Given current operations as part of the Global War on Terrorism, it is surprising how many have forgotten the lineage of the US military in other than traditional combat operations. To focus the issue, an excerpt from a military memorabilia collectors’ publication speaks volumes, and states:

“The collector of United States Campaign medals soon discovers that America’s military history encompasses much more than the major conflicts of the Revolutionary War, Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korean War and the Vietnam War. One soon discovers that some of our nation’s early heroes emerged from battles in Cardenas, Cuba; Peking, China; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; or Bluefields, Nicaragua. Long before Marines spoke in hallowed terms of places like Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima and the ‘Frozen Chosin’; there was the ‘Citidel’, Peking, Veracruz, Fort Riviere, and Quilali.

These ‘Little Wars’ helped define America as a world military power and provided the espirit-de-corps and traditions that would steel our soldiers, sailors and Marines for World War I and the horrors of Belleau Wood, Verdun and the Somme.”

In point of fact, while the US military (past and present) spends most of its time involved in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), or Small Scale Contingencies, the training focus is traditional symmetric operations – for example a major theater of war. For current operations, research suggests, a contributing factor for this mindset is that from 1945 to 1991 and the Cold War the focus was to defeat the Soviet Union and its allies on a symmetric battlefield, with few distractions save perhaps the Vietnam experience. However, with US involvement in small-scale operations beginning in the early 1980s, for example Panama and Grenada, the ‘battlefield’ focus has once again shifted to asymmetrical, much the same as the period from 1865 to 1917 and during the 1920s to 1930s in US military history. Additionally, as the military’s primary mission is to fight and win our nation’s wars, indications are decision-makers past and present principally rely on the flexibility of the military leadership at the operational and tactical levels to adapt itself ‘on the fly’ to meet local requirements.

To further complicate the matter, many tasks for MOOTW operations, for example current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Balkans etc., are not far removed from traditional war-fighting tasks. This is certainly true in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an attempt to undermine the relief effort coalition vehicle convoys are constantly plagued by insurgent Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and a variety of other ambush tactics. To codify the relationship between traditional operational tasks and MOOTW or Stability Operations tasks, a study was conducted by the US Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Results revealed platoon- and company-level tasks of US Army Infantry, Armor and Cavalry units comparing traditional tasks to MOOTW tasks were 84–87 per cent compatible. Many of the ‘tasks’ were the same but the ‘conditions’ and ‘standards’ were different. For example, the ‘task’ of conducting a patrol is the same, yet in a traditional setting this ‘patrol’ relies on cover and Concealment to avoid detection. In a MOOTW setting, however, the ‘patrol’ relies on discovery to demonstrate presence.

Adaptation of conventional training is certainly not a new phenomenon for the US military. As far back as the Indian Wars Campaign of the 1860s–1890s the US Army concentrated most of its training time on conventional tactics, techniques and procedures, particularly officer training at the US Military Academy at West Point. Until the late 1870s or early 1880s, individual officer training on MOOTW at West Point was relegated to an occasional field training exercise or classroom lecture. The primary method of adapting traditional soldier skills to the ‘irregular battlefield’ was relegated to unit training passed down by veterans as replacements were introduced to the isolated US Army posts of the West.

The trend of modifying conventional training to the MOOTW environment has changed little since those early days of ‘irregular warfare’. Institutional officer training in the US Army’s ‘Basic Course, Career Course, Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College’ either offer no or very little in the way of training outside traditional operations. As for unit training, leaders at the tactical and operational leaders have remarked, ‘We don’t have enough time to spend on honing war-fighting skills, let alone train specifically for a smaller contingency operation’. The lack of unit training time continues to plague decision-makers, particularly since US forces are responsible for a variety of operations ranging from traditional operations, to peacekeeping/peace enforcement to counterinsurgency, to humanitarian assistance, and the list goes on. Also, the US military is much smaller today than during the ColdWar years and units are being deployed more frequently with little ‘down time’ between rotations, causing second- and third-level effects in recruiting numbers.

Doctrine as well has tended to lag behind and is not commensurate with current operations. The US military is designed to teach the individual, the unit and in institutions, for example Military Occupational Specialty producing institutions. Common sense suggests the preponderance of time should focus on small-scale contingencies, since US forces are predominately engaged in this type of operation. That, however, is not the case.

Again, using the US Army as an example, research suggests individual, unit and institutional training continues to focus on traditional operations giving only cursory attention to the specifics of other scenarios, for example Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, traditional operations continue to be the training and doctrine focus, and small-scale contingencies are an afterthought. This is also an age-old story as in earlier contingencies, for example the Indian Campaign, the Philippines and operations in the Caribbean, US forces were also ill prepared to execute their assigned missions. Each campaign demanded adapting traditional tasks to accommodate other than traditional tasks specific to the area of operation.

In the turn-of-the-century Philippines for example, as the mission called for a shift in focus from war-fighting tasks to ‘benevolent assimilation’ of the populace and nation-building tasks in 1901, ‘on the fly’ leaders made prolific use of US State Volunteers (later named the National Guard) and their acquired civilian skills to contribute in the nation-building effort, which also occurs today in Iraq and Afghanistan. This practice paid huge dividends in the rebuilding and improving of the infrastructure of the Philippine archipelago. Additionally, the US Army leadership of the period was rich with experience from the American CivilWar, the IndianWars Campaign or both. So, although leaders were used to training for and conducting traditional operations, they were also well acquainted with MOOTW operations particularly counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures, and overcame training shortfalls. This can also be said of US forces in Iraq today, as most leaders are veterans of the Balkans, or other small-scale contingencies. However, in some instances, for example Vietnam, the US military did have ‘irregular warfare doctrine’, but only for a short time and the refinement and maintenance of the doctrine was neglected and forgotten.

Leader experience, however, should not mitigate the requirement for codified training and doctrine curricula particularly at the individual and institutional level to properly prepare US forces for a variety of small-scale contingencies. Unlike earlier experiences, since 1905 with the introduction of printed field manuals, the US military, particularly the US Army, has made tremendous progress in training and doctrine policies and procedures. As the latest version of the US Army Field Manual (FM) FM-1, The Army states:

Since the 1980s, The Army developed a comprehensive doctrinal construct forassessing current capabilities and managing change. The Army maintains a trained and ready force and develops future capabilities by carefully balancing six imperatives: doctrine, organizations, materiel, leader development, training, and Soldiers.

These six imperatives are to be synchronized with one another to ensure an effective fighting force. Yet without a proper reflection of current operations in the doctrine imperative, which influences the training imperative, it is questionable whether the current method of ignoring the trend of current operations is a sound decision. To continue to allow a preponderance of training and doctrine to reflect traditional war fighting vice MOOTW, and rely on the innovation and agility of leaders seems unsound and appears to be an ‘accident waiting to happen’. A misleading comment voiced several times further complicates the situation and goes something like this, ‘it has worked this way so far’. Another old adage, ‘learn from someone else’s mistake, so you don’t make the same’, seems more appropriate. It is of little doubt that the American military is the best in the world and possibly the best ever in training, doctrine, weaponry, tactics and leadership. Each of the six US Army imperatives is closely tied with the other. Ignoring the changes in the battlefield and failure to reflect those changes in the development of doctrine and training puts US forces at an unnecessary risk.

In a speech prior to his death in a plane crash in the Congo in 1962, Secretary General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold stated, ‘Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it’.  It is strongly urged that the training and doctrine regimen be given more than just cursory attention when considering MOOTW versus traditional tasks.

LTC Brent Bankus is a retired US Army Cavalry officer, formerly the Director of Joint Training and Exercises in PKI, and currently working in the National Securities Issues Branch, U.S. Army War College.

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