‘Winning the War’: Planning for Integrated, Synchronized, and Simultaneous Operations

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

‘Winning the War’: Planning for Integrated, Synchronized, and Simultaneous Operations by
Major Heather J. Warden, United States Army, 54 pages.

This monograph provides the context for a better understanding and appreciation of the
difficulties U.S. military planners face in their labors to develop an effective plan to ‘win the war.
‘Winning the war’ is not as simple as defeating an adversary, it also requires operations aimed at
restoring the peace and societal reconstruction. The military cannot win a war by itself, yet the
plans that it develops are the foundation from which the government pursues its objectives. Thus,
it is imperative that military plans integrate and synchronize combat operations and postwar
operations to achieve effectively the overall strategic objective.

The monograph examines the development of plans for Operation JUST CAUSE, the 1989
military operation conducted Panama to remove Manuel Noriega from power; Operation
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the 1994 military operation conducted in Haiti to restore the
legitimately elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide; and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the
2003 military operation conducted to remove Saddam Hussein from power and establish a
democratic-like state. Additionally this monograph reviews joint doctrine to establish the
concepts and frameworks in which military planners think about the use of force and develop war
plans.

The historical case studies reveal three trends in military planning that contribute to an overall
ineffectiveness in planning to ‘win’. First, the plans developed for each of these operations were
bifurcated; planners developed individual plans to address the use of force in combat (a high
intensity environment) and to address post-hostilities operations (a low intensity environment).
Second, coordination between all the government agencies responsible in some way for achieving
the overall objective was ineffective or nonexistent. Third, classification and
compartmentalization of planning efforts restricted the ability to assemble the required experts to
develop a coordinated and integrated plan. The doctrinal review reveals that current doctrine
does not adequately address planning to guide planners to develop effective plans to ‘win wars’.
Based on the findings this monograph makes four recommendations in two broad categories,
changes to doctrinal concepts and frameworks and other planning process improvements.
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INTRODUCTION

FIGHTING A WAR can cost more in blood and money than any other undertaking in which nations engage. And to wage war, governments develop more detailed plans, establish a more rigid organization, and institute tighter discipline than for any other national effort. Yet, despite all this elaborate and intense dedication, the grand design is often woefully incomplete. Usually, in fact, it is not grand enough: most of the exertion is devoted to the means – perfecting the military instruments and deciding on their use in battles and campaigns – and far too little is left for relating these means to their ends.

Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End*

How many times do we have to pay to repeat our failures? Despite the U.S. Armed Forces’ proven ability to plan and execute combat operations to achieve decisive military objectives, military planning to achieve strategic objectives effectively as alluded to by Iklé is often inadequate. Historically the military has primarily focused planning efforts on achieving a decisive victory over the adversary. Upon successfully defeating the enemy, the military has reluctantly assumed responsibility for planning the critical tasks of restoring the peace and reconstruction. If one accepts that ‘winning a war’ includes establishing a lasting peace, then past military planning efforts have fallen short of developing a comprehensive plan to ‘win’. The United States’ situation in Iraq almost one year after the conclusion of major combat operations serves as an ongoing reminder of the importance of effectively planning military operations to not only achieve military objectives in the most efficient manner, but to ensure that military operations set the conditions to achieve the desired political policy or goal. The purpose of this monograph is to examine military planning in the context of developing a military plan to ‘win the war’.

It is not the intent of this paper to advocate that military actions alone can ‘win a war.’ War can only be won by the development of a strategic plan that integrates all elements of national power to achieve the desired objective. Military operations are only one component of such a plan.
Since the beginning of history, war has been an inevitable part of human existence. To some, war is a term reserved to describe armed conflict as expansive and destructive as that of World War I and World War II. However, for the purpose of this monograph the term war means using military force to achieve a political objective or goal.\textsuperscript{2} This more encompassing understanding of war is used because it is inclusive of what is commonly accepted as U.S. military interventions, but not necessarily accepted as war.

Historically, the United States and its allies have intervened by using military force to achieve four general aims:

- to enforce international law or agreements made based on an interpretation or understanding of them

- “to gain control of transnational terrorists or criminal organizations in areas where governments have little control or are supportive of such activities”

- “to defeat the regular and irregular forces of a government engaged in ‘crimes against humanity’”

- to reinstate an elected government illegally disposed by force.”\textsuperscript{3}

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. military has been called to intervene more than it had been called upon in the past 100 years.

**The Strategic Environment**

The post-Cold War environment and the ongoing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) pose many security challenges to the United States. “It can be expected that nations, transnational actors, and non-state entities will challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the

\textsuperscript{2} This definition is a permutation of two senses from *Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*: sense 1a(1), “a state of usu. [usually] open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations,” and sense 2b, “a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a particular end.” This definition is also in line with Carl von Clausewitz’s interpretation that war is the means to achieve a political object.

\textsuperscript{3} Huba Wass de Czege, “Why We Need a Strong Army,” *Army*, February 2004, 44.
The concept of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare.” The continuance of globalization will create friction among governments, organizations, cultures, and religious faiths. Currently 30 of the 193 nation-states “have the potential for failure as a consequence of under-representative governance, an inability to meet the needs of their populations, lack of access to resources or markets (2.8 billion people live on less than $2.00/day and 1.1 billion lack access to safe water), or as a product of ethnic, cultural, or religious friction.” “Expanding webs of social, economic, political, military, and information architectures will afford opportunity for some regional powers to compete on a broader and more influential scale and emerge on the global landscape with considerable influence. In addition, regional power structures are likely to alter continuously, as regional conflicts, civil wars, and transnational actors reshape existing norms.”

Military operations in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and other areas around the world indicate the primacy of the military instrument of power in American foreign policy. Dana Priest in her book, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping the Peace With America’s Military*, details the dependence on the military to shape and in many respects manage foreign affairs. If the recent past is an accurate indicator, then it is conceivable that the U.S. Armed Forces will be required to intervene for reasons previously discussed. The majority of these actions will take place in developing countries and nations that lack or do not possess effective governments, political structures and/or economies. Ethnicity, religion, and poverty will add complexity to the environment along with other collapsing functions of the state, particularly basic services and rule of law. The sheer complexity of the environment in which future wars will be fought will challenge the military’s ability to plan to ‘win.’

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5 Ibid., 71-72.

6 Ibid., 70-71.
Academicians, professional soldiers, politicians, and career civil/government servants have conducted detailed studies on ‘winning wars’, yet ‘winning the war’ does not have a universal meaning. Among the general population ‘winning the war’ often connotes one armed force defeating another armed force. However, among scholars of policy and armed conflict ‘winning the war’ not only includes defeating an adversary but also achieving national strategic goals and objectives which often includes instilling a lasting peace and or energizing the process of societal reconstruction. This second connotation is supported in joint doctrine; “But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis.”

Although the military’s non-negotiable contract is to ‘fight and win the nations wars,’ it also has the responsibility to “advance and defend other important national interests and objectives.” Doctrinally the military advertises an ability to conduct operations across the full spectrum or range of military operations. However, the Department of Defense and more specifically uniformed military personnel are quick to assert that their primary function is to defeat an adversary. It is one of the enduring aspects of American military culture not to accept the importance of operations/missions that are not wholly about fighting wars. Yet, in order to achieve victory in future wars, the complexity of the environment will require the military to conduct major combat operations and stabilization and reconstruction operations simultaneously and in an integrated and synchronized manner. Thus, it is imperative to address and develop a methodology to effectively plan within this context.


Methodology and Criteria.

To analyze military planning in the context of developing a military plan to ‘win the war’, it is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of planning doctrine as well as examine how the military has planned in past operations. The review of doctrine will capture current concepts and constructs on the process of planning, integrating and synchronizing operations. Three case studies will provide a historical context of past planning experiences. Comparative analysis based on the following criteria should provide significant insight to potential doctrine changes or tactic, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for organizing planning cells and developing integrated plans.

Determining the effectiveness of military planning to win wars is very subjective because effectiveness is relative to where one sits. This paper measures the effectiveness of planning by the following three criteria:

- Is the planning cell organized to facilitate integration of all the elements of national power toward a common endstate?
- Does the planning cell translate policy aims into tasks and assign responsibility for execution?
- Are major combat operations and stability and support operations integrated and synchronized?

Clearly, the U.S. Armed Forces must maintain its superior ability to plan for and execute operations in a conventional fight or other high intensity conflict environment. However, just as clearly we should ensure that we are capable of planning operations that effectively achieve strategic success. This may mean that future war plans challenge historical approaches and doctrinal thinking.
CASE STUDIES

History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy. But as most of the thinking about war has been done by men of the military profession there has been a very natural tendency to lose sight of the basic national object, and identify it with the military aim.

B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*

Reflecting on how planners developed plans for past military operations can provide insights into how to develop plans for future wars. This section examines the process in which planners developed plans for military operations following the implementation of the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols). Each case study selected required plans for operations across the spectrum of conflict, from high intensity to low intensity, in order to achieve the desired strategic objective. The three case studies examined are Operation JUST CAUSE, the 1989 military operation conducted Panama to remove Manuel Noriega from power; Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the 1994 military operation conducted in Haiti to restore the legitimately elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide; and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 2003 military operation conducted to remove Saddam Hussein from power and establish a democratic-like state. The hypothesis is that there will be clearly identifiable trends with respect to the evaluation criteria as discussed in the introduction.
PANAMA (Operation JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY)

Overview (Why the US Became Involved)\(^9\)

The United States’ relations with Panama began deteriorating in June 1987 when the Panamanian dictator, General Manuel Noriega, “was implicated in the murder of prominent Panamanian politician Hugo Spadafora.”\(^10\) The U.S. imposed sanctions against Noriega in the fall of 1987 and on 5 February 1988, the U.S. Federal Court indicted Noriega for involvement in drug trafficking and thereby accelerated the Reagan administration’s desire to remove Noriega from power. The United States explored various policies and options that ranged from imposing sanctions and encouraging a Panamanian solution, to the use of military force in order to remove Noriega from power. On 25 February 1988, Panamanian President Eric Delvalle tried to fire General Noriega and Noriega responded by naming Solis Palma as Delvalle’s successor. In March, Panama Defense Force (PDF) officers attempted a coup but failed to seize power from Noriega. These failed attempts to remove Noriega from power confirmed U.S. doubts that Panama could oust Noriega by itself. Throughout 1988 and 1989, General Noriega continued to monopolize power within Panama and harass U.S. citizens. In March 1989, the PDF seized 21 U.S. school buses transporting the children of U.S. military and civilian personnel stationed in


\[^10\] Oakley, 45. “Spadafora … had fallen out of favor with Noriega and was apprehended, brutally tortured, and beheaded by members of the PDF” in September of 1985.
Panama. In May, Noriega nullified the election results and live TV coverage of the elections caught his followers brutally beating Billy Ford, one of President-elect Guillermo Endara’s vice-presidential running mates. In order to confront Noriega and the PDF’s harassment of U.S. citizens, the Bush administration deployed forces from U.S. installations to augment forces stationed in Panama. The forces conducted exercises to enforce the “treaty rights of free passage through Panama.”11 These exercises, known as PURPLE STORMS and SAND FLEAS, did little to deter Noriega and his PDF. By late August, there were 300 incidents of PDF harassment of U.S. citizens and soldiers. On 15 December, “the National Assembly passed a resolution that a state of war existed with the United States, and Noriega named himself the Maximum Leader.”12 On 16 December, the PDF shot and killed Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz at a checkpoint near Noriega’s headquarters and witnesses to the incident, a Navy Lieutenant and his wife, were detained and assaulted. This last action caused the Bush administration to intervene in Panama to achieve four strategic objectives: “protect American lives, ensure the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties, restore Panamanian democracy, and bring Manuel Noriega to justice.”13

The Plans

Planning for potential military operations in Panama was conducted under the direction of two Combatant Commanders, General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr. and General Maxwell R. Thurman, and spanned over two years. Each commander influenced the planning process based upon his understanding of the desired political endstate during his tenure.

11 Ibid., 47.
12 Cole, 2.
13 Fishel, 4.
Planning Under General Woerner

In April 1987, General Woerner assumed command of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) just prior to the heightening of tensions between the U.S. and Noriega. Despite his understanding that the Reagan Administration had prohibited the use of military force to solve the Noriega crisis, General Woerner directed his staff to begin contingency planning for potential military operations in November 1987. General Woerner and his staff developed a series of plans named ELABORATE MAZE that “covered a wide range of combat and post-combat operations.” On 28 February 1988, following indictment of Noriega, the “Joint Chiefs of Staff directed . . . U.S. Southern Command . . . to revise contingency plans intended to protect U.S. lives and property, to keep open the Canal, to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in peaceful or hostile environments, and to develop a plan to assist any government that might replace the Noriega regime.” Upon receipt of the planning directive, the SOUTHCOM and US Army South (USARSO) staffs began work on the ELABORATE MAZE plans, which were held strictly within Department of Defense (DoD) channels.

While planning for military contingency operations, General Woerner also pursued a coordinated strategy to deal with Panama. In conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in Panama, he and his staff developed a plan, called FISSURES. The plan relied on “coordinated interagency efforts to split Noriega from the rest of the PDF leadership (and the civilian leadership of the regime as well) which would result in an internal Panamanian resolution of the problem of Noriega, nudged along by a coordinated series of U.S. actions.” These actions included

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14 Donnelly, 15-17.
15 Ibid., 18
16 Cole, 7.
17 Fishel, 7.
initiatives, developed by the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, designed to create friction between Noriega and the PDF.\textsuperscript{18} General Woerner forwarded this strategy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and received no reply. He updated the strategy and resubmitted the plan, FISSURES II, to the JCS with the caveat “that the plan was integrated and holistic and could not be executed piecemeal. The only answer he received to FISSURES II was to execute individual pieces!”\textsuperscript{19} General Woerner’s attempt to develop an integrated approach that included all elements of power never gained traction within defense channels; the JCS continued to direct the focus of the planning effort to the ELABORATE MAZE plans that were being worked strictly within defense channels.

President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Carlucci, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Crowe, approved SOUTHCOM’s ELABORATE MAZE concept, which included building up a mass of forces on U.S. bases in Panama in order to either intimidate the PDF into overthrowing General Noriega or to conduct an invasion of Panama territory and overthrow the PDF.\textsuperscript{20} Following the concept approval, “Chairman Crowe asked General Woerner to break down ELABORATE MAZE into four separate operations orders to facilitate execution.”\textsuperscript{21} These four operations orders were collectively named PRAYER BOOK and were designed to be implemented “independently, concurrently, or in sequence.”\textsuperscript{22}
The first operations order, KLONDIKE KEY, detailed the plan for conducting noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in the event the U.S. government determined that U.S. citizens could no longer reside in Panama safely. The second operations order, POST TIME, detailed the plan for deploying forces to Panama from the U.S. to augment forces already stationed there in order to protect U.S. interests and intimidate the PDF. The third operations order, BLUE SPOON, detailed the plan for a “joint offensive operation to defeat and dismantle the Panama Defense Force while protecting U.S. lives, U.S. property and the Canal.”23 The fourth operations order, BLIND LOGIC, was a three-phased operation in which the U.S. military would provide a secure environment; restore essential services and transfer authority to a legitimate and functioning Panamanian government; and establish a defense force responsive to civilian control.24

From the beginning, planning for BLUE SPOON, the combat operation, took precedence over the other operations orders. The SOUTHCOM Directorate of Operations (SCJ3) developed the initial plan for BLUE SPOON in conjunction with USARSO, which would become Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, the command headquarters for conventional ground operations. The initial concept included the execution of POST TIME over a two-week period to build up forces, consisting of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and a Marine expeditionary force, which would fall under the operational control of JTF Panama. These forces, in addition to the 193rd Infantry Brigade stationed in Panama, would conduct offensive operations aimed at dismantling the PDF; a Special Operations Task Force would conduct operations aimed at capturing Noriega and other critical infrastructure; and a naval carrier would provide air power.25 After 15 months of refining,

23 Cole, 8.
24 Ibid., 9.
25 Ibid., 8.
the plan’s concept evolved to include the deployment of the XVIII\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Corps to assume command and control of conventional operations from JTF Panama once all forces on the deployment listing arrived in Panama.\textsuperscript{26}

During the SCJ3’s initial development of the BLUE SPOON plan the SOUTHCOM Directorate of Strategy, Plans and Policy (SCJ5) conducted a secondary planning effort to develop the BLIND LOGIC plan, originally known as KRYSTAL BALL. Planners based the initial concept of this plan on the assumption that the Commander of USSOUTHCOM would temporarily run the Panamanian government until a functioning Panamanian civilian government was in place. SOUTHCOM relied on Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) officers assigned to the 361\textsuperscript{st} CA Brigade, which was its CAPSTONE unit and had augmented the SCJ5 since 1983, to develop the details of the plan.\textsuperscript{27} The initial plan divided Panama into three areas of operation, each controlled by a reserve CA unit that would conduct operations focusing on “public safety (law and order), public health, education, public administration, and economic restoration.”\textsuperscript{28} The plan designated the SCJ5 as Commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force (COMCMOTF), which would be the operational headquarters to execute the BLIND LOGIC plan.

**Planning Under General Maxwell R. Thurman**

Following the U.S. adoption of a tougher policy toward Noriega, DoD announced on 22 July 1989 that General Maxwell R. Thurman would assume command of USSOUTHCOM. Prior to his actual assumption of command on 30 September 1989, General Thurman began to influence planning for potential operations in Panama. In August, the XVIII\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Corps staff briefed General Thurman on a revised concept for the BLUE SPOON plan based on their analysis. The

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{27} Fishel, 8-10. CAPSTONE refers to the alignment of a reserve unit to an active headquarters.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 12.
concept was built around the “rapid application of combat power” as opposed to the gradual build-up of forces. Receptive to the concept, General Thurman gave his approval for the Corps to “set about detailed planning.” Additionally General Thurman determined that a single headquarters should plan and execute operations and he felt that the SOUTHCOM staff was not adequately staffed to execute contingency operations. Thus he notified the XVIIIth Airborne Corps Commander, LTG Carl Stiner, that he would become responsible “for everything that has to be done there [Panama]. Forewarned of General Thurman’s ideas the SOUTHCOM staff began to revise their plans and develop new guidance for the execution headquarters.

After three months of evolution under General Thurman’s guidance, the BLUE SPOON plan reflected the thinking of applying overwhelming combat power. The XVIIIth Airborne Corps, serving as JTF South, would conduct operations to take down the PDF and capture Noriega. Approximately 27,000 personnel would deploy within four to five days. Both the conventional ground force and the special operations force were organized into four task forces. Each task force was assigned missions to execute at targets identified in the planning process.

The SCJ5 and the COMCMOTF planning group working on the BLIND LOGIC plan had conducted a complete update of the plan by the end of August. The revised plan “took account of the involvement of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps as the JTF and, if implemented following BLUE SPOON, it set as the critical condition for execution that combat be at less than platoon strength. At that point, CMO support forces would come under the control of the COMCMOTF. Prior to that point the law and order mission and emergency restoration mission would belong to the JTF.”

Planners felt comfortable that the plan would accomplish the mission whether executed

29 Donnelly, 55.
30 Ibid.
31 Fishel, 21.
independently or in conjunction with BLUE SPOON and they also felt that the XVIII Corps planners were sufficiently aware of the conditions required for execution following combat operations. It was not until after General Thurman assumed command did he learn of the BLIND LOGIC plan but did not provide guidance. Once the major BLUE SPOON revisions under Thurman were completed, the SCJ5 brought the BLIND LOGIC plan to General Thurman’s attention when he recommended that USARSO assume responsibility for executing the plan. General Thurman approved the transfer of responsibility for execution and the SCJ5 began the process of handing over the plan. USARSO never accepted responsibility for the plan. They stood by their belief that the plan had to be coordinated with the U.S. Embassy and other government agencies before they could execute it. For this to happen, SOUTHCOM would have to seek clarification and a change to the compartmentalization and classification of the plan. No priority was placed on this action; thus, the plan remained in its current state. The SCJ5 was responsible for execution and, the SOUTHCOM Commander and the JCS had not approved the plan.

Planning Process Evaluation

Numerous Operation JUST CAUSE studies reveal general agreement that the combat operation to remove General Noriega and the PDF from power was nearly flawless in both planning and execution. However, flawless planning and execution are not descriptors used when discussing post-conflict operations. The discussion turns to the revelation of weakness in the U.S.’s ability to plan and execute post-conflict operations. General Thurman laments this sentiment in a 1992 interview with Dr. Richard H. Schultz.

The warfighting elements are mainly interested in conflict termination as opposed to post-conflict restoration, which is admittedly a problem for us in the military establishment. If I

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32 Ibid., 25.
had been the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, I might have very well said Blind Logic is going to be residual. . . . My task is to conduct the strike force operation and get out. I think the proclivity was to leave the fighting to the warfighter, and the restoration to the people who were in country. SOUTHCOM should have been more attentive to the transition from one phase to the other, but I readily admit it was the last priority on my agenda at the time.\textsuperscript{33}

Essentially the US did not have a coordinated political-military plan designed to achieve the desired political endstate.

The planning process was bifurcated;\textsuperscript{34} there was a planning effort focused on combat operations to remove Noriega and there was a second planning effort focused on post-conflict/post-hostilities operations and restoration of a democratic Panama. Richard Schultz noted this observation in his study on the post-conflict operations. “The plans subsumed under Prayer Book were divided into two separate and largely uncoordinated categories. One focused on the use of military force, the other on postconflict restoration.”\textsuperscript{35} Those planning combat operations perceived the efforts to coordinate and integrate the plans on the part of those planning restoration operations as unimportant. The consequence of the poor coordination between the two planning groups resulted in poorly integrated operations that hampered the ability to achieve the overall objective in an efficient and effective manner. Mass looting and a break down in law and order spread in the densely populated areas once the combat force began dismantling the PDF.

Additionally, planning was restricted to within the DoD and even within DoD the information was compartmentalized so that only those with a need to know had access. This compartmentalization of information not only hindered military planning efforts but also excluded other U.S. government agencies and organizations from providing input into the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid. Bifurcated is a term that Dr. Schultz used in his analysis of the planning process.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Fishel, 16.
\end{itemize}
planning process that was clearly within their areas of responsibility. Very few people knew of the plans because the planning efforts were so compartmentalized. LTG Stiner, the JTF South Commander, noted there were about 25 people within his command that knew of the plan until 24 hours prior to execution.\(^{36}\) Additionally those planning for the restoration operations were not allowed to coordinate with the U.S. embassy or other government agencies.

When looking at the planning process through the lens of the three criteria identified in the introduction, the planning effort failed in two of the three. Compartmentalization and classification prevented the planning cells from integrating personnel from the other government agencies to ensure that all elements of power were working toward the strategic objective. The military translated the policy aims into military tasks and assigned responsibilities, but primarily focused on the required combat tasks instead of giving equal priority to both combat and restoration tasks. JTF South planned for and executed operations to secure U.S. citizens and interests, remove Noriega from power and dismantle the PDF. The SCJ5 and the COMCMOTF planned for and executed operations aimed at assisting the Panamanians restore their government. The planning efforts failed to integrate and synchronize combat operations and stabilization and reconstruction operations in order to facilitate achieving the overall strategic objective to restore Panamanian democracy.

**HAITI (Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY)**

**Overview (Why the U.S. Became Involved)**

The Haiti crisis evolved over a period of three years beginning with a military coup on 30 September 1991 in which President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown and eventually

exiled to the United States. For almost three years, the military government led by LTG Raoul Cedras defied the International Communities’ efforts to return Aristide and restore the legitimate government; violated human rights; and severely repressed the Haitian people. By January 1992, over 14,000 Haitians refugees had traveled to the U.S. by boat to escape the ever-so-worsening living conditions.\(^\text{37}\) Unable to get LTG Cedras to step down, the United Nations (UN) passed Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 841 on 16 June 1993. To prevent the illegitimate government from receiving any benefits from Haitian assets, UNSCR 841 called for an embargo on petroleum and arms sales to Haiti and froze overseas financial assets belonging to the Haitian government and its officials and businesspeople. After the UN-imposed sanctions, representatives of the Aristide government, the Cedras-led government, the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the U.S. met at Governors Island, New York. On 3 July 1993, the parties reached an agreement in which Cedras would resign and the military step aside, Aristide would return by 30 October 1993, and the UN would lift the sanctions immediately but also contingent on meeting the deadline for Aristide to return.\(^\text{38}\) In October 1993, the USS HARLAN COUNTY sailed for Haiti with a UN contingent of 220 personnel to help implement the Governors Island Agreement. The ship was “greeted by angry, chanting crowds and denied entry to the dock”\(^\text{39}\) at Port Au Prince. The Governors Island Agreement deadline for Aristide’s return passed and the UN reestablished the sanctions outlined UNSCR 841. Further lack of progress to restore the Aristide government caused the UN to pass UNSCR 917 on 6 May 1994, which demanded the resignation of the Haitian military leaders, instituted a global trade embargo, and


\(^{39}\) Ibid. 11.
imposed other restrictions on finance and travel.\textsuperscript{40} These further sanctions did not compel the military government to step down. Therefore, on 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 940, which authorized “Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement.”\textsuperscript{41}

The Plans

In the aftermath of the USS HARLAN COUNTY incident, the CJCS issued an alert order on 30 October 1993 to United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) concerning contingency operations in Haiti.\textsuperscript{42} During the next eleven months, USACOM and its subordinate commands developed three plans for the use of military force to assist in restoring the legitimate government of President Aristide in Haiti. The first plan, 2370, entailed a forcible entry into Haiti to remove the military government in order to restore President Aristide to power. The second plan, 2380, centered on a peaceful departure of the military government and permissive entry into Haiti to assist the Aristide government in restoring order and essential services. The third plan, 2375, served as a bridge between the first two plans; planners merged elements of both plans to provide a military force capable of executing operations in an uncertain environment (somewhere


\textsuperscript{41} US Atlantic Command, A-2.

between forced entry and permissive entry). The following paragraphs detail how these three plans evolved.

On 8 January 1994, USACOM directed the XVIII Airborne Corps to “begin deliberate planning for the invasion of Haiti”\textsuperscript{43} in order “to establish a safe and secure environment that would permit the reestablishment of the legitimate government of President Aristide, . . .

“neutralize the Haitian Army (FAdH) and to protect American citizens.”\textsuperscript{44} For operational security measures, USACOM directed that planning efforts be compartmented at the secret level. Because of compartmentalization, only two planners worked on the plan initially, however contingency planning that the Corps Headquarters had conducted in the fall of 1993 facilitated the planner’s initial efforts in areas where they were not experts.\textsuperscript{45} After approximately a month of planning USACOM directed that planning would be compartmented at the top secret level and expanded the number of people that could be read on.\textsuperscript{46} Once USACOM further opened the compartment and established the XVIII Airborne Corps as a Joint Task Force (JTF 180), the Corps Staff and augmentees formed a joint planning group that developed the initial OPLAN 2370 (Forcible Entry).\textsuperscript{47} The basic concept

\dots of OPLAN 2370 was originally designed of as a 96-hour option from the notification of the executing force, the 82nd Airborne Division, until they parachuted on to Port Au Prince


\textsuperscript{44} U.S. Atlantic Command, 2.

\textsuperscript{45} JTF 180 Oral History Interviews, 43-44. In the fall, XVIII Airborne Corps had conducted contingency planning for potential Haiti operations. This planning included potential missions as part of the USS Harlan County operation and or to conduct operations in response to an event triggered by the USS Harlan County operation. All of the Corps staff as well as planners from the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne division participated in the contingency planning.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. In military lexicon, read on means that an individual is granted access to compartmented classified information based on a ‘need to know’ requirement.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 16.
airport. The plan envisioned airborne, amphibious, and air assaults to neutralize the FAdH and police, secure key facilities, restore civil order, and establish internal defenses. These objectives would be accomplished within the first two days by an air assault on Port Au Prince International Airport by elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, US Marines securing Cap Haitien to the north, and the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) capturing the FAdH headquarters in Port Au Prince. 48

After the initial operations, the Joint Special Operations Task Force, augmented by civil affairs, psychological operations, and engineers “would concentrate on establishing civil-military operations, expanding foreign internal defense measures to include reorganizing the FAdH, and preparing for the handover of control to US Forces, Haiti. These actions would take about thirty days to accomplish. By D+45, there would be a handover to a MNF of which US forces [10th Mountain Division] would be a part.” 49 After a series of back and forth briefs with USACOM, “the initial planning effort culminated on the twenty-second of March 1994 with the first key leader rehearsal at Fort Bragg.” 50 Following the rehearsal, the planners put the plan on the shelf and made revisions as changes to the operational environment or force availability occurred.

On 1 June 1994, CJCS directed USACOM to develop a plan for Haiti in the event the military-led government stepped down and the UN or President Aristide asked the U.S. to deploy forces to Haiti to assist in restoring order and re-establishing essential services. 51 Planners from XVIII Airborne Corps worked with the USACOM J5 through mid-June to develop a concept for a second plan, which became CONPLAN 2380 (Permissive Entry). This plan envisioned that an infantry division serving as a part of a multinational force (MNF) would provide security to permit the reorganization of the Haitian National Police, assist in establishing essential functions

48 U.S. Atlantic Command, 3.

49 Ibid.

50 JTF 180 Oral History Interviews, 16.

and set the conditions to transfer responsibilities to United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).  

USACOM forwarded CONPLAN 2380 to the CJCS and on 29 June the CJCS directed USACOM to develop the plan into an operations order. Through the month of July, the XVIII Airborne Corps worked on developing CONPLAN 2380 into an Operations Plan as well as refining OPLAN 2370. As planning progressed, it became evident that “2380 would be a long term operation” and as such it was not practical to “having the key forcible entry assets, the 82d Airborne Division and our JSOTF forces being fixed or committed for an extended period in time and not be able to react to other contingencies.” Thus, the commanders of USACOM, Forces Command (FORSCOM) and XVIII Airborne Corps mutually decided to activate a second JTF to plan for the permissive entry operation, OPLAN 2380.

On 29 July, USACOM activated JTF 190 and planning for OPLAN 2380 transitioned from the XVIII Airborne Corps to the 10th Mountain Division. General Meade, his Chief of Staff, his G-3, and his planners came to Fort Bragg and received detailed briefs on the planning conducted to date on OPLAN 2380 from JTF 180/XVIII Airborne Corps Staff and Major General Byron, USACOM J-5. By 10 August, the 10th Mountain Division, serving as JTF 190, had fully developed and briefed an initial plan to USACOM as well as published a draft OPLAN. By the

52 U.S. Atlantic Command, 4.
54 JTF 180 Oral History Interviews, 10
55 Ibid.
end of the month, USACOM had approved JTF 190’s OPLAN 2380, and the JTF with all its major subordinate commands had conducted rehearsals.\textsuperscript{56}

On 29 August, USACOM briefed the CJCS on both plans, 2370 (Forcible Entry) and 2380 (Permissive Entry), and received additional guidance to develop a third plan. At the time, it was nearly impossible to define the environment in which U.S. forces would enter Haiti. Thus, the requirement emerged to produce a plan that had enough lethality to get in forcibly, but also had the right mix of forces to establish a secure environment and conduct civil-military operations (assist with reestablishing the legitimate government, organizing security forces, and restoring essential services). On 2 September, USACOM, JTF 180 (XVIII Airborne Corps), and JTF 190 (10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division) began work to develop the third plan, OPLAN 2375 (The Bridge).\textsuperscript{57}

The initial concept for OPLAN 2375 was to “send in 2370 as the initial door kicking element; gain security; stability; rapidly flow in 2380 on the heels of 2370; transition from 2370 JTF 180 to 2380 JTF 190, and then redeploy 2370.”\textsuperscript{58} In essence, the planners recommended merging the two existing plans and developing a new force flow to meet the emerging challenge of an uncertain environment.

In addition to the strictly military planning for operations in Haiti, in May the Executive Committee, “with representatives of the Departments of Defense (to include the Joint Staff), State, Justice, and Treasury” as well as participants from the “Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency”\textsuperscript{59} met to coordinate planning efforts. “The interagency discussions


\textsuperscript{57} JTF 180 Oral History Interviews, 32.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{59} U.S. Atlantic Command, 7.
that occurred in Washington failed to arrive at basic decisions on the course of the mission. . . This delayed the transmission of policy guidance to the military forces.”  

At a lower level, there were two interagency rehearsals. The first was conducted while JTF 190 was developing its plan and the second was conducted on September 11 at Fort McNair. The purpose of these meetings was “to discuss the military plan, coordinate interagency activity, identify issues that needed to be addressed, and task various agencies for actions to be accomplished.”

**Planning Process Evaluation**

One may question the long-term success of the 1994 U.S./UN intervention in Haiti, given that international forces including a contingent of U.S. Marines are in early 2004 conducting operations to assist the government of Haiti following the international call for the resignation of President Aristide. Without regard to the current situation in Haiti, the U.S. Armed Forces generally contend that military operations conducted as part of the 1994 U.S./UN intervention were successful. An excerpt from an USACOM pamphlet, published as part of a multimedia package, developed to provide planning and execution lessons learned for military operations other than war (MOOTW) lessons learned, captures this thought. “Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrated the US military’s capabilities and flexibility to plan for and adapt to rapidly changing situations and the ability to conduct a successful operation other than war. . . . The US military demonstrated it could complete its part of the mission in Haiti by establishing a safe and secure environment.” The success achieved was by no means perfect; several areas were identified where shortfalls existed.

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60 U.S. Atlantic Command, 7.

61 Ibid., 8.

62 Ibid., 60.
Strictly from a planning perspective, the last-minute diplomatic success may have prevented the U.S. military forces from experiencing an outcome similar to Panama (a period in which forces were focused so intensely on combat operations and objectives that the security environment/law and order breaks down to create a larger overall problem ultimately affecting the success of attaining strategic goals and objectives). LTC Gordon Bonham, JTF 180 J5 Plans Officer, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, referred to the potential for this situation.

... 2370, in my opinion, always had a flaw. That flaw was, we could rapidly neutralize the FAD’H; we could rapidly secure key and essential targets but, it’s kind of like the “now what?” arrangement. And, the concept of thirty to forty-five days handing off to a COMUSFOR HAITI (Commander US Forces Haiti) that had a Special Forces battalion and some combat support/combat service support built around it; that was the risk of 2370. The front piece was well planned; rehearsed over many, many months and, I think, every commander, to include the President, was very confident that we would have done that and executed it to near perfection. However, that force was not capable of conducting the civil military operations that we are currently involved in now. 63

Like the planning for Panama, planning for combat operations was separated from planning operations to provide a secure environment and support the reestablishment of a functioning government. In the 2370 plan, the XVIII Airborne Corps would through overwhelming combat power take down the FAdH and remove the military government. They would secure key areas then transition the responsibility for security and reestablishing a functioning government to an augmented special operations task force. In the 2375 plan, JTF 180 would be responsible for conducting combat operations and JTF 190 would flow in to assume responsibilities for providing a secure environment and assisting in establishing government functions.

Much of the success of this operation that is noted in most studies is that of the progress made in interagency coordination.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY for the first time integrated political, military, and economic planning through an IWG that developed a plan to assist Haiti. Although this was a first step, it fell short of its goal and highlighted the need for an interagency structure based

63 JTF 180 Oral History Interviews, 13.
on accountability of all participants and a formal process to ensure the execution of planning efforts for the successful attainment of US goals and objectives.\textsuperscript{64}

Still, classification and compartmentalization of planning efforts severely restricted the ability to effectively coordinate operations between the various government organizations that would be responsible for operations in Haiti. It also created problems for the military planning efforts as noted by Major Garrett, one of the primary XVIII\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Corps planners:

\ldots we were working without our intel side; our logistics planner; none of the Joint planning was there. So for the first month it was very bare bones in terms of what we were getting from the other battlefield operating systems. It is certainly a fault of the compartmenting process.\textsuperscript{65}

Comparatively, planning for operations in Haiti are a degree better than the planning for Panama when analyzed through the three criteria presented in the introduction. The JTF planning cells did not have embedded representation from the other agencies, but at the strategic level an interagency working group was established to develop integrated and coordinated solutions. Additionally, two meetings were held for the JTF planners to coordinate actions and efforts. Each of the planning cells incorporated the policy aims into the overall concept of their operations. But just like the Panama planning efforts, the planners focused on perfecting the combat portion of the operations. In both plans 2370 and 2375 planners envisioned combat operations followed by stabilization and reconstruction. Because neither of these plans were executed it is difficult to determine how well the actions had been integrated. However, in the 2370 plan the special operations task force was responsible for elements of the combat operation as well as the stabilization and reconstruction operations, so on the surface it would appear that their efforts would have been integrated.

\textsuperscript{64} U.S. Atlantic Command, 61.

\textsuperscript{65} JTF 180 Oral History Interviews, 44.
IRAQ (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM)

Overview (Why the US Became Involved)

Tensions with Iraq began in August of 1990 when Saddam Hussein ordered his military to invade Kuwait and refused to withdraw despite months of diplomatic efforts. The failed diplomatic efforts led to the formation of a U.S.-led coalition and UN authorization to force the Iraqi military out of Kuwait. On 17 January 1991, Operation DESERT STORM began with air operations aimed at cutting off and destroying Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Following 39 days of air operations, the coalition launched ground operations that lasted only 100 hours before the US offered a temporary cease-fire to the overwhelmed Iraqi Army. On 7 April 1991, Saddam agreed to the terms of the UN cease-fire conditions and resolutions. From this point until the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq posed a unique problem for the United States. A 12-year cat and mouse like game between the UN weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspection teams and Iraqi officials prevented the UN from verifying that Saddam was destroying Iraqi WMD capabilities as required by the 1991 cease-fire and resolutions. Additionally, despite continual international efforts to create a non-threatening Iraq, Saddam continued to wield his power, oppress his people, and deceitfully disregard agreements made with the UN. The attacks on September 11, 2001 caused the U.S. to review threats to its national security and from this review Iraq was seen as a threat and named as a member of the ‘axis of evil.’ The U.S. insisted that the UN energize diplomatic efforts and inspection programs to force Iraq to comply with agreements it had made with the UN. In response to these pressures, the UN passed Security Council

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Resolution 1441, which laid out a timeline in which Saddam would have to show his intent to comply with UN requirements. Just as in 1991, Saddam refused to abide by UN imposed deadlines and sufficiently comply with requirements thereby challenging the U.S. to take actions as promised in order to protect itself and others from the threats posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime.

The Plans

Planning for Regime Removal

On Wednesday 21 November 2001 following a National Security Council meeting, President George W. Bush pulled Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, aside and asked “What kind of a war plan do you have for Iraq? How do you feel about the war plan for Iraq?” Secretary Rumsfeld replied that he did not feel that the war plan was current or that it reflected the thinking of General Tommy Franks, Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) or himself. He continued by explaining that all the war plans were outdated; they held old assumptions and were not reflective of the administration’s goals. Following Secretary Rumsfeld’s response, the President directed him to get started in a non-noticeable way on “looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to.” The same day the CENTCOM operations officer received a heads up from the Joint Staff operations officer that they would soon receive a task to provide a commander’s estimate for

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68 Most information regarding the development of plans for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM remains classified. The majority of the information in this section was taken from Bob Woodward newly released book, *Plan of Attack*, and newspaper articles. Other information presented in this section represents non-attributional remarks made during unclassified presentations and open forum discussions that the ’03/04 School of Advanced Military Studies Class had with individuals that participated in the planning and execution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.


70 Ibid., 2.
operations in Iraq.\textsuperscript{71} Six days after the warning, Secretary Rumsfeld visited General Franks at the CENTCOM headquarters to discuss OPLAN 1003, which was last updated in 1998 but not approved by the Clinton administration, and his ideas for the revision of that plan. On 1 December, CENTCOM received the Top Secret planning order that required a commander’s estimate on “operations to remove Saddam from power, eliminate the threat of any possible weapons of mass destruction, and choke off his suspected support of terrorism.”\textsuperscript{72}

Over the next three and one half months, General Frank’s and his staff developed five iterations of the commander’s concept. The process started with revising the concept of OPLAN 1003, which reflected a similar fight to that of 1991. It called for a build up of 500,000 personnel over a seven-month period before six divisions would be prepared to launch offensive military actions against Iraq. By the fifth iteration of the commander’s estimate, which was called the ‘Generated Start Plan’, General Franks and his staff had developed a plan that could be executed “as a unilateral U.S.-only plan.”\textsuperscript{73} The concept called for 90 days of preparation and force movement prior to starting the war, followed by 45 days of bombing while the ground forces completed deployment. Once the ground forces (approximately 300,000 personnel) were in place the major ground operations would start and if all went well it was estimated to take 90 days to remove the regime. General Franks briefed this concept to President Bush on 7 February 2002.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 8. A commander’s estimate is defined in the Department of Defense Dictionary as “a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken in order to accomplish the mission.” The estimate is a document forwarded from the combatant commander to the national chain of command to provide a recommendation on the best use of military forces to achieve the desired goal. Normally, the estimate will center on military capabilities in terms of forces available, response time, and significant logistic considerations

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 38.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 96.
Following the brief, he highlighted that the plan was not complete and commented that there was “a lot of interagency work needed for the Phase Four Stability operations”.74

On 21 March, General Franks assembled his service component commanders to discuss formally the concept that he had briefed the President and directed them to begin planning in earnest.75 Various subordinate headquarters began planning for operations in Iraq as early as September 2001, to ensure that deliberate plans were current.76 However, all subordinate plans would continue to change with each iteration of the Combatant Commander’s concept. By March 29th when General Franks briefed the Service Chiefs, the plan required about 200,000 troops and the goal was to be ready to conduct operations by 1 October should the President desire to do so.77 General Franks met again with his service component commanders on 24 April and asked that they provide him with all of the preparatory requirements they would need to execute to ensure that the current plan would be successful. On 9 May he “asked his commanders to develop a plan for a second or northern front option for an attack into Iraq through Turkey.”78 General Franks on May 11, again briefed the President on planning to date. At this brief, General Franks presented a five front attack on Iraq, which included an attack through Turkey if they could get approval from the Turks. During the brief questions were raised concerning Baghdad and the possibility of an unwanted urban fight.79

74 Ibid., 98-102.
75 Ibid., 114.
76 The majority of these planning efforts were merely prudent planning efforts on the part of planners to ensure that they were prepared for any number of certain eventualities that may occur as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
77 Ibid., 118.
78 Ibid., 123.
79 Ibid., 126.
On 3 June, General Franks presented Secretary Rumsfeld “what he called the “Running Start” – beginning the war before all the U.S. forces were in the region and ready.” Rumsfeld liked the concept and thought that it should be further developed. On 27 and 28 June General Franks met with the component commanders and directed that the priority of planning be directed at the ‘Running Start’ concept. On 5 August General Franks provided an update of the planning effort to the National Security Council (NSC) he provide overviews of both the ‘Generated Start’ and the ‘Running Start’ plans followed by his new ‘Hybrid’ concept that used the best of the two previous plans. The Hybrid concept consisted of four phases:

Phase One: Five days to establish the air bridge, which included involuntarily enlisting all necessary U.S. commercial aircraft to augment the military airlift to the combat region. Then, 11 days to transport the initial forces.
Phase Two: 16 days of air attacks and Special Forces operations.
Phase Three: 125 days of decisive combat operations. At the beginning of the 125 days, they would try to get a division inside Iraq, and within a week another division of ground forces.
Phase Four: Stability operations of unknown duration.

The NSC was receptive of the presentation and on 6 August General Franks directed his component commanders to transition planning to the Hybrid concept. Over the next five months, CENTCOM and subordinate commands continued to develop and refine the Hybrid plan. On 24 January 2003, General Franks delivered the final plan designed to remove Saddam’s regime, to Secretary Rumsfeld.

Planning for Postwar Iraq

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80 Ibid., 134.
81 Ibid., 136.
82 Ibid., 146.
83 Ibid., 153.
84 Ibid., 287.
On 20 May 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld “through the JCS ordered planning for Phase Four stability operations in Iraq after combat operations.”\textsuperscript{85} The majority of CENTCOM’s staff was fully engaged in planning for regime removal and only secondary efforts were placed on planning for post war actions. By late November, the NSC deputies began to focus their attention on “looking at what the transition of power might be in a post-Saddam Iraq once major combat operations were over.”\textsuperscript{86} In January, Mr. Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for policy, proposed setting up an interagency planning cell in DoD to turn the NSC’s policy guidance on postwar issues into a plan for implementation following the regime removal. On 20 January, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive #24 that established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). The purpose of ORHA was to plan and implement postwar actions such as humanitarian assistance, reestablishing basic services, rebuilding the economy, forming and restructuring security services to include an Iraqi military force, and transitioning to an Iraqi-led authority. All work conducted by the various agencies regarding postwar Iraq was to be transferred to ORHA for further development and integration. This included the work done by the State Department ‘Future of Iraq’ study.\textsuperscript{87} As CENTCOM completed planning for combat operations, they established Joint Task Force 4 to conduct planning for Phase IV stabilization operations. The JTF developed a Phase IV plan but it was not fully coordinated or integrated with the planning efforts of ORHA.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 133.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 280 - 281.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 281 -283.
Planning Process Evaluation

Only time will confirm whether Operation IRAQI Freedom was successful or not. However, the situation as of April 2004 raises many questions about the planning process. Early on there were some initial doubts about the plan to defeat the Iraqi Army and remove the regime from power, but time revealed the U.S. coalition’s plan to defeat the Iraqi Army and remove the regime was on target. Today the failures to achieve progress toward the strategic goal of establishing a democratic-like Iraq quickly shadow the brilliance of that military victory. Some have suggested that there was no planning conducted for post-conflict operations. These suggestions are ill informed. There was at a minimum three major planning groups developing such plans, the military led by Central Command, the State Department with its “Future of Iraq” project and the DoD Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. As well, each of these groups had subordinate groups planning for action at various levels.

Just as in the two previous case studies factors that have contributed to military’s inability to achieve progress rapidly are a bifurcation of the planning process; poorly coordinated efforts among all the participants required to achieve the strategic objective; and classification and compartmentalization of the planning efforts. Comments published in The Washington Times article based on a final draft secret report titled “Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons Learned” addresses several of these factors. “Late formation of DoD [Phase IV] organizations limited the time available for the development of detailed plans and predeployment coordination. . . . On planning for the post-Saddam period, the interagency process, such as between the Pentagon and State Department, ‘was not fully integrated prior to hostilities.’ Before the war
‘Phase IV objectives were identified but the scope of the effort required to continually refine operational plans for the defeat of Iraqi military limited the focus on Phase IV.’\textsuperscript{88}

The planning efforts for Iraq represent a remarkably improved process from that of the previous two case studies, yet when evaluated by the three criteria the planning efforts appear to be only marginally better. Planning cells were organized to include representation for each of the elements of national power. However, the products from these planning cells with interagency representation were never integrated to ensure that actions and efforts were coordinated in order to achieve the common objective. The military planning cell translated the policy aims into military tasks and assigned responsibilities. Just as in the two previous case studies the priority of effort was to perfect the synchronization of the combat tasks followed by an effort to plan the tasks for those actions that would follow combat. Major combat operations and stabilization and reconstruction operations were somewhat integrated in that the ground plan assigned a task common to all maneuver units during the major combat phase, Phase III, to conduct stabilization operations in order to facilitate the transition to a new government. Yet, the specifics for the stabilization operations were defined in the Phase IV plan. For planning and execution of the conduct of operations, commanders gravitated towards the cultural tendency to focus on the militaries non-negotiable task, ‘to fight and win’ and then to focus on what is perceived to be a follow-on mission, stabilization and reconstruction. LTC Stephen Peterson, a CFLCC planner, addresses this very issue.

Over a month before the war began, the Phase IV planning group concluded that the campaign would produce conditions at odds with meeting strategic objectives. They realized that the joint campaign was specifically designed to break all control mechanisms of the regime and that there would be a period following regime collapse in which we would face the greatest danger to our strategic objectives. This assessment described the risk of an influx of terrorists to Iraq, the rise of criminal activity, the probable actions of former regime leaders, etc.

members, and the loss of control of WMD that was believed to exist. It was not an omniscient assessment; it did not describe all aspects of what came to occur following the war. Nevertheless, it did identify a need to take some specific actions including: planning to control the borders, analyzing what key areas and infrastructure should be immediately protected, and allocating adequate resources to quickly re-establish post-war control throughout Iraq. Adjusting the plan would have created much different transition conditions and left us in a much better position than what we now face. But, the planners failed to persuade the Commanding General and dropped these issues with little resistance. Why? Because both the planners and the commander had been schooled to see fighting as the realm of war and thus attached lesser importance to post-war issues.\textsuperscript{89}

**Trend Analysis**

Clearly, there are trends that emerge from the examination of the three case studies. The plans developed for each of these operations were bifurcated; planners developed individual plans to address the use of force in combat (a high intensity environment) and to address post-hostilities operations (a low intensity environment). Coordination between all the government agencies responsible in some way for achieving the overall objective was ineffective or nonexistent. Additionally classification and compartmentalization of planning efforts restricted the ability to assemble the required experts to develop a coordinated and integrated plan. Each of these trends in their own way contribute to an overall ineffectiveness of the use of the military element of power to achieve strategic objectives or ‘win the war.’ These trends and their implications will be further discussed in the conclusions and recommendations section of this monograph.

DOCTRINE ANALYSIS

Doctrine shapes the way the Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrument of national power. 

*Joint Publication 1*

Doctrinal concepts and constructs provide the foundation upon which military planners develop plans for the use of the military instrument of power. The purpose of this section is to identify the ideas presented in joint doctrine that influence how we think about the use of military force and to identify the framework and concepts that joint doctrine provides with respect to how planners develop plans to ‘win the war.’

**Doctrinal Review**

*Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, published in November of 2000, is “the capstone publication for all US joint doctrine.”

It describes the military’s role in national policy and provides overarching guidance on the employment of the military instrument of national power. There are several key concepts within this document that are critical to understanding the framework for planning to ‘win the war’.

First, the document outlines the role of the U.S. Armed Forces in the following manner: “The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces is to win the Nation’s wars. . . . The Armed Forces also serve to advance and defend other important national interests and objectives, including participation in operations that do not envision combat, as directed by the NCA.”

Secondly, the document characterizes the employment of military forces to achieve policy into categories and refers to the categories by the term ‘range of military operations’. “The range

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90 JP 1.0, CJCS’s Transmittal Note.

91 Ibid., III-1. National Command Authority is defined in the 12 April 2001 Joint Publication 1-02 as “the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.”
of military operations encompasses war and operations other than war."\textsuperscript{92} War refers to the conduct of “large-scale, sustained combat operations in conjunction with other instruments of national power. . . . Military operations other than war focus on deterring war and promoting peace”\textsuperscript{93} and are further categorized by operations in which force is used and those in which force is not used. Figure 1 provides a further understanding of the range of military operations.

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1**\textsuperscript{94}. Range of Military Operations

Thirdly, JP 1 explains the concept of campaign and its use as a construct to plan for employment of U.S. Armed Forces. “The campaign is the central organizing instrument for joint warfare. The JFC uses it to arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions into a series of related major operations, focused on accomplishing strategic and operational objectives.”\textsuperscript{95} Normally campaign plans address all operations within a theater, however in complex situations joint task forces or subordinate commands may prepare supporting campaign plans. The campaign is based on the commander’s concept, which includes “how operations will be

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., III-14.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., III-14.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., III-15. Figure III-5. Range of Military Operations

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., V-1.
integrated, sequenced, and synchronized to achieve conflict termination objectives (including postconflict measures).”\(^96\)

Finally, JP 1 emphasizes the necessity to integrate military operations with actions taken by the other instruments of national power in order to achieve U.S. policy objectives. In Chapter VI, Fundamentals of Interagency Operations, the following statement is made: “Early inclusion of interagency considerations in assessments, estimates, and plans will facilitate civil-military integration of effort, focus the appropriate military participation, and assist the military effort to obtain the best available support from other interagency participants.”\(^97\) Chapter VI, Section 4, discusses organizing for Interagency Operations and identifies a list of tasks to assist combatant commanders in planning for and executing operations in which interagency organizations will be involved. These tasks are as follows:

- Identification of all agencies and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation.
- Establishment of an interagency hierarchy and definition of the objectives of the response effort pertinent to the operation as a whole and to each participating agency.
- Definition of COAs for both theater military operations and agency activities.
- Solicitation from each agency, department, or organization of a clear understanding of the role that each plays.
- Identification of potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities.
- Identification of resources of each participant in order to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort.
- Definition of the desired end state and exit criteria.
- Sharing of relevant intelligence to those with a need to know subject to US and command security standards.

\(^{96}\) Ibid., V-5

\(^{97}\) Ibid., VI-1.
Focus of the mission’s assets to support the longer-term goals of the enterprise.

 Establishment of a liaison section, interagency assessment teams, civil-military operations centers, humanitarian assistance coordination centers, and logistic operations centers as required.  

*Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, published on 10 September of 2001, is the “keystone document of the joint operations series.” It outlines the fundamental principles used by the U.S. Armed Forces in conducting joint and multinational operations and “provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates for the direction, planning, execution, and support of campaigns and operations – in war and in operations other than war (MOOTW).” This publication presents a variety of concepts that relate to planning to “Win the War.”

Chapter 1, The Strategic Context, identifies political and military considerations that will inform the development of termination criteria for operations. The following military consideration implies a separation and sequential order for military operations.

Another military consideration is the follow-up political exploitation of completed military action and the military role in the transition to peace. This exploitation includes matters such as military government, civil affairs (CA), and FHA [Foreign Humanitarian Assistance], and requires early planning, liaison, and coordination both at the national level and in the theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.

An explanation of the concept of termination, a facet of operational art, in Chapter III, Planning Joint Operations, again refers to the separation of military actions. The explanation also addresses the transition between the actions and the need to determine and plan for post-conflict requirements early.

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98 Ibid., VI-5.
99 JP 3.0, xv.
100 Ibid., I-1.
101 Ibid., I-12.
A period of postconflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member. . . .
Even as forces transition from combat operations to postconflict activities . . .
During postconflict operations, JFCs may transfer control to other authorities and redeploy forces. JFCs should identify postconflict requirements as early as possible so as to facilitate transition and to permit the simultaneous redeployment of forces no longer required.102

Chapter III explains another facet of operational art that is critical to the success of military operations—arranging operations. The primary tool for arranging operations is the construct of phasing. Commanders phase operations to “dominate and achieve the desired end state conditions quickly, with the least cost in personnel and other resources.”103 The joint phasing construct was designed to provide “a flexible model to arrange the full spectrum of combat and noncombat operations.”104 The four phases in the construct are deter/engage, seize the initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Figure 2 depicts the construct as identified in the publication. The following excerpts from the description of each of the phases influence how planners develop the sequence of operations. These descriptions guide how planners think about conflict and military operations other than war, in particular, post-hostilities operations.

102 Ibid., III-25.
103 Ibid., III-17.
104 Ibid., III-19.
**Seize Initiative.** JFCs seek to seize the initiative in combat and noncombat situations through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In noncombat operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis.

**Decisive Operations.** The decisive operations phase continues with full spectrum employment of joint force capabilities and the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area as quickly as possible. In combat situations this phase focuses on driving the adversary to culmination and achieving the objectives defined by the NCA and JFC. Operations in this phase depend upon overmatching force capabilities with the C2 and logistics base required to achieve the desired End State. Decisive operations focus on winning through full spectrum dominance. In noncombat situations, the JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish conditions for an early, favorable conclusion, setting the conditions for the transition phase.

**Transition.** The transition phase enables the JFC to focus on synchronizing and integrating joint force activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion, typically characterized by self-sustaining peace and the establishment of the rule of law. Part of this phase may be to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is not able to resurrect itself or, in noncombat situations, to ensure where possible that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in support of other governmental, nongovernmental, and international agencies. JFCs continuously assess the

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105 Ibid., III-19. Figure III-4. Phases – Joint Campaign.
impact of current operations on the termination objectives. The outcome of military
operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis. During this phase,
JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to
another authority and redeploy their forces. JFCs should identify redeployment requirements
as early as possible.  

This phasing construct is yet another example of the idea that military actions, conflict and
postconflict, are separate and sequential.

Chapter V, Military Operations Other Than War, Section 4, Planning Considerations
contains a section to identify considerations for postconflict operations. The following ideas are
presented:

Planning for postconflict operations should begin as early as possible, and preferably before
the operations begin. As combat operations are nearing termination, military forces should
prepare to transition to noncombat MOOTW. Refugee control, reestablishing civil order
and public services, medical assistance, and other postconflict activities may be done best by
military forces during this turbulent period. Postconflict activities typically begin with
significant military involvement, then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the
threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished.
The military’s presence and its ability to operate in crisis environments and under extreme
conditions may give it the de facto lead in operations normally governed by other agencies.
Military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly subordinating
military forces to the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting postconflict
activities require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance
of governmental agencies, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners.

Again, the concepts of sequential operations; the need to start planning early; and the need
for integration and participation across government agencies, Services, and partners are expressed
in this publication.

Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations, published on 13 April 1995,
“is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and
doctrine that guide planning by the Armed Forces of the United States in joint or multinational

\[\text{106} \text{ Ibid., III-20 – III-21. No description is given for Deter/Engage because the information is not relevant to the primary discussions of this paper.}\]

\[\text{107} \text{ Ibid., V-5.}\]
operations.”108 This publication contains two related elements. First is an acknowledgement that planning is a “highly structured process that engages the commanders and staffs of the entire JPEC [Joint Planning and Execution Community] in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex planning for all contingencies and the transition to and from war.”109 Secondly, the publication addresses four key planning concepts that “that enhance understanding of the combatant commander’s strategic vision and the sequence of operations needed to attain the commander’s theater objectives.” One of the concepts listed is “Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities), to include the commander’s intent for each phase.”110 This concept has evolved since 1995 and its current construct was discussed earlier.

*Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, published 25 January 2002, “provides overarching guidance and principles governing the planning of campaigns at the combatant command and subordinate joint force levels. . . . It describes joint campaign planning across the full range of military operations at the strategic and operational levels of war [and] discusses campaign planning within the context of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System [JOPES].”111


109 Ibid., I-10.


This publication contains several sections, like in the previously discussed publications, that reiterate the construct of combat operations followed by post conflict operations. The first is the pictorial representation of the role of strategic guidance, Figure 3.

![Role of Strategic Guidance](image)

**Figure 3**. Role of Strategic Guidance

The second reiteration is the phasing construct that was discussed previously and a third is outlined in guidance to combatant commands. “Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as to postconflict.”

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112 Ibid., II-2. Figure II-1. Role of strategic Guidance.

113 Ibid., III-3.
This publication also reiterates the idea of the importance of interagency planning.

“Interagency coordination plays a major role in the termination phase. View conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new posthostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems.”

The publication also discusses the importance of ensuring that military objectives are designed to support strategic objectives. The following excerpts are from the section on strategic guidance.

• Campaign plan design begins with strategic guidance in the form of military strategic objectives that define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives.

This focus on the military strategic objective is one of the most important considerations in operational design. The nature of the political aim, taken in balance with the sources of national strength and vulnerabilities, must be compared with the stakes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the opponent in order to arrive at reasonably attainable national military objectives. The strategic guidance must establish whether the combatant commander is to pursue a limited or unlimited strategic (political) objective. This distinction is absolutely essential to ensure the right match between political and military objectives.

This publication includes many of the concepts presented in Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-0, and often the concepts are more fully developed.

*Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, published on 16 June 1995, describes military operations other than war and provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services and the combatant commands in preparing for and conducting these operations. A section entitled Transition from Wartime Operations to MOOTW, in Chapter 4, Planning for MOOTW, addresses four points: planning for the transition must occur from the outset; there may be a requirement for the JFC to realign forces or make force adjustments to start post-conflict operations; as post conflict operations progress the more military forces will be in a

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114 Ibid., II-4 – II-5.

115 Ibid., II-2.
supporting role; and potential post conflict tasks.\textsuperscript{116} Each of these four points are a reiteration of concepts outlined in the aforementioned publications.

\textit{Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations} published on 9 October 1996 consists of two volumes. Volume I discusses the interagency environment and describes methods to best achieve coordination between combatant commands and other USG agencies, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations and to successfully synchronize interagency operations. “Volume II describes the key US Government departments and agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States”\textsuperscript{117}. These publications provide assistance in how to coordinate during planning but do not provide any concepts for how to develop integrated plans.

**Doctrine Summary**

Key constructs and concepts outlined in doctrine that shape how planners think about war are:

- Military operations must be planned so as to support the overall strategic goal—a crushing military defeat of an enemy force rarely achieves the strategic goal.
- The military conducts operations across the range of military operations. The range includes two distinct categories war and MOOTW.
- The campaign is the organizing construct for joint warfare. It arranges actions into a series of related operations aimed at achieving the strategic objectives.


• Within a campaign, operations are phased to allow the commander to dominate and achieve the desired endstate. The phasing construct model consisting of the phases, Deter/Engage,

• Seize Initiative, Decisive Operations, and Transition, implies sequential operations—combat followed by something else.

• There is a need for interagency coordination early in the planning process.

The next section of this paper will address whether these concepts are useful in assisting planners in developing plans to ‘win’ future wars.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If we’re talking about the future, we need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you’ve got to look at this thing from start to finish. It’s not phased conflict; there isn’t a fighting part and then another part. It’s nine innings. And at the end of the game, somebody’s going to declare victory.


Conclusions

Thus far, this monograph has provided the context for a better understanding and appreciation of the difficulties U.S. military planners face in their labors to develop an effective plan to ‘win the war.’ What does it all mean though? First, quick summaries of what was discovered.

The case studies provided concrete examples of how planning has been conducted for past operations. The analysis revealed several key factors that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the overall military effort toward ‘winning the war.’ Planners developed separate plans to address combat operations and those stabilization and reconstruction operations. The net effect – plans were not integrated. Neither the operations of the first plan were designed to ensure that they did not create conditions that would hinder the operations of the second plan nor were the operations of the first plan designed to create the conditions required by the second plan. A more important finding is that developing two individual plans led to sequential execution as opposed to simultaneous execution thereby ruling out the chance of benefiting from synergy created by the combination of actions. Another factor is that of compartmentalization and classification. Often those individuals with valuable knowledge and experience were not part of the planning group because they did not possess the requisite security clearance or need to know. Excluding these individuals made it more difficult to develop comprehensive plans. Not only did the
compartmentalization and classification hinder military planning efforts but it also removed any opportunities for the military to coordinate with other agencies.

The doctrine analysis provided an understanding of the concepts and constructs for how we think about planning. Insights here are interesting. Often our cultural biases prevent us from practicing published doctrinal concepts. Our doctrine clearly identifies the role of the armed forces, yet more often than not the military leadership reluctantly commits our forces to missions other than combat or to missions with unclear objectives and exit criteria. Additionally, when asked to use military force, planners spend most of the time allotted for perfecting combat operations and only a secondary effort toward planning for those actions that follow combat. The Armed Forces have not successfully implemented other aspects of doctrine. Doctrine establishes the criticality of ensuring that military operations are linked to and supportive of the overall strategic goals. The case studies show that the military is very good at determining linkages as they pertain to combat operations, which have a clearly defined objective but is less proficient at applying military force to execute missions that are not wholly about fighting. The campaign model and phasing construct presented in doctrine leads planners to develop self-contained sequential operations aimed at specific objectives, yet often the self-contained operations are interdependent and require simultaneous execution for effectiveness. The Armed Forces clearly desire to begin interagency coordination from the outset of planning as described in doctrine; however, classification and compartmentalization often prevents such coordination.

**Recommendations**

This research provides evidence that there is ample room for the armed forces to seek improvement in certain aspects of military planning in order to develop plans to ‘win’ future wars. There are four recommendations proposed in the following sections, Doctrinal Changes and Other Planning Process Improvements.
Doctrinal Changes

Recommendation One. Several sections within the Joint Publications reviewed discuss strategic guidance, its role, and how military operations are designed to support strategic goals. However, in all of the explanations and numerous lists of considerations there is a failure to present a model that leads planners to logically think through how the military can support the overall strategic goal/objective. The model in Figure 4 may be useful in guiding planners to develop military operations to support the overall strategic goal/objective.

Figure 4. Military Operations Linkage To Strategic Objective

Once planners are given a strategic objective they should identify the conditions, represented by the 1, 2, 3, and 4 circles in the figure, that are required to achieve the stated objective. Once the conditions have been identified, then planners can determine the military operations, represented by the A, B, C, and D circles in the figure, that support setting the conditions. Depending on the strategic objective planners may find that a specific military operation may support one or more of the required conditions. In most cases the military operation that supports
more than one condition should be the primary focus and other operations should then be integrated and sequenced to support achieving the strategic objective.

Recommendation Two. Our recent war experiences, Afghanistan and Iraq, have resulted in rapid defeats of the enemy forces with limited collateral damage. Strategist predict that the U.S. military will fight future wars against enemies and governments that may crumble as just as quickly as those of Afghanistan and Iraq. Technology has allowed U.S. Armed Forces to be successful in achieving military defeats with fewer ground forces and a relatively shorter period of conflict. This shortened period of conflict has far-reaching implications. No longer, do military planners have the luxury of time in planning stabilization and reconstruction operations that the military planners of World War II had. Many leaders and planners have talked about the blurring of the transition from combat to stability operations. Given the condensed planning time for stabilization and reconstruction operations and the blurring transition it is imperative that doctrine provides an adequate framework, to address planning for stabilization and reconstruction as an integrated part of planning for combat operations. A new framework for phasing should consists of only three phases, deploy, operations, and redeploy. This framework would lead planners to think of all operations simultaneously and then integrate and organize the operations to best achieve the strategic objective.

Other Planning Process Improvements

Recommendation Three. Coordination with other agencies representing the diplomatic, economic and information elements of power continues to be a source of frustration and failure within the planning process. It is not that interagency planning does not happen, but rather the planning conducted is rarely integrated. DoD has taken steps to try to improve the integration of planning efforts by developing Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) within the combatant command headquarters. Yet, there is no formal mechanism to improve the planning capability of the personnel assigned to the JIACG. DoD should extend an opportunity for JIACG
representatives to attend military schools that specialize in training planners to provide them with a common understanding of how the military plans. For example the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies should have slots allocated for personnel from other agencies such as State Department, CIA, Department of Treasury, or others as required. More importantly and if for no other reason than the military’s track record of getting tasked to conduct missions that are outside of the scope of combat, DoD should take the lead to recommend changes to the current interagency process and or structure to improve the effectiveness of planning.

Recommendation Four. Classification and compartmentalization most likely will remain an issue that often hinders planning efforts by restricting those that can become involved in the process. However, to the extent possible DoD and the Combatant Commands have to ensure that information and planning efforts are not overly classified or compartmentalized. This is not to suggest that operational security measures should be thrown to the wayside. It is important to maintain operational security, but at the same time the right people, regardless of their organization, should be gathered in order to develop coordinated and integrated plans.

**Final Thoughts**

By no means is planning to ‘win the war’ an easy task, nor is it the sole responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces. However, as an institution we have the lion’s share of the responsibility until other agencies are resourced to effectively execute their primary responsibilities that often fall into our plate. With this in mind, it is imperative to our national well-being that military commander’s and planners do not allow cultural tendencies to perfect the means of combat to distract our focus on military requirements to achieve the strategic goal/objective.
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