

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 9, 1985.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin, (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order. This morning we are continuing our hearings of the policy panel looking into the question about what have we gotten for the trillion dollars that we have spent on defense, \$1.1 trillion, to be exact.

To help us shed light on that issue is a person who a lot of us have come to admire his work over the years, a person who has done a lot of work on the United States-Soviet balance and who—at least among people who deal with the subject in the unclassified world—is one of the few real experts in it.

I would like to welcome Mr. John Collins, who is the senior specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service, author of a number of books from the CRS on the United States-Soviet balance, most recently one that just came out this spring and would like to welcome you, Mr. Collins, and turn the testimony over to you, let you present whatever testimony you would like and then we would like to ask you some questions.

STATEMENT OF JOHN COLLINS, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN NATIONAL DEFENSE AT THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. COLLINS. Henry Ford used to say thinking is the hardest work there is; that is why so few people do it. I know for a fact that he could not have been talking about any members of this panel because all the members think all the time, but Congressman Aspin in his invitational letter asked me to be provocative and try to stimulate some new thinking on the topic "what happened to a trillion DOD dollars in the last 5 years?" I will do my best, bounded by bureaucratic restrictions that forbid me to be partisan or an advocate.

My credentials are totally different than those of the Congressional Budget Office that testified yesterday. My title is senior specialist in national defense. It is a misnomer. I am not a specialist. I am a generalist. If you scratch me anywhere, I am about a quarter of an inch deep. I certainly am not a specialist on defense budgets. I could not talk to you knowledgeably about a single line item. I am not a hardware or manpower specialist. I couldn't talk to you knowledgeably about a single Pentagon program. If I have any spe-

cialty at all, it is putting pieces of the defense puzzle together to find out what capabilities we bought with the money that we spent.

I am sorry that I don't have any written testimony. I don't think very fast. I don't write very fast. There was not time for more than a little outline. My United States-Soviet military balance study, which was published in July covering 1980 through 1985, supports most of my testimony. Two members of this panel were among the sponsors, Congressman Aspin and Congressman Skelton.

For openers, I would like to review five recipes for getting wrong answers to the question, "What happened to the trillion dollars?" All five are in vogue right now.

You almost always get wrong answers from simplistic questions like "Who is ahead?" or "Who is No. 1?" The Soviet Union is ahead in some respects. The United States is ahead in others. Who is overall ahead is so dependent on circumstances, assumptions, and scenarios that any single answer is probably going to be grossly wrong.

Another simplistic question is constantly being asked of members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Would you trade United States forces for Soviet forces?" Of course, the answer is always "no." I can guarantee you that if the balance was a whole lot worse than it is right now, the answer would still be "no," because each of those gentlemen knows that if he said, "yes, I would trade U.S. forces," he would be swapped himself before the sun went down. Lots of people in this town and lots of organizations, however, that grab the answer to that simplistic question and run down the street saying, "Hey, the balance is not bad, because the JCS admit they would not swap United States for Soviet forces."

You get wrong answers almost always from mirror image assessments. A good example: The Soviet requirement for balanced forces is a whole lot less than the United States requirement. The Soviets could lose a war at sea and still have a good chance to win on land in NATO Europe, in the Middle East, in the Far East, but we wouldn't. If we lose at sea, or if we are even stalemated at sea, we just lost the war. Now, does that mean that we should put most of our eggs into the Navy basket? Of course, it does not, because if we win the naval war and don't have land and air forces strong enough to prevail on the Eurasian land mass, we still lose. So their requirement for balanced forces does not look like our requirement at all.

You get wrong answers from assessments out of context. Readiness reports, for example, don't mean anything at all, unless they consider ready to do what to whom, where, when, how, using what forces, with what allies. It is very important to have hair trigger readiness, if you think the other side is about to attack. If it looks like peace is going to be prolonged, readiness really is not all that important. The place you want to put your bucks is into modernization.

Peacetime and wartime readiness don't look alike at all. The minute the war starts, peacetime standards go out the window. An awful lot of battalions have won battles at 50 percent strength or less. Trucks categorized C-4 readiness because the tread on the tires was not deep enough could run all the way to California and back, no problem at all.

You get wrong answers almost always from assessments that look at one side's best case and the other side's worst case. A couple of books on the market right now are good examples. Andrew Cockburn's "The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine" probably gives too little credit to the Soviet side. Another book, published by people working here on the Hill, Quentin Crommelin and David Sullivan, called "Soviet Military Supremacy" probably gives the Soviets too much credit.

You get wrong answers from piecemeal assessments because the balance in Europe bears on the balance in the Middle East and vice versa. You can't look at conventional forces in isolation. One of the things we would like to do is have greater conventional strength so that we could raise the nuclear threshold in Europe. But you see, if you close the conventional door to the opposition, you probably have lowered the nuclear threshold rather than raising it, unless you simultaneously take steps to preserve the prelaunch capability of your own nuclear delivery systems and protect the stockpiles, which are excruciatingly vulnerable right now.

OK. Those are five guarantees for wrong answers. Another technique gets right answers that are incomplete.

It is a one-sided assessment that only looks at the United States. You get some benefits out of this. You can tell where you are improving and where you are not. You can see what rates of change are. You can tell what you bought, but you don't have any idea what difference it makes. You have no way to assign any kind of priorities to improve this but not improve that. The only way you do that is to compare our pluses and minuses with the pluses and minuses of prospective opponents.

My recommendation is to use the old garden variety, five-part formula, standard net assessment to determine what happened to your trillion dollars. It starts with objectives. What are you trying to do? It follows that with threats. What are the obstacles to the achievement of those objectives? Then it looks at strategies. How do you intend to overcome the obstacles? Next it looks at forces. You want to know how much of what, how fast, in what order of priority to execute the strategy successfully. Finally, it looks at funds, which are well spent only if they match ends with means—that is a measure of effectiveness—and do so with minimum waste—that is a measure of efficiency.

I am going to take that five-part formula and apply it to the United States-Soviet military balance to see in some way what happened to the trillion dollars over the last 5 years. Understand, of course, that the United States-Soviet balance is not the only thing that contributes to United States national security, but that is where most of the money goes so it is really not a bad standard.

There are two balances instead of one. There is a peacetime balance, where the basic objective is deterrence, and a wartime balance, where the basic objective is defense. They don't look alike at all.

What is the peacetime balance? It is pretty good, a whole lot better than most official pronouncements and publications would lead you to believe. U.S. deterrence, in my opinion, is solid right straight across the board. It probably is going to remain so for some undetermined but prolonged period.

The probability that the Soviets are going to launch a nuclear attack against the United States as a deliberate act of national policy is somewhere between zero and about minus 8 million. They are not going to execute any of these cockamamie scenarios that are so prevalent right here in Washington, which say they are going to take part of their ICBM's and they are going to knock out all of our ICBM's and they are going to have all of their ICBM's and all their bombers and submarines in reserve. The answer is "forget it." Soviet leadership likes to call itself revolutionary. These guys are hyper-conservative. Their proclivity for taking risks is very, very low. They have proved this repeatedly since 1917, the year the Soviet Union came into being. The No. 1 national security objective of the Soviet Union appears to be homeland defense. They can't do it.

When I watch the Soviets begin to deploy a really, really good ballistic missile defense to complement their pretty good air defense and their pretty good civil defense, I am going to get a very queasy feeling in the pit of my stomach. Until then, I am relaxed. My recommendation to you is to do likewise, prepare to enjoy the next weekend, because it isn't going to happen.

The likelihood is excruciatingly low that the Soviets will use their conventional or theater nuclear forces to be militarily adventurous on a large scale anywhere in the world. Jimmy the Greek, who is a very hardnosed, objective observer, probably would make book that there is no likelihood at all that in the near term, the Soviets are going to invade NATO Europe, use military power to try and seize the Persian Gulf petroleum by force of arms, or launch large scale operations anywhere in the Far East.

How much did the trillion dollars contribute to that deterrent? I ain't got a clue. I don't know anybody who does. I don't know anybody in CIA, in DIA, or anywhere else who can tell you how much that trillion dollars contributed to deterrence. A whole lot of the deterrent was bought, paid for, and deployed before 1981. A lot of that trillion bucks is still in the pipeline. It may influence deterrence in the future, but it has not yet. There is only one group that I know of in the world who can tell you how much that trillion dollars contributed to deterrence: the Politburo in Moscow, and for some reason or another, they aren't talking.

Beyond that, the Soviets are self-deterred in a lot of regards, because of circumstances that are totally beyond our control and beyond their control.

I am going to use Poland as an example. It is just possible that the whole Soviet security apparatus in Central Europe is coming unraveled. The East Germans, the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Romanians, now the Lithuanians are watching what is going on in Poland and saying, "if those guys can loosen the ties with Moscow why can't we?" The Soviets have to control that situation to their total satisfaction, or they are going to live in a world they don't like. In fact, they see developing in Poland exactly what they have said they want in the Soviet Union since 1917. It is a dictatorship of the proletariat, and they don't like it.

It has been going on for over 5 years. They have not used military power to crush the Poles, which they could do very easily, for awfully good reasons. They want a pipeline into Western Europe. If

they use military power against the Poles, they can forget the pipeline. They want hard currency from the West. If they use military power against the Poles, they can forget that hard currency. They probably think that, from a political standpoint, NATO is coming unglued. The best way in the world to put NATO back together solidly is to use military force against the Poles.

So they have been working through the Polish Government and security forces more than 5 years. The beauty of it is, it doesn't make any difference whether they solve that situation by peaceful means or they have to go to war, the heat is clearly off NATO Europe. If they had every seriously considered invading Western Europe, they had planned on using Polish divisions as part of the spearhead. They can't do that anymore. Far more importantly, there was always a big question about the security of Soviet lines of supply and communication through Poland. It isn't a question anymore. They are not secure. The risk is high. The costs are way too high in relationship to probable gains. They are not going to do it.

My punchline is this. The most dangerous capability you can possibly imagine is not necessarily a dangerous threat. I want to repeat that, because I think it may be the only important thing I have to say all morning. The most dangerous capability you can possibly imagine does not necessarily amount to a dangerous threat.

The Soviets have had the capability of destroying the United States with nuclear weapons for over 20 years. They haven't exercised that capability, for very good reasons. If we go off the map, they go off the map with us. They have had the capability of invading Western Europe, with no notice at all, using at least 30 divisions in the spearhead, 25, 30 years. Haven't done it for very, very good reasons. The price is too high. The deterrent is too good.

What I am saying to you is this: When you try to figure what happened to the defense budget, be wary if the executive branch feeds you threats that are couched almost solely in terms of capabilities without relation to intentions, most of which in turn are conditioned by context, and therefore cannot change very rapidly. If you don't get that whole package, you probably are going to put an awful lot of money on programs that don't need it because the threat really isn't imminent, and you will fail to put money where you need it most.

The peacetime balance, in sum, looks pretty good. The wartime balance does not. If deterrence fails for any reason at all, we have troubles you wouldn't believe, because, you see, the forces we bought for deterrent purposes probably are not sufficient to execute our stated strategies successfully.

Most—not some—of the major U.S. objectives in wartime are extraordinarily in doubt. We have a forward deployment strategy. For that strategy to work we have to reinforce and resupply those forward deployed forces very rapidly because they cannot survive with what is in place. That objective is in doubt. We want to be able to control escalation. That objective is in doubt. We would like to be able to limit damage and casualties not only to ourselves but to our allies and friends. That objective is in doubt. And we would

like to be able to terminate any conflict with the Soviet Union quickly on U.S. terms. That objective is in doubt.

Two basic factors are influential. We are being swamped by numbers. Simultaneously, we are losing our qualitative edge. That is a bad combination.

I keep a running inventory of United States and Soviet statistics that now cover 15 consecutive years, starting in 1970. It's almost impossible to identify a quantitative trend that favors the United States in any meaningful fashion. I can really only think of two. We have great superiority in aircraft carriers. We have great superiority in carrier aircraft. After that it begins to be very fuzzy. It is true that the United States has superiority right now in strategic nuclear weapons, but what we have in peacetime is not nearly as important as how many of those weapons survive a Soviet first strike. With the Soviet MIRV program, we are even rapidly losing quantitative peacetime superiority.

We are behind right now, grossly, in many important respects. I am talking about manpower; divisions; armor, including tanks; artillery; fighter attack aircraft; attack submarines; and sealift. The quantitative balance is getting worse instead of better.

The penalties are severe. I love the lead quotation on the first volume of U.S. Soviet statistics that I put together. It said, "Quantity has a quality all its own." Whose words are those? They are Lenin's. Another volume has a lead quotation I like a whole lot: "Quality is superior to quantity, particularly when purchased in large numbers." Admiral Nelson used to say, "Numbers annihilate." When the quantitative balance becomes too lopsided, some very unhappy things occur.

If we went to war with the Soviet Union, got hit hard, and took heavy casualties fast, there would be no way to absorb that attrition. We can't replace it. We lose. We lack flexibility because almost everything we own is nailed down. It's nailed down in NATO Europe, it is nailed down in the Far East. We are playing a game called "rob Peter to pay Paul." Sometimes we talk about horizontal escalation. Horizontal escalation could not be a U.S. strategy. It could be a Soviet strategy. We have 28 divisions, active and reserve. They have 200. Guess who has the most forces in uncommitted reserve to play horizontal escalation?

Qualitative troubles are compounding quantitative problems. We have a solid technological lead in defense technology, but the Soviets are truly ahead in some important regards and are closing the gap in others.

More importantly, we are being crippled by our own procurement policy, because we hesitate to deploy marginal improvements that might be semi-obsolescent before they reach using units. The Soviet Union doesn't have that inhibition, so we wait for an elevator marked "major military advantage" while the Soviets, with their incremental improvements, are climbing the stairs. Their forces are better armed and equipped in many respects than ours a good deal of the time because of that policy.

The bottom line under wartime balance is that \$1 trillion over the last 5 years didn't do hardly anything to rectify the quantitative imbalance, and it did a lot less to keep our technological superiority intact than we would like.

So now we are down to "Why didn't we get more-for our money?" Well, it's easy to say that the Soviets have been modernizing a lot longer than we have. Their modernization program started right after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and they have kept it up. We got bogged down in Vietnam, so an awful lot of our budget for a period of many years was spent for operation and maintenance, rather than modernization. When the Vietnam war was over, the U.S. military establishment wasn't terribly popular. It had budgetary problems. The Soviets had the momentum going in 1981 and kept it going. We are playing catch-up, so it's pretty hard to turn trends around.

That is part of the problem, but you can't blame it all on conditions beyond control over the last 5 years, because we could have spent a lot of that trillion dollars better correcting mismatches. We have mismatches between forces and objectives, forces and threats, forces and strategy, forces and forces. I would like to give you one example each, bing, bing, bing, bing, real fast, so you understand what I am talking about.

The best example of a mismatch between forces and objectives that I can think of is the All-Volunteer Force. If you talk to the leadership in the Pentagon, they will tell you that the All-Volunteer Force is qualitatively better than it has ever been in its history. Absolutely correct, and absolutely misses the whole point, because the problem is not basically qualitative, it's basically quantitative. If you fill the All-Volunteer Force to its authorized legal limit, everybody there is a Ph.D. from MIT—you have exactly the quality you want and you retain them all because they all reenlist, that force can't even remotely cover the commitments our national leadership says are critical to the security of the United States of America. Either you review the commitments and get rid of part of them or seriously reconsider conscription, because you can't have it both ways. The mismatch between forces and objectives is close to complete.

OK. Mismatch between forces and threats. The No. 1 national security program of the current administration is to refurbish all three legs of our strategic nuclear triad simultaneously at a rapid clip. If you believe, as I do, that the probability is exceedingly remote that the Soviets are going to attack the United States with nuclear weapons as a matter of national policy anytime in the foreseeable future, then you cannot possibly justify as your top priority refurbishing all three legs of the triad simultaneously at a rapid pace. One leg at a time, sure; slower pace, sure; pick the most important one first, sure; all three of them at once at a rapid clip, no way.

I can find no U.S. national military strategy that relates to Army division structure at the present time. I can't find a strategy that demands 7 different kinds of U.S. Army divisions when you have only 18 total in the active structure, including 1 airborne, 1 air assault, 1 high technology, a couple of light divisions. How in the world can you justify seven different kinds of Army divisions with any strategy at all? The mismatch between forces and strategy is total.

Finally, mismatches between forces and forces. We buy airlift, but are really not very interested in sealift. We are developing a

capability to commit U.S. Forces rapidly on foreign shores, but can't sustain them. We have all the seeds of a disaster. We have marines without amphibious lift: four marine divisions, three active, one in the Marine Corps Reserve. We can pick up one of them for an amphibious assault, if we wait somewhere around 30 or 40 days to assemble shipping, which is scattered all the way from Manila to the Mediterranean. Even then, we wouldn't have all the right kinds of ships. Nothing between now and 1994 is really going to change that situation much. Either we have too many marines or don't have enough amphibious lift or the Marine Corps has the wrong mission, but it doesn't make any sense at all right now. The mismatch between forces and forces is close to complete.

While we are getting rid of mismatches, let's get rid of some mental blocks, which are bureaucratic blinders. We need to ask some basic questions. I will give you a couple of examples related to the U.S. nuclear triad. Before we get wrapped around the axle arguing about MX or Midgetman, wouldn't it be nice to know whether the future triad ought to have a land-based missile in it at all? Before we argue about the merits of B-1 versus Stealth bombers, wouldn't it be nice to know whether the future triad ought to have a manned bomber in it at all?

Right now we do not have three systems for a triad, we have seven. We have the original three, ICBM's, LBM's, and land bombers. We have already deployed sea- and air-launched missiles with quite different characteristics, quite different strengths, quite different weaknesses. We have also deployed in Europe ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles targeted on the Soviet Union. In my wildest dreams I cannot imagine that if we launch the latter two types against targets in the Soviet Union retaliation would not come back against the United States, which has no means of controlling escalation and no homeland defense either for its people or production base. We should look at our triad and decide whether more than three systems are essential.

I personally believe that three, by accident, is the right number. Nobody in the Pentagon ever got up on Monday morning and said let's have a triad. It's a historical accident that worked very well for over 20 years. I think that three is the right number. You get more capability if you have 4 systems or 5 or 6 or 10, but the law of diminishing returns takes over very rapidly and you are wasting money.

So I would take a look at imbalances. I would take a look at mental blocks. I would not ever tell you gentlemen that if you make changes after that review that you are going to have a smaller defense budget. It might even be bigger. But I could guarantee you that what you spend your money for would make more sense.

OK. I am down to the tail end of my presentation. What is the answer to "What happened to the \$1 trillion over the last 5 years? I have four conflicting answers, all of which are partly correct. Part of that money was well spent. Part of it was not. In some regards we could have done better. In a lot of regards we could have done worse. I would suggest that anybody who tells you he has a definitive answer to that question probably doesn't know what he is talking about.

In conclusion, my charter, sir, from you was to stimulate thought. If I have stimulated a little new thought about what happened to the \$1 trillion, then I am very grateful. If I haven't, I have wasted your time.

That completes my presentation. I invite your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN M. COLLINS

WHAT DID WE GET FOR \$1 TRILLION?

1. Purpose and scope of testimony

a. The question, as stated in Congressman Aspin's October 4, 1985 news release, is "What have we gotten for a trillion [DOD] dollars?" since 1980.

b. My testimony breaks that question into component parts, to make it more manageable.

c. It then identifies a few approaches guaranteed to produce incorrect or incomplete answers; recommends a better method; and puts it into practice, using the U.S.-Soviet military balance as a vehicle to help trace the \$1 trillion.

d. I use cautions and caveats, because some of that money served other purposes, and ambiguities abound.

e. Contributions to deterrence are one distinct topic. Defense, if deterrence fails, is another.

f. I conclude with some reasons why we did not do better, and couple them with ways we might improve.

2. Component parts of the question

a. What did the money buy?

b. What difference did it make?

c. Why didn't we get more for our money?

3. Recipes for wrong answers

a. Single answer assessments.

b. Mirror image assessments.

c. Assessments out of context.

d. Best case assessments on one side, worst case on the other.

e. Piecemeal assessments.

4. Recipe for right, but truncated, answers

a. Assess what the budget bought, in absolute terms, considering the U.S. side only.

b. Benefits: observe whether raw power is increasing or decreasing, and establish how fast. Basic pluses and minuses appear.

c. Those facts, however, lack full significance until appraisers compare pluses and minuses with those of opponents.

5. Integrated net assessments

The standard format for integrated net assessments contains the following five elements:

a. Objectives.

b. Threats.

c. Strategies.

d. Forces.

e. Funds, which are well spent only if forces purchased:

(1) Match ends with means (effectiveness).

(2) Minimize waste (efficiency).

6. United States-Soviet military balance

a. Not the only means of measuring U.S. security, but an appropriate standard, since that is where most of the money goes.

∴ Actually there are two balances: peacetime (deterrence) and wartime (defense).

7. Peacetime balance

a. Not bad. Deterrence still solid across the board.

(1) Soviet nuclear first strikes or large-scale conventional aggression seem unlikely.

(2) Costs appear great, compared with possible gains.

b. I don't know how much \$1 trillion strengthened deterrence is, and doubt anyone who thinks they do.

(1) A lot of U.S. power was in place before 1980.

(2) Circumstances beyond U.S. control constrain the USSR.

c. The relationship between deterrence and recent DOD budgets, in short, is obscure.

d. The relationship between deterrent requirements and threat appraisals is not.

(1) Dangerous enemy capabilities do not necessarily constitute dangerous threats.

(2) Many dangerous Soviet capabilities, visible for the last 25-30 years, have never been employed, for very good reasons.

(3) The point is this: It is imperative to connect enemy capabilities with intentions, which in turn are conditioned by context, then put threats in priority. Wise spending otherwise is an accident.

8. *Wartime balance*

a. Not good. Forces bought for deterrent purposes probably are insufficient to execute wartime strategies against Soviet opposition.

b. Key conventional war objectives in doubt, for example, are:

(1) Reinforce, resupply U.S. forward deployed forces quickly.

(2) Control escalation.

(3) Limit casualties and damage to desired degrees.

(4) Terminate combat early on U.S. terms.

c. Two basic factors contribute:

(1) We are being swamped by numbers.

(2) Simultaneously, we are losing our qualitative edge.

d. \$1 trillion did little to alleviate the first problem, and less than it could have to correct the second.

(1) The quantitative balance is getting worse, not better.

(2) We maintain an overall technological lead, but the Soviets are closing many gaps.

(a) We hesitate to deploy incremental improvements; the Soviets do not.

(b) Their forces consequently are better armed and equipped in important respects, because we choose not to counter.

9. *Why didn't we get more for our money?*

a. It takes a long time to turn adverse trends around, even if we spend \$1 trillion perfectly.

b. We can't however, blame unfavorable balances entirely on conditions beyond U.S. control during the last five years.

c. Money is not the solution to many problems, but part of the DOD budget could have been put to better use correcting mismatches between forces and objectives, forces and threats, forces and strategies, forces and other forces.

d. Mental blocks also inhibit a better military balance. Objective reviews of basic requirements, after removing bureaucratic blinders, might not reduce the budget, but would ensure that money is better spent.

10. *Conflicting conclusions*

Five conflicting conclusions, all partly correct, comprise my ultimate answer to the question, "What have we gotten for a trillion [DOD] dollars?" since 1980:

a. Some money was well spent.

b. Some money was poorly spent.

c. We could have gotten more for our money.

d. We could have gotten less.

e. Precise answers to the question probably are inaccurate.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Collins, not very many witnesses get applause. Who would like to lead this? Bill Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Collins, you have stimulated a lot of thought in my mind. Your presentation is different from the usual run of witnesses that come before our committee, and I appreciate the thoughts that you have brought us. I don't know that I agree with all of them, but I appreciate them and it's been stimulating. You got on to the volunteer force and you indicated the all-volunteer concept, that our problem is quantitative and not necessarily qualitative.

You admit we have a smart Army, a bright Army, and fine young people in it; but you bring up the 200 divisions the Soviets have to our 20 divisions. Are you suggesting that we abandon the all-volunteer concept and go into some sort of conscripted military?

Mr. COLLINS. No, sir. If I made that recommendation, I would be out of the CRS before 12 o'clock. What I suggested was that there is a visible mismatch between the All-Volunteer Force and the things we tell ourselves we have to do to maintain the security of the United States of America; that it would be very useful to review our objectives, to review our commitments to see whether or not we have anachronisms that may have made sense in 1965 or 1975 but don't pertain anymore.

Is there a way we can revise our objectives and commitments downward so that the All-Volunteer Force can cover them effectively? If we can't, then do we want to stay with the All-Volunteer Force? That is an open option, but if we do, we must accept an increased risk. Now you are consciously, knowingly accepting an imbalance between objectives and the forces to accomplish them.

Mr. NICHOLS. One other question, Mr. Chairman.

You indicated you think the possibility of the Soviets making any kind of an attack on the United States or even on the continent is rather remote. You said that the price is too high. Would you agree with me the price would be a little cheaper if we hadn't spent the trillion dollars?

Mr. COLLINS. I think that is a fair statement. What I did say was that there is no way in the world for me to confirm that we got a full trillion dollars worth in terms of deterrence or 75 percent of it or 50 percent, because I don't know how to break it out. It is such a complex equation, with so many nonmilitary things that fold into it.

Do I believe that there was a requirement to refurbish the Armed Forces of the United States starting in 1981? I sure do. I think we hit rock bottom about 1975 or early 1976, and one morning the American people, the Congress, the media all woke up about the same time and said, "The pendulum has swung too far; we need to do something to strengthen our defense establishment." Then a couple of things happened that were very favorable to us. The best friend we ever had showed up, who was the Ayatollah Khomeini. In a way, we should have paid this guy to do what he did because he converted more wild-eyed liberals to moderates in about 2 weeks than I can count. Then Brezhnev ripped his knickers by moving into Afghanistan and fire bells began to ring all over the free world. We began to understand that there is a requirement to bring that pendulum back a little bit.

So, yes, sir, I think part of that trillion dollars surely is required. It may be that all of the trillion is required, but at least some of it could have been spent a lot better than it was.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Collins, I am sorry I wasn't here for your statement, but I want you to know the part I heard was certainly stimulating, interesting, and in parts amusing. I don't disagree with anything that I heard.

Mr. COLLINS. Sir, I don't even agree with everything I say.

Mr. DICKINSON. Well, you know, when I am taken to task, when I am campaigning and somebody asks me about the votes, I have to say nobody is perfect. My wife doesn't agree with me all the time. Heck, if I had to take some of the votes over again I would vote differently, so I am with you. One of the things that you said, though, that is troublesome to me and to the committee is the problem of transport. We call it tooth-to-tail, or whatever. If you had to fight, how are you going to get there.

It's so easy and glamorous to talk about buying airplanes. We bought the C-5 with the outsize cargo capability and the tremendous airlift, and they are able to fly an M-1 tank. That is wonderful. We flew M-1 tanks to Israel in their last war. As a matter of fact, we flew two, that is all, two. But we had to show that we could do it, you know. It was symbolic, but it ain't worth a heat. If you are buying airplanes to fly tanks, you are crazy. So we go to the outsize cargo and we go to the extra eight and so forth. We are faced with a very real problem now. The most expensive weapon system, I believe, that we have ever undertaken to buy, if we go forward with it, will be the C-17.

You say we need sealift. I don't think you ought to deny that. We spend billions of dollars on ships of war, carriers, frigates, and battleships now. I wonder if you would give us your assessment of the value of some \$60 billion I believe we are going to spend total if we buy the entire projected C-17 cargo fleet as opposed to other needs. Could you comment on that?

Mr. COLLINS. Yes, sir; remember—well, you didn't hear my opening remarks, sir, in which I said I can't talk to this panel knowledgeably about a single Pentagon program. I don't know anything about them. So I will take your question and put it into a little broader context. You have got to relate airlift, and sealift needs to objectives—what we are trying to do—and strategy—the way we plan to do it—because those factors dictate how much we have to have of what kinds of equipment, how fast we need to move forces, in what quantities, and so forth.

We are trying to do a lot of this on the cheap. Pre-positioning is on the cheap. There is point beyond which pre-positioning will hurt more than it helps.

Examples: If I were a Soviet strategist, the first thing to go up in smoke in NATO Europe would be pre-positioned stocks. I would never allow any reinforcement or resupply from the continental United States if I could possibly prevent it. I would hit ports, airfields, supply depots, and those pre-positioned stocks. Consider also pre-positioning in the Indian Ocean, for my best friend, Bob Kingston, who owns Central Command. If his problem turned out to be a conflict between Libya and Egypt, it would be easier to bring supplies from the continental United States to that theater of combat than from the Indian Ocean. So you need to be very sure that pre-positioning matches threats which cannot just be a threat couched in terms of capabilities, but in total context.

I am worried that we continue to buy airlift that allows us to put the forces on the far shore without attention to sealift. We are talking about balance, sir. So I couldn't tell you whether we need the new transport. I have the gut feeling we need something as a re-

placement for C-5. It's been around for a while. It's the only out-size airlift aircraft we have. It doesn't have a short field capability like the new one we are talking about. There are a lot of pros and cons of which I am not totally aware. I wouldn't begin to say "this is what you ought to buy" and "you ought to drop that kind of thing." But you do need balance.

Mr. DICKINSON. Let me interrupt to say we have just about 50 brand new. They are not finished, they are still coming off, C-5 is still coming off the production line and I think the short field capability and the off-ramp capability are comparable. So these are factual things you might have to go back and look at. But go ahead. Thank you.

Mr. COLLINS. Disregard that transmission, sir. My basic thesis is that we need a better balanced approach to mobility than we have now, a better balance between airlift and sealift, and that we need to go back and review what we are trying to do to see whether or not the mobility means that we say we have to have are genuine needs or not.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Nick Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Mr. Collins, for your different kind of testimony here this morning. I think it's most appreciated on the part of the Members. I might remind you that you mentioned Jimmy the Greek and his laying odds in certain situations. You are talking to Nick the Greek right now, and I might remind you Jimmy the Greek couldn't even pick the Kentucky Derby or the Belmont or for that matter the Preakness.

Mr. DICKINSON. How did you do?

Mr. MAVROULES. I couldn't either. I am delighted to have you with us. I think you are really keying in on some very important issues. Given the fact we have so many defense dollars to spend and the unhealthy budget deficits not only today but those projected into the future, it's interesting to note some of the analyses you made relative to perhaps a confrontational situation.

General Rogers was before us on two or three occasions stating—of course, he should know, he is the expert in the field—in the event the Soviet Union were to attack in Western Europe, we probably could not sustain any kind of resistance by our forces, land-based forces, air forces, more than maybe 20 or 30 days. He also said that perhaps he would have to make a decision: Would he want to go to tactical nuclear forces? And then he said to us, he did not want to make that decision; rather, he would have that decision made by the Soviet Union. He came before us and stated continue to modernize our forces so we can be put in that position. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with that statement. I agree with him. But given the sum of money—we only have so much money we are going to spend.

I am going to ask you two or three questions you can respond to. Do you think we ought to be spending more money in the modernization of our conventional forces to raise that threshold that he referred to, tactical nuclear? And of course, you know what that means.

Once we go there, then you have to go all-out, in my opinion. Given the industrialized background of the NATO alliance, most of those nations have good industry. They have good technology. Are they pulling their fair share of the load here because the American public and the taxpayer has been paying through the nose for the last 6 years, not the last 4 years, and projected into the next 4 or 5 years.

Do you think the NATO alliance could be doing more to cut this difference in land-based forces? Would you care to respond to those questions, sir?

Mr. COLLINS. Reference conventional forces for NATO supplied by the United States or reference a stronger NATO conventional capability. I guess the best I can do with that is to expand a little bit more on the idea I had in my prepared remarks. You can't look at conventional without looking at theater nukes simultaneously.

It is clear to me that we have a conventional force problem in Europe, that the forces are not strong enough to accomplish the assigned missions. We are working with some extraordinary constraints that you can't get away from. The German Government, for example, very understandably does not care to trade space for time. They have been involved in two horrendous wars in this century. They are not terribly interested in having their territory used as a battleground again. They are not interested in trading space for time, even though it might mean in the end that NATO was able to prevail, where if they didn't trade space, NATO would be broken along the line of contact. So I think trading space for time is not an open option.

We have no reserves of any size in Europe to counter penetrations if the crust is penetrated, and almost everybody agrees that the probability is high that it would be. A possible way of providing more reserves would be to produce some sort of field fortifications along the line of contact. That recommendation has repeatedly been vetoed by the German Government, but I think is an option that ought to be subject to continued negotiation. Field fortifications along the border—and I am not talking about pre-positioned nuclear weapons or anything like that—would slow the opposition. They could channelize the opposition. NATO would not need so much for forward defense and thus could retain larger reserves for use where the greatest threat begins to develop, and we don't know where that is going to be. That is one way of looking at the problem.

A second way of looking at conventional forces for NATO is that if you improve conventional capabilities a whole lot, you almost certainly will lower the nuclear threshold, unless you provide better survivability for our nuclear weapons. Right now, U.S. nuclear stockpiles in Europe are under central control for security purposes in peacetime. It makes a lot of peacetime sense, but it makes them terribly vulnerable to a preemptive attack. We have the same problem with a number of our nuclear delivery systems. Consider ground-launched cruise missiles, for example. Each one has four missiles on a launcher. We have put them on airfields that almost certainly are already Soviet targets. If the airfield is hit, there go your cruise missiles. We plan, to disperse on strategic warning, which presumably will be adequate to allow us to do so. A

very dangerous assumption. I remember a review of warning times produced by Alexander Haig & Co. when he was Supreme Allied Commander for Europe.

One of the options they discarded out of hand was an attack out of the blue. I can think of a lot of scenarios where an attack out of the blue would make a lot of sense from the Soviet standpoint. So, it is dangerous to tell ourselves, "yes, we know we are very concentrated right now, but we are going to have plenty of time to do something about that after strategic warning makes it evident an attack could be imminent." I haven't given you a straight direct answer to your question partly because of my inhibitions as a member of CRS, but partly because I don't think it's—

Mr. MAVROULES. Did I misunderstand you, sir? Did you say if we modernize to a greater extent the conventional forces that we would lower the threshold?

Mr. COLLINS. Absolutely.

Mr. MAVROULES. Would you explain that, please.

Mr. COLLINS. Absolutely, it would lower the threshold. Because you would make it impossible for the other side to conduct a conventional offensive and win quickly, which is a prerequisite for the Soviet Union—they have allies that really aren't terribly reliable, their lines of supply and communication are not terribly secure. If they ever go to war against NATO Europe, they must have a high degree of confidence that they are going to win fast. So if you have improved your conventional power to the point where they don't have that confidence, and they really believe that they have to go into Western Europe, the first thing they are going to think about is nuclear weapons. That is the only way to get there in a hurry. The way to keep the nuclear threshold high is to improve NATO's conventional power and at the same time eliminate Soviet incentives to preempt against NATO's nuclear weapons. Am I communicating?

Mr. MAVROULES. You are communicating. This is the first time I have heard that scenario. All of the witnesses I have listened to over the last 7 years have stated to us if we continue—by the way, this is the opinion of some of our leading military personnel in Europe, in the NATO.

Mr. COLLINS. You now have another opinion, sir.

Mr. MAVROULES. I realize that. That if we continue the modernization, then we have a greater deterrent factor in the land base forces and, therefore the Soviet Union would not want to attempt to take us on.

Mr. COLLINS. That is a half correct answer. You will have improved your conventional deterrent quite a lot. It probably will not improve your overall deterrent.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just follow up on Nick Mavroules' question by asking, if I could, Mr. Collins, the question that we discussed with the testimony of Dr. Penner yesterday. What Dr. Penner's testimony showed was that we were paying a great deal more for individual weapons now than we had in the past.

The question which he said he was not able to answer was, "Was the additional capability bought with those weapons worth the ad-

ditional cost?" You have both testified, on the one hand, that quantity does matter.

On the other hand, I think at one point you said we have been losing our qualitative edge. In your opinion, are we spending too much on quality and not enough on quantity?

Mr. COLLINS. No, sir. One of the things that just drives me up the wall is the either/or approach we have to national defense in this country, in which we are either going to do this or we are going to do that. The Soviet Union does both, and we find ourselves behind the eight ball all the time. There was a long time when quality produced a pretty good balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, because the Soviets were relying almost exclusively on a principle of war called "Mass." We were operating off a principle called "Economy of Force," buttressed by very pronounced qualitative superiority. Through the 1950's and 1960's we were really worried about the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, about this massive Soviet offensive capability. I couldn't ever see it. They didn't have a great offensive capability during that period. They had a lot of numbers, but didn't have the logistic apparatus to support an offensive. They didn't have the type arms and equipment to support an offensive.

Many things have changed since 1970. The Soviets are not only increasing the size of their force, but they are improving quality by orders of magnitude. Their offensive capabilities in Europe have gone up like a skyrocket. They have added a lot of armor, tanks, and other type armor. They have added a lot of artillery. They have put that artillery on tracks, where previously it was almost all on wheels. They have a mobile air defense umbrella that could accompany a fast-moving offensive. They have the world's best combat bridging. There was a long period in which their tactical aviation was very short range and had very little lift capability. It really didn't have much interdiction or close air support competence. That is all changed.

So the question, "Should we put most of our money into quality or should we put most of it into quantity?" Could be added to the recipes for wrong answers that I mentioned in my opening remarks. I think we have reached that point where we need to have a reasonable balance of both.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we agree on that. The question is, do we currently have that balance or are we currently spending it the way we allocate our current dollars—obviously, you would like to have more of both. The point is, is it in the budgets that are coming up in the next few years given what is going on on the deficit side, that is not likely to be an option.

The question is, could we improve the capability of our forces by shifting some of the resources away from quality toward more quantity or are you comfortable with the balance as it is or maybe you would go toward more quality.

Mr. COLLINS. I am not comfortable with the balance the way it is. Let me review a Soviet policy which I certainly do not recommend we duplicate, to show how they are competing very effectively.

They produce a large number of forces that are very high tech, high quality. They hardly ever throw anything away, but retain a large number of weapons and equipment which are less technologi-

cally advantageous. Those assets can be used to take care of attrition and provide them flexibility. Trained reserves can be used to feed into their divisions when they mobilize and bring category III divisions to full strength.

One of the advantages pointed out by Viktor Sovonov in his book called "Inside the Soviet Army" is that old equipment is not all bad, because the people who are going to use it trained on it. They do not have to be retrained on new equipment before they are combat effective. Those kinds of forces used as fillers can be very, very effective.

So I think we have a requirement for more numbers but if more numbers are not qualitatively competitive with the Soviet Union, you still get beat early in the war. You have to look for a balance and I would be the last one on this short notice to try and tell you, sir, where that balance ought to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hillis.

Mr. HILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Collins.

I really appreciate your statement here today. It is a diverse opinion on this panel and you have given us enough to confuse all of us. Seriously, I want to ask you just in a couple of areas.

I take it from what you said about the Russians implemental deployment weapons systems, if they had been developed against DIVAD, we would have been in trouble. Did we make a mistake? We spent a lot of money in this country.

Next year or 2 years from now we have got something on paper that looks a heck of a lot better, but somehow we never produce it or if we produce it, it takes 10 years from the thought being processed until it is fielded.

We seem to be much slower. Because we don't have DIVAD, we are going back to a system that is really antiquated. So I would like to get your views on R&D.

I would like to have your views. You talked about too much in the strategic triad, there is seven systems instead of three. How about SDI? Should the money that is being spent there perhaps go into some other area?

Then you mentioned in that the strategic area about the deployment of GLCM's overseas and Pershing missiles. Part of their presence there is a balance of a political equation, the use of placement of SS-20's close to the European members of the NATO alliance and this is to kind of shore up the Europeans. Don't you have to give some of how we spend our money and our force structure to the political realities of what is going on in the world?

Another area I would like to have your comments, can we survive with a frozen defense budget now that we have spent the trillion dollars? In other words, the \$292 billion figure.

Last, but not least, I would like a few thoughts from you on should we develop chemical warfare weapons?

Mr. COLLINS. GLCM and Pershing II. I do not intend to give any member of the panel the impression that we should not have put those weapons there. If I had had a choice, I am not sure I would, but I understand the political implications. It is my belief that we are getting some deterrent value.

Several years ago I published a little article called "Principles of Deterrence." We have Principles of War. We don't pay any attention to them, but at least we have them. We say that deterrence is our No. 1 national security objective, but there are no principles of deterrence. So I published a list of them, what I thought they ought to be. One was called the Principle of Uncertainty. If you can't adhere to the Principle of Credibility for deterrence, then your fallback position can be uncertainty. GLCM's and Pershing II's enhance U.S. deterrence in Western Europe through uncertainty, because the people in Moscow have to ask themselves "would U.S. leaders be stupid enough to use those weapons the way they say they are going to?" This would give them pause. It would improve our deterrent. So I couldn't possibly say to you I wouldn't have done it at all. What I could say is I would certainly look for some other way to improve deterrence through credibility rather than uncertainty, while satisfying political requirements in Europe.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Chemical, and probably biological warfare are Soviet specialties. The United States is almost totally unprepared to compete in those fields. It is a possible paradox that if we really believe we want to deter the use of chemical weapons, if we hope that we can avoid ever seeing them used against the United States in combat anywhere by anybody at any time, that we must have an offensive retaliatory capability of our own. It is a possible paradox that you must have them in order to avoid using them. My rationale is this: No nation since 1918 has used chemical weapons against anybody who can retaliate with chemical weapons. Mussolini used them against the Ethiopians in 1936. They have been used in Kampuchea, in Laos, presumably. They have been used in Vietnam. They have probably been used in Afghanistan. They have never been used since World War I against anybody who can reciprocate with chemical weapons.

The basic argument here is, do you really need a chemical retaliatory capability in order to deter? Do you really need it? And if so, how much do you need before you begin arguing about binary versus something else? You have got to know whether you want them at all.

I read in a defense publication in the last week something that I hadn't thought about before, and it was very intriguing. Gen. Bernie Rogers said if he were a Soviet strategist he would lob one nonpersistent chemical weapon into each NATO division area at the start of war, which would make our side button up.¹ If that is all it takes, then we may not have a chemical offensive problem. I think maybe it was an off-the-wall comment that was not very carefully thought through, but it surely would simplify requirements. I would think about whether or not I need to have chemical retaliatory capabilities in order to have a deterrent, and if I do, how much. Then I would start worrying about whether or not it

¹ Reuters North European Service, Sept. 3, 1985 (news conference to open the Alliance's annual Autumn Forge military exercise).

ought to be binary weapons and how many should we buy or deploy here, here, here or here.

SDI technology. I think the best thing I can do without violating CRS ground rules is to discuss what is the basic meaning of SDI in my opinion. I think that research, maybe not even development, but research in this field is an insurance policy. The Soviet Union has been involved in its own SDI program for a long time. They haven't been terribly successful, but they are very interested in it because, if I read the tea leaves correctly, their No. 1 national security objective is homeland defense. They have been experimenting for a long time. I can remember when George Keegan retired as Air Force two-star Chief of Intelligence, 1977, I believe. He took his message to the American people on TV—in 1 or 2 or 3 years the Soviets are going to have deployable particle beam weapons. He was way beyond the point where the hard data would support that conclusion. They probably don't have an imminent breakthrough in that field in 1985, but they are pushing at it.

The breakthrough may not come in terms of charged particle beams or high energy lasers. We don't know. Nobody in CIA knows, nobody in DIA, and there is a very good reason. For many years we didn't emphasize homeland defense as a matter of national policy. The only ballistic missile defense research and development related to hard site defense for ICBM's in silos. Related problems are totally different than population and production base defense. Because we were not pressing the state of technological art, we had no way to look over the technological horizon and with any degree of confidence in CIA, DIA or anywhere else, say "these avenues are likely to be dead ends for the Soviets; these avenues are likely to pay off; and this is when the payoff is likely to take place. Now that we have started our own SDI research program, our intelligence community has sharper intellectual tools to estimate what is possible and what is the likelihood of a real threat developing in the foreseeable future. That capability goes way up as research progresses.

So SDI is an insurance program. It is insurance doubly, because if we wait to do our technological homework and one day we watch the Soviets begin to test, not deploy, an SDI system that looks like it really might work, we just lost. You can't catch up if you haven't already done your homework. If we watch them begin to test, and can't test something equally as good or better, we have probably put the United States of America out of business. I put it this way to most of the people I talk to on this subject. Offense and defense have alternated with one on top since the Stone Age. Offense has been solidly on top since 1945 with the two bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I see nothing that indicates that historical cycle ceased with deployment of nuclear weapons. The fact that one or both sides add more offensive systems right now is not going to change the nuclear balance very significantly. The side that solves the defense problem first picks up all the marbles and goes home. They win. So that is the ballpark I am putting SDI technology into.

From that standpoint SDI is enormously important. It may be that the breakthrough won't come until the 29th century. It also may be that it will come a lot faster than a lot of the pundits believe it will.

I happen to think any scientist that tells you something is impossible is probably wrong. All of the technological forecasts over the last century have been way off. The biggest one in 1937 didn't even mention nuclear weapons. They were only 8 years away. We put a man on the Moon in the 1960's. Not many people in 1961 thought we were going to have a man walking on the Moon in 1969, but we did it. The people who tell you that it is impossible to get an SDI breakthrough just possibly may be wrong. If they are, we are toying with survival of the Nation.

Mr. HILLIS. Thank you.

Mr. COLLINS. You asked me about the frozen defense budget and can we deal with it.

Mr. McCURDY. Good job, Bud.

Mr. COLLINS. The answer is you not only can deal with it, you are going to have to deal with it. So that makes it doubly imperative that we go back to square 1, reevaluate what we are trying to do and how we are trying to do it, look for mismatches, look for mental blocks, and spend every penny the best way we can.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I turn it over to Dave McCurdy, let me follow up.

You pointed out, Mr. Collins, a number of areas that we have not spent due to the various mismatches that we should be spending more money in. I think they are some very good examples.

If, as we all know, we are going to be living with flat budgets, we have got to get money from somewhere else. I haven't heard you suggest ways in which we are spending money that is inappropriate.

Could you suggest some ways? If we are going to spend more money in the ways you have pointed out, weaknesses, and we have got flat budgets, we have got to get the money from somewhere. What areas would you say that we have spent money on that we should not spend money on?

Mr. COLLINS. I would like you to do me a big favor. I would like you to invite me to discuss this with you in your chambers and I will tell you exactly what I think, but I hate to be out in Macy's window doing it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have got it. We will set up a closed session sometime.

Dave McCurdy.

Mr. McCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Collins, I have long been a fan of yours and I have always appreciated your candor and your work. I am going to ask you a question that you probably wouldn't expect, and I am not sure that many in this committee have been anticipating, but an area of work that I have been involved in, an area that I have a great deal of interest is that of net assessment.

I have been meeting with a number of your friends, folks ranging from Andy Marshal and Ted Warner and Jasper Welsh, Leon Slaus, and I can name a few others, some since I served on the Intelligence Committee it would be better off not naming.

But I have been disturbed by the lack of any real good net assessment in this country; that is, comparing our capability with the Soviets, not threat enhancement or threat inflation on one hand, and devaluing our capabilities on the other.

The fact that there is only one, other than a few think tanks, agency in this Government that is clearly assigned the responsibility of net assessment within the Pentagon, and that is Andy Marshal's shop, I am preparing legislation to consider the option of mandating a congressional office of net assessment.

The question I have is somewhat provocative because I haven't decided exactly where it should be placed. It is, what is your view of our net assessment capability?

Should Congress, should the Pentagon be afraid of objective net assessment and does Congress really have a role in requiring this type of assessment?

Mr. COLLINS. The foreword to my military balance book, which was published last July, notes that Senator Culver put me in the military balance business in 1976. My first study was a Senate Armed Services Committee print, January 1976. I thought then that immediately the field was going to be flooded. Ten years later it has never happened. As far as I know, I am the only individual anywhere who is doing unclassified net assessments of the U.S.-Soviet military balance across the board.

Mr. McCURDY. Across the board? There are a lot?

Mr. COLLINS. There are a lot of doing NATO-Warsaw Pact and strategic nuclear. A lot of people speculate on the Far East. A lot of people are doing something else. I don't know anybody who is trying to put all the pieces together unclassified.

It is a terrible indictment to have one runny-nosed analyst at the Library of Congress as the only guy in the country who is trying to do it.

It is almost that bad in the executive branch. Andy Marshal's net assessment shop is working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I believe there ought to be a net assessment shop, a really good one, in each of the four services. There probably ought to be one serving the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well.

Is there a place for an office of net assessment on Capitol Hill? I don't know. You have just asked me a question I never thought about.

Mr. McCURDY. I would like you to think about it. You don't have to give me an answer today. As a matter of fact, we have been in touch with your office, and I think we even have an appointment scheduled.

Mr. COLLINS. You asked whether the executive branch should be afraid of objective net assessments. Of course not. They ought to be down on their knees begging for objective net assessments, because this is the only possible way they can get a feel for what the real requirements are. It is the only possible way that they can know what forces they need or how much money those forces ought to cost.

I find it distressing that the emphasis on net assessment is so slight in the Pentagon. I don't know what happens to Andy Marshal's studies. I have no idea how much influence they have. If they have a lot of influence, I would think that after all the years I have been in contact with OSD, the Joint Staff, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, DIA, that someone would have said, "Gee, we are really getting a lot of good out of his studies and we are glad you are trying to do the same thing unclassified."

fied." But I never hear a word, so I haven't a clue what practical use is being made of the assessments he produces.

Mr. MCCURDY. Mr. Chairman, if I may just make one statement. Again, since I do serve on the Intelligence Committee, having seen a lot of reports, you are not inaccurate in your statement that there is not a lot of good net assessment across the board being done anywhere inside the Federal Government and to me that is a travesty.

That is why I am going to offer legislation to create and enforce better net assessment.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is a shame in the 5 years I have been on this committee we have not had this witness before us and I hope it is not too long in the future that we have him again, and other people of his caliber.

Thank you, Mr. Collins.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. McCurdy.

Let me just say I think one of the things that this committee is going to come out of with these hearings is some support for Mr. McCurdy's proposal. We have been kind of looking down the line of where does this whole thing go and what do we come out with at the end of this whole process and I think clearly getting Congress into the net assessment business is something we ought to do.

To follow up the question, you do look at net assessment and, as you say, you are the only one that does look at it broadly across the board in the unclassified literature, you are the only one doing it.

I did read your recent report which does some net assessment of regions. I would like you, if you could, to give us your assessment of three regions, the main three regions, Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northwest Asia, in particular.

Do you see an improvement in the balance in either of those three areas having spent the trillion dollars, back to our trillion dollars? Has our trillion dollars improved our position, our net position against the Soviets in any of those three major confrontational areas?

Mr. COLLINS. The answer to your question is absolutely yes. I am back where I started. I don't know how much, but there is no question in my mind that our military power in 1985 is significantly improved over 1981. I am talking about our R&D base. I am talking about manpower, which is slightly better quantitatively but significantly better qualitatively than it was in 1980. Firepower has improved. We have deployed nine brandnew systems since 1981; a lot of others have continued to climb or have accelerated. We have improved mobility significantly, stretched C-141's, bought C-5's, near-term pre-positioning ships, and SL-7 fast containerships. We have improved remarkably in command and control, particularly by the organization of two new unified commands that serve very useful purposes: Central Command and Space Command.

Did all of this improve our posture in Europe, in the Middle East, in the Far East? Yes, it certainly did. According to my prepared testimony, I think that the trillion dollars ensured that the deterrent which has been in place for a long time did not erode dangerously. We have not improved our combat capabilities all that much yet, if deterrence fails.

The military balance book, for example, notes that if you make worst case assessments for the Middle East, there is no way in the world we can possibly win, but a lot of other possibilities make Central Command look pretty good. What Central Command has now is much better than what was available to P.X. Kelley in 1980.

I am in agreement with the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our posture in the Far East has improved. I am not sure that it was ever as bad as made to appear in open print, but it could have been. We were on the way. The reason it stopped had largely to do with Afghanistan. President Carter until then was intent on withdrawing the rest of our ground forces from Korea. I have used that as an example, particularly in talking to friends in Japan, about the difference between deployments that have genuine symbolic influence and deployments that have symbolic influence that is really not very meaningful.

About the time we were getting ready to withdraw the rest of the forces from Korea, the first Kiev carrier showed up in the Pacific. Japanese newspapers reported it apprehensively. Big deal. And I said to my friends in Tokyo, you guys are doing the Soviet propagandists' work, because that carrier is nothing more than a visible symbol of Soviet R&D progress. It does not improve their combat capabilities enough to make any difference at all. If five Kiev carriers show up out there, I am going to start getting worried. One of them, no problem.

But if we pull out the rest of the 2d Infantry Division from Korea, there is symbolism that really counts, because it is visible evidence of United States commitment to support South Korea. It is very well to say our deterrent is going to be based on naval and air power, but when the crunch comes we can always move those forces. Land forces sitting right there on the DMZ can't withdraw at the last moment; they are going to get hit first. Do they contribute much to combat capability in Korea? Not a lot. There are 20 Korean divisions; a truncated United States division combatwise isn't important. Symbolically, its importance is enormous in terms of deterrence.

I am not sure the balance in the Pacific was ever as bad as we have said it was. We were working that way. That trend turned around after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. I think the balance is a lot better now than it was in 1981. I think it is a lot better in the Middle East than it was in 1981. I think it is better in Europe than it was in 1981.¹ Is this a reasonable answer, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Collins, for coming to testify.

You made an interesting statement I thought was quite remarkable. I am not sure what you meant.

Maybe you can explain it. You mentioned earlier in your testimony the Soviet Union was self-deterred. I don't think you mean that we don't need a national defense commitment in order to deter that.

¹ This comment refers to U.S. combat power in Western Europe, not to the overall NATO-Warsaw Pact balance.

I am sure you believe that we do. I am really wondering what you meant. I think you were talking about in that context Poland and the fact that the Soviet Union has problems. They don't rely and can't rely on the Polish people or the Polish army. That may be so, but on the other hand, I am old enough to remember—I was very young at the time—but I remember the way the Soviets handled similar types of problems in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and it is my feeling that if the situation in Poland became so out of control that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to use force in Poland as they have used force in other parts of the world, as well.

Second, you made an interesting observation and tried to draw a distinction between the peacetime balance of forces, deterrence in peacetime and deterrence in war and wartime balance and it seems to me that really one is very much the other and there should not really be a distinction between the two.

Even if we look good on paper in peacetime and the Soviet Union knows or has the perception we are weak in wartime because of new dynamics to the situation, therefore, we are not adequately strong and deterrence fails us, the Soviet Union is certainly not going to look at our peacetime, quote, unquote, deterrent and be deterred if our wartime deterrent is inadequate and, therefore, I think you really have to look at how we would be able to survive a first strike, how we would be able to fight both in Europe and in other parts of the world in a real wartime scenario and unless we can measure up to the Soviet Union we are not in fact deterring.

You made the statement that our wartime deterrence is bad. Do you conclude then in order to make it better we have to, in fact, spend more money than we are? You indicated by your testimony that we have indeed gotten a lot for the \$1 trillion, the sum of money that is brought up, and I suppose is the catalyst that brings us all together today.

If \$1 trillion brought us a lot, but nevertheless we still have very bad wartime deterrence, do we have to spend at rates even higher in the next number of years than we spent the last 3 or 4?

Mr. COLLINS. I make a very sharp distinction between peacetime and wartime capabilities. I make a very sharp distinction between deterrence and combat capabilities.

Let me put it this way: Let's say that you and I have an argument. You are bigger than I am and a lot younger than I am. There is not much question in my mind you could clean my clock. But I say to you in this argument, "If you take one more step, I am going to break your nose." Now, you have to decide whether it is worth it. You know you can whip me, but is the broken nose worth it? Is a broken arm worth it? Is a broken leg worth it? That is what we are talking about here.

What we bought and deployed for deterrent purposes may be totally sufficient. It raises the cost of aggression so high that the gains are not enough to make it worth taking the action. But if war occurs for any reason, whether it is over-confidence, miscalculation, accident, or what have you, what deterred may not be what it takes to fight effectively. What is necessary now is the capability to execute your strategy successfully. From where I sit, in a lot of regards we don't have it. The deterrent is good, but the combat capability is not.

I believe there is a very valid distinction. You talked a little bit about Poland. Could the Soviets go in there? Yes, sir. Will they sometime? Maybe. Could war erupt anywhere? Are Jimmy the Greek and I both wrong in our assessments? Can war happen? Yes, it can. Absolutely, it can, but the probability is so low that it is hard to imagine.

So it seems to me that, in the national defense business, if anybody insists on worse case assessments that do not look at the total context in which the opposing parties are operating, they are going to spend an awful lot of money on things they don't need and probably not spend enough on the things that they do.

I don't know whether I am communicating to you now or not.

Mr. COURTER. That is fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sweeney.

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Collins, I genuinely appreciate you coming before the committee here today, allowing us another opportunity to take the age-old issue of quality versus quantity out of the closet and beat it to death again.

I have been intrigued by some of the things you have recommended to our committee here today, at least five of which genuinely intrigue me. First of all, if I heard you correctly, you have recommended a wholesale restructuring of the Pentagon, a reorganizing of most of the Army, Navy, and Air Force divisions, a reinstatement of the draft, a re-thinking of the most fundamental of our national defense doctrines, the Triad, and in altering the procurement decisionmaking process has worked to a point where we have gained a qualitative edge that have sustained and stood up even during the years of the Carter legislation.

If I can catch my breath after all that thought and return to a more—some more mundane considerations, those being considerations of money and dollars, let me just begin by setting the hearing in a different context by quoting numbers but to set things in a different tilt.

Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact numbers showing that in the category of main battle tanks, just rounding off, Soviets enjoy a three-to-one advantage, 46,000 to 17,000. Artillery and mortar, about a 2.5-to-one advantage, 38,000 to 14,000, attack helicopters little over a thousand to our 900, anti-tank guided weapons launchers 35,000 to 19,000, total military including naval forces, 6 million to roughly our 4.5 million, et cetera.

I guess where I am going with all this is, as you have stated and acknowledged throughout your testimony, numbers surely don't tell the full story, but nor are they irrelevant.

In the sense of the purpose of these hearings is to focus on that most illusive concept of our defense and that is the quality of our defense, I think we need to put some more thinking into just what measurement you are using to draw the conclusions that you are drawing about the quality of our national defense.

Now, the chairman summarized Mr. Penner's testimony from yesterday as including that cost of our procurement has gone up and yet the quality of our systems are uncertain. I would submit they are only uncertain because they are very difficult to measure.

The cost surely goes up because as we improve our quality, we also increase our unit cost. We increase the replacement cost and

we increase the maintenance and repair on those systems which are becoming as we speak and as we go from defense budget to defense budget more costly all the while.

But to return to the most basic question and in common parlance are we getting the biggest bang for the buck? The most important assertion that I would like to take up with you briefly with a couple of questions is the one that you made where you said our qualitative balance or qualitative edge is eroding.

I would like to pursue that a little bit with you because in the absence of any fancy or arcane systems to analyze our qualitative balance we are forced to return to that most basic of considerations and that is how much money we are spending.

So, in other words, is the single most important factor maintaining our qualitative edge the money we have to conclusions we can draw very quickly. One is we are not spending enough or the other being the Soviet Union is spending more than we are.

Let me bring you to my question focusing on your assertion that our qualitative edge has been eroding.

Is it possible that we have temporarily lost our qualitative edge not because the chairman and ranking members of the appropriate procurement subcommittees on the House and Armed Services Committee or the people at the Pentagon are any less motivated or any less inspired or any less creative but, in fact, we have lost that qualitative edge because of the neglect that occurred during the period of 1977 to 1981 and because we have not allowed enough money to be spent in some areas to maintain that qualitative technological edge?

Mr. COLLINS. My military balance study released last July has a section on United States and Soviet defense technologies. At the tail end of that section is a 5-page tabular summary of who is ahead, who is behind, who is catching up and who is not. It uses, if I recall correctly, 120 different criteria, which are about evenly divided between basic and applied technology. In preparing that table, I used my normal research procedure, floating the first draft with 25 to 50 reviewers of various persuasions. They pretty well covered the spectrum in the particular field that the chapter deals with: a number of people in the Science Policy Division of the CRS; people in research and engineering in the Pentagon (a dozen different shops there took a look at it); some think tanks around town. Where I was unable to get a consensus on who is doing the best, I took a look at all of the input, decided what I thought were the most credible sources, and that is where the X's went.

The study shows that, although the United States has an overall lead, the Soviets are probably ahead in particle beam technology, chemical biological munitions, power generation, air-cushioned vehicles, submarine speeds, diving depths, and so forth. They are closing the gap in a number of regards. I can only find a few places where we are closing gaps. So if you straight-line project technological trends out to some undetermined point in the future the balance changes a whole lot, and our technological superiority doesn't look nearly as pronounced as it does now. What are some gaps they are closing? Acoustics, for example; optics; avionics, integrated circuits; several important materials, including alloys, composites, metal matrix, plastics, and synthetics.

Now, that is my basis for saying it looks like our qualitative edge is eroding. Part of that probably is impossible to prevent. It's like the strategic nuclear balance. There was no way in the world, no matter what we did, to maintain the offensive or retaliatory nuclear capability we had when we enjoyed a monopoly. There was no way to preserve that monopoly. There was no way to prevent the Soviets from deploying large numbers of systems that could hit this country. In the technology business it is impossible to maintain total superiority.

You can prevent a lot of erosion. I think the Soviets are terrified of our technological competence. They really believe they cannot compete effectively. This is one of the reasons they have a case of the hives about SDI, because they don't want to see us unleash what they see as technological superiority in a field that they believe is immensely important, because it could change the whole balance.

What we can do is review those areas where we are losing our edge and determine which ones really make a difference, which ones make the most difference, then do something about it. I am a firm believer that we can reverse almost all adverse trends, if we want to do it.

How much money will it take? You are talking to a guy who doesn't know anything about money. I can't even figure out my income tax. So how much money it takes I don't know. Certainly it would take more than we are plowing into R&D now, but how much I wouldn't have any idea.

The CHAIRMAN. Duncan Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COLLINS, do you think we ought to spend more money on SDI?

Mr. COLLINS. Now I am being advocative, aren't I?

Mr. HUNTER. Go right ahead.

Mr. COLLINS. Easy for you to say, sir. Do I think we ought to spend more on SDI? Let me put it this way. I have already said I think that the primary emphasis on SDI ought to be research right now, research alone. There is a requirement for basic research, there is a requirement for applied research. I wouldn't get into the development business or the testing business yet. Since I don't know anything about the budget, I couldn't tell you whether we are putting enough into SDI to get what we need in terms of research or whether we should spend more.

Mr. HUNTER. Let me put it another way. Do you think it would be wise to expand our technological edge in the area of strategic defense?

Mr. COLLINS. Of course.

Mr. HUNTER. Capability to track and do all the other things that are necessary?

Mr. COLLINS. Of course, for the reasons I have already mentioned. If you are not pressing the state of the art in that field, you can't have any reasonable estimate of what is possible for the opposition and you cannot prepare yourself to compete, if the Soviets begin to test something that looks like it's going to be good. So, absolutely, I think it's critical that we do our homework effectively in this field. Above all other endeavors, it deals with the long-term survival of the Nation.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much. I think that is a very profound statement.

Let me ask you about submarines just a little bit. The Soviets have over 300 attack submarines. We have right around 100. They are closing that gap in a number of areas. Acoustics is one of them. I agree with you, you can't keep them from becoming better in acoustics as they spend more money, no matter what we do, and it is tougher for us to move ahead in the higher echelon of technology than for them to go through what I would call medium rank technology at a faster clip.

I have got two questions for you. Do you think we should put more emphasis on submarine development, and maybe if we are talking about tight budgets, put more scrutiny on submarines versus surface vessels? You know we have put a lot of steel in the water in this budget, naval budget.

No. 2, do you think we should pursue with more vigor than we are—we are putting a lot of resources into acoustics and other areas to try to keep our submarine technology ahead of the Soviets. Do you think we should pursue that to a greater degree than we are right now?

Mr. COLLINS. A lot of Soviet antisubmarine technology is not in the field of acoustics, although they are delving into acoustics like we do. I have a one-liner in my military balance book that says many ASW specialists in this country believe if it is not acoustical it is "unsound." The Soviets don't believe that. They are exploring a wide variety of technologies. It would be helpful for us to do likewise, because submarine technology is changing. The day may come when acoustics is not the most important way of detecting or tracking submarines. Maybe it is going to be something else.

Among the mental blocks I mentioned in my prepared remarks, you find surface ships versus submarines and conventional combatants versus high performance surface ships. It might be beneficial to drop bureaucratic blinders and look at the prospects of a 100-knot Navy using hydrofoil, surface effect ships, various other options. If you change the whole character of the Navy by changing the proportion of conventional-type combatants we have now and the proportion of surface ships to submarines you might come up with a Navy in the 2000's that looks totally different. It is not too early to begin doing some creative, innovative thinking on this subject. But you can't do it, if you have already made up your mind that "A" and "B" and "C" are wrong and "D" is the direction you have to go.

Mr. HUNTER. I concur with you completely concerning surface-effect ships and other types of ships, and I have found over the last few years that there are a lot of people in the Navy who just want to put steel in the water and they just don't seem to like the idea of—I guess admirals don't like to stride the deck of surface-effect ships. It's not like a carrier. There is quite a resistance from going into that new technology I am glad you are an advocate of that. I think maybe this committee should become more of an advocate of SES technology in the future.

Mr. COLLINS. What I am an advocate of, sir, is innovative thinking. I don't know whether I advocate surface effect ships. What I advocate is taking a look at them. If you have preemptively closed

that door in your face, you will never know what the real possibilities are, and it may turn out the real possibilities are nil. I am only being an advocate for objective, creative thinking.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask Mr. Kasich or Mr. Bennett. Charley Bennett and then John Kasich.

Mr. BENNETT. I notice you say that unfortunately our peacetime balance is not bad and our wartime balance is not good and that certainly puts it down in very brief words. I certainly agree with you. This leads me to think perhaps you would think maybe we should do a little bit more to be protected in the field of conventional warfare. You have indicated someplace we have made some advances but the thrust of what you say seems to me to be saying, among other things, you said we ought to give a little more observation to how to win a conventional war and actually being able to do it. Is that your conclusion?

Mr. COLLINS. Maybe I can broaden that a little bit. If somebody asked me what is the No. 1 national security problem of the United States, I would have to say that it's an inability to produce creative, imaginative military strategies that interlock all the pieces in meaningful ways, that provide for security, not just in the present, but are taking steps now to make sure that it's better in the future. I don't see an apparatus anywhere in the United States that is dedicated to the development of new theories and concepts in this field. Until you have that, you really don't have a good handle on how you ought to deal with future conventional warfare requirements and capabilities, or nuclear, or what have you.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, sir, that is very stimulating. We have got a Cabinet that advises the President. We have got a National Security Council. We have got Joint Chiefs of Staff. Would you suggest Congress take the place of all these military advisers?

Mr. COLLINS. Of course not. What I am saying to you, sir, is that most of these organizations are involved in day-to-day business. They are involved in crisis management. They are involved in putting out brush fires.

I will give you a good example of creative thinking that has to do with basing modes for the MX missile. We have now gone through 30-some-odd. Most of those are about as old as I am. Four or five have been ginned up in the last 3 or 4 years. Mental blocks determine the direction we take. When we evaluate Triad options, we strain to find strengths for land-based missiles and strain to find weaknesses in anything else. I am not saying to you that the National Security Council and the Pentagon and all of these organizations are ineffective. That would be foolish.

What I am saying is that none of these organizations have an element that is seriously dedicated to the development of new theories and concepts in the field of military strategy, which would be of immense value in determining how we want to do business now and how we want to do it in the future.

Mr. BENNETT. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take umbrage at that. I think they would say that is their duty. Maybe they are in some way hampered because of rivalries or because of the President's setup of the National Security Council with the aid of Congress as a redundancy there, but the Cabinet itself is com-

posed of intelligent individuals. The President, the Commander in Chief under our Constitution, should be able to do pretty well, and I am not saying we shouldn't create another organization. Maybe we should.

We have got two or three very viable organizations which have had the proper people and the proper intelligence to be able to make this kind of decision. Of course, during the Revolution, the Congress ran the war. I don't know whether Congress is equipped to do that now or not. One of the problems that worries me about our national defense is the parochial system that you see surface all the time, or the industrial complex that President Eisenhower told us about, and the difficulty that Congress has to get reelected individually without taking care of all these sort of things.

For instance, we are right now junking the .45 pistol which never had any use anyway, not in the last hundred years, and going to an .09, which is really like improving the infantry sword. There really is no need for it in 1985, and yet we are going to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on that advance, because of a parochial system, as I see it. Then you see things voted upon on the floor of the House with very parochial background.

I have talked a lot to the people who procure for the Government, and they tell me you are too hard on the procurers. Because a lot of the procurement is dictated from above by a smile or inquiry, well placed, as to wouldn't it be better if this is done, and that and the pressures have been explained to me by people who make the contracts that it's not all that independent on their part. Of course, I am talking to you about political problems and you are a military specialist but you are looking at our American picture and seeing what is there and how to correct it.

I sort of wonder whether another organization is needed. I think maybe the people that exist ought to be able to make decisions. You know one person can make decisions; at least I can make decisions a lot better without advice. I call on advice but I sure can make the decisions on my own. But when you call a lot of the people in who make different decisions, it's sometimes difficult to make the conclusion. I don't mean to make all this speech because you are the wise person here and not I, but I would like to ask you about conventional weapons in this respect.

Do you believe there needs to be done some R&D in the conventional weaponry field that might improve our strength if we are not going to increase our size considerably? Do you think there is a need there?

Mr. COLLINS. Absolutely. I think there is a need for R&D across the board to keep us competitive. I think there is a need for R&D to dovetail effectively with what we believe are going to be future strategies. I want to divest you of one thought, sir. I hope nobody believes I am suggesting we have a new organization for strategy. I am suggesting we have some new procedures within the existing organizations.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you. That is helpful to me because I am sort of cynical about creating another organization. I am not against abolishing the National Security Council, because I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff could do that work. There is some thinking going along today about maybe we could store some things that

are more ancient, not exactly the crossbow but maybe the old .03 rifle, is a pretty good rifle now compared to the M-1 or the M-16.

Maybe we ought to store some of these things so we might get down to having to use them as the Russians do. They store all their old material, apparently. Would you feel that would be a wise thing? Of course there is some cost in warehousing, but we have a tendency to give it away or to destroy it. That criticism arose in the original announcement of this program, and I am wondering, do you think there is some validity to that? Do you think maybe we ought to hold on to some of our old goods in case we can't have an M-16 we can have an .03?

Mr. COLLINS. I can't answer that question because I never put any serious thought into it, but it certainly is a Soviet policy and it wouldn't hurt to take a look and see how much of that policy might be appropriate for us. I don't know.

Mr. BENNETT. What do you feel could be done to help our wartime effectiveness since you say that is a thing that we are not doing as well as we are doing our deterrent activity? What would you suggest?

Mr. COLLINS. I will come back to my prepared statement. I would look at the mismatches. I would look at the mental blocks. I would take corrective action. This would allow us to spend money more effectively than we can right now, and put it where it does the most good.

Mr. BENNETT. Don't you think a strong President—we have got a strong President now of the United States—don't you think a strong President could use his Joint Chiefs of Staff to do the very sorts of things you are asking?

Mr. COLLINS. Of course.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. John Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. I just want to quickly ask a few questions. There has been a lot of concern by Senator Nunn and others about the Europeans' commitment to NATO and also concern about the level of commitment to defense by the Japanese. Lockwood, in his book, talks about the fact that if you look at America's economy versus the economies of all of Europe we are contributing considerably more of a percentage of our economy than if you put all the European economies together. And then combine that with the fact that the West Germans make interest-free loans to the East Germans and then reduce their defense commitments. Do you believe that the European countries ought to be making a greater commitment to their own defense, No. 1?

Do you think that is practical for them to make greater commitments? Do you think they are capable of making greater commitments? Do we have any leverage in getting them to make greater commitments? Is it in our interest to get them to make greater commitments? And the last question is, does that also apply to Japan?

Mr. COLLINS. This is another question I would much prefer to discuss in private, if that is agreeable with you.

Mr. KASICH. We will do it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Collins. Thank you very much for a very interesting morning.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 the Defense Policy Panel adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]