable to result in crises in short order. As a consequence, military operations need to be phased in order to create the foundations for a durable political order. This ought to be an important consideration particularly in regards to operations around Kandahar, which is likely to end up being a zone where the Quetta Shura Taliban receives at least some concessions about local control. Holding Kandahar “hostage” — in terms of repeatedly clearing Taliban forces -- to QST concessions is perhaps a productive approach, but trying to institutionalize control of the area is likely to result in tensions in an eventual peace accord.

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Third, special attention ought to be paid to the position of economic spoilers. A major challenge with insurgencies is that they tend to draw in opportunists looking to profit from the fighting. These actors, with little interest in the political outcome, profit politically and financially from ongoing conflict. They cannot easily be brought into a political process because they prefer fighting to peace, regardless of the substance of any accord. As mentioned earlier, there is at least some evidence that the Haqqani network is this sort of group. Regardless, an important contribution of military operations will be to defeat and disarm these kinds of conflict parasites if possible. If it is not possible to eliminate them militarily, these economic spoilers might be “bought off” with material concessions, though this sort of arrangement is inherently unstable and prone to exploitation.

Pitfalls to Avoid

There are also several approaches that we should avoid in order to bring about a successful outcome to negotiations.

First, we need to avoid over-thinking the military campaign in the hopes of sending calibrated messages to the insurgents. Much of the limited war literature of the 1950s and 1960s argued for extensive signaling through military campaigns. At various times this has led to proposals in past conflicts to constrain the use of certain military capabilities and weapons systems, and also planning military operations around arbitrary geographical limitation. These are rarely effective. While, for instance, a predator drone strike halt might seem a significant signal of “good will” from our perspective, the insurgents are unlikely to perceive it as such if they are still being targeted by other means. Similarly, there will be proposals to respect certain administrative boundaries, such as city or provincial limits, but again while the message may seem clear to us, it be essentially invisible to the adversary which may not organize along similar lines.

Second, military pressure is one of the major sources of pressure we can place on the insurgents. As a consequence, we ought to consent to a ceasefire only very later in the process, when major framing issues have been resolved and the discussions are focused on implementation. Military operations are the backbone of diplomatic leverage, not any of the other, softer metrics of population-centric counterinsurgency such as measures of goods and services provided.

Third, time is a crucial element to consider, and as a practical matter it is not clear that time is on our side. As a result, we ought to begin negotiations with a willingness to make concessions, but gradually harden our positions and begin to impose costs if the insurgents seek to draw out the process.

Ultimately, if the insurgents believe they can win in the long-run, negotiations will collapse anyway. We ought to find out sooner rather than later if the time is ripe for a settlement by being initially generous and increasingly firm. The insurgents must know, in no uncertain terms, that negotiations are a window of opportunity, not an invitation to delay.

Fourth, we have to assume that any settlement will be subject to numerous violations. As a consequence, we need to think carefully about redlines. Some violations can be met with quid pro quo responses. Others will require wholesale re-considerations. The goal is not a perfect peace, but rather a peace that is better for U.S. national security interests than the current war. That said, we need to plan for the collapse of accords, not because we lack faith in our ability to enforce them, but rather as a prudent form of risk management. Some possible measures include pre-staged catchment areas for refugees, regional agreements for power projection capabilities, and plans for the reintroduction of combat forces developed and to the extent possible negotiated to ensure Congressional approval.

Conclusions

The goal of a negotiated outcome is not the abandonment of Afghanistan. The goal instead is to place U.S.-Afghan cooperation on a long-term stable basis. Obviously, the United States is not going to keep 100,000 troops in Afghanistan forever. As a consequence, our goal must be to wring the ma-
imum benefit possible from this high-water mark of our military power in the country. The biggest risk to continued American involvement to safeguard our interests is not a gradual withdrawal but rather an over commitment that leads to a dramatic collapse of national will down the road. Our current approach represents a reckless gamble, an all-or-nothing bid at total victory against a resilient and adaptive foe. Not only must we try to convince the insurgents to accept half a loaf, we must be willing to do so as well.

Perhaps the biggest challenge to negotiations is political. President Obama has done little to prepare the country for such a process, and news that the coalition is negotiating with insurgents will result in a howl of protest about negotiating with “terrorists.” Indeed, President Obama made his own job more difficult when he made his case for escalation in Afghanistan and seemed to conflate al Qaeda and the Taliban. In order to sell negotiations at home, Obama will need to educate the public about the complexities of Afghan politics. The reality is that this will be difficult, and as a consequence, it is likely that the United States will need to negotiate through proxies, likely through Afghan President Hamid Karzai. President Obama will need to convince the American public to support Karzai in this process, and that Afghan solutions to Afghan problems may require us to accept inclusion of some unsavory characters into the Afghan political order. Regardless, whether negotiations involve the United States directly, or at arm’s length, a domestic political strategy for gaining support for talks is already overdue.

Our military success is opening up a window of opportunity to establish a decent outcome in Afghanistan. We can only achieve that if we aggressively push for negotiations now. Otherwise, we will fritter away the benefits of the Afghan “surge” and find ourselves in 2013 facing the same challenges we faced in 2009.

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Design and the Prospects for Critical Dialogue

by Christopher R. Paparone

To the Greeks dia-logos meant a free-flowing of meaning through a group, allowing the group to discover insights not attainable individually.

--Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline

Designing Meaning

David Bohm is one of the most cited authors on the subject of dialogue.¹ He defines it as “communication from which something new emerges.”² Peter Senge (a widely read purveyor of systems thinking) extends Bohm’s definition by comparing discussion with dialogue.³ Discussion is oriented on an agenda, coming to a conclusion, finding an answer, or seeking closure for decision (the present author would contrast this approach to “formulaic,” one-way PowerPoint briefings that occur before the commander decides on an operational course of action). Dialogue, on the other hand, is about keeping group membership diverse, expertly facilitating and sustaining open conversation, and continually updating the community’s appreciation of the circumstances it faces. Rather than conceptualizing decisions as a point-in-time, dialogue recognizes decision making as an unstructured and ongoing process (that may continue for generations!).⁴ In many ways, dialogue is countercultural to a traditional command-centric, masculine-dominated military life world, where analytic staff work and decisive orders are emphasized and even romanticized.⁵

What is Dialogue?

By Other Names. Scholars have presented different names for dialogical forms of reasoning. Here are a few: social construction of reality, grammatology, double-loop learning, appreciative inquiry, disciplined reflexivity, action learning, practical skepticism, reflective practice, hermeneutic appreciation, sensemaking, narrative revelation, communicative coordination. All of these nomenclatures attempt to portray how humans build (and can rebuild) worldviews and the knowledge that goes with them. All have one common philosophical assumption – the intersubjectivity (“social made-up-ness”) of being a human does not permit a singular paradigm (otherwise claimed by objectivists) to be sufficient to explain reality. All (according to postpositivist Thomas S. Kuhn) are, at their core, subjectively created by knowledge communities; hence, can be challenged principally by using alternative paradigms to expose this intersubjective construction process. If Kuhn is correct (and nonmilitary proponents of design assume he is), all knowledge is subject to criticism and can be deconstructed while exposing the paradigmatic roots of its man-made creation.

Multi-Paradigmatic. Reasoning from this assumption of intersubjectivity, designers become more aware of prevalent paradigms that guide, in a socially contrived or normative way, the use of language to describe the reality they and their community of practice face. For example, military designers may actively seek to criticize doctrinal concepts that community members otherwise have considered authoritative. The philosophy that underpins design demands this critical approach (this point the present author accentuated in the Herac-atolic-Parmenidean debate in Essay #1 of this series).

The designer is interested in having participants in the dialogue suspend disbelief while viewing situations through the lenses of other paradigms. The designer does not seek closure in finding the Parmenidean “best view” (or in the vernacular, the course of action, best practice or lesson learned). All such perspectives offer insight, “triangulating” into a design that appreciates all of them, even if they seem paradoxical (Figure 1). While the obdurate Parmenidean may be frustrated at not achieving closure in order to settle on a planned course of action, the designer’s hope is that even more views will emerge as time goes on. “Closure,” a strong value of a traditional military culture, is not a dominant value in the Heraclitean designing-as-you-go-, unstructured-process enabled by critical dialogue.

Figure 1 A Paradigm Sampler. Design philosophy calls for examining wicked situations through “multiple lenses,” associated with an assortment of paradigms. The logic of explanation changes depending on which lens is used. Design proposes that logics of explanation (i.e. a plurality of views) is superior to singular ones. Sample epistemologies related to the ontology of the paradigms are provided in blue font at the top of the cloud.

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9 By paradigm, the present author employs Kuhn’s definition applicable to the social context: “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on, shared by members of a given community.” Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd ed.) (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996), p. 175. Objectivists have a different view of ontological reasoning; for example, see Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (New York: New American Library, 1979).

10 One of the founders of design thinking was Herbert A. Simon who called these creations, The Sciences of the Artificial – the title of his book (3d ed.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

11 The Greeks called this purposeful suspension of complicity, epoché. For example, see Bryan Lawson, How Designers Think: The Design Process Demystified (4th ed.) (Amsterdam, NE: Elsevier, 2006). Lawson describes six qualities of the design process that stand in stark contrast to analytic decision or planning models: (1) The process is endless; (2) There is no infallibly correct process; (3) The process involves finding as well as solving problems; (4) Design invariably involves subjective value judgment; (5) Design is a prescriptive activity (what might be?);
A Design Scenario. In practical terms, let us say a military designer wants to question the functionalist view of joint operations that dominates US military doctrine. The paradigm, functionalism, represents a Parmenidean belief that various phenomena in the world serve some sort of structured, interdependent purpose that can be studied through the scientific method (like the field of medicine studies how organs in the human body function together). The functionalist US joint planner, under the auspices of Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, is led to believe that in combining these functions (particular activities and capabilities) the military can operate “jointly”: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, protection, and sustainment. His assumptive structure is that to plan he has to consider all of these in a synchronized way. A multifunctional view of operations demands that these functions be distributed across organizations (in the form of task assignment) to create success.

If operations are not successful, the joint planner may either conclude that the force either did not deduce the functions correctly in unison (i.e., misapplication of theory) or that the doctrinaires have to go back to the drawing board to inductively re-functionalize how to conceive of operations (i.e., reconstruction of theory). If we look at the history of joint doctrine, we see evidence of both. Military writers often use critical analysis to explain how principles of war were misapplied. In terms of re-functionalizing, the previous portrayal of “jointness” was different from current US doctrine. In the 2001 edition of Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, functions were less categorical and more oriented on how to form interdependent multifunctional command and control structures—land, air, and maritime—with respect to Service-pure, Army-, Navy-, and Air Force commands.

Armed with a broadened philosophical array of paradigms, the reflective military designer is positioned to criticize the way the community of planners normally conceives of operations and notices these doctrinal re-functionalizations are, metaphorically, not much more than “rearranging the deck chairs on the same ship.” She argues to her community that the assumption of functionalized operations is not serving the effort-at-hand very well. To enable alternative views and arguments, the military designer may suggest bringing in “outsiders” to help the otherwise functionalist-based community view the situation through alternative lenses. Through critical dialogue, they together design very different forms of knowledge, uniquely formed around the novelty of the situation faced. Ideally some of those others have been educated in other “non-functionalist” fields or are immersed deeply in local situations as to have learned tacit forms of knowledge (i.e. knowing, intuitively, more than they can tell). They tell, through differing paradigms, lucid stories about the situation at hand.

Our military designer notes that this storytelling is an important form of rich description that creates images to help participants, to include the potentially reformed functionalists, “see vicariously.” Important questions (the “aha moments” and “holy Toledo’s”) may begin to emerge that the functionalist paradigm would not spur. From a the view of the interpretive paradigm, she notes that activities of those involved in the dialogue may be better expressed as narrative descriptions of the immersive practices of diversified, small teams that are interacting with local villages and regionally connect with others in the same valley. She hears one participant remark that US troops are paradoxically defeating a sense of security in one of the villages by driving scary monster-like, dehumanizing vehicles through them (see photo below). The dialogical participants discover that functional categories (like force protection) can become distracters from appreciating what is happening. This form of categorial thinking cannot explain the process of acting and deeper meaning needed here, in the moment. One of the nongovernmental participants in the dialogue may argue that functionalist categories that the military espouses in their planning doctrine may promote categorical thinking and categorial thinking is promoting categorical acting. Note that in this hypothetical case, the military designer is both provocative and collaborative (two important qualities of effective dialogue). She provokes meta-paradigmatic conversation by bringing others (who distinctly perceive the world through alternative paradigms) into the conversation. Together they seek to reframe the situ-

—and, (6) Designers work in the context of a need for action (pp. 123-125).
14 For example, see Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (NY: Dell, 1982).
17 Gergen, Gergen, and Barrett, p. 17.
action dialogically. (Note, the present author is saving a related discussion of framing and reframing for the next article, Essay #5, in this series.)

Photo. “Joint Combat Patrol” Taken During Security Operations in Afghanistan. Is this a functionalist, categorical action? If this moment in time is examined through other paradigmatic lenses, such as interpretivism, the scene may seem absurdly insecure, whereas, through the functionalist view (categorically “force protection”), it seems perfectly logical. (US Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Efren Lopez taken 18 Jan 2010/Released to the public domain by DOD and available online at Defense Imagery Distribution System)

The Qualities of Critical Dialogue

So what does a military designer need to consider when provoking critical dialogue?

Avoid Categories While Conversing. In many ways, design is “the antidote.” Reducing complex reality to categories (some sort of naming conventions or taxonomies) reflects oversimplification and a false sense of understanding. Categorical thinking is taking terms and concepts associated with assumed known-knows and applying them to other situations (an assumed Parmenidean quality also known as generalizability in the empirical sciences). The categories are based in existing theories of action believed to have worked in the past. Categorical thinking is synonymous with deductive reasoning (application of existing theory). In the military sense, this would involve sizing up the situation using doctrinal terms (such as offense, defense, stability, and so on), institutionalized mnemonics (such as “METT-TC,” “PMESII,” and “DIME”), measures of effectiveness and performance (MOEs/MOPs), and standardized map symbols. There are at least two alternatives to communicating categorically: rich description and patterned thinking (using continua).

Rich Description. Karl E. Weick proposes that one substitute for categorical forms of communications is rich description. Rich description is a grammatology often employed by cultural anthropologists and is linked to inductive thinking (theory-building) and abductive reasoning (creating more tentative explanations of what is going on). Communicating richly is the ability to describe one’s observations without being hampered by a Parmenidean set of theories, models, and causal assumptions about technology and production processes. The describer is aware that the latter might serve as a psychological façade that protects against the inevitable anxiety associated with being surprised and the post-hoc discovery of analytic error in mission analysis as events unfold. Weick describes a technique — called E-Prime (attributed to scholar E.W. Kellogg) that strives for communications that do not using any derivative of the verb “to be.” For example, in lieu of describing the local activity as “there was a terrorist attack,” e-prime demands that the reporting agent provides context (literally, “with text”). The rich description may include statements like:

After speaking with several townspeople, I found 10-year old local Ishmael Taleb who told me that at around sunset yesterday, he observed two people, dressed in local garb, put something into a flower pot in the market square. This morning when the market opened, an explosive device detonated at or about the same location as the flower pot; perhaps triggered by a cell phone (I found parts of a cell phone nearby).

Weick explains that when...

I’m forced to forego the verb to be, I pay more attention to particulars, context, and the situation. I also tend to see more clearly what I am not in a position to say...When people perceive flowing experience; and, DIME—Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic.


22 For example, see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, 1973.
ience, those undifferentiated sensations gradually take on explicit meaning when they are named, systematized, and formalized. When people name and formalize, they move farther away from their initial impressions.\

*Patterned Thinking.* Another technique is to communicate along the continua of narrative domains rather than in categories (more common phrases are “thinking outside the box” and “patterned thinking”). For example, the Parmenidean mindset frames the idea of “critical thinking” around classical empiricist categorical values (deemed “universal intellectual standards”) of clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, logic, significance, and fairness. A design thinker may reframe those qualities along continua into a pattern (see sample in Figure 2). Traditional analytic methods attempt to “define the problem” within the narrative domain along the left side of the figure.

From this Parmenidean point of view, all critical thinking is oriented on making a difficult situation into an understandable situation (with information sharing values constituting the validity of the narrative domain). However, design thinkers may take a Heraclitean view and draw a line depicting the conditional state of the situation they are in as falling somewhere in between the domain opposites (see the hand-drawn red “line of appreciation”). Rather than expending energy analyzing “the problem” in order to get to the left side, the designer realizes that the red line represents the wicked reality at hand. Designers acknowledge that problem definition is not possible if the appreciation line is along the narrative domain on the right. In critical dialogue, the conceptualization of “wicked problems” in the midst of these narrative continua provides a form of appreciation, where understanding would be illusory.

One could also make the principles of war into continua signifying different patterns of operations can afford different appreciations of which principles should dominate in a particular circumstance. There are many more examples of employment of continua (patterned thinking) rather than categories.

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*Figure 2. Some Sample Continua Between the Narrative Domains of “Information Sharing” and “Critical Dialogue” (designated with a “Line of Appreciation”).*

**Invite a Diversity of Participants** (including those who are situationally immersed). In high VUCA niches, context matters and effective dialogue is “historically and culturally situated.” A “broad church of approaches” can prevent epistemological fallacy (that is “confusing what is with what we take it to be”).

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23 Weick, p. 18.
25 In the Army’s newly published FM 5-0, The Operations Process, the word “understanding” is used over 250 times (one of the top 10 most frequently words used in the document!). To a reflective designer, this may reveal the Parmenidean mindset of the doctrinaires. The main idea of “the operations process” is to achieve understanding. Design makes no such assertion that this is even remotely possible when facing wicked, high VUCA situations. Hence, the designer may expose the fallacy of this assertion, for example, by asking complexity scientists or chaos theorists to enter the conversation in order to poke ontological and epistemological holes into the doctrinal assertion.
29 Margaret Archer, “Realism in the Social Sciences,” pp. 189-205, in Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony
feelings, ethics, and spirituality can constitute a strategic advantage. Seeking an inconsistent ethos (a set of histories and cultural- and psychological-value preferences) is quite a departure from the consistent normative values (such as getting the US military staffs’ customarily, if not mindlessly, to singularly follow commander’s guidance in a planning process). While we cannot rely on a science of selection for who should participate in critical dialogue sessions, the community of military designers can provide opportunities for self-selection and gently nudge potentially interesting people into the boundaryless design club.

Insofar as situational immersion, anthropologist Anna Simons summed up her research of history’s most profound strategists that, “Without any formal training in anthropology, such disparate figures as T. E. Lawrence, Douglas MacArthur, Joseph Stilwell, George Kennan, and Edward Lansdale all proved adept at turning their insights about another culture to strategic effect. More significantly, the strategies they came up with succeeded as instruments of war.” Immersion into local situations, coupled with the ability to tell the story effectively, are essential to dialogue.

**Shape Social Norms for Frank and Open Dialogue.** Ideally, participants subscribe to values associated with healthy dialogue. Hierarchical values are detrimental to good dialogue. Participants must somehow leave rank and positional authority “at the door” and not confuse passionate argument with insubordination or disrespect. Active or reflective listening practices are important (“I heard you say… [rephrasing] …, is that about right?”). Chris Argyris suggests these additional norms:

- Advocate positions forthrightly as possible, but do so in a way that encourages others to question them.
- Ask for a better-supported argument whenever someone states a disagreeable position, or help the arguer better assess the position.

- Use illustrative data (storytelling) and make lucid, cogent arguments when evaluating another person’s argument. Clearly articulated reason, rather than authoritative response, should serve as the standard for known-knowns.
- Apologize if, in the process of dialogue, you act in ways that appear to upset others. Assume that this was not the intention (provided that is genuinely the case) and state the intent and the reasoning behind it.
- Ask for the reasoning behind actions that you find upsetting, in order to appreciate the other’s intentions.

Facilitating such norms may be the most important advice of all and yet it is not supported by the US Army doctrinaires who published the March 2010 version of Field Manual 5-0, _The Operations Process_. The manual reduces the philosophy of design to a methodological tool of those in the upper hierarchy where the commander exercises “decisive leadership” (a value that is antithetical to open dialogue) and develops “a thorough understanding” in order to “formulate effective solutions to complex, ill-structured problems.”

**Don’t Be so Damned Rational!** Social theorist Alfred Schutz defined rationalization as the “transformation of an uncontrollable and unintelligible world into an organization which we can understand and therefore master, and in the framework of which prediction becomes possible.” This bears a striking resemblance to what mission analysis and other methods of analytic decision making are believed to promise. US Army doctrinaires assume that there are such things as “ill-structured problems;” however, from the Schutzian frame of reference, this presents an absurd, uncritical belief. Situations cannot be conceived as problems without a useable intellectual structure to frame them; hence, the construct “ill-

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34 US Army FM 5-0, p. 3-1.
36 US Army’s FM 5-0 asserts that design is about placing participants in “purpose-built, problem-centric” design teams “based on their expertise relative to the problem” (emphasis added, p. 3-6). The document also conveys that there can be “understanding [of] ill-structured problems” (p. 3-2). This is absurd if only from the fallacious basis of why the design team would move to a design philosophy if it could be “problem centric” or if it were just a matter of sharing information to achieve “understanding?” This is a massive logical fallacy in the way the US Army has introduced design to the military community of practitioners. Why massive? This distorted view of design reinforces the community to see the world from a single paradigm – the Parmenidean one.

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34 Many organization theorists have written support to this thesis. The most sophisticated (in my view) is those who have developed the Competing Values Framework, concisely summarized in Kim S. Cameron and Robert Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1999).
structured problems” is an oxymoron. When faced with wicked situations or messes, all of our shibboleths and typifications do not work; hence, there is no “problem” to define. A contemporary of Schutz, Herbert Blumer, puts it this way, “…objects, events, and situations do not convey their own meanings, [rather] we confer meaning on them.” 37 Practitioners invoke design when they have inadequate or no structure to place onto situations in order to “define the problem.” Wrapping design into the planner’s functionalist’s world of rationalization (as the US Army doctrinaires attempt to do) seems ludicrous from this frame of reference. In high VUCA situations, designers must design meaning!

**Encourage Irreverence.** A deviant leader can be more influential while participating in critical dialogue if they make others laugh at what they thought to be true. Jokes, puns, and other forms of humor jab at established rules, norms, and even values (the latter often being “taboo”). To be deviant is to be irreverent and to be irreverent is to be creative — essential to the process of critical dialogue. As Michael Cohen and James March assert, it is hypocrisy that transforms thinking, not conformance. “Playfulness is the deliberate, temporary relaxation of rules in order to explore the possibility of alternative rules,” Cohen and March continue. These observers maintain that “a little heresy can go a long way,” and that “humor, play, and silliness can reduce tension and encourage irreverence.” Finally these authors suggest profoundly that those involved in design should “[s]upplement the technology of reasoning with a technology of foolishness.” 38

**Conclusion**

From these observations on the importance of effective critical dialogue, we can now speculate on some tentative inferences concerning institutional illogic:

**You Cannot Make Design into a Doctrine**

(i.e. design doctrine is oxymoronic) and rational planning methods may obstruct design. We will never get design “right” because design requires dynamic instability (through ongoing, never-ending critical dialogue) in ontology and epistemology. While Army doctrinaires describe design as a methodology for planning (to embellish the “conceptual component” of planning), this essay, as have the preceding three, attempts to describe design ultimately as a philosophy. The present essay argues that critical dialogue, inherent to design, is an unstructurable methodology. Design is not part of a definable “operations process,” as the US Army contends. Critical dialogue may very well call into question the efficacy of the paradigm that operational planning represents. Theories of how to approach social problems, like war, are themselves social products. Design would postulate that there can be no concept of war in general, only war as historically situated and interpreted. 40 The US Army’s (and all the other military doctrine) is historically situated and interpreted. Designers become intimately critical of that historicity and those singular interpretations.

**DOD Curricula are Too Parmenidean** (i.e. singularly paradigmatic). The Department of Defense (DOD) colleges’ and universities’ mantra of “teaching students how to think in lieu of teaching them what to think” is a fallacy given the view of critical dialogue proposed in this essay. Ideally, DOD educators provide practitioners opportunities for effective forms of critical dialogue. We cannot presuppose how students might think while engaged in critical dialogue (in fact, we should hope for being surprised). If this value of being surprised is not considered paramount in curriculum design, then DOD educational institutions are not effectively providing opportunities for critical dialogue. Related, the community of practice should stress that acting may be required before thinking (as with the deeply immersed teams operating in uniquely local situations exploring novel approaches to craftwork and emergent tasks discussed in Essay #3). The ability to richly describe what is happening (i.e. good storytelling) may be much more important than conducting analysis through the lenses of preconceived categorizations of activities and capabilities. 41

In high VUCA operations, English language skills associated with the liberal arts’ Trivium are more important to critical dialogue than information sharing about the military functionalist sciences. DOD schools have to find ways to import “stories from the field” into critical dialogue in the classroom or near real time in the actual field setting. For too long, the DOD classroom has become the “high ground” that is substantively disconnected from “the swamp” of the practitioner.

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39 US Army FM 5-0, p. 3-1.
40 This is Roy Bhaskar’s central argument in “Societies,” (pp. 206-257) in (Op. cit.) Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie, 1998.
41 For example, see “The Story is Telling: Simplicity is Complicated” in *Defense AT&L Magazine*, June 2010, pp 51-54.
cators have to become career-long tutors who stay connected with their cohorts of practitioners while they are practicing. The practitioners’ experiences-as-they-are-acting become case studies for critical dialogue. Traditional “canned” case studies are inappropriate to exercise critical dialogue that orients on narrating about wicked situations.

**One neither Manages nor Commands Dialogue.** As argued in Essay #2, this should be a call for the reform of institutionalized views on leadership. The following chart imports the dialogical qualities of leadership juxtaposed with the *managerial* and *command* views (Figure 3). Dialogical forms of critical reasoning require Heifetzian-style leadership and the devolution (if only temporary) of hierarchical management and command values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dialogical</td>
<td>Monological</td>
<td>Monological (or PowerPointology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-creation of Reality</td>
<td>Policy-in-Reality</td>
<td>Top-Down Guidance on Rfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative</td>
<td>Rule-Following</td>
<td>Disciplined Compliance with In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Tasks &amp; Craftwork</td>
<td>Routine Tasks</td>
<td>Engineering In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing Storytelling</td>
<td>Resource Allocation</td>
<td>Deciding is a Point-in-Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**Figure 3.** Comparative Study of the Qualities of Design-Oriented Leadership (based in Essay #2 of this series).

**Lessons Learned Aren’t** (i.e. the Lawrence Paradox is real). In her brilliant exposé, anthropologist Anna Simons states, “The Lawrence paradox refers to our propensity to turn unduplicable lessons into generic principles as if anyone should be able to apply them.”42 In the next essay (#5) in this series, we will examine the role of metaphoric (heuristic-based) reasoning as it relates to framing and reframing wicked situations. Experience in the complex social milieu is merely a hypothesis and more often than not a generalizable, causal story of the functionalist. Recall senior military leaders in the 80s who aspired to the mantra that, “we’ll never fight the last war; every war is different.” Yet all of our formal organizational learning systems seemed geared to collecting “best practices” and “lessons learned” on how we are operating. We should not be surprised when the institution operates the same ways the next time!

To summarize, design is largely about creating meaning in the face of wicked (high VUCA) situations. The professional practitioner cannot rely solely on the Parmenidean paradigm and its questionable assumptions about knowledge. Critical dialogue is essential to the efficacy of constructing and reconstructing the reality at hand by exploring new or improved meanings.

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College’s Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a B.A. from the University of South Florida; master’s degrees from the Florida Institute of Technology, the U.S. Naval War College, and the Army War College; and a Ph.D. in public administration from Pennsylvania State University.

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42 Simons, p. vi.
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Police Forces need assistance in the following three important priority areas.

Acknowledging this progress, President Obama outlined a “new page” for Iraq and highlighted the importance of a continued Iraqi/US relationship. This relationship appropriately rests upon Iraq’s growing ability to “help itself,” but recognizes the essential role the US can play in Iraq’s future. I have returned to Iraq three times since I had responsibility for accelerating the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces during the 2007-8 surge, and in my view, the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Police Forces need assistance in the following three important priority areas.

Download the Full Article: Iraqi Police Priorities

### Article Intro / Excerpts (Chronological Order)

**Counterinsurgency in Pakistan**
*by Kashif Taher*

The most immediate threat to the security of Pakistan is an Islamist insurgency raging in the north-west tribal regions. They have launched a deadly campaign of terror attacks throughout Pakistan over the last few years which have killed large numbers of civilians and non-civilians alike. Some of this loss was countered by the destruction of infrastructure, and hindered NATO success in Afghanistan. They may be also harbouring high-ranking members of Al-Qaeda. The insurgents are affiliated with various militant groups which pose a threat to the wider region, especially Afghanistan. Tackling this network is necessary to reverse the destabilisation of the Pakistani state and to ensure NATO success in Afghanistan. In 2009 the Pakistani army attempted to pacify this threat in its stronghold of the South Waziristan region in north-west Pakistan. This discussion aims to apply counterinsurgency principles to this particular war and recommend improvements counterinsurgency operators can make for future campaigns. In fact, the counterinsurgents succeeded militarily but the lack of infrastructure building will not ensure South Waziristan does not fall back into the control of the insurgents.

Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

**Bismarck’s Lesson on COIN:**

*An Invading Force’s Presence in a Foreign Land is its own Enemy*
*by Ali Iqbal, Major, Pakistan Army*

An invading foreign force, on completion of its objectives i.e. regime change through violent means or having inflicted sufficient losses to a targeted group, should not prolong its stay and assume the role of occupiers. This tendency infuriates local passion built on independent beliefs, cultural biases, religious differences and historic events. This complex/non-linear environment poses tremendous challenges for an outsider to transform the invaded country and bring it to a desired level of stability. On the other hand, the same environment presents lucrative opportunities for non-state and other state actors who intend exploiting the volatile situation to further their agendas/interests. The actors relevant to this theory include a foreign force, which can be composed of a single nation or a coalition, local populace of the invaded country, non-state actors within, and outside the invaded country and regional/neighboring countries having negative or positive interests in the invaded country and the foreign force.

Download the Full Article: Bismarck’s Lesson on COIN

**Iraqi Police Priorities**
*by Lieutenant General James M. Dubik*

Whether in Iraq or in the United States arguments remain as to the origins of the war as well as how it was conducted. But equally certain in this: most of the Iraqis that I’ve talked to are grateful for the American troops and families who have sacrificed so much and to the other nations of the coalition who have also contributed sons, daughters, and treasure to eliminate the Saddam regime and help create the evident progress in their country. They know that war is not over in Iraq, even if Iraq’s enemies are far weaker than they had been. They also understand that Iraqi is in a far better place today than it was in 2006, and each year finds more progress. They may be frustrated that progress is not faster or more widespread, but they are not ungrateful for the freedoms and opportunities they now have. Acknowledging this progress, President Obama outlined a “new page” for Iraq and highlighted the importance of a continued Iraqi/US relationship. This relationship appropriately rests upon Iraq’s growing ability to “help itself,” but recognizes the essential role the US can play in Iraq’s future. I have returned to Iraq three times since I had responsibility for accelerating the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces during the 2007-8 surge, and in my view, the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Police Forces need assistance in the following three important priority areas.

Download the Full Article: Iraqi Police Priorities
**The Misunderstood Private Dynamic of Modern War**  
*by Torie Rose DeGhett*

The purpose of this article is to explore the use of private military contractors as a policy tool and their place in the context of rapidly changing ways of fighting wars. Its primary goal is to defay the conventional wisdom of contractors as overpaid, gun-toting mercenaries who wreak havoc in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The hope is that this article shows a bigger picture, correcting misinformation and highlighting the real problems with privatization, namely the lack of bureaucratic clarity and control, and offering solutions.

Download the Full Article: The Misunderstood Private Dynamic of Modern War

**The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift From Iraq/Afghanistan to Mexico/The Americas and the Stabilization of Europe**  
*by Dr. Robert J. Bunker*

The United States currently faces two strategic level non-state (network) threats—but only one of them is openly recognized. Al Qaeda, and other elements of radical Islam, have been recognized as the #1 threat since the 11 September 2001 attacks which killed nearly 3,000 Americans and caused well over 100 billion dollars in infrastructure damage, emergency response, and economic disruption. This threat which garners ongoing media attention, however, on many fronts pales in comparison to that represented by the drug cartels and narco-gangs which for decades now have been evolving, mutating, and growing in capabilities and power in the Americas. While presently viewed as a 'crime and law enforcement issue', as Al Qaeda was pre 9-11, this more subtle and encompassing strategic threat has resulted in the deaths of well over 100,000 citizens of the Americas (roughly 30,000 in Mexico alone in the last 4 years) and has caused the destabilization of a number of nations including Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras, and witnessed the rise of heightened narco influence within regions of the US homeland along its Southern Border. Economically, the sustained damage and disruption caused by drug cartel and narco-gang activities to private individuals, local economies, and governmental bodies is well past the trillion dollar mark and rising. Both of these non-state (network) threats challenge the institutions of the many nations affected, the loyalty of the indigenous populations to the state itself, and are indicative of the 'war over social and political organization' now being waged in various regions of the globe.

Download the Full Article: The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift

**Afghanistan: The De-evolution of Insurgency**  
*by Kevin Meredith, Sergio Villarreal, and Mitchel Wilkinson*

In this article we will examine contemporary definitions of insurgencies as presented in The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24), compare the insurgency in Afghanistan to other insurgencies and present an argument that the present situation in Afghanistan is in-fact, not an insurgency. In our conclusion, we will present a theory that the situation in Afghanistan more closely resembles a synergy of criminal elements that have coalesced into a loosely organized front to form an anti-government, anti-coalition movement that has insurgent elements involved. Our theory also suggests that there is a cyclical nature of conflict in Afghanistan that includes the growth of insurgency and the de-evolution of insurgency as a part of a constantly changing Chaotic Cannibalistic State; a state of being that consists of groups of people in perpetual conflict, feeding on each other quickly changing ways of fighting wars. Its primary goal is to defy the conventional wisdom of contractors as overpaid, gun-toting mercenaries who wreak havoc in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The hope is that this article shows a bigger picture, correcting misinformation and highlighting the real problems with privatization, namely the lack of bureaucratic clarity and control, and offering solutions.

Download The Full Article: The De-evolution of Insurgency

**Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis**  
*by COL (ret.) Christopher R. Paparone*

This episode attempts to expose the myth that design is a “methodology” that leads to “understanding” that eventually leads to good military planning as suggested in the US Army’s latest doctrine, particularly its Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process. The focus is to reveal the issues associated with “mission analysis,” that is, the breaking down of a “problem” into manageable tasks that, when all put together into a military plan or order, serve to solve the overall “problem.” Beyond conventional, “force-on-force” fights, this essay argues that mission analysis is a misconception when it comes to framing complex operations.

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis

**The Prospect for a Unified International Policy on Iran**  
*by Anthony Tsontakis*

Evidence made public over the course of the last year compellingly supports the conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program is not peaceful, contrary to every maxim of Iran’s stated policy, including a religious decree by Iran’s Supreme Leader that says Islam forbids the production and use of nuclear weapons. As a result, and because confidence in the good faith and ultimate justice of the Iranian government yields, as it must, to the painful experience of endless disappointment, a consensus against Iran’s nuclear activity has been emerging internationally.

Download the Full Article: The Prospect for a Unified International Policy on Iran
Arming the U.S. Military for the Future
by Daniel R. DePetris

There is a huge debate brewing in Washington today about the current health and state of the U.S. Military. And with good reason; virtually every branch of the military has been stretched to the brink over the past decade. 100,000 American soldiers are expected to be in Afghanistan by the end of this summer; 50,000 American troops will remain in Iraq for at least another year; and nearly 30,000 are deployed in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korean aggression. All of this is not to be outdone by the tens of thousands more who are stationed in bases all across the European continent.

Download the Full Article: Arming the U.S. Military for the Future

Humanizing “The Man:”
Strengthening Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan
by A. Lawrence Chickering

In this paper, I will argue there are three great challenges the coalition forces need to overcome in their search for narratives that resonate with Afghans and that ultimately will promote support for the coalition and for the government. First is the traditional and tribal Afghan antagonism to outsiders. Second is the lack of a stake that ordinary Afghans have in the larger system. And the third involves a conflict in impact of major activities in the country, a conflict between programs that empower Afghans and programs that disempower them.

Download the Full Article: Humanizing the "Man"

A Better, Bad Choice
by Richard M. Wrona, Jr.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a modern-day nightmare. After more than a decade of conflict, the country’s eastern region is known for its seemingly unending human misery. Mass murder, forced displacements, and the horrible distinction of being the world’s “rape capital” embody Thomas Hobbes’ description of life in an anarchic world, (i.e. nasty, brutish, and short.) Reports two weeks ago of hundreds of women, girls, and babies being gang-raped by rebels and tribesmen within miles of a United Nations peacekeepers’ camp only serve as the most recent chapters in an epic tragedy (“Congo mass rape numbers rise to 240—UN,” BBC).

Download the Full Article: A Better, Bad Choice

The Rising Dominance of the Information Revolution within RMA Thought
by Major Tripp McCullar

The purpose of this piece is to argue that the Information Revolution will ultimately eclipse most of history’s widely-accepted RMAs due to its ability to “empower the weak” by (1) widely propagating strategic weapons technology, (2) rendering traditional military organization near-obsolete, (3) providing open access to mass social mobilization platforms, and (4) bypassing the development of industrialized mobility to achieve strategic effects.

Download the Full Article: The Rising Dominance of the Information Revolution within RMA Thought

Looking for the Hedgehog Idea
by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan

Originally published in Australian Army Journal, and republished here with permission of the Journal, this article examines the limitations of traditional strategic approaches to the resolution of contemporary conflicts. It proposes control as the unifying idea for military action.

Download the Full Article: Looking for the Hedgehog Idea

Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State
by Dr. David C. Ellis and LCDR James Sisco

The failure of ISAF’s COIN strategy to achieve its political objectives is the result of a conceptual error in its COIN implementation framework. Though ISAF places meeting the needs of the population at the center of its strategy, attempting to do so through a kleptocratic, illegitimate, and unaccountable Afghan national government (GIRoA) will not succeed. This conceptual error is due to a reading of COIN theory that defines “the counterinsurgent” doctrinally as the national government. Thus, while ISAF strategy now claims to adopt a population centric, district-focused COIN strategy, it still tries with predictable results to reach the population top down through the very kleptocratic government that has precipitated the current political crisis.

Download the Full Article: Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State

Afghanistan: It Never Hurts to Talk
by Colonel Gary Anderson

Some pundits have questioned the wisdom of General Petraeus’ decision that allows certain Taliban leaders safe passage to conduct preliminary peace negotiations with the Afghan government. He has been second guessed before and has generally proven the critics wrong; there are three good reasons to believe that his decision was the right one.

smallwarsjournal.com
In Afghanistan, Less is More
by Dr. David Malet

Two recent developments have brought optimism to some Afghanistan-watchers. The first is the appointment of General David Petraeus as commander of the United States Forces. Petraeus is credited as the architect of the Surge of troops that brought greater levels of stability to Iraq in 2007 when all had seemed lost there, and the hope is that he can cause lightning to strike twice. The second is an anti-Taliban uprising in the Gizab district that perhaps signals a newfound willingness by even Pashtun tribesmen, the Afghan demographic most closely tied to the Taliban, to turn against it and ally with the United States. The Washington Post quoted American officials as claiming the Gizab revolt as “the most important thing that has happened in southern Afghanistan this year” and heralding a “breakthrough” if only the patterns of involvement by local tribesmen could be discerned.

Planning a Military Campaign to Support Negotiations in Afghanistan
by Dr. Bernard I. Finel

The policy debate in Washington over Afghanistan periodically lurches from irrational exuberance over the prospects of defeating the insurgency there to a sullen “throw the baby out with the bathwater” phase where everyone begins to talk about an “exit strategy” without much sense of what is left behind. In December 2009, the strategy was to defeat the insurgency, end corruption, and train up a viable Afghan national security apparatus. By later spring 2010, pessimism had set in and prominent analysts both inside and outside the government are now talking about much more modest goals focused on counter-terrorism and regional militias. With the firing of General Stanley McChrystal and his replacement with counterinsurgency guru General David Petraeus, enthusiasm is again on the upswing.

Unfortunately, neither the overly optimistic assessments nor the overly pessimistic are likely to be borne out. As a practical matter the United States is unlikely to be able to fully defeat the insurgency – not necessarily because any shortfalls in military capacity, but rather because of the fundamental implausibility of the non-military elements of modern counterinsurgency doctrine. Economic development is hard enough to promote under ideal circumstances; it is virtually impossible under conditions of “opposed development” where an armed group is actively trying to prevent the initiative from being successful. Anti-corruption initiatives are rarely successful as well and anti-drug programs almost always fail. Clearing insurgent controlled areas is relatively easy. Holding those areas against insurgent activities is costly but not fundamentally impossible. But building responsive and resilient local governance is at this point purely in the realm of conjecture.

But if the counterinsurgency model is flawed in its overly optimistic assessment of the non-military tools available, the alternative approach focused on a rapid transition to a smaller footprint in Afghanistan is also flawed. A smaller footprint approach would have made sense back in 2009, and it may be the best long-term approach. But for the next 12-24 months at least the United States is going to have in the neighborhood of 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. The key is to use this deployment to best effect.

Design and the Prospects for Critical Dialogue
by Christopher R. Paparone

This is the fourth in a series of short Small Wars Journal articles on design. The thesis of the present essay (#4) is that, especially in a military context, dialogue is central to the method of design. In the midst of operating in highly volatile, uncertain, and complex (high “VUCA”) environmental niches we have to continuously design meaning and find clever ways to communicate about that unique, novel, and highly contextual, wicked situation. We have to continuously and collectively MAKE SENSE when commonsense (the presumed esoteric “science” found in professional groups) does not seem to help. Dialogue is the condition that enables such collective sensemaking.

Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Military Unity of Effort
by Mark Schapiro and Major Stephen Petzold

Over the past year within the restless province of Ninewa Iraq, the “Team Ninewa” concept was born. This concept is a highly successful model of U.S. civilian-military cooperation that resulted in an unprecedented unity of effort among the State Department and U.S. military goals/objectives in the region. This unity of effort led to tens of millions of dollars in savings on redundant projects and a highly effective use of Defense and State Department funding streams targeted at very specific local communities. Key to this strategy was “thinking small” – de-prioritizing large infrastructure projects in favor of income-generating activities for neglected economic actors among Ninewa’s myriad ethnic groups and business associations.

Governance in the Raw:
A Primer on Tribal Political Systems
by Mark Stan Wiechnik

This paper will introduce the reader to some different types of pre-state or tribal governance systems a person is likely to find in portions of the planet where people are living at just above the subsistence level and there is limited or no state influence. While each
culture may be unique, certain commonalities can be seen between tribal people living across the globe. The intended audience for this paper is the practitioner working with these people, be they military or civilian, who are trying to influence the group without necessary trying to change it. To achieve this, a better understanding than might be provided by being told you are going to be dealing with a tribal society might be helpful.

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Southern Sudan - the Four Theses
by LTC Thomas Talley

This paper is not about the likelihood of war in Southern Sudan – it is about the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a war in Southern Sudan. As with many other interested observers, I have been following the development of Southern Sudan’s upcoming referendum with great interest, and increasingly, with a degree of alarm. This paper intends to be predictive – by discussing the three elements that I believe to be missing from the current discussions and analysis, I intend to show where the official U.S. policy (COA 1) is leading us. Accordingly, this paper will not elaborate further on the other two courses of action. Stated another way, this paper will discuss what will be, whereas the other courses of action offer insight into what could be, or even what should be. Those discussions are conversations for a different audience.

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A Comprehensive Approach to Local Engagement in Afghanistan,
That may also Mitigate IEDs
by LTC (ret) Eric T. Furey

This paper intends to provoke thought on the connection between Stability Operations and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) reduction. Stability Operations emphasizes the need for a simultaneous bottom-up, top-down, and whole of government approach in order to “…outsmart the insurgents and wrest away the initiative.” Ultimately, the end state is to link the informal (traditional) local sub-national consensus governance structures with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghan Central Government) at the district level. Therefore, one may reasonably ask whether an engagement program with local villagers might also diminish the IED threat.

Experience demonstrates it can. Interviews with US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (Special Forces Team(s)) conducting the Local Defense Initiative program from July 2009 until January 2010 provide evidence that a population-centric, bottom-up local engagement program within the rural areas of Afghanistan can reduce the number of IED incidents. What was further revealed was that indigenous reporting of IEDs and related information increased proportionately to the degree of trust, respect, and credibility developed between local village elders and United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets).

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CSIS’s Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story
by Captain Scott A. Cuomo and Captain Brandon J. Gorman

We were recently sent the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 21 July 2010 improvised explosive device (IED) metrics for Afghanistan report. This report illustrates a significant spike in IED activity in Afghanistan over the past year. This report also suggests that in this same period there has been an exponential decrease in the number of IEDs found by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) due to local national tips or turn-ins. Upon reviewing this report, we can understand why one might argue that the current counterinsurgency (COIN) operational design in Afghanistan is flawed and/or in part responsible for the seemingly increasing IED threat. For a variety of reasons, we discourage anyone from using this report to draw conclusions on the tactical conduct of the fight in Afghanistan today, especially conclusions about how best to counter the IED threat.

We caution against doing so because the experiences of the Marines, Sailors, and Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers that we had the privilege to serve with in southern Helmand Province from October 2009 to May 2010 completely contradict the seemingly logical conclusion that one might make from the report: IED incidents continue to grow while IED turn-ins due to local national tips appear to be exponentially decreasing; therefore, more troops and resources in Afghanistan have not led to greater security and cooperation for and among the population, but rather increasing hostility between ISAF/Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Afghan people.

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Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection
by Christopher R. Paparone

As we arrive to this fifth in a series of essays on design philosophy, it is a good place to pause, step back, and re-appreciate that the meaning of “design” is metaphorical (as are many of its derivative meanings). The root prefix “de-” is from Latin and means “of.” “Sign” has Latin roots, meaning “image.” Originally, the word design was closely related to “of image” or human imagination. Interestingly, Webster’s Third New International Unabridged Dictionary has dozens of definitions for the word; nevertheless, those who have imported the term to identify it with professional practice borrowed meaning from the field of architecture, signifying “design” is concerned with “the art and science of building.” Hence, it is no wonder that those who have used design to speak to professional practice borrow other meanings from architectural design. One such metaphor is “framing;” after all, how can one construct a building without frames? Several images come to mind – structural frames (that can be blue-printed), roof frames (to block adverse weather), window frames (to see through), door frames (to walk through), and so on.

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To Build Bridges in Afghanistan, Deploy India-Pakistan Nation-Builders
by Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti

The debate on Afghan nation building has pivoted on the duration of America’s presence. The concept of joint India-Pakistan teams across military training, government and development spectrums, presents a wildcard that carries the potential of correcting systemic flaws and resource deficiencies, and also promises to reduce deep rooted mistrusts between rivals India and Pakistan. Joint Indo-Pak nation building teams could concurrently yield four positive results- provide additional resources, bridge ethnic and political polarities, foster cooperation between India and Pakistan and device means to enable them to verify each other’s role, and ultimately, present a mechanism to ensure Afghanistan’s neutrality.

Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations:
Where, When, and Why Should the U.S. Intervene?
by Carol E. B. Choksy and Jamshed K. Choksy

Abstract. Despite the backlash from American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq during the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration of President Barack Obama is finding its international stability and reconstruction involvements expanding. But the U.S. currently possesses neither the resources nor the political will or the public support to maintain sufficiently large military and civilian forces for lasting S&R in more than a few key locales. So why does intervention benefit the U.S.? What are the factors most effective in predicting where S&R may become necessary? How can the U.S. assess the degree of threat when deciding whether to intervene or not?