The Political Warfighter

Mr. Erik Evans

“War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character.”[1]

- Mao Tse-Tung

 “In the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep solders out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerrillas do exactly the opposite. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politically educated and thoroughly aware of the issues at stake.” [2]

- Marine General Samuel B. Griffith

 “Our fighters have gone through a dogged political education...”[3]

 - General Vo Nguyen Giap

In classic Maoist warfare the political indoctrination of the population’s consciousness is the principle task of the guerrilla fighter. The guerilla is in essence a political warfighter that wages war against his enemy in the political and military realms. He is readily capable of conducting political campaigns to convince or coerce the population to back the insurgency while mounting combat operations against enemy forces.  Conversely, foot soldiers in a counter-insurgency campaign often have no political component to their mission. Their directive is to seek out and destroy guerrillas in the military battlespace, not to politically energize the passions of the people against the insurgent movement. Whereas, the political guerrilla stirs, captures and channels the hatred and animosity of the people against the insurgent infrastructure’s enemies (i.e. a constituted government or an occupying army).  The guerrilla acts as a political force that supercharges the insurgent organization’s political campaign. Meanwhile, the apolitical counter-insurgent actor gives no political advantage to the cause that he serves.

Mao Tse-Tung believed that understanding the relationship between politics and war was essential to prosecuting successful military campaigns. His ideas closely echoed the sentiments of 19^th century Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz contended that war develops in and springs forth from the “womb” of politics.[4] Mao concurred, “In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics.”[5] Clausewitz argued that war is employed to further political objectives in the same way that other political means (i.e. diplomatic cables, sanctions etc.) are utilized. It differs only from other political conflicts in that it is resolved through bloodshed.[6] Mao similarly stated, “...that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.”[7]

Mao emphasized the importance of politics in guerrilla warfare. He stated that, “Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail.” [8] He believed that the guerrilla must have a precise conception of the political goal for which he is fighting and the political organization to be used in attaining that goal.[9] Mao saw political training as the key component in the development of a politically charged foot soldier. Military arts were not the sole or principal concern of the guerrilla. Mao stated that, “The fighting capacity of a guerrilla unit is not determined exclusively by military arts, but depends above all on political consciousness, political influence, setting in motion the broad popular masses, disintegrating the enemy army, and inducing the broad popular masses to accept our leadership.”[10] Political training gave the guerrilla an effective knowledge base that he could use to fulfill his primary objective; political mobilization of the population.

The goal of political mobilization is to transform a disorganized and inert population into a politically organized and energized body. The first step in political mobilization is the establishment a political aim and political program to support that aim. Political mobilization does not involve the mere presentation of the political aim and program to the population. Rather it is a metaphysical bonding with the population that connects the political aim and program intimately with the people’s lives.  Mao stated, “Our job is not recite our political program to the people, for nobody will listen to recitations; we must link the political mobilization for the war with the developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement.”[11] Mobilization binds the population, army and government together into a coherent war machine. Why did Mao view political mobilization of the population as the key to success in war? The answer lies within an analysis of the Clausewitzian trinity and how Mao applied it to the Sino-Japanese war.

Clausewitz argued that war differed from other political expression in that it is produced and governed by three dominant tendencies known as the “paradoxical trinity”: (1) The elements of primordial violence and animosity which mainly concern the people; (2) Probability and chance which the army and its commander must contend with on the battlefield and; (3) War’s subordination to the political realm, which is the sole concern of the government and its ability to reason the politics of conflict.[12] Clausewitz contended that during 18th century European warfare, the people’s role in war was ‘extinguished.”[13]  During that time period European governments did not turn the elements of primordial violence and hatred that are latent in the people against their enemies. War was the business of governments and armies alone.

The French Revolution reintroduced and reemphasized the elements of primordial violence and pure hatred in warfare. Clausewitz stated that, “in 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly war again became the business of the people - a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens.”[14]  Warfare in Europe was no longer just the business of governments and their armies. The French had the advantage because their political structure was designed to arouse and capture the violence of the whole population. The political framework of European governments was structured to support small professional armies and could not channel the might of the people against France.

Clausewitz criticized European governments for believing that they could stop the power of the French with the government and army alone. He stated, “It was expected that a moderate auxiliary corps would be enough to end a civil war [French Revolution]; but the colossal weight of the whole French people, unhinged by political fanaticism, came crashing down on us.”[15] Radical alterations in the political character of European government had to be undertaken to defeat France. Napoleon’s armies were destroyed once Europe’s statesmen recognized the nature of politics that brought the masses and all their energy into war. [16] During the early Sino-Japanese war Mao came to the conclusion that the Chinese resistance against the Japanese was similarly making the same mistake that the European governments did during the Napoleonic wars.

Mao argued that the Chinese resistance was not accessing the hatred and animosity of the people. He argued that Chinese resistance amounted to a “...partial war because it is being waged only by the government and the army, and not by the people. It is precisely here that the chief reason for the great loss of territory and for the many military setbacks during the last few months is to be found.”[17] From Mao’s perspective, the Chinese needed to stir the passions of the people against the Japanese. He condemned Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang for suppressing the role of the people in war. He wrote, “The [Kuomintang] think the Japanese aggressors can be defeated by the government’s efforts alone, but they are wrong. A few battles may be won in a war of resistance fought by the government alone, but it will be impossible to defeat the Japanese oppressors thoroughly. This can be done only by a war of total resistance by the whole nation.”[18] The politicization of the soldier and political mobilization of the population were the solutions to China’s problems. Note that Mao’s references to the army, government and people are akin to Clausewitz’s trinity.

Clausewitz and Mao lambasted military theorists who denied that there was an intimate relationship with politics. They both blamed the loss of wars in their respective time periods on leaders who eschewed the role of the people/primordial violence in war. Warfare was not just the business of governments and the military. The North Vietnamese communists also believed that tapping into the primordial violence of the people through political mobilization would bring victory in battle. Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap said, “Many a time the political force of the masses crushed enemy mopping up operations and successfully protected our compatriots’ lives and property.”[19] The force of the people would energize the military and government into an awesome war machine. Giap wrote, “In a revolutionary war, the people’s political superiority will be translated into a material force capable of turning the table on the enemy, overcoming all difficulties and hardships to defeat in the end an enemy who at first was several times stronger.”[20] The Chinese and Vietnamese armies garnered stunning wartime success in the application of political mobilization in their war planning.

Insurgent groups that have tapped into the violent passions of people through political indoctrination pose a dangerous threat to counter-insurgent forces. For example, Hezbollah developed a psychological-political campaign that successfully channeled the violence and hatred of the Shiite population against Israel. [21]  Hezbollah emulated Mao’s dictum that,  “The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened.” [22] Ibrahim Moussawi, a spokesman for Hezbollah, stressed the significance of instructing the populace in the insurgent infrastructure’s political agenda:

We [Hezbollah] give as much support as possible to the people living in the occupied zone, making them aware that the eventual outcome of the war is also about their freedom. Obviously, this has certain serious psychological implications for those trying to counter our efforts. We have been more successful in achieving this objective than the enemy [Israelis] in recent times. [23]

A central component of Islamic militant-political groups, such as Hezbollah, has been to politicize the masses through educational, social and religious programs. The Muslim Brotherhood and its splinter groups, such as HAMAS and the Egyptian Gama’a Islamiyya, have made a  political and spiritual connection to the masses through their grassroots social-political programs. A Gama’a Islamiyya tract stated, “The social activities of the Gama’a have had great effect on the people, this is the secret of the spiritual union for the Gama’a with people from amongst the poor in particular.”[24] The insurgent movement’s religious-spiritual-political connection with the people allows it to control and channel their violent passions.

Giap stated that in Vietnam’s war against foreign powers, “political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda.”[25] Counter-insurgency doctrine often reverses this strategy with resulting failure. Military activities become more important than political activities and fighting becomes more important than propaganda. The apolitical counter-insurgency campaign is doomed against politically charged insurgent movements. As the lone insurgent fighter moves through the countryside and the city, he brings with him something more destructive to his enemy than bombs, bullets or bayonets; a political message. He uses this political message to spin a political web between himself and the people that nets the counter-insurgent forces trying to destroy him.

The answer to the politically charged guerrilla fighter is the development of a politically charged counter-insurgency fighter, a political warfighter. A political warfighter that understands the political aim and political program of the counter-insurgency campaign. A political warfighter who can galvanize the primordial violence and hateful instincts of the people against the insurgent enemy. A political warfighter that can unlock the political fanaticism of the people just as the French revolutionaries, Napoleon, Mao Tse-Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap did in past wars. The political warfighter is the spark. The political message is the fuel. The people’s hatred and animosity are the fire. The fire that forges a successful war machine.

Erik Evans. completed a B.A. in History from UCSB and an M.A. in National Security Studies. His research focus is on insurgency/counter-insurgency and the role of small arms in warfare. He is currently attending a gunsmithing program in Lakewood, Colorado.