
TITLE:

“Why Small Wars Theory Still Matters:
The Extension of the Principles on Irregular Warfare and Non-Traditional Missions
of the *Small Wars Manual* to the Contemporary Battlespace”

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Executive Summary

Title: Why Small Wars Theory Still Matters: The Extension of the Principles on Irregular Warfare and Non-Traditional Missions of the *Small Wars Manual* to the Contemporary Battlespace

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Thesis: The theory of the *Small Wars Manual* remains valid today for contemporary irregular warfare and non-traditional military missions.

Discussion:

This paper argues the importance of small wars theory today. It examines the first chapter of the *Small Wars Manual* from a 21st century perspective and extracts the immutable principles of small wars. Providing the context is American foreign policy and national security strategy. Sources for this study included works on the contemporary battlespace, recent operations, and doctrine for small wars. What are small wars? What is small wars theory? Why is small wars theory important? What are small wars today? What is the nature of contemporary small wars? What makes contemporary small wars different from the small wars covered in the *Small Wars Manual*? What are the implications? These are the questions under discussion.

The nature of small wars dictates that institutional change cannot keep pace with the threat. Small wars are wars over people. They are contests in achieving psychological ascendancy, not fire superiority. Changes in the world, such as globalization, economic interdependence, international financial markets, and dual-use technology, have enabled rogue transnational organizations to challenge the United States on the operational level of war by asymmetrical means. For example, a criminal organization can link together separate tactical acts of terrorism in different locations to fulfill a larger strategy of advancing its interests. That same organization can also use the exposure offered by the media or Internet to derive strategically meaningful results from single tactical actions such as kidnapping or assassination.

Conclusion:

Small wars represent the most prevalent form of conflict in the world today. Small wars are also the form of conflict the United States is most likely to face in the future. Small wars theory, therefore, matters more in the 21st century than it did in 1940.

Preface

The origin of this paper was a project entitled “21st Century Perspectives on Small Wars.” Colonel John A. Toolan, director of Command and Staff College, formed three teams. A former infantry battalion commander with service in Iraq led each team. Given a chapter from the 1940 *Small Wars Manual*, each team was to produce an addendum or update in light of contemporary operations. The intention was not to replace, revise, or rewrite the *Small Wars Manual*, but to apply its framework and methodology to today. I was part of Team 1; the first chapter of the *Small Wars Manual* was our blueprint. My part was the first two sections—“General Characteristics” and “Strategy.”

My methodology was to first gain an understanding of the *Small Wars Manual*—the authors, their experiences, their research, their approach to the subject matter, and the context of world events in which they wrote. I found *Small Wars Operations* (1935) as useful in this regard, if not more useful than its 1940 revision. My approach to contemporary events was to trace the foreign policy, national security strategy, and military history of the United States since World War II. The writing represents an attempt to reduce a wide-ranging subject to digestible form. The notes and bibliography to the manuscript document its approach and, I hope, chart the course for further study and improvements. I defer to the judgment of the reader on the results.

I owe many debts:

Of patience to my mentor, Colonel John L. Mayer, USMC (CO, 1/4, 1st Marine Division, and military governor of Najaf, Iraq), and my advisor Dr. Wray Johnson.

Of appreciation to the other members of Team 1 on this project: Major Nick Davis (USMC, Infantry), Major Travis Homiak (USMC, Intelligence), Ms. Denise Marsh (State Department, Foreign Service), and Major Carlos Vallejo (USMC, Logistics).

Of inspiration to the Marines who contributed to the original small wars project at Marine Corps Schools almost a century ago, Marines named Edson, Utley, Huntington, and many others.

And of hope this will further the understanding of Marines for whom the subject is real, not an exercise in academic inquiry and study.

Why Small Wars Theory Still Matters

Introduction

The small wars theory contained in the Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* remains valid for contemporary irregular warfare and non-traditional military missions. The inquiry guiding this paper follows the thesis: How do the principles of the *Small Wars Manual* extend to the contemporary battlespace?

There are five sections to this study. What is theory and why is it important? What are small wars and what are the principles of the *Small Wars Manual*? This essay answers these questions here in the opening section. The discussion then moves to case studies of two contemporary small wars—Lebanon and Somalia—to determine how the principles of small wars apply today. The third section analyzes the changes in small wars. How do the small wars from which the *Small Wars Manual* derived its principles compare with contemporary small wars? Using the analytical framework of ends, ways, and means, the analysis covers the changes in small wars from then to now. Finally, the last two sections identify the immutable principles of small wars, discuss their implications, and offer some conclusions.

The Use of Military Theory

What is military theory and why is it important? Theory is a set of statements, principles, or axioms that attempt to explain observed phenomena. A theory is also an expectation of what should happen. Theory is important because it is a comprehensive means of making the complex comprehensible. It is also a bridge to formal doctrine.¹ Experience and case studies are the observed phenomena; they provide the empirical data for theory, which provides the basis for

study, understanding, and action. Sound theory outlasts doctrine. Theory, in sum, is a prism of thought aimed at the mental processes of analysis and judgment.

Theory is also a field of study, a collection of related subsets. Small wars theory as a field of study includes, for example, the subset of foreign internal defense against insurgency, guerrilla war, and revolution. Other subsets include strategy, psychology, military government, and civil-military relations.

It is easier to just ask why we should study small wars than it is to engage in an abstract exploration of theory. There are two reasons we should study small wars. First, from an enemy standpoint, small wars are effective. For this reason and many others, small wars are the most probable form of conflict the United States will face in the future.² The second reason we should study small wars is more practical and relates to the challenges facing military commanders today. That is, theories, checklists, and categorizations do not defeat insurgencies or reconstruct governments. Theory alone does not tell the company commander, battalion commander, or individual Marine how to conduct negotiations with tribal sheikhs, clan leaders, or local elders. Military doctrine is insufficient for the tasks facing tactical commanders today, such as teaching civics or Robert's Rules of Order to a local population that has lived for generations under a repressive autocracy. Tables of organization and equipment designed for warfighting do not lend themselves to non-traditional missions.

Small Wars Theory

What is small wars theory? The answer to this question requires some parameters and also builds on the previous discussion of theory. One must consider small wars theory as a *study of related subjects*. The appropriate questions, then, are: What are the subsets or subjects of

small wars? What are the principles of each subject? In other words, for example, counterinsurgency is a subset of small wars. What are the principles of counterinsurgency?

Identifying all the subjects of small wars and extracting their principles is beyond the scope of this study. This paper limits its discussion to the principles contained in the opening chapter of the 1940 *Small Wars Manual*, and will make frequent reference to those principles in the text and notes.

The first chapter alone of the *Small Wars Manual* contains 28 subsets of small wars theory. The most important subjects include the definition of small wars, the distinguishing characteristics of small wars, the purpose for U.S. intervention in small wars and types of intervention, the strategy and psychology of small wars, and the classes of small wars.

What is a “small war?” The term itself is unquestionably vague and elastic. It is a term in which the adjective modifies the noun so energetically as to undermine the nature of the thing. “Small war” dates back to the 18th century as the literal translation of the Spanish word *guerilla*. Yet the usage of *small* in “small wars” has evolved in military vocabulary as an adjective for the asymmetrical, irregular, or hybrid.³ *Small* is used most often by, or pertaining to the intervening force. For the enemy or forces against the intervention, there is nothing small about the nature of their opposition. Their commitment is total, as evidenced by the willingness to drive an explosive-laden truck into the Marine Barracks in Beirut or smash passenger airplanes into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York.

What exactly is *small* in a small war? Is it the level of commitment in national resources? Is it the political will of the intervening force? What exactly is a *small war*? Admitting the vagueness of the term “small wars,” the authors of the 1940 manual offered a definition that still applies today:

Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation.⁴

What differentiates small wars from conventional conflict? In conventional war, the commitment of military forces is usually a last resort and comes after the United States has exhausted diplomatic means of solving the problem. In small wars, however, the United States commits forces while continuing to seek diplomatic solutions. According to the *Small Wars Manual*, “small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort.”⁵ Diplomacy and military action, then, are components of the same objective in small wars, with those agencies of the U.S. government responsible for determining foreign policy and national security strategy overseeing operations.

Small wars are interventions. The *Small Wars Manual* offers two basic types of interventions—intervention in the *internal* affairs of another state or intervention in the *external* affairs of another state—and discusses a host of reasons why the United States would intervene. For example, the United States could intervene in the internal affairs of another state to support the central government against revolution. Or the United States could intervene in the external affairs of another state to fulfill a treaty obligation.⁶

Strategy derives from the political purpose for intervention. For instance, if the United States was intervening in the internal affairs of a state to quash insurgency, strategic planning required a study of the indigenous people, especially those opposing the intervention.

The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered.... the military strategy of the campaign and the tactics employed by the commander in the field must be adapted to the situation in order to accomplish the mission without delay.... The strategy of this type of warfare will be strongly influenced by the probable nature of the contemplated operations. In regular warfare the decision will be gained on known fronts and probably limited theaters of operations; but in small

wars no defined battle front exists and the theater of the operations may be the whole length and breadth of the land.⁷

Small wars are asymmetrical contests of wills. They are wars over people. Tactics in small wars are a means of achieving psychological ascendancy, not fire superiority or control of terrain. Moreover, the presence of military forces in small wars is to facilitate a diplomatic solution. The influence of Sun Tzu is evident in the related passage of the *Small Wars Manual*: “A Force Commander who gains his objective in a small war without firing a shot has attained far greater success than one who resorted to the use of force.”

Classifying small wars is problematic. Small wars are episodic; no two are alike. This was a dilemma the *Small Wars Manual* recognized:

The legal and military features of each small war present distinctive characteristics which make the segregation of all them into fixed classifications an extremely difficult problem. There are so many combinations of conditions that a simple classification of small wars is possible only when one is limited to specific features in his study.⁸

This subject is a bridge to discussing the *Small Wars Manual* itself. Who were its authors? How did they approach the subject matter? What was their research methodology?

The *Small Wars Manual*⁹

The origin of the *Small Wars Manual* is a case study in the development of military doctrine. Its publication is an example of how the experience, study, and professional discourse of junior officers can shape an institution.¹⁰ The *Small Wars Manual* did not start as a sanctioned project by the Marine Corps but instead grew out of the unofficial efforts of officers including Maj. Samuel M. Harrington and Maj. Harold H. Utley.

As a student at the Field Officers Course in Quantico, Harrington drafted a study entitled the “The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars,” which appeared in the *Marine Corps Gazette* and

became the basis for more detailed writing on subject. Utley had served in Cuba (1908), Haiti (1915-1917, 1919-1921), and Nicaragua (1928-1929). Upon his return, he began to research the history of minor conflict and correspond with other Marine officers who had served in similar campaigns. The *Marine Corps Gazette* published the first three chapters of his “Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars,” which brought Utley to the attention of senior officers, and in turn resulted in the official sanction of a project to produce a comprehensive study of small wars.¹¹

The efforts at a comprehensive text for small wars by Marine Corps Schools during the 1930s went through a number of iterations. The enduring result of these efforts is the 1940 *Small Wars Manual*, 428 pages of text presented in 15 chapters. The 1940 edition represents a revision of *Small Wars Operations* (1935).

Abstract theory needs some form of concrete expression. This is the same dilemma Clausewitz faced in drafting *On War* and a dilemma particularly acute in small wars theory because of the complexity and episodic nature of the subject matter. The *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 removed the appendices of *Small Wars Operations* (1935), which had listed more than 100 interventions from combating piracy off the coast of Florida at Amelia Island (1811) to the protection of American interests in Haiti (1914-1934). In trying to produce timeless principles out of episodic events while avoiding the overreliance of operational solutions to political problems—a criticism of the classic work on small wars by Sir Charles Callwell—the authors of the 1940 *Small Wars Manual* eliminated the empirical data to support their arguments. This also resulted in a missed opportunity to chart a course for further study.¹²

Lebanon: 1982-1984¹⁴

The current Global War on Terrorism has part of its roots in Lebanon in the early 1980s. President Reagan sent Marines to Beirut in August 1982 as part of a multinational humanitarian and peacekeeping mission. The deployment was to last no more than 30 days. Instead, the result was an 18-month commitment during which terrorists bombed the American embassy, killing 63 people, and then bombed the Marine Barracks six months later, killing 241 Americans.¹⁵

Members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) used Lebanon as base from which to attack northern settlements of Israel. Lebanon itself was mid-way through a 15-year civil war and lacked a stable government. Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 and surrounded the 9,000 PLO soldiers under Yasir Arafat in West Beirut.¹⁶ Caught between the Israeli army and the PLO were the 500,000 citizens of West Beirut. Upon the recommendations of Special Envoy Philip Habib, President Reagan committed the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit to a multinational intervention force including French and Italian soldiers.

The mission was to evacuate the PLO. The presence of the PLO in Lebanon and their attacks across the southern border were the reason for the invasion by Israel. Evacuating the PLO was to result in the pullback of the Israeli Defense Force. From the start, senior officers were wary of the operation. The commitment of American forces to a coalition under the banner of the United Nations came against the recommendations of the Pentagon. For example, the Commandant of the Marine Corps expressed his reservations in a memorandum to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs:

I am concerned about the military aspects of the ongoing evacuation planning for Lebanon.... It appears the political considerations may be leading to the neglect of sound military planning.... The mission of the [Multinational Force] is vague and ill-defined. It does not prescribe the extent and limits of participation and it is not clear whether the force is an evacuation or a peacekeeping forces. With no unity of command, there is no single military or political authority.... the capability for making timely, important decisions is questionable. The potential for confusion is considerable.¹⁷

After the successful evacuation of more the 75,000 members of the PLO, and after the assassination of newly elected President of Lebanon Bashir Gemayel on 14 September 1982, U.S. forces returned to Beirut at the invitation of Amin Gemayel. The mission this time was to establish “presence” and support the central government by training the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Lebanon shows how the international setting today affects small wars. Neighboring Arab states blamed the United States for failing to prevent the invasion by Israel, while the media depicted Lebanese civilian casualties from the Israeli siege of Beirut. These were triggers for the intervention. There was no joint doctrine or formal training for the missions undertaken, nor were there clear lines of command between Washington and the commanders on the ground. The net effect was American forces under fire, under peacetime rules of engagement, with nebulous objectives, and conflicting lines of diplomatic and military authority back to Washington.

Lebanon was an American intervention in the internal affairs of another state undertaken under executive authority. The U.S. government combined military force with diplomatic pressure in the affairs of another state whose government was unstable and inadequate. In short, Lebanon is a contemporary operation that validates the principles of the *Small Wars Manual*.

Somalia: 1992-1994¹⁸

There are similarities and differences between Lebanon and Somalia. Unlike the Lebanese, the Somalis shared a single background, a single language, and a single religion (Sunni Islam). Yet the social divisions in Somalia—family, sub clan, and family—were as great as those between the Moslems and Christians in Lebanon, if not greater. More than a dozen gangs and militias in Somalia used food and weapons to compete for power. If Lebanon was civil war, Somalia was the absence of law altogether.

Snipers, terrorists, and mob violence were part of the operating environments in Lebanon and Somalia, as were refugees and displaced persons. The following are excerpts from two weeks in Somalia out of the operations log of Task Force Mogadishu:

- Local (CARE) [NGO relief] worker accidentally killed at port.
- TF Mogadishu suppressed sniper fire vic hill 104 unknown Somali casualties.
- Team Secure fires shots at Somali during robbery of newsmen near airport, unknown Somali casualties.
- C 1/7 ambushed returning from weapons seizure. Estimated 3 Somali casualties.
- 4yr old child killed in Bale Dogle by illum round.¹⁹

Cultural issues, such as recognition of tribal factions and affronts to local society, were dominant features of the terrain in Lebanon and Somalia. The bombings in Beirut occurred, in part, because Lebanese Moslems viewed American support of the Christian-dominated government as tacit support of Maronite Christians in the ongoing civil war. A warning of the *Small Wars Manual* had gone overlooked:

The people of many countries take their religion as seriously as their politics. Consequently members of the United States should avoid any attitude that tends to indicate criticism or lack of respect for the religious beliefs and practices observed by the native inhabitants.²⁰

Warring clans in Somalia vied for public recognition by the United States. Centers of gravity in Lebanon and Somalia were not military forces, but people—both the locals in the host nation and the American people in the United States, whose support influenced the actions of the U.S. government.

Lebanon and Somalia renew the debate over intervention and strategy in small wars. The basic intervention model of the *Small Wars Manual* remains valid but deserves elaboration. Contemporary American military intervention includes preventing famine, genocide, or ethnic conflict; interposing force between two factions after ceasefire or truce; interrupting or stopping the flow of supplies, material, or personnel; exacting revenge or imposing punishment; and establishing or supporting the sovereignty of a central government.²¹

Strategy is a product of the authority and purpose for intervention, as well as a bridge to the objectives of the intervening force. Strategy is the coordinated and integrated use of various means to achieve objectives. As the *Small Wars Manual* pointed out, military means alone can be insufficient:

The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social.²²

Objectives are supposed to flow from strategy, with the environment driving the nature of the operations. This logic from the *Small Wars Manual* is still true in the abstract. But it does not do justice to the true complexity for the operational and tactical commander on the ground. Political objectives in Somalia, as in Lebanon, did not translate well into military tasks. Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, drawing on his experiences in Somalia, northern Iraq, and the former Soviet Union, discussed the challenge:

We have a military mind-set that begins by taking a mission, analyzing it, drawing from it specified or implied tasks, and then going about our military requirements to meet those tasks. Never ever do you get a mission that you can deal with in this manner. The missions are vague; they're fuzzy; whatever the conditions are that got you in there quickly either change on the ground or weren't relevant or applicable to begin with. You're ability to distill military tasks from these political objectives just isn't there.²³

Lebanon and Somalia show that political purposes for intervention did not translate into attainable military objectives. Lebanon started as an evacuation, and then the objectives expanded to presence and peacekeeping. The U.S. government changed the mission without first understanding what these objectives truly meant in light of the situation on the ground. Military forces in Somalia were there initially to protect the delivery of food and humanitarian aid. The mission changed to nation building. Lebanon and Somalia also demonstrate the distinctive characteristics of small wars. Lebanon was an ideological war; Somalia was an ethnic war.

Small wars, as General Zinni's comments show, are about initiative, creativity, and adaptation to the asymmetrical in the face of complexity and uncertainty. The *Small Wars Manual* believed operations would only grow more challenging and complex:

If Marines have become accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in the past, they must now prepare themselves for the increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory in the future. The future opponent may be as well armed as they are; he will be able to concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments at the time and place he chooses; as in the past he will have a thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and the inhabitants; and he will have the inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease.... All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern armament, will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantage of the Marine forces in organization, equipment, intelligence, and discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted to warp good judgment.²⁴

Lebanon and Somalia, in summary, demonstrate the dynamics and complexity of contemporary small wars.

1940 Small Wars vs. Contemporary Small Wars²⁵

This section compares U.S. objectives, concepts, and resources for the small wars of 1940 with American ends, ways, and means for contemporary small wars.

Ends: The Objectives

The difference in U.S. objectives for small wars is a distillation of the differences in foreign policy and national security strategy. The pretext for the interventions of the *Small Wars Manual* was the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904. These executive orders or proclamations were shorthand for the U.S. version of colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. American foreign policy sought to expand American commercial interests in Latin America and keep out European hegemony and Axis subversion.

Global politics has changed, with the landscape of the contemporary battle space changing accordingly. The intervention in Lebanon took place during the Cold War. Affecting U.S. operations on the ground were the geopolitics of Soviet-backed Syria opposing American-armed Israel in the midst of a Lebanese Christian-Moslem civil war.

Washington committed forces in Beirut for stability and support.²⁶ Evacuating the PLO from Lebanon would remove right authority for the Israeli invasion and siege of Beirut. Training and equipping the Lebanese Armed Forces at the request of President Amin Gemayel would help the government reestablish sovereign control. These were the intended consequences. The unintended consequence of assisting the government was the appearance of siding with the Lebanese Christians. The unintended consequence of maintaining presence after evacuating the PLO was becoming a target of Hizbullah.

Intervention in Somalia occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War, with the primacy of the United States assured and the implications of the break up of the Soviet bloc unclear. What role the conventional forces of the U.S. military would play was also unclear. Part of foreign policy is the goals the United States seeks to attain abroad. In Somalia, the United States sought to increase its prestige in the eyes of the international community by committing U.S. forces to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations with the United Nations.²⁷

Humanitarian relief, however, expanded to the unrealistic objective of rebuilding the economic and political structure of Somalia. As in Lebanon, the end of the American intervention in Somalia bore little resemblance to the original justification for the commitment of forces. More than a decade later, Somalia remains a nation without an effective central government.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act created the requirement for the President to produce annual statements of national security strategy to assist Congress in matching the budget of an administration to its stated strategy.²⁸ U.S. involvement in small wars now occurs within the context defined in the grand strategy documents produced by the executive branch, which include the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*.²⁹

Ways: The Concepts

The difference in the concept of small wars is the cumulative effect of the differences in organization, doctrine, legislation, treaty alliances, cooperative security, and membership in the United Nations. Concepts, in short, refer to the rules governing the employment of U.S. forces in small wars.

The machinery of the U.S. government today for the deployment of forces and command and control of operations is complicated. There were eight layers in the chain of command between the President and the Marine battalion commander on the ground in Lebanon. This complex arrangement led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reform the Department of Defense.³⁰ This changed command and control in small wars at the operational level. Unified combatant commands with subordinate joint task force headquarters now oversee military operations during intervention. By comparison, the *Small Wars Manual* bases its description of command relationships on the Navy Regulations of 1920: “The operations of the Force are directed by the Office of the Naval Operations direct or through the local naval Commander if he is senior to the Force Commander.”³¹

Somalia triggered the release of Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (JP 3-07, MOOTW).³² This was a title as problematic as “small wars.” For one, “other than war” implies missions outside the core competencies of a warfighting organization. Second, while “small wars” at least implies the potential for armed combat, MOOTW does not. Moreover, examination of the 16 types of MOOTW operations in chapter III of JP 3-07 reveals a striking similarity to the 18 missions in the appendix of *Small Wars Operations* (1935), with the difference in language and scope reflecting the change in foreign policy and the place of the United States in world.³³

Chapter III of *JP 3-07 MOOTW* (June 1995) lists 15 types of operations: arms control, combating terrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations,

protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids. *Small Wars Operations* (1935) offered the following categories of small wars missions:

- Display of naval force to secure protection of American citizens.
- Use of Navy to protect American interests.
- Ultimatum demanding satisfaction delivered before landing made.
- American Forces landed in cooperation with other powers for the protection of foreigners.
- Simple protection of American citizens located in disturbed areas.
- Reestablishment of American legation, collection of indemnities and protection of minister.
- Protection of custom-house at the instance of regular local officials.
- Invasion of foreign territory for protection of American citizens and American territory.
- Operations of American forces landed on foreign soil for the protection of American Interests:
 - Forces merely land and apparently undertake no hostile measures.
 - Forces conducted belligerent operations.
- Establishment of presumed regular government.
- Suppression of local riots.
- To enforce demands for amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States.
- Securing an indemnity.
- Destruction of pirates infesting certain areas, whether nationals of the disturbed area or not.
- Punishment for murder of American citizens.

- Punishment for insults or injuries to American citizens or American officers, such injuries not resulting in death.
- Landing of American forces in times of foreign revolutions:
 - Without the invitation of either faction.
 - At the insistence of the regular local officials.
 - Interference between two fighting factions.
- Landing of American forces in time of war between two foreign nations.

Somalia also led to executive orders on multilateral peace operations and interagency coordination.³⁴ The directive on multilateral operations established criteria for committing forces in support of the United Nations. Public opinion would be one of the primary considerations in deciding to commit forces:

To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the American people must understand and accept the potential value of such operations as tools of U.S. interests. Congress and the American people must also be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations. Traditionally, the Executive branch has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more numerous, complex, and expensive. The Clinton Administration is committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize communication and consultation on these important issues.

The post conflict phase of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has added more vocabulary to the lexicon of small wars. In November 2005, the Department of Defense published DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. This resolved ambiguity by making stability operations a core competency of the U.S. military.³⁵

Yet this directive all but promises a repeat of the frustrations General Zinni and others felt in Somalia. The short term objectives of stability operations in DoD Directive 3000.05

include providing security for the population, restoring essential services, and providing humanitarian relief. The long term objectives entail helping the host nation develop the capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. The specific tasks these objectives require include:

- Help rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment.
- Help revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure.
- Aid in the development of representative governmental institutions.

The absence of a declaration of war was a distinguishing feature of 1940 small wars. Another point of distinction was the role of the President. According to the *Small Wars Manual*, “The very inception of small wars, as a rule, is an official act of the Chief Executive who personally gives instructions without action of Congress.”³⁶ Such is no longer the case. Although authority for U.S. interventions has remained in the executive branch, Congress reasserted itself in foreign affairs after Vietnam by passing the War Powers Resolution in 1973.³⁷

This legislation was supposed to be a mechanism in the spirit of the Constitution, through which Congress and the President would confer before the decision to commit troops. Occurring after a period in which Presidents Truman and Johnson committed the United States to conflict in Asia without a declaration of war from Congress, the War Powers Resolution was also an attempt to limit presidential warmaking power. Under debate was the constitutional authority of the Congress under article I, section 8—to provide for the common defense—against the

authority of the President as commander in chief under article II, section 2. Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over presidential veto. Section 3 contained the intent of the legislators:

The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

Contrary to its intended purpose, the War Powers Resolution ceded statutory authority to the President to go to war for 30 days without Congressional consent.

A trend since the War Powers Resolution and the end of the Cold War has been consultation with the United Nations and a move towards multilateral support.³⁸ The reason for this is twofold. First, multilateral support is a way of furthering the legitimacy of American foreign policy in the eyes of the international community. Second, multilateral operations are a way of sharing the burden for resources.

Means: The Resources

The difference in resources is the difference in the elements of U.S. national power, technology, and the international system of globalization. This part uses the principles of small wars theory to trace the changes in resources.

Small wars are protracted struggles over people. This means public opinion and support are critical resources. Whereas the President could act unilaterally in 1940 small wars by ordering a landing, he cannot do so today without the support of Congress or the American people. The effect of media coverage of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam is an example of the effect of public opinion on the exercise of presidential power. Public opinion influenced the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Lebanon and Somalia. After Somalia, public wariness of operations with the United Nations affected U.S. actions (or inactions) towards Rwanda in

1994. Media depictions of the abduction and execution of four private American contractors in Fallujah, Iraq, March 2004, moved officials in Washington to press for a conventional attack on the city against the advice the military commanders on the ground, who viewed such an attack as counterproductive.³⁹ Public opinion is also affecting U.S. actions towards the current genocide in the western Sudanese region of Darfur in Africa.

Small wars are wars over the local populace. People are still the chief resource in small wars. Peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, reconstruction, and establishing effective governance center on people as objectives, not battle with uniformed armed forces. Terrorism, ambushes, attacks on local citizens, and the improvised use of weaponry in small wars are not new.⁴⁰ But given the unmatched conventional military resources of the United States today, these tactics have broadened enough in scope to become a threat to national security.⁴¹

Military action does not cure political, social, or economic problems. In other words, small wars require political, social, and economic resources. This is an enduring principle. The amount and availability of these resources, however, is much greater today.

The environmental and humanitarian disaster in Somalia attracted the resources of international and nongovernmental relief organizations. By March 1993, there were more than 40 such groups in Somalia. This does not include the other agencies of the U.S. government, as well as private military companies or contractors. Civilian professionals and non-military agencies, in short, are most capable of performing many of the tasks in small wars. Military forces today require a separate command and control apparatus to make use of their resources.⁴²

Opponents in small wars have access to the same technology as the United States. This was not true in 1940 small wars but it is true today. The change is due to globalization, the transnational rapid integration of information, technology, and capital. Globalization is also the

trade, exchange, or interdependence of goods, information, and ideas, and thus the enabler for opponents to acquire economic, informational, and technology resources.⁴³

Summary

The publication of the *Small Wars Manual* in 1940 was due in part to the *absence* of theory, doctrine, or formal written concepts of the subject. Since then, analysis shows that American objectives, concepts, and resources for small wars have endured, adapted, or changed completely.

Immutable Principles of Small Wars

Immutable principles are the connecting tissue between 1940 small wars and contemporary small wars. Based on examination of the 1940 principles contained in the *Small Wars Manual* and the comparative analysis of the previous section, this study has identified the following immutable principles:

- Small wars are an asymmetrical contest of opposing wills.
- Small wars are interventions involving U.S. military forces.
 - The foreign policy and national security strategy of the executive branch provides the pretext for intervention.
 - The intervention often occurs after the root cause has developed—often over a period of a number of years.
 - The intervention occurs in regions where the host nation lacks effective governance or the resources to solve the problem.

- There is no archetype small war. Small wars are complex, unique, and episodic.⁴⁴
- Small wars are the most prevalent form of conflict in the world, and are the type the United States is most likely to face in the future.⁴⁵
- Small wars are real wars. They combine the measured application of force, or threat of force, or simply the presence of force with diplomacy.
- For the enemy forces opposing the intervention—for the terrorists, insurgents, and revolutionaries—small wars are *total* war.
- Small wars are wars over people. They are contests in achieving psychological ascendancy, not fire superiority.⁴⁶
- Small wars follow the law of unintended consequences: Military tasks must align with political objectives.
- Centers of gravity, vulnerabilities, resources, missions, objectives (political and military), measures of effectiveness, and lines of operations in small wars are completely different from those in conventional conflict.
 - The opposing forces in Iraq, for example, have no army or state; they do not wear uniforms and use fear and terrorism as weapons.⁴⁷ Centers of gravity are the people. “People” or maintaining the Clausewitzian trinity includes the United States. Without the support of the American people, the United States cannot maintain a protracted military presence abroad.
 - Diplomatic, economic, informational, finance, and law enforcement resources are more important than conventional military functions such as fires and maneuver.
 - Resettling refugees, distributing food, constructing refugee camps, appointing

judges, establishing judiciary committees and prison systems, providing medical assistance, managing newspapers, and running radio stations are examples of tasks Marines have performed in small wars.

- Planning is continuous in small wars, as are reassessments and changes in strategy.
 - Ongoing operations in Iraq have shown the enemy can change tactics in a week.
- Small wars require initiative, innovation, creativity, and flexibility. As such, they continue to present the greatest challenges to leadership.⁴⁸
- The intervening force in small wars must maintain momentum. Indecisiveness and loss of initiative signal weakness to the enemy.
- Small wars require unity of effort and constant coordination. Personalities and local relations among military commanders, diplomats, and representatives from the host region are more important than processes.

Implications

Nature of Small Wars

The nature of small wars is that institutional change cannot keep pace with enemy adaptation. Changes in the world have enabled rogue transnational organizations to challenge the United States on the operational level of war by asymmetrical means. For example, a criminal organization can link together separate tactical acts of terrorism in different locations to fulfill a larger strategy of advancing its interests. That same organization can also use the exposure offered by the media or Internet to derive strategically meaningful results from single

tactical actions such as kidnapping or assassination. The implication is that small wars now have the potential of threatening the survival of the United States.

American Commitment of Forces in Small Wars

Although small wars now have the potential of threatening the survival of the United States, small wars are still primarily vital or second-tier interests of American national security strategy.⁴⁹ Therefore the United States cannot afford to commit a large military force in pursuit of protracted victory. This implies a gamble for the United States. Does the country employ a large military force in pursuit of quick victory or seek protracted gains using a smaller slice of its military forces?

Moreover, the tendency of the United States to intervene multilaterally has implications for military effectiveness. By mixing different military cultures, resources, and capabilities, coalition operations add a layer of complexity.

Military Doctrine

The implication of small wars theory as a collection of related military activities is that the Marine Corps should not seek a single-volume authoritative and comprehensive text on small wars. The *Small Wars Manual* represents such an attempt. In fact, the *Small Wars Manual* still represents the best attempt thus far. Relevant and effective small wars doctrine will only come through the component parts of the subject matter. In other words, just as conventional military doctrine has separate manuals for armored, mechanized, and engineer operations, so too should doctrine for small wars have separate yet related texts for counterinsurgency, military government, and training foreign militaries.

Conclusion

This paper set out to argue the importance of small wars theory today. It examined the first chapter of the *Small Wars Manual* from a 21st century perspective and extracted the immutable principles of small wars. Providing the context was American foreign policy and national security strategy. Sources for this study included works on the contemporary battlespace, recent operations, and doctrine for small wars. The findings were twofold: First, small wars represent the most prevalent form of conflict in the world today. Second, small wars are the form of conflict the United States is most likely to face in the future. Small wars theory, therefore, matters more in the 21st century than it did in 1940.

The elasticity of the term “small wars” seems wholly appropriate for a subject whose inherent complexity resists all attempts at simple classification or analysis. This was the biggest challenge confronting this study, as well as the most important lesson for the author.

NOTES

1. *Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: 2001, as amended through 31 August 2005) defines doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”

2. Col. T. X. Hammes, “Why Study Small Wars?” *Small Wars Journal*, April 2005. Also see, by the same author, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), especially chapters 14 (pp. 207-21) and 15 (pp. 224-45). One of Colonel Hammes’s chief arguments is a familiar one involving America’s obsession with finding technological solutions to human problems (e.g., war).

Regarding future conflict, see, for example, Maj. Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, “Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,” *Military Review* 82 (September-October 2000): 42; and Ian Beckett, “The Future of Insurgency,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 16 (March 2005): 22-36.

Both Cassidy and Beckett say asymmetrical conflict is the most probable form of conflict the United States will face. Cassidy offers three reasons in support of his argument: The United States has a disproportionate advantage in technology and firepower; economic interdependence of the major powers prevents those nations from going to war with each other; and U.S. dominance in conventional battle in the Middle East in 1991 taught opponents not to fight America on America’s terms.

3. “Hybrid” a recent addition to the vocabulary of small wars. See: Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis and Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 131 (November 2005): 18-19.

4. U.S. Marine Corps, *FMFRP 12-15 Small Wars Manual (SWM)* (Washington, D.C.: 1990), I-1-1.

5. *SWM*, I-1-7.

6. Section II, “Basis of the Strategy,” *SWM*, I-1-7:

Intervention in the internal affairs of a state may be undertaken to restore order, to sustain governmental authority, to obtain redress, or to enforce the fulfillment of obligations binding between the two states. Intervention in the external affairs of a state may be the result of a treaty which authorizes one state to aid another as a matter of political expediency, to avoid more serious consequences when the interests of other states are involved, or to gain certain advantages not obtainable otherwise. It may be simply an intervention to enforce certain opinions or to propagate certain doctrines, principles or standards.

7. *SWM*, I-1-8.

8. *SWM*, I-1-2.

9. On the writing of the 1940 *Small Wars Manual*, see: Jon T. Hoffman, "Small Wars" and "Small Wars Manual," in *The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia*, Benjamin R. Beede, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), 511-6; Ronald Schaffer, "The 1940 Small Wars Manual and the 'Lessons of History,'" *Military Affairs* 36 (April 1972): 46-51; Kenneth J. Clifford, *Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1970* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1973), 37; and Keith B. Bickel, *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001).

For detail on the interventions used by the authors of the *Small Wars Manual*, see Capt. Harry Allanson Ellsworth, *One Hundred Eighty Landings of the United States Marines, 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974).

10. General William DePuy and the U.S. Army's development of its doctrine for Airland Battle after Vietnam is an example of a parallel contemporary development. See: Paul Herbert, *Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 61-107.

11. Maj. Samuel M. Harrington, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars," *Marine Corps Gazette* 6 (December 1921): 478, 483-4, 486-8; Harold H. Utley, "An Introduction to the Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars," *Marine Corps Gazette*, part 1, 16 (May 1931), 50-53; part 2, 18 (Aug 1933), 44-48; part 3, 18 (Nov 1922), 43-46.

12. Col. Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3d ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). This is a reprint of the 1906 edition, with an introduction from Dr. Douglas Porch, Center of Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School.

13. The selection of Lebanon and Somalia as case studies is representative of contemporary small wars but not comprehensive. The Small Wars Center of Excellence, for example, lists 17 small wars in North America alone since 1980. See: http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/sw_past.asp.

14. Sources on Lebanon include: Benis M. Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982-1984* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987); David K. Hall, "Lebanon Revisited," in *Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation, vol. II: U.S. Contingency Operations*, eds. Richard J. Norton and James F. Miskel (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1996), 68-97; "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),"

in *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 3d ed, U.S. Department of Public Information (New York: United Nations, 1996), 83-112; Mona Ghali, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978-Present," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 181-205. I also consulted the collection of official correspondence and action reports in the Lebanon Collection, Marine Corps University Archives, Gray Research Center, Quantico, Va.

15. The embassy bombing took place on 18 April 1983. The bombing of the Marine Barracks took place on 23 October 1983.

16. For a short background to the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hizbullah, and the events leading up to Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon, see: James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 398-417.

17. Memo, CMC to CJCS of 9 Aug 1982, subj: Lebanon Planning, in Lebanon Collection.

18. Sources on Somalia include: Robert B. Oakley, "The Urban Area During Support Missions Case Study: Mogadishu—The Strategic Level," in *Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century*, Proceedings of the RAND-Arroyo-TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, March 22-23, 2000, ed. Russ Glenn (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 309-54; Anthony C. Zinni, "It's Not Nice and Neat," *Proceedings* 121 (August 1995): 26-30; Zinni, "Non-traditional Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking," in *Capital "W" War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War (Because Wars Are Conflicts of Societies, Not Tactical Exercises Writ Large)*, Perspectives on Warfighting, No. 6, by Joe Strange (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 1998), 247-83; Tom Clancy, with Gen. Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *Battle Ready* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 229-302; "United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II (UNOSOM I and II)," in *Blue Helmets*, 287-318; James Dobbins, et al., *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 55-70; and Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 322-24. I also consulted the collection of official correspondence and action reports in the Somalia Collection, Marine Corps University Archives, Gray Research Center, Quantico, Va.

19. TF Mogadishu memo dtd 14 Jan 93, subj: Analysis of Possible Reasons for Attacks upon U.S. Marines Operating in Mogadishu, item 33, Somalia Collection. The period covered is 28 December 1992 to 12 January 1993.

20. *SWM*, I-1-31.

21. This is an abbreviated and arbitrary list. For full-length treatment, see: Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington, D.C.: A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1994). Chapter three, "The Vocabulary of Intervention,"

contains Haass's model for intervention today. A former member of the National Security Council staff during the 1990s, Haass posits 11 purposes: deterrence, preventive attacks, compellence, punitive attacks, peacekeeping, warfighting, peacemaking, nation-building, interdiction, humanitarian assistance, and rescue.

22. *SWM* I-1-9.

23. Zinni, "Non-Traditional Military Missions," 252. General Zinni's description of military planning follows current doctrine in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (Washington, D.C.: HQMC, 2000).

24. *SWM*, I-1-6.

25. I owe a debt of thanks to my mentor on this project, Col. John L. Mayer, USMC, for the idea of using this framework for comparing the content of the *Small Wars Manual* with contemporary small wars. I also relied on the discussion of the ends-ways-means paradigm by Dr. David Jablonsky (Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired), "Why is Strategy Difficult," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2004), 69-78.

26. My use of the terms "stability" and "support" to characterize operations in Lebanon is from current U.S. Army service doctrine in *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, 20 February 2003).

27. On foreign policy and national security strategy in the early 1990s, see, for example: Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses Its Role in a Turbulent World*, 2d ed. (Lexington, KY, University of Kentucky Press, 2001), 233-4; Steven W. Hook and John W. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 16th ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 2004), 284-7; William H. Lewis, "Peacekeeping: The Deeping Debate," in *American Defense Policy*, 7th ed, eds. Peter, L. Hays, et al. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 401-6.

28. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433, 1 October 1986) is contained in 10 U.S.C. 161 et seq. Section 603 contains the reporting requirements of the President on national security strategy.

President George H. W. Bush produced one NSS (1991). From 1995-2000, President Clinton produced six NSSs. President George W. Bush has produced one (2002).

For the limitations of the NSS and a critical analysis, see Robert H. Dorff, "The Current U.S. National Security Strategy and Policy: A Brief Appraisal." In *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Max G. Manwaring, et al. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 21-31.

Also see: John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," in *American Defense Policy*, 8th ed., ed. Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G. Shackelford, Jr. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 35-39; and Stephen D. Biddle, *American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2005). Biddle argues that the scope, end state, and enemy in the war on terror is unclear, and that the U.S. government needs to resolve these ambiguities in grand strategy.

29. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002); *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (February 2003), *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (July 2002); and *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (November 2005).

30. On the influence of Beirut on Goldwater-Nichols, see James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 142-63.

31. See *SWM* I-1-3, "Some legal aspects of small wars," and I-1-4, "Functions of headquarters Marine Corps.

32. For a discussion of the paradigm shift in small wars doctrine to MOOTW triggered by Somalia, see: Wray R. Johnson, *Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars* (Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Co., Ltd., 2001), 141-62.

33. Current U.S. joint doctrine for small wars includes: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub (JP) 3-03 Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations* (Washington, D.C.: 10 April 1997); *JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)* (Washington, D.C.: 16 June 1995); *JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)* (Washington, D.C.: 26 June 1996); *JP 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: 12 February 1999).

The appropriate U.S. Army service doctrine for small wars is U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations* (February 2003), and *FM(I) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations* (October 2004).

The Marine Corps has no separate service doctrine for MOOTW, but covers the subject in chapter 10 of *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 2001. *MCDP 1-0* does quote from the *Small Wars Manual*, but is primarily an endorsement of the same 16 types of MOOTW operations contained in *JP-07*. Moreover, the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication for counterinsurgency, *MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency Operations*, remains, essentially, a reprint of the original July 1973 manual by the same name. *The Small Wars Manual* remains in print, and the Marine Corps considers it a reference publication.

34. Those directives were Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 “Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations” (May 1994); and PDD 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations” (May 1997).

35. *DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 28 November 2005.

36. See *SWM*, I-1-3 (Legal Aspects) and I-1-4 (Functions of Headquarters Marine Corps).

37. The War Powers Resolution (PL 93-148, 7 November 1973) is contained in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548. The best study of Presidential warmaking power is Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 2d ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004). Fisher discusses the War Powers Resolution in pp. 144-53.

38. For a discussion of the United Nations Participation Act (PL 79-264, 20 December 1945), see Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 81-96. On the added complexity of multinational interventions, see: Andrew J. Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, July 1996).

39. On the effects of the media on Tet, see, for example: Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977); and Don Oberdorfer, *Tet: The Story of a Battle and its Historic Aftermath* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1971). For an account of the incident involving the contractors at Fallujah, Iraq, and the after effects, see: Bing West, *No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah* (New York: Bantam, 2005).

40. *SWM*, I-1-8: “Frequently irregulars kill and rob peaceful citizens in order to obtain supplies which are then secreted in remote strongholds.”

41. For example, see the current U.S. grand strategy documents previously cited in note 29.

42. Task Force Mogadishu, a provisional regimental-sized organization of about 1,800 Marines and 1,800 Coalition soldiers, used Civil Military Operations Teams (CMOT) to assist neighborhood leaders, police representatives, religious groups, and other locals in Mogadishu. See: Dep, I MEF(Fwd) AAR for Task Force Mogadishu, 31 Jan 93, and Operations Other Than War presentation by Brig. Gen. Bedard at Commander’s Conference, 6 Mar 95. Both in Somalia Collection.

For in-depth treatment of interagency coordination in small wars, see Denise Marsh, “Relationship with the Interagency,” master’s thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va., 2006.

43. Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, updated and expanded edition (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).

44. “There are so many combinations of conditions that a simple classification of small wars is possible only when one is limited to specific features in his study.” *SWM I-1-2*.

45. See note 2 above and *SWM I-1-1, I-1-3*. Small wars represent, the authors wrote,

... the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps.... in spite of the varying trend of the foreign policy of succeeding administrations, this government has interposed or intervened in the affairs of other states with remarkable regularity, and it may be anticipated that the same general procedure will be followed in the future.

46. The study of psychology in small wars warrants separate treatment. See Maj. Nicholas Davis, “Small War Psychology: The Handrail of the Three-Block War,” master’s thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va., 2006.

47. This was a tactic the authors of the *Small Wars Manual* also observed in their section on national war, *SWM I-1-9*: “In warfare of this kind, members of native forces will suddenly become innocent peasant workers when it suits their fancy and convenience.”

48. *SWM I-1-6*:

Small wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, and under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

The Marine Corps “Three Block War” concept of the late 1990s used three contiguous city blocks as a geographic construct. Within those three city blocks, Marine Commandant Charles C. Krulak predicted, Marines would encounter a dynamic force continuum from peacekeeping to combat and a range of attendant operations from civil law and order to running the local radio station. Just as the *Small Wars Manual* did, the Three Block War concept emphasized the importance of small unit leadership. Recent studies and reports on operations in Iraq have validated the importance of small unit leadership.

See: Gen. Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” *Marines*, January 1999. On small unit leadership in Iraq, see: Sgt. Earl J. Catagnus, et al., “Infantry Squad Tactics,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 89 (September 2005): 80-89; *Report on Non-Commissioned Officers Lessons Learned Conference, 9-10 August 2005* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned); James E Szepesy, “The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield: The Nexus Between the USMC’s Three Block War Concept and Network Centric Warfare,” M.A. thesis, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, March 2005.

49. For an analytical framework of U.S. national interests, see Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted*, 12-31.