

ADVISING INDIGENOUS FORCES

Captain Ryan T. Kranc

INTRODUCTION:

As the Long War continues, reaching its tactical, operational, and strategic objectives requires training and advising the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan to take control of their country from insurgents, sectarian violence, and lawlessness. General George Casey said in September 2005 that "The sooner we can shift [to Iraqi security forces] the better. A smaller U.S. footprint, that is allowed to decline gradually as Iraqi forces get stronger, actually helps us."¹ The November 2005 National Security Council publication, *The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* emphasized that point, quantifying victory in Iraq according to three distinct time metrics:

IN THE SHORT TERM

An Iraq that is making steady progress in fighting terrorists and neutralizing the insurgency, meeting political milestones; building democratic institutions; standing up robust security forces to gather intelligence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security; and tackling key economic reforms to lay the foundation for a sound economy.

IN THE MEDIUM TERM

An Iraq that is in the lead defeating terrorists and insurgents and providing its own security, with a constitutional, elected government in place, providing an inspiring example to reformers in the region, and well

BLOGGING STRONG

Our Surge (SWJ-rear) proceeds well. The all-star crew of bloggers continues to grow at the SWJ Blog, www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/. The Small Wars Council survived its recent forum expansion and continues to grow, fast approaching 1,000 members.

This edition of the SWJ Magazine is, again, later than our authors deserve. We will adjust our methods for vol 9 to get better throughput. We have many more quality articles tee'd up and yearning to be read. This issue also debuts the first fruits of collaboration with CALL, in two articles that are being co-published.

*Feel free to **send money** so we can buy admin help or at least lots of caffeine. And keep those articles, comments, and posts coming! We're humbled and massively energized that SWJ is so strong and has so many quality members.*

Dave Dilegge
Editor in Chief

Bill Nagle
Publisher

¹ *A Shift on Iraq*, *Washington Post*, David Ignatius, September 26, 2005

on its way to achieving its economic potential.

IN THE LONGER TERM

An Iraq that has defeated the terrorists and neutralized the insurgency.

An Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country.

An Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terror and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, integrated into the international community, an engine for regional economic growth, and proving the fruits of democratic governance to the region.²

The result of this command emphasis on developing indigenous forces capable of taking the lead in security and stability operations within their country stimulated the parallel development of 200 Military Transition Teams (MiTT) by February of 2005. Each MiTT has 12 officers and NCOs advising Iraq battalions, brigades, and divisions. According to a February 2006 media event regarding MiTT structure and future, there were somewhere in the arena of 2000 US soldiers on MiTTs, with 5,000 as “a fair estimate”³ for those who will eventually serve in the MiTT capacity.

We have done this before. On 1 July 1949 the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (K MAG) was established in order to replace the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) and tasked with

² National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, November 2005, p. 3

³ *Military Transition Team Training Shifts to Riley*, *Army Times*, Michelle Tan, February 23, 2006

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continuing to improve the competence of the Republic of Korea Army.⁴ In September 1950 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina was established to advise the French in their fight with the Viet Minh. By 1968, the peak of the Vietnam conflict, the number of advisors at the battalion or below level had reached an apex of 9,430 soldiers. Additionally, before deployment, potential advisors were schooled through the Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA) course, a four-week course that incorporated both language and counterinsurgency training.⁵ Indeed, the United States has in excess of fifty years experience as advisors in Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and a number of other countries around the globe.

⁴ Ramsey, Robert D III, Occasional Paper #18, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam and El Salvador*, 2006, p. 15

⁵ Krepinevich, Andrew, *The Army and Vietnam*, 1986, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press

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JP 1–02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines the US Army Special Forces (SF) mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion,

lawlessness, and insurgency.”⁶ Additionally, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) as “the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political,

⁶ JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, pg 212, 2006

economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society.”⁷

Given the need for SF units outside the theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan and the tremendous need for FID/IDAD inside those theaters, conventional forces and conventional Soldiers have had to take on what was an unconventional role, training and advising foreign security forces. Moreover this has become a role for joint conventional forces with JCISFA serving as it the DoD proponent. Certainly conventional forces faced a steep learning curve in the past four years taking on missions that in the past centered on SF’s core competencies of intercultural communications (to include both language proficiency and area and cultural orientation), warfighting, and training of foreign security forces. The establishment of consolidated MiTT training facilities at Fort Riley, Kansas under one command boosted progress in this arena over the past few years. Shifting that MiTT training to the Joint Readiness Training Center so that MiTTs can train alongside their U.S. conventional unit partners will further improve it.

But no matter how good the training, nothing can match the value of actual advisor experience when it comes to training and advising another human being in a cross-cultural environment. You cannot train "experience"; you can share that experience in training others. In this paper, I will share of my experiences as an advisor to an Iraqi Army brigade and as the commander of a multi-

national troop containing one Iraqi Army platoon.⁸

THE LAW OF REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS

Realistic is defined by Merriam-Webster as “interested in, concerned with, or based on what is real or practical.” Expectation is defined as “the degree of probability that something will occur.” To compare a 6th grade geometry student with a high school senior calculus student is mixing apples and oranges. Chances are the indigenous force you have been tasked to advise (the apples) through no fault of their own are not of the caliber you would expect in US Army units (the oranges). Clearly one can make a nice dessert using both; just don’t expect pure orange juice.

The advisor’s role, as Dr. David Kilcullen has so eloquently stated, is not to have the indigenous force mirror our forces, but for them to mirror the enemy.⁹ The Law of Realistic Expectation calls for progress, however slight, over a period of time; the objective is improvement. This law recognizes that the infantry battalion you advise during your tour will not transform into SEAL Team 6 or 3-325 AIR at the end of your 12-month advisory tour. Violating this Law by thinking in those terms will not only frustrate the advisor, but the advised force as well. The Law of Realistic Expectations focuses on the improvement and refinement of procedures as a vehicle to the desired end state without sacrificing standards. Forward progress is the engine. A good working relationship and

⁷ JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, pg 275, 2006

⁸ For additional techniques, see FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations, Appendix F - Advisor Techniques, February 2007

⁹ David Kilcullen, *28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency*, March 2006

partnership is the fuel. In our eagerness to do well, often we will place unrealistic expectations upon our partnership unit, which turns out to be unfair and frustrating. Understanding where you wish to be in twelve months will place into perspective where you should go with your training tomorrow.

IGNORANCE IS NOT STUPIDITY – DON'T STUPIDLY ASSUME THEY ARE IGNORANT

Often, we Americans erroneously equate ignorance with lack of intelligence. Ignorant people can learn and be taught; stupid people cannot be taught and will not learn. The wise advisor separates these two fundamentals to reduce misinterpretation or stereotyping by either advisor or advised. Understand that the ignorance you perceive in the partner unit is nothing compared to your actual ignorance of their way of life. It is virtually certain that those who you have been tasked to advise do not come from the same social, religious, political, or economic background as do you. It so follows that their customs and everyday activities will be dissimilar to anything you have seen before. As such, remember that in your everyday activities you will probably make mistakes that may be termed offensive to your partner force. The higher the quality of pre-deployment training is, the lower the proportionality or frequency of these occasions. Understand that they are much more tolerant of your inevitable social mistakes in their country than you will be of their tactical mistakes in training.

YOU WILL LEARN MORE THAN YOU TEACH

If you approach your advisory role with the misconception that you know it all and are there exclusively for the purpose of teaching anyone who will listen, you will have a disappointing and unproductive year. A method of introduction is to tell your partner force commander up front that you look forward to learning as much from him as you can. Advisory roles can be flipped quite easily. As a young captain advising battalion and brigade commanders in Iraq, I would have been foolish and arrogant to assume that I could learn nothing from them. Truthfully, at the end of my time with my partner unit, I had learned far more from them than I ever could have taught them.

AL-TIKRAR YI'ALLIM AL-SHUTTAR – REPETITION TEACHES THE CLEVER

The quoted Arabic proverb has as much application for an advisor as it does on the high school football field. Repeating any act over and over instills muscle and behavioral memory. Rehearsals are the most overt method of teaching, which require both advisor and partner unit to go through the steps to achieve a task. In repetitive actions good and bad habits are formed. Repeating the same drills not only will increase your partnership unit's proficiency, the unit will begin to correct its own mistakes. Few successes will be as sweet as seeing your partner unit begin to train to standard on tasks that you have been training their leaders.

TREAT THEM AS YOU WOULD YOUR OWN SOLDIERS

Understand that your success as an advisor is directly proportionate to the success of those around you, much like the success of the platoon leader is directly tied to the abilities of his or her platoon. Taking ownership, though not in a command role or relationship, vests interest into the well being and totality of the unit. Shortcomings, when taken personally, are apt to receive greater concentration so that they are not repeated. Additionally, success shared is sweeter than private satisfaction. When pointing out the successes of others, ensure that achievement is recognized. If one of your partner unit *jundis* (soldiers) does well, make sure that his leadership, peers, and subordinates know that he did well. Recognize him in public, making a point to reward his hard work and dedication. Conversely, correct in private, particularly those in leadership positions. Consider how you would want to be treated if you erred and knew it. Consider how you have felt in the past when corrected. Implement lessons learned from your own past into tangible and usable lessons in your advisory role.

RAPPORT AND RELATIONSHIPS

BUILD PROGRESS:

Your abilities to connect with your partner unit on a level transcending your professional military relationship will allow both of you to accomplish more together. We played soccer with our counterparts, watched television, drank chai, talked of our families (after a period of time), played ping pong, air hockey, and told old war stories. We connected in ways outside of our official capacities; in turn, these growing

personal relationships fostered significant progress over time. Think of your relationships, particularly those friendships bred from an initial working relationship. How did those friendships support better working relationships? How did you get to that point? How will you incorporate lessons learned in this arena throughout your life into your advisory role? You will be amazed at how much impact getting to know your advisory partner will have both personally and professionally.

MISTAKES ARE TRAINING TOOLS

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”¹⁰ Chances are that as a child or teenager, there was a time of your life where you were told that a particular action would cause some sort of negative reaction. If you were like me, and your parents told you this, chances are you did not listen. And like me, you probably found out the hard way that doing something incorrectly precipitated a reflex mechanism meant to teach you never to repeat said action again. Just as these formative experiences from our youth have conditioned us to, perhaps, the correct path, mistakes made by the partner unit may have significant consequences in determining how not to do things in the future. The responsibility of the advisor is to ensure that these mistakes do not become fatal in the long run.

¹⁰ T.E. Lawrence, *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917

YOU ARE NOT A COMMANDER

Unless you are working in the capacity as a multi-national force commander, you will not have any command authority over your partner unit. Regardless of your opinion of a specific course of action, it is up to the indigenous chain of command to make the ultimate decision. Additionally, granting your partner commander the same due respect he deserves is not only helpful, it's the right thing to do. Your status as an advisor to a commander of a brigade or battalion does not equate your status as a brigade or battalion commander. Too often have we seen young officer or non-commissioned officers who believe their nationality supersedes military customs and courtesies. The main job of an advisor is to provide assistance and advise to the partner unit. Explaining "another way" of conducting operations alternative to the chosen course of action may be prudent in some circumstances. The bottom line is to ensure that your status as an advisor does not diminish or subvert the command authority of the partner unit. Recall the section "Mistakes as training tools."

CONCLUSION

Emphasis on the advisory aspect in the Long War has thrust to the forefront the importance of placing tactically proficient officers and non-commissioned officers with interpersonal and intercultural skills in advisory positions. The role of the advisor in FID and IDAD operations is the lynchpin of success in fostering viable security forces able to protect their respective countries from internal and external threats. Standardization of the training programs to prepare potential advisors at Fort Riley, Kansas is an appropriate step in increasing the quality of the end product. However, common sense

and dealing with others as they should be treated are perhaps the greatest tools the advisor can bring to the table. Place yourself in the position of the "advised" and ask yourself "how would I wish to be treated?" That answer will guide you correctly.

CPT Ryan T Kranc is a two tour OIF veteran, Reconnaissance Tactics Instructor, and member in particularly good standing at the Small Wars Council, where all welcome his insights but are a bit puzzled by South Park displacing his photo evidence of a glory day with Lord Stanley's cup.



BUILDING INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES THAT REFLECT THE REALITIES OF METT-TC

By MAJ Rob Thornton

Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves. By this stage, you will be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them, and building indigenous capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in our own image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy's capabilities, and seek to supplant the insurgent's role.

David Kilcullen
Twenty-Eight Articles
Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

Kilcullen raises the central issue regarding advising and developing foreign security forces. The U.S. provides security assistance to any number of countries around the globe. In the vast majority of those cases our assistance is financial, technical, and logistical. We only place advisors where immediate tactical advice and assistance is needed, usually badly. Building effective indigenous security forces involves more than mustering a set number of troops, providing them weapons, and training them on tactics. Deciding on the correct number of troops is a decidedly complex issue. If you have any doubt about that complexity, look at the debates of the past five years on the size of the U.S. military. Selecting weapons and tactics can be equally challenging. And none of those questions--size, equipment, and methods--can be answered without looking at the issue of threats. This paper discusses the organizational design, functions, and capabilities of security forces in developing and transitioning states to counter threats from enemies whose goals, strategies and tactics oppose long-term security and stability. This is an important question for U.S. security; our own resources are better-spent developing

self-sustaining security capacities in our allies as we face the Long War.

Working as an advisor with the Iraqi Security Forces over the last year made me ask others and myself how we could best help indigenous leaders build something that looks and acts differently from anything we've ever seen? Had we seen it, we would not have been comfortable with it because it would not fit well in our own military culture. How do you as the agency, the command, or the group tasked with this mission exercise the analytical foresight to ensure that the security forces you are helping them build meet the current and emerging threats and needs? These are not rhetorical issues. They are both immediate and long-term. The Long War promises that we will do this more often in a variety of ways in locations around the globe.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AS A REFERENCE POINT

Iraq offers many variables to the questions raised above. Geographically and culturally the threats differ from province to province, city to

city, and in the case of Baghdad, district to district. Currently the greatest threats are internal but external forces are clearly in play and in the future could dominate security concerns. We have to look for adaptive models both regional and global that offer better templates for developing security forces.

The first challenge is deciding what end state we are seeking in our efforts. We want an Iraqi security force capable of internal defense and regional external defense. And we have to recognize that developing the first is not necessarily a linear path to the second. This means stepping outside our own experiences. For example, we have regular military, reserve military, and National Guard. In the U.S. only the latter can exercise the functions we call internal defense in Iraq. Police functions in the U.S. are just that functions left to law enforcement, not military.

The key point at this stage is to recognize that it is more efficient to develop capacities in the Iraqi security that compliment but do not necessarily replicate Coalition Forces' (CF) capabilities. Consider some of the observations we've used to compare U.S. Forces-driven operations with Iraqi-driven operations concerning the main and alternate supply routes (MSRs/ASRs) versus the population. We want Iraqi capabilities to focus on securing the people not the MSRs/ASRs for CF traffic. CF can secure the MSRs/ASRs. We want the Iraqis to develop a HUMINT capability that is covert and can operate at equal advantage with the enemy. We want the Iraqi forces to patrol more inside the neighborhoods with their uniformed assets. And we want to see the Iraqis execute an information operation (IO) campaign that talks about the real threats and develops common interests with the population. All of this will

assist in defeating the immediate internal threats facing Iraq.

Of course, the Iraqi Army is going to have to at some point transition from internal COIN to regular external threats in a more conventional sense. When that happens, it may not be enough to task the Iraq Police with internal security as state and non-state entities are likely to become an increasing danger and a long-term presence for Iraq. Many states may aid groups like the Mahdi Army, Hezbollah, or Al Qaeda to destabilize or weaken Iraq. Iraq's long term security then may require some type of paramilitary organization on par with the Spanish Guardia Civil or the those forces employed by other states. We must also be careful trying to create general-purpose forces for specialized missions. The U.S. does this, but we also have the resources and institutions to at least prepare our soldiers and marines to be adaptive. Most states we assist will not have the resources to be modular in organization or mission scope; if they did, they would probably not need our assistance in the first place (assuming we are not rebuilding a security force that we had dismantled previously).

THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT

Here are some samples of questions MiTT leaders in Iraq have discussed regarding Iraqi capabilities. In setting the parameters for these discussions we used the following to describe the threat in the current operational environment:

- IEDs,
- Mortars
- Small Arms Fire
- Ambushes
- Precision Small Arms Fire or snipers

- Kidnapping
- Assassination
- Black Market activities
- Other insurgent, terrorist and criminal activities

Is there a need to understand the way the environment impacts the enemy? How does the enemy's actions impact the environment? How do we help develop structure and capabilities that neutralize key environmental advantages for the enemy and maximize them for the security forces?

The enemy's greatest environmental advantage is that he is part of it or at least more so than CF. Enemy actions unchecked reinforce that advantage. Iraqi security forces by moving inside that environment challenge the enemy's previous control. Intelligence is a key factor in making that happen. HUMINT (focused on undercover, covert close target reconnaissance) is a capability that US Forces would be hard pressed to produce. Iraqi forces can. While Iraqis don't have great technological capabilities, their ability to blend in with the populace would allow them to collect information and confirm assumptions US Forces cannot through signals or imagery intelligence.

Is there a need for Iraqi forces to perform every warfighting function in the manner we consider them?

The first question we needed to do was identify strategic context for the nascent Iraqi military. The U.S. strategic context for our armed forces demands expeditionary capabilities and mindset. That paradigm to a large degree drives how we organize, train, and fight. Put simply we--the U.S.--prefer to do our defensive fighting, abroad and on the offensive. The military--excluding somewhat the National Guard--is something we use abroad. The U.S. has an interest in providing Iraq a security force

capable of internal security, especially for the immediate future, and a force capable of defending the country from external enemies, both conventional and unconventional. Internal security forces are capable of meeting an external unconventional force; indeed what we are now engaged in is creating that internal security force. As for meeting an external conventional threat, that will require greater emphasis on conventional maneuver warfare skills. But it is highly doubtful that the U.S. needs to build an Iraqi military based on a power projection, expeditionary mindset.

– Granted that the Iraqi security forces can best develop a HUMINT collection capability suitable for internal defense, where should that capability reside?

What type of organizational structure would support that and at what echelon would it be resident? Internal security has and is traditionally the role of the Ministry of the Interior in Iraq. But the immediate need is at the tactical level. Much of this also depends on how units are arrayed geographically. A unit with habitual responsibility for Mosul for instance would logically want to develop HUMINT collection capabilities.

– Do security forces focused on internal security need a logistics system as we in the US Army understand it, or could it be more fixed with parts of it drawn from the economy and parts from a RSU (Regional Support Unit)?

Wal-Mart Logistics is a term we settled upon to describe the use of the local economy and RSUs to support different echelons. We struggled with and lost valuable time here with the IA trying to establish a logistics system where requests originate at the battalion level, require stamps at the brigade and division then often get rejected or lost when the battalion travels to the RSU to pick up supplies because there is

no division representative present as required. Prior to these requirements being put in place, the battalion could request parts directly from the RSU, travel to the RSU, and pick up their supplies from the RSU without higher echelon oversight. Then US Forces decided that we had to exercise a system that involved all echelons of command, which greatly complicated the system. For forces that operate from fixed sites a majority of the time it may be much more effective and efficient to allow battalions to draw for themselves. Brigade and division headquarters companies should do the same without bureaucratic oversight. Higher echelons don't need to know what lower echelons are ordering because the brigade and division will not be building the parts or supply list – the RSU will. This is why one Wal-Mart store's stocks in one location may be different from another in a different location.

– Is there a need for Mobility/Counter-Mobility/Survivability (M/CM/S) assets within the division or could those capabilities be contracted on the civilian economy? Currently in the Iraqi Army, the division has an engineer company that operates heavy equipment and is responsible for M/CM/S. For a conventional army, this organization makes sense, but what about for an organization focused on internal security? Could it meet its M/CM/S needs by contracting through the local economy, or through the assistance of other government agencies?

– How do you sustain a reasonable amount of patrols out in the area of responsibility (AOR) to secure the public and still retain enough combat power to do other security tasks? Ambushes, over-watches and small kill teams require enough personnel to execute the actual mission, security elements, and a QRF on standby to extract them. Patrols require

sufficient numbers of soldiers and survivable vehicles to ensure that the patrol can succeed if it has to react to new information, or has chance contact. Patrols have been the most critical component of the battalion's security plan because the influence and provide information on the population, disrupt enemy activities and provide flexibility.

The biggest question regarding patrols is selecting the right number. Without good intelligence, the number of patrols, their sizes, and their frequency must be increased. If the security force has good intelligence--either through the population or through its own ability to collect information and do timely analysis--then the number of patrols can be reduced. Valuable resources can be reallocated to other tasks. This is very much a chicken and egg issue. For the population to support the security force with timely information the security force must win the public's support and secure the public against retribution. For the security force to have enough resources to collect and analyze its own information it must dedicate a significant portion of its strength to those tasks, which takes away from its ability to patrol. In the latter it also assumes the requirements and risk of training and resourcing another capability while trying to sustain its pace.

– Why would an explosive ordnance disposal capability be better at say at brigade level than at division level? Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are an asymmetrical fact of life on the battlefield of today and tomorrow. They range in explosive power from purely anti-personnel devices to devices capable of destroying heavy equipment (and crews). They are easy to construct, export, emplace and detonate even as they challenge their targets to detect, defeat and reduce them. They require specialized

equipment and training to neutralize. While a large part of defeating IEDs extends outside of the EOD community (IED awareness, aggressive patrolling, etc), the actual reduction of IEDs belongs in the hands of EOD. Currently the IA has an IED team at the division level. It has proved entirely inadequate because they are too small and too limited to respond to all the IEDs that occur. Even the CF EOD teams are hard pressed to keep up between UXO unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal ranging from dud mortar rounds to rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) to be able to be everywhere when they are needed. For an internal security force a team at the brigade may be best. It balances resource expenditure and against needed capability in a world that will probably only see more IEDs as a tactic of terrorists, criminals and insurgents.

What type of information operations (IO), psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) capability would internal security forces need? What would be their functions?

We've seen the need for the special fields within the IA that go with operating in the COIN environment. IO will become an increasingly important component of security operations on the domestic and international arenas. IO is particularly important in maintaining security and stability as the enemy seeks to disrupt government efforts, inflate their own victories and stature, and sow disharmony, bigotry, prejudice, and racism through their own IO campaign to psychologically affect the populace. Security forces must at a minimum be able to counter enemy IO themes (propaganda) and explain their actions and efforts to the public. On the other hand CA is most useful during rebuilding and expeditionary efforts; inside Iraq, local

government would probably take on that function once stability is established.

How does a "low tech" COIN security force share information and intelligence quickly at a reasonable investment? Developing, resourcing, training and implementing an information collection and sharing system that feeds a distributed security force's analytical network could rapidly generate actionable intelligence that can be targeted by security forces to disrupt enemy activities and detain key leaders for further exploitation. The security force would need network solutions that mirror the conditions in the security environment. It would need an intelligence system that drives maneuver, puts the security force in front of enemy operations and keeps it there.

NETWORK OBJECTIVES

Provide the security force a network that allows for rapid transfer of information for distributed analysis. This would put the "most eyeballs" looking at the most faces so the "analysts" attached to those "eyeballs" can use cell phones, IM or chat to share information on that "face"

Example A: A patrol from Unit X stops 3 men in a flash traffic control point (TCP) on the west side of a river. The patrol leader suspects they are terrorists but does not want to bring them back to the battalion. He takes a cell phone photo of their faces and identification cards and sends them to an address group for the battalion and brigade intelligence and operations sections. The addressees download the photos into their laptop running commercial anti-gang network software. Neither battalion nor brigade can match the photos but they send them to counterparts and division. The division finds a match based on a recent raid in unit Y's AOR. The detainees are brought in for valid reason. the intelligence and

operations sections at Unit X coordinates directly with their counterparts at Unit Y.

Example B: A close target reconnaissance (CTR) cell from Unit X observes a garage owner discussing business with unknown male who arrived in a vehicle matching description of a listed vehicle for TIER 1 personality from nearby city. They send a photo to the battalion intelligence and operations sections. From there it goes via internet to an addressee list that includes other security force units, agencies, and CF in both cities. The suspect's identity is confirmed and a patrol is launched. The CTR team gets further instructions to track several other contacts who are all photographed. As a result, the security forces roll up most of a cell. In detention, that cell gives up leads to other cells.

Make it an Iraqi Solution – buy tech Iraqis are familiar with & come with Arabic features:


- Cell phones are already predominant form of communication in Iraq. NET for cell phones is not required.
- Photo sharing infrastructure is in Mosul, and not cost prohibitive given Intel capability returns.
- Computer skills are minimal. Internet use is primarily email, or IM. The IA has demonstrated those skills.
- Keep it affordable – buy laptops with Arabic keyboards and software in Arabic, buy model of cell phone based on mission – i.e. a patrol leader who takes up close shots of identity cards and “mug” shots does not need as high speed a camera as a undercover scout doing CTR.

Opportunity for growth in scale of network

- Start from ground up so information sharing is ingrained at “grass roots”
- Start expanding from IA battalions and IP stations to IA brigades and CF task forces to IA divisions and CF brigade combat teams to adjacent cities to the Ministry of Defense and major detention facilities and prisons such as Buka..

Example: Unit X detains a man on transporting IEDs. Through network sharing his history reveals dates of previous internment in Buka, known contacts he made there, and case histories of those contacts. Put together this intelligence reveals a sophisticated network that has outside backing and ties to AQ in Iraq

Building a commercial network-like capability into evolving security forces levels the playing field and mirrors many enemy capabilities. Many traditional military networks are ponderous, stove piped, costly and limited. This is one of the reasons the insurgent and terrorist networks are very agile against indigenous forces. The enemy is already using cell phones and the Internet in ways that are both economical and effective. They are representative of an IT-driven world that allows for groups to adapt existing commercial networks for their own uses. They are in effect using the Internet and cell phones much like they use civilian identities and commercial vehicles to blend into the white noise. Indigenous security force design should consider both how the enemy is using commercial networks (cell phones, Internet – IM, Chat, Multi-Player On Line Role Playing Games), email and other WWW resources) and look at ways to counter those enemy capabilities and turn them into vulnerabilities.



DESIGNING AN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE

After considering the Iraqi forces and the questions above in the context of a "re-emerging" state where internal security needs will remain even as it transitions to focus on more conventional external threat, we looked at the requirements for a dedicated internal security force. We considered how an internal security force might be organized and "who" at

which level might do "what". This is a key question in Iraq's future; the transition from COIN to more conventional defense is we assumed inevitable. Paramilitary internal security missions will remain. Just as we have learned, Iraq's conventional units cannot do everything for everyone at every level. Some units will have to specialize and indeed some specialized functions--like HUMINT collection--will have to be emphasized. Tracking that one capability helped us make determine where the

other capabilities needed to be to allow different echelons to achieve their missions.

THE COMPANIES IN A SECURITY FORCE BATTALION

Given that the basis of internal security is local, we started at the level of implementation for that security, the lowest level that would include all capabilities needed for local, internal security. With that as our framework, we saw the basis for an internal security force would be a security force battalion. Much of this is based on the challenges we've seen from the environment and from observations about indigenous challenges to an organization. As you read, you might find easy comparisons with like units in our own organizations based on size or echelon, In some cases it was more helpful to use different names for a particular type of unit to distinguish it from our own terminology. An organizational chart (fig 1) can be referred to during an outline of the brief descriptions below to discuss capabilities:

The close target reconnaissance company (CTR). The CTR company provides covert CTR of population, suspects, target areas, and other people, places, and things to collect relevant information, provide alert reports to battalion headquarters and patrols. The CTR company disrupts enemy activity through its active collection and passively as a threat to the enemy's operational security. It works closely with the security force battalion intelligence section.

The basic unit in the CTR company is a "cell" consisting of four plainclothes, undercover operatives. These men may work mounted or dismounted. They live on the economy and use commercial technologies that blend in with the operating environment. Relaxed grooming

standards and other characteristics that allow them to blend in are the norm. Two cells together constitute a "team". Team structures and missions are task organized according to mission. One cell in a team might be the collection effort while the other is support and security element. The support cell is armed with assault rifles, communications, and other special equipment to secure the collection cell doing HUMINT collection. Cells would operate out of flats/apartments and drive common cars. In Iraq that is the Opal. Four teams make a platoon. There are four platoons per CTR company. Operational cycles of these teams are set to ensure cell members have the opportunity to refit, conduct sustainment training, and to avoid burn out on a very difficult job. A CTR company should be able to sustain operations with 4 to 8 teams out in the AOR depending on the scope of the current threat as provided by higher, and the flow of intelligence driven operations.

The patrol company. Patrol companies conduct mounted and dismounted patrols in sufficient number and size to overmatch threats identified by the CTR company, hotline tips, higher headquarters, or by chance. The patrol companies are also responsible for crowd management and riot control as necessary. These patrol companies can augment the raid platoon from the special service company for missions such as inner and outer cordon during a raid.

Basic unit in the patrol company is a "car" with a driver, a vehicle commander (VC), a gunner, and two dismountable soldiers. Three cars make a "patrol"; the patrol is the smallest unit to conduct operations. Three patrols equal a "platoon". Four platoons equal a company. A company would have four patrols out at any one time. Shifts and patrol schedules would




FIG 1: A *conceptual organization discussion* about how the companies in a BN might be laid out in terms of composition and roles.

alternate, but would overlap with enough time to allow the outgoing patrol to do a battle handover with the oncoming patrol. Here the Iraqis have reorganized themselves into similar patrol units with three 1025 Level II HMMWVs or Land Rover armored cars. Any armored type patrol car with a crew served weapon would suffice.

The fixed site security company. The fixed site security company provides site security for

important events, over watches Tier 1 IED sites or other named/targeted area of interest where enemy activity is likely in the next 24 hours. If provided necessary support these outposts can be sustained for periods longer than 24 hours.

The special services company. The special services company provides direct action and protective services capabilities. It has two raid platoons and a single very important person

(VIP) security platoon. A technical support platoon completes its structure.

- A raid platoon has two 14-man entry squads organized into three 4-man teams, a heavy weapons squad, and a sniper squad. Each entry squad has a 4-man breach element and two 4-man clearing teams, a squad leader and assistant squad leader. Each heavy weapons squad has two 3-man machine gun teams and a squad leader. A sniper squad consists of three 3-man sniper teams and a sniper squad leader. The platoon vehicles are larger and more capable than those of the patrol company, along the lines of a wheeled APC/ICV like Stryker or the Buffalo.
- The VIP security platoon in the special services company might consist of three teams organized into a "detail". Two of the teams would use armored sport utility vehicles (SUVs); one of them would use an armored sedan. There would be two details in the platoon. This platoon would provide security for VIPs or identified targets such as likely kidnap victims or civilians potentially targeted for assassination due to their role or remarks. This platoon could also cover events in the area such as rallies or ceremonies where visiting VIPs might be targeted. Details would need to be able to work in both uniforms and civilian clothes depending on the mission and would use a variety of protection service weaponry.
- The special support platoon in the special services company would be there to cover special technical support such as video, communications, computer, surveillance, etc.

THE SECURITY FORCE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF

The structure of the security force battalion headquarters and staff is not about providing command and control (C2) for maneuver elements. The headquarters does provide C2 but more as a static element in charge of semi-static entities, the companies underneath it. With that in mind, we saw the battalion headquarters oriented toward providing technical and analytical support, synchronization operations, and providing resources and administrative support. With its heavy emphasis on HUMINT in the companies, the battalion's operations and intelligence section under a major or lieutenant colonel would provide technical and analytical support in five 6-man field teams. The teams would analyze information, investigate incidents, and develop targets for exploitation. Each team would have one officer and five NCOs with experience in the line companies. They would act as detective "cells". Their goals would be:

- Establish linkages and target specific activities
- Develop target packages that can be refined through collection by the CTR companies and analyzed for action by the special services company.
- Follow through on captured criminals, terrorists, and insurgents. Support their effective prosecution by overseeing and assembling evidence files, witness lists, and other measures,

The synchronization would come from shifts similar to the way law enforcement commands provide information and direction to units on patrol in the field. The resourcing would come from other sections of the staff that might even

be composed of civilians. Shifts would be staffed with a captain, two lieutenants, and eight sergeants as in a western police force in a large city. They would battle track patrol company elements, dispatch patrols and other elements, and coordinate with brigade and other area offices. They would also disseminate information to patrols and cells as necessary. The goal is to provide the support for a long-term (think decades) area security force that resolves problems quickly by facilitating the

development of information into intelligence that can be exploited. The remaining sections of the battalion headquarters would deal with the expected functions of personnel administration, supply, and communications.

THE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AND STAFFS

The brigade headquarters and staff--like its subordinate internal security force battalions--is neither designed nor intended to C2




FIG 2. The BN HQs and Staff is heavy on investigative and analysis capability.

maneuvering subordinate battalions. It is focused on facilitating coordination of activities between local government offices; providing technical support to help the battalion field teams focus on physical development of evidence; supporting sustainment type training, and providing an EOD capability.

The heart of the brigade staff is its operations and intelligence section. This section is to connect subordinate battalion operations and intelligence sections to local and national agencies. The section has a large cell of analysts to answer requests for information from the battalions and to track information requests into higher and local agencies. The analyst cell could maintain limited case history and suspect files. The operations and intelligence cell would also handle liaison functions with judicial and penal agencies. It would operate the brigade consolidated training facility for weapons training, classroom instruction of all types, and annual recertification. The brigade operations and intelligence section would have no detention capability; all detainee functions are retained at the division. The brigade operation and intelligence section has an EOD cell capable of dispatching three teams at once. The logistics section is responsible for supporting the brigade headquarters only through the regional support unit. It does not have the functions of a U.S. S4 shop; it does not approve or disapprove battalion level contracts. The communications section provides communications for the headquarters and integrates those communications throughout the brigade area.

THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF

The internal security force division has no C2 function with regards to maneuver. The

division functions as a central hub for certain resources most efficiently used in a centralized fashion. Like its subordinate commands, the division is centered on the operations and intelligence section. The operations and intelligence section at division performs all internal investigations on soldiers below it because at two levels up the division investigations would be objective. The operations and intelligence section operates a major crime laboratory, allowing it access to other national and perhaps international assets. The division operations and intelligence section handles inter-agency coordination at the regional and national level. As such, it is a principle hub for intelligence sharing among its brigades and battalions as well as other agencies and elements. The division would also operate the only detention facility in its area for short-term internment prior to going to trial, or being brought in for questioning. The division develops information operations that counter enemy propaganda and push forward the government's messages. Finally the division is the training institution for its region, operating basic training, specialty schools, and secondary service schools.

CONCLUSION

Returning to Kilcullen's point on building security forces we--the U.S. military charged with building a new Iraqi military--went through the mental odyssey inherent in working across radically different cultures. We built those forces based on our own comfort zone and knowledge base. And because we recognized that we had limited time to do so. Put another way we had to do something about the swamp even as we were hunting alligators.

Like other critical areas in the COIN fight, there was much we did not know and much that

was unexpected. For most of us, developing anything else besides a force that mirrored our own was too much of a leap beyond our own experiences. Remember we were asking ourselves the questions in the first part of this paper about the Iraqi military even as we fought common enemies with them. Not a small part of that fight was bridging the understanding canyon between coalition forces and the Iraqis. We made mistakes and we contributed to mistakes made by the Iraqis. Trained on U.S. tactics, the Iraqis tried to execute only to fail because they lacked some of the technology and training that facilitate those tactics.

All experiences--good or bad--offer lessons to those astute enough to recognize them. We learned lessons. Key for us was the realization that training the Iraqis to maximize their strengths could offset standing coalition force weaknesses. Now that Iraqi Army units are doing their transfers of authority) and the Iraqi Ground Forces Command has assumed the lead, Iraqi units are starting to adjust their TTPs and organizational structure into something that acknowledges strengths and weaknesses. It is working.

That does not mean the advisory mission is anywhere near complete. At some stage, the Iraqi Army (or portions thereof) still has to transition from an internal to an external threat. The Iraqi Police while growing stronger may not have the right organizational structure to combat repeated insurgency or major terrorist movements. In working through these issues we came to see that a capabilities gap will exist for at least the next five years.

Filling that gap has to be the next step of the advisory effort, one taken before the Iraqi Army can begin to shift toward an external threat. In offering a possible blueprint for an

Iraqi internal security force built on paramilitary battalions, brigades, and divisions, we suggested an approach to bridging the internal security cap between the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police as they are now configured.

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03/31/07 - An Iraqi police officer takes a break in Baqubah, Iraq, March 31, 2007, during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers from 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment. The purpose of the operation is to clear houses and palm groves of insurgents near the Diyala River. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall) (Released)

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: 1991–2006

By Dr. David A. Anderson and Major Elisabeth P. Stringer

“Take up the White Man's burden—
The savage wars of peace—
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hopes to nought.”

Rudyard Kipling, 1899
“The White Man's Burden”

The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 requires the White House to present Congress an annual statement of national security policy. The national security policy focuses on protection of the United States' interests, both foreign and domestic. Under this law, the President is required to submit his policy in the form of a National Security Strategy (NSS), defining the “worldwide interests, goals and objectives of the U.S. that are vital to national security. Furthermore, the law requires that the foreign policy and the uses of the elements of national power utilized to achieve these goals and objectives (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) be provided for in the document. The national security strategies (NSS) issued between 1991 and 2006 have increasingly emphasized the use of economic policy as the instrument of choice in promoting U.S. interests and national security. Furthermore, economic policy is increasingly tied to spreading democracy and personal freedom. Spreading democracy and personal freedom through economic policy to prevent future military conflict is the post–Soviet Cold War of this generation.

PRE–1991: THE REAGAN YEARS

Ronald Reagan was the last Cold War president. Globalization was taking root. In their article, “It's the Reagan Economy, Stupid”, CNBC's Lawrence Kudlow and Stephen Moore, Senior Fellow at the CATO institute, wrote,

“It was Reagan's supply side economic ideas -- the policy of marginal rate tax cuts, a strong dollar, trade globalization (the Gipper started NAFTA with a U.S.–Canadian free trade agreement), deregulation of key industries like energy, financial services and transportation, and a re–armed military -- all of which unleashed a great wave of entrepreneurial–technological innovation that transformed and restructured the economy, resulting in a long boom prosperity that continues to throw off economic benefits to this day.”¹¹

Ronald Reagan set the conditions for the United States to be a key player in economic globalization. He smartly wagered that the U.S. could not only afford to put more of its economic resources into defense than the Soviets without creating economic hardship on

¹¹ Lawrence Kudlow and Stephen Moore, “It's the Reagan Economy, Stupid”, from <http://www.cato.org/dispatch/06-07-04d.html>

its citizens, but it could do so in such a way that defense technology could be utilized by the private sector and actually expand the U.S. economy. He further saw that trade globalization amongst free nations enhanced both their relationships and quality of life and further isolated the Soviet block of nations.

THE G.H. BUSH ADMINISTRATION – NSS 1991

As George H. Bush entered the White House, he also saw globalization as an opportunity for the United States. Soon after taking office, President Bush swore in his United States Trade Representative, Carla A. Hills, and remarked, “We don’t want an America that is closed to the world. What we want is a world that is open to America.”¹² With the fall of the Berlin Wall November 9, 1989, the world began to get smaller. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 showed that threats to the United States’ interests were no longer limited to Eastern Europe. By February 1991, America had shown its overwhelming military prowess by liberating Kuwait and destroying the Iraqi military. In August 1991, President G. H. Bush published his first NSS.

The 1991 NSS tied economic strength to national power. “Events of the past year have reaffirmed the critical link between the strength and flexibility of the U.S. economy and our ability to achieve national objectives. Indeed, strong macroeconomic performance on the part of the United States is not only an economic objective but a prerequisite for maintaining a position of global political leadership.”¹³ As the Soviet Union was showing signs it would break

into independent states, it was evident that the United States would be the remaining “super-power” in the world. As the 1991 NSS points out, the world situation was similar to that of 1920 when “no comparable threat was evident.”¹⁴ In the 1920s, America turned toward isolationism. In the 1990s, the opposite view prevailed; “at a time when the world is far more interdependent -- economically, technologically, environmentally -- any attempt to isolate ourselves militarily and politically would be folly.”¹⁵ Due to increasing globalization, the United States could not afford to isolate itself and risk economic and physical security. During this time, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was on-going, beginning in 1986. The goal was to establish trade opportunities for “emerging democracies and other developing countries.”¹⁶ As the Soviet Union began to crumble, threats to America became more ambiguous. China was seen as the next in line as a global power and possible threat to U.S. security and international stability. The 1991 NSS stated, “Consultations and contact with China will be central features of our policy, lest we intensify the isolation that shields repression. Change is inevitable in China, and our links with China must endure.”¹⁷ The following excerpt from the 1991 NSS shows the pervasive air of uncertainty.

America will continue to support an international economic system as open and inclusive as possible, as the best way to strengthen global economic development, political stability and the growth of free societies. But how can these goals best be attained, especially if they are not completely shared by all of

¹² George H. Bush, ceremony remarks, USTR swearing-in ceremony, 6 FEB 89, from <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16651>

¹³ 1991 NSS from <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm>

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

our economic competitors? How will the end of the Cold War and the increased economic strength of our major trading partners influence economic, political and even security relationships? In addition to working actively to conclude successfully the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, what other market-opening objectives should the United States pursue, and with whom should we pursue them?¹⁸

Even with an uncertain future, the 1991 NSS tied political stability and free societies to economics. The next NSS was not published until 1996 under the Clinton Administration.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (NSS 1996, 97, 99)

While the 1991 NSS tied economic strength to national power, the 1996 NSS tied promoting democracy to protecting U.S. economic and security interests.

“Promoting democracy does more than foster our ideals. It advances our interests because we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we, and the entire community of nations, will be. Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners and are far less likely to wage war on one another. While democracy will not soon take hold everywhere, it is in our interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in Central and Eastern Europe and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.”¹⁹

Compared to the 1991 NSS, the 1996 NSS mentions democracy 74 times versus 21 times in the 1991 NSS. By tying economics to

democracy, it seems establishing free markets is not just good for America, but free markets can actually achieve the noble cause of fostering freedom and democracy to oppressed people. The 1996 NSS further ties economic security to democracy by stating, “Our national security strategy is therefore based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”²⁰

The United States’ active participation in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations (subsequently renamed the World Trade Organization (WTO)) saved this free trade promoting body and is an example of the U.S. efforts to promote and enlarge the community of market democracies. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created as a new and improved “institutional lever”²¹ for access to foreign markets. The 1996 NSS outlines America’s goal of assessing China for entrance into the WTO, thus using the value of international trade as a means to persuade China to open its economy and advance personal freedoms for the Chinese. The key theme of supporting democracy to enhance economic opportunity prevails in Clinton’s 1997 and 1999 NSS; however, the WTO plays a large role in both as well.

If the 1996 NSS was the year of democracy, 1997 NSS and 1999 NSS were the years of the World Trade Organization. “WTO” appears 21 times in both the 1997 NSS and 1999 NSS as

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ 1996 NSS from <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

compared to no more than 7 times in any other NSS. The 1997 NSS states, “The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade significantly strengthened the world trading system. With the creation of the WTO, the United States stood to gain billions of dollars in increased trade. The 1997 NSS and 1999 NSS share common language about the WTO, but they also share verbatim language about democracy and economics.

The 1997 NSS and 1999 NSS state,

“Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats and to encourage free and open trade and economic development—and less likely to wage war or abuse the rights of their people. Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests. The United States must support this trend by remaining actively engaged in the world. This is the strategy to take us into the next century.”²²

Economics and democracy is again tied to advancing American interests. The 1999 NSS also cited globalization as making the world smaller and more interconnected. “Globalization – the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political integration – is bringing citizens from all continents closer together, allowing them to share ideas, goods and information in an instant.”²³ Globalization makes it even more important for America to maintain their interests.

“Our economic and security interests are inextricably linked. Prosperity at home depends on stability in key regions with

which we trade or from which we import critical commodities, such as oil and natural gas. Prosperity also demands our leadership in international development, financial and trade institutions. In turn, the strength of our diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military and the attractiveness of our values abroad depend in large part on the strength of our economy.”

The NSS themes throughout the Clinton Administration focused on the importance of the WTO as an international platform to expand trade and the importance of democracy in making key regions more stable, secure and productive trade partners. Even with the focus on stabilizing key regions, no NSS could have prepared the United States for the events of 11 September 2001. The G. W. Bush Administration did not publish a NSS until 2002.

THE G. W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (NSS 2002, 06)

The G. W. Bush NSS in 2002 once again tied personal freedom and liberty to economic freedom. The 2002 NSS states, “A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty.”²⁴ A strong economy equates to a more stable world. Free markets give people the same chance for success and give them hope for a better life. The 2002 NSS also sought to place more accountability on economic development aid to poorer countries. “Results of aid are typically

²² 1997 NSS Ibid. / 1999 NSS from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/nssr99.pdf

²³ 1999 NSS from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/nssr99.pdf

²⁴ 2002 NSS from <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2002.pdf>

measured in dollars spent by donors, not in the rates of growth and poverty reduction achieved by recipients. These are the indicators of a failed strategy.”²⁵ The Millennium Challenge program sought to make aid tied to advances in economic freedom, investing in people and ruling justly. In fact, the 2002 NSS stated that the United States had a “moral obligation”²⁶ to determine whether or not our development assistance was delivering results. The 2006 NSS takes this moral obligation a step forward and proposes,

“Economic freedom is a moral imperative. The liberty to create and build or to buy, sell, and own property is fundamental to human nature and foundational to a free society. Economic freedom also reinforces political freedom. It creates diversified centers of power and authority that limit the reach of government. It expands the free flow of ideas; with increased trade and foreign investment comes exposure to new ways of thinking and living which give citizens more control over their own lives.”²⁷

Moral imperative is interestingly strong language to use in reference to economic freedom, equating establishment of free trade and free markets with freeing people from oppression. This philosophy is evident with the 2002 NSS and 2006 NSS references to China. To be a better trade partner, China should give its citizens more rights. By claiming economic freedom is a moral imperative, it makes the case for increased human rights in China even stronger. The G. W. Bush Administration’s 2002 NSS and 2006 NSS continue to make an even stronger case, tying political stability, global security, and personal freedom to international economics and economic development among fragile states.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ 2006 NSS from <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf>

CONCLUSIONS

The National Security Strategies between 1991 and 2006 have increasingly tied global security and stability to successful free market economies. The links between democracy, personal freedom, and economic freedom have strengthened as well. Increasingly, economic freedom is being placed above any other type of freedom because economic freedoms positively influence political and personal freedoms, which leads to peace and prosperity. U.S. foreign economic development policies and program enhancements, such as expanded funding in support of the Foreign Aid program, U.S. Agency for International Development, and inter-agencies, coupled with the evolving roles “other than war” the military is absorbing—reinforced by directives such as DoD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations—are likely to increasingly shape and influence the type and number of U.S. military operational commitments well into the foreseeable future.

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They co-authored this article, based primarily on MAJ Stringer’s project for Dr. Anderson’s economics course.

IRAQ & THE AMERICAS: 3 GEN GANGS LESSONS AND PROSPECTS

Robert J. Bunker & John P. Sullivan

The United States is at a crossroads in its Iraqi policy now that control of the House and Senate will be shifting to the Democratic party. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as part of the political backlash against a mailed fist Republican foreign policy, has tendered his resignation. The appointment of Robert Gates as the incoming Secretary of Defense, the release of the bi-partisan *Iraq Study Group Report*, and forthcoming input from the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council to President George Bush on Iraq, offer new possibilities and hope for an insurgency- and, increasingly, civil war- weary US public. Still, a wide variety of suggestions ranging from a temporally ‘doubling down’ (increase) of troops to simply modifying our former strategy to enacting a complete and immediate pullout have been thrown into the currently advocated policy mix.

Gangs and Iraqi insurgents, militias, and other non-state groups share common origins based on tribalism, and therefore, it is expected that they will exhibit similar structures and behaviors. It is our belief that further insight into Iraq’s present situation and future prospects may be derived from a perspective utilizing 3rd generation gang (3 GEN Gangs) studies which present lessons learned from the emergence and spread of gangs within the United States, and other parts of the world, over roughly the last four decades.¹ Basically,

from a 3 GEN Gangs perspective, three generations of gangs have been found to exist: turf based, drug based, and mercenary based. The first generation gangs, comprising the vast majority, focus on protecting their turf. These gangs, the least developed of the three generational forms, provide both protection and identity to their members and little more. While some drug dealing is evident, it tends with these gangs to be a sideline activity.

The more evolved second and third generation gangs provide more tangible economic- and, later, political- based rewards to their members. Far fewer second generation gangs exist in relation to first generation gangs and, in turn, an even smaller number of third generation gangs exist in relation to second generation gangs—at least with regard to gangs found in the Americas. Second generation gangs focus on drug market development and exploitation and are far more sophisticated than turf based gangs. Third generation gangs are the most politicized, international in reach, and sophisticated of the gang generational forms. They will readily engage in mercenary endeavors and actively seek political power and financial gain from their activities. Certain terrorist groups (such as the Red Brigades in Italy), drug cartels, and local warlords all have attributes and organizational structures akin to third generation gangs.²

¹ For an overview and literature survey of this topic see John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gang Studies: An Introduction”, *Journal of Gang Research*. Forthcoming.

² A perspective on the Red Brigades as a 3 GEN Gang can be found in Max G. Manwaring, “Gangs and *Coups D’ Streets* in the New World

From a 3 GEN Gangs perspective, Iraq has been essentially overrun by 3rd generation gangs and their criminal–soldier equivalents. This is reminiscent of the nightmare scenario for the US already starting to develop in Central and South America (and, to a lesser extent, within the US) with the emergence, growth, and expansion of Mara Salvatrucha (MS–13) and other Maras. In many ways, the ‘Gangs of Iraq’ are a prelude to the ‘Gangs of the Americas’ that we will be increasingly facing in the Western Hemisphere.

Gangs emerge, prosper, and solidify their position as a viable social organizational form in housing projects, neighborhoods, prisons, slums, cities, urban regions, and even entire countries that have undergone (or are undergoing) varying forms of societal failure. The rise of newer forms of tribalism leading to gang emergence may be derived from combinations that include lack of jobs, high levels of poverty and drug abuse, low educational levels, an absence of functional families, along with high levels of crime and lawlessness, including that generated by domestic internal strife, which result in a daily threat of bodily injury. Further, newer forms of tribalism may readily mingle with older pre-existing forms of tribalism based on kinship, clan, and other extended family groupings.

Iraq’s current situation, at least for the middle and southern sections, is far from hopeful.

Currently some where between 1,000 and 5,000 people are now being killed throughout Iraq each month because of sectarian violence, gang wars, and rampant criminal activity.

Total post–invasion deaths in Iraq taking place during the American and allied stability and support operations (SASO) period ranges anywhere from 50,000 to +100,000.¹ Societal strife generated by ethnic and religious intolerance— derived from older forms of Middle Eastern tribalism— has resulted in neighborhood ethnic cleansing and the emergence of fortified enclaves. Extra–judicial killings and torture (i.e. street justice) have become the norm as have home invasion robberies, carjackings, petty theft, assaults, and kidnappings for ransom. Shifting coalitions of former regime loyalists, foreign Jihadi fighters linked to al Qaeda, Shia and Sunni militiamen tied to local clerics, criminal gangs of numerous types, competing Iraqi ministries and even active military and police units, along with foreign operatives promoting the interests of Iran, Hizballah, and Syria make for a chaotic and ever–changing threat landscape.

Americans, once universally hailed as liberators except by the most hardened former regime loyalists, are now viewed by many Iraqis at best as unwanted foreigners that will hopefully leave soon and at worst as hated crusaders that should be actively singled out, tortured, and killed. The northern Kurd–dominated region of the country is far more stable and supportive of American forces than

Disorder: Protean Insurgents in Post-Modern War”, Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers*, special double issue of *Global Crime*, Vol. 7. No. 3-4. August/November 2006; for drug cartel and warlord similarities to 3 GEN Gangs see John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords”, Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Non-State Threats and Future Wars*, special issue of *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 13. No. 2. Summer 2002, pp. 40-53.

¹ Actual numbers of Iraqis killed each month and total figures are unknown. Sources are unreliable and typically inflated or deflated in order to benefit the policies or agenda of the group providing the statistics. We can safely say that 1,000 to 2,000 people are being killed each month but the upper limit of 5,000 people is no longer out of the range of possibility given the high levels of violence now generated by the simultaneous insurgency and civil war taking place. Iraqi casualty reports and tracking websites offer total numbers killed upwards from 50,000.

the two other sections of Iraq but still is not free of sectarian violence in the urban centers and sabotage, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, suicide bombings, and assassinations occur throughout the region.

Insight can be gained by juxtaposing strife ridden Iraq with the US and other regions of the world, specifically Central and South America, with their high levels of gang emergence and activity. Gangs are very much a social cancer within American society and are a by-product of the new form of tribalism that has emerged nationally—possibly as a partial result of the demise of the older melting pot culture and an overemphasis on cultural relativism and heterogeneity.

As a consequence, gangs have spread at an alarming rate throughout American society. In the US, about 58 cities had gangs in 1960. By 1992, the number of cities with gangs had jumped to 769.¹ Luckily, the vast majority of gangs in the US are composed of the relatively less-evolved Turf gangs—though second generation drug gangs have been common for decades now and third generation mercenary gangs, in the current form of the Maras, have just recently started to appear within our borders.

Still, even though most gangs in the US are Turf-based gangs, gang-related homicides in our country have probably totaled about 100,000 over the last 20 years. This is an educated guess based on an extrapolation of Los Angeles county gang homicide data as no national gang homicide statistics exist.² The daily attrition rate on America's streets due to

gang violence has either gone unrecognized or is not yet viewed as a national security threat by our federal government. To its credit, however, FBI led national task forces to contend with the criminal activities and atrocities (e.g. torture and machete attacks) committed by MS-13 and other violent gang members have now been put in place.³

In Central and South America, gangs are now nothing less than out of control. Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are all being directly threatened by the Maras.⁴ In addition, Brazilian society was recently brought to its knees by a powerful prison gang that instigated a limited duration state wide insurgency that resulted in numerous civilian and law enforcement deaths and temporarily paralyzed the national economy.⁵ Mexico, furthermore, is seeing a fusion of its powerful drug cartels and gangs with an ensuing drug war that is resulting in numerous killings and decapitations—much like the ritual Jihadi beheadings witnessed in Iraq.⁶ No statistics or even estimates for the number of gang-related homicides that have taken place in Central and South America exist but they must surely be on par, if not far greater, than those that are estimated to have taken place in America over the last twenty years. If this is the case, gang

³ *Statement of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere House International Relations Committee April 20, 2005*, [online] Access at:

<http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/swecker042005.htm>.

⁴ See Ana Arana, "How the Street Gangs Took Central America," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 3. May/June 2005, pp. 98-110.

⁵ See Andrew Downie, "Police Are Targeted in Deadly Attacks, Prison Riots in Brazil", *Los Angeles Times*, Sunday, May 14, 2006, p. A25; Marcelo Soares and Patrick J. McDonnell, "Inmates Unleash a Torrent of Violence on Brazilian City", *Los Angeles Times*, Tuesday, May 16, 2006, pp. A1, A16; and Marcelo Soares and Patrick J. McDonnell, "Death Toll in Sao Paulo Rise to 133; City is Calm", *Los Angeles Times*, Wednesday, May 17, 2006, p. A16.

⁶ See Lisa J. Campbell, "The Use of Beheadings by Fundamentalist Islam", Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers*, special double issue of *Global Crime*, Vol. 7. No. 3-4. August/November 2006.

¹ Malcolm W. Klein, *The American Street Gang*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 92-95.

² Los Angeles County gang homicide information provided by Sgt. Wes McBride, Los Angeles Sheriffs Department, Retired, Safe Streets Bureau.

killings for all of the Americas would now number, at the very least, in the low hundreds of thousands for that time span.

Of direct interest is the continuum of environmental modification represented by gang activities in the US at one extreme and in parts of the Americas and Iraq at the other. Even the most basic level US gangs will attempt to culturally influence and modify their surroundings with drive-by shootings, the use of gang graffiti to mark their territory, and the take over of selected public spaces. Iraqi gangs and groups, on the other hand, are engaging in full out ethnic cleansing, neighborhood takeovers, and direct political control of those individuals living within their sphere of influence. Early intervention can prevent gangs from taking over a neighborhood, city, urban region and other environments. However, if allowed to evolve and engage in unchecked activities for too long they promise to replace legitimate political authority. As such, 3 GEN Gangs readily fill the vacuum left by the absence of legitimate authority.

Iraq's future prospects, given this scenario are bleak. The domination of Iraq by 3 GEN Gangs and other non-state entities (e.g. insurgent and terrorist groups, the militias of the clerics, and renegade police, military, and private security forces) has destroyed any chance of a free and democratically unified country emerging anytime soon, or possibly even for decades to come. The Iraqi operational environment has now seen the total blurring of crime and war. Perhaps, it is now even too far gone to salvage from a traditional policing or military perspective—only time will tell in this regard.¹

¹ The US military seems to think that temporarily raising troop levels in order to neutralize Muqtada al-Sadr's 'Mahdi Army' (Shia militia) and

This brings us some measure of concern with regard to the future prospects vis-à-vis the gang situation in the Americas. As more and more 3 GEN Gangs begin to emerge, thrive, and expand their networks in the Western Hemisphere the long term prospects for large regions of the Americas may very well, at some point, also come into question. Currently, 3 GEN Gangs have already take control in slums and other urban no-go zones, prisons, and some provinces and territories of various states including Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico. That such gangs are now starting to emerge within the United States should also give pause for concern. These developments in global context may ultimately cause us to re-examine our policies in the Americas and elevate our concerns over the "Gangs of the Americas" to the same level as that currently afforded the "Gangs of Iraq."

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possibly launching an offensive into the Sunni stronghold of Al Anbar province in support of the Iraqi government offer the best hopes for victory. This plan is being debated within the government and already criticized in some quarters. See Julian E. Barnes, "Larger U.S. effort in Iraq is proposed", *Los Angeles Times*, Wednesday, December 13, 2006, pp. A1, A16; and Maura Reynolds, "Majority support pullout timeline", *Los Angeles Times*, Wednesday, December 13, 2006, pp. A17.

PROGRESSIVE RECONSTRUCTION

MELDING EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE WITH NATION BUILDING–STABILITY OPERATIONS.

By Maj Karl C. Rohr

“If when taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that he will establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way.”

—Marshal Hubert Lyautey

The Twenty First Century Capstone Concept of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare calls on the Marine Corps to defeat America’s enemies from the sea, utilizing the sea as a maneuver area with an enhanced ability to assail the asymmetrical enemy. The concept is built on the legs of Operational Maneuver From The Sea, Ship to Objective Maneuver and Sea Basing. This is a strong foundation and will carry the Corps proudly and efficiently into the next century of conflicts. But it could be made stronger still. The addition of yet one more leg that of Progressive Reconstruction will fully round out the EMW concept to cover conflicts more in–depth. Progressive Reconstruction will fully integrate the Warfighting Functions with the necessary rebuilding of the target nation not after the war is complete but right on the heels of the assault and capture of the objectives. By striking while the iron is hot, when US influence is the strongest immediately after the initial shock of the assault has been delivered the Corps can gain a decisive advantage in peace–making.

“All our recent conquest...developed through two phases: that of the initial war, with the winning of apparently decisive victories, followed by that of insurrection, inevitable painful, and of which the issue was more administrative

than military, the organization of the country.”---E.F. Gautier 1910.

Progressive Reconstruction is loosely based upon the French Colonial Concept of Progressive Occupation, which assumed the initial conventional military victory and focused on immediate conservation and rehabilitation of the occupied territory.

In Progressive Reconstruction (PR) the Transition Phase begins immediately after the first rounds hit and the first objective is secured and continues concurrently with combat operations. PR would limit the ability of terrorist or guerrilla forces by removing their power base utilizing a combination of applied force and politics. Raid a town build a school. The rear area forces would be organized to conduct Area denial operations never allowing the insurgency to develop.

As we see today in Iraq such a policy of Progressive Occupation / Reconstruction would have better served the pacification efforts by providing a Military Governmental Structure to the newly liberated countryside in the wake of the assaulting forces. There would have been little to no power vacuum and the Coalition Forces would have fully capitalized on the

immense prestige created by the rapid destruction of the Iraqi armed forces.

In classical warfare (Clausewitz and Jomini) the goal is to crush an organization, a military machine. In a preemptive war on terrorism, the goal of warfare is to create a stable democratic nation. To do so one must attack not only the armed forces of the enemy but also the roots of the psychology of terrorism: poverty, corruption, instability, etc. PR changes the focus of military intervention from a purely combat operation to a military –political action. In Modern warfare the line between Transition and Decisive Operations is becoming increasingly blurry. Stability Operations need to be concurrent with decisive operations and not reserved for a separate Transition Phase. Interventionist forces must begin transforming the newly secured areas immediately and have a framework of reconstruction fully established while awaiting follow-on forces.

STOM and Sea Basing are designed to provide Assured Access and Power Projection. The question asked here is this, now that we have secured the objectives, what is next? In a Raid, NEO, Humanitarian Assistance, or Disaster Relief we withdraw. In a Regime Change we have to stay to replace the government. In Regime Support we have to stay to prop up the government. With PR in play the Corps would be better prepared to deal with the latter two contingencies. Progressive Reconstruction focuses on Democratic Nation Building & Stability Operations and can assist with Humanitarian Relief and Infrastructure Development. All would combine to reduce terrorist generation and insurrection.

WHY PROGRESSIVE RECONSTRUCTION:

It brings the doctrine of the Corps in line with the Pre-emptive threat removal theory currently in action. It would: Reduce emphasis on valid grievances, underemployment, and corruption; Reduce terrorism by keeping or providing a governmental structure in areas no longer in the war zone; Reduce the ability of the enemy remain behind and guerilla forces from causing the Coalition to loose the initiative in rear areas; Reduce guerilla potency by providing services–feeding, educating, rebuilding & health care; Reduce fear in areas which in regular Military operations would often be left without protection; Develop local self-defense forces or support local self-defense forces; Provide tangible evidence of a better future in rural and poor areas. In a regime change campaign PR provides an immediate framework of government and concentrated effort to win hearts and minds with orderly civic action ALL UNDER ONE MISSION COMMANDER. Civic Action would contribute to the betterment of the lives of the local population. It would gain the support, loyalty and respect of the people for the government/military government and contribute in some measure to national development by building ties with the local population.

The enemy of America is adapting, soft tactics are defeating our technological edge. The terrorist and guerillas melt away when the heavy forces arrive only to reemerge when they leave. TE Lawrence once stated that the advantage in an insurgency is in the hand of the insurgents through a common ideology: rationalized and focused discontent anchored in social organization. In this type of warfare relationships with the people mean more than

bullets and bombs. The firepower and technology advantage is important but in counter-insurgency it is not decisive. Insurgents from rival states can obtain modern weapons and technologies. The recent disabling of an M1A1 by a mystery round is an example. Artillery is marginalized, FWCAS is limited and RWCAS is vulnerable. Technology cannot replace sound strategic planning.

The goal of military intervention is to gain the collapse of the resistance as quickly as possible thereby removing the imminent threat. PR provides a means to defeat an enemy who is not tied to a capital or other critical objective and to fill the void created by the removal of the target nation government or the crushing of the insurgent main forces in the area of operation. The US, Coalition zone should become a center of attraction vice repulsion. Military forces conducting PR must be capable of conducting a highly mobile defense, with capability to conduct saturation operations. Mobile infantry is necessary to protect resource centers: LOC/MSR, Mercantile Centers, Ports, Airfields, Factories, Power & Water Plants, Sanitation and Medical Facilities; and to protect National Centers of Influence: Religious Sites, Universities, Museums and Archeological Sites etc. The native population must profit in the US/UN/Coalition presence. The protection should have a definite economic orientation. Encourage trade, attract investors, and bring not only a promise of security but also material prosperity.

PR CONCEPTS:

Advance Militarily: hunt the insurgents and enemy armed forces. Foster economic development on the heels of military action. Control Information by taking immediate control of TV, Radio, Print, and Internet

sources. Ensure through imbedded PsyOps that the population attributes improvements to US/Government intervention. The Military Forces must conduct Population and Resource Controls: Overt and covert surveillance of population; Movement control and curfews and Issuance of Papers—manifests—ID's. Concentrate on visible benefits to the people who work with us and foster peaceful relations. Isolate the troubled areas. Operate on a wide front, rapidly creating secure rear areas. Utilize surprise attacks and encirclement against insurgent strongholds. Develop and utilize local auxiliary forces for intelligence and security. Organize Regular Forces for point defense and raids. Conduct operations designed to transform dissidents into associates. Do not neglect Political Warfare. Devise ways to undermine the power of the government being replaced; conduct a systematic disintegration of the old power base –removal of authority from the old regimes former supporters.

Unity of Command: Unity of Command = Unity of Effort

Why: Because Military and Civilian officials don't always view success in the same way and because political action is more important than military. Clear military and Political goals must be established and developed from a common source before the invasion/intervention begins. Unity of Command must reach beyond just military functions. "A colonial expedition should always be under the command of the chief appointed to be the first administrator of the country after its conquest." –Marshal Hubert Lyautey. The goal is to ensure that the Commander of the Operation views the invasion/intervention as a whole entity not as two parts further integrating the warfighting with the peace making efforts. Additional unified territorial commands would need to be

established in the occupied territory (IMEF in Iraq splitting the southern zone into RCT and BN Sectors is a good example). This would create not an occupied point but a zone, and not a military post but a center of influence and action. All of these zones must answer to a common leader, a leader who also commanded the initial invasion/intervention this will further enhance the prestige of the occupying forces.

Force Structure: Warfighters–Peace Makers–Nation Builders.

In this type of warfare it is necessary to alter the traditional Western designed force structure, which is built for the European battlefields. Force structure must meet the unique requirements of the counter–insurgency. No force is more uniquely qualified for peace making than the Corps. The Marine Corps' Force structure heavy on mounted infantry is perfect for stability operations. The MAGTF is a complete package not only for warfighting but also in engineering and service support. The same structures could be augmented to serve the role of Nation builders. With the addition of Joint, Coalition and Governmental assets the MEB would be the perfect platform from which to launch the PR concept.

Marines could participate by supporting the Active Defense: Building local auxiliary forces, police, and army. Guarding Key infrastructure points (power, communications, transportation). They can assist with the rebuilding or building of key infrastructure points. If planned in advance they could foster the rebuilding of the market, making the target nation economically feasible and self–sustaining thereby providing jobs and making daily life safer.

To increase the effectiveness of EMW in today's strategic landscape the Corps must increase the strategic agility and tactical flexibility of the concept. This calls for the ability to pacify as well as defeat the enemy. Keeping the enemy off balance throughout the theater by removing not just the immediate threat but also the roots of future threats. It must be stressed that Transition begins immediately after the first round impacts with the boots on the ground and the capture of the first objectives. Again the goal of Progressive Reconstruction is to ensure when combat operations are over that there is already a unified government/military government in control of the target nation demonstrating the benefits of US military intervention. Adding a key piece of stability in order to reduce the breeding ground for terrorist and insurgents. Thus by acknowledging that the only way to defeat swarms of mosquitoes is not by attacking each individual but by draining the swampland they breed in the Corps can benefit by adding Progressive Reconstruction to the EMW concept. By conducting Progressive Reconstruction behind combat operations the Marine Corps will demonstrate the true benefits of Democracy.

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RECONSIDERING “WHY DR. JOHNNY WON’T GO TO WAR”

By Hugh Gusterson and David H. Price

Editor’s Note: This piece was received in response to Marc Tyrell’s published article in SWJ Magazine volume 7. At risk of confusing the issue, we consider it our first letter to the editor. Marc Tyrell knew he was launching a shot across the bow of the anthropology community, and this response elaborates on issues its authors feel were misrepresented or incomplete while certainly taking a few shots in return. A thread in the Small Wars Council discussed the original article, and that is certainly a good place to continue the discussion and any further clarifications or fallout. Most of us practitioners would be well served by understanding more anthropology, though we seem to have enough fire fights on our hands.

Marc W.D. Tyrell’s article, “Why Dr. Johnny Won’t Go to War,” is, unfortunately, cluttered with factual, interpretive and composition errors, especially in its characterization of our writing on the issue of anthropology and the national security state.

Before enumerating some of the factual errors in Tyrell’s article we would like to comment on the central argument of his piece: that anthropologists have, since Franz Boas, been monologically obsessed with the issue of espionage in regard to those who consult for the national security state. In fact, anthropologists’ feelings about and objections to national security consulting are more complex than that and have shifted over time. Boas’ objections to espionage under the cover of anthropology in World War I were grounded in an émigré German intellectual’s anxieties about the purity of science. (He published his famous letter in the Nation at about the same time that Max Weber delivered his address “Science as Vocation,” and both pieces evince similar attitudes and anxieties). During World War II many anthropologists were enthusiastic about applied anthropology on behalf of the allied war effort. A subsequent generation of anthropologists who objected to war work within the discipline during the Vietnam War was more concerned about the inherent

immorality of that particular war and the obligations anthropologists had toward informant communities whose interests were not held dear by the Pentagon and the CIA. They were also concerned that military secrecy violated a normative ethic of openness within the discipline. At a time when most universities decided to ban classified research on campus, the discipline of anthropology thus formally articulated a norm against secret research – only to weaken this norm in the 1990s in response to pressure from anthropologists doing contract research for corporations. In our own article on the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP), we are concerned (among other things) by the way in which it allows intelligence agencies to exploit financially and emotionally vulnerable students, locking them into working for the national security state through a pronounced form of debt bondage. Tyrell’s article largely ignores this complex tapestry of argumentation about national security work in anthropology, collapsing it all into a blinkered obsession with espionage.

In the course of making his argument, Tyrell seriously mischaracterizes an article we wrote for Anthropology News on PRISP. According to Tyrell it is our position that “anyone who does not speak out against PRISP

is “committing the professional ‘crime’ of ‘undermining the reputation of Anthropology’” [sic.] (Tyrrell 2007:8–9). Why are there quotation marks around the word “crime” in this passage? Who is being quoted? Not us. Although the quotation marks give the impression that we used this word in our article, we did not. Nor did we accuse anthropologists of committing a “professional ‘crime.’”

Tyrrell goes on to say, “while the Gustafson (sic) and Price article is clearly a ‘civilized’ warning to the community of Anthropologists (sic) it draws a not too subtle line in the sand. By using a rhetoric of ‘you are with us or against us,’ they are clearly attempting to establish the parameters of any debate in the discipline where the ‘discussion’ takes place only in terms of how extreme the penalty for supporting ‘them’ should be.”

Readers who have not read our article in Anthropology News may be surprised to learn that, far from being an exercise in totalitarian thought control and intimidation of ideological deviants, it was actually a call for debate among anthropologists about the implications of PRISP for our discipline. Our article included the following statement: “Given the arguable conflict between PRISP and the core values of openness in the academy, PRISP should be debated on campus in the same way that ROTC has been in the past. As with ROTC, some universities may decide that the program is compatible with their overarching values, and some may not, but the program should at least be debated.”¹ We will leave it to readers to decide for themselves whether, as Tyrrell claims, this constitutes a rhetoric of “you are with us or against us.” Our concern with

¹ Hugh Gusterson and David Price, “Spies in Our Midst” *Anthropology News* 46(6), 2005, pp.39-40, quote on p.40.

Tyrrell’s shoddy scholarship is not to issue an ad hominem counter-attack, but to clarify how his numerous inaccuracies and intentional mischaracterizations compile to build a flawed argumentative piece that disregards scholarly standards to press an ideological agenda. While such policy-driven ideological analysis appear to be widespread in the non-peer reviewed world of military and intelligence analysis generating and consuming social science analysis, such practices would be unacceptable in academic settings.

In Tyrrell’s article Ruth Benedict becomes “Ruthe Benedict” and he manages to spell Rhoda Métraux’s name three different ways within three consecutive lines of text (Tyrrell 2007:5). Given this remarkable feat perhaps we should be grateful that he only spelled one of our names two different ways. He confuses a published article with a “letter to the editor” (pp 2007:3,n2). His uses of secondary sources, Wikipedia, and pseudonym-based-blogs help create his own wikiality, and at times he offers “data” without providing any citations; in one such example he describes the “5 members of the executive council that issued the censure” against Boas. In truth the censure vote was conducted by thirty members of the AAA’s “Governing Council” who participated in Boas’ censure vote². It would be tedious to enumerate the many other examples of such poor scholarship.

Some of Tyrrell’s misunderstanding of anthropological ethics and the history of anthropology may be due to his background in sociology and the two disciplines’ significantly different developments of professional ethics

² Stocking, George W. 1968. “The Scientific Reaction Against Cultural Anthropology, 1917-1920.” In *Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology*, ed. George W. Stocking, 270-307. Chicago: University of Chicago Press., pp. 275-276.

standards. But his over-emphasis of the meaning of Boas's 1919 censure substitutes for an informed discussion of the Nuremberg Code's impact on the AAA's and all post-World War II professional social science ethics codes. He gives no indication of being aware of this history, but such a consideration would necessarily include an acknowledgement that principles of informed consent and disclosure to research subjects of what is to be done with research (rather than the simplistically misleading focus on "spying" that so obsesses Tyrrell that he finds evidence of it everywhere) are the fundamental issues pertaining to anthropological research in military and intelligence settings.

Finally, we would like to clarify that we agree with the American Anthropological Association's code of ethics statements declaring that anthropologists need to be open and honest about who they are, who they are working for, and what they are doing. This by

no means precludes the possibility of anthropologists studying military or intelligence organizations, or the possibility of anthropologists working for military or intelligence organizations, but it does limit the sort of work that these anthropologists may ethically undertake under the provisions of the AAA's ethics code.

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Hugh Gusterson is Professor of Cultural Studies and Anthropology at George Mason University. He is the author, most recently, of People of the Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Weapons Complex (Minnesota, 2004) and co-editor of Why America's Top Pundits Are Wrong (University of California Press, 2005).



03/24/07 - A U.S. Marine passes two Iraqi women making bread during a patrol in Zaidon, Iraq, March 22, 2007. The Marine is assigned to 3rd Platoon, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Samuel D. Corum) (Released)

AL-QA'IDA AS RAID-BASE: TECHNIQUE FROM THE PAST?

By John W. Jandora

Since 9/11 the American public has come to know the name al-Qa'ida (popularly corrupted to al-Qaeda) as designating an international terrorist network run by Usama bin Ladin and other militant Islamist leaders. Many Americans also know that the word *qâ'ida* generally translates as *base*. However, there is considerable uncertainty about the exact meaning of that term as used by the militant jihadists. Depending on the context, Arabic *qâ'ida* can designate something physical, such as a structural base or operational base, or it can designate something conceptual, such as a fundamental or basic principle. The search for meaning in the name is impeded by the understandable desire of primary sources to conceal or distort information that might be incriminating. It is further impeded by inconsistencies in reporting, which result from journalistic speculations, errors in interpretation or translation, and attempts by officials or ex-officials to “talk around” classified information.

Bin Ladin himself, who has made numerous public statements, has not fully explained the significance of the term. In an October 2001 interview, he asserted that al-Qa'ida was bigger than any one leader or any specific organization. As for the name, it “is very old and came about quite independently of me. Brother Abu Ubaida al-Banshiri created a military base to train young men to fight against the Soviet empire.”¹ In this comment, Bin Ladin was alluding to the Farouq training

camp near Kandahar, which is where militant leaders met in 1988 and agreed to expand their jihad beyond Afghanistan. If this camp was initially the sole base for the new “mission,” then it was unique among the dozen or more bases that accommodated foreign mujahideen (Arabic mujâhidîn, those who fight in jihad). So, it may originally have been “*the base (al-qâ'ida),*” but the bigger picture is that this term was linked with a registry (*sijill*) of fighters as well.² It is not known by whom or what process that particular roster was compiled. Saudi dissident Dr Saad al-Faqih credits Bin Ladin himself with starting the practice of registering the scores of Arab volunteers who passed through the transit houses in Pakistan. In any case, the register very likely accounted for competence and commitment to the cause, not resident status at the Farouq camp. Jihadists moved on from there. Several from Banshiri’s “circle” left Afghanistan to promote their cause elsewhere, especially after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Bin Ladin himself went to Saudi Arabia and then Sudan.

By the above reconstruction, it would seem that the word *qâ'ida* originally denoted one particular site. Nonetheless, by September 11, 2001 it denoted a whole network of camps and jihadist groups -- that is, the basis of a movement. The meaning of al-Qa'ida thus expanded over time. It first designated a physical site but came to symbolize a purpose and function as well, which suggests that the

¹ Usama bin Ladin, *Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence, trans. David Howarth (London and New York: Verso, 2005), p. 120.

² See “Hunting Bin Ladin,” Frontline Interview; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/interviews/al-fagih.html>; Internet.

term has yet the connotation of instrument, or means (to an end).

With the emergence of the Taliban movement in the mid-1990s, the camps in Afghanistan regained importance for al-Qa'ida. In May 1996 Bin Ladin relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan to spare his host, the Khartoum regime, further pressure from the international community. After settling in Afghanistan for the second time, Bin Ladin re-established his influence among the "Arab Afghans" who had remained or returned there. He forged an alliance with the Taliban and helped them contend against the Northern Alliance. The Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 and pushed their rivals into the northeast corner of the country. With Islamic rule imposed over the greater part of Afghanistan, the war against "unbelief" (in the righteous way of Islam) might be pursued elsewhere.

The numerous mujahideen camps that had emerged in the 1980s and '90s attracted both fighters and preachers from around the Arab and Islamic worlds. Over time, some camps closed, and some changed sponsorship. However, they collectively sustained an environment that justified war against infidels, which became the common cause despite differences of doctrine and primary enemy. Some jihadist leaders wanted to avoid innocent bloodshed; others held a broader view of culpability. Some saw the priority targets as the unjust regimes of their home countries; others saw them as the United States and Britain. The relevant point is that the camps had links to various groups in various countries. Thus, the al-Qa'ida network found itself with global reach and proceeded to act on that capability. Target sites extended to: Saudi Arabia (Khobar Towers, 1996; Riyadh, expat compounds, 2003; Khobar, compound, 2004);

East Africa (two U.S. Embassies, 1998; Mombasa, hotel, 2002); Yemen (USS Cole, 1990); America (World Trade Center/ Pentagon, 2001); Indonesia (Bali nightclub, 2002; Jakarta Marriott, 2003; Bali resorts, 2005); North Africa (Tunis, tourist area, 2003; Casablanca, "alien" communities, 2003); Turkey (Istanbul, foreign interests, 2003); Spain (Madrid, mass transit, 2004); England (London, mass transit, 2005); Jordan (Amman, hotel, 2005).¹

From this perspective, al-Qa'ida is the start-point of a process that resulted in strike operations, many, but not all, of which were terrorist in nature. The function of the Farouq Camp and others like it was not to marshal units and train them for conventional battle group tactics, combined arms operations, or sustained deployments. Rather, the foreign mujahideen camps were essentially centers for individual skills and team training, where volunteers rotated in and out.² Some deployed as squads to support the native mujahideen in their operations. Others returned to their home countries upon completion of training, ready to serve at a later time. A select few were admitted into advanced level training courses. Eventually, the foreign mujahideen were organized into units and employed as such. This egress of fighters to strike enemies near and far might well be envisioned as the activity of a raid base.

The raid as a feature of jihad has its own history, symbolism, and literary treatment, which largely derived from the military contest

¹ The list is representative only. It includes major attacks commonly attributed to al-Qa'ida, although culpability is in many cases questionable. Attacks conducted within the region of South Asia are omitted.

² See Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: the Man Who Declared War on America* (Rocklin, Calif.: Forum, 1999), pp. 21-22, 49-50 and Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2002), pp. 98-102, 130-131.

at the Anatolian frontier (modern Turkey) between the Islamic and Byzantine states.¹ (The Muslims' incursion into Northern India generated a parallel situation, which has a smaller profile in history.) After the unsuccessful siege of Constantinople in 716–17 CE, Arab-led Muslim armies faced improved counter strategies and consequently ceased to make deep penetrations of Byzantine territory. Cross-border raiding became the prevalent military activity. The deeds of the Muslim border warriors became the substance of an emerging jihad lore, which assimilated the raid motif of older, Arab tribal tradition. Since pre-Islamic times, camel raiding was an important facet of Arabian society, as it served to adjust ratios of wealth and power. The tribes originally commemorated their most significant raids (and related skirmishes) in poems and oral tradition. However, this lore was eventually recorded in historical works, commentaries on poetry, and historical romances, which lent a vocabulary and set of themes to jihad lore. The border raid was called *ghazw* or *ghazyā* (English *razzia*), as was the camel raid, and the border raider was called *ghâzî* (English *ghazi*), as was the camel raider. The word *ghâzî* was eventually applied to all frontier forces, irrespective of their military activity. The exploits of two famous early *ghâzîs* became the substance of folklore, as they were fictionalized, transposed in time, and forged into legends and an historical romance, of which segments are still commonly known in some parts of the Arab world.

In the course of history the ghazi ethos shifted from the Arabs and Arabized people to the Turks, who gradually became the dominant

component among Islam's frontier forces and within the military in general. The original legends of the border warriors were transformed into Turkish versions. At the Anatolian frontier, the Seljuk Turks and after them the Ottomans gained the reputation of *ghazis* par excellence, and they are even commemorated as such in modern Arabic historiography. As with the Ottoman sultans (1281–1922 CE), the Mughal rulers of India (1526–1857 CE) grafted the ghazi tradition onto their dynastic image. It would seem that the Arabs in a sense bequeathed the symbolism of the ghazi to others, and so they refer to their warrior heroes now as *mujâhidîn*.² Despite this particular change, the Arab people continued to use the raid motif in speaking of martial endeavors. Indeed, such usage is found within the "circles" of al-Qa'ida.

Usama Bin Ladin lauds the 9/11 attackers in a recording that was aired by al-Jazirah TV on 26 December 2001. That statement concludes with a poem, whose final verse is:

The fighters' winds blew, striking their towers and telling them:
We will not cease our raids until you leave our fields."³

His later audiotape of 23 April 2006, which was posted to al-Jazirah.net, refers to the 9/11 bombing as the "Manhattan raid."⁴ Similarly, Ayman al-Zawahiri's video broadcast by al-Jazirah TV on 01 September 2005 refers to the "blessed London raid" (07 July bombing) and

¹ discussion in John W. Jandora, *Militarism in Arab Society: An Historiographical and Bibliographical Sourcebook* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997), chap. 1.

² The term has, in modern times, been employed in a wide range of contexts, which, except for the case of the conflict in Afghanistan, are generally unknown in the West. Among variant uses, the name *mujâhidîn* has been confirmed on elite units or teams within the military and security forces of states as well as on the volunteers who fought in the first Arab-Israeli War.

³ Bin Ladin, *Messages*, p. 157.

⁴ English text, document FEA20060427022515, available from <http://www.opensource.gov/>; Internet.

likens it to “the previous raids in New York and Madrid.”¹

Further concerning 9/11, investigators uncovered the so-called “Doomsday Document” of questionable authorship, which contains guidance for the hijackers. The second page begins with the sayings: “One of the Companions said, ‘The messenger of God commanded that it (the Quran) be read before a raid, so we have read it, and have gained booty, and remained safe and sound.’” Juan Cole, who has analyzed the religious phraseology of the text, contends that the 9/11 hijackers were psychologically bent on reenacting sacred history. As the first Muslims struggled against the more powerful Meccans, “this hardy band of real Muslims . . . had no choice but to undertake a raid against this much superior foe.”² Cole’s point seems to be valid, although it is difficult to prove conclusively without testimonies. Still, there is ample evidence from Arab culture that raids undertaken to gain or recover goods count toward nobility, and raids undertaken in the cause of jihad count toward salvation.³

If the jihadist operatives see themselves as reenacting the deeds of the Prophet’s Companions, might al-Qa’ida, the base of the new jihad, take some precedent from the early Islamic movement? The analogy seems plausible, but it founders on the question of function. Islamic salvation history indeed indicates that raid activity was a key part of the

military strategy of the Medinan (early Islamic) state. The famous *Kitâb al-Maghâzî*, which is the only extant sample of a whole genre of works on early Muslim campaigns (or raids -- the word *maghâzî* has either meaning), mentions over fifty raids in addition to the few famous battles and sieges of the Prophet Muhammad’s time. It is noteworthy that this genre first appeared when border raiding was becoming the norm at the Anatolian frontier -- which was several decades after the events of interest. In any case, the writing has inspirational rather than instructional value.

Most of the accounts of “raids” are relatively vague, giving little more than dates, names of troop leaders and objective areas (sites), and quotes. They relate very little concerning operational aims, force composition, staging, movement, approach to target, and other technical military matters. There is no hint as to whether the raid forces departed from any particular staging area or areas. It is only for the later expeditions into the Byzantine and Sassanid domains that narratives mention Rabadha as the troop assembly point. The absence of fighting in some accounts suggests that the events commemorated were actually security (counter-raid) patrols and show-of-force operations. Such voids notwithstanding, it is possible to reconstruct the early Muslims’ military strategy on the basis of the related circumstances of the expansion of the Medinan state. The Muslims conducted raids as a means of inhibiting adversaries and indirectly controlling territory. They demonstrated the power to police routes, which assured commercial vitality, and to enforce security zones around their settlements. The Muslims also conducted raids as a means of pressuring tribes to submit to their authority.

¹ English text, document GMP20050901535005, available from <http://www.opensource.gov>; Internet.

² Juan Cole, “Al-Qaeda’s Doomsday Document and Psychological Manipulation,” paper presented at “Genocide and Terrorism: Probing the Mind of the Perpetrator” (Yale Center for Genocide Studies, New Haven, April 9, 2003); available from <http://www.juancole.com/essays/qaeda.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 April 2006.

³ The second point is manifest in the above cited texts; on the first point, see the bibliographic listing in Jandora, *Militarism in Arab Society*, pp.14-15.

Al-Qa'ida does not fit the above pattern. It has not existed as a state-based or state-directed activity, although it enjoyed the support of the Taliban government when that regime controlled much of Afghanistan. It has otherwise depended on the acquiescence of non-state allies – first the Afghan Mujahideen groups, then the tribes of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. Thus, al-Qa'ida has had "guest" accommodation in a permissive or semi-permissive setting. It has not functioned as a base for territorial expansion of some state. It has, rather, functioned as a transfer facility, a place where operatives, funds, and tradecraft could be taken in and redirected. Its purpose has been to dispatch (or link with), direct, and support jihadist cells whose operations are widely dispersed. Al-Qa'ida may facilitate linkage between cells where they belong to different groups among the so-called affiliates. It may recommend certain targets or timing of attacks. However, relative independence of action seems to be the norm. This scheme of offense is depicted in the graphic at Figure 1.


The terrorist nature of al-Qa'ida suggests another analogy. Among observers who condemn al-Qa'ida, some liken it to the "Assassin" phenomenon of the Crusade era, equating the two as "nests of terrorists."¹ The relevant history is that English Assassin derives from Arabic *Hashshâshîn*, which itself derives from legends concerning the militant Nizari

Ismailis.² This sect's emergence began with a dispute over succession to the Fatimid imamate in 1094 CE. When power brokers in Egypt dispossessed and murdered the designated heir Nizar, his supporters in eastern lands broke from the Cairo regime and established a new line of imams. Concurrently, these militants, whose main stronghold was at Alamut in northern Persia (Iran), took control of a number of castles and established the practice of assassinating elites -- rulers, officials, and religious dignitaries -- who opposed their version of Islam. In the early 12th century, Nizari missionaries began converting communities in northern Syria. They encountered difficulties, but the sect eventually gained bases to project power through assassination and subversion, as it had in Persia. The master of Masyaf, the main Nizari stronghold in Syria, became known in Crusader lore as "the Old Man of the Mountain."

The Nizari Ismailis in both their eastern and western domains assassinated scores of opponents over the course of several decades. They were feared and reviled by their opponents, who amplified that negative image in legend and history. Part of the legend was that "hitmen" were doped on hashish (hence, *Hashshâshîn*) so as to sustain resolve for an act of self-sacrifice; the assassin seldom escaped alive. Nizari militancy was eventually suppressed after the Mongols destroyed Alamut in 1256 CE and the Mamluks of Egypt seized Masyaf in 1270 CE. Much of the legend concerning the Nizaris is of questionable validity. Moreover, the comparison between al-Qa'ida and the "order of assassins" is likewise

¹ See, for example: Rick Ross, "Osama bin Laden and 'al Qaeda'" Cult Education and Recovery (November 2001); available from <http://www.culteducation.com/binladen.html>; Internet; accessed 11 May 2006; Steven Rowat, "Al-Qaeda and the New Assassins: Thoughts on Reading Maalouf," (2001) available from <http://rowatworks.com/Essays/maalouf.html>; Internet; accessed 11 May 2006; and "The Assassins: the World's First Terrorists," On Point (December 10, 2001); available from http://www.onpointradio.org/shows/2001/12/20011210_b_main.asp; Internet; accessed 11 May 2006.

² For a full account of Nizari militancy, see Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (New York: Basic Books, 1968) and Marshal G. S. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins* (New York: AMS, 1980). See also Farhad Daftary, *The Assassin Legends: Myths of the Isma'ilis* (London: I. B. Taurus & Co. Ltd., 1994).



debatable on several points. The militant Sunni founders of al-Qa'ida would never claim to emulate radical Shi'a, nor would they want or need to. Al-Qa'ida lacks the doctrinal cohesion of the Nizari Ismailis, whereas its target set is not restricted to individual elites but extends to institutions and public facilities as well. Lastly, al-Qa'ida does not govern the populated settlements around its strongholds, as was the case with the Nizaris.

Neither of the above cases seems to be a precedent for al-Qa'ida, especially since its leaders are not intent on territorial control at this time. There is, however, another possible precedent in an Arab technique of warfare that dates to the mid-tenth century (third Islamic century). It is an anomaly of history that this


technique has been recorded not by the Arabs but by their Byzantine foes. An anonymous military treatise dated to that era discusses countermeasures to the Arabs' doctrine (my word) for wide-area raids, and that discussion allows for the following reconstruction.¹ The Muslim army crosses the frontier in march-order and proceeds toward some district worth plundering. The commander (amir) establishes the main camp at a site that ideally affords natural protection and access to water. The camp may or may not be protected by a *foukon*. (This Byzantine technical term derives from Germanic *volk* and connotes the practice whereby armed tribes encamp within laagers.

¹ See George T. Dennis (ed. & trans.), *Three Byzantine Military Treatises* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1985), 143-239.

The text does not specify whether the Arabs' defensive perimeters are constructed of inter-locked shields, wagons, carts, stakes, or a combination thereof.) The amir sends out multiple columns to raid the surrounding villages. If a raid force's objective is too far from the main camp for safe retreat under duress, then that force will establish a *foulkon* at some intermediate site. The respective columns, if not intercepted and defeated, eventually return to the main camp and secure their plunder and captives. If another district is to be targeted, the entire army advances and repeats the above process, and, if not, it withdraws. The overall scheme is depicted at Figure 2.

In comparing the "raid" scheme of the Muslim border warriors with that of al-Qa'ida,

we find some differences. Al-Qa'ida has a global, and therefore much farther, reach, while it "deploys" much smaller strike forces. Nonetheless, the two models have many similarities, the relevant factors being practice, function, purpose, and method. To start with practice, the significant point is adherence to common technique, despite diversity in force composition or leadership. The wide-area raid technique was employed by various regimes that ruled over the Islamic borderlands in Anatolia – Tulunids, Abbasids, Ikhshidids, and the Shi'i Hamdanids. These regimes assembled into their raid force diverse units and warrior bands. Similarly, in the present day, the "army" of al-Qa'ida is a composite of groups -- militant salafist, radical Wahhabist, and Takfirist mujahideen. The practice of jihad seems, in both cases, to generate some



momentum of its own. As for analogy in function, in both raid schemes, the base serves to generate strike forces and to recover and re-deploy them, circumstances permitting.

In both cases, the purpose of the raiding is to attrite the enemy, while avoiding engagement on unfavorable terms. It is clear that the earlier wide-area raid technique evolved from the Muslims' acceptance of the Byzantines' military strengths and aimed at attrition of their staying power. The modern jihadists have likewise resorted to raids (terrorist strikes) since they cannot confront their enemies as military equals. As Bin Ladin said, "due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, that is, using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy."¹ They seek to undermine the political will of the United States and its allies to uphold their Middle East policies. Lastly, the methods (or means) of the two models reflect similarity in several aspects. They both depend on base displacement, decentralization of command-and-control, dispersion of forces, and strikes by highly mobile light forces. In both cases, the dispersal of forces (which contrasts with the normative dictum of concentrating, or massing, forces) does make sense. Of further interest is that the Byzantine advice on countermeasures applies as well in the present time, as it includes: scouting, surveillance, intelligence, communication, coordination between main force and advance force(s), and ambush and bait-and-ambush techniques.

Thus, the analogy appears to be valid on a number of points. One might contend that al-

Qa'ida's strikes amount to strategic, not operational, warfare. However, that view is not entirely correct, for the difference is one of distance rather than capability. The reality is that the "global jihadists" do not presently have the doctrinal cohesion necessary for strategic direction of effort.

Again one might object that their doctrine is salafism. However, salafism is more of a mindset than a comprehensive doctrine. Several important tenets remain to be clarified before the "movement" becomes truly cohesive. Key issues are:

- What are the specific qualifications for the position of caliph?
- What are the rules for selecting or deposing the caliph?
- What is the relevance, if any, of the old dialectic theology, particularly the opposing points of the Ash'ari and Maturidi "schools."
- What is the definition for "lawful blood" regarding conflict within Islam?
- What is the definition for "lawful blood" regarding conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims?
- Which acts (sins) constitute apostasy?

In the final analysis, we do not know whether the leaders of al-Qa'ida somehow knew of and were consciously replicating the older, wide-area raid technique or were merely pursuing a "natural" or innate course of action, that is, adapting to the circumstances. To my knowledge, the raid scheme recorded by the Byzantines has not been recorded in Arabic historiography. The first two "military leaders" of al-Qa'ida, Abu Ubaida al-Banshiri and Abu Hafs al-Masri, have died without recording their inspiration. We are left with Bin Ladin's remarks concerning al-Qa'ida: "the situation is

¹ Excerpt from English text of Bin Ladin's "Declaration of Jihad," available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A4342-2001Sep21>; Internet.

not as the West portrays it, that there exists an ‘organization’ with a specific name.”¹ Those words may well be true, if “al-Qâ’ida” indeed signifies an entire scheme for the pursuit of jihad. In any case, it is important to note that we can find explanations for the thought and behavior of the jihadists from inside their own culture. There is no need to seek explanations in Maoist or Guevarist insurgency theory or psychologic analyses of terrorism, as seems to be presently in vogue among security and defense analysts.

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¹ Bin Ladin, Messages, p. 119-120.

A LESSON FROM RWANDA

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN COUNTER INSURGENCY

LTC Thomas P. Odom US Army (ret.)


Civilians on the battlefield in counter insurgency are not only part of the battlefield; they are the objective. There are no collateral casualties. All non-*insurgent* casualties are friendly.

I wrote that short statement last year as a lesson learned from my experiences in Rwanda.¹ Since then I have had the opportunity to use that paper as a framework for briefing military officers and non-commissioned officers on the subject of counter insurgency (COIN) with Rwanda as a case study. In giving that brief, the above sentence drew the greatest reaction from the audience, some positive and some negative. On the positive side, a friend, recently returned from commanding a field artillery battalion in Iraq, remarked, "I have never heard anyone put it that way. That makes me think and that's good..." On the other hand a more senior officer deeply engaged in the doctrinal aspects of COIN (and with a year of brigade command in Iraq under his belt) responded, "I hope you don't think such a rule applies to our strike on Zarqawi..." I replied that I did and I still do. Here's why.

THE PRIMACY OF THE POPULATION IN COIN

In the spectrum of conflict, COIN is different in that it centers on the struggle for the population. Simply put COIN is a popularity contest between insurgent and counterinsurgent to win the support of the

¹ Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, USA (ret), "Guerrillas From The Mist: A Defense Attaché Watches the Rwandan Patriotic Front Transform from Insurgent to Counter Insurgent," *Small Wars Journal Magazine*, Volume 5 July 2006.



population. **FM 3-24 Counter Insurgency** captures this idea in graphic form.

FIGHTING THE INSURGENCY, NOT THE INSURGENT

This is not a new concept. T.E. Lawrence addressed this issue in his paper, "Evolution of a Revolt, saying, "Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic." ² This concept is fundamental to the idea of fighting the insurgency rather than fighting the insurgent. Fighting the insurgency means winning the support of the neutral or passive majority. Fighting the insurgent centers on killing insurgents and destroying their will to continue the fight.

² T.E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, United Kingdom.

In Rwanda, the former government took an extreme approach in focusing on the insurgency: the genocide set out to destroy not only the active minority supporting the insurgency but also anyone in the majority who remained openly neutral or passive. As a result, the hardliners polarized the ethnic issues and much of the majority went into exile with the hardliners as the government lost militarily. Over the next 2 to 3 years, the new government gradually set the stage to reestablish a semi-neutral majority and then coax that majority into supporting the former insurgents. It was not a smooth process; in the Kibeho Internally Displaced Persons Camp massacre, the new Rwandan military got too centered on catching or killing genocidal killers and some 2000 Rwandans died in the melee. Ultimately the new government took military action to break the hardliners' hold on the refugee camps and allow the survivors to go home. In that operation, the new Rwandan military remained focused on the population, not the enemy.¹

In COIN, focusing on killing or capturing the enemy is the strategic or operational equivalent of target fixation, an injection of conventional warfare in an arena of unconventional conflict. That is not to say counter insurgent forces should not destroy insurgents when the opportunity or the need so dictates. Rather as indicated by Dr. David Kilcullen in his "28 Articles"² the counter insurgent force should pursue its own objectives and "only attack the enemy when he gets in the way. Try not to be distracted, or forced into a series of reactive moves, by a desire to kill or capture the insurgents." Dr. Kalev Sepp describes this

¹ Thomas P. Odom, *Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2005).

² Dr. David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency."

phenomenon in his "Paradoxes of COIN"³ with three consecutive bullets:

- The more force you use, the less effective you are
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction
- The best weapons for COIN don't fire bullets

In cataloging dysfunctional COIN efforts, Sepp lists, "priority to "kill-capture" enemy, not on engaging population" as a key indicator for unsuccessful COIN operations. In my own experiences in post-genocide Rwanda, I saw first hand the delicate balance necessary between the use of force against insurgent killers and reconciliation within Rwandan society. Put bluntly killing perpetuated killing.⁴

FIREPOWER AND COUNTER INSURGENCY

It is axiomatic that firepower coupled with ever advancing technology is the basis for the American Way of War. The principle that firepower substitutes for manpower has served us well in conventional wars. Technology has allowed us to increase the lethality and precision of that firepower; this trend has over time reduced the size of deployed forces on the battlefield on the ground, at sea, and in the air. And this equation of tactical, operational, and strategic dominance has worked effectively in all realms of conflict with the exception of COIN. Going back to Dr. Sepp's paradoxes, "the best weapons for COIN don't fire bullets."⁵ In

³ Dr. Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counter-Insurgency," Presentation at the 2006 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Convention, Washington DC, 10 October 2006.

⁴ Both Kilcullen and Sepp's writings are used heavily in Chapter 1, FM 3-24.

⁵ Sepp.

war for the support of a population, dead men cast multiple votes through their survivors.


The relationship between the target population and COIN has implications at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Before such a relationship can be understood, one must first decide that a counter insurgency is in play.

From Paragraph 1–9 FM 3–24:

Clever insurgents strive to disguise their intentions. When these insurgents are successful at such deception, potential counterinsurgents are at a disadvantage. A coordinated reaction requires political and military leaders to recognize that an insurgency exists and to determine its makeup and characteristics. While the government prepares to respond, the insurgents gain strength and foster increasing disruption throughout the state or region.

Historically that has often been a problem. Our own recent experience in Iraq documents just how difficult it may be to define what type of war we are fighting. More than a few in the international community or even inside Rwanda did not see the signs of a new insurgency threatening post-genocide Rwanda until the new Rwandan military captured an insurgent base on an island in Lake Kivu 17 months after the July 1994 ceasefire. Even our recent efforts to define doctrine suggest we are not comfortable with the concepts of COIN, stability and reconstruction operations, security operations, or full spectrum operations. **FM 3–24** offers this graphic description of COIN at right

All of this assumes we have defined the conflict as COIN. I have already indicated that is not an easy task. We are not alone. Israel



In explaining this graphic FM 3–24 states:

1–105. The purpose of America’s ground forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Throughout history, however, the Army and Marine Corps have been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat; this has been particularly true during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be ready both to fight and to build—depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. The full spectrum operations doctrine (described in FM 3–0) captures this reality.

1–106. All full spectrum operations executed overseas—including COIN operations—include offensive, defensive, and stability operations that commanders combine to achieve the desired end state. The exact mix varies depending on the situation and the mission. Commanders weight each operation based on their assessment of the campaign’s phase and the situation in their AO. They shift the weight among these operations as necessary to address situations in different parts of the AO while continuing to pursue their overall objectives.

over the past 58 years fought a series of conventional wars with decisive results followed by a series of unconventional wars with distinctly indecisive outcomes. In those 58 years, Israel has achieved its tactical and operational objectives of preserving its existence and failed in its strategic objective of regional and global acceptance. It has consistently given "priority to "kill-capture" enemy, not on engaging population" of the Arab states and populations surrounding it. Israeli military actions have centered on retribution and suppression. And like the U.S. military, the Israeli Defense Forces have often concentrated on firepower and technology as

the answer to defeating their enemies.

STRATEGIC COIN

We face similar issues at the strategic level of the Global War on Terrorism. In the war against radical Islam, we are engaged in a global COIN operation. The population at the center of the struggle is the Muslim world. To win in this struggle, we have to expand the Muslim minority actively supporting our cause by winning greater support in the neutral or passive majority as we contain the radical Islamist. That is how we can fight the global radical Islamist insurgency. If we simply fixate on destroying the active insurgent minority, we

Precision Fires: The Efficiency Quotient of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)

In discussing strategic COIN and strike operations, the subject of PGMs must be raised. Aerial delivery of munitions dates back to 1911 when an Italian pilot dropped a grenade on tribesmen near Tripoli. Since that date precision has been both goal and mantra of air power advocates and developers. Precision is of course relative to technological innovation and as air power has evolved technological innovation has increased the precision of PGMs. It is most important to understand that the driving force behind PGM development is efficiency of resources expended to target destruction. How one defines the target obviously influences the precision and efficiency of the weapon or weapons necessary to destroy it. The one bomb, one target formula of precision and efficiency can be applied to Hiroshima or an Iraqi tank in Kuwait in 1991.

Where discussions of precision and PGMs start to get muddled is when they are applied to the concept of "surgical" air strikes. The latter term crept into use in Vietnam as the US deployed tactical bombers in "surgical strikes" against strategic targets inside North Vietnam. "Surgical" implied that only selected legitimate targets would be destroyed. As Vietnam closed the development and deployment of laser-designated PGMs capable of one bomb, one target precision and efficiency seemingly merged the concept of "surgical" and precision into one. A PGM could be used to deliver "surgical" strikes, thus limiting damage and casualties to the immediate target.

That is true to the technological limitations of the weapon system; 500-pound JDAM with a circular error probable of 13 meters has a 50 per cent probability of hitting within 13 meters of the target; there is a 10 percent probability of incapacitation for anyone 95 meters from the point of impact. In other words, precision concerns chances of hitting the target; it has no impact on the blast radius of the bomb. "Surgical" strikes using PGMs are not necessarily surgical in their effects on the population around any target.

The risk associated with using these weapons during a conventional war, a retaliatory raid not tied to a greater campaign, or support of stability operation is almost certainly within acceptable limits. In a strategic COIN setting, surgical strikes using PGMs may cause more damage to our interests than they are worth.

are fighting the global radical Islamists, on terms favorable to their cause. To win their global insurgency, the radical Islamists cannot accept the existence of the neutral or passive majority. Radical movements cannot survive stasis as stagnant radical movements invite moderation. We often speak of a Long War in regretful terms when a long war of containment is truly in our best interests. If you seek a model for the "Long War" on terrorism, look at the Cold War and its effects on Communism.

With regards to firepower and its application in strategic COIN, Dr. Sepp's Paradoxes of COIN still apply. Our tendency to combine firepower and technology is matched by the ever-growing number of delivery systems and our strategic confusion in using them when we should not. In plain English that means precision strike operations against high value targets are counter productive when they fail to kill the targets or they kill persons other than the intended targets. Missing the targets offers the global radical Islamists two key victories in the battle for the neutral or passive Muslim majority we are fighting to win over. It validates the radicals as major threats against us. It demonstrates that our systems and intelligence are ineffective. Killing persons other than the intended target offers the global radical Islamists similar victories. Even if the specified targets are killed, killing others creates

sympathy for the targets and replacements for them. It demonstrates our indifference to such casualties. Indeed as Dr. Sepp points out, "sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction."¹

OPERATIONAL COIN

Operational COIN is theater-level, often regional in scope. Operation Enduring Freedom centers on Afghanistan but it's regional scope encompasses all bordering countries. Operation Iraqi Freedom certainly follows that pattern and exceeds it with effects reaching throughout the region. By its very nature, theater operations mesh the strategic with the tactical levels of war. Much of the discussion about strategic corporals keys on this idea. The strategic level COIN effort against global radical Islamists begins to focus more on the theater players in the operational fight for a theater like Iraq or Afghanistan. As that convergence takes place, it increases the likelihood that the operational commander will face the issue of striking or not striking a high value target like Zarqawi in Iraq or Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders inside Afghanistan. In the latter theater, such strikes have also taken place in Pakistan, particularly in the areas tribally aligned with the Taliban.

Continuing in Afghanistan, strategic emphasis on OIF since 2003 kept troop levels

Casualties: Aerial Bombs Versus Suicide Bombs 2006

	International Aerial Bombs	Local Suicide Bombs
Civilians	268–3000*	185 Killed /Wounded
Combatants	3000	57

* Official figures–Local reports

¹ Sepp

in OEF low even as the Taliban rebuilt and reoccupied much of its former haunts, especially its homelands in southern Afghanistan. Stepped up military levels in 2006 and increased operations in southern Afghanistan led to intensified fighting and a increasing use of aerial strikes. The Taliban has responded with an increased use of suicide bombings. The immediate loser in this escalation has been that neutral or passive majority. Consider the below chart adapted from the SENLIS report, "An Assessment of the Hearts and Minds Campaign in Southern Afghanistan, *Zroona aw Zehnoona*."¹

Two salient points emerge from the chart. First is that suicide bombers killed fewer civilians than coalition air attacks. Second is—at least according to local reports and therefore in the locals' view—coalition air attacks killed a civilian for every combatant. Those two points—especially the latter—have been great blows to the credibility of the coalition forces seeking to win the support of that very same neutral or passive population. Large losses of life and even larger population displacement with concurrent food and health crises have resulted. Last year, the NATO-ISF Commander stated unequivocally that his command had to change its approach or that neutral majority would turn toward the Taliban. This echoed what I saw in Rwanda after Kibeho; the commanders, who focused purely on the enemy, ultimately were relieved and some went to prison.

¹ SENLIS, "An Assessment of the Hearts and Minds Campaign in Southern Afghanistan, *Zroona aw Zehnoona*," London: Autumn 2006, page 34.

TACTICAL COIN: THE COP'S WORLD, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND ESCALATION OF FORCE

It is at the tactical level that the relationship between COIN and the population emerges in clearest terms. **FM 3-24** makes that relationship clear :

Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals

1-157. Successful COIN operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines at all levels. Indeed, young leaders—so-called “strategic corporals”—often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders' intent.

Since 2004, Coalition forces have improved procedures for escalation of force, clarified rules of engagement, and emphasized applying the principles of COIN in their operations. Escalating sectarian violence at first appeared as a background to the COIN effort; now that violence has taken center stage, making the struggle to win the support of a neutral or passive population as the population itself fragments into conflict. In this environment, the push to stand up a professional Iraqi military that understands its objective is to win the trust and support of the Iraq people offers the greatest hope for containing and then reducing sectarian strife.

THE FALLACY OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN COIN

FM 3-24 has in my estimation made great strides in clarifying COIN to the Army and our sister services and allies. I find one critical error in its tenets, one that I opened this paper with and will again repeat.

A Lesson From Rwanda

Civilians on the battlefield in counter insurgency are not only part of the battlefield; they are the objective. There are no collateral casualties. All non-insurgent casualties are friendly.

USAF Pamphlet 14-210 states, "According to DIA's BDA Quick Guide (PC- 8060- 1- 96, Feb 96), collateral damage is assessed and reported during the BDA process. Broadly defined, collateral damage is unintentional damage or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment or personnel occurring as a result of military actions directed against targeted enemy forces or facilities. Such damage can occur to friendly, neutral, and even enemy forces." Not surprisingly, the text goes on to refer to Linebacker II in North Vietnam when B-52s conducted sustained strikes against previously restricted targets. Those attacks harkened back to the strategic bombing campaigns of WWII; Linebacker II was very much a conventional strategic air attack centered on breaking the will of the North Vietnamese. In contrast to Vietnam when collateral damage was used to describe friendly and civilian casualties, US commanders in Desert Storm addressed friendly casualties--US and Coalition--inflicted by friendly forces as fratricide. Such incidents are a "third rail" in US

military operations no commander wants to touch.

In contrast, collateral damage has remained the word of choice for civilian casualties. As it is used in FM 3-24, the term collateral damage largely reflects the idea of non-combatants or "civilians" wounded or killed in military operations. In a realm of conflict where the civilian population is the objective for insurgent word choice is more than a matter of semantics. Going back to Dr. Sepp's admonition that "priority to "kill-capture" enemy, not on engaging population" as a key indicator for unsuccessful COIN operations, describing civilian deaths or injuries as "collateral" damage only confirms that the COIN forces were focused on killing or capturing the enemy and the civilians were in the way.

Put another way, strategists have long warned that military forces are in support to diplomatic, political, and police forces in COIN operations. No police force in the Western world would try to kill a gang leader in a housing complex with a Hellfire missile. Why? Because the action against the gang leader is to protect the people in the housing complex from him. It is not to kill him at whatever cost to those same people. Any loss of civilian life is a friendly loss. The same rule applies to COIN.

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Editor's Note - Tom Odom is a flagrant repeat offender for contributions to SWJ Magazine, CALL, and the broader realm of military study. We hope he is never cured.

YOU'VE GOT HATE: WEB BASED TERROR

Captain Matthew Orris

We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups...

Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.

We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support.

-- National Intelligence Estimate, April 2006.

"We have to understand who uses the Internet for hate purposes. It is a propaganda tool par excellence to get one's message out to supporters and potential recruits, as well as a powerful way to denigrate one's enemies. Thus, the Internet is a natural venue not only for amateurs, but also for organized extremist groups and terrorists."

-- Rabbi Abraham Cooper, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Anti-Semitism and Terrorism on the Internet: New Threats, June 1, 2003. 21st Century Terrorism and the Internet: A Natural Fit

Terrorism today seems to be a far cry from the often state-backed terrorist movements of the 1970s and 1980s (many of which were offshoots of the protest and "peace" movements of Western Europe) that were hierarchical in structure and had formalized chains of command with identifiable leaders like Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof of the West German terror group, Red Army Faction (RAF). Since the early 1990s terrorism has shifted from ideologically rooted, rigidly organized, state-sponsored groups to a loosely organized network of like-minded terrorists, often religious in nature, that are based internationally throughout cyberspace. It is no accident that this shift occurred with the explosion of the Internet a global communications mode. The very nature the Internet makes it is the perfect location to "hide

in the open" and orchestrate and organize terrorist activities; the ease of access to the Internet and availability of technology, little cost to operate or to utilize Internet service, and a worldwide audience available 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

One of the most successful uses of new technology for the advancement of a terrorist agenda is that of Islamists¹. Many Islamist groups, and those sympathetic to their cause, already use the Internet to spread their anti-Western, anti-Israel message because the Internet, like night postings of leaflets and painted messages in years past, affords the

¹ Islamists: Adherents of Islamism, which refers to political ideologies derived from fundamentalist interpretations of Islam and asserts that all matters of religion, government and society must be ruled by strict interpretations of Sharia Law, all of which depends upon the group of self-appointed Imams who place themselves in charge.

The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

<http://www.periscope.usni.com>. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" and is either domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the organization. <http://www.fbi.gov>. Despite the differences both the DOD and the FBI agree a terrorist is an individual or member of a group who uses acts of violence and intimidation to force a desired social, political, or religious view on an unwilling society.

So in order to understand the motivations, one should first determine the particular goals of the group. Though it may seem like an exercise in semantics, it is vital in helping to understand the what, how and why the terrorist is trying to accomplish their stated goal and how to best prevent this from happening. The reasons behind terrorism are as diverse as the types of people who commit the attacks. Every type of rationale ranging from political oppression, religious intolerance to divine revelations is used to justify their actions. All terrorists state that they have exhausted all attempts at legitimate change but to no avail, and thus they have been "forced" to carry out acts of violence to effect those changes they desire.

individual a level anonymity and allows the individual (or small clique) to act as though they are part of a much larger and better organized group. Other uses for the Internet include, but are not excluded to, intimidation, extortion, instructions on the manufacture of explosives, poison, weapons familiarization, how to coordinate attacks on websites they deem as a threat, intelligence sharing, or providing a forum for propaganda.¹

Web based terror is focused at the micro level of a loose net of groups or individuals that share common held beliefs such as the hatred of "Jews," the United States, "capitalism" or "globalization." The process from political or religious extremism to terrorist is now just a

mere mouse click away thanks to the increasing access throughout the world of technology and information needed to commit acts of terrorist violence.

After the attacks on 9/11, the Internet became essential for the survival of many of these terrorist groups. On the Internet terrorist groups and their supporters are able to sidestep, with relative ease the few impediments imposed on their activities by democratic governments and are unhindered by effective monitoring or censorship and allows terror groups to easily disseminate their messages.

Not every terrorist or sympathizer website will actually enlist recruits for violent action; most sites stop short of enlisting and instead inform how one can show their commitment to the "cause" in other ways. An example of this can be found on the Kahane Chai website under

¹ Several Internet sites created by Hamas supporters carry the group's charter and communiqués (both political and military) that call for the killing of Jews. Other groups, such as the Iranian sponsored Hezbollah use the Internet to raise additional funds and to drum up support worldwide. Hezbollah also sells books and other publications through its own website based in southern Lebanon.

the heading of "How can I help the struggle: A few suggestions."¹ While the Peruvian Maoist terror group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) website one can receive helpful hints under the title, "Action alert: What you can do." Often times when part of a larger multi-media campaign the Internet can be quite effective in helping to mobilize activists, such was the case in 2003 and 2004 when International A.N.S.W.E.R.² utilized the Internet to great effect to protest the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in which tens of thousands, and in some case hundreds of thousands, people around the world responded with well organized demonstrations within a matter of hours.

Generally, individual group websites such as the Colombian based Marxist-Leninist groups ELN and FARC are designed more to raise funds and generate global propaganda than as a recruitment tool. Enlistments into terror groups still happen face-to-face, and in the more sophisticated groups the potential candidate is vetted, especially if the individual wanting to join is a foreigner, as in the case of U.S. citizen Lori Berenson.³ Unfortunately there are increasing exceptions to this rule, especially among jihadist groups, in which small groups give themselves grandiose titles with "Army" or

"Brigades" as a means of intimidation by non-existent numbers. Currently in North America the jihadi trend is for ad hoc groups to sprout up such as the six Yemeni-Americans who were arrested in upstate New York in April 2003 and convicted of being a "sleeper cell" for Al-Qaeda,⁴ and the seventeen in Toronto Canada.

It should be stressed that not every website is an all encompassing "one stop shop" for aspiring terrorists or revolutionaries; simply logging will not make one an effective fighter. What one will find on most sites is information and lots of it. Most websites have hyperlinks and file sharing with other sites that contain information such as the "Terrorist's Handbook" and the cult classic "The Anarchist Cookbook." The "Mujahideen Poisons Handbook" is replacing those older sources.⁵ Another much heftier tome, by Al-Qaeda, "The Encyclopedia of Jihad" is distributed through the Internet and offers detailed instructions on how to establish an underground organization and execute attacks. There are many books along similar lines are already easily accessible in bookstores, public libraries and gun shows.⁶

The more sophisticated groups and their support sites have gone through the Internet and data mined the sites of others (anarchist, communist, radical environmentalists, white supremacists, black supremacists, etc.) that have posted detailed instructions in manufacturing bombs, chemical weapons, and

¹ Kahane Lives: A splinter group of Kach, a Zionist terror group founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane whose stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kahane Chai, which means "Kahane Lives," was founded by Meir Kahane's son Binyamin following his assassination in the US were declared to be terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under the 1948 Terrorism Law.

² International A.N.S.W.E.R. (or simply ANSWER) is the front group for the Marxist-Leninist Workers World Party (WWP), which uses the anti-war movement to promote Communist ideals and condemn American foreign policy, and capitalism and was founded shortly after the attacks in September 2001. ANSWER's protests have been staged in numerous cities worldwide and have drawn thousands to hundreds of thousands of participants.

³ Berenson, a self-proclaimed journalist of dubious credibility was arrested in Lima, Peru on November 30, 1995 for collaboration with the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), and used her cover to gather information on the Peruvian Congress building (floor plans, security, etc.) as well as renting an apartment and a house for the group to use. Subsequent police raids netted fourteen terrorists and a large cache of weapons and explosives. She is currently serving a twenty-year prison sentence in Peru for supporting terrorist activities.

⁴ The "Lackawanna Six" had engaged in training at the al-Farooq terrorist camp in Afghanistan prior to the 9/11 attacks.

⁵ Written by the Palestinian terror group Hamas the book details how to prepare various homemade poisons, poisonous gases, and other deadly materials for use in terrorist attacks.

⁶ According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Federal agents investigating at least 30 bombings and four attempted bombings between 1985 and June 1996 recovered bomb-making literature that the suspects had obtained from open sources to the Internet. Among them, in February 1996, three junior high school students from Syracuse, NY, were charged with plotting to set off a homemade bomb in their school, based on plans they had found on the Internet.

poisons.¹ Practically one cannot become an effective fighter by studying such manuals; reading the “Ranger Handbook” won’t make one a US Army Ranger. Still there is no limit from theory to execution when it comes to the amount of terrorist and extremist propaganda that can be downloaded and used. And in any case, one does not have to be a Ranger to kill innocent people.

Conducting an attack is one thing, inciting others do it is quite another, and often a lot easier. Quite simply, the spread of any radical ideology is far more dangerous than an individual armed with an AK-47. A lone gunman may kill a few people, but by doing so he exposes himself and in turn he himself can be killed. It is the propagandist who moves unseen and whose message that reaches thousands and whose aim is to inspire others to kill millions, which is the true benefit of online terrorism, especially in coalescing views.

CONVERGING, DIVERGENT HATE GROUPS

One of the most disturbing trends is the growing willingness of these fringe groups to work together in a very disjointed way. Although the core beliefs of such groups and their public rhetoric may seem to limit their cooperation, they share “common enemies” – the government of the U.S. and of course, “the Jews.” According to the old adage, politics makes strange bedfellows, meaning that sometimes circumstances compel adversaries to temporarily join forces. It presupposes that such cooperation is not a situation sought after

¹ Supposedly a captured Al-Qaeda laptop found in Afghanistan had information downloaded from a French site run by the Société Anonyme (a self-described “fluctuating group of artists and theoreticians who work specifically on the relations between critical thinking and artistic practices”) that offers a two-volume “Sabotage Handbook.”

solution, but rather one that is thrust upon the parties involved. It is no different in the world of radical ideology. Since 2005 there has been an increase in the rather bizarre trend of cooperation between of radical Islam and neo-Nazis; such an alliance seems unlikely at face value since neo-Nazis view Arabs as racially inferior and Islamists contend that neo-Nazis are just another infidel that they will either have to convert or kill.² While there is little evidence of fully operational links between Islamist terror groups and neo-Nazis, some of these groups have indicated a certain measure of solidarity – due to their shared beliefs of Holocaust denial and hatred for the Jews. To make this unlikely alliance even sound remotely logical to fellow the white supremacist Aryan Nations website claimed that the idea of “holy war” is not limited to Islam but is available to Christians.³

Now even the radical left and it’s associated “peace movements” are increasingly finding themselves in agreement with Islamists and neo-Nazis. They all share the view that capitalism in general and the U.S. in particular are oppressive. The Global War on Terror and especially Operation Iraqi Freedom are designed to benefit only Israel and “international Jewry.” White supremacists and neo-Nazis like David Duke were quick to add support to the anti-Israel, Jewish conspiracy theories spouted publicly by various peace activists in the summer of 2005. Various neo-Nazi websites since that time have posted

² In an interview with CNN in March 2005, August Kreis, leader of the Aryan Nations said of al Qaeda, “You say they’re terrorists, I say they’re freedom fighters. And I want to instill the same jihadist feeling in our peoples’ heart, in the Aryan race, that they have for their father, who they call Allah.”

³ “All the sons of Abraham, all descendants of his three wives, Sarah, Hagar and Ketourah, the parties of the Islamic and Aryan World, all need to understand their duty to enact Holy Jihad, we need to live this Jihad; total war, death to our enemy, the insidious, poisonous and rabid satanic Jew.”

glowing op-ed piece of why these “peace movements” are right.¹

THE INTERNET REVOLUTIONIZES TERROR

The Internet has changed organization and management of terror groups. Groups such as the Aryan Nations and the American militia movement were the first to embrace the Internet as a means to organize, recruit and control activities. Their near monopoly of the Internet was soon challenged by religious terrorism, which like its racist counterparts also promoted either an uncompromising world-view, or used religion as a cloak for its revolutionary and violent theology. In short order virtually every terror group with the basest of means was on the Internet.

This Internet-based terrorism is far more diffused than traditional terrorist structures. It embraces the concept of “leaderless resistance” and relies on lone acts of terror first advocated by William Pierce, a former leader in the Aryan Nations.² Louis Beam³ best articulated the concept of “leaderless resistance” and the “lone wolf.” Beam suggested that hierarchy should be downplayed in favor of a network of “phantom cells,” which would communicate covertly and act through ideology rather than formal organizational structures for offensive

¹ In August 2005 neo-Nazis around the country praised Cindy Sheehan for her public statements such as, “My first born was murdered. Am I angry? Yes, he was killed for a PNAC (Project for a New American Century) neo-con agenda to benefit Israel. My son joined the Army to protect America, not Israel.” The current anti-war movement is popular with the American Nationalist Union, the National Socialist Movement, and at racist websites like www.stormfront.org, www.altermedia.info, www.davidduke.com.

² Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” *The Seditonist* (Feb. 1992), www.louisbeam.com

³ Louis Beam is a former Klansman and neo-Nazi from Texas who was one of the first published proponents of the “lone wolf” or “leaderless resistance” to encourage anti-government and racist terrorism by small cells. He has written that the attacks on 9/11 are part of a larger government sponsored conspiracy.

flexibility. Such networking would protect the security of the organization as a whole.

Not all of what Pierce or Beam proposed was novel; the lone wolf gunman is nothing new in terrorism and has produced some of the worst cases of terrorism the U.S.⁴ Below are some examples of what Beam advocated. They are not tied to a specific group. All but one are offshoots of radical ideologies and all were forms of terrorism.

PHANTOM CELL:

- April 19, 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols.
- October 2002: John Allen Mohammed and John Lee Malvo carry out 13 deadly sniper attacks in the Washington DC area.
- April 20, 1999 shooting at Columbine High School by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold.

LONE WOLF:

- The eighteen year long bombing campaign against progress carried out by Theodore Kaczynski--the “Unabomber”.
- Serial bomber Eric Rudolph who carried out the 1996 bombing of the Olympic Village in Atlanta Georgia, and the 1998 abortion clinic in Alabama.

⁴ Bath School bombing: Bath Township Michigan. May 18, 1927: 45 people were killed and 58 injured in a series of bombings at the Bath Consolidated School. Perpetrator was Andrew Kehoe, a school board member upset about taxes to build the school. After murdering his wife he then detonated a massive bomb he had placed inside the school. As first responders worked at the scene Mr. Kehoe drove up and detonated another bomb he had inside of his own car killing himself, the school superintendent and others. Another 500lbs of explosives were discovered in the school put had failed to detonate.

- March 5, 2006: Mohammed Reza Taherizar, a student at UNC–Chapel Hill, who ran down at least nine other students in his SUV in because of “America’s continued insult to Muslims.”

Beam's suggested methodologies do have obvious weaknesses centered on sustainment. A lone actor must know exactly how to do what he wished to accomplish. He depends on their ability to put into practice what he has gleaned from the Internet or sympathetic newspapers, magazines and DVDs. And no matter how frightful the concept of the “phantom cell” may be, if a cell is to remain “phantom,” it must limit its operations to its own means. Still the fundamental impact of the Internet remains one of decentralization.

ISLAMIST SUCCESSES IN APPLYING THEORY TO INTERNET REALITY

Thus far, the Islamists have been the most effective with the implementation of “strength-in-dispersion” theory to carry out and coordinate attacks. The wide dispersion of their activities makes the coordination between various law enforcement agencies, let alone between nations, extremely difficult and assists the groups in avoiding detection.¹ At the individual level the very ideology of Islamic jihad combines a nihilistic character with a religious fervor, which appeals to a global audience. This duality makes Islamic extremism it far more unifying than themes of racial superiority or of social-economic models such as Communism. The nature of the movement meshes well with the dispersed but one nature

¹ Bombing attacks in Paris carried out by the Algerian based Armed Islamic Group (known by its French acronym GIA) in 1995 and whose operations depended on cells in England, Belgium and France; the 9/11 attack in which operations were dispersed between the U.S., Germany and Afghanistan; the Madrid train station bombing on March 11, 2004; the London subway and bus bombings on July 7 and 21, 2005.

of the Internet, offering an easy means to recruit, educate, and inspire fellow travelers along the jihadist path. In this regard, the NIE quoted as the opening to this article misses the point on jihadist strategy; like the Internet it does not have to be a logical, progressive plan for accomplishing an end state to successfully reach that end state.

A textbook example of this dispersion of an organization is the terror group Hamas. The organization has separated its political and military wings, its leadership is divided between Gaza and Syria, and much of its political planning and fund-raising efforts is carried out overseas, mostly in the U.S. in places like metro-Detroit and Chicago.² This allows Hamas to collect and analyze intelligence reports and conduct financial transactions in the safety of places such as Dearborn for the parent organization back in Gaza.

The methodology of Internet-based terrorism is becoming increasingly more difficult to track as terrorists exploit widely available and affordable commercial encryption technology worldwide to communicate covertly to fellow members.³ Terrorist and their facilitators who live outside of the Middle East have little difficulty in obtaining state-of-the-art technology like satellite telephones, discount disposable cell phones, and of course the Internet itself. Additionally, the lax immigration laws in much of the world has helped to ensure that such de-centralized command and control models used by Hamas and Al Qaeda can work and survive. All of this

² This trend is not new; the FARC has employed this technique for years with success by keeping its political leadership, Secretariat, based quite openly in sympathetic nations in South America and Europe.

³ The increased sophistication of terror groups to encrypt their communication on the Internet has led to the activity called, “Steganography” which means imbedding messages on a normal looking website. Only those holding the required code can decipher the messages placed in otherwise innocuous images or text messages.

has created a nightmare for governments to simultaneously protect their citizens from harm while protecting their privacy.

TERRORISTS WITHOUT BORDERS (OR LIMITS)

Terrorism, whether ideologically or religious based, is no longer limited by geographic borders. When terrorism was backed by states, namely the Soviet Union, there were limits on just how far groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy could or would go. Moscow was not going to sanction or supply any of their groups with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) because the risk far outweighed any perceived benefit. With the growth of Islamist terrorism—including groups backed by Iran—such rules no longer apply. Now the stated aim of the state sponsor is to literally destroy the U.S. and “wipe Israel off of the map.” No longer are targets strictly symbolic like the killing of Deutsche Bank chief Alfred Herrhausen by the Red Army Faction in Bad Homburg on November 30, 1989. Today the terrorist goes for the greatest number of casualties in any event as in the attacks on the World Trade Center bombing on September 11, 2001, the Beslan school massacre in southern Russia on September 1, 2004, and the bombing of the wedding party in Amman Jordan on November 9, 2005 have shown.

Islamist terror's ideology and worldwide presence make it the most dangerous for the moment. Islamist terror groups will continue to thrive in Muslim nations where such beliefs can find a ready audience and around the world as long as they can map out a cohesive strategic agenda “to wage jihad in order to reconstitute the Muslim community beyond the national

divides.”¹ Such a strategy can support the never-ending jihads on the periphery of the Muslim world such as Kashmir in India, the Philippines, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, East Timor, Indonesia, Sudan, and so forth. In this manner, Islamist terror can not only survive but also perpetuate itself. New causes and newer fronts inspire and enlist ever more fighters and auxiliaries, especially the more technically savvy and directionless.

The websites of Islamist groups are not recruiting villagers living along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border; rather they are recruiting the young aspiring jihadist militant who may have immigrated to find employment or education opportunities, speaks English, and is familiar with technology. The very by-products of the globalization (command of English and availability of technology, ease of travel and immigration, mainly in Western Europe and North America) have dramatically helped groups such as Al–Qaeda to operate with relative ease worldwide. All that is needed is access to the Internet and a desire to be taken in by, and to spread, the message of jihad. In the security and privacy of one's own home or dorm room, a potential terrorist can download all that will help inspire and prepare the viewer for waging jihad.

It is important that the public does not confuse groups such as the Taliban in Afghanistan or Muqtada al–Sadr's militia in Iraq with the far more sophisticated Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas terrorist groups or those individuals wishing to enter into the world of web-based terror. Those who rely on Internet-based terror to further their ends, such as Al–Qaeda, have smart, capable and extremely

¹ Olivier Roy, “Islam, Iran and the New Terrorism”, published in “[A Response to America and the New Terrorism: An exchange](#)”, p160, International Institute for Strategic Studies Vol. 42 No. 2, Summer 2000

dedicated members within their respected organization; in fact Al-Qaeda actually recruits university students, preferably graduates, to become its members, even those enrolled in programs sponsored by the National Security Agency.¹ This is why terrorist websites are extraordinarily more dangerous than they would be if the field of potential terrorists was restricted to just computer illiterates.

Obviously, those attracted to such extremist causes are discontented and frustrated with the world as they see it; terrorism today still resembles the terrorism of yesterday in that the rationales given and the use of violence to achieve their goals remain largely the same. But their conversion occurs with less risk of discovery than members of traditional terror groups who came up through the ranks of the student protest movement with accompanying police records. A member of an Internet terror group is less likely to have a criminal record. The difference now lies in the lack of any restraint, diffusion of the groups involved or the ability for law enforcement to identify, track and interdict the groups.

A DECREASED FUNDING TRAIL IN A DISPERSED CYBER BATTLEFIELD

Following the money trail has also become harder. Funding, if any is required, for the “phantom cell” can easily be provided by legitimate enterprises that can generate and launder large volumes of money like restaurants, party stores and laundromats; or from the proceeds of criminal enterprises such

as prostitution, black marketing, and identity theft. And in the case of the “lone wolf” or “phantom cell” the funding can simply come out of the pocket of the would-be terrorist; none of the operations carried out by Timothy McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski, and Rudolph or John Mohammed were particularly cost prohibitive. As long as an act, no matter how small, can be attributed to acting in concert with a much larger agenda or group than the act itself is magnified that much more and achieves the additional benefit of terror due to its seemingly randomness.

At the same time divergent actors achieve combined effects, those using the Internet benefit from the reality of a dispersed cyber battlefield, one with an ill defined, emerging status around the globe. In the U.S. legal responses to terrorist websites are extremely sensitive because what is posted on the Internet is considered protected speech under the First Amendment. And unless a law enforcement agency actively pursues an investigation they cannot save the material they find on the Internet. Meanwhile the terrorists using the Internet to operate globally are careful to use Internet service providers (ISP) outside the U.S. and thus not subject to our laws/jurisdiction. In some cases the ISPs have been hijacked without the owner even knowing.

For example, Hamas has a policy of placing its top-tier websites on ISPs that are not based in the U.S. Instead they use ISPs in countries such as Russia and Ukraine where they feel that the history of corruption and anti-Semitism makes it highly unlikely that their websites will ever be targeted.² Meanwhile their bottom-tier websites are provided by ISPs in America. This

¹ In January 2004, a federal grand jury charged Saudi national Sami Omar Hussayen, a doctoral candidate in computer science at the University of Idaho with conspiring to help terrorist organizations wage jihad by using the Internet to raise funds, recruit, and locate perspective U.S targets, both military and civilian, in the Middle East; and for creating websites and e-mail groups to disseminate messages from himself and two radical clerics in Saudi Arabia.

² According to Hamas, in October of 2004 the Russian government had ordered the shutdown of a server. However, a visit to the Hamas website indicates that the move may not have been permanent.

strategy is probably based on a risk assessment that the damage inflicted at any one server would not cease operations completely and should any one ISP be permanently shut down the impact would not be significant enough to hinder any of their long-term operations. In any case, American privacy laws and protection of free speech limit monitoring and counteraction options against such sites. One of the appeals of Internet-based terror is that the user is always on the lookout for other ISPs in different locations, and with cash in hand Hamas, and others, will likely find businesses that will work with them.¹ This might explain why terrorists use the Internet far more than they attack it. While groups may post sites, message boards or chat rooms that glorify a wide assortment of views, no matter how repugnant, as long as they do not specifically engage in any criminal acts, they can continue unimpeded.

THE FUTURE

Our enemies--and there are many--are very imaginative, hard working, cunning and unscrupulous. And regardless of the cause they espouse they are only loyal to their kind and their only true objective is to have the world fit to their view – regardless of the cost. The threat will continue to morph as they adapt to new technologies, laws and procedures. The Internet is an emergent technology in the current struggle. Like the radio or the airplane, each side in this struggle will seek to use the Internet to its advantage even as it limits its opponent's use of the medium. Such struggles are cyclic; we must anticipate change if we are to get ahead of our enemies' adaptations. The only question is will we be able to keep pace?

¹ Hamas has diversified even further and expanded their ISP support to countries such as Malaysia and Singapore to help in protecting their sites from cyber attack. They are also looking at basing them in predominately Muslim nations where they feel secure in being tolerated.

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Iraqi police officers talk on the radio at the Al-Taji Police Station, April 17, 2006. Soldiers of the 463rd Military Police Company at Camp Liberty, Iraq, trained the Iraqi officers and make daily checks to ensure they are providing the best service to the Iraqi people. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Kevin L. Moses Sr.

VIRAL TARGETING OF THE IED SOCIAL NETWORK SYSTEM

By Scott Swanson

Extremist groups, insurgents, and resistance elements continue to use Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to attack coalition forces to thwart “infidel Crusaders” occupation activities and assault rival sectarian factions. The effective and low-cost IED weapon in Iraq hides as a tool created within an elusive social network system and its use will persist in opportunistic attacks if the status quo does not shift. This IED system⁸⁷ further devastates Iraq with evolving ambush accuracy and component sophistication, creates supply-chain income opportunities within the community, and beckons the youth who require a social-psychological outlet. Regrettably, IEDs will continue to be a weapon to channel the three “Rs” attributed to insurgencies: resentment, resistance, and revenge, unless social improvements can be rapidly implemented or the supporting networks can be debilitated.

Cutting off the regenerative hydra-heads of disparate insurgent networks is nearly impossible. Excessive direct action without timely intelligence runs the risk of civil infringements and insurgent propaganda opportunities. Capture and kill counter-IED solutions being used today have significant counter-effects of alienating and angering many Iraqis. The perceived social infractions create more discontent within the Iraqi

communities and increases resistance participation.

Special Forces have typically been attuned to the delicate interaction and trust building required between vying sects, tribes, factions, and families. Exchanges taking place between the SF teams and locals enhance intelligence collection and counterinsurgency (COIN) operational success in combat sign-tracking, targeting, combined/joint constabularies, and advisory activities. Such achievements replicated in multiples can destroy and disrupt insurgency groups with subsequent effects on the IED social network. The task of reducing negative “big military” battlefield effects and population flashpoints while minimizing contradictions to civil affairs and psychological themes adds to an already full plate. As SOF juggles shifting priorities with limited resources the insurgency grows and so does the IED threat.

Commanders and supporting intelligence resources involved in counter-IED activities require a deep understanding of the IED system’s social components to improve targeting and reduce time constraints in social network analysis. Unfortunately, quality intelligence on the IED network is often not available to meet operator requirements. Gaps in this intelligence make it difficult to examine the IED system’s vulnerability to attack, target criticality, downtime and destructive effects,

⁸⁷ The IED “System” refers to the overall compilation and interaction taking place to create the IED. This entails a human system that finances, recruits, indoctrinates/trains, safeguards, emplaces, and detonates. It also includes the device system which procures/assembles, moves the device to the human or location, and eventually the OBJ/TGT.

What is the most effective role for SF with regard to IEDs and the IED system?



Table: Poll conducted within ARSOFU Irregular Warfare forum February, 2007

and operational requirements (CARVER⁸⁸). The consequential result from light intelligence content is to engage more ad hoc targets. Statistics have shown, however, that neutralizing individuals with *rare skills* is 60% more effective than eliminating insurgents at random.⁸⁹ The trick then is to improve targeting around rare skills found deep within an impenetrable social network without adequate intelligence.

An augmentation to current counter-IED network activities is the application of Social Network Viral Targeting. Viral targeting is part of the “defeat mechanism” in the evolution of Operational Intelligence as it disrupts the human element around rare and valuable skills of insurgent groups with minimal civil impacts. The targeting method is potentially one of the most effective roles for SF action towards the IED system.

⁸⁸ USAF uses a fairly good model that consists of 2 components: Criticality (Value, Depth, Recuperation & Capacity); Vulnerability (Cushion, Reserve, Dispersion, Mobility, Countermeasures & Physical Characteristics), Ref JP 2-01.1.

⁸⁹ Kai Stinchcombe, How Can Governments Disrupt Terrorist Social Networks? Draft 10/16/04
http://www.stanford.edu/~kstinch/academic/stinchcombe_terror_networks.pdf

BACKGROUND

IEDs are often classified as Static IEDs, Vehicle Borne IEDs VBIEDs, Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (SVBIED), and Person Borne IEDs (PBIED). Simply “IED” will be used in this writing unless specifics are required for differentiation. The IED System is generally broken down by categories of: Information, Money, Personnel, Material, and Targets with a counter-engagement model split between *Attacking the IED Network* and *Defeating the IED Device*. The social network component most pertinent to special operations is focused on *Attacking the IED Network* through the various IED system stages, which is the foundation of this assessment.

The term “network” is used because of the unstructured relational activities correlating to an action’s nature that have some common characteristics and can be analyzed collectively. The IED network is not necessarily a formal organization. It similarly refers to the complex bodies of loose overlapping social partnerships that one would tap in order to facilitate IED core and supporting tasks. This process allows

repeatable missions to be accomplished successfully through procurement channels.


IED SOCIAL NETWORK

The present IED social network tends to be comprised of very fluid, linear decentralized structures with a number of recurring roles. This structure is unlike other “traditional” insurgent groups that follow centralized hierarchical organization models. Most emerging networks are inter-laced outside of core cells. Core cells are generally comprised of between 5–10 members. Some have been found to be as small as 3–4, but they are much less effective. Affiliated around and within the IED is a system involving roles of financier,

bomb-construction engineers, device emplacement and concealment, and detonating triggerman/bomber. Those roles also have connecting nodes in supporting roles.

Modular duties within the core IED roles can be over-arching and can involve others acting along the IED supply chain system for:

- information (target scouting, intelligence, intercept, lookouts, and lo exploitation after the event);
- recruiting;
- hardware components and explosive compound acquisition;
- social-network facilitation for procurement, logistics, and freedom of movement;



- bomb-making (explosives, initiators, complex assembly, and camouflage);
- emplacement

Vast numbers of today's hot-spots have adversarial groups operating in similar small autonomous adaptive cells that are independently orchestrated with no central authority and limited connection points. These covert networks don't behave like normal social networks. Underground members don't form many ties outside of their immediate cluster and often minimize the activation of existing ties inside the network. Strong connections between prior contacts, which were frequently formed years ago in school, neighborhoods, mosques, and training camps, keep the cells linked. Unlike normal social networks these bonds remain mostly dormant and therefore hidden to outsiders. This also allows cells to go detached ways and makes them nearly impossible to infiltrate with outsiders.⁹⁰ The cloaking also allows some cells to be created around deceitful criminal objectives where greedy and corrupt individuals may pretend to have religiously inspired drives in order to recruit others motivated by honor and quests to regain their dignity.

IRAQ'S IED NETWORK

The IED system in Iraq further complicates matters by expanding citizen involvement in both active and passive roles but is less insular than other terrorist cells. Military operations accordingly have to prepare themselves mentally and procedurally on the appropriateness of directly engaging the women and children participating in the IED

system. Also at hand are the innocent civilians being coerced into activities under the duress of insurgents, and the one-off IED events perpetrated by an offended Iraqi who needs to address a perceived honor infraction.

The number of highly skilled bomb makers making the most complex IEDs (large, difficult to locate, high-tech detonation) are relatively small due to the military (-like) training or engineering skills required. Many of these small and highly skilled IED teams can operate as a freelance unit hired out to other insurgent groups. Some of these IED teams have posted their contract for hire services through the internet with video footage of past acts serving as promotion and bona fides. Tracking these IED makers and discovering their caches and workshops is a high priority of coalition planning.

Clandestine groups complicate identification by remaining very fluid in their village movements and local interaction with an emphasis on operational and common goal cohesion. Numerous cells and factions share information, techniques, materials, personnel, etc. as appropriate with no formal or ongoing relationship necessary. Offshoots of these groups or aspiring individuals fall into about 100+ mid-tier expertise IED cells and insurgent networks. Of the almost 3,000 IED events reported each month, most unfold around a basic formula for assembly and emplacement within such mid-tier groups.

Skill sets can come very close to the highly-skilled IED makers since this mid-tier element is adept at exploiting internet PC based training. Other groups are taking advantage of procuring ready-to-assemble kits from suppliers or sponsors. The evolution of adeptness in developing advanced IED

⁹⁰ Valdis E. Krebs, Uncloaking Terrorist Networks. Source Online: http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue7_4/krebs/#author#author

capabilities outpaces all historic resistance activities to date (Ulster, South Lebanon, Chechnya, Gaza, etc.).

Many of these groups commingle in factions of 5–10 to share both intelligence and tactics. Leadership is comprised of many former Iraqi military colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors. The former military cadre provides additional technical skills, small unit tactics, social networks, and access to money/resources. While most cells work in their own regions, at times cells under some higher command or affiliation can be dispatched by cell commanders or lieutenants to other locations to blur intelligence identification attempts. Other times cells may be dispatched to augment another cell for a larger coordinated attack.

At the bottom level is an increasingly threatening IED-capable group comprised of low-skill bomb makers and untrained willing participants in the form of gang structures or grieving locals. The Iraqi youth at the ages between 12–16 years are escalating in active insurgency participation and peripheral criminal activity. Some data suggest this latest generation of revolutionary actors is more violent than its predecessor. Incoherent gangs with members older than 18 years of age (avg. 18–25) have progressively transformed into Shia and Sunni militia armies as sectarian violence and revenge killings escalate. Older-teens' previous roles in disjointed gangs have now been filled with younger children who are victims of growing trends of displacement and migration of Iraqis. Three wars and twelve years of economic sanctions have also created traumatic experiences and subsequently

emotional problems exacerbating the volatility within this growing pool of insurgents.⁹¹

Police and military networks, house searches and raids, arrests of innocent people and of suspects, shutting off streets, forced hajib removal, touching of women, sectarian warring, and other persistent social issues makes Iraqi life virtually unbearable. Children see homes demolished, beatings and humiliation of their fathers, killings, and other traumatic events. The resulting consequences are high levels of anxiety, depression, paranoid symptoms, and hyper arousal. Outlets are violent and criminal activity.⁹² Many young boys congregate with friends outside of their overcrowded dwellings and are progressively more vulnerable to the appeals of militias or insurgent group recruitment. These kids release their frustrations, humiliation, and resentment through increased tribal, Islamic, and Arab identity outlets pushed by the local factions, militia, and units, while directing the actions against US forces and religious or sect rivalries. Great internal self-worth and an instilled sense of appreciation or belonging is created for the

⁹¹ Reference based on a proposal submitted by Dr. Ali Hameed Rasheed, to the Ministry of Health in Baghdad to create a psycho-social mental health referral system for children in Iraq. Documentation coincides with many other sources on the topic of PTSD in the Middle East.

⁹² Youth Issues and Traumatic Behavior has been referenced in numerous articles, some of which were written by Jonathan Powers, a former U.S. Army captain who served in Iraq in 2003, who now works with kids there. Other references were made in Newsweek, *The Next Jihadists*, January 22, 2007. These observations follow many similar studies on Palestinian children written by Samir Qouta, Raija-Leena Punamaki, Eyad El-Sarraj, and Derek Summerfield. In 2006, a study by Iraqi psychiatrists, sponsored by the World Health Organization, found 30% of children surveyed to be suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. Of those also surveyed, almost 50% had been exposed to a major traumatic event. In another study by the Association of Psychologists of Iraq, 92% of kids surveyed showed signs of learning impediments. It is estimated that only 30% of the 3.5 million Iraqi elementary-age kids are attending school now, down from 75% last year.

youth by being taken in and offered the opportunity to dig an IED hole or keep watch from atop a village dwelling.

Lack of violence accountability and impunity increases children's participation and creates a surplus of those willing to participate in insurgency activities. The core members at this age are very irritable, distrustful of others, and have a willingness to die due to extreme feelings of situational hopelessness. The result is more competition to engage in insurgent activities and shifts the IED system's financial backdrop due to a surplus of volunteers in the supply chain.

FINANCIAL RESOURCES

The IED financial support landscape has changed quite dramatically over the past few years. Whereas the IED system staging had started with a financier initiating activity at arms length, now groups are becoming more self-funding. Others are becoming more profit centric over being ideologically driven but they still can leverage those who do have strong ideological interests from politics to religion (not that the two are very separate in the Middle East). This means that any number of combinations from Bekka Valley, ex-Mukhabarat (M-21 directorate and Spec Ops M-14) Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, etc. can lend a degree of expertise in the IED. More sophisticated Persian anti-tank mines triggered using photoflash and infrared initiating systems as well as explosively formed penetrators (EFP) appeared in the Iraqi theatre in 2005 and have been used with increasing effectiveness.⁹³

⁹³ Fourteen U.S. soldiers were killed recently in their armored vehicle by new shaped-charge Improvised Explosive Devices appearing in the insurgent theatre of operations. John Ward Anderson, "Bigger, Stronger Homemade Bombs Now to Blame for Half of U.S. Deaths." *The Washington Post* 26 October

Groups, especially those linked to the former regime elements, have enough sources of money to sustain violence for a great period of time. Some have fled to neighboring countries to build greater financial bases in support of insurgency. National charities, private donors, mosques, 'Zakat' alms, and governmental organizations around the region are also contributors to insurgent groups. Much of this money does not actually go into the low-cost IED as much as it contributes to the strengthening and power of influence from a group with the means to travel, bribe (officials, clans, families), and personally reap the acquired assets.

Towards the beginning of the Iraq conflict a participant planting an IED could yield the equivalent rate of \$1,000. Another \$1,000 could be earned for killing an American.⁹⁴ Martyr benefits were provided to the surviving family such that some rewards and sense of appeal drove foreigners to fight in Iraq.

Within a matter of a few years trends saw a decline to \$300 for emplacement with a \$700 bonus for a successful targeting. Today families' incomes are being sustained from rates of \$20-50 to set bombs, around \$35 for bomb couriers, and former suicide bonuses to martyrs' families have also dropped significantly. Artillery rounds (a 152mm. round can sell for \$75-250 and an old Soviet surface-to-air missile can sell for \$1,000) and other explosive compounds have risen in prices now that demand has increased with added

2005. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/25/AR2005102501987.html>

⁹⁴ Newsweek, p. 32. January 22, 2007; similar references made in Global Guerrillas "The IED Marketplace in Iraq" and same article written by Greg Grant, Defense News, August 3, 2005; Bomb Squad discussions; Defense Technology International, *Behind the Bomb Makers*, January/February 2006; www.iraqslogger.com; and other black market reports/sources.

participants including those ideologically driven and those who must earn wages to support a family (many head of household bread winners have been killed). Others are still willing to act as insurgency supporter or insurgent with no pay, either out of fear or sense of duty.

Black market visas for families to leave Iraq have increased from \$1,500 to reports of over \$15,000, which means meager salaries will require supplemental incomes. Other costs that have surged are arms such as AK-47s selling for around \$100 to over \$300 now. Glock 19 9mm pistols have also risen in prices. Those with social ties to weapons or direct access to arms find the business of insurgency the only viable economy. Some blame is in part on the U.S. with regard to an introduction of U.S. dollars into the Iraqi marketplace without a pre-determined exchange rate. Results are increased black market opportunities and inflation. This also complicates estimates on IED price supply and demand considerations. One thing is clear, however: there is an overabundance of explosive remnants of war (ERW), in the form of abandoned, scattered, or stolen ammunition stocks that can provide materiel for IEDs for the indefinite future in Iraq at current rates of usage. Military grade explosives are also readily available in neighboring countries. The ingredients for home-made explosives (HME) are also abundant in Iraq.

These figures have a great impact on operational targeting and security planning. Insurgent fundraising will increase around the less commoditized items in the IED system such as higher caliber talent, more complex triggering and detonation mechanisms (to counter procedures and IED-jammer devices), VBIEDs, etc.

The fundraising around this area will be tied to increased kidnapping, extortion, black market activities, white collar resources (who are largely driven to fund based on ideology), neighboring state actors through surrogates such as former/current government and military officials (often driven by ideology and money), fundamental Islamic groups, tribe and clan chiefs (often driven by power plays, honor, and self-interest), and gang activity (in some Iraqi neighborhoods money is cleaned through selling cars and some teens in neighborhoods may have three to five cars).

Insurgent money-schemes will evolve in short time from predatory operations to parasitical ones that yield a steadier, more dependable form of income⁹⁵ and combine more territory taxation as a military movement. This segment will operate according to clan and tribe and drive more of the black market activities as a formal economy⁹⁶, and begin to influence the “white collar”, military/law enforcement, political administration more and more (estimates cite official corruption costs Iraq \$5–7 billion per year). This will further stress the Iraqi infrastructure.

Money that had gone to recruitment resources will dwindle in some areas of low-complexity IED participation, but this is where extremist recruitment will capitalize on the ideologically motivated volunteers. Lines of the innocent become further blurred for operators

⁹⁵ This follows typical escalation of black market operations of guerrilla organizations. Observations from Iraq mirror many of the published works of R.T. Naylor’s research of insurgent economies.

⁹⁶ Experts estimate that 150,000-500,000 barrels of oil may be stolen per day due to the black market. Sources published and Iraq Study Group Report illustrate the Iraqi political leaders tendencies to pursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests, and that corruption is more responsible than insurgents for sector breakdowns. Many U.S. trained Iraqi Freedom Forces used their station to extort their fellow Iraqi citizens for money.

as insurgent activity is increased by decreasing ages and gender engagement expands to more females in support activity. Females primarily volunteer based on for vengeance, especially if their children have been killed. Increased friendly-fire casualties inflicted on citizens are the more significant insurgency growth levers. Device sophistication is increasing based on lessons learned and experience, but also based on the fact that erudition must evolve to yield higher dollars for those driven by financial motives.

When the supply of IED “gangs” is increasing martyr pay goes down for suicide activities, and increased sectarian conflicts cause an increase in amateur status cells with increasing mistakes and faulty detonation results. A number of side-effects also come with reduced quality cells since disharmony among Arabs creates more disorganization and disputes for greater fundamentalist movements. This will cause such movements to become a bit more vocal and visible to attract followers, greater internal/external support, and re-instill a wider Islamic movement.

The effectiveness of most IEDs will be reduced further but security resources will be tested due to greater instances distracting the focus from more complex cells.⁹⁷ On the other hand, when an IED is successful it will likely be of higher sophistication and casualty-causing capabilities for maximum political impact. Special Operations can get caught in the middle of these shifts. Targeting plans should not veer to the ad hoc chases driven by increased low-complexity IEDs that are situational honor-based and opportunity events. Selected targets remain higher value than most prospect


⁹⁷The basic response by adversaries has been to increase the number of IEDs at the risk of quality and complexity. This creates a quality all of its own.

targets. The smaller tasks are great real case training opportunities for Iraqi investigators and special police to demonstrate learned TTP.

PHYSICAL RESOURCES

The amount of weapons and ammunition available in Iraq is astonishing. Most households have a weapon, many with AK-47 automatic weapons. Arms dealers find great profit in selling military small arms and mortars within villages, and weapons bazaars can open in a roadside stand within minutes. Such weapons are also found in caches throughout the areas in orchards, canals, and gravesites. Where weapons are not at the ready, manufacturing and reverse-engineering is also a commonplace.

Most insurgents have learned that all they need to create a bomb is a fuel and oxidizer that can be combined chemically and detonated with a conflagration of between 9,000 and 27,500 feet per second. Many are professionals or semi-professional scientists, engineers, architects, and civil engineers. Other expertise has come from sources such as the Republican Guard, Special Guard, Hezbollah, Iranian Intelligence, and the internet. Unexploded or stockpiled ordnance (60mm or 81mm mortar rounds and 155mm shell), black powder, smokeless powder, ammonium nitrate (and ammonium nitrate chemical mixtures such as aluminum powder, fuel oil, sugars, etc.), dynamite, C4, Semtex, PETN, and nitroglycerin tend to be fairly obtainable and common. However, each explosive compound will be procured from a different supply chain, have greater cost disparity, and require an engineer or bomb-maker at differing skill levels. Most of these can be mapped together in a social network analysis knowledge exploitation (SNAKE) model for the area or less detailed



Terrorist System of Systems since rapid construction typically warrants a maker to utilize similar methods.

Device detonation equipment will also have a logical coupling and affiliated expertise. Cells shift their use of triggers. This is in part to availability but also by preferences and new innovations. Some cells will be forced to use any available black market remote controlled sending and receiving units while others will use command hard wire devices. MO should not be confused with shifts in the black market supplies. Only good HUMINT, SIGINT, or MASINT can detect some of the indicators around such shifts. Victim operated against people and pressure or timed detonated against static targets will also have slightly differing cells and network links based on

ideology and motivation. Other cells that desire the employment of more unconventional weapons, such as 82-mm chemical (TD-42 liquid) mortars, require different supply channels and expertise to execute their missions. Toxic Industrial Chemicals are available in large quantities throughout Iraq and pose to be another easily obtainable weapon.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Insurgency participation in Iraq has three strong foundations: religious ideology (and convictions), money, and social factors (nationalism, pan-Arabism, honor, debt, threats). Iraq also appears to have a number of different types of insurgencies: a resistance movement, revolutionary strategy, civil

sectarian strife, and a conflict between external state actors. The motivations behind each struggle differ in purpose, scope, and objective from one faction to another.

The Iraq Study Group Report cites, “Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency. The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial threat to immediate and long-term stability. These militias are diverse. Some are affiliated with the government, some are highly localized, and some are wholly outside the law. They are fragmenting, with an increasing breakdown in command structure.”

Short term differences in ideology can be overcome by some cell nodes with a united/common goal and opportunity for many to profit. Such was a case outside of Iraq in the 1980s as US black gangsters built ties in prison with US-Mexican gang members with close connection to Colombian drug dealers. Each group would not willingly collaborate but individuals could act as interface points to other groups without a visible alliance. This created a dual drug conduit supply chain that also included previous black gang relationships with the Mafia. Tweaks here and there based on gang locations, willing participants, and law enforcement dictated what would be sold as cocaine and/or crack. Before economies of scale were created to involve more people in this drug selling process and open the supply chain through social networking, it was nearly impossible to earn a living in a street gang.⁹⁸

⁹⁸Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything*, Harper Collins, 2005, pgs. 109-112.

The roles of bomb placer, triggerman, scouts, and bomb engineers typically fall into the category of financial interests albeit rationalized in ideology to drive the US out or to attack a rival faction. In the cases of VBIEDs most attacks are against rival sect civilian targets and not the US.

Triggermen have been found to have some criminal backgrounds and military training, which is also true of the placer. Digging, scouting, targeting can be done individually or in teams with an experienced individual and a couple youth or unseasoned activist. Many Iraqi's who wish to be involved only moderately can act within a cell's surveillance team as a spotter or security element communicating through hand signals or cell phones and taking the cover of a market browser, taxi driver, worker, or child at play.

Those who subscribe from an ideological perspective and have been recruited for suicide missions are typically hand picked with some attribution to the mosque. In younger circles, often the subject of dying for Allah is mentioned with a group and reactions are monitored. Those who are most interested in discussing matters further are singled out. In most of cases of attracting street resources, it is a male ranging in age from 12-18 but certainly the target range can stretch through 30 years of age and higher.⁹⁹ The small batches of foreigners coming to Iraq are from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, North Africa, Jordan,

⁹⁹ The trend for younger participants is not exclusive to Iraq. Most data on those in the ranges of 12-18 comes from research on Palestine. Applicability is based on mirroring of circumstances and post traumatic stress disorder coupled with unemployment, daily violence occurrences, and the overall bleakness of life. Christian Science Monitor published an article to this point on 5 March, 2004 “As life looks bleaker, suicide bombers get younger.” Also published was a statement in Al Wasat 29 March 2004 that 25% of Palestinian boys ages 12-17 wanted to become suicide bombers.

Yemen, and Syria. Upon arrival they head to mosques as an external resource where they can be linked to local resistance cells. Local mosques and sheiks in a village area can support between 10–20 insurgents– foreign or local.

Iraqi men who have lost their immediate family members, young impressionable distressed Iraqis, and foreigners are easy prey for self-destructive IED attacks. These individuals can be described as "Fence-sitters"; they are easily influenced to join if properly motivated and are used as fodder by fedayeen. Initially they come already sympathetic to insurgent cause, which makes them susceptible for recruitment into most any organization.¹⁰⁰ While they may have disparate and divergent ideologies; however, they do have common short term goals with those of the insurgent groups.

The call to jihad (usually referring to military exertion against non-Muslim combatants) can initially be presented in the broader usage and interpretation of striving to live a moral and virtuous life. Those more committed to the spreading and defending Islam, and to fighting injustice and oppression are recruited to make an impression "against the rejecters of truth after it has become evident to them." Qur'an verses drive the messages in calls to arms against seemingly overwhelming odds and that turning the back to a battlefield in fear or apathy can bring about the wrath of God:

"Prophet! Rouse the believers to wage war. If there are twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will subdue two hundred: if a hundred, they will

subdue a thousand of the disbelievers: for these are a people without understanding...—Qur'an, 8:65

And fight in the way of Allah with those who fight against you...drive them out [of the place] from which they drove you out and [remember] persecution is worse than carnage...if they attack you, put them to the sword. —Qur'an, 2:190–194

"O you who believe! When you meet those who disbelieve marching for war, then turn not your backs to them. And whoever shall turn his back to them on that day-- unless he turn aside for the sake of fighting or withdraws to a company-- then he, indeed, becomes deserving of Allah's wrath, and his abode is hell; and an evil destination shall it be. —Qur'an, 8:15–16

'Our Lord! Rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors, and raise for us from You one who will protect, and raise for us from You one who will help. —Qur'an, 4:75–76

SOCIAL NETWORK VIRUS DESIGN

In a report "How Big is the Iraqi Insurgency?" by John Robb of Global Guerrillas, estimates of the insurgency were calculated to be comprised of about 150,000 active participants with a worst case estimate around 300,000. Breaking down the individual cells with such a large sample and potentially non-calculated passive participants is nearly impossible with already constrained resources, yet by considering the afore mentioned roles, individuals or groups with the following characteristics can actually be identified:¹⁰¹

1. An individual or group where removal would alter the network significantly; e.g., by making it less able to adapt, by

¹⁰⁰ Recruiters and indoctrination agents capitalize on existing psycho-social factors to develop a 'doctrine of necessity'. The factors are: Diagnostic Argument (what's wrong w/status quo, list grievances) and the Prognostic Argument (the solution is only possible thru violence).

¹⁰¹ Destabilizing Networks, Kathleen M. Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, David Krackhardt, Carnegie Mellon University, November 2001. <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/complexity/papers/connections4.pdf>

- reducing performance, or by inhibiting the flow of information.
2. An individual or group that is unlikely to act even if given alternative information.
 3. An individual or group that if given new information can propagate it rapidly.
 4. An individual or group that has relatively more power and can be a possible source of trouble, potential dissidents, or potential innovators.
 5. An individual or group where movement to a competing group or organization would ensure that the competing unit would learn all the core or critical information in the original group or organization (inevitable disclosure).

All of these information factors are obtainable by SF elements that interact with family head sheiks (bloodline and emplaced), citizens, market vendors, imam religious leaders, political leaders, militia, Iraqi military, and local law enforcement. The IED factor is simply a tool used by the groups or a common thread to other groups. Access to specific skills within the IED system creates value within the network and when access to that skill is disrupted, they must identify a new restorative tie or learn the skill. Exposure is and the risk of detection is created by reaching outward into the network.¹⁰²

To disrupt the patterns the next step is to collect intel around:¹⁰³

1. The basic components that account for the networks structure; e.g., the number and types of sub-groups, or the number of triads, stars, and the extent of reciprocity.
2. The central tendency within a set of networks, and the networks that are anomalous when contrasted with the other networks in the set.
3. Critical differences between two or more sets of networks.
4. Which components in the network are structured significantly differently from the rest of the overall network?
5. How do cells contribute or control behavior, emotion, or attitudes of individual members?
6. What makes some groups hostile to one another and others neutral or civil?
7. Whether the existing network is coherent; i.e., what is the likelihood that there are key missing nodes or relations.

At a minimum create a matrix around Actors, Knowledge, and Tasks. All segments will cross-relate as Actors are contrived of the individuals who are a part of the varying social networks. The Actors are affiliated with specific Knowledge and information available on the networks and elements of the Tasks. Knowledge and Actors also fit into Tasks based on assignment, needs, and task-precedence. Since it is virtually impossible to penetrate these segments, specific social viruses can be sewn in the form of sabotage, distrust, persuasion, impersonation, ingratiation, and conformity. Operations may be conducted in the form of Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, black or overt SOF, and IO. Cornerstone is SOF HUMINT and moderate asset running. The virus works against group affiliations and is constructed with actors' social culture in mind.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Kai Stinchcombe, Ibid.

¹⁰³ Destabilizing Networks, Ibid.

¹⁰⁴RAND has also done work in this area through Future Insurgency Threats. A comparable theory is called 'Network-Oriented Subversion'. RAND also calls for another complementary component called 'Network-Oriented UW'.

Targeting the subjects' issues around inferiority, identity, role confusions, etc. should be pressed to mark the mean age range of insurgency participation for maximum virus uptake. Most of the virus frontline recipients will create a defensive behavior since the individuals will perceive or anticipate a threat. Energy and resources will be spent by the recipient in defensive posturing to mitigate attack, reposition one's self, escape punishment, and win dominance.¹⁰⁵ During this period defensive recipients will also distort the messages they are receiving and warp communications. Such distortions will create social disturbance between groups and impact talent procurement, status, power, and trustworthiness. In this situation the distortions will also play to symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and should include social cultural factors to enhance uptake results.

Most virus details will require action on a psychological and physical level but are inappropriate to share in this medium. The concept is simply based on illicit organization entrance, fraud, deceptive network intrusion, mistruths, and scheme disruption forced on the weakest link of a cell and social network. The system is similar in theory to an AnnaKournikova.jpg.vbs email propagation computer worm although it runs through humans and coincides with activities similar to that of the British Joint Support Group (JSG) or Force Research Unit (FRU). The misinformation or covertly orchestrated event is pushed by the cell members to other cell members, cells,

¹⁰⁵ Matthew S. Shane, Jordan B. Peterson (2004) Defensive Copers Show a Deficit in Passive Avoidance Learning on Newman's go/No-Go Task: Implications for Self-Deception and Socialization, *Journal of Personality* 72 (5), 939-966. Additional research in this area is found in: Ego Defense Mechanisms: The Unconscious Art of Verbal Defense; works on brainwashing; and problems with psychoanalytic techniques.

family, and social contacts along the IED supply chain. The push of perceptions and rumor is what carries the "virus" in a lytic cycle created by a contrived solution that directly correlates to the target and damages or ostracizes the group from within. While it damages individuals' credibility and trust, it also decelerates the flow of knowledge and information, creates some bottlenecks, and reduces innovation.

The family structure in a situation like Iraq makes the viral spread and absorption activity work so well. When one asks how many relatives an Iraqi has in a hundred mile radius, the answer is likely to be multiple hundreds of individuals considered to be family. Within the reach of these families are also blood feuds that are very much alive in Iraq where old scores are settled by informing on adversaries. Confused group identity through an unstable system shift naturally increases friction flash-points.

Qabilah = large tribe (500,000)
Ashirah = major tribe
Fakhdh = clan
Fundah = a branch of a clan
Khams = five-generation group
Hammulah = several households
Bayt = household

Also at hand are significantly differing ideologies that are currently cohesive based on a centralized threat of the US occupation. Each of the many groups in Iraq remain in distrust of the other and most have plans of attacking

even more opposing factions when the US is no longer a significant presence. One ex-military insurgent was reported as stating, “One day when there are no more Americans, I will kill the mujahedin.” Of the main armed groups, al Qaeda’s Organization in Mesopotamia is most closely associated with Islamic extremism. The Islamic Army in Iraq is more opposing with a nationalist outlook.¹⁰⁶ Both sides can be exploited based on power interests and all sides, while decentralized, rely almost exclusively on technology to fuel their network behavior. Other Sunni and Shia groups can be affected in a similar manner. The social virus spread through pervasive technology can be leveraged to refuel old blood feuds calling upon old codes of honor that still prevail. Protection and collaboration will recede to the family, clan, and tribe. Strategic and operation level employments of Civil Affairs and PSYOPS forces are well placed to disseminate the viruses in another avenue of social approach.

Similar techniques are used within the US prison system when convict gangs display increased coordination and collaboration. Guards can orchestrate rifts to create wedges in the unity by segmenting out activities of collaboration such as protection, smuggling, gambling, drugs, and shake-downs. Any spontaneous or engineered event can be used as a precipitating force. By instilling distrust and fingering one another word spreads and each group goes back to more insular activities until time has passed to attempt another consolidated effort. Even then, due to the frail levels of trust, each transaction, deal, or favor, is only as good as the perceived short-term benefits. Word travels fast to cease operations

and unity. Understand that in this example the environmental factors can be manipulated at a large scale while Iraq is limited to specific places of influence for finite periods of time. Therefore messaging for viral attacks has to be compelling enough for the network to push communications fast and with decisive measures.

Most insurgent groups in Iraq follow other national Islamic Extremist Elements patterns of internet use as a primary means of communication. Experts are found with a number of other horizontal skills such as mass e-mailing, chat rooms, video, computer security, etc. Many groups publish daily bulletins, either on their web sites or through mass emailing. Citizens are also affixed to mass communication and rumor spread by pervasive mobile telephone use. Any big news event travels quickly by word of mouth through Baghdad, aided by the enormous proliferation of cell phones with text messaging, making it easy to start misperceptions within the insurgent community. This is the weakness of a social network that holds cells together vertically. In a hierarchical structure, leadership would be more effective in quashing rumor or speculations and rooting out the root of virus in an efficient manner that would keep the organization from seizing. In a network, nodes are abruptly cut off taking weeks if not months to reestablish communication and transaction flows. Those with formal networks established with over 50 members are most vulnerable to disruption.

A great opportunity to negotiate with area and village leaders, sheikhs and amirs occurs during these gaps and confusion. The key is to hold them accountable through honor, shifting identity awareness, plus a stake in the outcome so they are motivated to exercise influence over

¹⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, “In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency,” Middle East Report, 50 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2006), 1-3.

locals to volunteer for local law enforcement or military roles. Locals at the lower class level who are usually distrustful of their own upper class local leaders will see value in such proposals that protect their families. Military and police recruitment enables militia members to protect their families and offers income, but now in the capacity of law enforcement former insurgents can hunt down “traitors” or “criminals” that were formerly part of a connected social network.

Iraqis may be more willing to risk disclosing locations of known insurgents if they believe in missions that are cloaked as Iraqi security improvements and not US operations. Those remaining in the cells and networks will know that their methods and whereabouts are common knowledge. They have little choice but to either also join law enforcement or move to a different area, only to be flushed out by those locals. Successes have been viewed in this vein with the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force, (ICTF) where this new group provides the sense of honor and belonging, “My family is the ICTF,” one ICTF captain has said. “Let me tell you something. If you ask one of these men what his religion is, he will tell you – ‘I am not Sunni, I am not Shia (Shiite), I am not Kurd. I am ICTF.’”

CONCLUSION

Iraqi faction unity has changed greatly in the last few years converging resources towards a common goal – Death to US troops. A recurring theme that has also endured but simultaneously escalated during this time is the hatred fostered between sectarian factions. The loss of power and enhanced paranoia of the Sunni and the increase of power and frustration by the Shia unites some activities against both the coalition and one another. In

this capacity the IED has been a successful facilitator through vertical social networks and loosely linked insurgent cells to keep the country in chaos. Sunnis and Shi'ites struggle to achieve or regain supremacy for political domination. Power quests and violence continue based on perceived social, political and economic inequality, imposed by repression and prejudice. This hatred is not mainly about religion. Iraq's civil conflict reverberates to other parts of the Middle East, fueling existing tensions between Sunnis and Shi'ites and rekindling long-dormant ones. In time, the conflict will transcend Iraq's boundaries and so too will the IED networks.

Raids and leader assassinations will not stop the network from existing and growing so another solution is required to destroy the cells and system from within. Special Forces have the unilateral operations experience that can leverage regional expertise and language capabilities which will reduce population alienation and limit resistance groups' propaganda ammunition; they are able to target the insurgent infrastructure and ideally enhance local security.¹⁰⁷ This lends credence for improving Low Level Source Operations (LLSO) for the GWOT with the recruitment of native language speaking 1st and 2nd generation individuals from specific country and tribal areas. Advanced Special Operations Techniques (ASOT)-Level III training must also produce greater abilities and tradecraft for such difficult to obtain HUMINT from local assets.

Creating virus-like disruptors that can damage hard to reach social networks from within is among the few ways to cripple or minimize this insurgent activity and minimize

¹⁰⁷ Colonel Ken Tovo, From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for contemporary counterinsurgency operations, Special Warfare, January-February 2007, Volume 20 Issue 1, p.12.

IED system activities (credibility, recruitment, motivation, procurement, sanctuary, and funds) if we can not penetrate the cells.¹⁰⁸ More importantly, it quickly shifts the three “Rs” away from the coalition until we hone our counterinsurgency operations.

Additional Contributions and insights were provided for this white paper by Air Force, Army, Navy and Joint special operations, engineering, and intelligence members. Thank you.

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03/29/07 - Iraqi army soldiers with 2nd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division stand next to the mortar tube and rounds at Combat Outpost X-Ray, Iraq, March 29, 2007, after finding a destroyed mortar team. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall) (Released)

¹⁰⁸ Given the nature of some complex IED networks or the overly simplistic supplies where weapons are just given away with no repeat affiliations, the viral attack system does not necessarily work in every situation. IED-social network countermeasures must still calculate the action-reaction counteraction dynamics; cumulative, cascading, and collateral effects; comprehensive possible sequels or outcomes and then prepare robust plans to address those most likely to occur in order to avoid unintended effects.