Britain and U.S.: Special But Not So Special Relationship?
Jamie Dettmer, Voice of America
One of the first phone calls Theresa May will make as Britain’s new prime minister will be to U.S. President Barack Obama. Earlier this week, a White House spokesman said with May as Britain’s new leader, there was confidence in Washington that the ‘special relationship’ between the two countries would not only be protected but advanced.
That was music to the ears of British media that are always quick to take the temperature of the so-called special relationship and fret at any suspected transatlantic coolness. But past and current British diplomats who talked with VOA on the condition of anonymity aren’t so sure that as Britain shapes its future outside the European Union, the intimate ties between Washington and London that stretch back to World War II will remain as close.
They worry more than ever about their access to Washington power after President Obama’s dire warnings over Brexit in the run-up to last month’s referendum in which he warned Britain would be diminished, if it left the EU and would be at the back of the line behind the Europeans when it comes to negotiating future free trade deals.
“Germany will increasingly become more important,” worries a former British ambassador to the U.S. “Outside the EU, we will be of less importance to Washington - Berlin and Paris more so,” he fears.
Another envoy, currently an ambassador to a European country, says that by exiting the European bloc, Britain has jettisoned one of its key roles as far as Washington is concerned - namely, acting as America’s deputy within the European camp, cajoling and lobbying on behalf of the U.S. That was seen most dramatically in the run-up to the Iraq invasion when then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair backed George W. Bush and rallied European doubters, although he had no luck with the French.
Losing Leverage
With the EU developing a common security and foreign policy, “Britain won’t be able to help influence it, reducing our leverage with Washington,” the envoy says. And he argued that last week’s long-awaited Chilcot report with its damning indictment of the reasons the Blair government gave for joining the U.S. in invading Iraq is fueling fears that Britain is in danger of becoming a less dependable ally for the Americans.
“Chilcot will have a chilling effect on future British prime ministers when it comes to joining the U.S. in overseas interventions,” he predicts.
“I will be with you, whatever,” Tony Blair was revealed to have promised Bush in a secret letter sent eight months before the joint invasion.
A major factor in Blair’s decision to offer unequivocal support to Bush was a fear that Britain would lose influence in Washington and damage the special relationship, if it withheld its support for the post-9/11 invasion.
But, unlike when the special relationship was forged in World War II between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, Washington was far less ready to accept British political counsel about how to go about garnering international support for the invasion, according to John Chilcot, a former top British civil servant, whose seven-year-long inquiry heaped blame on British politicians, intelligence officials, diplomats and generals for their role in the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq.
Seeking a Role
The diplomats worry that the 1962 remarks of Dean Acheson, a former U.S. secretary of state, about Britain’s position in the world, will start becoming true, albeit belatedly.
In a speech at West Point, the U.S. military academy - and to the anger of the British media - Acheson said, “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role, that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, a role based on being head of a ‘Commonwealth’ which has no political structure, or unity, or strength - this role is about played out.”
Even before Brexit, the U.S. foreign policy establishment was questioning Britain’s reliability as the go-to-country for support. The 2013 vote by British lawmakers rejecting taking military action against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government to deter the use of chemical weapons took Washington aback.
France has been far more active in Africa and the Middle East against jihadists than Britain, note U.S. officials, who, like Obama, are keen now to refer to France as America’s “oldest ally.”
Before arriving in Poland for last week’s NATO summit, Obama sought to reassure Britons. “The special relationship between the U.S. and the UK will endure,” he wrote in the Financial Times.
While no one doubts Britain will remain a key player in transatlantic relations, and an important contributor to European security, few British diplomats appear to think it will be as in the past the key player.
Noticeably, at the NATO summit, U.S. diplomats didn’t schedule any private meetings between President Obama and outgoing Prime Minister David Cameron.
Comments
To see more on the neocon connection re: the "special relationship" between the U.S. and Britain, see the following article from The Guardian:
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/oct/23/foreignpolicy.iraq
Note here the suggestion that, as per the neocons, military force is not only to be used in defense and as a last resort-- but as an instrument of foreign policy offense as in days of old, for example, to facilitate the promotion of our (the U.S. and Britain's) common values, way of life, way of governance, and common foreign policy agenda (see below) etc.
Likewise note how it is observed that this such agenda is considered to be "almost imperial in scope."
In this latter regard, note that back-in-the-day, Schumpeter observed that "colonization" was necessary to overcome the "cultural backwardness" of other states and societies; this so that the Western/ commercial nations might penetrate these regions and enjoy "normal economic intercourse" and "free trade" via the exploitation of same. (Today, the neocon's tout "nation-building" as the means to achieve these exact same ends?)
With the end of the Old Cold War (and the end of needing to focus on containing the values, the way of life, etc., of communism), this imperial impulse, central Western/commercial desire and associated mandate returned.
The Clinton administration, in 1993, would announce the United States formal movement in this direction with such documents as then-National Security Advisor Anthony Lakes' "From Containment to Enlargement."
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html
As the above "Guardian" article indicates, Tony Blair is "on-board" soon thereafter.
Bottom Line:
This (neocons?) like-minded determination and goal -- to overcome (via force of arms if necessary; as back in Schumpeter's and Callwell's day) the problems that "cultural backwardness" presents to the optimum achievement of "normal economic intercourse" and "free trade" (and, thereby, peace and prosperity) throughout the world -- this appears to be the matter that best attests to the "special relationship" between the U.S. and Britain: both immediately following the Old Cold War of yesterday, and still even unto today? (And even in spite of the current crises?)
A potential reason for the continuation of the "special relationship:"
"By the end of the book, Oborne has to conclude that in spite of the disaster of the war – the loss of life, the cost, increased insecurity for Britain, catastrophe for Iraq, and the emergence of ISIS – the neoconservative worldview is still deeply entrenched in British politics. Cameron's participation in a new war in Libya, a return to war in Iraq, and its extension to Syria, are all indications of this."
https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/peter-obornes-not-chilcot-rep…
Herein, a means/methods for continuing to move forward along neocon lines -- flying under the radar as we might say -- being via such things as "shadow wars," to wit: means/methods which, given terrorism, both the American and the British public are likely to (a) approve of and (b) give both a very long lease and a very long leash? (Minus this, then how will the leaders of these countries answer to their populations re: terrorism?)
https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/wests-shadow-war
(Both of such links above provided earlier by davidbfpo.)
Thus, from the neocons' point of view, the fact and increase of terrorism; this gives them both (a) a new lease on life and (b) a means/method/forum by which they might continue to try to achieve their aims.
Bottom Line:
I do not think that the neocons believe that they are either (a) on the wrong track or that (b) our operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, etc., were, in fact, mistakes.
Rather, they seem to take the position that Part I of their Project for a New American Century (primacy/"expanding westernism"- the grand strategy to replace "containing communism" from the Old Cold War?) has been successful; this given that many of the Old Cold War era rulers -- via our recent interventions -- have been deposed.
Part II (transformation of these states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and incorporation into the Western sphere of influence), this to simply take more time, effort and diplomatic, etc., guile.
(This, given that "universal values" -- a critical matter that the neocon's had originally counted on -- was not, and is not in fact, present.)
I added a longer comment to another SWJ piece in January 2016 and my views have not changed since the EU Referendum. Nor would I base an article on listening to diplomats!
The 'Special Relationship' today is based on two key factors: a) a national political judgement that it is in the UK's best interests and b) the close working relationship between our respective military-intelligence-diplomatic partners.
Since the end of the 'Cold War' and after three GWOT wars NO adjustment has been made here to the reality that the UK's national power is shrinking.
There were always critics of the relationship and the burden it meant, today they are more vocal and in my opinion growing. Part of this comes from the fear that the UK is simply 'America's Ghurkha' and follows the USA into conflicts that are not in our national interest. The USA is no longer seen as the ultimate provider of security, as it was in the 'Cold War'. That provider is us alone and MAYBE with others.
Those in the Whitehall-Westminster-Cheltenham corridor have ignored how public opinion has changed. This has not been helped by understandable, but confusing - to Brits who travel to the USA - decisions and actions (well reported in newspapers traditionally friendly to the USA). The numbers of UK visitors to the USA has dropped in part reflecting this; the US$ to UK£ exchange rate has an impact too.
The GWOT has not helped too, yes war weariness is a factor, but when many look at the USA through a human rights and justice lens questions are asked.
Just what exactly does the UK bring to this relationship - that is in the British national interest? I would argue that our military is over-extended and under-resourced. So for example our role "East of Suez" is unwise, especially in the Gulf, where there plety of military capability already. We should stay in Europe. The recent reporting how little has changed after the vote to bomb Syria is a good example.
Does the UK really need a replacement for Trident? There are serious voices arguing it is an expensive political gesture. Leaving aside the problem if Scotland asserts its independence.