

Deterring and Responding to Asymmetrical Threats

**A Monograph
by
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Title of Monograph: Deterring and Responding to Asymmetrical Threats

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Abstract

DETECTING AND RESPONDING TO ASYMMETRICAL THREATS by Major John W Reynolds, United States Army, 59 pages.

The United States involvement in military operations around the world has operational commanders on the front line against asymmetrical threats, be it from state or nonstate actors. In Somalia US soldiers were exposed to mortar attacks that originated from hospitals and schoolyards. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, US soldiers confronted an enemy that hid weapons in mosques, hospitals, and schools and wore civilian clothing to avoid destruction. Operational commanders will continue to face these types of threats regardless of the type of operation they undertake: Offense, Defense, Stability, or Support. The tendency for belligerent actors to avoid open area conflict with the United States will certainly increase. These approaches are intended to offset America's strength and intended to attack America's weakness. With the increase of asymmetric attacks and the potential of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to rogue actors, where does this leave the United States' strategy of nuclear and conventional deterrence? Is the US Army capable in playing a deterrent role against these threats?

This study examines the doctrinal definition of deterrence, reviews Bernard Brodie's deterrence theory and discusses the impacts of his theory upon state and nonstate actors. The study further defines the terms asymmetry and asymmetrical threats and reviews a World View Threat survey (European and American) that identifies these asymmetrical threats as Islamic fundamentalists. Additionally, the study presents the ends, ways, and means utilized by the Union Army during the Civil War, and the ends, ways, means utilized by the US Army during operations in Bosnia in order to deter asymmetrical threats. The study concludes by presenting operational commanders with five principles for consideration when designing campaign plans against asymmetrical threats. These five principles are 1) first strike capability, 2) force protection (second strike capability), 3) the ability to threaten severe consequences on the belligerent's interests, 4) sending a deterrence message, and 5) demonstrating the will and determination to conduct retaliatory strikes. Additionally, the study concludes that neither active, passive, nor retributive actions by themselves are effective in deterring asymmetrically threats; it is only when these three actions are integrated together into a single campaign plan where one can hope to deter asymmetrical threats and regain the deterrence equilibrium.

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CHAPTER ONE

A Memo from Osama

*My men: This is a great day. Did you see what we accomplished last week? We drove the U.S. armed forces out of three Arab countries by just threatening to hit them. I had some of our boys discuss an attack against the U.S. over cell phones, the CIA picked it up, and look what happened: the FBI team in Yemen, which was investigating our destruction of the U.S.S Cole in Aden Harbor, just packed up and left-- even though the State Department was begging them to stay. See ya. Then, after we made a few more phone calls, hundreds of U.S. marines-marines!-- who were conducting a joint exercise with the Jordanian Army cut short their operation, got back on their amphibious vessels, and fled Jordan on Saturday. See ya. Then all the U.S. Warships in Bahrain, which is the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, were so scared of being hit by us they evacuated Bahrain's harbor and sailed out into the Persian Gulf. Boys, there is military term for all this; it's called "retreat." Allahu Akbar! God is Great! This is a superpower? The Americans turned tail as soon as they picked up a few threats from us. The U.S. Press barely reported it; the White House press didn't even ask the President about it. But trust me, everyone out here noticed it. It told them many things: the Americans are afraid of sustaining even one casualty to their soldiers; they don't trust their own intelligence or weak Arab allies to protect them; **and they have no military answer for our threat.**¹*

Thomas L. Friedman

Introduction

Thomas Friedman presents a unique point of view in respect to the environment of conflict we currently find ourselves in. Who is really deterring whom? Has the United States lost the ability to act in fear of retaliation by an elusive adversary? Has the adversary dictated triggers to us, and has he established consequences if we cross those triggers? Does America, as Friedman asks, have a military answer in order to reestablish the deterrence equilibrium against this new threat? The purpose of this study is to explore these questions and find out if the United States has the military answer to regain the deterrence equilibrium. More specifically, this study will determine if the United States Army is capable in playing a deterrent role against asymmetrical threats. This chapter will identify the background and the purpose of the study, state the problem, identify the sub problems, highlight the importance and discuss the organization of the study.

¹Thomas L. Friedman, *Longitudes and Attitudes* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002), 36.

Background

A series of terrorist attacks since 1990 by nonstate actors cost the United States over 7000 casualties (approximately 3000 killed, and 4000 wounded), the damage and destruction of three U.S. embassies, one U.S. Navy destroyer, the World Trade Center complex, the Pentagon, and billions of dollars worth of material damage.² While the U.S. placed responsibility for the September 11th attacks on the al Qaeda terrorists, the responsibility for the anthrax attacks is still unknown. This possibility for anonymity could encourage nonstate actors to continue to strike the U.S. without the fear of retaliation. Furthermore, the opportunity for terrorists to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical materials could eventually provide terrorists with a more devastating weapon to attack U.S. interests at home and abroad.

The U.S. involvement in military operations around the world has operational commanders on the front line against asymmetrical threats, be it from nation states or nonstate actors. For example, in Somalia U.S. soldiers were exposed to mortar attacks; in Bosnia and Kosovo U.S. soldiers were exposed to house explosions and mines, and in Afghanistan U.S. compounds and convoys are targeted by rocket propelled grenades and sniper fire. Even in traditionally safe environments, like U.S. bases in Europe and in Kuwait, threat actors are targeting U.S. personnel and facilities. With the increase of these attack incidents against U.S. personnel and the potential of the proliferation of WMD to rogue actors, where does this leave the United States' strategy of nuclear or conventional deterrence? Will deterrence prevail among nation states? Will it prevail against nonstate actors? Is the U.S. Army capable in playing a

²“Terrorism: Attacks and Responses”, [article on-line]; available from <http://www.library.vanderbilt.edu/romans/terrorism.html#MILI>, Internet; accessed on 7 August 2002. “The Global War on Terrorism”, [article on-line]; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html>, Internet; accessed on 7 August 2002. In Feb 1993, an explosion at the World Trade Center complex killed six and injured more than a thousand people. In June 1996, an explosion at the Khobar Tower complex in Saudi Arabia killed 19 U.S. servicemen. In August 1998, bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania killed 12 U.S. citizens and injured more than four thousand (not necessary Americans). In Oct 2000, an explosion directed at the U.S.S Cole killed 16 U.S. servicemen. On September 11, 2001, attacks against the World Trade center, and the Pentagon killed over 3000 personnel, and injured over 2000.

deterrent role against these threats at the operational level? Where does this leave Brodie's theory of nuclear deterrence? Is his theory still applicable in the 21st century? Is it relevant to conventional deterrence?

Statement of the Problem

This research proposes to determine if the U.S. Army is capable in playing a deterrent role against regional asymmetrical threats. The purpose is to provide the operational commander with a deterrence framework against these threats. To answer the research question, the monograph 1) examines the relationship between WMD deterrence and non-WMD deterrence through Bernard Brodie's deterrence theory; 2) it examines and defines the asymmetrical threats that confront the operational commander; 3) it determines if the Army possess the ends, ways, and means to deter these threats; 4) and it analyzes the Army's current deterrence doctrine within FM 3-0 *Operations*, and FM 3-13(Draft) *Information Operations*. In addition, the monograph looks at the operational environment in Somalia in Oct 1993 and the challenges the command faced to deter asymmetric attacks; it looks at the operational environment in Bosnia during IFOR/SFOR transition and the challenges the command faced to deter house bombings; it looks at the 1861-1865 pacification campaign where operational commanders were tasked to deter threats against Union's interests. Although it is unlikely that 100% deterrence can be achieved, a deterrence framework that reduces incidences and prevents mass casualties will signify Army capability to deter asymmetrical threats.

Organization of the Study

Chapter two defines deterrence theory through the eyes of Brodie's principles, addresses the impact of these principles upon state and nonstate actors, and reviews deterrence doctrine in the Army. Chapter three defines the terms asymmetry and asymmetrical threats, discusses the results from a World View Threat survey (which addresses comparable perceptions in Europe and the United States on the question of "who friends and threats are"), identifies threat actors through the lenses of Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, and provides an example of a center

of gravity analysis (CC-CR-CV) of an asymmetrical threat. Chapter four describes the ends, ways, and means that are available to the operational commander to actually deter regional asymmetrical threats. It discusses the constraints placed upon operational commanders in the form of Rules of Engagement (ROE), discusses the concept of deterrence at the individual level and provides a model to see the impact of any changes of ends, ways, and means. Finally, in chapter five, the author summarizes the study and makes recommendations for operational commanders to consider when designing a deterrence campaign.

CHAPTER TWO

Introduction

The Army plays a critical role in deterring by maintaining a strong credible conventional force that is able to conduct first strike and second strike operations. It is the national leadership, however, that ensures adversaries these forces will be used if they cross a specified threshold. If an adversary doubts this commitment, the U.S. will be required to use force in order to reestablish the deterrence equilibrium. It is this threat of conventional U.S. military retaliation and the perceived willingness of national leadership to use it that may change the approaches that adversary actors take. These threats may avoid open area confrontation and hide among the population of nation states. With the potential of these actors to live within safe havens, can the Army realistically play a deterrent role? To answer this question this study must first define deterrence.

What is Deterrence?

Army doctrine defines deterrence in FM1-02 *Operational Terms and Symbols*, (Draft) as follows:

Deterrence: The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.³

Deterrence rests in the mind of the adversary, or rather, lies in the eyes of the beholder. In order for deterrence to be effective, the adversary must be fully aware that any action taken against the United States' interests will certainly lead to decisive counteractions against the adversary's interests. Army doctrine FM 3-0 *Operations* describes potential adversaries as relying on land based military and paramilitary forces to retain power and to control their populations. FM 3-0 describes how the Army will deter these types of threats:

³Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Symbols* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 2002), 68.

“Army forces deter by threatening these means of power retention and population control with the ability to engage in decisive combat and seize and occupy adversary territory. Army forces also deter cross-border aggression through forward presence, forward deployment and prompt, flexible responses. Army forces poised for action signal the unquestioned commitment of America to fight and win if deterrence fails.”⁴

While this definition may be applicable to foreign states that possess military or paramilitary forces, it is not applicable against threats that seek asymmetric approaches cloaked in anonymity. Nonstate actors, such as members of the al Qaeda network, do not reside in any one specific place nor are they regulated to one base of operation. Their “nation state” is a virtual one wrapped in ideology. They utilize computers, cell phones, and in some cases public media to conduct their day to day operations: cells located in Afghanistan are able to communicate and coordinate with cells in Somalia. So how do we deter threats that may reside within safe havens across the globe? The first step is to ensure they get the deterrence message.

Deterrence: A State of Mind

William J. Perry, one of the essayists in *How Did this Happen*, contends that the United States continues to maintain “a powerful and credible deterrent involving both nuclear and conventional weapons”.⁵ He infers that as long as the United States maintains its nuclear arsenal and a strong conventional force, nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and other rational nation states would be unlikely. However, deterrence is more than just possessing the physical means to conduct a possible first or second strike against an aggressor; it is also a state of mind. For deterrence to work, the threat of retaliation must be credible. The parties must believe that each possesses the means and the will to enter into either a nuclear confrontation or a deliberate commitment of conventional means. They also must clearly know each other’s thresholds and triggers; they must get the deterrence message. For example, the U.S. reserved the right to use

⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 June 2001), 1-2.

⁵William J. Perry, “The New Security Mantra,” in *How Did This Happen*. ed. James F. Hodge and Gideon Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 229.

atomic weapons if the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe during the Cold War. This meant that a U.S. nuclear strike would be triggered by a Soviet conventional attack instead of a nuclear attack; this of course was information the Soviet Union needed to know in order to prevent from reaching this U.S. trigger. Another example was the Bush administration's declaratory policy with regard to retaliation against a biological or chemical attack against coalition forces during the Gulf War. General Schwarzkopf, in his book *It Doesn't Take A Hero*, states:

“the chairman was pressing the White House to inform Tariq Aziz that we would use our unconventional weapons if the Iraqis used chemicals on us. The chairman believed that Secretary Baker would deliver this message to the Iraqi foreign minister.”⁶

If an adversary doubts the United States' commitment to use force, the U.S. is then required to use force; the interesting point is that the use of force may not be in pursuit of any specific strategic interest, but because the bluff was called and the adversary has gained freedom of action. The United States is then placed in a reactive mode and has to respond to the adversary in order to reestablish the deterrence equilibrium. While deterrence was applicable in the bipolar world, does it remain applicable today in a multi-polar world? Can Bernard Brodie's deterrence theory provide us with a model to answer this question?

Brodie's Theory

For fifty years, the threat of thermonuclear war has prevented conflict from reaching the level of destruction witnessed during WWI and WWII. This threat was based on Bernard Brodie's theory of nuclear deterrence. Brodie, a naval theorist, political scientist, and military historian, borrowed Douhet's concept of air supremacy, and terror bombing, and derived his theory of nuclear deterrence. Brodie's theory consisted of three points.

First, the defense is no longer the stronger form of war. Since defenses cannot block 100% of enemy bombers, and since it only takes one bomb to deliver the devastating power of the atom, as witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, defenses become useless. The corollary to

⁶Norman H. Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't take A Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 453.

Brodie's first point is that one must possess the means to conduct a first strike in order to overwhelm the adversary's defenses: at least one weapon system must get through. This can be accomplished either through quantity of means (100 bombers), or through stealth and precision technology that is able to penetrate an adversary's defenses. Second, surprise attacks are of little value due to the eventual response that will occur: enemy second strike capability. This of course implies that one's own second-strike capability has been properly protected, and enough resources are available to sustain operations: force protection.⁷ It is this threat of atomic retaliation that has developed the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Third, due to the scarcity of nuclear material, populated cities, with its large collection of people, become the premier high payoff targets for nuclear munitions- it is the consequence the adversary is unwilling to lose.⁸ Will Brodie's deterrence theory be applicable when the amount of nations possessing nuclear weapons increases? Yes.

Owning nuclear weapons today assures sovereignty and a seat on the international negotiations table. It is the symbol that demonstrates world power. Regional powers have three options in conducting nuclear action against the United States: direct action on U.S. soil, the threat of using the bomb, and indirect action abroad by targeting allies. Although the U.S. is currently unable to defend itself against a strategic nuclear attack from regional powers (such as China, Russia, and North Korea), the delivery means by these powers would be traceable and therefore retaliatory strikes would be possible. The assumption is that the quantity of nuclear weapons maintained by the United States is sufficient to strike different regional powers simultaneously. Therefore, it would be more likely that these regional powers would continue to

⁷This infers, of course that nations have guaranteed themselves the ability to respond in kind, and have secured their means of delivery in various locations.

⁸Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983) 26-32. Brodie's argument suggests that the costs of producing WMD are expensive, and time consuming; they are also inaccurate against point targets and not effective against mobile targets. Therefore, cities prove to be the most logical target. Attacking the work force and the morale (will) of the people becomes the number one HPT. However, when Nuclear weapons become abundant, other targets become feasible.

use their “potential capacity”⁹ of these weapons to achieve their limited means (bargaining power), and not pursue an open nuclear confrontation with the U.S. This action would severely hamper U.S. foreign policy and inhibit actions that would otherwise be available if the U.S. remained the primary actor possessing these weapons.¹⁰

One could argue that limited nuclear attacks against U.S. allies prove a more lucrative target and may prevent nuclear retaliatory strikes. For example, although the security of Taiwan is an important U.S. national interest, it may not be a vital interest to risk nuclear war; however, this does not mean that a U.S. conventional option would not be pursued. Again, a strong permanent conventional force and the clear intent that this force would be used if U.S. national interest were attacked (a trigger) might be enough to deter unwelcome action.

Will regional actors target tactical or operational targets? Brodie’s concept of scarcity still applies. The technical, and expensive resources required to produce nuclear weapons will continue to limit the target lists and force regional powers to pursue strategic targets: cities. The United States, however does possess the means to pursue tactical targets with nuclear weapons, but will refrain from using them for fear of retaliatory strikes and international condemnation. Therefore, more destructive non-nuclear weapons will be developed to defeat tactical and operational targets. Precision guided and improved conventional area munitions provide the United States with effects that equal those of tactical nuclear weapons. Fuel air explosives, thermo baric weapons, and area denial cluster bombs provide a more efficient way to destroy a target; they are less expensive, and insure less international condemnation.

⁹Giulio Douhet, *The Probable Aspects of the War of the Future* (CSI Reprint: From The Command of the Air (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), p143-208), 26. Douhet’s theory of Potential capacity: the possession of means to destroy an enemy’s capability is enough to deter the enemy from using that capability. England won the sea war (WWI) against Germany without firing a shot; the virtue of having a superior fleet and their potential of using this capability was sufficient to deter Germany from engaging in a sea war with England.

¹⁰In December 2002, North Korea announced its intention to restart its nuclear program. The United States response was to invalidate an agreement that provided North Korea with economic assistance. Is North Korea using its potential capacity of nuclear weapons to renegotiate economic assistance?

What impact does several states possessing nuclear weapons have on the United States' ability to act offensively? The United States will be constrained in pursuing interests. For example, if Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons and the means to attack coalition forces (nuclear scud attacks against Israel) during the Gulf War, would the U.S. or other members of the coalition have decided to attack? Would or could General Clark, as the NATO commander, pursue offensive actions against Milosovic in Kosovo, if Serbia possessed the means to threaten NATO countries with nuclear strikes? Whether the answer is yes or no, the decision to execute would have been complicated.

When discussing regional powers this study assumed that self-preservation and rational thinking would prevent nuclear war. If, however, a radical regime such as Iraq, which has shown the tendency to use WMD in the past, were to possess nuclear weapons then there would be no way of knowing whether that country can be deterred from using its arsenal. Even further, the other option for Iraq may be to provide this capability to radical fundamentalists in order to create a buffer zone and attempt to distance responsibility. An investigation into the Khobar tower bombings found that Iranian officials financed the attacks against the U.S. While the U.S. has convicted individuals directly involved with the incident, it has failed in engaging Iran directly.¹¹ While it may seem irrational that actors (state or nonstate) may pursue a course of action that leads to a nuclear holocaust, one only has to reflect on the ability of these actors to convince other humans to commit suicide to see that it is viable. If means were available on September 11th to kill 30,000 people, does any one doubt the terrorists would have not used them? If such actors exist and self-preservation is of a lesser value than the destruction of "America", then the U.S. should pursue preemptive and proactive measures to prevent such regimes from acquiring nuclear capability.

¹¹"Iranian Link", *ABC News.COM*, [article on-line]; available from <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/iran991005.html>, Internet; accessed on 7 September 2002. State Department spokesman James Rubin states that Iranian governmental officials were involved in the Khobar tower attack.

Unconventional Threats

Today, while MAD still provides deterrence against regional threats, it may not be applicable against unconventional, nonstate actors. These actors are waging a protracted asymmetric war against the United States; they have acquired the taste of killing and do and will not act in accordance to our definition of rationality. They are capable of atrocities and are willing to sacrifice their own in order to achieve their objectives. They are not impressed in America's firepower and mock at the "rational" rules of engagement established by America's policy makers. While terrorism is their method, their center of gravity is their anonymity. The attacks by these actors such as the bombing of the Khobar towers, the attack on the USS Cole, the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, and the attack on the twin towers and the Pentagon show that these threats are real and are part of a greater scheme to undermine U.S. interests. Responding to these attacks is proving to be difficult due to detecting their infiltrations and identifying responsibility. For example, the responses the U.S. administration pursued during the last ten years did little to deter the attacks on September 11th: economic sanctions, military strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan, and criminal convictions.¹²

Brodie's theory of deterrence hinges on the ability to conduct retaliatory strikes. If, however, it is impossible to determine culpability and responsibility then deterrence fails.¹³ What cities do you target when you can't link responsibility to the population or government? Which

¹²"Strikes on Terrorist-Related Facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan August 20, 1998", Department of State, [article on-line]; available from http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/sudan_afghan.html, Internet; accessed on 7 March 2002. Although limited, previous administrations have always responded against attacks across the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic). While the amount and type of clandestine actions remain classified, the U.S. should focus on maintaining the initiative, and forcing the enemy into our decision cycle instead of the other way around.

¹³If, however, culpability is known, and nonstate actors can be identified, it requires the U.S. to have the "will" to affect these threats at their source. For example, if the U.S. knew that al Qaeda was culpable for the Embassy and USS Cole attacks, why did the U.S. not attack Afghanistan at that time? Obviously, at that time, the trigger for such a commitment was not met. The failure of not responding adequately may have resulted in the U.S. not delivering the appropriate deterrence message that could have deterred 9/11.

country do you detonate a nuclear weapon in to defeat a 30-40-man cell? The attacks on September 11 were neither delivered by military bombers nor by scuds but by unconventional means: commercial planes, hijacked by terrorists, directed towards their targets by individuals willing to die for their cause. One can make the argument that nuclear weapons are too sophisticated and technical to be produced by nonstate actors; anonymity will be difficult to keep and delivery means would require the assistance of a nation state. However, one has to only reflect on the anthrax attacks that took place after September 11th to see that it is possible to develop sophisticated WMD, infiltrate America's defenses, strike and remain unknown.

Options

The United States seeks to fight decisive battles of annihilation.¹⁴ This however, may have to change as more nations gain possession of nuclear weapons; it may become difficult to threaten military consequences against a nuclear capable adversary, which can threaten the U.S. or its allies with a nuclear responses. Other instruments of power, such as economic or diplomatic, may play a more dominant role. With that said, what actions should the U.S. undertake to deter future threats? Strategically, the United States needs to continue its policy of deterrence as outlined by Brodie (which includes seeking to fight decisive battles), maintain an adequate nuclear arsenal (first strike and second strike capability) to confront the proliferation of nuclear weapons, develop and refine the national ballistic defense shield, maintain conventional dominance to deter belligerent actors, conduct informational campaigns that proffer globalization and interaction (co-existence), build and maintain international anti-terrorist coalitions, maintain a prominent role in economic interaction, and conduct proactive actions to prevent the proliferation

¹⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 June 2001), 1-2.

of nuclear capability to hostile regimes.¹⁵ Operationally, the United States needs to maintain intelligence collection superiority within targeted countries, maintain worldwide rapid force projection capability with forward bases, and develop decisive campaigns against active terrorist and supporting infrastructures. Tactically, the United States must find, fix, isolate, and destroy terrorist cells, nuclear proliferation and financial infrastructures, and hostile command and control networks as quickly as they are identified. Being proactive at each of these levels will prevent the “enemy” from regaining the initiative.

Summary

The key to deterrence is the adversary’s state of mind and the ability to paralyze the adversary into inaction. Brodie’s theory provides us a model in which this can be accomplished. As mentioned above and depicted in figure 1, Brodie’s maxim that defense is no longer the stronger form of war is correct: infiltration by unconventional forces into the United States is possible by land, sea or air. This suggests that regardless of the amount of resources that are invested to strengthen our defenses, the adaptive and thinking adversary will find a way to penetrate those defenses. Brodie’s first point also holds true for the United States. We should maintain first strike capability, and demonstrate the preparedness to conduct active/ preemptive measures against

Figure 1: Deterrence Theory

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Defense No Longer Stronger Form Of War <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintain First Strike Capability: Quantity or Stealth - Active Measures 2. Surprise and Preemptive Strike No Longer of Value <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Second Strike Capability - Force Protection - Force Sustainment - Intelligence 3. Cities are Targets: Threaten sever consequences <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Threaten adversaries with unbearable consequences - ROE (Indirect Deterrence) 4. Sending the Deterrence Message <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing Triggers & Thresholds - Doctrine - Pattern of Behavior - History of Combat Success (Tactical/Operational) 5. Will and Determination to conduct Retaliatory strikes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Domestic & International Cooperation - History of Success (Strategic) |
|---|

¹⁵Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and The Olive Tree* (New York: Random House, 2000) p. 7-9. Friedman’s argument states that Globalization filled the vacuum of the cold war and is now the predominant international system that brings sovereign nations to interact: “it is the inexorable integration of markets, nation states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is enabling the world to reach into individuals, corporation and nation states farther, faster, deeper, cheaper than ever before.” Contrary to the polar relationship of the cold war, Friedman defines the multi-polar relationship as being interaction between: 1) nation state and nation state, 2) nation state and global markets, 3) nation states and super empowered people.

threats in order to deter future attacks. Contrary to Brodie's second point, surprise nuclear attacks may be of value to nonstate actors. Nonstate actors may be able to avoid retaliatory strikes through anonymity and through the dispersion of their operating cells throughout the world. This dispersion of threat actors, within safe havens, may prove hard to defeat due to political and international laws. Third, while the U.S. maintains an adequate inventory of nuclear weapons, terrorists intermingle among the non-combatants within cities and therefore cannot be threatened with retaliation. Additionally, it becomes very difficult to threaten consequences on individuals that are willing to die for their cause. Fourth, the deterrence message must reach the adversary; triggers and thresholds must be understood so there are no misunderstandings. Additionally, a history of successful engagements, and battles plays an important role in deterring aggression. It demonstrates the U.S. resolve in pursuing threats that cross the deterrence line. This may include focusing on secondary and easily accessible and vulnerable targets first in order to build up combat success. Fifth, the U.S. must possess the will to engage threats regardless of their physical location. This is done through international cooperation.

Brodie's theory of deterrence is still applicable today against state actors, but not necessarily against nonstate actors. The issue involves anonymity and the idea of rational behavior. As mentioned, it is difficult to deter against a nuclear attack if one does not know who is responsible or what targets to attack. It is also difficult to deter against actors who are willing to give up their lives to achieve their ultimate goal: the defeat of America. Therefore, nuclear deterrence alone will not constrain nonstate actors; conventional strength coupled with aggressive domestic and foreign policy should compliment each other in this regard. Existing rules of engagement may be required to adapt to this new threat. It may require the U.S. to pursue indirect methods to deter the threat.¹⁶ Like cancer, once terrorism has spread through out the

¹⁶This idea of affecting the threat indirectly by affecting supporters or other things important to the threat is covered in chapter V. The author recommends planners look at Maslow's hierarchy of needs as a framework to help identify potential critical vulnerabilities of the adversary.

organism the only solution is to eradicate the entire organism (tactical level): find, fix, and destroy. However, if one can catch it at its roots one might be able contain it and force it into remission (operational and strategic level): education, globalization, and coexistence. Deterring asymmetric threats will require the U.S. to adopt new rules and approaches; in fact, to reestablish the deterrence equilibrium it may require the adoption of new asymmetric approaches. To answer these questions, we must first define asymmetry and asymmetric warfare.

CHAPTER THREE

Asymmetry

“ Sir, tower two has been hit... America is under attack.”

Andrew Card to President Bush, September 11, 2001, Florida¹⁷

In chapter 2, the author defined deterrence and addressed the relevancy of Bernard Brodie’s deterrence theory. The author concluded that deterrence consisted of five areas: maintaining a first strike capability, protecting second strike capability, threatening adversaries with unbearable consequences, delivering the deterrence message, and demonstrating the will to accomplish assigned objectives. Additionally, chapter 2 concluded that the key to deterrence is the ability to affect the will of the adversary in order to paralyze the adversary into inaction. With that said, the object of deterrence is the adversary actor. But what if we cannot affect the adversary directly? Is it still possible to deter the threat? The premise of this chapter is that the Army can; in fact, the Army plays an important deterrent role by engaging the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) either directly, or indirectly (or a combination of direct and indirect). Before delving directly into identifying how to affect these threats, we must first look at who and what they are. Therefore, this chapter defines asymmetrical threats, discusses results from a World View Threat survey, identifies threat actors through the lenses of Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, provides current regional threat examples, and provides a threat center of gravity analysis of one critical capability with an example worksheet to help record the COG’s critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.

Asymmetrical Warfare

The word asymmetry is an adjective; it describes items that are not symmetrical, and compares and relates them against each other.¹⁸ While the term is vacant in JP1-02 (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms), it has been added and defined in the United States

¹⁷CNN Headline News, *CNN Broadcast*, March 8, 2002.

¹⁸Merriam-Webster, INC, *Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 10th Edition* (Springfield: Merriam Webster INC, 1996), 76.

Army's latest doctrinal manual FM1-02 *Operational Terms and Symbols* (Draft), which supersedes its September 1997 version of FM 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A (Operational Terms and Symbols). It states

Asymmetry: Dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, capabilities, and values between other armed forces (formally organized or not) and US forces. Engagements are symmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are similar; they are asymmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional rules of engagement are the norm (FM 3-0).¹⁹

Considering the environment and the operations in which today's commanders find themselves, one should not limit the comparison between armed forces but should include all actors that interact with the operational commander, be it state or nonstate.

In his essay, "The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities for Defense Planning", McKenzie argued that "weaker powers, both state and nonstate, will seek ways to mitigate the dominance of the strong."²⁰ While this is true, one must not discount the ability of stronger states to seek asymmetric approaches against weaker powers. Why come to a knife fight with a knife if one has a machine gun, or better yet why come at all if one can send remotely guided precision bombs instead?²¹ Alvin and Heidi Toffler identify these asymmetric approaches in their book *War and Anti-War*. It seems that the greatest potential for asymmetry to occur is between the Tofflers' first wave (agrarian) and their other two waves (industrial and informational).²²

¹⁹Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Symbols* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 2002), 21.

²⁰Kenneth F. McKenzie, *The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities for Defense Planning*. In QDR 2001: Strategy- Driven Choices For America's Security, edited by Michele A. Flournoy, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), 75.

²¹One cannot forget the approach Harrison Ford undertook in his movie, *Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom*. The character Indiana Jones, while being confronted with an expert swordsman who dazzlingly shows his skill in a 30 second display of sword play, takes his gun out of his holster and shoots him. He wins; end of story.

²²Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1993), 33. The Tofflers' three waves of warfare range from the hoe and the sword, to the mass production and tanks, to the computer and precision guided weapons.

Asymmetrical warfare therefore, is defined as one actor seeking to offset the other's strength by utilizing different approaches or means in order to attack identified vulnerabilities; it is the deliberate strategy chosen by one side to exploit the weakness of an opponent. This art of war should not surprise us; actors have always sought to avoid strength and to attack the enemy's weak points. What has changed for the United States however, is its conventional military dominance. Currently, the United States faces no peer military competitor or rival military coalition. The Gulf War clearly showed the futility of attempting to match the United States with conventional methods. Even the recent defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan provides an example that mere second wave parity is not sufficient against the United States third wave dominance; in effect, the United States sought an asymmetric approach.

Due to the conventional military dominance, the United States will most likely face regional threats that will challenge it through asymmetric approaches, such as area denial strategies, economic competition, and information warfare. More importantly, nonstate threats will continue to attempt to offset the United States' strengths, and strike at its vulnerabilities using an indirect approach. These approaches may include informational attacks (propaganda), computer attacks (web hacks and viruses), and direct action attacks (irregular attacks/terrorism) against U.S. targets at home and abroad. Attacks of this kind will be hard to trace, and therefore, be difficult to respond or deter against.

An important characteristic in asymmetric warfare is identifying the vulnerabilities of the actors involved. If one can identify these then one can either protect them or attack them to accomplish one's aim. Dr. Joe Strange, author of *Perspectives on Warfighting: Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities*, provided an analysis tool that links the concepts of center of gravity (COG) and critical vulnerabilities (CV). His logic trail begins with the Clausewitz concept of center of gravity, then identifies the critical capabilities required to enable that center of gravity; these capabilities are then associated with critical requirements, which are "essential

conditions, resources and means for a critical capability to be fully operative”.²³ From this list of critical requirements a list of critical vulnerabilities are identified “which are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack (moral/physical harm) in a manner achieving decisive results.”²⁴ Dr. Strange’s concept, as he laid it out in his book, was adopted in Joint Publications 5-00.1 (Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning) and published in January 2002.²⁵ It appears that our threats have made this linkage by identifying the American will as a center of gravity, and American casualties as a critical vulnerability.

Asymmetrical Threats

Asymmetric threats will seek approaches that offset the advantages of a stronger force; these threats will rely on indirect approaches in order to achieve their aim. For example, warlords in Somalia, which the Tofflers would probably categorize as late first wave, caused the United States, third wave, to withdraw from the region by attacking a strategic center of gravity: the will of the American people. Casualties, from an operation that was intended to relieve human suffering, shocked the President of the United States into the eventual withdrawal of all forces in the region. The terrorist bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut had similar results when large numbers of Americans returned to the United States in body bags. Both of these events occurred while the United States was on “Peacekeeping operations”. These threat approaches, while conducted tactically, had strategic consequences. It is such approaches that current threats will continue to seek in order to impact the strategic interests of the United States. They take the form of terrorism, sniper attacks, mortar attacks, riots, and informational warfare. So what and who are the threats that we are facing? In a recent survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the majority of

²³Dr. Joe Strange, *Perspectives on Warfighting: Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities* (Virginia: Defense Automated Printing Service Center, 1996), IX.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Joint Publication 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (25 January 2002), II-6.

Americans and Europeans agree that terrorism, WMD, and Islamic fundamentalism are among the top threats in the world (figure 2).²⁶ While it is not surprising that terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism are on the top of the list, due to the recent terrorism attacks, the question is why are these threats focused against the United States, and what is the appeal for terrorists like Osama bin Laden?

Islamists currently blame the West, and of course the West's core country the United States, for their demise and their economic disparity.²⁷ The communication age has intensified this awareness at the personal level, family level, regional level, and national level. The popularity and appeal of men like Osama bin Laden should therefore not surprise us. Among the Islamic culture Osama becomes the modern day Robin Hood. Not only is Osama a persuasive and eloquent speaker

Figure 2: German Marshall Fund Survey 2002

Possible threats to vital interests seen as "extremely important" ("critical" in U.S.)		
THREATS	EUROPE	U.S.
International terrorism	65%	91%
Iraq developing WMD	58%	86%
Global warming	50%	46%
Islamic fundamentalism	49%	61%
Military conflict between Israel and Arab neighbors	43%	67%
Large number of immigrants and refugees coming into your country	38%	60%
Tensions between India and Pakistan	32%	54%
Globalization	22%	29%
Development of China as a world power	19%	56%
Economic competition ...from the U.S. (in Europe) ...from Europe (in the U.S.)	18%	13%
Political turmoil in Russia	15%	27%

Sources: The German Marshall Fund of the United States and The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

but he also represents a figure that is attempting to rectify disparity by defying the strong in order to protect the weak. This image finds favor among many men that want to reclaim former Islamic glory.

²⁶The German Marshall Fund of the United States. "Europeans See The World As Americans Do, But Critical of U.S. Foreign Policy". Worldviews 2002 Survey of American and European Attitudes and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy. [article on-line]; available from http://208.141.197,179/key_findings/transatlantic_report.htm, Internet; accessed on 4 September 2002.

²⁷Bernard Lewis, author of the book *What Went Wrong*, concluded that Islamists believe the United States is presenting an obstacle in the path of Islam; it is preventing Islam in returning to its earlier form as taught and preached by Muhammad. The economic, and productivity dominance enjoyed by the Arabic world prior to the 18th century had moved to the west. Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Samuel P. Huntington, in *The Clash of Civilizations*, suggested that there were seven major civilizations that define the world's contemporary environment versus the polar environment during the cold war. While during the Cold War one could expect a linear cause and effect relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union; this is no longer the case.²⁸ The new multi-polar world, according to Huntington, adds additional complexity to foreign policy and cause and effect relationships are harder to determine. For example, owning nuclear weapons today assures sovereignty and a seat on the international negotiations table; it is a symbol that demonstrates world power. Will deterrence be applicable when the number of nations or actors possessing nuclear weapons increases? In regards to nation states the answer is yes; the answer to nonstate actors is unknown. The deterrence policy against one actor may not work against another.

According to Huntington, it is the differences between cultural interests that place civilizations at odds against each other. For example, he suggests that Islam is “a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power”.²⁹ It is this obsession of inferiority that has driven this culture to pursue actions to regain their former glory. Terrorist organizations count on this issue and draw their recruits from the collection of these angry men.

The greatest advantages that terrorists have and will continue to have are a virtually unlimited range of targets. They can attack anything, anytime, anywhere, but traditionally they attack soft targets. Figure 3 represents a center of gravity analysis (CC-CR-CV) of an example threat the operational commander may encounter in the future. While only one capability,

²⁸Linear cause and effect relationship refers to Senge's concept of detailed complexity. That is given a set of inputs into a system, a reliable output could be expected. For example, if you invade Afghanistan (as the Soviets did) then the U.S. would boycott the Olympics. If you don't remove missiles from Turkey, the missiles in Cuba will remain.

²⁹Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 217.

asymmetric approach, is discussed, similar analysis can be conducted on all critical capabilities associated with the threat's COG- Anonymity.




Figure 3: System Worksheet (CC: Asymmetric Approach)

While the Army may not be able to engage the adversary directly, the above example suggests that there are vulnerable targets within the adversary's system that the Army can affect. For example, the Army can affect the adversary's training facilities, disrupt his communications, disrupt his freedom of action through checkpoints, and influence his manpower through psychological operations. The Army confronted asymmetric threats in Somalia and Bosnia; while these operations began as peacekeeping missions they ended very differently.

Regional Threat Examples

Somalia

In 1993, the United States participated in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission to Somalia. While originally a humanitarian relief operation under the UN charter, political conditions soon changed the environment for the operational commander. In late April of 1993, the United States-led operation into Somalia was handed over to a United Nations representative, General Cevic Bir from Turkey. Mohammed Farah Aidid perceived he was being marginalized

by the UN sponsored efforts to rebuild the political structure in Somalia. Originally, Robert Oakely, Bush’s representative to Somalia, acknowledged Aidid as a future leader of Somalia. As Robert Oakely gave way to Admiral Jonathan Howe, who was the United Nations' special envoy, Aidid saw his position weaken. Tom Farer, a legal advisor to Howe, states that “Aidid thought he had been "blackballed" as a Somali leader.”³⁰

Initially, Aidid utilized guerilla tactics (asymmetric) to attack UN forces within Mogadishu in an attempt to convince the UN he should not be marginalized. Aidid escalated the pressure when these low levels attacks proved unsuccessful in changing the minds of the UN. On June 5th 1993, Aidid graduated to a deliberate ambush that killed 24 Pakistanis. In response, TF 1-22 of the 10th Mountain Division conducted the first U.S. led raid on Somali militia to punish those responsible for the ambush. After this date U.S. troops experienced daily mortar attacks against their compounds, and sniper attacks against their convoys. Aidid’s hit and run attacks persisted until the 3- 4 October battle that eventually led to the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia.³¹

Figure 4 displays the events that took place between August and October 1993 by TF 2-14 of the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia. It displays the myriad of threats to which the operational commander responded.

Figure 4: TF 2-14 Responses

8 AUGUST 1993	TF 2-14 responds to MP mine vehicle ambush that kills 4 Americans
15 AUGUST 1993	TF 2-14 attacks to clear potential residents responsible for the 8 August Ambush
19 AUGUST 1993	TF 2-14 responds to vehicle ambush site, that destroys two friendly vehicles; 4 soldiers wounded

³⁰Michael Elliott, "The Making of a Fiasco." Newsweek, October 1993, 34.

³¹The author was the company executive officer of B Company, TF 2-14 during the extraction of the Ranger elements in Somalia. Appendix D is an extract of the account; it was taken from personnel notes and accounts from members of the company, and captured in the authors journal.

22 AUGUST 1993	TF 2-14 conducts operations to secure Main Supply Route (MSR), which was disrupted by burning tires and obstacles
31 AUGUST 1993	TF 2-14 conducts search and attack of suspected mortar site responsible for the daily attacks against U.N. compounds
2 SEPTEMBER 1993	TF 2-14 conducts search and attack against suspected sniper/ weapons cache site
3 SEPTEMBER 1993	TF 2-14 conducts search and attack against suspected sniper/ weapons cache site
8 SEPTEMBER 1993	TF 2-14 conducts search and attack of suspected mortar site responsible for the daily attacks against U.N. compounds
13 SEPTEMBER 1993	TF 2-14 conducts search and attack against suspected sniper/ weapons cache site: 5 soldiers wounded from gunshot
19 SEPTEMBER 1993	TF 2-14 conducts search and attack of suspected mortar site responsible for the daily attacks against U.N. compounds
25 SEPTEMBER 1993	TF 2-14 responds to rescue personnel from a downed Blackhawk
3-4 OCTOBER	TF 2-14 responds to extract 3 rd Battalion 75 th Ranger during operations in the city

What deterrence value did the U.S. forces possess in Somalia? None. Although the military had forces stationed in Somalia, to include elements of a ranger battalion, it was unable to reduce or eliminate the attacks. The units adopted passive measures; they constructed base camps and concentrated on force protection operations. Although they provided security for humanitarian relief convoys they never conducted active and preemptive operations directed at eliminating the threat- the raid on 3-4 October being the exception. U.S. forces were unable to establish triggers and thresholds to deliver the deterrence message to the adversary. Looking at the list of incidents, the majority of the operations was reactive in nature; friendly forces maneuvered against the adversary only after the adversary attacked. The adversary's freedom of action was never constrained, and therefore the adversary could pick when and what target he wanted to attack. The adoption of passive measures and the failure to deny the adversary's freedom of action contributed to loss of the deterrence equilibrium.

In addition, identifying actors was also difficult; Mogadishu consisted of 16 warring factions, with over 21 clans and subclans. Each of these clans had their own appointed leader and their own agenda. In this plethora of actors, delivering deterrence messages to establish U.S. triggers and thresholds proved too complicated. Even if the message went out, what consequences could the U.S. undertake if the triggers were crossed? In the majority of cases, individuals that were apprehended were often released due to the lack of civil authority within the city. The U.S. military had no liaison with civilian officials to hand over apprehended personnel and the U.S. did not want to accept that additional burden of establishing courts and prisons. Adversaries were able to hide among these clans and often blamed their actions on rival clan leaders and organizations. This lack of information, and inability to threaten the adversary's interests degraded the deterrence value for the U.S. forces. While American forces were sequestered in base camps in Somalia, the opposite occurred in Bosnia.

Bosnia

What were the ends, ways, and means adopted by the U.S. Army during Operation Enduring Freedom to deter asymmetrical threats?

For 2000 years Balkan history had been marked with ethnic cleansing and religious fighting, and only during the cold war did the bipolar nature of the world provide for peace and stability in the region; this stability minimized internal strife and maintained order among the different ethnic groups in the region: Serbs (Orthodox Christians), Bosniacs (Muslims), and Croats (Roman Catholics). This however, quickly changed when both Josep Broz, better known as Tito, died in 1980, and when the Soviet Union began to economically implode in the late 1980s. As international attention moved to the Middle East during the Gulf War in 1990, the former state of Yugoslavia slowly moved into ethnic chaos and war. At the end of four years of war (1991-1995) close to 300,000 people were killed with the majority of casualties resulting from ethnic

cleansing.³² While the United Nation (UN) efforts to end the war were marked with embarrassing results, most notably human UN shields against NATO bombing efforts, United States negotiating efforts led by Richard Holbrooke finally brought the war to an end.

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords ended the war in the former republic of Yugoslavia and brought the United States into the region. UN Security Council Resolution 1031 mandated NATO to provide a 60,000 man implementation force (IFOR) to enforce the cease-fire between the entities within the region: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska. Eighteen thousand of these forces were American,. IFOR was given the mission to “ensure compliance with the cease fire, ensure the withdrawal and separation of forces to cantonment areas, ensure the demobilization of remaining forces, and control the Bosnian airspace.”³³

Colonel Greg Fontenot, the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division commander, led U.S. forces (as part of IFOR) into Bosnia in 1995. The brigade was situated in the northern sector, which included the city of Brcko, and set out to accomplish the required tasks as set forward in the Dayton Peace Accords: separate forces, gain control of the area of operation, disarm troops, clear mines, blow bunkers, and enforce compliance. Although the faction representatives signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) back at Dayton, Colonel Fontenot quickly realized that things were not as clear-cut on the ground.

By the spring of 1996, the factions began a plan of confrontation against IFOR, focusing on challenging the agreements in the Accords. The Croats and Bosniacs would demand freedom of movement into Serbian held territory in order to visit graveyards to pay respects to lost loved ones, which was permitted under the Accords; however, during the visits the Croats and Bosniacs would attempt to reclaim their homes, which were given to Serb families. The ensuing

³²Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), XV.

³³Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup, *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (New York: M.E. Sharp INC, 1999), 377.

confrontation placed U.S. forces in the middle and often resulted in injury to the soldiers. Serbs reacted similarly; rent-a-crowds would often show up within 30 minutes of the graveyard visits, and begin harassing IFOR and the Croatian and Bosnian visitors by throwing rocks and swinging sticks.³⁴ These rent-a-crowds would also disrupt other IFOR missions. During a weapons confiscation operation in the vicinity of Brcko in September 1996, U.S. forces were ordered to confiscate a T55 tank and destroy it. Within thirty minutes of IFOR's arrival rent-a-crowds appeared and began harassing the soldiers by throwing rocks and creating human chains around the tank; this not only delayed the removal of the tank but also pitted soldiers against civilians.

Another tactic used by the Serbs was the bombing of freshly built homes along the Zone of Separation to prevent Croatian and Bosniac resettlement in the vicinity of Brcko; these explosions were dangerous to U.S. forces who were conducting foot patrols within the vicinity of the homes; in one incident collateral damage injured two U.S. soldiers burying them among the fallen debris.

How did the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division deter these confrontations? The brigade aggressively patrolled the zone of separation (ZOS) during the day and during the night. The patrols were conducted seven days a week at random times, often with overlapping routes.³⁵ The patrols served as both a show of force and a source of information, which the commander used to deter factions at the operational level. For example, the patrols would closely monitor the construction progress of Bosniac homes within the ZOS: checking the homes every three days. Each home was assigned a number between one and four; a one meant that the home was physically ready for resettlement; a four meant it required a significant amount of work before resettlement could occur. According to the GFAP, resettlement of displaced personnel hinged on

³⁴Russel W, Glenn, *Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 203. This rent-a-crowds would get paid 100DM for their participation.

³⁵Appendix B provides an example of a patrol matrix and a route overlay that was typical for a company in Bosnia 1996. The patrols ran 24 hours and that they overlapped. The diagram shows Charlie company mounted patrol route number one. C01M; there were an additional 50 separate patrol routes, with overlapping checkpoints, in an attempt to deter asymmetric attacks within the Zone of Separation.

two primary criteria: the displaced person could prove the home was his, and the home was ready to be resettled. The intent of the Bosniacs, however, was to resettle the ZOS as quickly as possible in order to prevent Serb refugees from moving into their homes. The Army commander was able to deter this massive influx of Bosniac personnel by demonstrating that the homes requested for resettlement were in fact level four homes (unlivable: no roofs, walls, stoves, etc) and could not sustain a family and any attempt to do so would be unnecessary. This in fact would keep tensions between the different factions down.³⁶

The brigade also weighted the main effort with additional resources to ensure they could react faster than the factions; Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, UK Sound Acquisition, SOF, JSTARS, UAV, Air Cavalry, AC-130 Reconnaissance, Imagery, SIGINT and COMINT, Field Artillery, Target Acquisition Radar, and Dogs. While the intelligence assets proved critical to stay ahead of the factions, the mechanized quick reaction force (QRF) promised factions a decisive response to any unfavorable actions they may have wanted to commit. The brigade also secured key facilities such as Brcko bridge and checkpoints along the ZOS. The checkpoint near the bridge not only indicated U.S. presence but also denied anyone the opportunity to destroy the bridge. Checkpoints near the ZOS, especially in the vicinity of the roads, provided an opportunity for informal trade between the factions- the Arizonia Market: Colonel Fontenot stated that “it became the model for the rest of Bosnia for stimulating economic activity and establishing a potential for economic reintegration.”

How effective was 1st Brigade? Colonel Fontenot indicates that while only 13 homes were destroyed in Brcko due to house bombings in six months, a total of 65 homes were destroyed in one night in a different sector. In addition, while the other sectors were struggling

³⁶The author was a company commander during this IFOR rotation, and has provided a sample housing worksheet in appendix B; he has also provided a copy of the memo approving process: one can see that only a small amount of homes were approved each week and were tracked accordingly.

with resettlement issues, 1st BDE led the way in the return of displaced civilians, with over 300 homes being rebuilt.³⁷

Summary

Asymmetrical warfare is defined as one actor seeking to offset the other's strength by utilizing different approaches or means in order to attack identified vulnerabilities. Nonstate threats will attempt to offset the United States' strengths, and strike at its vulnerabilities using an indirect approach; these vulnerabilities include soft targets, such as American casualties, and American facilities. These approaches include informational attacks, computer attacks, and direct action attacks against targets at home and abroad. Attacks of this kind will be hard to trace, and therefore, be difficult to respond or deter against. Therefore, if one conducts a center of gravity analysis of these threats, and identifies the critical capabilities and critical requirements one may be able to attack the COG indirectly.

The threats, according to Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington are international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. It seems that part of the Islamic culture blame the West, and the West's core country the United States, for their demise. Islamic fundamentalists are convinced of their superiority and are obsessed with the inferiority of their own power. It is this obsession that has driven many on a quest to regain their former glory. The Army plays a key role in deterring this threat by neutralizing the popularity of Osama bin Laden through regional psychological operations, by reversing the blame game through Information Operations, and by eradicating key leadership nodes of the Islamic fundamentalist network.

³⁷Russel W, Glenn, *Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 211.

CHAPTER FOUR

In chapter 3 the author defined asymmetrical warfare as one actor seeking to offset the other's strength by utilizing different approaches or means in order to attack identified vulnerabilities. These approaches include indirect approaches such as terrorism, informational attacks, and computer attacks. In order to defeat these threats the Army may have to adopt asymmetric approaches of its own in order to reestablish the deterrence equilibrium. In considering such approaches, the Army must understand the ends that are to be achieved, the means that are required, and the accepted ways to be used. This chapter presents an ends, ways, and means model, reviews the ends, ways, and means used by the Union Army to deter southern threats during the Civil War, and discusses if the U.S. Army possesses the ends, ways, and means to deter asymmetrical threats. The premise of this chapter is that the Army is capable in deterring threats by sending a clear deterrence message to its adversaries; this message is based on successful tactical results through active and passive measures, and operations that are closely tied to political ends.

Ends/ Ways/ Means

“The political object-the original motive for war-will thus determine both the military objectives to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”³⁸

The political objective, according to Clausewitz, is the original motive for war. It establishes the strategic aim, the objective, to which all efforts and resources are directed. The objectives, (the ends), the efforts (the ways), and the resources (the means) are intertwined and interrelated. Failure to understand their interrelationship could lead “to policy making demands on war which war can not fulfill.”³⁹ In other words, the factors that affect war aims are found in

³⁸Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 84.


³⁹*Ibid.*, 607.

the quantity and quality of the means used, and in the manner in which they are used. If there are no means available then the political objective is limited in nature and often cannot be achieved. How to balance the ends, ways, and the means is left to the art of strategy, which according to Clausewitz, is employing fighting forces (means) in a series of engagements (ways) to achieve a victorious campaign (ends).

A Model

In figure 5, ends is represented along the vertical axis, means along the horizontal axis, and ways represented by the diagonal line. The ends and means graph shows a dynamic relationship between all three variables: an adjustment in the value of one variable is associated with an adjustment in the value of the other

Figure 5: Ends/Ways/Means Model



two. The political objectives (ends) ranges from non-vital interests, located at the bottom of the vertical axis, to vital interests located at the top of the axis. The means available ranges from zero and increases as the axis moves to the right. Ways represents the course of action selected⁴⁰, and an increase in

slope represents an increase in effort, and a decrease in slope represents a decrease in effort. So at a given political objective E' , with a given set of means M' , an equilibrium will ensue at a

⁴⁰ James J. Schneider, *Theoretical Paper NO.3: The Theory of Operational Art* (Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 18. Dr Schneider in his discussion of Ends, Ways, and Means refers to ways “as the actual form of operational art.” It is here where the commander selects the appropriate method to apply the means at hand to accomplish his given endstate. The method may include; envelopment, exploitation, penetration, etc.


given course of action W' .⁴¹ What happens, however when the ends or means change? What happens when the ways change?

Ends/Means Change

The fact that ends change in warfare should not surprise us. They reflect the complexity of the environment in which we operate. With military success, the goals may become grander and with political constraints, the means may become more controlled and limited. In the following discussion it is assumed that ways- the methods the commander has selected to accomplish his aim-will remain constant in order to discover and discuss the positive relationship between ends and means. The inter-relationship suggests that an increase in either ends or means will necessitate an increase in the other. The political end needs to be proportionate to the means available; if the ends increase without an appropriate increase in means, then the delta in means becomes the risk of not achieving the objective. This relationship is dynamic and requires constant communication between the military and political leadership in order to mitigate the risk.

At equilibrium state 1, ends, ways, means are in balance and the aim is being accomplished. In the event of an increase in ends, a shift in E' to E'' (figure 6), policy has demanded more than the military can deliver, therefore more means must be committed in order to achieve the desired endstate at equilibrium state 2: M' increase to M'' . If, however, the strategist adopts the new ends

Figure 6: Increase in Ends




⁴¹Although, there is no overt reference to the other elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic: DIME) it has been subsumed under the means axis. It is accurate to say that the other elements of the DIME can actually serve as a combat multiplier and can achieve set ends. This model assumes that these elements have been incorporated on the means axis.

without an appropriate increase in means, he accepts the risk in accomplishing his aim; the delta (shaded triangle) between M'' and M' is that risk.

If there is a decrease in the political objective, a shift from E'' to E' (figure 7), assuming means remains at M'' , the military possess the means required and gains flexibility in accomplishing its task. Given the two events, one realizes that in the first instance, the military will require more time to assembly the means to achieve the higher ends, and is constrained in its ability to accomplish its tasks. In the second instance, the military

Figure 7: Decrease in Ends



possess sufficient means to accomplish the desired endstate and gains freedom of action to react to unforeseen events, therefore, reducing risk. The next discussion concerns itself with an increase in means. If means increases from M' to M'' without a change in the political objective (E'), the military gains flexibility in pursuing potential changes in ends (similar to the discussion above concerning the decrease in ends). If the means decreases from M'' to M' with ends at E'' , then the associated ends will have to decrease, thus constraining political objectives. The imbalance between ends and means leads “to policy making demands on war which war can not fulfill.”⁴² Somalia, 3-4 October 1993, presented such a situation.

In July 1993, President Clinton placed responsibility for the ambush and deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers on Aidid, and issued a warrant for his arrest. In addition to the arrest warrant, a reward of \$25,000 was offered to anyone providing information leading to Aidid’s capture. President Clinton’s decision to arrest Aidid changed the objective and hinged success of the UN

⁴²Ibid., 607.


mission on Aidid's capture.⁴³ Initially, the U.S. command relied on the truck supported QRF to conduct the snatch missions within the city (armor protection was not available). After several failed attempts, Admiral Howe asked the Joint Staff for special forces and mechanized forces to assist in accomplishing this new task. Although the approval for the special forces was given, the request for mechanized forces was denied by the Secretary of Defense Les Aspen. Apparently, the Clinton administration was being heavily scrutinized in its handling of the Somalia peacekeeping mission and a deployment of heavy forces was not going to reduce the political criticism. The risk in not matching the means to the newly established ends played itself out on the night of 3-4 OCT 1993 when 18 Rangers lost their lives.

Ways Change

Corbett, author of *Classics of Sea Power*, in analyzing Clausewitz, discusses the issue of ways and how it is interrelated to ends and means. He states that the “political object of the war, its original motive, will not only

determine for both belligerents the aim of the force they use, but it will also be the standard of the intensity of the efforts they will make”.⁴⁴ These efforts are in effect, the methods the strategist chooses to accomplish his political objective: he understands the risk and the

Figure 8: Change in Ways



sacrifices that are required to accomplish the desired endstate. Figure 8 represents an increase of ends from E' to E'' . If means are not increased to M'' to reach equilibrium state 2, the commander can attempt to accomplish the established aims by adjusting his ways from W' to W'' and reach state 3. The delta between the W'' and W' (shaded triangle) becomes the risk the

⁴³Lawrence E. Casper, *Falcon Brigade* (Denver: Lynne Ryder Publishers Inc., 2001), 31.

⁴⁴Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 42.

commander assumes by changing his course of action (snatch mission to capture Aidid). The shaded triangle possesses the same area as in the previous graph and suggests that a mere change of method (ways) does not by itself reduce risk. So how does the strategist reduce or mitigate risk to compensate for the imbalance between ends, ways, and means? A possible answer is deterrence. Deterrence provides added insurance to overcome the risk that was created by the imbalance. In fact it becomes a “virtual” means or the implied effect of means in order to reestablish the equilibrium. The implied effect of military means increases the relative power that exists. For example, the United States’ commitment to the defense of Saudi Arabia with the 82nd Airborne Division in 1990, became an immediate deterrence for any further incursions by Iraq; although sufficient means were not available to properly defend the Kingdom (force ratio), the implied effect of further commitment of forces was sufficient to accomplish established aims. The appearance of friendly means and the perception of strength in the mind of the enemy deterred Iraqi aggression. In the eyes of the enemy, the U.S. had the appropriate means to accomplish its ends; the defense of Saudi Arabia.

U.S. Army 1860-1864

What were the ends, ways, and means adopted by the Union Army during the Civil War to deter against the southern asymmetrical threats? Robert Mackey, in his book *The Uncivil War: Irregular warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865*, contended that the South fought the North utilizing two approaches: the first a conventional war and the second an irregular war to “provide support to the conventional field armies.”⁴⁵ Unlike other irregular wars the Confederates focused their efforts against the Federal field armies. The tactics and techniques of the irregular forces focused on the use of asymmetric approaches. As Federal troops advanced south, irregular forces conducted raids and ambushes against the Federal Army’s lines of communication. Strength was avoided and weak spots were attacked. The center of gravity of the irregular forces was their

⁴⁵Robert R. Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865*, (UMI, Ann Arbor, MI: 2000), 2.

ability to blend in with the local populace after they had conducted their raids and ambushes. It is this anonymity that the Union Army fought by using active, passive, and retributive measures.

Mackey stated that Union Forces used active, passive, and retributive measures in order to counter the asymmetric threats posed by the South. Active measures included the anti-guerilla strategy aimed at actively eliminating enemy irregular forces through direct action.

“Of all the active operations developed to hinder Confederate partisan warfare, the use of specialized anti-guerilla units against Mosby and other irregulars were the most successful and promising”.⁴⁶

The men that led these small detachments of specialized anti-guerilla forces were hand picked by their officers. These small detachments had a dual purpose; they not only conducted direct action against the Confederate irregular forces but also provided the operational commander with needed information as they infiltrated the human networks of the adversary. The methods ultimately failed, however, “due to mismanagement, confederate counter-guerilla operations, and the impatience of the Union High Command.”⁴⁷ The anti-guerilla measure was a protracted method, which was not acceptable to the Union leadership.

The second strategy used by the Union was passive in nature. These operations were focused on neutralizing the asymmetric threat by strengthening the force protection measures of Union forces. For example, blockhouses were built along key railroad nodes to protect the Union lines of operations, and armed escorts were assigned to protect wagon and rail trains. In some cases ironclad railcars were used to deter raids and ambushes. Mackey points out however, that by allowing the partisans their freedom of action, the ability to pick the targets they wanted, passive measures were flawed from the start; “passive measures would only succeed in reducing, but not eliminating the partisan threat”.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., 230.

The third approach Mackey discusses is that of Union retribution against the populace either by burning homes or conducting punitive measures. In one incident, he cites the account of a Union Lieutenant H.H Chipman and his actions against a group of accused guerrilla. A sniper had killed one of Chipman's soldiers while they were on a patrol. Chipman ordered his soldiers to recover the remains, arrest any men they found in the vicinity, and to burn their homes. In the process of burning the homes, cartridge explosions were heard. This led Chipman to the conclusion that these men were involved with the sniper attack and ordered the inhabitants to be executed by a firing squad. Mackey points out that these retribution efforts against the populace ultimately backfired, and when Mosby returned to take command after Sheridan's destructive campaign throughout the South, he found many willing recruits for his command.⁴⁹

Andrew J. Birtle, author of *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, recounted the efforts of the South to fight the North with both a conventional and an irregular force in a similar manner as Mackey. Birtle stated that the Union Army responded to the challenges of irregular warfare in several ways: the establishment of constables, governors, jurists and lawmakers. The intent was to pacify the regions to support Union operations. Birtle recounts the efforts of General George B. McClellan as being one of the first to attempt in winning the hearts and minds of the local populace. He promised the inhabitants they would maintain their rights to their property, including owning slaves in some incidents; he promised to restore local government in any region where at least 10% of the electorate had taken oaths to the federal government; he established small pox inoculation programs and established laws that aimed at reducing disease. Birtle, however, states that these "benevolent" efforts eventually proved to be a failure due to the fact that federal commanders were never able to stamp out unauthorized foraging, looting, and other assaults directed at the legitimacy of the occupation: they never denied the rebels their freedom of action. One example

⁴⁹Ibid., 241.

was the rebel partisan attacks against the Unionist civilians; the “ inability to protect the population from the guerrillas on the account of troop shortages essentially doomed the progress in pacification.”⁵⁰

U.S. Army: Ends, Ways, Means

Does the U.S. Army possess the ends, ways, and means to deter asymmetrical threats? Yes. Joint Publication 5-00.1 stresses the importance to our nation to maintain flexible deterrent options (FDOs) in order to send the right message to our adversaries; it states that FDOs serve two basic purposes. First, prevent further escalation by establishing triggers and thresholds to the adversaries (sending the deterrence message), and secondly position forces within the region to provide military options in case conflict is unavoidable (first and second strike capability). The National Command Authority directs and integrates all the instruments of national power to influence the adversary’s actions. JP 5-00.1 lists the following key objectives for FDOs:

- Deter aggression through communication of strength of US commitment to treaty obligations and peace and stability in the combatant commander’s AOR
- Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs of their possible aggression.
- Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition
- Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the AOR, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, PSYOP, and force protection assets without precipitating armed response from the adversary.⁵¹

Military FDOs are not conducted in isolation from the other elements of national power; they are coordinated and integrated into a coherent plan in order to achieve the deterrent objectives. Regional commanders, in accordance with their plans, will request support of the other instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Economic) and will integrate the

⁵⁰Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1998), 28.

⁵¹Joint Publication 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine For Campaign Planning*, A-2.

resources into a campaign plan. The figure represents examples of military deterrent options in which the Army plays an integral role.⁵²

The Army plans to deter threats by maintaining the ability to engage in decisive combat with the enemy; it will do this either by destroying the enemy outright or by seizing and occupying territory to force the enemy to succumb to its will. The Army also plans to deter regional instability through a forward presence

EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED MILITARY FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase readiness of in-place forces • Upgrade alert status • Increase strategic reconnaissance • Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection efforts • Initiate or increase show of force actions • Employ electronic measures • Conduct aircraft flyovers • Increase exercise activities, gain popular support • Gain Congressional support • Take measures to increase public support • Maintain an open dialogue with the press 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote US policy objectives through public policy statements • Heighten informational efforts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- quickly; -- honestly; and -- within security constraints imposed by the crisis • Keep selected issues as lead stories • Impose sanctions on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) technology transfer • Protect friendly C4I assets • Interrupt satellite loan link

approach by maintaining bases in key regional areas. The success of engagements in these regional areas provides a deterrent value against adversaries. It demonstrates the inability of the adversaries to achieve their endstate, and impresses on their mind that their efforts are in vain.

The following paragraphs will demonstrate the success of the Army conducting decisive operations against regional threats, discuss the concept of pressure points and highlight three recommended methods the operational commander may undertake against asymmetrical threats: 1) he can protect his own vulnerabilities; 2) he can disrupt the threat's activities and plans; and 3) he can force reason on the mind of the threat by threatening the loss of items held in value.

The concept of engaging the enemy in decisive combat was clearly demonstrated during the Gulf War. Colonel Montgomery Meigs, commander of 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, engaged a dug in armored brigade of the 1st Medina Republican Guard Division on 27 February 1991. Within forty-five minutes, Colonel Meigs' brigade destroyed sixty T-72 tanks, nine T-55 tanks, and thirty-eight Iraqi armored personnel carriers, with no loss to friendly personnel or

⁵²Examples of flexible deterrent options for the other national instruments of power can be found in Appendix A of JP 5-00.1.

equipment. “It was more like a one-sided clay pigeon shoot than an armored battle.”⁵³ The success of the engagement was the technological ability to locate the enemy using thermal sights. Once located the Army was able to mass fires and conduct a deliberate and decisive attack against the enemy. While the Army possesses the ways and means to defeat a conventional military threat, does it possess the ways and means against asymmetrical threats?

As mentioned earlier, the center of gravity (COG) of asymmetric threats is their anonymity. Unlike the thermal sights Colonel Meigs used to detect the enemy brigade, the Army does not have the required resources to penetrate the human networks to identify potential threats. The Army has limited means to get at this COG directly. While the Army possesses the means to identify potential threats within its area of responsibility through aggressive patrolling, electronic surveillance, civil military operations, and force protection teams, it can do little against the international rent-a-terrorist or other transnational groups that tend to infiltrate the area, conduct attacks, and then depart.

While Colonel Fontenot was successful in both limiting attacks against the homes of Bosniac Muslims by aggressively engaging the populace, similar efforts by civil affairs personnel in Somalia proved deadly. One reason could be the idea of pressure points. In Bosnia, the operational commander was able to communicate directly with legitimate leaders, at the local, regional, and national level. He was able to deter threats by either promoting a carrot for compliance or by retrieving a carrot or confiscating items if compliance was not adhered to. This was not the case in Somalia; after the U.N. decided to push Aidid to the curb, there were no pressure points available to be used by the operational commander, nor were there items of value to confiscate. Pressure points are not developed overnight and require time to build.

Regional success also becomes a deterrent against potential threats. It shows the adversary that his or her method has little impact on the commitment of the operational

⁵³Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1995), 407.

commander to accomplish his task. For example, Colonel Fontenot's aggressive and successful resettlement operation supported by the aggressive nature of security and presence patrols within the region demonstrated the commitment of the operational commander to accomplish his task. The limited amount of house explosions within his area of operation, compared to other areas, suggests that the actions conducted by the brigade were successful in reducing and deterring the threat.

Recommendations

Earlier during the asymmetric threat analysis, the study identified the critical requirements and vulnerabilities of one of the threat's critical capabilities: asymmetric approaches. During the analysis the threat's method was to use asymmetric approaches, such as terrorism, in order to weaken the United States' resolve in the Middle East. It was also determined that these actors were irrational and did not conform to what western civilizations would consider as rational behavior. In order to deter these type of irrational acts, the Army operational commander has three options: 1) he can protect his own vulnerabilities; 2) he can disrupt the threat's activities and plans; and 3) he can force reason on the mind of the threat by threatening the loss of items held in value.

To protect against his vulnerabilities the commander must conduct a vulnerability analysis of his environment. Using the center of gravity analysis model identified earlier, he can identify his own critical vulnerabilities and then take measures to protect them. As discussed earlier the terrorist is focused on soft targets and is looking for opportunities to create mass casualties. Therefore, the protection should focus on securing these soft targets such as water and food distribution centers, and communication nodes. It must also provide for WMD protection. These operations are not unlike those taken by the Union Army during the Civil War. The Union Army used a series of blockhouses and forts to secure their key nodes, and used patrols to escort their trains as they were traveling from key node to key node. The Army has adopted similar measures by establishing base camps and requiring patrols to be escorted by

security forces. For example, in Bosnia and in Somalia, patrols were either escorted by a four vehicle armed security force or rotary wing aircraft to patrol along routes. However, as seen from the incidents in Somalia, and from similar incidents during the Civil War, by concentrating on passive measures alone, the threat was able to maintain its freedom of action and to pick and choose which targets to attack. These targets in Somalia included civil affairs personnel, single vehicles, and construction engineers that were repairing roads. Although these passive measures may reduce the threat it does not eliminate them, and therefore direct action is necessary. These direct actions include denying the adversary his freedom of action. This in itself becomes a deterrent for his operations.

To disrupt the plans and activities of the threat, the Army must possess the means to conduct first and second strike operations. Intelligence in the form of electronic and human intelligence is essential for this to occur. Finding the enemy has always been the crucial requirement for the Army, and while the Army is equipped to locate tanks, armored personnel carriers, and armed formations on the battlefield it possesses limited means to infiltrate the human networks to get at the threat's anonymity.⁵⁴ Sun Tzu, the author of *The Art of Warfare*, stresses the importance of spies to prevent bloodshed, and sanctions the methods spies must undertake to extract information. For Sun Tzu, victory should be decided prior to fighting, for a "victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle".⁵⁵ Sun Tzu places such a premium on the importance of "foreknowledge" that he dedicated a whole chapter to the use of spies in not only gaining information on the enemy strategy, but also in confusing the enemy so that he cannot conduct operations against you.

⁵⁴Appendix C, Task organization of TF 1-18, indicates the means the TF 1-18 commander had available to help locate and find the threat.

⁵⁵Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith (trans.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 87.

Spies have to live and act like the natives in order to be effective. That means they may have to adopt and accept immoral behavior in order to extract valuable information.⁵⁶ Intelligence like this involves years of dedicated and dangerous undercover work. The Army does not possess this capability and relies heavily on national level resources. The commander therefore has to rely on second and third tier sources to attack the threat's anonymity.⁵⁷ Once the enemy is found, established rules of engagement (ROE) must be permissive in nature to allow the Army to engage the threat. During stability operations this may not be possible due to country jurisdiction. Political ends may in fact constrain military means.

Another aspect of disrupting the activities and plans of potential threats is the responsiveness of the forces. The Army does possess this ability with its airborne and air assault forces, and to a lesser degree with its mechanized forces. For example, after the 3-4 October battle a mechanized company team from TF1-64, 24th Infantry Division was deployed to Somalia within 72 hours of notification. In the future this capability will be enhanced with the introduction of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SCBTs). The SCBTs will be capable of deploying anywhere in the world within 96 hours of notification. They will equal the lethality and mobility of today's mechanized forces. The Army does possess the means to respond against regional targets. Its aerial reaction forces and its armored forces provide it with the necessary means to defeat the threat once it has been located. Again this is dependent on political restrictions or conditions placed on the military, specifically the means the military is authorized to use. COL Casper, in his book *Falcon Brigade*, suggested his requests for

⁵⁶The United States prides itself in the individual freedom it grants its people; however, to enjoy these individual freedoms and to protect its way of life, it may be necessary to resort to non democratic methods and violate the freedoms of individuals to ensure that society as a whole is safe. The dangers of passing the threshold, and causing society to implode can be further studied in Thucydides book, *The Peloponnesian War*.

⁵⁷In Bosnia, commanders relied on the JCOs to provide human intelligence on the various security networks within the city of Brcko; this included intelligence of both military organizations and criminal networks.

mechanized forces were rejected due to political constraints.⁵⁸ While political objectives changed to capture Aidid, military means were not adjusted. This of course proved unfortunate on 3 Oct 1993.

The third option, forcing reason on the mind of the threat, falls in the realm of Information Operations. FM 3-13, *Information Operations* (IO), states that the goal of IO is to gain and maintain information superiority; the Army will conduct IO through a combination of the 12 Information Operations elements. These elements are not specifically conducted by any one

- | Information Operations Elements | |
|--|--------------------------|
| • | Operations security |
| • | Psychological operations |
| • | Counterpropaganda |
| • | Military deception |
| • | Counterdeception |
| • | Electronic warfare |
| • | Computer network attack |
| • | Physical destruction |
| • | Information assurance |
| • | Computer network defense |
| • | Physical security |
| • | Counterintelligence |

organization, but are used by the commander to synchronize his IO operation. One of the elements, Psychological Operations, is an operation that attempts to influence the mind of the adversary. FM 3-13 defines it as:

Psychological operations are planned operations conducted to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objectives, and reasoning, and ultimately to influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives (JP 3-53).

According to FM 3-13, PSYOP is conducted at the strategic level; it establishes thresholds and the consequences if thresholds are crossed. Operationally, PYSOP is nested with the strategic themes and messages and seeks to convince the adversary decision maker that his actions are not in his best interests. These operations attempt to influence and gain the cooperation of the local population, and to reduce the active opposition to friendly operations.

Psychological operations, while potentially effective against rational thinking adversaries, may be ineffective against adversaries that do not care about consequences. The

⁵⁸Lawrence E. Casper. *Falcon Brigade* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2001), 44. Casper suggests that this decision cost Les Aspin his job.

“culture of death” and the willingness of adversaries to sacrifice themselves in order to attack U.S. interests needs a long term solution; a solution the Army cannot conduct by itself. What are the consequences that would prevent these adversaries from conducting asymmetric attacks against the U.S.? Both Brodie’s concept of deterrence and JP 5-00.1 provides us with a model to apply deterrence at the individual level. In order to deter a threat, the threat must possess something of value that he is unwilling to lose, and must understand that his interests will be attacked regardless if he is dead or alive; such interests could be personal property, defamation of his family name, or backlash against his action from within his own culture. These measures do not fall in the realm of the Army, but reflect the political ends of the nation’s leaders and the implementation of the other elements of national power. The ends established by the political leadership need to address what ways and means are appropriate and acceptable. For example, is it permissible to seize the assets of suicide bombers or harass and interrogate their family members in order to deter future threats? These are answers that political leaders must address, and once a decision is made the military can act. Clearly the retributive and punitive measures conducted by the Union Army, falls outside of today’s acceptable behavior. However, there are courses of action that can be pursued that do not overstep the moral thresholds.

Summary

Carl von Clausewitz and Julian Corbett assert that there is an inter-relationship between the political objective and the military effort, where an adjustment of one will cause the other to adjust; with military success, the goals become more grand, and with political constraints, the means become more controlled and limited. This relationship is dynamic and requires constant communication between the military and political leadership. If there is an imbalance between the ends and means, that imbalance becomes the risk assumed by the decision maker. Deterrence mitigates and reduces this risk through the use of “virtual”/ implied means.

During the Civil War, the Union Army adopted both active and passive measures against the irregulars of the South. While all measures contributed to the reduction of the threat, no one

measure eliminated the threat outright. In fact, the retributive and punitive measures adopted by the Union Army caused many of the populace to further resent the Union occupation and aided the recruitment of new Rebel guerrillas.⁵⁹ It was a combination of anti-guerrilla operations, force protection measures, and populace pacification that eventually reduced and deterred the asymmetric threats in the South.

The U.S. Army, in the form of its doctrine, FM 3-0, FM 3-13, has established its commitment to deter regional threats. Since Army doctrine is accessible by our adversaries the documents become a deterrence method by themselves; they establish the thresholds, triggers, response means, and commitments to deal with potential threats. The U.S. Army has adopted both active and passive measures in order to reduce asymmetric threats, to include force protection and direct action. While the U.S. Army possesses the means to defeat conventional threats and reduce asymmetrical threats, it lacks intelligence assets to find and eliminate the threat among the many human threat networks that exist. The Army does possess the physical means to conduct first strike and second strike operations with its airborne, air assault, special forces, and to a lesser degree its mechanized forces. The SBCTs and forward presence will facilitate the growth of this capability. While the Army can reduce the threat in its region through civil military operations and direct action success, it cannot by itself eliminate the threat. While psychological operations may be effective against rational actors, they are ineffective against adversaries who do not care about consequences. It is this point where political ends and military means must communicate in order to properly identify the appropriate and legitimate actions to take to deter the threat. Permissive ROEs should be sought and granted to operational commanders in order to gain flexibility in dealing with the threat. The discussion above, indicates that the Army is capable in playing a deterrent role, and suggest that the Army should cooperate and synchronize efforts with other agencies in order to fully deter asymmetrical threats.

⁵⁹Robert R. Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865* (Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services, 2000), 59.

CHAPTER FIVE

Little Ender versus Stilson's Gang

Ender knew the unspoken rules of manly warfare, even though he was only six. It was forbidden to strike the opponent who lay helpless on the ground; only an animal would do that. So Ender walked to Stilson's supine body and kicked him again, viciously, in the ribs. Stilson groaned and rolled away from him. Ender walked around him and kicked him again, in the crotch. Then Ender looked at the other boys coldly. "You might be having some idea of ganging up on me. You could probably beat me up pretty bad. But just remember what I do to people who try to hurt me. From then on you'd be wondering when I'd get you, and how bad it would be." He kicked Stilson in the Face. Blood from his nose spattered the ground nearby. "It wouldn't be this bad," Ender said. "It would be worse."⁶⁰

Conclusions and Recommendation

The United States Army is capable in playing a deterrent role against asymmetrical threats. It will, however, require the Army to revise existing rules, doctrine, and training in order to deter a threat that hides in the background and seemingly has nothing to lose. Deterrence fails when established triggers and thresholds have been crossed and adversaries perceive that their gains outweigh the expected consequences. In order to reestablish the deterrent equilibrium, adversaries must be convinced that their continued aggression will result in grave consequences to their interests- in fact, adversaries must fear the "Ender" response. This will require persuasive evidence that the United States Army is able and committed to use all its resources to seek out the interests of the threat. While the Army possesses the relative combat power to defeat any current threat, it must be able to find the enemy first in order to deter his will. The following paragraphs will review key points of the monograph, provide a force tailoring recommendation to assist the commander in finding the threat, provide a recommendation to revise the doctrinal definitions of center of gravity and asymmetry to help identify threats different from military forces, and provide a recommendation for unit training.

⁶⁰Orson S. Card, *Ender's Game* (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, LLC, 1991), 7.

Monograph Summary

Brodie's theory of deterrence is still applicable today against state actors, but not necessarily against nonstate and transnational actors. The issue involves anonymity, rational behavior, and the ability to threaten and attack targets that are important to the adversary. Brodie's first principle, that defense is no longer the stronger form of war, remains true today. Brodie was referring to the inability of defenses to block 100% of the enemy's bombers that could deliver the devastating power of the atom as witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Similarly, today's defenses cannot block out 100% of threat actors that use anonymity to infiltrate defenses in order to attack soft targets. During stability and support operations these infiltrations may take the form of interpreters, vendors, and other hired help that first gain the trust of U.S. commanders and then exploit that trust by conducting attacks from within the perimeter. The Army reduces this threat by its force protection measures it has established at its bases throughout the world. Screening and limiting access to U.S. installations and hardening vulnerable targets are examples of these physical security measures.

Brodie's second principle states that surprise attacks are of little value to the adversary due to the eventual response that will occur. This principle hinges on the ability to find the enemy and then conduct retaliatory strikes. Today's threats will not present themselves in direct confrontation with the United States. The United States military's conventional dominance has driven our adversaries to asymmetric approaches. These threats will hide among the population and will seek protection from within the nation-states they want to destroy. They will avoid open area contact and seek the protection of built up areas in order to degrade the technological advantages of the United States. Retaliatory strikes then become difficult if not impossible due to determining culpability and responsibility, and causing collateral damage. The Army counters this threat through active measures such as counter terrorism, electronic surveillance, and peacetime military engagements. The Army should use the COG analysis approach to view the threat in terms of a system, and identify the adversary's critical requirements/vulnerabilities

in order to determine which functional component of the adversary COG the Army can affect. For example, one of the threats' critical requirements is its freedom of action and movement. Army commanders defeat this requirement by coordinating with local civilian law enforcement officials (domestic and international) to reduce the adversary's freedom of action and safe havens. Through accurate enemy intelligence, aggressive patrolling, and the use of irregular tactics the initiative can be wrested from the enemy.


Brodie's third principle is that of consequences. For the last sixty years the threat of mutual assured destruction has successfully deterred nuclear war. Each actor had a consequence, namely the safety of its population, that it was unwilling to risk in order to accomplish its aims. Today, however, it will be difficult to deter actors who are willing to give up their lives to achieve their aims. It seems these threats have no thresholds, and cannot be deterred. What are the consequences that would deter these threats? Clearly the threat of the loss of life is of minimum consequence; other consequences must be looked at, such as confiscation and destruction of property, defamation of family name, or an internal cultural backlash. Maslow's hierarchy of needs may provide the operational commander with a framework to identify possible needs the adversary may not be willing to give up.⁶¹

Maslow identified five levels that motivate human behavior: physiology, safety, belongingness, esteem, and self-actualization. Maslow's model suggests that human beings must satisfy lower needs first before higher needs can be achieved, and any disruption at any one level will require a correction at that level prior to seeking higher needs. For example, if the Army attacks the adversary and disrupts the food and water supply (physiological), attacks safe

⁶¹ Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), 16-22. Physiological needs consist of anything the organism needs to survive. Safety needs consists of security, stability, and protection from fear and chaos. Belongingness: A hunger for relations with people, being a member of a group or family. Esteem needs: The desire for achievement, mastery, competence, and confidence in the face of the world and having a reputation and respect from other people. Self-actualization needs: "what humans can be, they must be". It is a strong desire to attempt to achieve personal expectations. Some needs, at higher levels may substitute for lower ones. Example, mothers will protect their infants (security) at the cost of their own life.

havens (safety), isolates the adversary from his culture (belongingness), and discredits him in front of his peers (esteem), then the threat will attempt to rectify these needs prior to attempting to actualize other goals (self-actualization). So what does this mean concerning individuals who are willing to give up their lives and seemingly give up a

Figure 9: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs



requirement at Maslow's first level- physiological? One should first look at the self-sacrifice as an attainment at the self-actualization level, and not at the physiological level. These actors are concerned about their lives, and are only willing to give up their existence to self-actualize their goal. Therefore, one can deter these threats by depriving them of needs at any other level. The figure above shows possible critical requirements associated with each level that may be used to deter the behavior of potential threats. Decisions to attack any of these, however, must be clearly coordinated between policy makers and military commanders to ensure the proper means have been identified to accomplish the desired ends.

Fourth, sending the deterrence message to the adversary can be accomplished by the Army through a pattern of success in previous engagements, and the credible appearance that the Army is committed to complete assigned missions. Additionally, through peacetime engagements and information operations, triggers and thresholds can be directly passed to the various actors within the commander's area of operation. This requires, that the Army continues to conduct active measures and engage the population, and not rely on passive measures and hunker down in force protection bases.

Fifth, closely related with all the previous points are the will, determination, and attitude the Army displays to its adversaries. The commitment to complete the mission and not to be deterred through exhaustion should be closely tied to the political ends of the nation. Ends,

ways, and means need to be in balance to ensure adequate means exist to accomplish desired ends; this needs to be completed in order to minimize operational risk.

Force Tailoring

The importance of detecting and identifying the threat is a crucial factor in deterrence. This will require the Army to infiltrate the various human networks within its area of operations. It can do this either by establishing force protection teams to engage the population and gather information or through the use of special operating forces (SOF). SOF should be collocated with the lowest level operational commander. This provides area expertise and intelligence continuity when conventional forces are rotated in and out of the region. SOF should not be an independent effort conducted in isolation but should be in conjunction with the larger conventional force. It should have a force structure with sufficient communication architecture to communicate vertically with other SOF forces and horizontally with conventional forces. The Army must also have the ability to integrate and synchronize national level intelligence in a timely manner in order to detect and identify transnational actors; this can be done through liaison efforts or through virtual reach-back means.

Unlike Somalia, army units in Bosnia were task organized with organic assets that facilitated human information gathering.⁶² Electronic and human intelligence assets allowed the commander to find and assess the threat and then take preemptive action. In Somalia, however, ground commanders were sequestered within their base camps and never engaged the local populace directly; military intelligence units and force protection teams were not part of TF 2-14's organization. The day-to-day interactions with the population in Bosnia were very successful in establishing pressure points and identifying vulnerabilities that ultimately reduced the threat; the failure to do this in Mogadishu increased the threat.

⁶²Appendix D (Task Organization TF 1-18 Bosnia 1996, TF 2-14 Somalia 1993).

Doctrine

Doctrine does more than just provide the United States Army a common language, and framework to conduct operations. It also represents written verification to potential adversaries what the United States Army is able and willing to do. Access to U.S. doctrine has become easier through the Internet, and threats can download manuals at will.⁶³ For example, in November 2001, as the Northern Alliance culminated their attack in Kabul, CNN journalists broadcasted images of former Taliban and al Qaeda command centers. Among the images that were broadcasted, one could clearly identify pages of Army FM 7-8, *Infantry rifle Platoon and Squad*, and FM 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, that were littered among the debris in the buildings.⁶⁴ The possession of these documents, regardless of reason (intelligence or training tools), reinforces the idea that the adversary reads our doctrine. Therefore, doctrine provides a conduit to which the Army can communicate with its adversaries and establish triggers and thresholds in order to deter the threat from action. The intent of the U.S. Army to pursue active preemptive measures should be clearly identified and addressed in our doctrine. The following paragraphs will provide recommendations to include in the next revision of *FM 3-0 Operations*.

Full Spectrum Operations: FM 3-0 (paragraph 4-114)

This monograph identified that passive measures were effective in reducing asymmetric threats, but were not effective in eliminating the threat by itself. Force protection and force presence measures, in the form of physical security and peacetime military engagement, can reduce the risk from asymmetric threats by hardening soft and vulnerable targets; it cannot, however, deny the enemy his freedom of action. The study indicated that active measures, such as enemy intelligence gathering, aggressive patrolling, mobile hunter-killer teams and the use of

⁶³Access to these manuals via Internet can be obtained through the following web site location: <http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.htm>.

⁶⁴Ominous Documents in Kabul. Directed by Christiane Amanpour. 3.5 minutes., *Headline News*, Cable News Network, 17 November 2001. References to Army doctrine being found in the buildings were never made; however, videotape footage shows the pages littered throughout the facilities.

irregular tactics were effective in not only reducing the threat, but also in deterring future attacks. The aggressive actions of IFOR/SFOR deterred the threat of house bombings in Brcko by implementing military curfews and conducting 24-hour patrols to apprehend violators. These actions constrained the threat's freedom of action. The patrols also deterred political resettlement pressure by providing evidence that the homes within the ZOS were not ready for the inhabitants. This information provided the operational commander with what he needed to deter a mass Bosniac resettlement within the Serb portion of the ZOS and prevented civilian clashes between the two factions.⁶⁵

In order to counter asymmetric attacks, the Army must alter its existing rules of engagement (ROE). Our forward deployed forces must do more than just force projection and force presence; our forces must actively engage the threat in decisive operations (military raids, ambushes, law enforcement raids, civil disturbance operations, etc). Paragraph 4-114 in FM 3-0 discusses the measures the Army must emphasize to reduce the vulnerability to asymmetric threats:

4-114. Asymmetric attacks pose dilemmas to both friendly and enemy forces. Countering asymmetric attacks requires the disadvantaged side to alter rules of engagement, organization, doctrine, training, or equipment. The higher the echelon, the longer it takes to remedy an enemy asymmetric advantage. To reduce the vulnerability to asymmetric attacks and to minimize their effects, Army organizations, training, and equipment emphasize flexible employment in diverse situations. Protective measures, such as physical security and OPSEC, lessen the effects of asymmetry. A credible NBC defense capability at the tactical level deters the use of WMD. Commanders must anticipate asymmetries and take preventive measures that reduce adversary advantages. Commanders identify and exploit friendly capabilities that pose asymmetric challenges to the enemy force, even as Army forces act to counter hostile asymmetric threats. 66

The paragraph clearly addresses the Army's adoption of passive measures, such as physical security, in order to reduce its vulnerability to asymmetric threats; it is unclear,

⁶⁵Appendix C (Resettlement Worksheet/Tracking).

⁶⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 2001) 4-32.

however, if the Army is willing to conduct active measures to reduce vulnerabilities. Terms such as “protective measures”, “preventive measures”, and “counter hostile asymmetric threats” indicate this fact. Therefore, it is recommended that paragraph 4-114 be revised to include the phrases that reflect the Army’s intent to pursue active and preemptive measures against asymmetric threats;

4-114. ...Protective measures such as physical security and OPSEC, and *active measures such as military raids and attacks*, reduce the effects of asymmetry... A credible NBC defense capability at the tactical level deters the use of WMD, while *a history of successful preemptive military engagements deters future attacks*. Commanders must anticipate asymmetries and take preventive and *active measures that reduce adversary advantages*. Commanders identify and exploit friendly capabilities that pose asymmetric challenges to the enemy force, even as Army forces engage hostile asymmetric threats.

Bottom line, an aggressive, preemptive doctrine towards potential asymmetric threats is required to re-establish the equilibrium between the asymmetric threat and U.S. forces. It must be clear, that the U.S. is willing to take aggressive action across the full spectrum of operations, and specifically during stability and support operations.

Asymmetry

The United States Army Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Symbols (Draft)*, consists of a consolidated list of operational terms and graphics that provide the U.S. Army with a common vocabulary to conduct planning and operations. Although asymmetric warfare has been around for years and consisted of actors seeking to offset each other’s strength by utilizing different approaches or means, the term asymmetry itself was only recently added into our doctrinal database.

Asymmetry: Dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, capabilities, and values between other armed forces (formally organized or not) and US forces. Engagements are symmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are similar; they are asymmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional rules of engagement are the norm (FM 3-0).⁶⁷

⁶⁷Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Symbols* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 2002), 68.

The definition above, while mentioning terrorism as an asymmetric approach, needs to clearly articulate all actors, other than military, that can pose as an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces. Therefore, it is recommended that the following definition of asymmetry be adopted in both FM 1-02 and in FM 3-0 (paragraph 4-109).

Asymmetry: Dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, capabilities, values, and means (*diplomatic, economic, informational, military*) between belligerent actors and US forces. Engagements are symmetric if forces, technologies, weapons, and means are similar; they are asymmetric if forces, technologies, weapons, and means are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional rules of engagement are the norm (FM 3-0).

This minor change will ensure that planners are not constrained to comparing opposing armed forces (state on state), but consider asymmetric pairings between the U.S. military and enemy information, economic, and diplomatic efforts. It lifts the commander out side his traditional, mechanical battlefield and places him in today's multi-dimensional threat environment.

Center of Gravity

Similarly, the definition of center of gravity, found within FM 1-02 and FM 3-0, will need to be revised in order to reflect the current threat environment. As discussed previously, threats to the United States are not necessarily military or paramilitary forces. Threats to the military can come from state (rent-a-crowds, diplomatic, informational, or economic), and nonstate or transnational actors (terrorists). Therefore, it is recommended that that the definition of center of gravity be expanded to include these actors. FM 3-0 and FM 1-02 define center of gravity as: "Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."⁶⁸ The recommended revised definition should be as follows:

⁶⁸Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 June 2001), 5-7.

A center of gravity is the primary source of strength, power, and legitimacy that an actor (military, state, nonstate, or transnational) requires in order to maintain its freedom of action and will to fight.

This minor change will lift the operational commander out of a military centric view of threats, and allow him to consider non-military threats such as civilian, economic, informational, and diplomatic. For example, in Bosnia IFOR successfully separated the military forces of the factions within the first six months. Their next task was to ensure compliance of the remaining aspects of the peace accords. This required the commander to identify the center of gravity of each faction within his area of responsibility in order to develop an engagement plan to facilitate enforcement of the accords. No longer was the focus of operations directed toward the military, but instead it was focused on the different civilian actors within the area of operation.

Training

Individual Skills.

Units that are trained for war are prepared to conduct operations against asymmetric threats. The Army training focus at the individual level, with its combat marksmanship drills (instinctive fire, partially-exposed and moving targets) and physical fitness standards, give soldiers the tools to win. The threat environment, however, will present challenges to our soldiers concerning permissive actions. The rules of engagement, therefore, must be clearly understood by all and constantly reinforced. Commanders, in close coordination with their legal and political advisors, must structure an environment where rules of engagement can be easily understood and adjusted. Flexibility within the ROE will give commanders the freedom of action needed to conduct operations.

In addition, today's soldiers will be equipped with technology that will facilitate finding the enemy in a closed area environment. Global positioning systems, electronic sensors, and individual computers will require additional training time for each soldier to master the new equipment. This technology will provide leaders with the capability to designate targets within a

closed area in order to control attack helicopters, fixed wing aircraft or other precision fire assets to defeat the threat.

Bottom-up Review

Today's asymmetric threats will avoid open area conflict with the United States and seek the shelter of anonymity to conduct their operations. They will hide among the population storing their weapons and ammunition in the vicinity of traditional sensitive areas. Hospitals, churches, mosques, and other traditional protected sites will form their base of operation. Commanders, pursuing active measures to defeat the threat, must conduct missions to defeat the enemy at these sites. Therefore, the mission statement, intent, proposed task organization, end states, and objectives must be driven from the bottom up for higher headquarters review, approval, or additional guidance. The purpose for this bottom up review is to ensure that the means and ways are in balance with the established ends. If, for example, the army commander wishes to conduct a raid against a suspected enemy weapons cache site, which is located at a hospital, the commander must assess the risks involved and mitigate any second or third order effects from conducting these operations. His actions should be articulated to his higher headquarters to ensure his operations are acceptable. Therefore, it is recommended that operational commanders, be presented with the dilemmas of engaging the enemy at these sensitive sites; these events are best suited for BCTP or other command post exercises. The commander and his staff must exercise the bottom up review and be able to present an acceptable operational plan that engages the threat at these sites.

Synchronization

Conducting operations against asymmetric threats will add to the complexity of synchronizing tasks that do not fit into the responsibility of a particular battlefield operating system (BOS); external coordination, for example, is one such task. External coordination with national level agencies, embassies, coalition partners, joint forces, and within one's own service

is required to integrate a plan designed to defeat the threat's entire system (global). The complexity and difficulty of coordinating information and operations against a threat that operates in every regional combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) may require a special team within the unit. This team will have to integrate and synchronize global intelligence to help assist the unit in finding the threat within its AOR. A solution may be the development of a Universal Target Folder.⁶⁹ This folder would be created utilizing the United States' asymmetric tool: information domainance. National level agencies (FBI, CIA, NIMA, NEMA etc), service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard), and homeland security agencies would develop a virtual folder on the internet where each agency would be required to provide information regarding the target or objective in question. Each organization could then track the targets as they move from one commander's Area of Responsibility (AOR) to the other commander's AOR. This is a concept similar to the United Postal Service (UPS) tracking system. While this effort would require coordination among agencies not under direct control of the commander, the commander could begin by establishing his own "Target Folder" for his AOR and requiring his organization to maintain these folders up to date.

The environment and conditions in which this task takes place is hard to reconstruct and therefore hard to train. Therefore, it is recommended that students attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), be imbedded as staff members into an organization that is executing an ongoing operation; this on the job experience will allow the students to experience the requirement and conditions for external coordination.

Negotiations

⁶⁹This represents the ideas, efforts, and techniques developed during a planning mission of six officers assigned the task of solving the problem-how to seize a city without destroying it: LTC Suterhland, MAJ Gerald Burton, MAJ Martha Granger, MAJ John Reynolds, MAJ David Tohn, and MAJ Meg Vanasse.

Deterrence lies in the mind of the beholder, and it requires both sides to understand each other's triggers, thresholds, and consequences. To prevent miscalculation, the messages and themes must be clearly understood and requires a nested effort between the strategic, operational, and tactical level of war. This will require the Army to equip its leaders with basic techniques and principles to conduct negotiations with other actors, be it military or civilian. History, culture, and language classes should be incorporated in the unit's training regime to acclimatize soldiers to the environment. In addition, it is recommended that officers attending the U.S. Army General Command and Staff College be given a block of instruction on negotiations. The knowledge gained will benefit the officer as he interacts with the population across the full spectrum of operations.⁷⁰

The U.S. Army does play a deterrent role against asymmetric threats. It will, however, require the Army to alter its existing rules of engagement (ROE), doctrine, and training in order to once again achieve equilibrium with the threat. The driving force of this success will be the commitment of both the leaders of United States and its people to accept new approaches to attack the threat's center of gravity- anonymity. It must be willing to allow the Army to infiltrate enemy human networks, gather information, and conduct preemptive attacks against those items held of value to the threat. Deterrence is of value if one is willing to engage the threat with the necessary means regardless of the threat's location.

⁷⁰Recommended lesson plans for a negotiation seminar can be found at the following web site: <http://www.culture-at-work.com/penncalendar.html>.


Appendix A

Patrol Matrix & Route

Example Company Week Patrol Matrix 1996

DATE	TIME	1 Platoon			2 Platoon			3 Platoon			HQs		
		EVENT	PATROL	TIME	EVENT	PATROL	TIME	EVENT	PATROL	TIME	EVENT	PATROL	
WEDNESDAY	0500-0900	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C35D	0900-1100	PATROL(D)	C20D	0000-2400	OP6 OPS		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
28-Nov	0830-1230	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C36D	1730-1945	PATROL(D)	C25D				1100	JMC		
	1400-1800	DOG PATROL	C38D	2000-2200	PATROL(M) OPT	C18D				1600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1800-2400	MOUNTED PATROL	C37M	0100-0400	PATROL(D) OPT	C17D							
	2330-0330	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C35D										
Thursday				0800-1000	PATROL(D)	C11D	0000-2400	OP6 OPS		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
29-Nov	1000-1200	M. PATROL	C42M										
				2000-2200	PATROL(M) OPT	C18D				1200-1700	THANKSGIVING		
	1900-2300	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C41D								MEAL LOGPAC		
Friday	0230-0630	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C35D	0900-1130	PATROL(D)	C18D	0000-2400	ROTATION OF		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
30-Nov	1100-1300	M. PATROL W/OPT	C42M	1630-1900	DOG PATROL(D)	C11D		OP 6 TO TM TANK		0600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1415-1815	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C36D	2100-2400	M. PATROL W/AV/GSR	C12D				1600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1900-2300	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C38D	2400-0300	PATROL(D) OPT	C13D							
Saturday	0100-0400	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C40D	0900-1130	PATROL(D)	C11D		BROD RECON		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
1-Dec	0700-1100	DOG PATROL	C41D	1630-1930	PATROL(D)	C21D		SERVICES		1600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1100-1300	MOUNTED PATROL	C37M	2200 0100	PATROL(M) OPT	C17D							
	1445-1845	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C35D	2400-0200	PATROL(D) OPT	C18D							
	2015-0015	M. PATROL W/AV/GSR	C42M										
Sunday	0945-1145	M. PATROL W/OPT	C42M	1000-1300	TCP	C23D		BROD LDRS TECH		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
2-Dec	1800-2200	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C40D	2300-0200	M. PATROL W/AV/GSR	C15D		SERVICES		1200	DEZDARUSA		
										1430	BROD		
										1600	LOGPAC OP9		
										2300-0100	AIR RCN OPT		
MONDAY	0245-0645	M. PATROL W/AV/GSR	C37M	0900-1300	DOG PATROL(D)	C23D		BROD LDRS TECH		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
3-Dec	0915-1315	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C35D	1600-1830	PATROL(D)	C20D		SERVICES		0600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1500-1630	MOUNTED PATROL	C42M	2000-2300	PATROL(M) OPT	C18D				1600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1730-2130	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C36D	2400-0300	PATROL(D) OPT	C11D							
		ROTATE TO OP9											
TUESDAY	0300-0700	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C38D	0900-1130	PATROL(D)	C11D		BROD LDRS TECH		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
4-Dec	0830-0830	MOUNTED PATROL	C42M	1600-1800	PATROL(D)	C15D		SERVICES		1600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1145-1245	DOG PATROL	C40D	2000-2300	M. PATROL W/AV/GSR	C12D					LDRS AIR RECON		
	1530-2200		C39M	2400-0300	PATROL(D) OPT	C23D					ACL 6		
	1800-2200	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C41D										
WEDNESDAY	0115-0415	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C35D	1000-1300	PATROL(D)	C10D		BROD LDRS TECH		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
5-Dec	0930-1330	DOG PATROL	C36D	1600-1800	PATROL(D)	C11D		SERVICES		1100	JMC		
	1515-1715	MOUNTED PATROL	C37M	1900-2200	PATROL(M) OPT	C12D				1600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1745-2145	D. PATROL W/OPT	C38D	2400-0300	PATROL(D)	C15D							
Thursday	0000-0400	M. PATROL W/AV/GSR	C42M	0900-1130	PATROL(D)	C11D		ROTATE TO BROD PATROLS		0000-2400	CO C2 OPS		
6-Dec	0745-1145	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C41D	1630-1900	PATROL(D)	C15D		SERVICES		0600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1330-1430	MOUNTED PATROL	C37M	2000-2300	PATROL(M) OPT	C12D				1600	LOGPAC OP9		
	1700-2100	DISMOUNTED PATROL	C35D	2400-0300	PATROL(D)	C18D				0100-0300	AIR RCN OPT		
					AOR RECON KANSAS TCP								

D01M	SP	CP2	CP5	CP43	CP29	RP
GRID	CQ 22506405	CQ 25307120	CQ 27007090	CQ 26805960	CQ 25306740	CQ 22506405
BFV	PCI Ⓞ INITIATE MOVEMT	SITREP	SITREP	SITREP	SITREP	GREEN 2 AAR
DISMTS	PCI Ⓞ MOUNT BFV Ⓞ	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	GREEN 2 AAR
MEDEVAC	MGB	MGB	OP9	CP43	MGB	MGB
FIST		LA0201	LA0205	LA0284	LA0264	



MISSION: _____ PLT conducts mounted patrol in sector NLT _____ in order to conduct reconnaissance of AOR and monitor entity activity.

Concept: BFV~~Ⓞ~~ depart MGB by platoon. Platoon will move down designated route in platoon column formation. Platoon Leader will call in all primary and supplementary checkpoints in route.

Fire Support:: Mortars from TF, 155 from A/2-3 FA

- Coordinating Instructions:
1. Commo checks within platoon and with Destroyer Main.
 2. Boresight all turret weapons systems NLT 30 min prior to SP.
 3. Load 3 days water and class I.
 4. Report SP, RP, all check points, and halts.
 5. Maintain turret orientation during movement and at halts.
 6. Before, During, and After checks completed and verified by Section Sergeant.
 7. PCI all vehicles and personnel NLT 30 min prior to SP.
 8. Ensure drivers are licensed and have a current dispatch.

PCIⓄ	
Hours of Visibility:	Hours of Limited Visibility
Commo check/Batteries	Same as hours of Visibility
Water	PVS-7
Ammo	Dragon Night Sights
GPS/Batteries	PAQ-4s
Ammo/Smoke	IR Chemlights
Illum, Trip Flares	
Map, Compass	
Sensitive Items	Rehearsals
GPS	Back Brief
PVS-7B	React to Contact
PAQ-4	Break Contact
Dragon Night Sight	React to Indirect Fire
	Call for Fire
	Mount/Dismounts BFV
	Link Up Procedures
REMARKS: Review ROE, Current INTSUM,	
PATROL # D01M	

Appendix B

Resettlement Worksheet/Tracking

OMERBEGOVACA							
No.	Name of Applicant	CLEARED STATUS	Approved Date	Location	Construction Level	Occupied?	Remarks
1	Mehmedovic Fuad	28 JAN 97	17/07/96	CQ 2571368225	1		
2	Krajnovic Izet	28 JAN 97	17/07/96	CQ 25676801	2		
3		28 JAN97		CQ 2558671	1		
4	Krajnovic Nihad	22 JAN97	17/07/96	CQ 2552867635	1		MOVED IN JUL 96
5	Ibrahimbasic Enisa	28 JAN 97	21/08/96	CQ 2561067504	1		
6	Hodzic Ruhija	18 JAN 97		CQ 2563367481	1		Neighborhood Watch
7	Brcvak Hidajet	18 JAN 97	17/07/96	CQ 2578867643	2		
8	Lukac Selman	28 JAN 97	24/07/96	CQ 2588767457	3		
9	Mustacevic Mirsada	28 JAN 97	24/07/96	CQ 2588767457	3		
10	Salihovic Ismeta		17/07/96				
11	Ibrahimbasic Samed	16 JAN97	17/07/96	CQ 25856759	4		
12	Hodzic Selman		17/07/96				
13	RIBIC HASIJA	28 JAN 97	24/07/96	CQ 2533167623	1		MOVED IN JUL 96
14	Ribic Hasija	22 JAN 97	09/10/96	CQ 2427065470	1	YES	
15	Ramic Dzevad	16 JAN 97	24/07/96	CQ 25206765	1	YES	MOVED IN JUL 96
16	Omerhodzic Semsudin	28 JAN 97	18/09/96	CQ 2523367513	1		MOVED IN 25 JAN 96
17	Omerhodzic Jakub	25 JAN 97	25/09/96	CQ	1		
18	Begovic Semso Begovic Sele	25 JAN 97	18/09/96	CQ 2536167470	2	YES	MOVED IN 25 JAN 97
19	Jukovic Dervis		17/07/96				
20	Bajric Mehmed	25 JAN 97	17/07/96	CQ 2545667523	1		MOVED IN 25 JAN 97
21	Hadzic Alosman	23 JAN 97	30/10/96	CQ 2530967309	1		
22	Hadzic Novalija	23 JAN 97	17/07/96	CQ 2528367323	1		
23	Kevric Jusuf	27 JAN 97	17/07/96	CQ 2517467226	1		MOVED IN 25 JAN 97
24	Brodlic Enis	25 JAN 97	24/07/96	CQ 2513767153	1		MOVED IN 25 JAN 97
25	Ribic Musija	14 JAN 97	17/07/96	CQ 2494366956	2		
26		28 JAN 97		CQ 2542467566	1		
27	Hodzic Zlata		17/07/96	CQ 2571367452	3		
28	Tahrovic Zineta	18 JAN 97	24/07/96	CQ 2563867483	1		

Houses Authorized for Reconstruction in the ZOS

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 18TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR
APO AE 09789**

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, TF 1-18
04 Dec 96

SUBJECT: Houses authorized for Reconstruction in the ZOS

1. The following houses are authorized and/or approved for reconstruction. The listing is by town and lot number. A map is maintained in the Civil Affairs office that identifies the approximate locations of the lots and its respective number and status. This week 8 houses were approved in Brod, 0 in Dizdarsusa, 12 in Omerbegovaca, and 0 in Lipovac.

Omerbegovaca:

1,2,3*,4,5,6*,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,27,28,29,30,31,
32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,57,58,
,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,70,71,72,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,91,92,93,94,95,96,
99,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,111,112,114,116,117,119,120,121,122,124,125,126,
128,129,131,132,133,134,135,136,138,139,140,141,143,144,146,149,151,152,154,155,156,157,158,160,161,162,163,164,165,167,168,169,172,173,177,179,180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202,211,214,220 (TOTAL: 173 approved, plus 2 under construction prior to moratorium)

Brod:

1,2,3,4,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,
34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,
,60,61,62,63,
64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,87,88,89,90,
,93,94,95,96,
97,98,99,100,101,103,104,105,106,107,108,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,
121,122,123,124,125,127,128,129,130,133,135,136,137,141,143,144,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163,164,165,166,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,176,401,402,403,404,405,406,407,408,409,410,411,412,413,414,415,416,417,418,419,420,421,422,423,424,425,426,427,428,429,430,431,432,433,442,443,444,445,446,447,448,449 (TOTAL: 198 approved)

Dizdarusa:

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13*,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,
28,29,30,31,
32,33,34,35,36,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,57,58,59
,60,61,63,67,
70,80 (TOTAL: 62 approved, plus 1 under construction prior to moratorium)

Lipovac:

15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,25,26,27,28,30,33,34,36,39,40,41,42,43,44
(TOTAL: 22 approved)

TOTAL: 455 approved and 3 under construction prior to moratorium not yet approved

* already in progress prior to moratorium, not approved yet

2. This list will be updated weekly NLT Wednesdays after the Private Property Commission meeting or as necessary. POC is MAJ Ciminelli, DSN 556-5204.

PAUL V. CIMINELLI
MAJ, CA
TF 1-18

c:\cms\privprop\memo

Zone of Separation Residence Record

IFOR/SFOR Zone of Separation Residence Record

DOSIJE SFORa O USELJAVANJU U ZONI RAZDVAJANJA

(Must be completed in triplicate and returned to SFOR before occupying residence)

(Popunjen original I dvije kopije ovog formulara potrebno je vratiti IFORu prije useljavanja)

Property Owner Name / Ime vlasnika ime	Father's Name / Ocevo ime
--	-------------------------------------

Property Location / Lokacija vlasništva		
Town / Grad parcele	House # / Broj kuće	Lot# / Broj

Family Member's Names & DOB's Living at This Location (Imena članova porodice koji će živjeti na ovoj lokaciji I njihovi datumi rođenja)	
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____
_____ / _____	_____ / _____

Town Official's Approval Signature & Seal / Odobrenje opstinskih vlasti/Potpis
I pecat

Date Received _____

Date Occupied _____

in this space

Relief Supplies Received Y / N

licne karte vlasnika


Describe

Attach copy of owner's ID

Na ovom mjestu priložite kopiju

Appendix C

Task Organization TF 2-14 Somalia 1993



Task Organization TF 1-18 Bosnia 1996

3 NOV

TF 1-18 IN

A/1-18

C/1-18

D/1-18

TM TANK

SCT PLT

MTR PLT

HHC (-)

3-5 CAV (-) TACON

A/3-5

D/3-5

C/3-5

519 MP (-) OPCON

HHD 519

293 MP (-)

258 MP (-)

65 MP (-)

TF CONTROL

TOC
A/9E
3/D/4-3 ADA
4/D/4-3 ADA
BPSE 210
 TPT 211 (DS)
 TPT 212 (DS)
 TPT 213 (DS)
FAST/299 FSB (DS)
TM B/121 SIG (DS)
TACP
SWO
DET/106 FIN (DS)
DET/38 PSB (DS)
DET/38 POSTAL (DS)
CATHST/40 (DS)
 CATST/41, 44
 CATST/42, 47
 CATST/46
2/C/101 MI (-) (DS)
 5/2/C/101 MI (GSR)
 6/2/C/101 MI (GSR)
 7/2/C/101 MI (GSR)
 8/2/C/101 MI (GSR)
FP 21/101 MI
FP 23/101 MI
FP 24/101 MI

Appendix D

OCT 3-4 Battle (Journal Entry)

“ The BN performed magnificently! Fire & maneuver to and from the crash site was a textbook example of fire and maneuver. The more soldiers are exposed to live fire exercises the better they will be when its time to execute. Our LFX paid off! No battalion Sergeant Major can be more proud than I am of the soldiers of 2-14 IN. They all are credit to the unit and the 10th Mountain Division”

CSM Counts

On 3 Oct 93, TF Ranger conducted a raid into an enemy stronghold to seize several key members of Mohamed Aidid's militia. During TF Ranger's extraction, two of their extraction aircraft were shot down killing and wounding several members of the ranger Task Force and trapping one pilot inside the aircraft. At 031545C OCT 93 TF 2-14, under the command of LTC David, was alerted to be prepared to secure TF Ranger's exfiltration route. At 031645C OCT 93, TF 2-14 received the order to execute and departed to the Mogadishu Airfield with one company via ground convoy enroute to the downed aircraft site. Approximately one kilometer from the airfield the convoy was caught in a deliberate ambush resulting in two HUMMV's destroyed and 4 friendly WIA. The deliberate ambush resulted in a break in contact between friendly units and a temporary loss in communication between ground maneuver elements. Due to the multiple deliberate ambushes initiated along the primary route to the downed aircraft site, the first attempt to reach the trapped members of TF Ranger was aborted. After consolidating his forces at the airfield, LTC David was informed that the situation at the downed aircraft was deteriorating rapidly. In addition to the first aircraft being shot down, a second aircraft had been shot down, the TF Ranger Ground Reaction Force had made four unsuccessful attempts to reach the aircraft site. TF Ranger had lost communication with a sniper element diverted to secure the second crash site, and that the 90 rangers still in the objective area were encircled and were receiving intense direct and indirect enemy fire. The situation appeared to be extremely grave and became clear that if the trapped Rangers could not be reached by a ground element they would be overwhelmed by a superior enemy forces. At approximately 031945C OCT 9, LTC David was placed in command of an ad hoc task force consisting of two rifle companies, two Malaysian mechanized companies, a composite platoon from TF Ranger, one Pakistani platoon and aerial support form elements of TF 2-25AVN and special Operations aircraft. At 032130C OCT 93 LTC David assessed the situation, developed a simple plan that offered the greatest possibility for success, briefed his subordinate leaders and prepared an ad hoc organization for a seemingly impossible task. At 032300 OCT this ad hoc task force departed and moved east around the old port of Mogadishu and then north to National Street. As the task force turned west on National Street, the enemy once again initiated a deliberate ambush with extremely heavy rocket, mortar, and automatic weapons fire. The subordinate commanders, clearly understanding the gravity of the situation and the commanders intent, immediately returned fire and continued to forge ahead down a gauntlet of fire until they reached their respected release points. For three hours, Alpha Company 2-14INF fought a pitched battle to finally link up with the encircled ranger detachment at the first crash site. Upon reaching the first downed

aircraft site, LTC David was informed by CPT Drew Meyerowich that the remains of one of the aircraft pilots was trapped in the aircraft and that it would be very difficult to dislodge him. Still receiving intensive direct and indirect enemy fire, LTC David informed CPT Meyerowich that we would stay in the respective area until all personnel and remains were recovered. Charlie Company 2-14 was then dispatched to the second crash site to determine if there was anyone or anything to recover. Immediately upon moving to the second crash site, Charlie Company, under the command of CPT Michael Whetstone, came under extremely heavy rocket and small arms fire, yet continued to press forward to the second crash site. Upon reaching the crash site, CPT Whetstone informed LTC David that there was nothing to be recovered. Realizing that CPT Whetstone was in close proximity to a Malaysian platoon that had been separated from the main body at the onset of the battle, LTC David instructed CPT Whetstone to link up with the Malaysian platoon and to ensure that we did not leave anyone on the battlefield. Upon making contact the Malaysian platoon, CPT Whetstone was informed that two of the Malaysian armored vehicles had been destroyed by rocket fire and that there were several Malaysian dead and wounded. The Malaysian Company commander was informed by his Battalion commander not to attempt to recover the dead and wounded in fear of sustaining additional casualties. LTC David reiterated to the company commanders, "stay the course, we will fight here as long as it takes. We will not leave any of our soldiers on the battlefield." The task force fought on for an additional four hours until all of the rangers, the wounded and the dead were recovered. The fact that so few casualties were sustained by this ad hoc organization is miraculous. TF David sustained two KIA and 21 WIA, including the Malaysian casualties.

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