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Those readers who recognize the symbolism of the above title may doubt the seriousness of this essay. It is indeed serious, as I will proceed to demonstrate. However, for those who do not recognize the symbolism, my first task is to explain it. Certainly among older generation Americans, many undoubtedly recall that Mao Zedong was the man who led the Chinese Communists to victory in 1949. Through his position as Party Chairman, he retained a more or less dominant influence in China’s government through 1976. More significantly for this study, Mao was considered to be a practical and theoretical authority in peoples’ wars of liberation – movements to overthrow traditional or colonial-imperialist masters. He converted Karl Marx’s theory of the inevitable revolt of the proletariat (industrial working class) into a strategy for the mobilization of the largely agrarian society of China. Chairman Mao was a source of inspiration for insurgent movements throughout the Third World during the Cold War era (1947-91). The Cold War has ended, but the world community is still beset by peoples’ striving against the established order, and so some see his influence as remaining relevant, albeit in a new milieu. The difference is one of geographic setting. East Asia’s upheaval has for the most part ended. It has been decades since the Chinese Communists consolidated their control of the mainland, the Malayan Communists were defeated, and the Vietnamese Communists united their own country and disciplined the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The Communist insurgency in the Philippines has dwindled considerably. The locus of upheaval has apparently shifted westward, with peoples’ struggles enduring in Palestine (Gaza and the West Bank), Afghanistan, and Iraq and recently erupting in northern Yemen and southwestern Pakistan (Baluchistan). It is this geography that evokes the term mufti, which originally alluded to the custom of British officers in Middle East service wearing, on their off-duty time, garb resembling that of a mufti (native authority on Islamic law). This metaphor raises some serious questions, as the U.S. Government considers the prospect of “staying the course” in its current engagements. Is the resistance activity in Iraq, and secondarily Afghanistan, comparable to the Cold War era insurgencies in East Asia and their “replicas” in other parts of the world? Is the transnational jihadism that originated in the Islamic World comparable to the global subversive activity that was abetted by the Communist International? The answers to those questions largely shape the response to the problems of pacifying Iraq and Afghanistan and winning the war on terrorism. Among the conflicts in question, there is of course an apparent similarity in the enemies’ strategy, that is, their master plan for victory. Some common axioms are to make the populace a key factor in the arena of conflict, plan for a long war, and engage in all power arenas -- political, economic, and informational, as well as military -- to erode the stronger side’s will to sustain the struggle. There is also similarity of method -- what the military community refers to as “tactics, techniques, and procedures.” Offensive action entails raids and ambushes, hit-and-run and stand-off attacks, and improvised use of weaponry. Protective measures include concealment, blending with the populace, deception, and denial of engagement, compromise, or key assets. Psychological warfare (against non-combatants) involves brutality, intimidation, and disinformation. Sustainment efforts include living “off the land,” smuggling, looting weapons and supplies, and operating secret factories and clinics. (These lists are exemplary, not all inclusive.) Such observations have rekindled interest in insurgency theory and, by extension, counter-insurgency theory, which is reflected in military-educational, news-journalist, and book-publishing circles. The authors who see analogies between the jihadist and Communist-inspired movements have framed their thoughts in terms of some interesting, albeit contentious, themes. We are engaged in “fourth generation warfare,” which combines the aspects of primitive (first generation) warfare with the practice of Mao. We might consider for Iraq “the Salvador option,” which recalls the Cold War era technique of employing hit/snatch teams against Marxist-inspired insurgent leaders. We face a “global insurgency,” which, in concept, seems to be a substitution of al-Qaeda for Comintern.TP[1]PT Even some who claim uniqueness for conflicts within the Islamic world have modeled them in terms of the three phases of Mao’s protracted popular war – strategic defensive (subversive activity), strategic stalemate (guerrilla warfare), and strategic offensive (war of movement). It would seem that the analogy is compelling, but it should not be. Is there some way to expose the misfit? The answer to that question takes us into a “fuzzy” area of the international relations discourse – the concept of worldview. SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1Reference to worldview appears in both textbooks and expository works, yet its meaning and implications are generally taken for granted. Scholars of other disciplines have examined the relations between worldview and philosophy, religion, language, and culture in general. Where precise definition has been attempted, the task is usually undertaken by experts in sociology or anthropology.TP[2]PT Some scholars would argue that worldview is undefinable since its subjective, symbolic nature transcends rationalization. Moreover, the concept does not lend itself to empirical method, and it has to accommodate “counter-culture” and change over time. Despite these caveats, the concept of worldview must be real and meaningful, as it widely occurs in the titles and contexts of myriads of books, scholarly essays, and media articles. In simple terms, worldview is the intersection of various aspects of man's understanding of his world and life -- as shaped by culture. Worldview is both descriptive and normative; it explains what appears to be as well as what ought to be. The concept is highly complex and involves many cognitive categories. The present task is to focus on those that are most germane to the motivation, legitimation, and measure of victory of some cause – some purposive, collective effort. Hence, I propose the model in the chart below, which includes seven categories and some corollary notions added for clarity. Regarding two terms that may not be self-evident as to meaning, “end state” equals the outcome of the human ordeal, and “agency” is the class of people through which the end-state is achieved. Infusing the categories with the appropriate images creates a basis of comparison/contrast of the mindsets of Communist (Marxist-Maoist) militants vice Islamist militants. Of course, the below scheme is based on abstraction and generalization and does not account for variants among either the Communists or the Islamists. Nonetheless, the two ideals are useful for comparative analysis.
To give more substance to the above notions, it might be helpful to see how some of them are reflected in the words of Mao Zedong and Usama bin Ladin.TP[3]PTP Active ParticipantsMao: “The richest source of power to wage war lies in the mass of the people.” Usama: “So, then, I urge the (male) youth to think for themselves about jihad, for they are the first of those obliged to pursue it today.” AgencyMao: “The secretary of a Party committee must be good at being a ‘squad leader.’” Usama: “Arab mujâjidîn rose up and left their jobs, universities, families, and tribes to earn the pleasure of God” (in Afghanistan). End StateMao: “When human society advances to the point where classes and states are eliminated, there will be no more war.” Usama: “And life, to which the Qur’an, God, and His Messenger are calling you, should be a life of self respect in this world and victory in the next – a life of jihad for the sake of God Almighty.” Comparing the primary and corollary notions of the two worldviews reveals the obvious, and perhaps anticipated, dissimilarity: differences with perceptions of we and they; the materialist/non-materialist contrast regarding mandate and end state. Lest some readers be stunned, I should better explain my rendering of the Islamists’ sense of the we/they relation. First, the image for the corollary notion of participant disputes that female suicide bombers (in Palestine) generally act on an Islamist worldview. They more likely respond to Arab codes of honor that enjoin retaliation for harm inflicted on an immediate- or extended-family member. Secondly, the notion of potential (vice inevitable) adversity recalls Qur’anic guidance to seek predominance by peaceful means, unless confronted with force. The caveat is that the Islamists are willing to concede on the necessity for force -- but not on conviction to the true word or the temporal precondition for the end state. The difference with the Communists is that they compromised on the true word, and once they did so, the formula for reaching the end state was negated, as was the necessity of adversarial relations. The reader will no doubt quickly see the commonality where both worldviews involve a global domain of adversity and attainment of social justice (a fair chance for everyone, not strict equality) as the temporal precondition for the end state. What does this comparison suggest? Awareness that the conflict is global merely clarifies the scope of the challenge. However, the prerequisite of social justice will probably attract the notice of counter-insurgency theorists who see opportunity for an analogous “carrot” versus “stick” approach. The recourse would be the proverbial effort to “win hearts and minds” via aid and development projects. Thus, the analogy would be complete because the “stick” option addresses a very similar set of insurgent “mechanics” -- the strategy and methods mentioned in the first part of this essay. The analogy falters, however, because the apparently common prerequisite of social justice has different implications in each case. The historic fact is that Communism never had much appeal in the Islamic world. Islam itself enjoins social justice -- and tribal code enjoins mutual support among kinsmen. In contrast with the militant Communist mindset, that of the militant Islamist has an anti-materialistic orientation and a spiritual goal. Thus, an appeal to the “heart and mind” might not suffice because “soul” is a key element of the Islamist worldview construct. Although the patent victory of capitalist-democracy in the Cold War undermined the Communist worldview, that is largely irrelevant in the current conflict with the radical Islamists. Showing a better way to worldly utopia (classless society) hardly counts when the focus is spiritual salvation. But is the focus always spiritual salvation? Perhaps not. Muslims, as any people anywhere, can become pre-occupied with the tasks of making a living. However, when those tasks become too overwhelming, there are many symbols, traditions, institutions, opinion-leaders, and other prompts to remind them that religion offers the best remedy – the true solution. To challenge this “truth” would be very counter-productive. It is nonsense to presume that, since the former Communist societies of Russia and China abandoned Marx’s dialectical materialism, Islamic societies could bypass the Qur’an. The predominant message of the Qur’an is the imperative of social justice, and Islamic teaching establishes the benchmark for morality and social ethics -- the right conduct of both rulers and ruled. There is presently no secular alternative of any real significance. Thus, the Qur’an, as the true word, is the nucleus of the whole Islamist construct, and that is the key to conflict resolution. The moderate opinion leaders have already pointed out the distortions in the radicals’ use of the scripture. However, much more must be done because the grievances of the radicals are unlikely to vanish. The regional governments face the daunting task of improving technical education, productivity, and income distribution for their respective societies. They might also complement such effort by helping to establish progressive social institutions.TP[4]PT If they ever were to achieve a modicum of social justice, people would probably not need to ask: what is wrong with the world, and what response is enjoined by the Qur’an? Meanwhile, the U.S. might consider as bilateral programs: 1) a developmental assistance campaign that vets, engages, and works through moderate Islamic non-governmental or quasi-governmental organizations, and 2) an information campaign that accommodates the dialectic of Muslim moderates, for example substituting kharijites (translated as deviants in the Arab World’s English press) for Sunni extremists and condemning extremism – not jihad per se. Perhaps the damage of communicating the themes of “clash of civilizations” and “crusades” has already been recognized? In conclusion, the defeat of Communist insurgency offers no analogous lessons from this comparative worldview analysis. Nor does it do so from the practical perspective of insurgent/counter-insurgent methods. America is not dealing with the same kind of enemy. A fellow Vietnam veteran recently asked why there is no “Charlie in the wire” experience (stealthy, determined assault against an American position) in Iraq. The Viet Cong (“Victor Charlie”) agreed with Mao on the need to concentrate forces for frontal and flanks attacks under certain circumstances. The Iraqi insurgents have yet to follow suit. They probably never will. One reason is that American military technologic advances have made this tactic very risky. Another reason is that the native way of war has for over two thousand years tended to favor stand-off and close-combat avoidance in contrast with the West’s reliance on shock action.TP[5]PT Moreover, the factionalism of Iraqi resistance starkly contrasts with Mao’s concept of a people’s army coming together with a “conscious discipline . . . (to) fight for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation.”TP[6]PT We see, for example, Sunni militias, in one instance, contending against the Coalition, in another, fighting other Sunnis who follow Zarqawi, and in yet another, changing alignment. Turning to counter-insurgent methods, the “Salvador option” might make sense for a non-tribal society or for a genuine foreign-fighter dominance. However, in much of the Islamic World it would merely invoke the tribal code of blood-revenge. So, there is yet more complexity to the insurgency issue -- the mix of radical Islamist, tribal, and partisan (Ba’thists in Iraq) interests. Groups cooperate for the same near term objective, withdrawal of the U.S. and Coalition forces, and tout what seems to be similar jihad lore. Yet they adhere to different principles to legitimate violence, and they pursue different long-term goals. Bringing the conflicts in question to a successful conclusion requires a full understanding of this complexity. One must discern, for example, the alternative means of aggregating power at the macro and micro levels --alliance building vice indoctrination and mobilization of kin-groups vice recruitment of (alienated) individuals. Such understanding should come from situation- and culture-specific analysis, not questionable analogies. Yes, the image of Mao in mufti is absurd. Dr. Jandora is currently employed as a senior analyst with US Army Special Operations Command. He retired from the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve at the rank of colonel, with active service in the Vietnam and Gulf Wars. He holds a PhD from the University of Chicago, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations. He has resided and worked in Saudi Arabia for several years and has traveled extensively throughout the Near and Middle East. TP[1]PT This term is synonymous with the Communist International (organization) that was founded in 1919 (disbanded in 1943) with the aim of revolutionary overthrow of capitalist regimes around the world. Michael Vlahos proposes a more practical concept of “civilizational insurgency,” in “Terror’s Mask: Insurgency Within Islam” (Occasional Paper, Joint Warfare Analysis Department, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University, May 2002), pp. 4, 6-7, and 27. Although the concept has merit, I disagree with the methodology, especially the analogy with the Reformation in Europe, and the recommendations of the report. TP[2]PT For some helpful references, see: Michael Kearney, World View (Novato, Calif.: Chandler and Sharp Publishers, 1984), chap. 3; Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), chap. 5; and James H. Olthius, “On Worldviews” in Paul A. Marshall et al. (eds.), Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989). TP[3]PT English translation are found respectively in Quotations from Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966) online version, Mao Tse-Tung Internet Archive 2000; available from TUhttp://www.marxist.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red.bookUT; Internet, Sections 8, 10, and 5 and Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama Bin Ladin ed. Bruce Lawrence, trans. David Howarth (London and New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 205, 147, and 18. TP[4]PT It might be feasible to create futûwah-like organizations that promote inventiveness and pride of work. I use this term not in its modern but in its medieval sense, which denotes an urban fraternal organization or youth group that follows some code of conduct. TP[5]PT This thesis is presented in John W. Jandora, “War and Culture: A Neglected Relation,” Armed Forces and Society 25, No. 4 (1999), pp. 541-556. TP[6]PT Quotations from Chairman Mao, Sect. 9. |
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