Some aspects to keep in mind as we think about what it means to be a profession include among other things --- the special skills and expertise, the ethics that define our behaviors, a commitment to continued education and development, self-regulation, and in our particular case, subordination to civilian authority.
To serve as a initial catalyst for a discussion, I have posted an interview that I recently conducted with the Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic who are profiling a number of Army leaders on "The Army Profession". By sharing this dialog with you, I hope to expand awareness and initiate a substantive dialogue on this important subject. I welcome you to view my interview at YouTube and below as well as encourage you to provide comments.
Comments
The Army Profession is not only a occupational group characterized by extensive education and specialized training, which the use of skills based on theoretical knowledge, a code of conduct, and an association that organizes its members. It is a profession that is well paid and derives social status and prestige (now days, forget the '60s)from its occupation. It is not autonomous, only under the direction of the President of the United States, and should not be controlled or interfered with by outside groups. The Army Profession must seperate itself from conflicts of interests of all types, including corporate and bureaucratic.
The Profession must identify its spiritual self. Yes, one of religion. This is where the U.S. Army will rise above all other armies of the past. It must do so to retain the values, ethos, and all other ideals trained into all soldiers and their leaders, in the field and at home.
Currently, we must recognize we are indeed fighting an enemy who describes his war against us as religious. We cannot deny we are indeed in a war with an enemy who does not recognize our values and religion as something he can cohabit with. He is bound and determined to destroy all those who do not think in his 13th century way.
The Army Profession must not deny its spiritual and religious underpinnings, because if it is ignored, we will always be missing the one and only piece of the Profession that makes all the rest of it work.
<i>Doesn't anyone find it interesting that most company-grade officers go to PlatoonLeader.army.mil and CompanyCommand.army.mil to learn how to run their platoons or companies but for innovative ideas they turn to sites like Small Wars Journal, which is not a US military site?</i>
Until the Army adopted them as "innovative ideas", both of those sites were privately owned, built by guys/gals who saw a gap and tried to fill it. By their hard work they became the base piece for a number of the sites you find in BCKS.
It's good to have both types of venues; ones where who you are matters (i.e. on the .mil domain) and ones where you can express more freely.
Viet,
That seems like quite a tangent. If you want to discuss that issue, there is already a thread about that issue (or non-issue, as some of us view it) on this site in the "council", <a href="http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7682">here</a>. You'll probably get some better responses if you take it up in the council.
In my humble opinion, the biggest obstacle to our profession and junior leader development is the lack of ability to manage and exploit information from the tactical level. The Army is innovative enough to generate and apply the information in isolated pockets of time and space.
Doesn't anyone find it interesting that most company-grade officers go to PlatoonLeader.army.mil and CompanyCommand.army.mil to learn how to run their platoons or companies but for innovative ideas they turn to sites like Small Wars Journal, which is not a US military site?
The traditional journal publishing turn-around is intolerable for this generation of junior leaders because information needs to be disseminated immediately. I've submitted an article to Military Review in November 2009 and it was published in July 2010.
Although blogs and forums are good for the exchange of ideas, a formal journal system forces thinkers to tighten their arguments to a degree that cannot be really found on blogs/forums. Junior leaders in combat need fresh ideas immediately and they do not have time to screen blogs/forums every day - a formal journal system allows them just to see the best ideas in a timely fashion.
Secondly, I do not believe there is an incentive system for lieutenants/captains or staff sergeants to contribute to these discussions. In a profession, it is the duty of members of the profession to enhance the knowledge of their profession. But as GEN. Dempsey highlighted, just saying that you are a profession doesnt make you a profession. The lack of understanding of incentives does not only harm us institutionally but it harms us on the battlefield. For example, we are not using disincentives for what we consider as bad behavior in the governance field in Afghanistan (ie cancel all of Ahmed Wali Karzai's contracts).
Third, the US Army is talking the talk on imagination but not walking the walk. The Army has developed a paradigm in which to operate and it is hard to operate outside the paradigm - especially for junior leaders.
This is evident from my brief participation in the Strategic Studies Institute's "The Future of the U.S. Army Officer Corps" Virtual Conference - most junior officers are leaving not for money but because they do not want to stay in a profession where there is a lack of leadership and imagination (field grade officers) that they have most daily interaction with. Its great that the four-star generals are innovative thinkers- i.e. Army Starfish Program but how much of that will be filtered down to the battalions? Battalion commanders are busy running their battalions. This leads to my fourth point: lack of time for reflection and introspection.
My last battalion commander was in command for 20 months (12 in combat) and he had 30 days to PCS to another 24 month command. How much time will he have to reflect on what he's learned? How can he share this information? Most BCTs redeploy back to a lessons learned session but it is seen by junior leaders as a mandatory Army event which removes any incentive to really participate.
An alternative is to take junior leaders to teach at the COIN Academy for their last week in their tour in Afghanistan. The COIN Academy uses contracted instructors who have no relevant or timely knowledge of Afghanistan and the students generally know that. Junior leaders spend the last weeks of their deployment usually doing nothing in Manas or Kuwait. If they had an opportunity to say, tell their story to the incoming Afpak hands program at Camp Julien - wouldnt they have a much better incentive to share their lessons facing the very people who will be facing combat over doing it at their home station?
As for the recipients of the knowledge, wouldn't you listen to a Staff Sergeant who survived 5 IEDs vs. a contractor with 20 years of (insert SF, MI, or other) experience not pertaining to this fight right now?
Rant/off