www.smallwarsjournal.com

Small Wars Journal

Reference

Site Info

Beirut's Lesson for Future Foreign Policy

Lieutenant Commander Steven K. Westra, USN

CSC 1993

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title:   Beirut's Lesson For Future Foreign Policy

Author:  Lieutenant Commander Steven K. Westra,

         United States Navy

Thesis:  Lessons learned from America's failed Lebanon policy

during 1982-83 are valid today as a means to guide foreign

policy formulation and to assist policymakers in determining

the suitability of using military forces to secure the

objectives of policy in regional conflicts.

Background:  America's Lebanon policy during 1982-83 was in

disarray.  Centralized control of policy in a few individuals

virtually eliminated the traditional interagency debate on the

ends, ways, and means of achieving American goals. As a 

result, those goals became overly aggressive and attempted to

solve virtually all of Lebanon's complex problems

simultaneously. American policy was formulated without

adequate consideration of the complexity of the Lebanese

conflict or its political and religious antecedents.

Additionally, our policy was pursued from a purely American

perspective without consideration of the goals and motivations

of numerous factions involved in the fighting.  As a

consequence of these policy shortcomings, American military

forces were mistakenly committed as a first resort before all

diplomatic and other means had been exhausted.  The U.S.

military mission included peacekeeping and support to the

minority Christian government of Lebanon and the Lebanese

Armed Forces.  However, the Christian government lacked

support from a majority of the Lebanese population.  This

resulted in our forces rapidly becoming non-neutral in the

eyes of most Lebanese factional leaders and their state

sponsors such as Syria and Iran.  Ultimately, our forces

became targets of Lebanon's violence.  The decision to commit

military forces in Lebanon was made despite opposition by the

senior military and civilian leadership of the Armed Forces.

The mistake of using military force in a conflict that did not

have a military solution resulted in the death of 241 American

soldiers and contributed to a humiliating defeat for U.S.

policy in the Middle East.

Recommendation:  Lessons learned from America's policy and

military disaster in Lebanon during 1982-83 remain valid today

and are increasingly important as ethnic conflicts spread in

the aftermath of the Cold War. By submitting future conflicts

to a "Lebanon Test," policymakers will have an in-depth model

delineating the multitude of considerations and pitfalls

affecting policy formulation and the use of military force to

secure the objectives of policy in regional conflicts.

                           OUTLINE

Thesis:  Lessons learned from America's failed Lebanon policy

during 1982-83 are valid today as a means to guide foreign

policy formulation and to assist policymakers in determining

the suitability of using military forces to secure the

objectives of policy in regional conflicts.

I.   Background to 1983 Lebanon civil war

     A.   Political/Military situation

     B.   Terrorism

     C.   Historical considerations

II.  Arab/Israeli conflict

     A.   PLO military operations against Israel

     B.   Lebanon's civil war

     C.   Israeli invasion of Lebanon

III. American Middle East Policy

     A.   Israeli invasion of Lebanon causes rapid changes in

          U.S. policy

     B.   Policy goals aggressive and optimistic

     C.   Centralized control creates problems

IV.  American military involvement

     A.   Original U.S. military mission and Lebanon security

          environment

     B.   Changed  mission and deteriorating security

          environment

     C.   U.S. role in Lebanon becomes non-neutral

V.   Beirut's lessons for the future

     A.   Policy goals need to be realistic

     B.   Centralized control creates problems

     C.   Policy needs to look beyond the American perspective

     D.   Military forces should be committed as a last resort

         BEIRUT'S LESSON FOR FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY

     America's National Security Strategy has shifted from a

focus on the Soviet threat to a focus on regional threats and

opportunities. The military services are currently making the

required changes in doctrine and focus to adequately address

the complex requirements for future employment.  However,

ongoing debates among policymakers over American military

involvement in Bosnia and other regional conflicts bring into

question whether future policy will always adequately assess

when military force is appropriate as an element of grand

strategy to protect U.S. interests.

     Lessons learned from America's policy and military

disaster in Lebanon during 1982-83 remain valid today and are

increasingly important as ethnic conflicts spread in the

aftermath of the Cold War. The key problem of our involvement

in Lebanon was that American military forces were mistakenly

committed in order to solve a complex set of political

problems that had no military solution.  By submitting future

regional conflicts to a "Lebanon Test," policymakers will have

an in-depth model delineating the multitude of considerations

and pitfalls affecting policy formulation and the use of

military force to secure the objectives of policy in regional

conflicts.

     The political/military situation in Lebanon in 1982

exemplified virtually every unresolved dispute with which the

Middle East was grappling.  Lebanon, roughly the size of

Connecticut, had a population of three million people,

seventeen officially recognized religious sects, and twenty-

four paramilitary organizations and militias.  Also, the

country was occupied by the Israeli and Syrian armies.

Lebanon had become a convenient war zone, where Israel, Syria,

the PLO, Iraq, Iran, Libya, the USSR, and others either vied

for control and influence directly or used the anarchy and

abundance of willing surrogates to further "fuel the fire" in

pursuit of goals that were often obscure to American

policymakers.

     In Lebanon during 1982-83, there existed the spectrum of

low-intensity conflict.  Concurrent wars were waged by an

assortment of regular armies, guerrillas, private militias,

and various terrorist groups. Terrorism, specifically, was an

accepted form of warfare by numerous factions.  It was

commonplace for terrorists to hold press conferences to

justify their actions to the world, indicating how complex the

Lebanon security environment was at the time. Governments and

individuals who had major interests in the outcome of the

struggle in Lebanon, or were against U.S. involvement in

Lebanon, found the country a very conducive environment for

terrorist warfare, where the rewards carried minimum risk and

cost.  In 1982-83, terrorists were intensely dedicated, well-

trained, and well-supported.  State sponsorship helped the

terrorists to be less concerned about building a popular base

of support, enabling them to be less inhibited in committing

acts that caused massive destruction and inflicted heavy

casualties. (4:128)

     This view of Lebanon, and the Lebanese people, is vastly

different from the Lebanon that existed before civil war

erupted in 1975.  Lebanese are known throughout the world for

having the highest regard for the arts, sciences, and academic

freedom. These values were fostered in pre-civil war Lebanon.

A knowledge of the history and geography of Lebanon is

necessary to understand what caused the country to become

immersed in civil war.

     The Lebanese people are not united with a sense of

national identity.  Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Maronite and

Greek Orthodox Christians, and Druze interpret their Lebanese

identity differently.  In antiquity, Lebanon was comprised of

Mount Lebanon, a highland chain running from north to south

through present day Lebanon. Maronite Christians, in relative

isolation on Mount Lebanon for over 1,000 years, developed

their own sense of identity.  France created the state of

Lebanon in 1924 by adding territory from the former Ottoman

empire.  This act brought together Christians, Muslims, and

Druze within an artificial boundary.  As a result, Maronite

Christians comprised a minority of the population of the newly

created state.  The Sunni Muslims had been preeminent in the

Ottoman Empire and believed they were part of a "greater

Syria," not a "greater Lebanon."  They were opposed to being

ruled by the Maronites.  The unwritten "National Pact" of 1943

was struck by Maronite and Sunni elites as the French prepared

to depart Lebanon.  This agreement stipulated that the

President and Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief would always be

a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the

Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite Muslim, and for

every five non-Christian deputies there would be six

Christians.  As a result, the future survival of the country

was dependent upon sectarian cooperation and the maintenance

of a delicate balance of power, all guided by an unwritten

constitution.

     The Arab-Israeli conflict slowly destroyed Lebanon's

fragile political system.  The arrival of large numbers of

Palestinians into Lebanon in 1948 and 1967, followed by

thousands of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters

and the PLO leadership in 1971, contributed to Lebanon

becoming an armed "state within a state."  In 1968, the PLO

commenced military operations against Israel from bases in

southern Lebanon.  The PLO, in order to strengthen its

position, formed alliances with various Lebanese dissident

groups who hoped to use PLO military strength to support their

various revolutionary causes.  The PLO-Israeli confrontation

in southern Lebanon eventually began to polarize the Lebanese

along confessional lines, with Maronite Christians opposing

the PLO presence in Lebanon and the Muslims generally

supporting the PLO.  Many of the sectarian groups and local

power brokers that had contributed to the delicate political

balance of power in Lebanon eventually sought their own agenda

and solutions with support from foreign sources.  These

sources included, but were not limited to, Syria, Israel,

Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the USSR.  The result was civil war in

Lebanon beginning in 1975.  Syria, fearing that its previous

support of the PLO and the PLO's allies in Lebanon would

eventually result in a war with Israel, intervened in support

of the Christians and to end the civil war.  As a result, in

1976 Lebanon became a country that was divided geographically

and along sectarian lines, with the Syrian army occupying

portions of the country.

     The stalemate in Lebanon was broken in June 1982 when

Israeli forces launched an offensive into southern Lebanon.

Israel sought to end the military and political power of the

PLO, to create a secure environment in northern Israel, and to

break the internal Lebanese political gridlock in a way that

would allow for formal relations between Israel and Lebanon.

Events surrounding the Israeli invasion proved to be the

catalyst that eventually resulted in U.S. involvement in

Lebanon.

     Israel's invasion of Lebanon brought about a rapid

transition in America's Middle East policy.  During this time

frame,  Lebanon's Christian president was assassinated,

hundreds of unarmed Palestinians and other civilians were

massacred at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and the

Israelis laid siege to Beirut.  As a result, President Reagan

decided that increased American involvement in Lebanon was

necessary to end the fighting.  President Reagan's new policy

sought the resolution of all of Lebanon's complex problems

while simultaneously bolstering American prestige in the

region.  American policy sought to end the civil war, secure

the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces, prop-up the

minority Maronite Christian government, secure a homeland for

the Palestinians, and win a de-facto victory over the Soviet

Union by evicting the Syrians from Lebanon.

     These goals, by any standards of foreign policy, were

highly aggressive and extremely difficult to achieve.  There

existed no coordinated plan on how to resolve the complex

religious and political antecedents of the civil war itself.

American policy pursued the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian

forces from Lebanon.  However, it failed to include Syrian

President Assad in the negotiations and failed to anticipate

Israeli reluctance to withdraw from Lebanon while the Syrians

remained.  Our policy of supporting the Maronite Christian

government ignored the fact that there was little popular

support in Lebanon for that government.  There was no

coordinated strategy for resolving the Palestinian issue.

Perhaps the greatest problem with our policy was the fact that

America's past support of Israel had created a perception in

the Arab world that any U.S. policy in Lebanon would be

favorable to Israeli interests.  This created a credibility

problem for America in its attempt to accomplish such an

optimistic policy in Lebanon.

     President Reagan gave special Middle East envoy Philip

Habib extraordinary powers to formulate foreign policy for

Lebanon.  According to a State Department official, "Habib

. . . took the decision-making process by storm." The official

also stated, "In Habib, you had a guy who was on the scene,

who has an imposing history, who's respected, and who has the

confidence of the President and acts accordingly."  Habib and

selected members of the NSC exercised centralized control of

American Middle East policy, with no traditional interagency

debate as to ends, ways, or means of achieving the goals.

Habib made the decisions and often merely informed the State

Department of where policy was headed.(5)  Because of this

centralized control of policy, goals were established based on

an optimistic assessment of what America would like to achieve

versus what we were capable of achieving.  A key element of

Reagan's new policy was the commitment of U.S. forces as a

means to guarantee the security of the Gemayel government.

According to Middle East scholar George W. Ball, the U.S., in

Lebanon, repeated the mistake of Vietnam:  "the belief that,

with resolute will and vast resources, America could mix in

the internal affairs of a small country with exotic customs

and values and effectively impose a papier-mâché regime on all

the warring factions."(2:18)   In Lebanon, the U.S. had

committed to supporting the minority Christian government

without adequately assessing the impact this support would

have on the Muslim population and various political and

religious groups and alliances opposed to the government. The

Christian government not only lacked support from the Muslim

population but suffered from a lack of support from a

significant portion of the Christian community.

     American forces were used for the first time in Lebanon

in June 1982 as Israeli forces prepared to institute a

military blockade of Beirut.  A NEO was conducted on 23

June by the 32nd MAU to evacuate U.S. citizens through the

port city of Juniyah.  A multi-national force (MNF) consisting

of the 32nd MAU, along with French and Italian contingents,

assisted in the evacuation of 15,000 armed Palestinian and

Syrian forces from Beirut on 2 July in an effort aimed at

preventing full scale war in Beirut.  U.S. forces, along with

the other MNF contingents, were withdrawn by 10 September 1982

after successfully completing their missions.  However, during

the period 14-18 September 1982, Lebanese President Bashir

Gemayel was assassinated, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF)

occupied West Beirut, and Palestinian and Lebanese civilians

were massacred at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.  This

massacre had particular significance since the IDF, reportedly

allowed anti-PLO elements access to the camps in order to

commit the massacre.  These events resulted in a decision

by the U.S., France, and Italy to reconstitute the MNF.  

For America, a move back into Beirut was seen as necessary 

since the U.S. had guaranteed the safety of the camps as part

of the withdrawal agreement to evacuate the 15,000 PLO

fighters from Beirut on 2 July. The 32nd MAU moved into

Beirut on 29 September.  American policy now sought to use

Marine forces within the MNF as a peacekeeping force and to

provide support to the new Lebanese government of Amin

Gemayel, all geared toward stabilizing the political and

military environment.  A critical element of this policy

included Marine Mobile Training Teams in support of the

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

     The following mission statement was provided to USCINCEUR

by the JCS Alert Order of 23 September 1983:

     To establish an environment which will permit the

     Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their

     responsibilities in the Beirut area.  When

     directed, USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as

     part of a multinational force presence in the

     Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a

     designated section of the line from south of the

     Beirut International Airport to a position in the

     vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to

     protect U.S. forces; and, on order, conduct

     retrograde operations as required.

Additional tasking included the direction that U.S. forces

would not be engaged in combat, peacetime rules of engagement

would apply, USCINCEUR would be prepared to extract forces if

required by hostile action, air and naval gunfire support

would be provided to forces ashore as required, and liaison

teams would be provided to the LAF.  The commitment of U.S.

forces was contingent upon the Government of Lebanon and the

LAF providing for the security of the MNF from factional

fighting.  This included guarantees that armed factions would

respect the neutrality of the MNF and neither engage nor

interfere with their activities.  Special envoy Habib was

given confirmation that agreements had been reached with all

the armed factions.  As a result, American forces were

initially sent into a relatively benign military environment.

According to the Long Commission Report, "It was anticipated

that the USMNF would be perceived by the various factions as

evenhanded and neutral and that this perception would hold

through the expected 60 day duration of the operation."  In

the beginning of the operation, American troops were welcomed

by the majority of Lebanese in Beirut as a stabilizing force.

This initial, non-hostile period of operations had ended by

March 1983.(4:39)

     U.S. forces increasingly became the target of factional

violence.  The most significant early incidents were a grenade

attack on a USMNF patrol on 16 March and the attack on the

U.S. Embassy in Beirut on 18 April.  In August, factional

groups began launching rocket, artillery and mortar attacks

against Marine positions at BIA.  Marines returned fire for

the first time on 28 August.  During September, fighting

between the LAF and Druze increased dramatically, especially

in the vicinity of Suq-Al-Gharb, a strategic area of high

ground overlooking the Marine positions at BIA.  Also, Marine

forces were conducting counter-battery fire regularly while

under attack from various militia groups.  On 16 September,

U.S. Naval gunfire support was used in response to shelling of

BIA and the U.S. Ambassadors residence.  On 19 September,

Naval gunfire was used again to support LAF forces fighting

for control of Suq-Al-Gharb.  LAF forces were engaged in

intense fighting with Druze and various factions throughout

August and September, and were supplied by U.S. ammunition

from the MAU, CONUS, and USCINCEUR stocks.  The U.S. was

rapidly becoming non-neutral in the eyes of many Lebanese and

the Naval gunfire support to the LAF left no doubt to the

various factions that the U.S. had taken sides in the

conflict.  As a result, U.S. forces were seen by a majority of

the belligerents in Lebanon and the region as just another

militia competing for control and influence.  American policy

had made the error of taking sides in the conflict in support

of a government that lacked popular support.  The policy also

sought to support the LAF, which lacked the capability to

effectively defend against the various warring factions,

inevitably drawing the U.S. into the fight.  The Long

Commission Report found that policy decisions during this time

frame were characterized by an emphasis on military options

and the expansion of the U.S. military role.  This occurred

despite the fact that the conditions upon which the security

of the USMNF were originally based continued to deteriorate as

progress toward a diplomatic solution slowed.  The Commission

reported that policy decisions may have been taken without

clear recognition that the initial conditions had dramatically

changed and that our expanding military involvement greatly

increased the risk to U.S. forces in Lebanon.  The Long

Commission made the following recommendation regarding U.S.

policy in Lebanon:  "The Commission recommends that the

Secretary of Defense continue to urge that the National

Security Council undertake a reexamination of alternative

means of achieving U.S. objectives in Lebanon, to include a

comprehensive assessment of the military security options

being developed by the chain of command and a more vigorous

and demanding approach to pursuing diplomatic alternatives."

(4) This finding, which was published after the bombing of

the Marine barracks on 23 October, occurred too late to

change our Lebanon policy in time to avoid the extensive

loss of life.  Nevertheless,  policymakers had received

numerous reports in 1983 from the National Intelligence

Agencies, indicating clearly that U.S. forces were perceived

by the warring factions as having become actively involved

in the conflict on the side of the LAF.  These warnings had

no appreciable impact on our policy.

     In order to avoid disasters like Lebanon in the future,

American foreign policy goals need to be realistic and

achievable.  The policy formulation process should include an

assessment of how a balance of the political, diplomatic,

economic, and military resources of the U.S. can be best used

in order to secure our interests.  American policy in Lebanon

was idealistic, and there was no strategy to accomplish our

extremely aggressive goals.  In future regional conflicts,

military forces should never be committed without clear and

compelling evidence that all other means have been

ineffective, and that there is a military solution to the

problem.

     The President is ultimately responsible for foreign

policy decisions.  However, the centralized control of

America's Lebanon policy during 1982-83 resulted in the

failure of policymakers to provide the President with a viable

strategy for policy and failed to anticipate, for the

President, the complexity of the Lebanon problem and the

danger to military forces deployed in Lebanon.  This

centralized control of policy not only contributed to the

establishment of overly aggressive goals, it effectively

eliminated the expertise on the Lebanon situation that had

warned against U.S. military  involvement.  In future

conflicts, foreign policy must not unilaterally ignore the

recommendations of senior foreign policy experts and the

civilian and military leadership of the Armed Forces.  To do

so imperils the lives of American soldiers, is counter-

productive to U.S. interests, and ultimately contributes to

American policy repeating past mistakes.

     Foreign policy goals for future regional or low-intensity

conflicts need to be established by first analyzing the

problem from the eyes of the belligerents, not from a purely

American perspective.  The situation in Lebanon virtually

demanded that policymakers have a knowledge of the goals and

motivations of the factions and their state sponsors, in

addition to the historical antecedents of the conflict, before

rational and achievable policy goals could be established.

Before American forces are committed to secure policy goals in

future regional conflicts, policymakers must accurately assess

the suitability of using military forces.  A key to this

assessment will be how American military forces are perceived

by the citizens/military forces of the country we are going

into and whether the U.S. is seen as part of the problem or

part of the solution.

     It is generally accepted that the use of military force

is an extension of policy by other means and that it should be

used as a last resort after all diplomatic means have been

exhausted.  In Lebanon, military forces were used as a first

resort in support of policy.  The military mission was never

clear, either to policymakers or the forces themselves.  They

were employed as a peacekeeping force in an extremely complex

low-intensity conflict where American policy goals clearly

supported a minority government. American forces were seen by

most Lebanese as just another force vying for goals contrary

to their own.

     American  policy  in  Lebanon  during  1982-83  was  in

disarray.  Centralized control eliminated the healthy

interagency debate that would have provided policy focus

through an assessment of the ends, ways, and means of that

policy.  American policy did not take into consideration the

complexity of the Lebanese conflict or its history, and our

policy was pursued from a purely American perspective without

adequately considering the goals and motivations of the

various factions.  American forces were mistakenly used as a

first resort rather than as a last resort.  The mistake of

using military forces in a conflict that did not have a

military solution resulted in the death of 241 American

soldiers and a humiliating defeat for U.S. policy in the

Middle East.  Policymakers need to know, and remember, what

went wrong in Lebanon to adequately understand what the U.S.

is capable of achieving with military forces in the future in

regional conflicts.  The religious and geopolitical roots of

the Lebanon conflict, the multitude of belligerents and

conflicting issues involved, and the involvement of regional

players, looked at in terms of U.S. policy at the time, offer

policymakers unique lessons that can be used to support future

policy formulation.  Most importantly, if we are to benefit

from the difficult lessons of the past, Lebanon should serve

as a "test" for determining when to use military force to

secure American interests in regional conflicts.

                       BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.   Alnwick, Kenneth J. and Thomas A. Fabyanic.  Warfare in

          Lebanon.     Washington,  DC:  National  Defense

          University, 1988.

2.   Ball,  George  W.    Error and Betrayal  in  Lebanon.

         Washington, DC:   Foundation For Middle East Peace,

          1984.

3.   Central Intelligence Agency.  The World Factbook 1992.

          Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

          1992.

4.   Department of Defense.  Report of the DOD Commission on

          Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October

          23, 1983.   DOD "Long Commission" report on the

          bombing of the Marine barracks 20 December 1983.

5.   Kennedy, David and Leslie Brunetta.    Lebanon and the

          Intelligence Community.  President and Fellows of

          Harvard College, 1988.

6.   U.S. Army and Air Force.  Field Manual 100-20, Military

          Operations In Low Intensity Conflict.  Washington,

          DC: Headquarters Departments of the Army and the

          Air Force, 5 December 1990.