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
COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS  
IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1946 - 1953

A Seminar on the Huk Campaign  
Held at Ft. Bragg, N.C., 15 June 1961

- I. "Introductory Comments on the Campaign," by Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, who served as JUSMAG liaison with Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay in the campaign.
- II. "The Communist Huk Enemy," by Colonel Ismael Lopus, AFP, who served as G-2, Armed Forces of the Philippines, at the critical period of the Huk campaign.
- III. "Military Operations," by Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, AFP-Ret., who commanded the Nenita Unit and the 7th BCT during the campaign.
- IV. "Combat Intelligence," by Major Medardo Justiniano, AFP, who conducted special operations for the Nenita Unit and was S-2 of the 7th BCT.
- V. "Unconventional Warfare," by Major Charles Bohannon, USAR, who was JUSMAG advisor to the AFP on unconventional operations at critical phases of the campaign.

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as a counter-intelligence officer in the early days of the Huk campaign, and later as an adviser to the Philippine forces with JUSMAG during the most critical phases, he speaks from considerable experience.

Now, I know that a number of you here this morning are familiar with the Huk campaign. Some of you know from first-hand. You will want to ask questions and contribute to the discussion. I am going to ask you to be patient and give us the morning up here. The afternoon is for you, your comments, your questions. I hope you will write down some points during the morning, to bring them up this afternoon. We would welcome a good discussion with you this afternoon to wind up our session.

The reason we want the morning session for the five of us up here is simple. Each of us knows different aspects of the subjects that the others will talk about. When one of us gets through talking, we hope that the rest of us will remember further incidents to help illustrate the points made. It's a way of bringing out a lot of tactical examples which may help you some day when you face your own guerrilla problems in the field.

Fifteen years ago, the Philippines became an independent nation. I guess that the five of us were about the first people in the Philippines, outside of the Communists, to note that the Communist Huks were going to challenge the right of the new government to govern the people. It was natural that we should note this. Each of us then was assigned to Intelligence duty with our forces, and it was part of the job to spot potential trouble early. I say "our forces," because we had all been in the Army of the United States until that first Independence Day in the Philippines. When the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary also became independent, we continued our close association.

Most of the lessons we learned, we learned the hard way. We made mistakes, but kept on trying until we found something that would work. Then, because some of the lessons were highly unorthodox, we had to fight off interference from more conventional people for the right to apply these lessons that win. We were pretty junior at the beginning and took some lickings. Later, we were able to prove our points.

The real combat phase of the Huk campaign lasted about 8 years. That is, 8 years is about the period when the Communists were able to field units of guerrillas whose objective was to overthrow the elected Philippine government by armed force. The Communists admitted

defeat by deciding to give up the idea of what they called "armed struggle" in favor of trying to win by what they call the "legal struggle." This simply means that the Communists suffered military defeat and turned to subversion to gain their ends. They are still patiently at work in the Philippines.

Much of the action of the campaign took place in Central Luzon -- so much so that the newspapers took to naming the area "Huklandia." There were actions in other parts of the Philippines, but Central Luzon remained the hot spot. It offered an agrarian population which felt, with some justice, that it was not getting a fair deal out of life. It offered swamps, two mountain ranges, and jungles ideal for guerrilla bases. It had ample food supplies. It was close to major population centers. And, just to round out the picture, it had American military bases in the area whose personnel were under strict orders to keep out of the domestic affairs of the Filipinos. They were there to help defend the Philippines from external aggression. The secretive operations of international Communism, of which the Huks were part, somehow never seem to be labelled as "external aggression" even when it is so entirely foreign to the local scene.

Actually, what happened was that the Communists fomented a civil war. Like most civil wars, it was bitter and savage, splitting families, turning neighbor against neighbor. The Communist Huks used Mao's guerrilla warfare doctrine for their operations. This doctrine was little known or understood in the free world in those days. Most of the free world thought that Mao and the Chinese Communists were simply "agrarian reformers." In reality, Mao's guerrilla doctrine was the major export item from China to the Communist cadres all over the world. ✓

The Communists were able to field about 15,000 armed Huks in guerrilla units. These were supported by a claimed million sympathizers among the population, whom the Communists dubbed as their "mass base." This million was a big chunk of the 17-20 million total population at the time.

Opposing this Communist armed force of 15,000 which often was able to hide in among the population, were the Philippine Armed Forces of around 50,000. I mention these figures so that you might compare them with other counter-guerrilla campaigns. These Philippine government forces were not enough to defeat the Communist guerrillas by conventional military tactics. 3 3/3



The first years of the campaign, from 1946 to mid-1950, saw the Philippine military using tactics right out of the good text-books. Their small-unit combat techniques were well done. They made excellent use of fire-power. They were well-equipped and well-trained. According to the usual military doctrine, they should have won. But, they didn't.

In this same period of strong, aggressive military action, the Communist Huks were able to increase the strength of their forces in the field, extend their areas of influence and control, and greatly increase the numbers of population supporting them. They were so heartened by their success that their leaders were predicting victory in one year.

The reason for this situation can be stated in basic terms: the Huks were running a revolution and the Philippine government was fighting the Huks as though they were formal enemy armed forces. This is hard truth -- not easily seen at the time, still recognized by too few responsible people, and the point of honest similarity between the Huk campaign and other modern counter-guerrilla conflicts in other lands.

The Huks said they were fighting for popular causes. The Communist politburo had carefully analyzed the people's grievances, adopted the righting of these wrongs as their rallying slogans, and then exploited the situation with great skill. The fact that this was directed from the top in a rather cold-blooded cynicism -- to win a popular revolution which would put a handful of Communists in power, to run the country afterwards as ruthless dictators -- simply didn't permeate down to the people. Their eyes and ears were on the popular slogans.

In mid-1950, Ramon Magsaysay was appointed Secretary of National Defense. He was from the people, loved and trusted them, and understood the full danger to the people's welfare of the Communist Huk movement. We five had the privilege of his friendship and worked closely with him in this critical period. Under his leadership, the Philippines found the ways and means to defeat the Huks.

The most urgent need was to construct a political base for supporting the fight. Without it, the Philippine armed forces would be model examples of applied military doctrine, but would go on

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INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS  
ON THE HUK CAMPAIGN

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Edward G. Lansdale  
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We have met here today to talk about a counter-guerrilla campaign which has become a classic in our time -- the Huk campaign in the Philippines. It is classic in the way it demonstrated economy of force. It is classic in its lessons of the strategy and tactics that win.

Rather than bring you these lessons in the usual way -- through lectures and books -- we are going to try something a little different. The five of us up here on the platform are fellow gremlins. We shared many experiences during some 8 years of the Huk campaign, even though we are from different services and from different nations. It is simple justice that, when the school here asked me to speak to you, I decided to share the dangers of the speaker's platform with them.

We have split up the subject matter between us. Colonel Lopus and I will take the first period. My stint will be to introduce you to the campaign and note some of the major lessons. Colonel Lopus, who was head of MIS and later G-2 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines during critical phases of the campaign, will describe the Communist Huk enemy.

Then, Colonel Valeriano, whom I believe was the outstanding combat commander during the campaign -- particularly for the way he led the Nenita Unit and later the 7th BCT -- will describe the military operations.

He will be followed by Major Justiniano who will talk about the intelligence operations of the campaign. "Justi" had years of experience in leading combat patrols, in the collection of combat intelligence, and in understanding special missions.

Then Major Bohannon will talk about some of the unconventional operations of the campaign. As a combat infantryman in the Philippines,

losing. The Huks had popular support, because they had espoused the needs of the people. The people make the nation. A national Army can hardly win a fight against the very things that give it life, give it a reason for being.

The people of the Philippines have two documents which give them their own government, their own armed forces. These documents are the Philippine Constitution and the Philippine Electoral Code. In 1950, the trouble was that these documents had been turned by political and economic factors into almost worthless pieces of paper. There had been exploitable cheating in the 1949 election -- so obvious that the people were made to feel that the government was no longer their own. If ballots no longer counted, then -- the argument went -- there might be truth in the Huk plea to use bullets instead of ballots to change the government.

The Philippine defense forces took the initiative to construct a true political base for their fight. They shunned the temptations of a coup, which would have brought chaos to a literate, idealistic people by further destroying the legality of the Constitution. Instead, they set about to make the Constitution and the Electoral Code working, realistic, living documents for the people. As they did so, they and the people emerged on the same side of the fight. The Communist Huks lost their own political base. As popular support was lost, the Huk forces lost their dynamic role, and had to go on the static defensive. There was no longer a population to hide within.

The Philippine defense forces constructed this political base legally, within the Constitution. Under instructions of the Electoral Commission, the armed forces policed the 1951 elections, insuring freedom in electioneering and voting, as well as an honest count of the ballots. Since the freedom of elections is also a firmly-held ideal in the United States, the United States government openly backed this concept of making the elections free, as promised by the Philippine Constitution. The 1951 and 1953 elections, with the protection of the armed forces, in essence, gave the government back to the people.

As further moves in constructing a political base for the fight, the Philippine armed forces undertook a wide range of social operations -- from something as basic as military discipline and courtesy on up to humanitarian and social justice measures. Troop behavior at check points and on patrol was improved. Civilians accidentally wounded in the cross-fire of combat were given the same hospital

treatment as wounded soldiers. Poor farmers were given legal assistance in the land courts in tenancy cases. Even the enemy, when captured, was given a fair chance at rehabilitation. As Magsaysay put it, the armed forces offered the Huks the choice of receiving either "the hand of all-out force or all-out friendship." Remember this expression of "all-out force or all-out friendship." It's good tactical doctrine for the free world.

With a true political base being established on sound principles, the way was opened for military victory. The military actions then were pushed with great energy. In my opinion, the success of the resulting military campaign was due mainly to four factors:

1. - the strong, dynamic, and understanding leadership of Magsaysay; he was always suddenly present, in surprise visits, when the troops were facing danger; the troops had someone at the top who really cared.
2. - the improvement of combat intelligence collection and use; this was the result of better relations with the population, an upgrading of the importance of the intelligence function, more realistic organization, and making use of techniques proven in the field.
3. - the step-up of aggressive patrol actions; troops were taken off static defense of towns, taken out of their barracks, and led into active patrolling in the jungles, mountains and swamps, day and night; they gave the Huk enemy no rest, kept him on the run.
4. - the strong support of psychological warfare; it was used as an infantry weapon in combat, as a civil affairs means of bringing troops and people together, as a debunker of Communist propaganda, and as an instrumental part of the program of rehabilitation of prisoners; the EDCOR projects were part of these enlightened psychological operations.

The climax of the campaign came in 1951. The 1951 election, which was made a free election largely through the work of the military, established the needed political base for the operation. Two days after that election, when the results were known and it became obvious that the ballot count had been honest, the Huk forces

lost their popular support. As guerrilla forces, they had to switch from the offensive to the defensive. From then on, they got weaker every day. By 1953, only small remnants were left, to be mopped up by police actions.

In sum, then, when the Philippine defense forces had a sound political base -- defending a government of the people, by the people, and for the people -- and used this political base to mount a bold, imaginative, and popular campaign against the Communist guerrillas -- the Huks were defeated.

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## DISCUSSION

Query: How is the situation today in the Philippines? We know that the Communists always are ready to take a step back, but I know they will always come again. Perhaps by twos and fours. What about Communist efforts in the Philippines today?

Answer: (Gen. Lansdale). I believe that Major Justiniano should answer that. He is most recently from the Philippines and, as the public information officer in the Philippine Department of National Defense, he probably is ready with the answer.

Answer: (Maj. Justiniano). That is a very interesting question, which I would like to answer under three different headings. First, I would like to answer your question from the psychological point of view. Psychologically it would seem, as a newspaperman recently told me, that for a Communist agent directing operations in the Far East the Philippines should be a first objective. This is not only because of the strategic location of the Philippines from a military point of view, but even more because of the psychological effect which the failure of Communism in the "show window of democracy in the Far East" must necessarily have on other countries.

The second heading under which I would like to answer your question is that of operational facts. The Communist Party, which never admits permanent defeat, has realized

that the successes which we gained against them were the result of our adopting a new approach and new techniques. Certainly they are studying and developing new techniques which will not be vulnerable to ours. I might say that there are perhaps 300 Huks still active in the field in the Philippines including one of their old top leaders.

Thirdly, I should like to answer your question from the historical point of view. We know the Communists always keep trying, that infiltration no matter how many infiltrators are exposed, is one of their standard operating techniques. They succeeded in infiltrating one of their top brass into a high echelon in our Department of Foreign Affairs. I am sure that some of you have read the headlines here in the United States in the last few days about infiltration of the U.S. State Department.

I believe that answers the question. It would be wrong to assume the Communist threat in the Philippines or in any country is finished. We, all of us in the free world, must work patiently to maintain the gains which we have made. The problem in the Philippines is not ours alone, it is the problem of every nation in the free world.

Answer: (Gen. Lansdale). I think that answers the question, and it is an answer which is important. As you defeat the Communists some place, you can be sure that their objective -- ultimate victory -- remains unchanged. When you defeat them, they patiently devise new methods which they hope will be more successful and then they come back to try again. For myself, I feel certain that this is the case in the Philippines.

Query: I would appreciate receiving your personal impressions concerning the inter-relationship of Communist movements in these countries. Are they home-grown operations or are they truly branches of an international effort?

Answer: (Gen. Lansdale). I gather that what you are really asking is about the relationship between the Communist movement in your own country of Vietnam and the Communist movements in China, in Laos, the Philippines, and elsewhere. As you know, Vietnam is very close to my heart. I would love to sit down and talk with you at length about its problems and compare them with those of other countries.

As our time is so very limited here, I will limit myself to say simply this: Communism is, of course, an international effort. In each country, its expression, its activities, are tailored to the local situation. If those directing it are clever, the Communist program becomes so well adapted to local conditions, to local issues, local grievances, and local people that it appears to be a home-grown product. You will find some seeming differences among the programs in different countries, but you will find many, many more points of similarity. No matter in what portion of the world you choose the countries for comparison, the pattern is substantially the same everywhere. Many of you here today face, or possibly will face, the problems which were substantially solved in the Philippines and which today are critical in such countries as South Vietnam and Laos.

# HELP IN THE PEACE AND ORDER DRIVE P100,000.00

REWARD FOR THE CAPTURE OR  
INFORMATION LEADING TO  
THE CAPTURE OF EACH OF THE  
FOLLOWING HUK CHIEFTAINS:



**LUIS M. TARUC**  
alias Enteng, Tandang  
Anong, Apo Iro Ipe,  
Apong Pio Juan de la  
Cruz, Felipe Salvador,  
Jr., Catilpa Pio Papa,  
Apong Pio. 39 yrs. old;  
5 ft. 6 in.; brown com-  
plexion, slender built;  
black straight hair,  
well-groomed; non-smok-  
er.



**GUILLERMO CAPADOCIA**  
alias Capital, Huan,  
Bantiling, Agurang Owa,  
45 yrs. old; brown com-  
plexion, slender built,  
aggressive character. A  
Visayan but fluent in  
Tagalog. Walks fast.  
Wears smoke glasses.



**JESUS LAYA**  
alias Pacing, Jessy, No-  
li, Payet. 34 yrs. old; 5  
ft. 10 in.; light com-  
plexion, slender built, black  
straight hair, well-  
groomed; non-smoker.

**P30,000.00**

REWARD FOR THE CAPTURE OR INFORMATION LEADING TO  
THE CAPTURE OF THE FOLLOWING TOP HUK COMMANDERS:



**MATEO DEL CASTILLO**  
alias Villapando, Pando,  
Olivas, Orlando. 60 yrs.  
old; 5 ft. 4 in.; grey  
hair, wears eyeglasses,  
light complexion; smokes  
cigars and sometimes a  
pipe; slight built.



**MARIANO BALGOS**  
alias Bakal, Pacio, Tom,  
Collantes, Buli, Balti-  
more. 56 yrs. old; 5 ft.  
2 in.; brown hair; war-  
ried-looking, fairly-  
built; pipe-smoker.



**JOSE DE LEON**  
alias Dimasalang, Dim 1.



**CASTO ALEJANDRINO**  
alias Tarros, Guanyes,  
Gy. 36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 6  
in.; light-complexioned,  
straight black hair;  
well-groomed; aloof.



**ALFREDO B. SAULO**  
alias Fred, Elias. 36 yrs.  
old; 5 ft. 3 in.; straight  
black hair; wears sure-  
fit cap, with jacket; ci-  
garet and pipe-smoker.

**P20,000.00**

REWARD FOR THE CAPTURE  
OR INFORMATION LEADING  
TO THE CAPTURE OF EACH  
OF THE FOLLOWING HUK  
COMMANDERS:

**TEOFILO MALABANAN**

alias Filo, Tommy.  
22 yrs. old; 5 ft. 6  
in.; slender built;  
dark complexion,  
black hair parted on  
side; wears buri hat;  
has 5 gold teeth in  
upper set; wears  
jacket.



**SILVESTRE LIWANAG**

alias Linda Bie, Pat,  
Bet's. 33 yrs. old; 5  
ft. 1 in.; long wavy  
hair, oval face, fair  
complexion, slender  
built, sharp eyes.

**P10,000.00**

REWARD FOR THE CAPTURE  
OR INFORMATION LEADING  
TO THE CAPTURE OF EACH  
OF THE FOLLOWING HUK  
RECO COMMANDERS:



**ALEXANDER VIERNES**  
alias Stalin, Miranda,  
Jaro, Armando Villa.



**TOMAS CALMA**  
alias Sol, Tom, Tommy,  
Mag-usig, Alonto, Alfa-  
ra. 36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 7  
in.; light complexion,  
thinly built; wears eye-  
glasses.



**PEDRO CAGUIN**  
alias Samonte, Salcedo.  
36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 7 in.;  
brown complexion, black  
hair; cigaret-smoker;  
wears combat boots.



**BARTOLOME CUBIDA**  
alias Sonny, Sonny Alu-  
gay, Jockey, Alupay. 33  
yrs. old; 5 ft. 2 in.;  
brown complexion, black  
hair; tubercular.

## DEAD OR ALIVE

**P5,000.00**

REWARD ON HUK FIELD  
OR DISTRICT COMMANDERS

**P2,000.00**

REWARD ON HUK BATTALION  
OR SQUADRON COMMANDERS

**ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES**



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
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RCW Dec 17

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# HELP IN THE PEACE AND ORDER DRIVE P100,000.00

REWARD FOR THE CAPTURE OR  
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THE CAPTURE OF EACH OF THE  
FOLLOWING HUK CHIEFTAINS:



**LUIS M. TARUC**  
alias Enteng, Tandag  
Anang, Apo Iro Ipo,  
Apang, Pio Juan de la  
Cruz, Felipe Salvador,  
Jr., Catilpa, Pio Papa,  
Apang Pio. 39 yrs. old;  
5 ft. 6 in.; brown com-  
plexion, slender built;  
black straight hair,  
well-groomed; non-smok-  
er.



**GUILLERMO CAPADOCIA**  
alias Capitol, Huan,  
Bantiling, Agurang Owa,  
45 yrs. old; brown com-  
plexion, slender built,  
aggressive character. A  
Visayan but fluent in  
Tagalog. Walks fast.  
Wears smoke glasses.



**JESUS LAYA**  
alias Pacing, Jessy, Ho-  
li, Payat. 34 yrs. old; 5  
ft. 10 in.; light com-  
plexion, slender built, black  
straight hair, well-  
groomed; non-smoker.

## P30,000.00

REWARD FOR THE CAPTURE OR INFORMATION LEADING TO  
THE CAPTURE OF THE FOLLOWING TOP HUK COMMANDERS:



**MATEO DEL CASTILLO**  
alias Villapando, Pandu,  
Olivus, Orlando. 60 yrs.  
old; 5 ft. 4 in.; grey  
hair, wears eyeglasses,  
light complexion; smokes  
cigars and sometimes a  
pipe; slight built.



**MARIANO BALGOS**  
alias Bakal, Pacio, Tom,  
Collantes, Buli, Balti-  
more. 36 yrs. old; 5 ft.  
2 in.; brown hair; war-  
ried-looking, fairly-  
built; pipe-smoker.



**JOSE DE LEON**  
alias Dimasalang, Dum 1.



**CASTO ALEJANDRINO**  
alias Turra, Gaanyeh,  
Cy. 36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 6  
in.; light-complexioned,  
straight black hair;  
well-groomed; aloof.



**ALFREDO B. SAULO**  
alias Fred, Elias. 36 yrs.  
old; 5 ft. 3 in.; straight  
black hair; wears sun-  
fit cap, with jacket; ci-  
garet and pipe-smoker.

## P20,000.00

REWARD FOR THE CAPTURE  
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TO THE CAPTURE OF EACH  
OF THE FOLLOWING HUK  
COMMANDERS:

### TEOFILO MALABANAN

alias Felo, Tommy.  
22 yrs. old; 5 ft. 6  
in.; slender built,  
dark complexion,  
black hair parted on  
side; wears bush hat;  
has 3 gold teeth in  
upper set; wears  
jacket.



### SILVESTRE LIWANAG

alias Linda Bie, Fel,  
Bet's. 33 yrs. old; 5  
ft. 1 in.; long wavy  
hair, oval face, fair  
complexion, slender  
built, sharp eyes.

## P10,000.00

REWARD FOR THE CAPTURE  
OR INFORMATION LEADING  
TO THE CAPTURE OF EACH  
OF THE FOLLOWING HUK  
RECO COMMANDERS:



**ALEXANDER VIERNES**  
alias Stalin, Miranda,  
Jaro, Armando Villa.



**TOMAS CALMA**  
alias Sol, Tom, Tommy,  
Mag-usig, Alansa, Alfa-  
ra. 36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 7  
in.; light complexion,  
thick built; wears eye-  
glasses.



**PEDRO CAGUIN**  
alias Samonte, Salcedo.  
36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 7 in.;  
brown complexion, black  
hair; cigaret-smoker;  
wears combat boots.



**BARTOLOME CURIOLA**  
alias Sonny, Sonny Ala-  
pay, Jockey, Alupay. 33  
yrs. old; 5 ft. 2 in.;  
brown complexion, black  
hair, tubercular.

## DEAD OR ALIVE

P5,000.00

REWARD ON HUK FIELD  
OR DISTRICT COMMANDERS

P2,000.00

REWARD ON HUK BATTALION  
OR SQUADRON COMMANDERS

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

RCW

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I.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS  
ON THE HUK CAMPAIGN

By

Edward G. Lansdale  
Brigadier General, USAF

We have met here today to talk about a counter-guerrilla campaign which has become a classic in our time -- the Huk campaign in the Philippines. It is classic in the way it demonstrated economy of force. It is classic in its lessons of the strategy and tactics that win.

Rather than bring you these lessons in the usual way -- through lectures and books -- we are going to try something a little different. The five of us up here on the platform are fellow gremlins. We shared many experiences during some 8 years of the Huk campaign, even though we are from different services and from different nations. It is simple justice that, when the school here asked me to speak to you, I decided to share the dangers of the speaker's platform with them.

We have split up the subject matter between us. Colonel Lapus and I will take the first period. My stint will be to introduce you to the campaign and note some of the major lessons. Colonel Lapus, who was head of MIS and later G-2 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines during critical phases of the campaign, will describe the Communist Huk enemy.

Then, Colonel Valeriano, whom I believe was the outstanding combat commander during the campaign -- particularly for the way he led the Nenita Unit and later the 7th BCT -- will describe the military operations.

He will be followed by Major Justiniano who will talk about the intelligence operations of the campaign. "Justi" had years of experience in leading combat patrols, in the collection of combat intelligence, and in understanding special missions.

Then Major Bohannon will talk about some of the unconventional operations of the campaign. As a combat infantryman in the Philippines,

as a counter-intelligence officer in the early days of the Huk campaign, and later as an adviser to the Philippine forces with JUSMAG during the most critical phases, he speaks from considerable experience.

Now, I know that a number of you here this morning are familiar with the Huk campaign. Some of you know from first-hand. You will want to ask questions and contribute to the discussion. I am going to ask you to be patient and give us the morning up here. The afternoon is for you, your comments, your questions. I hope you will write down some points during the morning, to bring them up this afternoon. We would welcome a good discussion with you this afternoon to wind up our session.

The reason we want the morning session for the five of us up here is simple. Each of us knows different aspects of the subjects that the others will talk about. When one of us gets through talking, we hope that the rest of us will remember further incidents to help illustrate the points made. It's a way of bringing out a lot of tactical examples which may help you some day when you face your own guerrilla problems in the field.

Fifteen years ago, the Philippines became an independent nation. I guess that the five of us were about the first people in the Philippines, outside of the Communists, to note that the Communist Huks were going to challenge the right of the new government to govern the people. It was natural that we should note this. Each of us then was assigned to Intelligence duty with our forces, and it was part of the job to spot potential trouble early. I say "our forces," because we had all been in the Army of the United States until that first Independence Day in the Philippines. When the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary also became independent, we continued our close association.

Most of the lessons we learned, we learned the hard way. We made mistakes, but kept on trying until we found something that would work. Then, because some of the lessons were highly unorthodox, we had to fight off interference from more conventional people for the right to apply these lessons that win. We were pretty junior at the beginning and took some lickings. Later, we were able to prove our points.

The real combat phase of the Huk campaign lasted about 8 years. That is, 8 years is about the period when the Communists were able to field units of guerrillas whose objective was to overthrow the elected Philippine government by armed force. The Communists admitted



defeat by deciding to give up the idea of what they called "armed struggle" in favor of trying to win by what they call the "legal struggle." This simply means that the Communists suffered military defeat and turned to subversion to gain their ends. They are still patiently at work in the Philippines.

Much of the action of the campaign took place in Central Luzon -- so much so that the newspapers took to naming the area "Huklandia." There were actions in other parts of the Philippines, but Central Luzon remained the hot spot. It offered an agrarian population which felt, with some justice, that it was not getting a fair deal out of life. It offered swamps, two mountain ranges, and jungles ideal for guerrilla bases. It had ample food supplies. It was close to major population centers. And, just to round out the picture, it had American military bases in the area whose personnel were under strict orders to keep out of the domestic affairs of the Filipinos. They were there to help defend the Philippines from external aggression. The secretive operations of international Communism, of which the Huks were part, somehow never seem to be labelled as "external aggression" even when it is so entirely foreign to the local scene.

Actually, what happened was that the Communists fomented a civil war. Like most civil wars, it was bitter and savage, splitting families, turning neighbor against neighbor. The Communist Huks used Mao's guerrilla warfare doctrine for their operations. This doctrine was little known or understood in the free world in those days. Most of the free world thought that Mao and the Chinese Communists were simply "agrarian reformers." In reality, Mao's guerrilla doctrine was the major export item from China to the Communist cadres all over the world.

The Communists were able to field about 15,000 armed Huks in guerrilla units. These were supported by a claimed million sympathizers among the population, whom the Communists dubbed as their "mass base." This million was a big chunk of the 17-20 million total population at the time.

Opposing this Communist armed force of 15,000 which often was able to hide in among the population, were the Philippine Armed Forces of around 50,000. I mention these figures so that you might compare them with other counter-guerrilla campaigns. These Philippine government forces were not enough to defeat the Communist guerrillas by conventional military tactics.

The first years of the campaign, from 1946 to mid-1950, saw the Philippine military using tactics right out of the good text-books. Their small-unit combat techniques were well done. They made excellent use of fire-power. They were well-equipped and well-trained. According to the usual military doctrine, they should have won. But, they didn't.

In this same period of strong, aggressive military action, the Communist Huks were able to increase the strength of their forces in the field, extend their areas of influence and control, and greatly increase the numbers of population supporting them. They were so heartened by their success that their leaders were predicting victory in one year.

The reason for this situation can be stated in basic terms: the Huks were running a revolution and the Philippine government was fighting the Huks as though they were formal enemy armed forces. This is hard truth -- not easily seen at the time, still recognized by too few responsible people, and the point of honest similarity between the Huk campaign and other modern counter-guerrilla conflicts in other lands.

The Huks said they were fighting for popular causes. The Communist politburo had carefully analyzed the people's grievances, adopted the righting of these wrongs as their rallying slogans, and then exploited the situation with great skill. The fact that this was directed from the top in a rather cold-blooded cynicism -- to win a popular revolution which would put a handful of Communists in power, to run the country afterwards as ruthless dictators -- simply didn't permeate down to the people. Their eyes and ears were on the popular slogans.

In mid-1950, Ramon Magsaysay was appointed Secretary of National Defense. He was from the people, loved and trusted them, and understood the full danger to the people's welfare of the Communist Huk movement. We five had the privilege of his friendship and worked closely with him in this critical period. Under his leadership, the Philippines found the ways and means to defeat the Huks.

The most urgent need was to construct a political base for supporting the fight. Without it, the Philippine armed forces would be model examples of applied military doctrine, but would go on

losing. The Huks had popular support, because they had espoused the needs of the people. The people make the nation. A national Army can hardly win a fight against the very things that give it life, give it a reason for being.

The people of the Philippines have two documents which give them their own government, their own armed forces. These documents are the Philippine Constitution and the Philippine Electoral Code. In 1950, the trouble was that these documents had been turned by political and economic factors into almost worthless pieces of paper. There had been exploitable cheating in the 1949 election -- so obvious that the people were made to feel that the government was no longer their own. If ballots no longer counted, then -- the argument went -- there might be truth in the Huk plea to use bullets instead of ballots to change the government.

The Philippine defense forces took the initiative to construct a true political base for their fight. They shunned the temptations of a coup, which would have brought chaos to a literate, idealistic people by further destroying the legality of the Constitution. Instead, they set about to make the Constitution and the Electoral Code working, realistic, living documents for the people. As they did so, they and the people emerged on the same side of the fight. The Communist Huks lost their own political base. As popular support was lost, the Huk forces lost their dynamic role, and had to go on the static defensive. There was no longer a population to hide within.

The Philippine defense forces constructed this political base legally, within the Constitution. Under instructions of the Electoral Commission, the armed forces policed the 1951 elections, insuring freedom in electioneering and voting, as well as an honest count of the ballots. Since the freedom of elections is also a firmly-held ideal in the United States, the United States government openly backed this concept of making the elections free, as promised by the Philippine Constitution. The 1951 and 1953 elections, with the protection of the armed forces, in essence, gave the government back to the people.

As further moves in constructing a political base for the fight, the Philippine armed forces undertook a wide range of social operations -- from something as basic as military discipline and courtesy on up to humanitarian and social justice measures. Troop behavior at check points and on patrol was improved. Civilians accidentally wounded in the cross-fire of combat were given the same hospital

treatment as wounded soldiers. Poor farmers were given legal assistance in the land courts in tenancy cases. Even the enemy, when captured, was given a fair chance at rehabilitation. As Magsaysay put it, the armed forces offered the Huks the choice of receiving either "the hand of all-out force or all-out friendship." Remember this expression of "all-out force or all-out friendship." It's good tactical doctrine for the free world.

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Cruz, Felipe Salvador,  
Jr., Catilpa Pio Papa,  
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5 ft. 6 in.; brown com-  
plexion, slender build;  
black straight hair,  
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er.



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alias Capitol, Huan,  
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**JOSE DE LEON**  
alias Dimasalang, Dim I.



**CASTO ALEJANDRINO**  
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Gy. 36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 6  
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RECO COMMANDERS:



**ALEXANDER VIENES**  
alias Stalin, Miranda,  
Jara, Armando Villa.



**TOMAS CALMA**  
alias Sol, Tom, Tommy,  
Mag-usig, Alonso, Alfa-  
ra. 36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 7  
in.; light complexion,  
thinly built; wears eye-  
glasses.



**PEDRO CAGUIN**  
alias Samonte, Salcedo,  
36 yrs. old; 5 ft. 7 in.;  
brown complexion, black  
hair; cigaret-smoker;  
wears combat boots.



**BARTOLOME CUBIDA**  
alias Sonny, Sonny Ala-  
pay, Jockey, Alipay. 33  
yrs. old; 5 ft. 2 in.;  
brown complexion, black  
hair; tubercular.

## DEAD OR ALIVE

**P5,000.00** REWARD ON HUK FIELD OR DISTRICT COMMANDERS **P2,000.00** REWARD ON HUK BATTALION OR SQUADRON COMMANDERS

**ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES**



II.

THE COMMUNIST HUK ENEMY

By

Ismael D. Lapus  
Colonel, AFP

The Congress of the Philippines passed a law in 1957 known as the Anti-Subversion Act.

Section 2 of this Act reads:

"The Congress hereby declares the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the government under the control and domination of an alien power. The said party and any other organization having the same purpose and their successors are hereby declared illegal and outlawed."

President Carlos P. Garcia, in signing the Act in June 20, 1957, said:

"With this law, our people have not only officially made the fight against Communism a matter of national policy, but we have also acquired a potent weapon in the fight against subversion . . . . Under the circumstances, it is clearly the right and the duty of this government to invoke the police powers of a sovereign state to protect itself and the institutions entrusted to its care from criminal attack. I shall not only see to it that the anti-communist program of my illustrious predecessor, Ramon Magsaysay, will remain intact, but I shall also push it through with the same dedication and with unrelenting vigor."

It took eleven years since the first armed encounter between the Huks and the government forces in May, 1946, to convince Congress that the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the Huks, were conspiring to overthrow the government.

The story of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines is a long and complicated one. Although it followed the same pattern as any Communist-led and inspired revolt, circumstances that contributed to the rise and fall of the movement in the Philippines evolved lessons that may prove useful in dealing with people and areas affected by Communist uprisings.

My talk this morning is to give you a quick run-down of the history of the CPP and its military arm, the Huks, its organization, their aims and methods, and the atrocities committed by them, which led to their being outlawed and declared illegal.

This movement may be better understood by presenting to you the events in sequence, i.e., before World War II, during World War II, and after World War II.

#### 1920 - 1941

As early as 1920, shortly after the Third International or the Comintern was formed, Communism started taking roots in the Philippines. Intellectuals like Isabelo de los Reyes, Dominador Gomez, Crisanto Evangelista, and Antonio D. Ora, through their readings of Karl Marx and contacts with foreign agents like William Janequette alias Harrison George, American Communist from San Francisco, succeeded in organizing Philippine labor leaders to attend the Comintern-sponsored labor conference in Canton, China. In 1925, the Indonesian Communist, Tan Malaka alias Elias Fuentes, infiltrated into the Philippines disguised as a Filipino.

Conditions in the Philippines then offered a fertile ground for Communism to take root. The colonial status of the country offered excellent propaganda for agitators. The antiquated land tenure system served to emphasize the class struggle between the rich landowner and the poor peasant. The crop-sharing system and the usurious rates of interest prevented the peasants to rise above their deplorable low level of living.

Capitalizing on these conditions, Tan Malaka, a Comintern agent, succeeded in stirring the Filipino workers and the labor leaders to accept an invitation to attend the Moscow conference. On their way to Moscow in 1928,

Evangelista and Bognot attended the Shanghai conference first and met Communist delegates like Chou en Lai, Earl Browder and others from Europe. In Moscow, they met Stalin himself.

On his return in 1929 to the Philippines, Evangelista lost no time in organizing the Anti-Imperialist League, the Congress of Philippine Workingmen, and formed a working class party "to direct and lead the workers in their struggle for political and economic independence."

A year later on August 26, 1930 (Cry of Balintawak), the birth of the CPP was ushered in with Evangelista guiding its development along the pattern set by the Comintern. The first Politburo was composed of Evangelista, Ora, Manahan, Feleo, Caguin, Arcega and a Chinese referred to as "Comrade C." The official launching of the CPP on November 7, 1930 was made to coincide with the 13th Anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution with the following aims: (1) Fight and overthrow American imperialism in the Philippines; (2) Direct the movement for immediate and complete independence; (3) Establish Communism under the authority and direction of the masses; (4) Fight against the exploitation of the masses and to defend their rights and liberties; (5) Fight and overthrow capitalism; and (6) Use the dictatorship of labor to expedite the move for early independence of the nation and for redemption of the masses and for the practice and adoption of Communism. The hammer and sickle emblem emblazoned against a red background with the phrase "Communist Party of the Philippines" around it was adopted.

The CPP pursued its aims vigorously. Potential leaders like Maclang, Galvez, Brioso, Bambao, Liberio were sent to Moscow to train in Comintern schools; the CPP organ called "Titis" was circulated; propaganda leaflets were distributed with inflammatory slogans such as "Down with this government for this is a government of the dominant American imperialists," "All friars are liars in heaven," "There is no God; God is a mere illusion," "Blood, blood, and only blood can wash away the corruption in the country." After a series of violent and bloody demonstrations, the CPP leaders were arrested in 1931, tried and sentenced to prison.

The remaining free members of the CPP went underground and continued their illegal activities. During the period that the CPP was undergoing severe trials, the Socialist Party under Pedro Abad Santos, brother of a Supreme Court justice, former representative of the Philippine Legislature and member of the Quezon-Osmena Independence Mission to the United States, was gaining considerable influence. Agitations on land reforms were launched by the Party but the movement promoted class struggle in its activities. Its members killed

landowners, burned sugarcane fields and rice fields, slaughtered work animals and used threats to recruit followers. President Quezon then instituted land reforms, but the CPP had by then gained control of the Socialist Party and violent clashes between landowners and socialists worsened. At this time, 1938, James Allen alias Dr. Sol Ouerbach of the U. S. Communist Party appeared on the scene and convinced Quezon to pardon Evangelista, Capadocia, Balgos, and others.

The CPP leaders lost no time in gaining control of the Socialist Party and on November 7, 1938, the CPP and the Socialist Party formalized a merger. Abad Santos believed it would be beneficial to the working class. A political committee instead of a politburo was adopted with the following members: Evangelista, Abad Santos, Capadocia, Balgos, Castro, Feleo, del Castillo, Taruc, del Rosario, Cruz, Arogante. The merger added the phrase "affiliated to the Communist International" in Art. VIII of the new constitution and adopted the United Front tactics. The merger ushered in problems that caused differences of opinions among the leaders, petty quarrels and internal splits, which later caused purges in the leadership.

#### 1941 - 1945

Eleven years after the formal launching of the CPP, the Philippines saw itself in the violent clutches of another menace, that of Japanese imperialism. Recognizing perhaps that the battle was one of survival, the CPP leaders initiated steps to win the alliance of the Commonwealth of American high officials by pledging "Loyalty to the governments of the Philippines and the United States." These overtures were, however, ignored by President Quezon and Commissioner Sayre because of the anti-government activities of the CPP.

On the whole, the war was a blessing to the CPP. Aside from acquiring the name of patriots, the CPP was afforded the rare opportunity of setting up a miniature "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" complete with a civil branch in the form of the BUDC (Barrio United Defense Corps) and a military arm in the guise of the Anti-Jap Army. Furthermore, the Japanese invasion forced a closer tie between the Filipino and Chinese Communists thru the activation of the Wachi, Chinese squadrons of the Hukbalahap.

The early Japanese victory in the Philippines, however, proved to be a blow to the CPP. The leaders' failure to convince their followers to surrender led to the arrest of Evangelista, del Rosario, Abad Santos, Capadocia, and others. Evangelista later died of torture, Abad Santos succumbed after illness suffered at Fort Santiago, del Rosario was liquidated and Capadocia escaped.

The remaining free leaders were quick to retaliate. They met in March, 1942 and organized the Anti-Jap Army called Hukbalahap, (a contraction of "Huk labang sa Hapon" or "Army Against Japan"), on suggestion of "Comrade C"; with Taruc as CinC and Alejandrino, deputy. Initially, five squadrons with 100 men each were activated. Abandoned arms in the battlefields of Bataan were gathered, deserters from the Jap-sponsored BC with their arms swelled their ranks, arms from ambushed Jap-patrols became a source of more arms. Later, Taruc, after contact was made with Colonel Claude M. Thorpe, was able to get American arms and supplies.

One squadron after another began to be activated and as their army increased in strength, the need for training and indoctrination began to be realized. The CPP established the Stalin University in Mt. Arayat and in the Sierra Madre Mountains, manned by Chinese military and political experts from the Red Chinese 8th Route Army. An all-Chinese guerrilla force, the Overseas Chinese 48th Detachment of the Philippine Anti-Japanese Forces known as the Wachi commanded by Uy Kiat and Wang Keu, was organized. With the support of the Philippine Chinese community, the detachment rapidly increased to six squadrons of 200 men each, operating in Bulacan and Laguna.

To insure their control and get cooperation of civilians, the Huks organized the BUDC (Barrio United Defense Corps) with membership of 5-12 depending on the size of the barrio on the pretext of protecting the people from looting and banditry. They actually were engaged in recruiting, drilling, intelligence and supply activities. The BUDC performed as courts of justice, and performed marriages among the barrio folks. By December, 1942, the Huk Army with Taruc as CinC, Balgos as Political Commissioner, Alejandrino as Vice CinC, swelled to 5000 well-armed troops. Encouraged by the Chinese Wachi troops, they became bolder and attacked Japanese garrisons, engaged patrols, Japanese convoys and raided BC troops and installations. By March, 1943, they had an Army of about 10,000. The Japanese Imperial Army retaliated and put Mt. Arayat, the Huk stronghold, under siege for ten days, killing and capturing many of the Huk leaders, and drove the Huks deeply underground.

The Huk Army was reorganized. Military districts were dissolved and regional commands were formed. Political organs, to guide fighting units and to see that orders were complied with, were formed down to squad level. Efforts to contact other guerrilla units under Peralta, Montelibano, Confessor, the USAFFE guerrillas under Colonel Merrill, were undertaken by Jose Lava but failed due to misunderstandings and confusion. A new politburo, with Arogante, Castro, Feleo, Comrade "C", Balgos, Taruc, del Castillo, Lava as members, were formed to do away with leaders who advocated the retreat policy and to prepare for the coming of the Liberation forces and proposed a peacetime coalition with the Osmena government. Regional commands were disbanded and provincial committees, provincial boards and regional staffs were activated in the provinces. The Military Committee was raised to a department.

When the Liberation forces came, they found Alejandrino governor of Pampanga, Feleo governor of Nueva Ecija, Jesus Lava governor of Laguna. Osmena refused to recognize the Communist local administration and the U. S. Army disarmed the Huk Force sent to Manila. The CIC arrested Taruc, Alejandrino, Cayan, de Leon, and others. They were later released on appeal by the masses but, because of their defiance, they were re-arrested and sent to Iwahig Penal Colony in Palawan. The people of Pampanga then petitioned General MacArthur and President Osmena to recognize the civil officials and the local government set up by the Communists. As expected, the petition was ignored. It was estimated that out of the 25,000 killed by the Huks, only 5000 were Japanese. Another petition ignored was that made by Balgos who succeeded Luis Taruc as CinC to induct the Huk Army as a whole unit into the Philippine Army.

#### 1945 - 1953

So far as the CPP was concerned, the struggle was resumed when Osmena repudiated the local government set-up by the Communists in Pampanga and the U. S. Army arrested Huk leaders and disarmed Huk squadrons. President Roxas, a sworn enemy of the Communists, defeated Osmena in the first post-war election and promised to solve the peace and order problem in sixty days. Troubled by the herculean task of national reconstruction and harassed by charges of collaboration with the Japanese and subservience to the United States by the Communists, Roxas died without fulfilling his mission.

With the Pacific campaign drawing to a close, the Huk soldiers wanted recognition by the U. S. Army for their guerrilla service. Their die-hard leaders opposed the idea so much so that only the Banal regiment presented itself for recognition. Embittered, the unrecognized Huks kept their arms and laid low. In March, 1945, the Politburo transferred its headquarters to Manila and concentrated their efforts towards winning labor and peasantry. Thus, the CLO and PKM were taken in. A new political party was formed in July, 1945, called the Democratic Alliance with the aim of ridding the country of political confusion, economic insecurity, and to put up an honest, efficient and progressive administration. It did not take long for the Communists to control this organization. As their first offensive move, a huge demonstration demanding release of Huk leaders, Taruc and Alejandrino, was effected in September, 1946. Following their success in having the Huk leaders released, the coalition of the DA and NP was effected and Huk leaders, Lava and Taruc and four others, were elected to Congress. They were, however, not allowed to seat due to charges of fraud and terrorism in their respective provinces. Lava and Taruc returned to their Huk bands in the mountains.

The peace and order situation worsened with the unseating of Taruc and Lava. The Huks geared for the offensive. With their mass base then numbering about 54,000, they stationed guards in strategic places to warn the troops of approaching government troops, and provide shelter and food for Huk troops. The links between the Huks and the PKM were carefully hidden to preserve the status of the former as a respectable peasant organization. The Communist leaders had an excellent propaganda line. They had a good cause to fight for, arising from discontentment against the government. Most of those who collaborated with the Japanese, the Communists observed, were now in high government positions. The members of the Japanese-sponsored BC were now with the MPC. Their ranks swelled to about 15,000 experienced guerrilla fighters with a strong base support from the masses. On the other hand, the Army at the time was beset with problems of demobilization and collaboration. It was forced to demobilize 95,000 officers and men and keep only 37,000.

The initial encounter between the Huks and the government forces occurred in May, 1946 when a group of Huks ambushed a patrol of the 10th MP Co in Sta. Monica, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, killing 10 soldiers, capturing and beheading its leaders. Soon the Huks went on lightning raids, recruited followers by force, kidnapped, murdered, and burned homes and fields. President Roxas then felt that agrarian reforms could solve the problem. The 70-30 crop-sharing law was passed and signed in consideration for the Huks laying down their arms. This did not stop the Huk rampage while negotiations for surrender were going

on. Two hundred Huks under Commander Viernes alias Stalin raised the hammer and sickle flag in Nueva Ecija, robbed the people of their crops, chickens and work animals, and threatened the townpeople to support the Huks or else.

The town of Norzagaray, Laguna, was sacked and the municipal building robbed of all the Huk raiders could carry. About this time, Feleo disappeared and the Huks accused government troops of having kidnapped and killed him. Roxas then enunciated the mailed-fist policy in place of the policy of attraction.

The Communists met this policy with a combination of legal and armed struggle. In actual implementation, these tactics became an armed struggle for the Huks and a legal struggle for a group of Communist leaders led by the Secretary General, Pedro C. Castro. On April, 1947, the Huks ambushed another patrol of MPs, killing its leader and wounding six others. A month later, 100 Huks raided Laur, Nueva Ecija, and robbed the treasury of \$600.00, kidnapped a policeman and looted the town. Another ambush followed in San Miguel, Bulacan, killing two officers of the 115th PC Co. While all these ambushes were being carried out, Taruc was building up his forces in Mt. Arayat. Upon learning this, Operations Arayat was launched with 2000 troops of the PC. Twenty-one Huks were killed, six wounded, several sacks of rice, medicine, 43 MGs, 34 rifles and 10,000 rolls of ammunition captured. Taruc was able to escape. Several more bloody encounters crystallized public clamor for general amnesty, which was rejected by Roxas for the reason that the Huks had their chance but did not take it. The situation turned from bad to worse with the unexplained death of Manuel Joven, a radical labor leader. Even PKM members, the civilian arm of the CPP, openly participated in the ambushade. This led Roxas to declare the Huk and PKM illegal and seditious in March, 1948. A month later, Roxas died of heart attack at Clark Field, leaving the cleavage between the government and the dissidents at its worst.

A grave conflict inside CPP ranks occurred in the face of government mailed-fist policy. Castro, Secretary General, claimed that a "revolutionary situation" was non-existent and therefore, set his foot against the resumption of the armed struggle. On the other hand, the Huks now in fighting spirit and led by more radical leaders like Lava, Taruc and Balgos disobeyed Castro's order and eventually ousted Castro. The Lava faction at this time was beginning to assert its leadership and through a series of purges over disagreement on top policies, the Lava brothers succeeded in power.



The ascension of Quirino to the Presidency after the death of Roxas brought a new approach to the Huk situation. He felt that the strong-arm policy should be changed to a conciliatory one. Quick to grasp a new development to their advantage, Taruc sent word to President Quirino, offering his cooperation and that of the Huk organization in the restoration of peace and order. After a series of exchange of notes, Taruc came out of hiding to see President Quirino. Taruc pledged loyalty to the government and promised to live up to the pledge. He regained his seat in Congress and collected his backpay. The machinery for mass surrender was slow in forming and meanwhile, both sides started accusing each other of bad faith. Then came the day, August 29, 1948, when Taruc, instead of showing up as one of the speakers in a rally to convince his men to lay down their arms, sent a letter to President Quirino, accusing the government of bad faith. He had rejoined his troops to resume the armed struggle.

The failure of the Amnesty Proclamation led to a resurgence of Huk activities. In November, 1948, the CPP leaders changed the name of their military arm to Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB), "People's Liberation Army," this time making their followers believe they were engaged in the liberation of the Filipino people from "American imperialism." Soon the catchy preamble to their new constitution was attracting new recruits. The Katipunan red banner with the 3 K's replaced the letters HMB. Then began new raids on PC detachments, army camps, government installations, and ambushes of government troops.

The most publicized of dissident activities was the ambush of Mrs. Aurora Quezon by Alexander Viernes alias Commander Stalin with 200 Huks. Killed were Mrs. Quezon, her daughter, Aurora, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, Filipe Buencamino, III, the San Agustin brothers, and many others. This was a serious setback to the Communist propaganda activities, since Mrs. Quezon was widely beloved by the people. Noticing the nation's feeling of condemnation, the Communist leaders tried to wash their hands by declaring that the perpetrators were not under orders to do so.

The elections in 1949 provided an excuse for the Communists to declare the existence of a revolutionary situation. Terrorism, fraud and abuses were rampant. Then, a new Politburo came into being with Jose Lava as Secretary General. Military discipline was stricter, financial problems were remedied, attacks were well planned. The 8th Anniversary of the Huks was celebrated with an attack on San Pablo City by 100 Huks, and the Communist flag was hoisted in the town hall. Another group raided the PC barracks at San Mateo, Rizal. The town of Montalban was attacked and the mayor kidnapped. The PC

barracks in San Rafael, Bulacan was attacked. Other raids were staged in Paete, Nagcarlan, Rizal; Pangil, Lilio, Calamba and Los Banos, Laguna; Lipa, Tanauan, Batangas; Guimba, Aliaga, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; Apalit, Mexico, Pampanga. On March 29, in a coordinated military attack, Luis Taruc reported that R. C. 2 ambushed and killed Captain Dumlao and several soldiers and another attack on San Simon and Mabalacat, Pampanga. Total losses for this anniversary celebration were more than 30 killed, many of them civilians, and more than 50 wounded.

In towns attacked, Huk leaflets were left, enjoining the people to give all possible aid to the Huks. A Presidential order relieved the PC from operational duties and turned the work over to the Army. Army troops reporting to their new stations were being ambushed whenever possible. May 1, 1950, 100 Huks attacked Aguilar, Pangasinan and twice that number attacked Laur, Nueva Ecija. Troops on the way to Laur were ambushed.

To intensify their intelligence work, the Intelligence Division of the MD was created by the Politburo to gather military, political, and economic intelligence for use in their Armed Struggle. The CPP finally formed two sets of Politburo: PB In - with Jose Lava, Maclang, Espiritu, Bautista, Rodriguez, to stay in Manila; PB Out - with Jesus Lava, Luis Taruc, Castillo, Alejandrino, Balgos to direct field activities. Plans were prepared to increase cadres from 3,600 to 56,000; party members from 10,800 to 172,000; organized masses from 30,000 to 2,430,000 for a period of one year beginning July, 1950. A strategic plan for the national seizure of power was drawn, which called for a general uprising as soon as a revolutionary crisis existed in coordination with trade union strikes and seizure of strategic industries. On May 1, 1952, the government was expected to fall and power would be in Communist hands. Thirty-five Huk Divisions of 3,329 men each or a total of about 116,480 men were planned for the job. R. C. 5 was designated to be their GHQ.

To step up the revolutionary movement, the CPP reorganized their forces. GHQ was composed of Jesus Lava, Chief of Staff, Luis Taruc, Vice Chief of Staff, Alejandrino, Chief, W/Plans, etc. Regional arrangements were effected too.

The next coordinated attack was launched August 26, 1950 to celebrate the Cry of Balintawak. Camp Macabulos in Tarlac was the target. 200 HMBs under Silvestre Liwanag alias Linda Bie killed 5 officers, 18 EMs, 7 civilians (nurses were criminally attacked), 4 bystanders wounded. Attackers released 47 prisoners from the provincial jail of Tarlac, looted the Army camp before setting it on fire. Patients in the hospital were among those murdered in cold blood while lying helpless in bed.

Sta. Cruz, Laguna, was another target on the same day. 300 HMBs under Pedro Caguin alias Commander Samonte attacked the town at 2:00 A.M., looted and burned the town. 3 killed and 8 wounded on PC side, 15 HMBs killed and their wounded loaded in trucks and escaped towards Pila, Laguna.

To implement their plans for technical training and special warfare, the Special Warfare Division was created in September, 1950 with Angel Baking as Chief. Mission was to teach HMBs the technique of making homemade bombs, booby traps, land mines, use of wireless.

Expansion plans were being implemented full blast. Balgos with 200 HMBs went to Bicol, Briones to Ilocos, Sawit for Cagayan Valley, Manaoag to Batangas and Cavite. A special force under Pamintuan was sent to Manila. Capadocia spearheaded expansion in the Visayas.

At its height, the Communist revolt counted with about 15,000 organized strength with about 13,000 firearms of assorted types.

The fast deteriorating peace and order conditions aroused public sentiment. Congress and the President were blaming each other for the deplorable situation. Manila's population was swelling by hundreds of thousands who sought protection from Huk raids and attacks in isolated towns. Barangays and civil guards were being organized to help defend the towns and barrios.

On September 1, 1950 the President appointed Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense. He was a man from the masses, who understood the problem thoroughly, an experienced guerrilla fighter, humble, courageous, and dedicated to the cause of freedom and democracy. His first move was to clean the Armed Forces of incompetent, abusive and corrupt personnel in order to restore the confidence of the people in their Army. To this end, he was quick to reward the brave ones with either decorations or spot promotions.

He placed the Army in the role of helping the economic social development of rural areas and get the assistance of the ECA (U. S.) in the work of bringing prosperity and social justice to the poverty-stricken people. Desiring to know the facts firsthand, he traveled extensively, talked with soldiers in the field, directed operations, talked to civilians in far-flung barrios, slept and ate with them whenever he could. He initiated the giving of rewards to surrendered, captured or killed Huk leaders and protection to those who affect such feats. He encouraged civilians to come to him and report directly or by letter and telegram collect. He organized the Psywar effort that counteracted Communist propaganda with tangible offers, such as land for the landless.

In less than two months in office, Magsaysay achieved his first big success on October 18, 1950, when the Politburo (In) was completely broken with the arrest of all the members, in a daring raid conducted in the city of Manila by the Military Intelligence Service under his supervision. In the words of William Pomeroy, this is how the news was received by the Huks in the field: "One evening, a few days after the end of the school Reg (Taruc, brother of Luis) who had a radio, burst into our hut and stood there looking at us, his face a picture of pain. 'Comrades,' he said, in a particularly strained voice, 'bad news.' He stood there silent for a moment while we jumped to our feet. 'The whole city organization has been smashed. All PB members in Manila have been captured.' He stood. No one spoke for a long time."

Taken in the raid were many of the keenest minds and best organizers in the whole Huk movement and two truckloads of documents containing complete plans of their activities, files of previous activities and drafts for the whole period of the preparation for the national seizure of power. The PB (Out) took over leadership and they abandoned plans for the 20th anniversary celebration of the CPP on November 7, 1950 with the seizure of plans for the coordinated attack. In retaliation, and to restore morale among the rank and file, the Huks launched a series of holdups, arson, killing, kidnapping. Among these were: Commander Amat and his flying Squadron held up MRR at Binan, fled with cash loot of \$76,000. 100 Huks attacked San Marcelino, Zambales, burning 34 houses, kidnapped 10 civilians and butchered 22 residents. 50 Huks surprised a PC garrison at Palawig, Zambales, got 21 rifles and killed 2 soldiers. The Hardie Farm near Antipolo, Rizal was raided by Huks, killing Mr. and Mrs. Hardie and the foreman.

The AFP intensified its campaign, using the information gained from captured documents and revelations made by captured Politburo members. One after the other, Huk commanders hiding in the city of Manila and neighboring towns fell into the dragnet of the MIS. Huk lairs and hideouts in the city were raided. With the capture of Maclang, Liaison Officer with the CB, and secret documents linking the CB with the movement, the Chinese began to be apprehensive. Not long after the capture of the PB, the MIS staged another raid and apprehended the members of the Chinese Bureau. The remnants of the CPP and HUKs went in hiding deep in mountain lairs where they are now trying to recoup.

The tide had changed. Magsaysay initiated vigorous economic programs to rehabilitate the suffering masses, as well as surrendered and captured dissidents and continued his Strong-Army policy against the Communist die-hards who had chosen to pursue their Communist objectives.

To give time to prepare cases against the PB, CLO and the CB, the President issued Proclamation No. 210, suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The CPP reacted quickly by getting the pink newspapers to voice their indignation and accusations that the government was trampling on the democratic rights of citizens. The CLU joined in the protest but was silenced after a captured document, made public, revealed that the CLU action was Communist-inspired. The legal battle in court started with the accused CPP leaders represented by legal luminaries such as Recto, Araneta, Barredo, Baisas, Salonga, Laurel, Teehankee, and Villanueva. After three long years of trial, the PB members were convicted, sentenced. Sentences ranged from death to long terms in prison. Up to the present, the cases are on appeal in the Supreme Court.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### DISCUSSION

Query: What was the military organization of the Hukbalahap? Did they organize in three forces, such as mobile columns, local or regional guerrilla units and a home guard?

Answer: (Col Valeriano). Yes. They did have all these units, but under different names. For instance, the mobile units. Their version of mobile units were called "Striking Forces." These were actually the Huks' principal fighting forces for major operations, and employed very mobile tactics. They operated directly under the Huk commander, Luis Taruc.

The second thing that you asked was about area or static guerrilla units. As Colonel Lapus mentioned, the Huks had area or regional commands in which they maintained active elements of approximately company size, which were called squadrons.

Home guards, yes. They had what they called the Barrio Unit Defense Corps units, formed from local residents activated on call. These units were commonly known in the Philippines as the Huk home guard.

**Query:** What was the organization of the mobile columns? Did they have battalions, regiments, and so on? Did they carry heavy weapons?

**Answer:** (Col Valeriano). In the Philippines, we found that the striking force strength varied. A striking force would move out of its redoubt area and move towards its target, gathering strength along the way. In this way, by the time it reached the target area, the basic element of the striking force would be augmented by two or three times its size when it left its redoubt. This augmentation was principally by area squadrons. There was a time when a striking force could gather as many as 500 well armed men. Armaments varied. There was no standard armament, but we did find that the best arms in the hands of the Huks were carried by these striking forces. The squadrons also varied in strength and in equipment.

**Answer:** (Gen Lansdale). I'd like to comment to the Vietnamese officers here that the Huks in organization, tactics, and strength were very similar to the Viet Cong you are now facing down in your Fifth Region. They are not similar to the Viet Minh organization against the French. In that campaign, the Viet Minh had more formal organizations.

**Query:** Can you give me the relative strength of the Huks and of your armed forces in one of their major operations?

**Answer:** (Col Valeriano). I will tell you about a particular case, the ambush of Mrs. Quezon, the widow of our first President. The Huks, with a strength of 250 men, ambushed her party along a lonely road, killing her, several members of her family, and a number of military personnel who were with the party. There was a tremendous public reaction, a demand that the Philippine Constabulary produce results. I was placed in command of a force which ultimately numbered 3,000 men, with orders to achieve and maintain contact with the ambushing force until it was destroyed. After seven months of continuous operation in wild, virtually unexplored mountains, I was able to report to GHQ that the five squadrons involved and their 250 men had been wiped out or captured.

**Query:** Did the Huk have outside assistance? If so how was this rendered?

**Answer:** (Gen Lansdale). Colonel Lopus touched on some international aspects, in the description of the Communist Party in the Philippines,

how it was formed, with the fact that some of the Communists there went to Moscow, went to Peking, were in with both the Chinese and the Russian Communist Parties.

However, during the Huk campaign, the military campaign, there was no substantial outside assistance in a large material way, no assistance with arms or supplies. There were no regular submarine or air supply routes operating. They did receive some funds at times, and so on. Couriers did come in, of course, but usually through normal routes of travel. I believe that is about all we can say in a general discussion.

Query: Did I understand you to say that the Huks were never established on any of the other islands except Luzon? Is this true and is there any reasonable explanation?

Answer: (Maj Justiniano). This is not true. From 1946 through 1951 the Huks were actively pushing an expansion program. They had in fact what they called their expansion force, with a primary mission of initiating Huk movements in other islands. They met with very considerable success on Panay Island. However, through troop action and a very daring and successful infiltration operation under the direction of Colonel Lapus here, we were able to crush the movement entirely, killing its leader, a high ranking member of the Politburo.

Query: Why was the expansion movement unsuccessful?

Answer: (Maj Bohanan). As I see it, there were two principal reasons for failure. One was that the Huk propaganda line was not sufficiently flexible. It was not well adapted to conditions prevailing in localities other than Central Luzon. The other reason is that expansion activities were usually recognized and vigorously repressed by local authorities, by the constabulary, and even at times by citizen leaders in the communities.

Incidentally, in that Panay operation masterminded by Colonel Lapus, the infiltrators never revealed themselves until the commander was killed. After the second in command learned of his leader's death, he turned to his two principal staff officers, asking: "What do we do?" Their answer was to tell him that he was under arrest.

II.

THE COMMUNIST HUK ENEMY

By

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The Congress of the Philippines passed a law in 1957 known as the Anti-Subversion Act.

Section 2 of this Act reads:

"The Congress hereby declares the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the government under the control and domination of an alien power. The said party and any other organization having the same purpose and their successors are hereby declared illegal and outlawed."

President Carlos P. Garcia, in signing the Act in June 20, 1957, said:

"With this law, our people have not only officially made the fight against Communism a matter of national policy, but we have also acquired a potent weapon in the fight against subversion . . . . Under the circumstances, it is clearly the right and the duty of this government to invoke the police powers of a sovereign state to protect itself and the institutions entrusted to its care from criminal attack. I shall not only see to it that the anti-communist program of my illustrious predecessor, Ramon Magsaysay, will remain intact, but I shall also push it through with the same dedication and with unrelenting vigor."

It took eleven years since the first armed encounter between the Huks and the government forces in May, 1946, to convince Congress that the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the Huks, were conspiring to overthrow the government.



The story of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines is a long and complicated one. Although it followed the same pattern as any Communist-led and inspired revolt, circumstances that contributed to the rise and fall of the movement in the Philippines evolved lessons that may prove useful in dealing with people and areas affected by Communist uprisings.

My talk this morning is to give you a quick run-down of the history of the CPP and its military arm, the Huks, its organization, their aims and methods, and the atrocities committed by them, which led to their being outlawed and declared illegal.

This movement may be better understood by presenting to you the events in sequence, i.e., before World War II, during World War II, and after World War II.

#### 1920 - 1941

As early as 1920, shortly after the Third International or the Comintern was formed, Communism started taking roots in the Philippines. Intellectuals like Isabelo de los Reyes, Dominador Gomez, Crisanto Evangelista, and Antonio D. Ora, through their readings of Karl Marx and contacts with foreign agents like William Janequette alias Harrison George, American Communist from San Francisco, succeeded in organizing Philippine labor leaders to attend the Comintern-sponsored labor conference in Canton, China. In 1925, the Indonesian Communist, Tan Malaka alias Elias Fuentes, infiltrated into the Philippines disguised as a Filipino.

Conditions in the Philippines then offered a fertile ground for Communism to take root. The colonial status of the country offered excellent propaganda for agitators. The antiquated land tenure system served to emphasize the class struggle between the rich landowner and the poor peasant. The crop-sharing system and the usurious rates of interest prevented the peasants to rise above their deplorable low level of living.

Capitalizing on these conditions, Tan Malaka, a Comintern agent, succeeded in stirring the Filipino workers and the labor leaders to accept an invitation to attend the Moscow conference. On their way to Moscow in 1928,

Evangelista and Bognot attended the Shanghai conference first and met Communist delegates like Chou en Lai, Earl Browder and others from Europe. In Moscow, they met Stalin himself.

On his return in 1929 to the Philippines, Evangelista lost no time in organizing the Anti-Imperialist League, the Congress of Philippine Workingmen, and formed a working class party "to direct and lead the workers in their struggle for political and economic independence."

A year later on August 26, 1930 (Cry of Balintawak), the birth of the CPP was ushered in with Evangelista guiding its development along the pattern set by the Comintern. The first Politburo was composed of Evangelista, Ora, Manahan, Feleo, Caguin, Arcega and a Chinese referred to as "Comrade C." The official launching of the CPP on November 7, 1930 was made to coincide with the 13th Anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution with the following aims: (1) Fight and overthrow American imperialism in the Philippines; (2) Direct the movement for immediate and complete independence; (3) Establish Communism under the authority and direction of the masses; (4) Fight against the exploitation of the masses and to defend their rights and liberties; (5) Fight and overthrow capitalism; and (6) Use the dictatorship of labor to expedite the move for early independence of the nation and for redemption of the masses and for the practice and adoption of Communism. The hammer and sickle emblem emblazoned against a red background with the phrase "Communist Party of the Philippines" around it was adopted.

The CPP pursued its aims vigorously. Potential leaders like Maclang, Galvez, Brioso, Bambao, Liberio were sent to Moscow to train in Comintern schools; the CPP organ called "Titis" was circulated; propaganda leaflets were distributed with inflammatory slogans such as "Down with this government for this is a government of the dominant American imperialists," "All friars are liars in heaven," "There is no God; God is a mere illusion," "Blood, blood, and only blood can wash away the corruption in the country." After a series of violent and bloody demonstrations, the CPP leaders were arrested in 1931, tried and sentenced to prison.

The remaining free members of the CPP went underground and continued their illegal activities. During the period that the CPP was undergoing severe trials, the Socialist Party under Pedro Abad Santos, brother of a Supreme Court justice, former representative of the Philippine Legislature and member of the Quezon-Osmena Independence Mission to the United States, was gaining considerable influence. Agitations on land reforms were launched by the Party but the movement promoted class struggle in its activities. Its members killed

landowners, burned sugarcane fields and rice fields, slaughtered work animals and used threats to recruit followers. President Quezon then instituted land reforms, but the CPP had by then gained control of the Socialist Party and violent clashes between landowners and socialists worsened. At this time, 1938, James Allen alias Dr. Sol Ouerbach of the U. S. Communist Party appeared on the scene and convinced Quezon to pardon Evangelista, Capadocia, Balgos, and others.

The CPP leaders lost no time in gaining control of the Socialist Party and on November 7, 1938, the CPP and the Socialist Party formalized a merger. Abad Santos believed it would be beneficial to the working class. A political committee instead of a politburo was adopted with the following members: Evangelista, Abad Santos, Capadocia, Balgos, Castro, Feleo, del Castillo, Taruc, del Rosario, Cruz, Arogante. The merger added the phrase "affiliated to the Communist International" in Art. VIII of the new constitution and adopted the United Front tactics. The merger ushered in problems that caused differences of opinions among the leaders, petty quarrels and internal splits, which later caused purges in the leadership.

#### 1941 - 1945

Eleven years after the formal launching of the CPP, the Philippines saw itself in the violent clutches of another menace, that of Japanese imperialism. Recognizing perhaps that the battle was one of survival, the CPP leaders initiated steps to win the alliance of the Commonwealth of American high officials by pledging "Loyalty to the governments of the Philippines and the United States." These overtures were, however, ignored by President Quezon and Commissioner Sayre because of the anti-government activities of the CPP.

On the whole, the war was a blessing to the CPP. Aside from acquiring the name of patriots, the CPP was afforded the rare opportunity of setting up a miniature "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" complete with a civil branch in the form of the BUDC (Barrio United Defense Corps) and a military arm in the guise of the Anti-Jap Army. Furthermore, the Japanese invasion forced a closer tie between the Filipino and Chinese Communists thru the activation of the Wachi, Chinese squadrons of the Hukbalahap.

The early Japanese victory in the Philippines, however, proved to be a blow to the CPP. The leaders' failure to convince their followers to surrender led to the arrest of Evangelista, del Rosario, Abad Santos, Capadocia, and others. Evangelista later died of torture, Abad Santos succumbed after illness suffered at Fort Santiago, del Rosario was liquidated and Capadocia escaped.

The remaining free leaders were quick to retaliate. They met in March, 1942 and organized the Anti-Jap Army called Hukbalahap, (a contraction of "Huk labang sa Hapon" or "Army Against Japan"), on suggestion of "Comrade C"; with Taruc as CinC and Alejandrino, deputy. Initially, five squadrons with 100 men each were activated. Abandoned arms in the battlefields of Bataan were gathered, deserters from the Jap-sponsored BC with their arms swelled their ranks, arms from ambushed Jap-patrols became a source of more arms. Later, Taruc, after contact was made with Colonel Claude M. Thorpe, was able to get American arms and supplies.

One squadron after another began to be activated and as their army increased in strength, the need for training and indoctrination began to be realized. The CPP established the Stalin University in Mt. Arayat and in the Sierra Madre Mountains, manned by Chinese military and political experts from the Red Chinese 8th Route Army. An all-Chinese guerrilla force, the Overseas Chinese 48th Detachment of the Philippine Anti-Japanese Forces known as the Wachi commanded by Uy Kiat and Wang Keu, was organized. With the support of the Philippine Chinese community, the detachment rapidly increased to six squadrons of 200 men each, operating in Bulacan and Laguna.

To insure their control and get cooperation of civilians, the Huks organized the BUDC (Barrio United Defense Corps) with membership of 5-12 depending on the size of the barrio on the pretext of protecting the people from looting and banditry. They actually were engaged in recruiting, drilling, intelligence and supply activities. The BUDC performed as courts of justice, and performed marriages among the barrio folks. By December, 1942, the Huk Army with Taruc as CinC, Balgos as Political Commissioner, Alejandrino as Vice CinC, swelled to 5000 well-armed troops. Encouraged by the Chinese Wachi troops, they became bolder and attacked Japanese garrisons, engaged patrols, Japanese convoys and raided BC troops and installations. By March, 1943, they had an Army of about 10,000. The Japanese Imperial Army retaliated and put Mt. Arayat, the Huk stronghold, under siege for ten days, killing and capturing many of the Huk leaders, and drove the Huks deeply underground.

The Huk Army was reorganized. Military districts were dissolved and regional commands were formed. Political organs, to guide fighting units and to see that orders were complied with, were formed down to squad level. Efforts to contact other guerrilla units under Peralta, Montelibano, Confessor, the USAFFE guerrillas under Colonel Merrill, were undertaken by Jose Lava but failed due to misunderstandings and confusion. A new politburo, with Arogante, Castro, Feleo, Comrade "C", Balgos, Taruc, del Castillo, Lava as members, were formed to do away with leaders who advocated the retreat policy and to prepare for the coming of the Liberation forces and proposed a peacetime coalition with the Osmena government. Regional commands were disbanded and provincial committees, provincial boards and regional staffs were activated in the provinces. The Military Committee was raised to a department.

When the Liberation forces came, they found Alejandrino governor of Pampanga, Feleo governor of Nueva Ecija, Jesus Lava governor of Laguna. Osmena refused to recognize the Communist local administration and the U. S. Army disarmed the Huk Force sent to Manila. The CIC arrested Taruc, Alejandrino, Cayanán, de Leon, and others. They were later released on appeal by the masses but, because of their defiance, they were re-arrested and sent to Iwahig Penal Colony in Palawan. The people of Pampanga then petitioned General MacArthur and President Osmena to recognize the civil officials and the local government set up by the Communists. As expected, the petition was ignored. It was estimated that out of the 25,000 killed by the Huks, only 5000 were Japanese. Another petition ignored was that made by Balgos who succeeded Luis Taruc as CinC to induct the Huk Army as a whole unit into the Philippine Army.

#### 1945 - 1953

So far as the CPP was concerned, the struggle was resumed when Osmena repudiated the local government set-up by the Communists in Pampanga and the U. S. Army arrested Huk leaders and disarmed Huk squadrons. President Roxas, a sworn enemy of the Communists, defeated Osmena in the first post-war election and promised to solve the peace and order problem in sixty days. Troubled by the herculean task of national reconstruction and harassed by charges of collaboration with the Japanese and subservience to the United States by the Communists, Roxas died without fulfilling his mission.

With the Pacific campaign drawing to a close, the Huk soldiers wanted recognition by the U. S. Army for their guerrilla service. Their die-hard leaders opposed the idea so much so that only the Banal regiment presented itself for recognition. Embittered, the unrecognized Huks kept their arms and laid low. In March, 1945, the Politburo transferred its headquarters to Manila and concentrated their efforts towards winning labor and peasantry. Thus, the CLO and PKM were taken in. A new political party was formed in July, 1945, called the Democratic Alliance with the aim of ridding the country of political confusion, economic insecurity, and to put up an honest, efficient and progressive administration. It did not take long for the Communists to control this organization. As their first offensive move, a huge demonstration demanding release of Huk leaders, Taruc and Alejandrino, was effected in September, 1946. Following their success in having the Huk leaders released, the coalition of the DA and NP was effected and Huk leaders, Lava and Taruc and four others, were elected to Congress. They were, however, not allowed to seat due to charges of fraud and terrorism in their respective provinces. Lava and Taruc returned to their Huk bands in the mountains.

The peace and order situation worsened with the unseating of Taruc and Lava. The Huks geared for the offensive. With their mass base then numbering about 54,000, they stationed guards in strategic places to warn the troops of approaching government troops, and provide shelter and food for Huk troops. The links between the Huks and the PKM were carefully hidden to preserve the status of the former as a respectable peasant organization. The Communist leaders had an excellent propaganda line. They had a good cause to fight for, arising from discontentment against the government. Most of those who collaborated with the Japanese, the Communists observed, were now in high government positions. The members of the Japanese-sponsored BC were now with the MPC. Their ranks swelled to about 15,000 experienced guerrilla fighters with a strong base support from the masses. On the other hand, the Army at the time was beset with problems of demobilization and collaboration. It was forced to demobilize 95,000 officers and men and keep only 37,000.

The initial encounter between the Huks and the government forces occurred in May, 1946 when a group of Huks ambushed a patrol of the 10th MP Co in Sta. Monica, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, killing 10 soldiers, capturing and beheading its leaders. Soon the Huks went on lightning raids, recruited followers by force, kidnapped, murdered, and burned homes and fields. President Roxas then felt that agrarian reforms could solve the problem. The 70-30 crop-sharing law was passed and signed in consideration for the Huks laying down their arms. This did not stop the Huk rampage while negotiations for surrender were going

on. Two hundred Huks under Commander Viernes alias Stalin raised the hammer and sickle flag in Nueva Ecija, robbed the people of their crops, chickens and work animals, and threatened the townpeople to support the Huks or else.

The town of Norzagaray, Laguna, was sacked and the municipal building robbed of all the Huk raiders could carry. About this time, Feleo disappeared and the Huks accused government troops of having kidnapped and killed him. Roxas then enunciated the mailed-fist policy in place of the policy of attraction.

The Communists met this policy with a combination of legal and armed struggle. In actual implementation, these tactics became an armed struggle for the Huks and a legal struggle for a group of Communist leaders led by the Secretary General, Pedro C. Castro. On April, 1947, the Huks ambushed another patrol of MPs, killing its leader and wounding six others. A month later, 100 Huks raided Laur, Nueva Ecija, and robbed the treasury of \$600.00, kidnapped a policeman and looted the town. Another ambush followed in San Miguel, Bulacan, killing two officers of the 115th PC Co. While all these ambushes were being carried out, Taruc was building up his forces in Mt. Arayat. Upon learning this, Operations Arayat was launched with 2000 troops of the PC. Twenty-one Huks were killed, six wounded, several sacks of rice, medicine, 43 MGs, 34 rifles and 10,000 rolls of ammunition captured. Taruc was able to escape. Several more bloody encounters crystallized public clamor for general amnesty, which was rejected by Roxas for the reason that the Huks had their chance but did not take it. The situation turned from bad to worse with the unexplained death of Manuel Joven, a radical labor leader. Even PKM members, the civilian arm of the CPP, openly participated in the ambushade. This led Roxas to declare the Huk and PKM illegal and seditious in March, 1948. A month later, Roxas died of heart attack at Clark Field, leaving the cleavage between the government and the dissidents at its worst.

A grave conflict inside CPP ranks occurred in the face of government mailed-fist policy. Castro, Secretary General, claimed that a "revolutionary situation" was non-existent and therefore, set his foot against the resumption of the armed struggle. On the other hand, the Huks now in fighting spirit and led by more radical leaders like Lava, Taruc and Balgos disobeyed Castro's order and eventually ousted Castro. The Lava faction at this time was beginning to assert its leadership and through a series of purges over disagreement on top policies, the Lava brothers succeeded in power.

The ascension of Quirino to the Presidency after the death of Roxas brought a new approach to the Huk situation. He felt that the strong-arm policy should be changed to a conciliatory one. Quick to grasp a new development to their advantage, Taruc sent word to President Quirino, offering his cooperation and that of the Huk organization in the restoration of peace and order. After a series of exchange of notes, Taruc came out of hiding to see President Quirino. Taruc pledged loyalty to the government and promised to live up to the pledge. He regained his seat in Congress and collected his backpay. The machinery for mass surrender was slow in forming and meanwhile, both sides started accusing each other of bad faith. Then came the day, August 29, 1948, when Taruc, instead of showing up as one of the speakers in a rally to convince his men to lay down their arms, sent a letter to President Quirino, accusing the government of bad faith. He had rejoined his troops to resume the armed struggle.

The failure of the Amnesty Proclamation led to a resurgence of Huk activities. In November, 1948, the CPP leaders changed the name of their military arm to Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB), "People's Liberation Army," this time making their followers believe they were engaged in the liberation of the Filipino people from "American imperialism." Soon the catchy preamble to their new constitution was attracting new recruits. The Katipunan red banner with the 3 K's replaced the letters HMB. Then began new raids on PC detachments, army camps, government installations, and ambushes of government troops.

The most publicized of dissident activities was the ambush of Mrs. Aurora Quezon by Alexander Viernes alias Commander Stalin with 200 Huks. Killed were Mrs. Quezon, her daughter, Aurora, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, Filipe Buencamino, III, the San Agustin brothers, and many others. This was a serious setback to the Communist propaganda activities, since Mrs. Quezon was widely beloved by the people. Noticing the nation's feeling of condemnation, the Communist leaders tried to wash their hands by declaring that the perpetrators were not under orders to do so.

The elections in 1949 provided an excuse for the Communists to declare the existence of a revolutionary situation. Terrorism, fraud and abuses were rampant. Then, a new Politburo came into being with Jose Lava as Secretary General. Military discipline was stricter, financial problems were remedied, attacks were well planned. The 8th Anniversary of the Huks was celebrated with an attack on San Pablo City by 100 Huks, and the Communist flag was hoisted in the town hall. Another group raided the PC barracks at San Mateo, Rizal. The town of Montalban was attacked and the mayor kidnapped. The PC



barracks in San Rafael, Bulacan was attacked. Other raids were staged in Paete, Nagcarlan, Rizal; Pangil, Lilio, Calamba and Los Banos, Laguna; Lipa, Tanauan, Batangas; Guimba, Aliaga, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; Apalit, Mexico, Pampanga. On March 29, in a coordinated military attack, Luis Taruc reported that R. C. 2 ambushed and killed Captain Dumlao and several soldiers and another attack on San Simon and Mabalacat, Pampanga. Total losses for this anniversary celebration were more than 30 killed, many of them civilians, and more than 50 wounded.

In towns attacked, Huk leaflets were left, enjoining the people to give all possible aid to the Huks. A Presidential order relieved the PC from operational duties and turned the work over to the Army. Army troops reporting to their new stations were being ambushed whenever possible. May 1, 1950, 100 Huks attacked Aguilar, Pangasinan and twice that number attacked Laur, Nueva Ecija. Troops on the way to Laur were ambushed.

To intensify their intelligence work, the Intelligence Division of the MD was created by the Politburo to gather military, political, and economic intelligence for use in their Armed Struggle. The CPP finally formed two sets of Politburo: PB In - with Jose Lava, Maclang, Espiritu, Bautista, Rodriguez, to stay in Manila; PB Out - with Jesus Lava, Luis Taruc, Castillo, Alejandrino, Balgos to direct field activities. Plans were prepared to increase cadres from 3,600 to 56,000; party members from 10,800 to 172,000; organized masses from 30,000 to 2,430,000 for a period of one year beginning July, 1950. A strategic plan for the national seizure of power was drawn, which called for a general uprising as soon as a revolutionary crisis existed in coordination with trade union strikes and seizure of strategic industries. On May 1, 1952, the government was expected to fall and power would be in Communist hands. Thirty-five Huk Divisions of 3,329 men each or a total of about 116,480 men were planned for the job. R. C. 5 was designated to be their GHQ.

To step up the revolutionary movement, the CPP reorganized their forces. GHQ was composed of Jesus Lava, Chief of Staff, Luis Taruc, Vice Chief of Staff, Alejandrino, Chief, W/Plans, etc. Regional arrangements were effected too.

The next coordinated attack was launched August 26, 1950 to celebrate the Cry of Balintawak. Camp Macabulos in Tarlac was the target. 200 HMBs under Silvestre Liwanag alias Linda Bie killed 5 officers, 18 EMs, 7 civilians (nurses were criminally attacked), 4 bystanders wounded. Attackers released 47 prisoners from the provincial jail of Tarlac, looted the Army camp before setting it on fire. Patients in the hospital were among those murdered in cold blood while lying helpless in bed.

Sta. Cruz, Laguna, was another target on the same day. 300 HMBs under Pedro Caguin alias Commander Samonte attacked the town at 2:00 A.M., looted and burned the town. 3 killed and 8 wounded on PC side, 15 HMBs killed and their wounded loaded in trucks and escaped towards Pila, Laguna.

To implement their plans for technical training and special warfare, the Special Warfare Division was created in September, 1950 with Angel Baking as Chief. Mission was to teach HMBs the technique of making homemade bombs, booby traps, land mines, use of wireless.

Expansion plans were being implemented full blast. Balgos with 200 HMBs went to Bicol, Briones to Ilocos, Sawit for Cagayan Valley, Manaoag to Batangas and Cavite. A special force under Pamintuan was sent to Manila. Capadocia spearheaded expansion in the Visayas.

At its height, the Communist revolt counted with about 15,000 organized strength with about 13,000 firearms of assorted types.

The fast deteriorating peace and order conditions aroused public sentiment. Congress and the President were blaming each other for the deplorable situation. Manila's population was swelling by hundreds of thousands who sought protection from Huk raids and attacks in isolated towns. Barangays and civil guards were being organized to help defend the towns and barrios.

On September 1, 1950 the President appointed Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense. He was a man from the masses, who understood the problem thoroughly, an experienced guerrilla fighter, humble, courageous, and dedicated to the cause of freedom and democracy. His first move was to clean the Armed Forces of incompetent, abusive and corrupt personnel in order to restore the confidence of the people in their Army. To this end, he was quick to reward the brave ones with either decorations or spot promotions.

He placed the Army in the role of helping the economic social development of rural areas and get the assistance of the ECA (U. S.) in the work of bringing prosperity and social justice to the poverty-stricken people. Desiring to know the facts firsthand, he traveled extensively, talked with soldiers in the field, directed operations, talked to civilians in far-flung barrios, slept and ate with them whenever he could. He initiated the giving of rewards to surrendered, captured or killed Huk leaders and protection to those who affect such feats. He encouraged civilians to come to him and report directly or by letter and telegram collect. He organized the Psywar effort that counteracted Communist propaganda with tangible offers, such as land for the landless.

In less than two months in office, Magsaysay achieved his first big success on October 18, 1950, when the Politburo (In) was completely broken with the arrest of all the members, in a daring raid conducted in the city of Manila by the Military Intelligence Service under his supervision. In the words of William Pomeroy, this is how the news was received by the Huks in the field: "One evening, a few days after the end of the school Reg (Taruc, brother of Luis) who had a radio, burst into our hut and stood there looking at us, his face a picture of pain. 'Comrades,' he said, in a particularly strained voice, 'bad news.' He stood there silent for a moment while we jumped to our feet. 'The whole city organization has been smashed. All PB members in Manila have been captured.' He stood. No one spoke for a long time."

Taken in the raid were many of the keenest minds and best organizers in the whole Huk movement and two truckloads of documents containing complete plans of their activities, files of previous activities and drafts for the whole period of the preparation for the national seizure of power. The PB (Out) took over leadership and they abandoned plans for the 20th anniversary celebration of the CPP on November 7, 1950 with the seizure of plans for the coordinated attack. In retaliation, and to restore morale among the rank and file, the Huks launched a series of holdups, arson, killing, kidnapping. Among these were: Commander Amat and his flying Squadron held up MRR at Binan, fled with cash loot of \$76,000. 100 Huks attacked San Marcelino, Zambales, burning 34 houses, kidnapped 10 civilians and butchered 22 residents. 50 Huks surprised a PC garrison at Palawig, Zambales, got 21 rifles and killed 2 soldiers. The Hardie Farm near Antipolo, Rizal was raided by Huks, killing Mr. and Mrs. Hardie and the foreman.

The AFP intensified its campaign, using the information gained from captured documents and revelations made by captured Politburo members. One after the other, Huk commanders hiding in the city of Manila and neighboring towns fell into the dragnet of the MIS. Huk lairs and hideouts in the city were raided. With the capture of Maclang, Liaison Officer with the CB, and secret documents linking the CB with the movement, the Chinese began to be apprehensive. Not long after the capture of the PB, the MIS staged another raid and apprehended the members of the Chinese Bureau. The remnants of the CPP and HUKs went in hiding deep in mountain lairs where they are now trying to recoup.

The tide had changed. Magsaysay initiated vigorous economic programs to rehabilitate the suffering masses, as well as surrendered and captured dissidents and continued his Strong-Army policy against the Communist die-hards who had chosen to pursue their Communist objectives.

To give time to prepare cases against the PB, CLO and the CB, the President issued Proclamation No. 210, suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The CPP reacted quickly by getting the pink newspapers to voice their indignation and accusations that the government was trampling on the democratic rights of citizens. The CLU joined in the protest but was silenced after a captured document, made public, revealed that the CLU action was Communist-inspired. The legal battle in court started with the accused CPP leaders represented by legal luminaries such as Recto, Araneta, Barredo, Baisas, Salonga, Laurel, Teehankee, and Villanueva. After three long years of trial, the PB members were convicted, sentenced. Sentences ranged from death to long terms in prison. Up to the present, the cases are on appeal in the Supreme Court.

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#### DISCUSSION

**Query:** What was the military organization of the Hukbalahap? Did they organize in three forces, such as mobile columns, local or regional guerrilla units and a home guard?

**Answer:** (Col Valeriano). Yes. They did have all these units, but under different names. For instance, the mobile units. Their version of mobile units were called "Striking Forces." These were actually the Huks' principal fighting forces for major operations, and employed very mobile tactics. They operated directly under the Huk commander, Luis Taruc.

The second thing that you asked was about area or static guerrilla units. As Colonel Lopus mentioned, the Huks had area or regional commands in which they maintained active elements of approximately company size, which were called squadrons.

Home guards, yes. They had what they called the Barrio Unit Defense Corps units, formed from local residents activated on call. These units were commonly known in the Philippines as the Huk home guard.

**Query:** What was the organization of the mobile columns? Did they have battalions, regiments, and so on? Did they carry heavy weapons?

**Answer:** (Col Valeriano). In the Philippines, we found that the striking force strength varied. A striking force would move out of its redoubt area and move towards its target, gathering strength along the way. In this way, by the time it reached the target area, the basic element of the striking force would be augmented by two or three times its size when it left its redoubt. This augmentation was principally by area squadrons. There was a time when a striking force could gather as many as 500 well armed men. Armaments varied. There was no standard armament, but we did find that the best arms in the hands of the Huks were carried by these striking forces. The squadrons also varied in strength and in equipment.

**Answer:** (Gen Lansdale). I'd like to comment to the Vietnamese officers here that the Huks in organization, tactics, and strength were very similar to the Viet Cong you are now facing down in your Fifth Region. They are not similar to the Viet Minh organization against the French. In that campaign, the Viet Minh had more formal organizations.

**Query:** Can you give me the relative strength of the Huks and of your armed forces in one of their major operations?

**Answer:** (Col Valeriano). I will tell you about a particular case, the ambush of Mrs. Quezon, the widow of our first President. The Huks, with a strength of 250 men, ambushed her party along a lonely road, killing her, several members of her family, and a number of military personnel who were with the party. There was a tremendous public reaction, a demand that the Philippine Constabulary produce results. I was placed in command of a force which ultimately numbered 3,000 men, with orders to achieve and maintain contact with the ambushing force until it was destroyed. After seven months of continuous operation in wild, virtually unexplored mountains, I was able to report to GHQ that the five squadrons involved and their 250 men had been wiped out or captured.

**Query:** Did the Huk have outside assistance? If so how was this rendered?

**Answer:** (Gen Lansdale). Colonel Lapus touched on some international aspects, in the description of the Communist Party in the Philippines,

how it was formed, with the fact that some of the Communists there went to Moscow, went to Peking, were in with both the Chinese and the Russian Communist Parties.

However, during the Huk campaign, the military campaign, there was no substantial outside assistance in a large material way, no assistance with arms or supplies. There were no regular submarine or air supply routes operating. They did receive some funds at times, and so on. Couriers did come in, of course, but usually through normal routes of travel. I believe that is about all we can say in a general discussion.

**Query:** Did I understand you to say that the Huks were never established on any of the other islands except Luzon? Is this true and is there any reasonable explanation?

**Answer:** (Maj Justiniano). This is not true. From 1946 through 1951 the Huks were actively pushing an expansion program. They had in fact what they called their expansion force, with a primary mission of initiating Huk movements in other islands. They met with very considerable success on Panay Island. However, through troop action and a very daring and successful infiltration operation under the direction of Colonel Lopus here, we were able to crush the movement entirely, killing its leader, a high ranking member of the Politburo.

**Query:** Why was the expansion movement unsuccessful?

**Answer:** (Maj Bohanan). As I see it, there were two principal reasons for failure. One was that the Huk propaganda line was not sufficiently flexible. It was not well adapted to conditions prevailing in localities other than Central Luzon. The other reason is that expansion activities were usually recognized and vigorously repressed by local authorities, by the constabulary, and even at times by citizen leaders in the communities.

Incidentally, in that Panay operation masterminded by Colonel Lopus, the infiltrators never revealed themselves until the commander was killed. After the second in command learned of his leader's death, he turned to his two principal staff officers, asking: "What do we do?" Their answer was to tell him that he was under arrest.

Counter-Guerrilla Seminar  
Fort Bragg, 15 June 1961

II.

THE COMMUNIST HUK ENEMY

By

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The Congress of the Philippines passed a law in 1957 known as the Anti-Subversion Act.

Section 2 of this Act reads:

"The Congress hereby declares the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the government under the control and domination of an alien power. The said party and any other organization having the same purpose and their successors are hereby declared illegal and outlawed."

President Carlos P. Garcia, in signing the Act in June 20, 1957, said:

"With this law, our people have not only officially made the fight against Communism a matter of national policy, but we have also acquired a potent weapon in the fight against subversion . . . . Under the circumstances, it is clearly the right and the duty of this government to invoke the police powers of a sovereign state to protect itself and the institutions entrusted to its care from criminal attack. I shall not only see to it that the anti-communist program of my illustrious predecessor, Ramon Magsaysay, will remain intact, but I shall also push it through with the same dedication and with unrelenting vigor."

It took eleven years since the first armed encounter between the Huks and the government forces in May, 1946, to convince Congress that the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the Huks, were conspiring to overthrow the government.

The story of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines is a long and complicated one. Although it followed the same pattern as any Communist-led and inspired revolt, circumstances that contributed to the rise and fall of the movement in the Philippines evolved lessons that may prove useful in dealing with people and areas affected by Communist uprisings.

My talk this morning is to give you a quick run-down of the history of the CPP and its military arm, the Huks, its organization, their aims and methods, and the atrocities committed by them, which led to their being outlawed and declared illegal.

This movement may be better understood by presenting to you the events in sequence, i.e., before World War II, during World War II, and after World War II.

#### 1920 - 1941

As early as 1920, shortly after the Third International or the Comintern was formed, Communism started taking roots in the Philippines. Intellectuals like Isabelo de los Reyes, Dominador Gomez, Crisanto Evangelista, and Antonio D. Ora, through their readings of Karl Marx and contacts with foreign agents like William Janequette alias Harrison George, American Communist from San Francisco, succeeded in organizing Philippine labor leaders to attend the Comintern-sponsored labor conference in Canton, China. In 1925, the Indonesian Communist, Tan Malaka alias Elias Fuentes, infiltrated into the Philippines disguised as a Filipino.

Conditions in the Philippines then offered a fertile ground for Communism to take root. The colonial status of the country offered excellent propaganda for agitators. The antiquated land tenure system served to emphasize the class struggle between the rich landowner and the poor peasant. The crop-sharing system and the usurious rates of interest prevented the peasants to rise above their deplorable low level of living.

Capitalizing on these conditions, Tan Malaka, a Comintern agent, succeeded in stirring the Filipino workers and the labor leaders to accept an invitation to attend the Moscow conference. On their way to Moscow in 1928,



Evangelista and Bognot attended the Shanghai conference first and met Communist delegates like Chou en Lai, Earl Browder and others from Europe. In Moscow, they met Stalin himself.

On his return in 1929 to the Philippines, Evangelista lost no time in organizing the Anti-Imperialist League, the Congress of Philippine Workingmen, and formed a working class party "to direct and lead the workers in their struggle for political and economic independence."

A year later on August 26, 1930 (Cry of Balintawak), the birth of the CPP was ushered in with Evangelista guiding its development along the pattern set by the Comintern. The first Politburo was composed of Evangelista, Ora, Manahan, Feleo, Caguin, Arcega and a Chinese referred to as "Comrade C." The official launching of the CPP on November 7, 1930 was made to coincide with the 13th Anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution with the following aims: (1) Fight and overthrow American imperialism in the Philippines; (2) Direct the movement for immediate and complete independence; (3) Establish Communism under the authority and direction of the masses; (4) Fight against the exploitation of the masses and to defend their rights and liberties; (5) Fight and overthrow capitalism; and (6) Use the dictatorship of labor to expedite the move for early independence of the nation and for redemption of the masses and for the practice and adoption of Communism. The hammer and sickle emblem emblazoned against a red background with the phrase "Communist Party of the Philippines" around it was adopted.

The CPP pursued its aims vigorously. Potential leaders like Maclang, Galvez, Brioso, Bambao, Liberio were sent to Moscow to train in Comintern schools; the CPP organ called "Titis" was circulated; propaganda leaflets were distributed with inflammatory slogans such as "Down with this government for this is a government of the dominant American imperialists," "All friars are liars in heaven," "There is no God; God is a mere illusion," "Blood, blood, and only blood can wash away the corruption in the country." After a series of violent and bloody demonstrations, the CPP leaders were arrested in 1931, tried and sentenced to prison.

The remaining free members of the CPP went underground and continued their illegal activities. During the period that the CPP was undergoing severe trials, the Socialist Party under Pedro Abad Santos, brother of a Supreme Court justice, former representative of the Philippine Legislature and member of the Quezon-Osmena Independence Mission to the United States, was gaining considerable influence. Agitations on land reforms were launched by the Party but the movement promoted class struggle in its activities. Its members killed

landowners, burned sugarcane fields and rice fields, slaughtered work animals and used threats to recruit followers. President Quezon then instituted land reforms, but the CPP had by then gained control of the Socialist Party and violent clashes between landowners and socialists worsened. At this time, 1938, James Allen alias Dr. Sol Ouerbach of the U. S. Communist Party appeared on the scene and convinced Quezon to pardon Evangelista, Capadocia, Balgos, and others.

The CPP leaders lost no time in gaining control of the Socialist Party and on November 7, 1938, the CPP and the Socialist Party formalized a merger. Abad Santos believed it would be beneficial to the working class. A political committee instead of a politburo was adopted with the following members: Evangelista, Abad Santos, Capadocia, Balgos, Castro, Feleo, del Castillo, Taruc, del Rosario, Cruz, Arogante. The merger added the phrase "affiliated to the Communist International" in Art. VIII of the new constitution and adopted the United Front tactics. The merger ushered in problems that caused differences of opinions among the leaders, petty quarrels and internal splits, which later caused purges in the leadership.

#### 1941 - 1945

Eleven years after the formal launching of the CPP, the Philippines saw itself in the violent clutches of another menace, that of Japanese imperialism. Recognizing perhaps that the battle was one of survival, the CPP leaders initiated steps to win the alliance of the Commonwealth of American high officials by pledging "Loyalty to the governments of the Philippines and the United States." These overtures were, however, ignored by President Quezon and Commissioner Sayre because of the anti-government activities of the CPP.

On the whole, the war was a blessing to the CPP. Aside from acquiring the name of patriots, the CPP was afforded the rare opportunity of setting up a miniature "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" complete with a civil branch in the form of the BUDC (Barrio United Defense Corps) and a military arm in the guise of the Anti-Jap Army. Furthermore, the Japanese invasion forced a closer tie between the Filipino and Chinese Communists thru the activation of the Wachi, Chinese squadrons of the Hukbalahap.

The early Japanese victory in the Philippines, however, proved to be a blow to the CPP. The leaders' failure to convince their followers to surrender led to the arrest of Evangelista, del Rosario, Abad Santos, Capadocia, and others. Evangelista later died of torture, Abad Santos succumbed after illness suffered at Fort Santiago, del Rosario was liquidated and Capadocia escaped.

The remaining free leaders were quick to retaliate. They met in March, 1942 and organized the Anti-Jap Army called Hukbalahap, (a contraction of "Huk labang sa Hapon" or "Army Against Japan"), on suggestion of "Comrade C"; with Taruc as CinC and Alejandrino, deputy. Initially, five squadrons with 100 men each were activated. Abandoned arms in the battlefields of Bataan were gathered, deserters from the Jap-sponsored BC with their arms swelled their ranks, arms from ambushed Jap-patrols became a source of more arms. Later, Taruc, after contact was made with Colonel Claude M. Thorpe, was able to get American arms and supplies.

One squadron after another began to be activated and as their army increased in strength, the need for training and indoctrination began to be realized. The CPP established the Stalin University in Mt. Arayat and in the Sierra Madre Mountains, manned by Chinese military and political experts from the Red Chinese 8th Route Army. An all-Chinese guerrilla force, the Overseas Chinese 48th Detachment of the Philippine Anti-Japanese Forces known as the Wachi commanded by Uy Kiat and Wang Keu, was organized. With the support of the Philippine Chinese community, the detachment rapidly increased to six squadrons of 200 men each, operating in Bulacan and Laguna.

To insure their control and get cooperation of civilians, the Huks organized the BUDC (Barrio United Defense Corps) with membership of 5-12 depending on the size of the barrio on the pretext of protecting the people from looting and banditry. They actually were engaged in recruiting, drilling, intelligence and supply activities. The BUDC performed as courts of justice, and performed marriages among the barrio folks. By December, 1942, the Huk Army with Taruc as CinC, Balgos as Political Commissioner, Alejandrino as Vice CinC, swelled to 5000 well-armed troops. Encouraged by the Chinese Wachi troops, they became bolder and attacked Japanese garrisons, engaged patrols, Japanese convoys and raided BC troops and installations. By March, 1943, they had an Army of about 10,000. The Japanese Imperial Army retaliated and put Mt. Arayat, the Huk stronghold, under siege for ten days, killing and capturing many of the Huk leaders, and drove the Huks deeply underground.

The Huk Army was reorganized. Military districts were dissolved and regional commands were formed. Political organs, to guide fighting units and to see that orders were complied with, were formed down to squad level. Efforts to contact other guerrilla units under Peralta, Montelibano, Confessor, the USAFFE guerrillas under Colonel Merrill, were undertaken by Jose Lava but failed due to misunderstandings and confusion. A new politburo, with Arogante, Castro, Feleo, Comrade "C", Balgos, Taruc, del Castillo, Lava as members, were formed to do away with leaders who advocated the retreat policy and to prepare for the coming of the Liberation forces and proposed a peacetime coalition with the Osmena government. Regional commands were disbanded and provincial committees, provincial boards and regional staffs were activated in the provinces. The Military Committee was raised to a department.

When the Liberation forces came, they found Alejandrino governor of Pampanga, Feleo governor of Nueva Ecija, Jesus Lava governor of Laguna. Osmena refused to recognize the Communist local administration and the U. S. Army disarmed the Huk Force sent to Manila. The CIC arrested Taruc, Alejandrino, Cayan, de Leon, and others. They were later released on appeal by the masses but, because of their defiance, they were re-arrested and sent to Iwahig Penal Colony in Palawan. The people of Pampanga then petitioned General MacArthur and President Osmena to recognize the civil officials and the local government set up by the Communists. As expected, the petition was ignored. It was estimated that out of the 25,000 killed by the Huks, only 5000 were Japanese. Another petition ignored was that made by Balgos who succeeded Luis Taruc as CinC to induct the Huk Army as a whole unit into the Philippine Army.

#### 1945 - 1953

So far as the CPP was concerned, the struggle was resumed when Osmena repudiated the local government set-up by the Communists in Pampanga and the U. S. Army arrested Huk leaders and disarmed Huk squadrons. President Roxas, a sworn enemy of the Communists, defeated Osmena in the first post-war election and promised to solve the peace and order problem in sixty days. Troubled by the herculean task of national reconstruction and harassed by charges of collaboration with the Japanese and subservience to the United States by the Communists, Roxas died without fulfilling his mission.

With the Pacific campaign drawing to a close, the Huk soldiers wanted recognition by the U. S. Army for their guerrilla service. Their die-hard leaders opposed the idea so much so that only the Banal regiment presented itself for recognition. Embittered, the unrecognized Huks kept their arms and laid low. In March, 1945, the Politburo transferred its headquarters to Manila and concentrated their efforts towards winning labor and peasantry. Thus, the CLO and PKM were taken in. A new political party was formed in July, 1945, called the Democratic Alliance with the aim of ridding the country of political confusion, economic insecurity, and to put up an honest, efficient and progressive administration. It did not take long for the Communists to control this organization. As their first offensive move, a huge demonstration demanding release of Huk leaders, Taruc and Alejandrino, was effected in September, 1946. Following their success in having the Huk leaders released, the coalition of the DA and NP was effected and Huk leaders, Lava and Taruc and four others, were elected to Congress. They were, however, not allowed to seat due to charges of fraud and terrorism in their respective provinces. Lava and Taruc returned to their Huk bands in the mountains.

The peace and order situation worsened with the unseating of Taruc and Lava. The Huks geared for the offensive. With their mass base then numbering about 54,000, they stationed guards in strategic places to warn the troops of approaching government troops, and provide shelter and food for Huk troops. The links between the Huks and the PKM were carefully hidden to preserve the status of the former as a respectable peasant organization. The Communist leaders had an excellent propaganda line. They had a good cause to fight for, arising from discontentment against the government. Most of those who collaborated with the Japanese, the Communists observed, were now in high government positions. The members of the Japanese-sponsored BC were now with the MPC. Their ranks swelled to about 15,000 experienced guerrilla fighters with a strong base support from the masses. On the other hand, the Army at the time was beset with problems of demobilization and collaboration. It was forced to demobilize 95,000 officers and men and keep only 37,000.

The initial encounter between the Huks and the government forces occurred in May, 1946 when a group of Huks ambushed a patrol of the 10th MP Co in Sta. Monica, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, killing 10 soldiers, capturing and beheading its leaders. Soon the Huks went on lightning raids, recruited followers by force, kidnapped, murdered, and burned homes and fields. President Roxas then felt that agrarian reforms could solve the problem. The 70-30 crop-sharing law was passed and signed in consideration for the Huks laying down their arms. This did not stop the Huk rampage while negotiations for surrender were going

on. Two hundred Huks under Commander Viernes alias Stalin raised the hammer and sickle flag in Nueva Ecija, robbed the people of their crops, chickens and work animals, and threatened the townpeople to support the Huks or else.

The town of Norzagaray, Laguna, was sacked and the municipal building robbed of all the Huk raiders could carry. About this time, Feleo disappeared and the Huks accused government troops of having kidnapped and killed him. Roxas then enunciated the mailed-fist policy in place of the policy of attraction.

The Communists met this policy with a combination of legal and armed struggle. In actual implementation, these tactics became an armed struggle for the Huks and a legal struggle for a group of Communist leaders led by the Secretary General, Pedro C. Castro. On April, 1947, the Huks ambushed another patrol of MPs, killing its leader and wounding six others. A month later, 100 Huks raided Laur, Nueva Ecija, and robbed the treasury of \$600.00, kidnapped a policeman and looted the town. Another ambush followed in San Miguel, Bulacan, killing two officers of the 115th PC Co. While all these ambushes were being carried out, Taruc was building up his forces in Mt. Arayat. Upon learning this, Operations Arayat was launched with 2000 troops of the PC. Twenty-one Huks were killed, six wounded, several sacks of rice, medicine, 43 MGs, 34 rifles and 10,000 rolls of ammunition captured. Taruc was able to escape. Several more bloody encounters crystallized public clamor for general amnesty, which was rejected by Roxas for the reason that the Huks had their chance but did not take it. The situation turned from bad to worse with the unexplained death of Manuel Joven, a radical labor leader. Even PKM members, the civilian arm of the CPP, openly participated in the ambushade. This led Roxas to declare the Huk and PKM illegal and seditious in March, 1948. A month later, Roxas died of heart attack at Clark Field, leaving the cleavage between the government and the dissidents at its worst.

A grave conflict inside CPP ranks occurred in the face of government mailed-fist policy. Castro, Secretary General, claimed that a "revolutionary situation" was non-existent and therefore, set his foot against the resumption of the armed struggle. On the other hand, the Huks now in fighting spirit and led by more radical leaders like Lava, Taruc and Balgos disobeyed Castro's order and eventually ousted Castro. The Lava faction at this time was beginning to assert its leadership and through a series of purges over disagreement on top policies, the Lava brothers succeeded in power.

The ascension of Quirino to the Presidency after the death of Roxas brought a new approach to the Huk situation. He felt that the strong-arm policy should be changed to a conciliatory one. Quick to grasp a new development to their advantage, Taruc sent word to President Quirino, offering his cooperation and that of the Huk organization in the restoration of peace and order. After a series of exchange of notes, Taruc came out of hiding to see President Quirino. Taruc pledged loyalty to the government and promised to live up to the pledge. He regained his seat in Congress and collected his backpay. The machinery for mass surrender was slow in forming and meanwhile, both sides started accusing each other of bad faith. Then came the day, August 29, 1948, when Taruc, instead of showing up as one of the speakers in a rally to convince his men to lay down their arms, sent a letter to President Quirino, accusing the government of bad faith. He had rejoined his troops to resume the armed struggle.

The failure of the Amnesty Proclamation led to a resurgence of Huk activities. In November, 1948, the CPP leaders changed the name of their military arm to Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB), "People's Liberation Army," this time making their followers believe they were engaged in the liberation of the Filipino people from "American imperialism." Soon the catchy preamble to their new constitution was attracting new recruits. The Katipunan red banner with the 3 K's replaced the letters HMB. Then began new raids on PC detachments, army camps, government installations, and ambushes of government troops.

The most publicized of dissident activities was the ambush of Mrs. Aurora Quezon by Alexander Viernes alias Commander Stalin with 200 Huks. Killed were Mrs. Quezon, her daughter, Aurora, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, Filipe Buencamino, III, the San Agustin brothers, and many others. This was a serious setback to the Communist propaganda activities, since Mrs. Quezon was widely beloved by the people. Noticing the nation's feeling of condemnation, the Communist leaders tried to wash their hands by declaring that the perpetrators were not under orders to do so.

The elections in 1949 provided an excuse for the Communists to declare the existence of a revolutionary situation. Terrorism, fraud and abuses were rampant. Then, a new Politburo came into being with Jose Lava as Secretary General. Military discipline was stricter, financial problems were remedied, attacks were well planned. The 8th Anniversary of the Huks was celebrated with an attack on San Pablo City by 100 Huks, and the Communist flag was hoisted in the town hall. Another group raided the PC barracks at San Mateo, Rizal. The town of Montalban was attacked and the mayor kidnapped. The PC

barracks in San Rafael, Bulacan was attacked. Other raids were staged in Paete, Nagcarlan, Rizal; Pangil, Lilio, Calamba and Los Banos, Laguna; Lipa, Tanauan, Batangas; Guimba, Aliaga, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; Apalit, Mexico, Pampanga. On March 29, in a coordinated military attack, Luis Taruc reported that R. C. 2 ambushed and killed Captain Dumlao and several soldiers and another attack on San Simon and Mabalacat, Pampanga. Total losses for this anniversary celebration were more than 30 killed, many of them civilians, and more than 50 wounded.

In towns attacked, Huk leaflets were left, enjoining the people to give all possible aid to the Huks. A Presidential order relieved the PC from operational duties and turned the work over to the Army. Army troops reporting to their new stations were being ambushed whenever possible. May 1, 1950, 100 Huks attacked Aguilar, Pangasinan and twice that number attacked Laur, Nueva Ecija. Troops on the way to Laur were ambushed.

To intensify their intelligence work, the Intelligence Division of the MD was created by the Politburo to gather military, political, and economic intelligence for use in their Armed Struggle. The CPP finally formed two sets of Politburo: PB In - with Jose Lava, Maclang, Espiritu, Bautista, Rodriguez, to stay in Manila; PB Out - with Jesus Lava, Luis Taruc, Castillo, Alejandrino, Balgos to direct field activities. Plans were prepared to increase cadres from 3,600 to 56,000; party members from 10,800 to 172,000; organized masses from 30,000 to 2,430,000 for a period of one year beginning July, 1950. A strategic plan for the national seizure of power was drawn, which called for a general uprising as soon as a revolutionary crisis existed in coordination with trade union strikes and seizure of strategic industries. On May 1, 1952, the government was expected to fall and power would be in Communist hands. Thirty-five Huk Divisions of 3,329 men each or a total of about 116,480 men were planned for the job. R. C. 5 was designated to be their GHQ.

To step up the revolutionary movement, the CPP reorganized their forces. GHQ was composed of Jesus Lava, Chief of Staff, Luis Taruc, Vice Chief of Staff, Alejandrino, Chief, W/Plans, etc. Regional arrangements were effected too.

The next coordinated attack was launched August 26, 1950 to celebrate the Cry of Balintawak. Camp Macabulos in Tarlac was the target. 200 HMBs under Silvestre Liwanag alias Linda Bie killed 5 officers, 18 EMs, 7 civilians (nurses were criminally attacked), 4 bystanders wounded. Attackers released 47 prisoners from the provincial jail of Tarlac, looted the Army camp before setting it on fire. Patients in the hospital were among those murdered in cold blood while lying helpless in bed.



Sta. Cruz, Laguna, was another target on the same day. 300 HMBs under Pedro Caguin alias Commander Samonte attacked the town at 2:00 A.M., looted and burned the town. 3 killed and 8 wounded on PC side, 15 HMBs killed and their wounded loaded in trucks and escaped towards Pila, Laguna.

To implement their plans for technical training and special warfare, the Special Warfare Division was created in September, 1950 with Angel Baking as Chief. Mission was to teach HMBs the technique of making homemade bombs, booby traps, land mines, use of wireless.

Expansion plans were being implemented full blast. Balgos with 200 HMBs went to Bicol, Briones to Ilocos, Sawit for Cagayan Valley, Manaoag to Batangas and Cavite. A special force under Pamintuan was sent to Manila. Capadocia spearheaded expansion in the Visayas.

At its height, the Communist revolt counted with about 15,000 organized strength with about 13,000 firearms of assorted types.

The fast deteriorating peace and order conditions aroused public sentiment. Congress and the President were blaming each other for the deplorable situation. Manila's population was swelling by hundreds of thousands who sought protection from Huk raids and attacks in isolated towns. Barangays and civil guards were being organized to help defend the towns and barrios.

On September 1, 1950 the President appointed Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense. He was a man from the masses, who understood the problem thoroughly, an experienced guerrilla fighter, humble, courageous, and dedicated to the cause of freedom and democracy. His first move was to clean the Armed Forces of incompetent, abusive and corrupt personnel in order to restore the confidence of the people in their Army. To this end, he was quick to reward the brave ones with either decorations or spot promotions.

He placed the Army in the role of helping the economic social development of rural areas and get the assistance of the ECA (U. S.) in the work of bringing prosperity and social justice to the poverty-stricken people. Desiring to know the facts firsthand, he traveled extensively, talked with soldiers in the field, directed operations, talked to civilians in far-flung barrios, slept and ate with them whenever he could. He initiated the giving of rewards to surrendered, captured or killed Huk leaders and protection to those who affect such feats. He encouraged civilians to come to him and report directly or by letter and telegram collect. He organized the Psywar effort that counteracted Communist propaganda with tangible offers, such as land for the landless.

In less than two months in office, Magsaysay achieved his first big success on October 18, 1950, when the Politburo (In) was completely broken with the arrest of all the members, in a daring raid conducted in the city of Manila by the Military Intelligence Service under his supervision. In the words of William Pomeroy, this is how the news was received by the Huks in the field: "One evening, a few days after the end of the school Reg (Taruc, brother of Luis) who had a radio, burst into our hut and stood there looking at us, his face a picture of pain. 'Comrades,' he said, in a particularly strained voice, 'bad news.' He stood there silent for a moment while we jumped to our feet. 'The whole city organization has been smashed. All PB members in Manila have been captured.' He stood. No one spoke for a long time."

Taken in the raid were many of the keenest minds and best organizers in the whole Huk movement and two truckloads of documents containing complete plans of their activities, files of previous activities and drafts for the whole period of the preparation for the national seizure of power. The PB (Out) took over leadership and they abandoned plans for the 20th anniversary celebration of the CPP on November 7, 1950 with the seizure of plans for the coordinated attack. In retaliation, and to restore morale among the rank and file, the Huks launched a series of holdups, arson, killing, kidnapping. Among these were: Commander Amat and his flying Squadron held up MRR at Binan, fled with cash loot of \$76,000. 100 Huks attacked San Marcelino, Zambales, burning 34 houses, kidnapped 10 civilians and butchered 22 residents. 50 Huks surprised a PC garrison at Palawig, Zambales, got 21 rifles and killed 2 soldiers. The Hardie Farm near Antipolo, Rizal was raided by Huks, killing Mr. and Mrs. Hardie and the foreman.

The AFP intensified its campaign, using the information gained from captured documents and revelations made by captured Politburo members. One after the other, Huk commanders hiding in the city of Manila and neighboring towns fell into the dragnet of the MIS. Huk lairs and hideouts in the city were raided. With the capture of Maclang, Liaison Officer with the CB, and secret documents linking the CB with the movement, the Chinese began to be apprehensive. Not long after the capture of the PB, the MIS staged another raid and apprehended the members of the Chinese Bureau. The remnants of the CPP and HUKs went in hiding deep in mountain lairs where they are now trying to recoup.

The tide had changed. Magsaysay initiated vigorous economic programs to rehabilitate the suffering masses, as well as surrendered and captured dissidents and continued his Strong-Army policy against the Communist die-hards who had chosen to pursue their Communist objectives.

To give time to prepare cases against the PB, CLO and the CB, the President issued Proclamation No. 210, suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The CPP reacted quickly by getting the pink newspapers to voice their indignation and accusations that the government was trampling on the democratic rights of citizens. The CLU joined in the protest but was silenced after a captured document, made public, revealed that the CLU action was Communist-inspired. The legal battle in court started with the accused CPP leaders represented by legal luminaries such as Recto, Araneta, Barredo, Baisas, Salonga, Laurel, Teehankee, and Villanueva. After three long years of trial, the PB members were convicted, sentenced. Sentences ranged from death to long terms in prison. Up to the present, the cases are on appeal in the Supreme Court.

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#### DISCUSSION

Query: What was the military organization of the Hukbalahap? Did they organize in three forces, such as mobile columns, local or regional guerrilla units and a home guard?

Answer: (Col Valeriano). Yes. They did have all these units, but under different names. For instance, the mobile units. Their version of mobile units were called "Striking Forces." These were actually the Huks' principal fighting forces for major operations, and employed very mobile tactics. They operated directly under the Huk commander, Luis Taruc.

The second thing that you asked was about area or static guerrilla units. As Colonel Lapus mentioned, the Huks had area or regional commands in which they maintained active elements of approximately company size, which were called squadrons.

Home guards, yes. They had what they called the Barrio Unit Defense Corps units, formed from local residents activated on call. These units were commonly known in the Philippines as the Huk home guard.

Query: What was the organization of the mobile columns? Did they have battalions, regiments, and so on? Did they carry heavy weapons?

Answer: (Col Valeriano). In the Philippines, we found that the striking force strength varied. A striking force would move out of its redoubt area and move towards its target, gathering strength along the way. In this way, by the time it reached the target area, the basic element of the striking force would be augmented by two or three times its size when it left its redoubt. This augmentation was principally by area squadrons. There was a time when a striking force could gather as many as 500 well armed men. Armaments varied. There was no standard armament, but we did find that the best arms in the hands of the Huks were carried by these striking forces. The squadrons also varied in strength and in equipment.

Answer: (Gen Lansdale). I'd like to comment to the Vietnamese officers here that the Huks in organization, tactics, and strength were very similar to the Viet Cong you are now facing down in your Fifth Region. They are not similar to the Viet Minh organization against the French. In that campaign, the Viet Minh had more formal organizations.

Query: Can you give me the relative strength of the Huks and of your armed forces in one of their major operations?

Answer: (Col Valeriano). I will tell you about a particular case, the ambush of Mrs. Quezon, the widow of our first President. The Huks, with a strength of 250 men, ambushed her party along a lonely road, killing her, several members of her family, and a number of military personnel who were with the party. There was a tremendous public reaction, a demand that the Philippine Constabulary produce results. I was placed in command of a force which ultimately numbered 3,000 men, with orders to achieve and maintain contact with the ambushing force until it was destroyed. After seven months of continuous operation in wild, virtually unexplored mountains, I was able to report to GHQ that the five squadrons involved and their 250 men had been wiped out or captured.

Query: Did the Huk have outside assistance? If so how was this rendered?

Answer: (Gen Lansdale). Colonel Lapus touched on some international aspects, in the description of the Communist Party in the Philippines,

how it was formed, with the fact that some of the Communists there went to Moscow, went to Peking, were in with both the Chinese and the Russian Communist Parties.

However, during the Huk campaign, the military campaign, there was no substantial outside assistance in a large material way, no assistance with arms or supplies. There were no regular submarine or air supply routes operating. They did receive some funds at times, and so on. Couriers did come in, of course, but usually through normal routes of travel. I believe that is about all we can say in a general discussion.

Query: Did I understand you to say that the Huks were never established on any of the other islands except Luzon? Is this true and is there any reasonable explanation?

Answer: (Maj Justiniano). This is not true. From 1946 through 1951 the Huks were actively pushing an expansion program. They had in fact what they called their expansion force, with a primary mission of initiating Huk movements in other islands. They met with very considerable success on Panay Island. However, through troop action and a very daring and successful infiltration operation under the direction of Colonel Lapus here, we were able to crush the movement entirely, killing its leader, a high ranking member of the Politburo.

Query: Why was the expansion movement unsuccessful?

Answer: (Maj Bohanan). As I see it, there were two principal reasons for failure. One was that the Huk propaganda line was not sufficiently flexible. It was not well adapted to conditions prevailing in localities other than Central Luzon. The other reason is that expansion activities were usually recognized and vigorously repressed by local authorities, by the constabulary, and even at times by citizen leaders in the communities.

Incidentally, in that Panay operation masterminded by Colonel Lapus, the infiltrators never revealed themselves until the commander was killed. After the second in command learned of his leader's death, he turned to his two principal staff officers, asking: "What do we do?" Their answer was to tell him that he was under arrest.

### III

## MILITARY OPERATIONS

by

Napoleon D. Valeriano  
Colonel, AFP, Retired

Gentlemen, for the purpose of my discussion covering military combat contributions to the final subjugation of the Communist movement in the Philippines, I have divided the operations into four phases.

The first phase covers the period from 1945 until early 1947. This was the period when the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, which was in exile in the United States during the period of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, returned with General McArthur. This transition government was not too well prepared to face its problems, especially the problems of national security. It was informed about the subversive movement in Central Luzon, but it did not understand fully the implications of the Hukbalahap movement. After it became the government of the Philippine Republic in 1946, these same people still refused to accept the intelligence reports repeatedly and consistently furnished. But, since this movement really was Communist inspired, the military policy during this period was inadequate, and proved most costly to the country from 1946 up to 1955.

The Hukbalahap movement as discussed by today's speakers so far has concerned military organizations called regional commands. These commands have varied strengths. But for my discussion, I will speak about the fighting units called the Hukbalahap squadrons. These squadrons varied in strength, varied in armament, varied in the quality of their leadership. Some of these squadrons were led by blood-thirsty types. That is quite common in guerrilla warfare. Some of them were lead by such inoffensive leaders that we did not give them operational priorities until much later. However, during the Japanese occupation period, under the cover of being anti-Japanese guerrilla units, they all were able to accumulate armament and equipment.

Now, in this transition period the armed forces of the Philippines were being demobilized slowly to peacetime status. We started organizing units to take over the functions of the pre-war Philippine Constabulary

which was a military organization with national police functions. The new post-war organization was called the Military Police Command, Philippine Army. During this period, General McArthur's headquarters authorized the organization, training and equipment of some 13 military police companies, with the necessary headquarters organizations, in order that these companies when deployed would be properly coordinated, supervised and controlled.

Again, the attitude of the Commonwealth government was reflected in the training of these units, in the equipment of these units, in the armament of these units. Most of the units, as I saw them in the field, were armed with patrolmen's billies and whistles to be policemen. They were issued white painted helmets, white painted jeeps, and the heaviest weapon that I saw for these military police companies were carbines. They were pitted against experienced Huk guerrillas who were armed with the heaviest infantry armaments available, including bazookas. So that in several incidents in 1945 and 1946, we found military police companies or formations either being beaten back or overrun by Huk-balahap units. Again in 1946, the total number of government formations actually deployed in the field with semi-constabulary combat missions had an effective strength of about 11,000 officers and men.

The second phase was from 1947 through 1949, beginning at the time the young Republic had already been responsible for its own defense for about a year. By this time, we in the field had been able to convince several key members of the government in Manila that the Huk movement, and the Huks themselves, were mistakenly dubbed agrarian reformers or persecuted peasants, that they were actually guerrillas with Communist inspiration and direction. Accordingly, a reorganization of the Military Police Command in the Armed Forces of the Philippines was effected. It was redesignated as the Philippine Constabulary and the strength was increased to 17,000. This, they believed at the time, would be more than adequate to destroy the Huk guerrilla formations which were then practically controlling the rural areas of Central Luzon.

During this period, we in the field who saw the Huks at close range were impressed not only by their military capabilities but also by their non-military activities which were well integrated with their military program. Specifically, we were impressed by their efforts and success in cultivating a closer liaison with the villages or, in other words, in building a guerrilla support base. Quite a few of us

made lengthy reports about these developments to GHQ (General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines). Unfortunately, we were reporting to military men who clung too stubbornly to the ideas of conventional warfare which they had learned in staff schools there and here. Naturally, civilian leaders in government were influenced by the attitudes of the Army brass in Manila, and our reports were often ignored.

During this period, normal operations of the Philippine Constabulary were largely routine patrol and constabulary missions. Too often, patrols were sent out to execute purely constabulary duties, such as serving search warrants or warrants of arrest, and accomplished nothing else. Constabulary groups were dispersed in zone and provincial commands and further broken down into small village garrisons of platoons or less. In actual fact, these detachments either established a more or less tacit modus vivendi with the Huks in their area, or were forced to devote most of their efforts to supporting and protecting themselves.

A few large operations were mounted. I would like to discuss these operations from the standpoint of their motivation, their execution, and the results obtained.

A task force operation was usually initiated after some Huk outrage had prompted headlines in the newspapers claiming that the Philippine Constabulary was asleep. The Chief of Constabulary would answer the headline with an announcement that already the Constabulary was planning an operation, which he would personally command, that would end for all time the Huk menace.

Plans would be made, troops assembled, from the provincial and zone commands (leaving those areas virtually unprotected) and a thoroughly conventional "sweep" of an allegedly Huk infested area would be underway. The operations were well planned in accordance with conventional doctrine. We had lines of departure, we had phase lines, we had zones of action, and we had priorities of support.

The results were usually no hits, some runs (non-scoring) and many errors. The troops would be exhausted, our gasoline supply for the next month would be exhausted, but the Huks themselves would scarcely be tired by the effort necessary to draw out of the path of the sweep.



Once the previously announced objective had been reached, the operations would be considered successfully terminated and the troops would return to their normal stations. The guerrillas would also return to the area which had just been swept, confident that they would be free of molestation for some time to come.

However, during this period, being a very curious individual, I started germinating a few ideas of my own on how to meet these Huk guerrillas on equal terms. Time prohibits me from describing to you the organization of a team from Headquarters consisting of four officers and 50 enlisted men, known in the Philippines as the Nenita unit. We found out many things that we did not learn from text books. We learned the Huk technique of getting supplies, the Huk technique of getting information, the Huk technique for ambushes, for raids, interrogating captured government personnel. As we learned, in this period of 1947 to 1949, we tried in our small way to evolve useful counter-measures. One case history concerning these, I will describe later in this period. Before discussing our efforts, I would like to give you additional information about the tactics and practices of the Philippine Constabulary and of the Huks during this period.

I have already mentioned our Constabulary patrol missions. These patrols often were ambushed or would be forced into meeting engagements with guerrilla formations. Sometimes the patrols were decimated, sometimes they were able to force the guerrillas back. Despite occasional setbacks, the guerrillas gained strength throughout this period. Campaign analysis reveals that these patrol actions did not seek to cultivate the sympathy of the people in the area. As I recall those days, it was very normal for a company commander in the field to dispatch a patrol from squad to platoon size to serve a warrant of arrest in an isolated village. This patrol would reach the village, locate the individual (if he were surprised and found there) and would return to town without further action. Junior leaders of these formations did not attempt to stay long enough in this village to get friendly with the people, find out what were their problems, and if their patrol could assist them in any manner.

The guerrillas were doing exactly the opposite. They would sneak into these villages, stay with the people, play with them, work with them, but at the same time in a very subtle method indoctrinate them in Communism. This was the secret of the whole thing.

Another important factor which entered into our failure, and which I still cannot forget, was the poor support we received from higher echelons. Particularly significant was the inefficiency of our logistic system. Support was so poor that troops in the field were often forced to live off the country. As you know, gentlemen, when there is no other way for the troops to eat, commanders are virtually forced to tolerate troopers going to the villages and demanding food. It's either they go hungry or we go hungry. That was the theory of the average government trooper in the field. This, of course, worsened matters.

As the troops lived off the people, the Huks naturally exploited the situation. Their propagandists hammered constantly at the theme that these practices were an exact reflection of the attitude of the government in Manila towards the "persecuted masses."

That general situation was bad enough. Even worse, there were, as might be expected, instances of officers involved in matters definitely unworthy of one who is by definition an officer and a gentleman by the act of our Congress. Instances, including demanding bribes for the performance or non-performance of duty, occurred in all ranks. Each, of course, was magnified by Huk propagandists and their sympathizers. Few of the offenders were punished appropriately and publicly. We had quite a few big scandals in Central Luzon during this period. In a general statement, we can say that troop behavior was so low that it cultivated an antipathy by the masses for the man in uniform.

The third phase of the operations against the Huk is what I like to call the "phase of enlightenment." This is the period of the new approach which started in 1950 and lasted into 1952. The turning point of the whole campaign occurred in 1951, right in the middle of this period. This, as General Lansdale stated, was the election of 1951. In 1950, the situation in the Philippines and the representations of the Philippine Government awakened and invited the concern of our American brothers. Philippine President Quirino installed as Secretary of Defense a vigorous new man, a man of the people, Ramon Magsaysay. He had adequate guerrilla background; but, more important, is the fact that as a man of the people, he understood exactly and instinctively what was happening in the homes and the minds of the people of the villages and the farms. He knew their problems, he knew what the mistakes of the Armed Forces were. As soon as he got into the office of Secretary of National Defense, things started happening so fast that right now it's very hard to recall the exact order or sequence of the actions during this period.

As soon as he took office, we started feeling the punch of new, vigorous, inspired leadership which made its effect felt in every aspect of our fight against the Huks. I well remember his first visit to me, when he said, "I want you to turn out public relations men from every private, corporal, sergeant, lieutenant and officer of your command. I want every enlisted man of the Philippine Army in uniform to serve as a public relations man for the Army and for our government." That was the substance of his statement, and accurately reflected his policy.

In speaking of the new formations and new activities which were strange to the Hukbalahaps, I want to cite first the effectiveness of the Scout Ranger teams that were thrown into the field. These were conventionally trained enlisted men, thoroughly screened personnel of the AFP, who were taken to Fort McKinley and given special instructions on ranger tactics. They formed deep penetration units which went far into the guerrilla redoubts or safe areas in the Sierra Madre Mountains and the Zambales Mountains. From the accumulation of reports from these Scout Ranger teams, we were able to determine the location of the enemy's long-established refuge areas.

It was largely from the reports of the Scout Ranger teams and from the invigorated Military Intelligence Service in the operational area that the intelligence was secured which was the basis of large, well coordinated, well directed, and well led task force operations such as Operation Four Roses, Operation Omaha, and others. I want to stress that we no longer started large unit operations because of a newspaper headline. We were now in a position that before we attempted a big operation we made sure that we had a good basis for it.

Ninety percent of our time in the field was devoted to small patrol operations. This time the patrols were properly instructed, properly oriented, and properly prepared. They were not only prepared to deal with the enemy as soldiers should, they were also prepared to talk to the people as individuals from villages themselves and coming to the village as friends and helpers.

The turning point of the whole campaign was in 1951, when the people were dramatically impressed with the desire of the armed forces to have clean elections in the Philippines. You can imagine, gentlemen, the effect of young students from the ROTC units being sworn in on temporary duty status with the armed forces. These

youngsters, ranging from the age of 14 up to about 18 at the most, were given weapons, were given AFP insignia and were assigned to guard the polling places, with strict orders to insure honesty and compliance to the letter to the election law. The repercussions felt by the people in the rural areas in Huklandia were tremendous. For the first time they were convinced that the government was sincere in eliminating the Communist movement. This operation proved also to every man in army uniform in the field that abuses, misconduct, graft would no longer be tolerated with the new approach to the campaign.

The fourth phase was the consolidation phase. This was when Huk squadron units started disintegrating slowly but surely. This was when the government formations started pushing and pushing, when we applied constant pressure and did not allow the Huks to rest. Within a short time, because they had lost the sympathy of the masses, it was an easy matter to isolate these units up in the mountains. There they ran out of food and some of them came down from the hills to surrender en masse, in groups sometimes practically dying of thirst or hunger.

This alienation of the people from the Huk was completed when the Secretary of National Defense became our President in the 1953 election, so that he had the whole government under his control and direction, to press his campaigns for the welfare of the people and against the Huk.

The surrender of Taruc was virtually the surrender of the Huk movement. But we did not stop after the surrender of Taruc. We recognized that there were certain mop-up operations that were needed. These were criminal bands disguising themselves as Huks who tried to out-live or escape the notice of the armed forces. We swung our attention to these criminal bands, criminal guerrillas, or shall I say bandit guerrillas. By 1955, even a very critical Congress recognized that after all the AFP, the men in uniform, had done a good job.

At the height of the campaign, the troop build-up of Government formations against the Huk guerrilla finally reached a total of 34,000 officers and enlisted men deployed in the field as combat forces. Of these 34,000, I would say that a good ninety percent were in combat units which had civic and social welfare missions as well as combat missions. During the last two phases of the campaign, we added to our combat units civil affairs officers and civil affairs units and kindred units. These greatly assisted in realizing Secretary Magsaysay's objective of building up acceptance of the Armed Forces by the civilian population.

In my command, which was typical, the civil affairs officer served as the liaison officer of the civil government on my staff. He was the man who was my link with the provincial governor and with the other civilian government officials in that province. He also served as my liaison officer with the civilian armed bodies that we had in my area of responsibility. These included police forces of the local governments and also home guard units, commonly known as Civilian Guards, which were formed in almost every town in the area. Such integration, such cohesion of all government and semi-government agencies was achieved that I was able to accomplish my purpose, which was to separate the armed guerrillas from the local population, and the destruction of active guerrilla units. Actions of all agencies were this well planned, well coordinated, well directed, and well supervised.

I would like now to discuss with you some actual case histories. Time prohibits detailed discussion of every device which we in the Philippines found effective in combatting these guerrillas. Actually, in the various commands which I held, about thirty different ruses, stratagems, types of unconventional operation, were found to be successful. Now we will cover one particular activity which was the result of a lot of study on our part and which was successfully used. It is one which I hope may be found useful by some of you.

This activity is what we in the 7th Battalion Combat Team called "Large Unit Infiltration." The basic idea was to infiltrate a specially trained counter-guerrilla force in enemy guise deep into enemy territory. This force, it was felt, should be able to fraternize with the local inhabitants, gathering intelligence and making contact with enemy armed units, until the most favorable opportunity arrived for striking with maximum effect, and then withdrawing to friendly territory.

We felt that this activity was one partial solution of the major problem of counter-guerrilla warfare, that of finding and finishing enemy units in large force. Usually, guerrilla enemy intelligence and warning systems are too efficient to permit major encounters.

To recapitulate, the two major objectives of this activity are to effect surprise contact with the enemy in force and to take advantage of this contact to destroy him by close combat. There are many other obvious objectives. First in importance is to gather

intelligence, especially verification of enemy order of battle. Second is the penetration and study of existing enemy systems of security. Third, the study of enemy signal communications and the extent and nature of civilian support and liaison methods. Fourth, is the appreciation and study of enemy supply methods and extent of local area support to enemy units. As a special appendix, there might be added the final identification of local government officials secretly in collusion with the enemy.

The advantages which may be gained from the adoption of this activity, which we call Force "X," are obvious from a recital of its missions. There are also disadvantages which must be considered, problems which must be solved, prerequisites which must be met. Assuming that the personnel are available, they must be screened for suitability and carefully trained until they know enemy procedures and personalities as well as the members of the enemy unit which they are to impersonate would know them. This means that before their training is finished, a favorable situation for their employment must exist and must be known in detail.

What is a favorable situation for the employment of such a unit? It is a situation when communications between enemy units are not yet well developed, or have been thoroughly disrupted for a long period. It is a situation where the enemy to be contacted knows less about the unit to be impersonated by your men than you do. Such situations most often arise when the enemy is expanding his organization vigorously, when there is as yet little contact between different centers of expansion.

Above all, the entire operation must be planned and conducted, from the start to the moment of the final strike, in absolute secrecy. Information must be given only on the strictest need-to-know basis.

I regret to say that several BCT commanders in our Army failed to give adequate consideration to the problems of employment of such forces and learned a sad lesson from their efforts.

Once the tactical opportunity has been determined to exist, an appropriate cover plan must be developed. Most often, we found, the cover for the infiltration unit will be that of being a known unit from a distant area with which communications are poor which has come on a liaison and reconnaissance mission. Needless to say,

every man in the unit must know the cover story in great detail, must know more about his supposed unit than any enemy with whom he may come in contact.

To some extent the cover story will depend upon the target, or targets selected for the operation. Targets can be only tentatively designated and assigned priorities in advance. Much should depend upon opportunities encountered. The killing of leading enemy personalities may be far more important than the destruction of a certain enemy unit. A system of priorities may be established, in which the priorities may be: One - the killing of enemy leaders or outstanding fanatics; two - the destruction of enemy elite organizations; three - the penetration and destruction of especially devoted or effective enemy support elements.

The above-mentioned targets may all be found in the area of a single operation deep in enemy territory. Time factors involved in preparation of counter-guerrilla infiltration units are variable. Don't be tempted into throwing in half-trained units. In our experience, four to six weeks of intensive training was usually found adequate. Careful screening and selection of operating personnel is of paramount importance. Based on combat experience and physical condition, selected personnel are segregated in a secret training base. Training should stress physical conditioning and adopting to enemy "personalities" (of enemy units being represented), dress, speech, manners, customs, etc. Divested of any article of clothing identifying your own force, personnel are reissued captured weapons, equipment, articles and other materiel. This is an important item. Where it is possible, captured enemy insignias, uniforms, documents, ID cards, propaganda publications, song books, indoctrination booklets etc., are freely distributed to operating personnel.

Caution should be exercised on the issuance of enemy uniforms, as civilian clothing is normally being more representative of enemy guerrilla elements. There should be no uniformity of wearing apparel, possibly with the exception of the two or three ranking members of the disguised force. Armament and equipment must show signs of wear and tear, or poor upkeep, which is characteristic of guerrilla weapons. Well kept weapons and abundance of ammunition with the disguised force is a dead give-away. However, the newer and gaudier weapons, such as pistols with pearl handles, should be given to leaders. This is common with guerrilla units.

The maximum number of ex-enemy personnel are recruited. Through careful screening and tests to establish loyalties, services of this particular type of individual will be invaluable during the training and operational phases. During the training of the troops, these individuals are useful and instructive critics. With individual cover stories, they are assigned with command, security or advance elements during actual operations. After training, the disguised force should be made to undergo rigid tests with unwitting friendly troop units. These tests will require special precautions to prevent mistaken encounters.

Now I would like to tell you about the first time we employed this device. First, you should know the basic situation at the time, which was in 1948 when the Huks were running freely all over Central Luzon. However, in the Huk ranks we had a division of authority. Those in Southern Luzon had been independent (they thought), but their commander, a Colonel Villegas, had just died. As a result, some of their units were trying hard to establish contact with the more developed forces up in Central Luzon, under Taruc, who was anxious to contact them. This was obviously a very favorable opportunity.

I designated the 16th Philippine Constabulary company as the unit to compose Force X. The Commander, Lt. Marana, after receiving his instructions, quietly screened his entire company, collected 44 enlisted men and 3 officers, and at night moved to a predesignated training base in the jungle around this area here. Force X was in existence and was isolated completely from the day they moved into that base. Only three officers from my staff were authorized to go into that secret training base.

The training the men received in that secret training base followed very closely the description I just gave. These men were divested of all items which could identify them as members of the Army. They were dressed in civilian clothes, and when they arrived in camp they received all the captured weapons that had been accumulated by my S-2 section under Major Justiniano. They were given reading material, indoctrination booklets and propaganda publications of the sort carried by Huks. They were given the things generally found on Huk dead, soiled handkerchiefs, love mementoes from girl friends. During the period of four weeks, no rank was recognized except as conferred by predesignated enemy identifications, preassigned aliases and pet names commonly used by guerrilla



units. They were addressed as comrades, brothers, members of the proletariat. They were taught Huk songs. They were taught how to deliver speeches Huk-style.

They were taught the descriptions of the leaders of the Southern Luzon guerrillas. Some of them, whose physical appearances coincided with known guerrilla leaders, posed as these personalities. They were required to take on the appearance of hunted guerrilla individuals during those days. They became, and stayed, dirty, unshaven, badly in need of haircuts. Like the enemy, these soldiers were unhappily forced away from bathrooms, shaving creams, and razor blades.

Somewhere about the second week, Justiniano came back from our national prison smuggling in three ex-Huks who were captured in Southern Luzon. These had been tested, screened, and reindoc-trinated to our side and were brought to the training base to serve as instructors. They became around-the-clock critics of mannerisms, speeches, customs. Huks were taught certain methods of addressing a superior, certain ways to eat, certain general practices for their daily ablutions in the river. These little things were taught to the men of Force X.

While this training was going on, my troops were making a reconnaissance of the area through which Force X would supposedly pass while en route for Southern to Central Luzon. A disguised patrol, led by a sergeant, actually covered the route. It noted the trails, noted the attitude of the inhabitants, and identified the obstacles which were encountered. All this was incorporated in the cover story of Force X to insure that force would be accepted in the proposed operational areas which was called the Candaba Swamp.

When everything was set, Justiniano was ordered back to Manila to recruit several walking, wounded men from our Army hospital. He had to go from one bedside to the other and finally found two rugged enlisted men belonging to different commands who wanted to join Force X in spite of their wounds. With the addition of these personnel, the operation was ready to roll, and the operation was launched at 1700 hours, 14 April 1948.

The force almost precipitated a pitched battle when passing near a PC company in another province, while en route to their line of departure for their operational area. The operational departure was

taken from a small town, about four miles east of the highway, where they fought a carefully staged sham battle with two of my uniformed PC companies. From this they withdrew in good order, carrying with them their two wounded. Four hours later they contacted the first Huk outpost, which was of course informed of their approach and very curious as to the identity of this unit which had been fighting the PC.

They were carefully interrogated as to who they were, where they came from, where they were going, etc. Their cover stories stood up well, and their wounded lent an invaluable authenticity to their accounts. They were given guides who took them on into the Candaba Swamp until they linked up with Huk squadrons 5 and 17, under Commanders Romy and Vergara. There they were again interrogated, asked about their route from Southern Luzon. Much interest was taken in them, and they were promised that top leaders, possibly the "Supremo," Luis Taruc, would see them. Force X and the 2 squadrons (estimated strength about 120) fraternized for more than a day and a half, exchanging experiences, boasting of their respective commands. Naturally Force X was talking about the prowess of the South Luzon Huks. Squadrons 2 and 17 were talking of the prowess of the Huk Supremo. During these conversations of individuals, Force X accumulated a lot of information. Preselected individuals deliberately engaged local visitors in lively discussions about local conditions, propaganda and supply systems, etc. They found that most of the town mayors and chiefs of police were in collusion with the enemy. They found there were enlisted men in the PC company on the other side of the swamps who were giving information to the Huks. They found out how supplies were left by women in selected spots along the road to be picked up at sun-down by Huks.

The fourth day after they crossed the line of departure, another two Huk squadrons joined the combined group. These two squadrons, 4 and 21, were special killer groups. One in particular, under Commander Bundalian, was unique in its organization and in its assigned mission. It was called the enforcing squadron, assigned by the Huk Supremo to enforce Huk justice. Actually, it was a band of well trained executioners; their specialty was kidnapping civilian individuals who were suspected of disloyalty to the movement.

By the end of the 5th day, Force X was outnumbered 1 to 3. During all these five days, the Huk squadrons showed no indications of suspecting that Force X was other than what it seemed to be. No one detected

that they had with them four 60mm mortars, two light machine guns, close to about 200 hand grenades and a complete voice radio, all hidden. How was this equipment hidden? Why, some enterprising enlisted man found that mortar tubes fitted inside bamboo water tubes and so did light machine guns. Others took delight in hiding grenades and mortar shells inside watermelons, papayas, etc. The radio was in a sack of rice.

About breakfast time on the 6th day, according to the version of the Force X commander, Lt. Marana, they noticed all of a sudden that the Huks, and I'm talking about the real Huks, started getting cool, so much so that breakfast was eaten in virtual silence. Lt. Marana decided that the time to strike had come. On a prearranged signal, the members of Force X unobtrusively segregated themselves away from the Huk groups, and Lt. Marana gave the order to strike.

There was actually a slaughter in the area. Two Huk squadrons were practically deactivated as of that moment. The mortars came into play within the first two minutes when the strike was ordered. The men were instructed to throw hand grenades before using their weapons. And, within five minutes, the radio was in operation and was in contact with me and with three Philippine Constabulary companies that were alerted around the operational area ready to move in.

At the end of the battle, when the Huk withdrew, we counted 82 killed in an action that did not last more than 30 minutes. Among those identified by the town mayor of that region were three commanders including Commander Bundalian, the commander of the assassin group. Two others were commanders sent by the Huk Supremo to make a personal screening of Force X.

Of course, as soon as I received word that the fight was on, I committed my two alert companies and all the other troops I could get. For two weeks the area was saturated with troops. This resulted in 21 Huks killed and 9 captured in seven encounters in the area. Out of more than a hundred local inhabitants detained for interrogation, 17 turned out to be members of the squadrons we had deactivated.

As an interesting aftermath, about three weeks later we learned of an intense fire-fight in the middle of the swamp. Investigation disclosed that a Huk squadron from the adjoining province, on a foraging mission, had met another squadron from my province. Each thought they had stumbled on another "Force X" unit, with a resulting casualty list of 11 dead and 3 seriously wounded.

We also learned, later, what gave our operation away to the enemy. The genuine Huks decided that Force X had too much bright shiny new ammunition for a legitimate guerrilla unit.

Gentlemen, there are no hard and fast rules that will guarantee success in an operation of this kind. I told you earlier of some of the things which I think are essential, which if not observed are likely to cause failure. Success, however, can only be achieved through the maximum effort to understand the local situation and adapt to it, avoiding the obvious pitfalls and exercising cunning, training, and ability superior to that of the enemy.

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#### DISCUSSION

Query: Did the isolated position of the Philippines help or hinder the campaign against the Huk?

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). The geographical situation of the Philippines, an archipelago of 7,000 islands surrounded by ocean, was of great assistance in the campaign against the Huk, only because we realized at the very beginning the extreme importance of securing our boundaries against the enemy. Had we not been aware of this, and reasonably successful, our infinitely long shore lines and our communications difficulties would have aided the enemy.

I realize that you in South Vietnam have the same problem of a long coast line as well as the disadvantage of being situated on the same land-mass as your powerful enemy.

### III

## MILITARY OPERATIONS

by

Napoleon D. Valeriano  
Colonel, AFP, Retired

Gentlemen, for the purpose of my discussion covering military combat contributions to the final subjugation of the Communist movement in the Philippines, I have divided the operations into four phases.

The first phase covers the period from 1945 until early 1947. This was the period when the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, which was in exile in the United States during the period of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, returned with General McArthur. This transition government was not too well prepared to face its problems, especially the problems of national security. It was informed about the subversive movement in Central Luzon, but it did not understand fully the implications of the Hukbalahap movement. After it became the government of the Philippine Republic in 1946, these same people still refused to accept the intelligence reports repeatedly and consistently furnished. But, since this movement really was Communist inspired, the military policy during this period was inadequate, and proved most costly to the country from 1946 up to 1955.

The Hukbalahap movement as discussed by today's speakers so far has concerned military organizations called regional commands. These commands have varied strengths. But for my discussion, I will speak about the fighting units called the Hukbalahap squadrons. These squadrons varied in strength, varied in armament, varied in the quality of their leadership. Some of these squadrons were led by blood-thirsty types. That is quite common in guerrilla warfare. Some of them were lead by such inoffensive leaders that we did not give them operational priorities until much later. However, during the Japanese occupation period, under the cover of being anti-Japanese guerrilla units, they all were able to accumulate armament and equipment.

Now, in this transition period the armed forces of the Philippines were being demobilized slowly to peacetime status. We started organizing units to take over the functions of the pre-war Philippine Constabulary

which was a military organization with national police functions. The new post-war organization was called the Military Police Command, Philippine Army. During this period, General McArthur's headquarters authorized the organization, training and equipment of some 13 military police companies, with the necessary headquarters organizations, in order that these companies when deployed would be properly coordinated, supervised and controlled.

Again, the attitude of the Commonwealth government was reflected in the training of these units, in the equipment of these units, in the armament of these units. Most of the units, as I saw them in the field, were armed with patrolmen's billies and whistles to be policemen. They were issued white painted helmets, white painted jeeps, and the heaviest weapon that I saw for these military police companies were carbines. They were pitted against experienced Huk guerrillas who were armed with the heaviest infantry armaments available, including bazookas. So that in several incidents in 1945 and 1946, we found military police companies or formations either being beaten back or overrun by Huk-balahap units. Again in 1946, the total number of government formations actually deployed in the field with semi-constabulary combat missions had an effective strength of about 11,000 officers and men.

The second phase was from 1947 through 1949, beginning at the time the young Republic had already been responsible for its own defense for about a year. By this time, we in the field had been able to convince several key members of the government in Manila that the Huk movement, and the Huks themselves, were mistakenly dubbed agrarian reformers or persecuted peasants, that they were actually guerrillas with Communist inspiration and direction. Accordingly, a reorganization of the Military Police Command in the Armed Forces of the Philippines was effected. It was redesignated as the Philippine Constabulary and the strength was increased to 17,000. This, they believed at the time, would be more than adequate to destroy the Huk guerrilla formations which were then practically controlling the rural areas of Central Luzon.

During this period, we in the field who saw the Huks at close range were impressed not only by their military capabilities but also by their non-military activities which were well integrated with their military program. Specifically, we were impressed by their efforts and success in cultivating a closer liaison with the villages or, in other words, in building a guerrilla support base. Quite a few of us

made lengthy reports about these developments to GHQ (General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines). Unfortunately, we were reporting to military men who clung too stubbornly to the ideas of conventional warfare which they had learned in staff schools there and here. Naturally, civilian leaders in government were influenced by the attitudes of the Army brass in Manila, and our reports were often ignored.

During this period, normal operations of the Philippine Constabulary were largely routine patrol and constabulary missions. Too often, patrols were sent out to execute purely constabulary duties, such as serving search warrants or warrants of arrest, and accomplished nothing else. Constabulary groups were dispersed in zone and provincial commands and further broken down into small village garrisons of platoons or less. In actual fact, these detachments either established a more or less tacit modus vivendi with the Huks in their area, or were forced to devote most of their efforts to supporting and protecting themselves.

A few large operations were mounted. I would like to discuss these operations from the standpoint of their motivation, their execution, and the results obtained.

A task force operation was usually initiated after some Huk outrage had prompted headlines in the newspapers claiming that the Philippine Constabulary was asleep. The Chief of Constabulary would answer the headline with an announcement that already the Constabulary was planning an operation, which he would personally command, that would end for all time the Huk menace.

Plans would be made, troops assembled, from the provincial and zone commands (leaving those areas virtually unprotected) and a thoroughly conventional "sweep" of an allegedly Huk infested area would be underway. The operations were well planned in accordance with conventional doctrine. We had lines of departure, we had phase lines, we had zones of action, and we had priorities of support.

The results were usually no hits, some runs (non-scoring) and many errors. The troops would be exhausted, our gasoline supply for the next month would be exhausted, but the Huks themselves would scarcely be tired by the effort necessary to draw out of the path of the sweep.

Once the previously announced objective had been reached, the operations would be considered successfully terminated and the troops would return to their normal stations. The guerrillas would also return to the area which had just been swept, confident that they would be free of molestation for some time to come.

However, during this period, being a very curious individual, I started germinating a few ideas of my own on how to meet these Huk guerrillas on equal terms. Time prohibits me from describing to you the organization of a team from Headquarters consisting of four officers and 50 enlisted men, known in the Philippines as the Nenita unit. We found out many things that we did not learn from text books. We learned the Huk technique of getting supplies, the Huk technique of getting information, the Huk technique for ambushes, for raids, interrogating captured government personnel. As we learned, in this period of 1947 to 1949, we tried in our small way to evolve useful counter-measures. One case history concerning these, I will describe later in this period. Before discussing our efforts, I would like to give you additional information about the tactics and practices of the Philippine Constabulary and of the Huks during this period.

I have already mentioned our Constabulary patrol missions. These patrols often were ambushed or would be forced into meeting engagements with guerrilla formations. Sometimes the patrols were decimated, sometimes they were able to force the guerrillas back. Despite occasional setbacks, the guerrillas gained strength throughout this period. Campaign analysis reveals that these patrol actions did not seek to cultivate the sympathy of the people in the area. As I recall those days, it was very normal for a company commander in the field to dispatch a patrol from squad to platoon size to serve a warrant of arrest in an isolated village. This patrol would reach the village, locate the individual (if he were surprised and found there) and would return to town without further action. Junior leaders of these formations did not attempt to stay long enough in this village to get friendly with the people, find out what were their problems, and if their patrol could assist them in any manner.

The guerrillas were doing exactly the opposite. They would sneak into these villages, stay with the people, play with them, work with them, but at the same time in a very subtle method indoctrinate them in Communism. This was the secret of the whole thing.



Another important factor which entered into our failure, and which I still cannot forget, was the poor support we received from higher echelons. Particularly significant was the inefficiency of our logistic system. Support was so poor that troops in the field were often forced to live off the country. As you know, gentlemen, when there is no other way for the troops to eat, commanders are virtually forced to tolerate troopers going to the villages and demanding food. It's either they go hungry or we go hungry. That was the theory of the average government trooper in the field. This, of course, worsened matters.

As the troops lived off the people, the Huks naturally exploited the situation. Their propagandists hammered constantly at the theme that these practices were an exact reflection of the attitude of the government in Manila towards the "persecuted masses."

That general situation was bad enough. Even worse, there were, as might be expected, instances of officers involved in matters definitely unworthy of one who is by definition an officer and a gentleman by the act of our Congress. Instances, including demanding bribes for the performance or non-performance of duty, occurred in all ranks. Each, of course, was magnified by Huk propagandists and their sympathizers. Few of the offenders were punished appropriately and publicly. We had quite a few big scandals in Central Luzon during this period. In a general statement, we can say that troop behavior was so low that it cultivated an antipathy by the masses for the man in uniform.

The third phase of the operations against the Huk is what I like to call the "phase of enlightenment." This is the period of the new approach which started in 1950 and lasted into 1952. The turning point of the whole campaign occurred in 1951, right in the middle of this period. This, as General Lansdale stated, was the election of 1951. In 1950, the situation in the Philippines and the representations of the Philippine Government awakened and invited the concern of our American brothers. Philippine President Quirino installed as Secretary of Defense a vigorous new man, a man of the people, Ramon Magsaysay. He had adequate guerrilla background; but, more important, is the fact that as a man of the people, he understood exactly and instinctively what was happening in the homes and the minds of the people of the villages and the farms. He knew their problems, he knew what the mistakes of the Armed Forces were. As soon as he got into the office of Secretary of National Defense, things started happening so fast that right now it's very hard to recall the exact order or sequence of the actions during this period.

As soon as he took office, we started feeling the punch of new, vigorous, inspired leadership which made its effect felt in every aspect of our fight against the Huks. I well remember his first visit to me, when he said, "I want you to turn out public relations men from every private, corporal, sergeant, lieutenant and officer of your command. I want every enlisted man of the Philippine Army in uniform to serve as a public relations man for the Army and for our government." That was the substance of his statement, and accurately reflected his policy.

In speaking of the new formations and new activities which were strange to the Hukbalahaps, I want to cite first the effectiveness of the Scout Ranger teams that were thrown into the field. These were conventionally trained enlisted men, thoroughly screened personnel of the AFP, who were taken to Fort McKinley and given special instructions on ranger tactics. They formed deep penetration units which went far into the guerrilla redoubts or safe areas in the Sierra Madre Mountains and the Zambales Mountains. From the accumulation of reports from these Scout Ranger teams, we were able to determine the location of the enemy's long-established refuge areas.

It was largely from the reports of the Scout Ranger teams and from the invigorated Military Intelligence Service in the operational area that the intelligence was secured which was the basis of large, well coordinated, well directed, and well led task force operations such as Operation Four Roses, Operation Omaha, and others. I want to stress that we no longer started large unit operations because of a newspaper headline. We were now in a position that before we attempted a big operation we made sure that we had a good basis for it.

Ninety percent of our time in the field was devoted to small patrol operations. This time the patrols were properly instructed, properly oriented, and properly prepared. They were not only prepared to deal with the enemy as soldiers should, they were also prepared to talk to the people as individuals from villages themselves and coming to the village as friends and helpers.

The turning point of the whole campaign was in 1951, when the people were dramatically impressed with the desire of the armed forces to have clean elections in the Philippines. You can imagine, gentlemen, the effect of young students from the ROTC units being sworn in on temporary duty status with the armed forces. These

youngsters, ranging from the age of 14 up to about 18 at the most, were given weapons, were given AFP insignia and were assigned to guard the polling places, with strict orders to insure honesty and compliance to the letter to the election law. The repercussions felt by the people in the rural areas in Huklandia were tremendous. For the first time they were convinced that the government was sincere in eliminating the Communist movement. This operation proved also to every man in army uniform in the field that abuses, misconduct, graft would no longer be tolerated with the new approach to the campaign.

The fourth phase was the consolidation phase. This was when Huk squadron units started disintegrating slowly but surely. This was when the government formations started pushing and pushing, when we applied constant pressure and did not allow the Huks to rest. Within a short time, because they had lost the sympathy of the masses, it was an easy matter to isolate these units up in the mountains. There they ran out of food and some of them came down from the hills to surrender en masse, in groups sometimes practically dying of thirst or hunger.

This alienation of the people from the Huk was completed when the Secretary of National Defense became our President in the 1953 election, so that he had the whole government under his control and direction, to press his campaigns for the welfare of the people and against the Huk.

The surrender of Taruc was virtually the surrender of the Huk movement. But we did not stop after the surrender of Taruc. We recognized that there were certain mop-up operations that were needed. These were criminal bands disguising themselves as Huks who tried to out-live or escape the notice of the armed forces. We swung our attention to these criminal bands, criminal guerrillas, or shall I say bandit guerrillas. By 1955, even a very critical Congress recognized that after all the AFP, the men in uniform, had done a good job.

At the height of the campaign, the troop build-up of Government formations against the Huk guerrilla finally reached a total of 34,000 officers and enlisted men deployed in the field as combat forces. Of these 34,000, I would say that a good ninety percent were in combat units which had civic and social welfare missions as well as combat missions. During the last two phases of the campaign, we added to our combat units civil affairs officers and civil affairs units and kindred units. These greatly assisted in realizing Secretary Magsaysay's objective of building up acceptance of the Armed Forces by the civilian population.

In my command, which was typical, the civil affairs officer served as the liaison officer of the civil government on my staff. He was the man who was my link with the provincial governor and with the other civilian government officials in that province. He also served as my liaison officer with the civilian armed bodies that we had in my area of responsibility. These included police forces of the local governments and also home guard units, commonly known as Civilian Guards, which were formed in almost every town in the area. Such integration, such cohesion of all government and semi-government agencies was achieved that I was able to accomplish my purpose, which was to separate the armed guerrillas from the local population, and the destruction of active guerrilla units. Actions of all agencies were this well planned, well coordinated, well directed, and well supervised.

I would like now to discuss with you some actual case histories. Time prohibits detailed discussion of every device which we in the Philippines found effective in combatting these guerrillas. Actually, in the various commands which I held, about thirty different ruses, stratagems, types of unconventional operation, were found to be successful. Now we will cover one particular activity which was the result of a lot of study on our part and which was successfully used. It is one which I hope may be found useful by some of you.

This activity is what we in the 7th Battalion Combat Team called "Large Unit Infiltration." The basic idea was to infiltrate a specially trained counter-guerrilla force in enemy guise deep into enemy territory. This force, it was felt, should be able to fraternize with the local inhabitants, gathering intelligence and making contact with enemy armed units, until the most favorable opportunity arrived for striking with maximum effect, and then withdrawing to friendly territory.

We felt that this activity was one partial solution of the major problem of counter-guerrilla warfare, that of finding and finishing enemy units in large force. Usually, guerrilla enemy intelligence and warning systems are too efficient to permit major encounters.

To recapitulate, the two major objectives of this activity are to effect surprise contact with the enemy in force and to take advantage of this contact to destroy him by close combat. There are many other obvious objectives. First in importance is to gather

intelligence, especially verification of enemy order of battle. Second is the penetration and study of existing enemy systems of security. Third, the study of enemy signal communications and the extent and nature of civilian support and liaison methods. Fourth, is the appreciation and study of enemy supply methods and extent of local area support to enemy units. As a special appendix, there might be added the final identification of local government officials secretly in collusion with the enemy.

The advantages which may be gained from the adoption of this activity, which we call Force "X," are obvious from a recital of its missions. There are also disadvantages which must be considered, problems which must be solved, prerequisites which must be met. Assuming that the personnel are available, they must be screened for suitability and carefully trained until they know enemy procedures and personalities as well as the members of the enemy unit which they are to impersonate would know them. This means that before their training is finished, a favorable situation for their employment must exist and must be known in detail.

What is a favorable situation for the employment of such a unit? It is a situation when communications between enemy units are not yet well developed, or have been thoroughly disrupted for a long period. It is a situation where the enemy to be contacted knows less about the unit to be impersonated by your men than you do. Such situations most often arise when the enemy is expanding his organization vigorously, when there is as yet little contact between different centers of expansion.

Above all, the entire operation must be planned and conducted, from the start to the moment of the final strike, in absolute secrecy. Information must be given only on the strictest need-to-know basis.

I regret to say that several BCT commanders in our Army failed to give adequate consideration to the problems of employment of such forces and learned a sad lesson from their efforts.

Once the tactical opportunity has been determined to exist, an appropriate cover plan must be developed. Most often, we found, the cover for the infiltration unit will be that of being a known unit from a distant area with which communications are poor which has come on a liaison and reconnaissance mission. Needless to say,

every man in the unit must know the cover story in great detail, must know more about his supposed unit than any enemy with whom he may come in contact.

To some extent the cover story will depend upon the target, or targets selected for the operation. Targets can be only tentatively designated and assigned priorities in advance. Much should depend upon opportunities encountered. The killing of leading enemy personalities may be far more important than the destruction of a certain enemy unit. A system of priorities may be established, in which the priorities may be: One - the killing of enemy leaders or outstanding fanatics; two - the destruction of enemy elite organizations; three - the penetration and destruction of especially devoted or effective enemy support elements.

The above-mentioned targets may all be found in the area of a single operation deep in enemy territory. Time factors involved in preparation of counter-guerrilla infiltration units are variable. Don't be tempted into throwing in half-trained units. In our experience, four to six weeks of intensive training was usually found adequate. Careful screening and selection of operating personnel is of paramount importance. Based on combat experience and physical condition, selected personnel are segregated in a secret training base. Training should stress physical conditioning and adopting to enemy "personalities" (of enemy units being represented), dress, speech, manners, customs, etc. Divested of any article of clothing identifying your own force, personnel are reissued captured weapons, equipment, articles and other materiel. This is an important item. Where it is possible, captured enemy insignias, uniforms, documents, ID cards, propaganda publications, song books, indoctrination booklets etc., are freely distributed to operating personnel.

Caution should be exercised on the issuance of enemy uniforms, as civilian clothing is normally being more representative of enemy guerrilla elements. There should be no uniformity of wearing apparel, possibly with the exception of the two or three ranking members of the disguised force. Armament and equipment must show signs of wear and tear, or poor upkeep, which is characteristic of guerrilla weapons. Well kept weapons and abundance of ammunition with the disguised force is a dead give-away. However, the newer and gaudier weapons, such as pistols with pearl handles, should be given to leaders. This is common with guerrilla units.

The maximum number of ex-enemy personnel are recruited. Through careful screening and tests to establish loyalties, services of this particular type of individual will be invaluable during the training and operational phases. During the training of the troops, these individuals are useful and instructive critics. With individual cover stories, they are assigned with command, security or advance elements during actual operations. After training, the disguised force should be made to undergo rigid tests with unwitting friendly troop units. These tests will require special precautions to prevent mistaken encounters.

Now I would like to tell you about the first time we employed this device. First, you should know the basic situation at the time, which was in 1948 when the Huks were running freely all over Central Luzon. However, in the Huk ranks we had a division of authority. Those in Southern Luzon had been independent (they thought), but their commander, a Colonel Villegas, had just died. As a result, some of their units were trying hard to establish contact with the more developed forces up in Central Luzon, under Taruc, who was anxious to contact them. This was obviously a very favorable opportunity.

I designated the 16th Philippine Constabulary company as the unit to compose Force X. The Commander, Lt. Marana, after receiving his instructions, quietly screened his entire company, collected 44 enlisted men and 3 officers, and at night moved to a predesignated training base in the jungle around this area here. Force X was in existence and was isolated completely from the day they moved into that base. Only three officers from my staff were authorized to go into that secret training base.

The training the men received in that secret training base followed very closely the description I just gave. These men were divested of all items which could identify them as members of the Army. They were dressed in civilian clothes, and when they arrived in camp they received all the captured weapons that had been accumulated by my S-2 section under Major Justiniano. They were given reading material, indoctrination booklets and propaganda publications of the sort carried by Huks. They were given the things generally found on Huk dead, soiled handkerchiefs, love mementoes from girl friends. During the period of four weeks, no rank was recognized except as conferred by predesignated enemy identifications, preassigned aliases and pet names commonly used by guerrilla

units. They were addressed as comrades, brothers, members of the proletariat. They were taught Huk songs. They were taught how to deliver speeches Huk-style.

They were taught the descriptions of the leaders of the Southern Luzon guerrillas. Some of them, whose physical appearances coincided with known guerrilla leaders, posed as these personalities. They were required to take on the appearance of hunted guerrilla individuals during those days. They became, and stayed, dirty, unshaven, badly in need of haircuts. Like the enemy, these soldiers were unhappily forced away from bathrooms, shaving creams, and razor blades.

Somewhere about the second week, Justiniano came back from our national prison smuggling in three ex-Huks who were captured in Southern Luzon. These had been tested, screened, and reindoctrinated to our side and were brought to the training base to serve as instructors. They became around-the-clock critics of mannerisms, speeches, customs. Huks were taught certain methods of addressing a superior, certain ways to eat, certain general practices for their daily ablutions in the river. These little things were taught to the men of Force X.

While this training was going on, my troops were making a reconnaissance of the area through which Force X would supposedly pass while en route for Southern to Central Luzon. A disguised patrol, led by a sergeant, actually covered the route. It noted the trails, noted the attitude of the inhabitants, and identified the obstacles which were encountered. All this was incorporated in the cover story of Force X to insure that force would be accepted in the proposed operational areas which was called the Candaba Swamp.

When everything was set, Justiniano was ordered back to Manila to recruit several walking, wounded men from our Army hospital. He had to go from one bedside to the other and finally found two rugged enlisted men belonging to different commands who wanted to join Force X in spite of their wounds. With the addition of these personnel, the operation was ready to roll, and the operation was launched at 1700 hours, 14 April 1948.

The force almost precipitated a pitched battle when passing near a PC company in another province, while en route to their line of departure for their operational area. The operational departure was



taken from a small town, about four miles east of the highway, where they fought a carefully staged sham battle with two of my uniformed PC companies. From this they withdrew in good order, carrying with them their two wounded. Four hours later they contacted the first Huk outpost, which was of course informed of their approach and very curious as to the identity of this unit which had been fighting the PC.

They were carefully interrogated as to who they were, where they came from, where they were going, etc. Their cover stories stood up well, and their wounded lent an invaluable authenticity to their accounts. They were given guides who took them on into the Candaba Swamp until they linked up with Huk squadrons 5 and 17, under Commanders Romy and Vergara. There they were again interrogated, asked about their route from Southern Luzon. Much interest was taken in them, and they were promised that top leaders, possibly the "Supremo," Luis Taruc, would see them. Force X and the 2 squadrons (estimated strength about 120) fraternized for more than a day and a half, exchanging experiences, boasting of their respective commands. Naturally Force X was talking about the prowess of the South Luzon Huks. Squadrons 2 and 17 were talking of the prowess of the Huk Supremo. During these conversations of individuals, Force X accumulated a lot of information. Preselected individuals deliberately engaged local visitors in lively discussions about local conditions, propaganda and supply systems, etc. They found that most of the town mayors and chiefs of police were in collusion with the enemy. They found there were enlisted men in the PC company on the other side of the swamps who were giving information to the Huks. They found out how supplies were left by women in selected spots along the road to be picked up at sun-down by Huks.

The fourth day after they crossed the line of departure, another two Huk squadrons joined the combined group. These two squadrons, 4 and 21, were special killer groups. One in particular, under Commander Bundalian, was unique in its organization and in its assigned mission. It was called the enforcing squadron, assigned by the Huk Supremo to enforce Huk justice. Actually, it was a band of well trained executioners; their specialty was kidnapping civilian individuals who were suspected of disloyalty to the movement.

By the end of the 5th day, Force X was outnumbered 1 to 3. During all these five days, the Huk squadrons showed no indications of suspecting that Force X was other than what it seemed to be. No one detected

that they had with them four 60mm mortars, two light machine guns, close to about 200 hand grenades and a complete voice radio, all hidden. How was this equipment hidden? Why, some enterprising enlisted man found that mortar tubes fitted inside bamboo water tubes and so did light machine guns. Others took delight in hiding grenades and mortar shells inside watermelons, papayas, etc. The radio was in a sack of rice.

About breakfast time on the 6th day, according to the version of the Force X commander, Lt. Marana, they noticed all of a sudden that the Huks, and I'm talking about the real Huks, started getting cool, so much so that breakfast was eaten in virtual silence. Lt. Marana decided that the time to strike had come. On a prearranged signal, the members of Force X unobtrusively segregated themselves away from the Huk groups, and Lt. Marana gave the order to strike.

There was actually a slaughter in the area. Two Huk squadrons were practically deactivated as of that moment. The mortars came into play within the first two minutes when the strike was ordered. The men were instructed to throw hand grenades before using their weapons. And, within five minutes, the radio was in operation and was in contact with me and with three Philippine Constabulary companies that were alerted around the operational area ready to move in.

At the end of the battle, when the Huk withdrew, we counted 82 killed in an action that did not last more than 30 minutes. Among those identified by the town mayor of that region were three commanders including Commander Bundalian, the commander of the assassin group. Two others were commanders sent by the Huk Supremo to make a personal screening of Force X.

Of course, as soon as I received word that the fight was on, I committed my two alert companies and all the other troops I could get. For two weeks the area was saturated with troops. This resulted in 21 Huks killed and 9 captured in seven encounters in the area. Out of more than a hundred local inhabitants detained for interrogation, 17 turned out to be members of the squadrons we had deactivated.

As an interesting aftermath, about three weeks later we learned of an intense fire-fight in the middle of the swamp. Investigation disclosed that a Huk squadron from the adjoining province, on a foraging mission, had met another squadron from my province. Each thought they had stumbled on another "Force X" unit, with a resulting casualty list of 11 dead and 3 seriously wounded.

We also learned, later, what gave our operation away to the enemy. The genuine Huks decided that Force X had too much bright shiny new ammunition for a legitimate guerrilla unit.

Gentlemen, there are no hard and fast rules that will guarantee success in an operation of this kind. I told you earlier of some of the things which I think are essential, which if not observed are likely to cause failure. Success, however, can only be achieved through the maximum effort to understand the local situation and adapt to it, avoiding the obvious pitfalls and exercising cunning, training, and ability superior to that of the enemy.

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#### DISCUSSION

Query: Did the isolated position of the Philippines help or hinder the campaign against the Huk?

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). The geographical situation of the Philippines, an archipelago of 7,000 islands surrounded by ocean, was of great assistance in the campaign against the Huk, only because we realized at the very beginning the extreme importance of securing our boundaries against the enemy. Had we not been aware of this, and reasonably successful, our infinitely long shore lines and our communications difficulties would have aided the enemy.

I realize that you in South Vietnam have the same problem of a long coast line as well as the disadvantage of being situated on the same land-mass as your powerful enemy.

### III

## MILITARY OPERATIONS

by

Napoleon D. Valeriano  
Colonel, AFP, Retired

Gentlemen, for the purpose of my discussion covering military combat contributions to the final subjugation of the Communist movement in the Philippines, I have divided the operations into four phases.

The first phase covers the period from 1945 until early 1947. This was the period when the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, which was in exile in the United States during the period of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, returned with General McArthur. This transition government was not too well prepared to face its problems, especially the problems of national security. It was informed about the subversive movement in Central Luzon, but it did not understand fully the implications of the Hukbalahap movement. After it became the government of the Philippine Republic in 1946, these same people still refused to accept the intelligence reports repeatedly and consistently furnished. But, since this movement really was Communist inspired, the military policy during this period was inadequate, and proved most costly to the country from 1946 up to 1955.

The Hukbalahap movement as discussed by today's speakers so far has concerned military organizations called regional commands. These commands have varied strengths. But for my discussion, I will speak about the fighting units called the Hukbalahap squadrons. These squadrons varied in strength, varied in armament, varied in the quality of their leadership. Some of these squadrons were led by blood-thirsty types. That is quite common in guerrilla warfare. Some of them were lead by such inoffensive leaders that we did not give them operational priorities until much later. However, during the Japanese occupation period, under the cover of being anti-Japanese guerrilla units, they all were able to accumulate armament and equipment.

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which was a military organization with national police functions. The new post-war organization was called the Military Police Command, Philippine Army. During this period, General McArthur's headquarters authorized the organization, training and equipment of some 13 military police companies, with the necessary headquarters organizations, in order that these companies when deployed would be properly coordinated, supervised and controlled.

Again, the attitude of the Commonwealth government was reflected in the training of these units, in the equipment of these units, in the armament of these units. Most of the units, as I saw them in the field, were armed with patrolmen's billies and whistles to be policemen. They were issued white painted helmets, white painted jeeps, and the heaviest weapon that I saw for these military police companies were carbines. They were pitted against experienced Huk guerrillas who were armed with the heaviest infantry armaments available, including bazookas. So that in several incidents in 1945 and 1946, we found military police companies or formations either being beaten back or overrun by Huk-balahap units. Again in 1946, the total number of government formations actually deployed in the field with semi-constabulary combat missions had an effective strength of about 11,000 officers and men.

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During this period, normal operations of the Philippine Constabulary were largely routine patrol and constabulary missions. Too often, patrols were sent out to execute purely constabulary duties, such as serving search warrants or warrants of arrest, and accomplished nothing else. Constabulary groups were dispersed in zone and provincial commands and further broken down into small village garrisons of platoons or less. In actual fact, these detachments either established a more or less tacit modus vivendi with the Huks in their area, or were forced to devote most of their efforts to supporting and protecting themselves.

A few large operations were mounted. I would like to discuss these operations from the standpoint of their motivation, their execution, and the results obtained.

A task force operation was usually initiated after some Huk outrage had prompted headlines in the newspapers claiming that the Philippine Constabulary was asleep. The Chief of Constabulary would answer the headline with an announcement that already the Constabulary was planning an operation, which he would personally command, that would end for all time the Huk menace.

Plans would be made, troops assembled, from the provincial and zone commands (leaving those areas virtually unprotected) and a thoroughly conventional "sweep" of an allegedly Huk infested area would be underway. The operations were well planned in accordance with conventional doctrine. We had lines of departure, we had phase lines, we had zones of action, and we had priorities of support.

The results were usually no hits, some runs (non-scoring) and many errors. The troops would be exhausted, our gasoline supply for the next month would be exhausted, but the Huks themselves would scarcely be tired by the effort necessary to draw out of the path of the sweep.

Once the previously announced objective had been reached, the operations would be considered successfully terminated and the troops would return to their normal stations. The guerrillas would also return to the area which had just been swept, confident that they would be free of molestation for some time to come.

However, during this period, being a very curious individual, I started germinating a few ideas of my own on how to meet these Huk guerrillas on equal terms. Time prohibits me from describing to you the organization of a team from Headquarters consisting of four officers and 50 enlisted men, known in the Philippines as the Nenita unit. We found out many things that we did not learn from text books. We learned the Huk technique of getting supplies, the Huk technique of getting information, the Huk technique for ambushes, for raids, interrogating captured government personnel. As we learned, in this period of 1947 to 1949, we tried in our small way to evolve useful counter-measures. One case history concerning these, I will describe later in this period. Before discussing our efforts, I would like to give you additional information about the tactics and practices of the Philippine Constabulary and of the Huks during this period.

I have already mentioned our Constabulary patrol missions. These patrols often were ambushed or would be forced into meeting engagements with guerrilla formations. Sometimes the patrols were decimated, sometimes they were able to force the guerrillas back. Despite occasional setbacks, the guerrillas gained strength throughout this period. Campaign analysis reveals that these patrol actions did not seek to cultivate the sympathy of the people in the area. As I recall those days, it was very normal for a company commander in the field to dispatch a patrol from squad to platoon size to serve a warrant of arrest in an isolated village. This patrol would reach the village, locate the individual (if he were surprised and found there) and would return to town without further action. Junior leaders of these formations did not attempt to stay long enough in this village to get friendly with the people, find out what were their problems, and if their patrol could assist them in any manner.

The guerrillas were doing exactly the opposite. They would sneak into these villages, stay with the people, play with them, work with them, but at the same time in a very subtle method indoctrinate them in Communism. This was the secret of the whole thing.

Another important factor which entered into our failure, and which I still cannot forget, was the poor support we received from higher echelons. Particularly significant was the inefficiency of our logistic system. Support was so poor that troops in the field were often forced to live off the country. As you know, gentlemen, when there is no other way for the troops to eat, commanders are virtually forced to tolerate troopers going to the villages and demanding food. It's either they go hungry or we go hungry. That was the theory of the average government trooper in the field. This, of course, worsened matters.

As the troops lived off the people, the Huks naturally exploited the situation. Their propagandists hammered constantly at the theme that these practices were an exact reflection of the attitude of the government in Manila towards the "persecuted masses."

That general situation was bad enough. Even worse, there were, as might be expected, instances of officers involved in matters definitely unworthy of one who is by definition an officer and a gentleman by the act of our Congress. Instances, including demanding bribes for the performance or non-performance of duty, occurred in all ranks. Each, of course, was magnified by Huk propagandists and their sympathizers. Few of the offenders were punished appropriately and publicly. We had quite a few big scandals in Central Luzon during this period. In a general statement, we can say that troop behavior was so low that it cultivated an antipathy by the masses for the man in uniform.

The third phase of the operations against the Huk is what I like to call the "phase of enlightenment." This is the period of the new approach which started in 1950 and lasted into 1952. The turning point of the whole campaign occurred in 1951, right in the middle of this period. This, as General Lansdale stated, was the election of 1951. In 1950, the situation in the Philippines and the representations of the Philippine Government awakened and invited the concern of our American brothers. Philippine President Quirino installed as Secretary of Defense a vigorous new man, a man of the people, Ramon Magsaysay. He had adequate guerrilla background; but, more important, is the fact that as a man of the people, he understood exactly and instinctively what was happening in the homes and the minds of the people of the villages and the farms. He knew their problems, he knew what the mistakes of the Armed Forces were. As soon as he got into the office of Secretary of National Defense, things started happening so fast that right now it's very hard to recall the exact order or sequence of the actions during this period.



As soon as he took office, we started feeling the punch of new, vigorous, inspired leadership which made its effect felt in every aspect of our fight against the Huks. I well remember his first visit to me, when he said, "I want you to turn out public relations men from every private, corporal, sergeant, lieutenant and officer of your command. I want every enlisted man of the Philippine Army in uniform to serve as a public relations man for the Army and for our government." That was the substance of his statement, and accurately reflected his policy.

In speaking of the new formations and new activities which were strange to the Hukbalahaps, I want to cite first the effectiveness of the Scout Ranger teams that were thrown into the field. These were conventionally trained enlisted men, thoroughly screened personnel of the AFP, who were taken to Fort McKinley and given special instructions on ranger tactics. They formed deep penetration units which went far into the guerrilla redoubts or safe areas in the Sierra Madre Mountains and the Zambales Mountains. From the accumulation of reports from these Scout Ranger teams, we were able to determine the location of the enemy's long-established refuge areas.

It was largely from the reports of the Scout Ranger teams and from the invigorated Military Intelligence Service in the operational area that the intelligence was secured which was the basis of large, well coordinated, well directed, and well led task force operations such as Operation Four Roses, Operation Omaha, and others. I want to stress that we no longer started large unit operations because of a newspaper headline. We were now in a position that before we attempted a big operation we made sure that we had a good basis for it.

Ninety percent of our time in the field was devoted to small patrol operations. This time the patrols were properly instructed, properly oriented, and properly prepared. They were not only prepared to deal with the enemy as soldiers should, they were also prepared to talk to the people as individuals from villages themselves and coming to the village as friends and helpers.

The turning point of the whole campaign was in 1951, when the people were dramatically impressed with the desire of the armed forces to have clean elections in the Philippines. You can imagine, gentlemen, the effect of young students from the ROTC units being sworn in on temporary duty status with the armed forces. These

youngsters, ranging from the age of 14 up to about 18 at the most, were given weapons, were given AFP insignia and were assigned to guard the polling places, with strict orders to insure honesty and compliance to the letter to the election law. The repercussions felt by the people in the rural areas in Huklandia were tremendous. For the first time they were convinced that the government was sincere in eliminating the Communist movement. This operation proved also to every man in army uniform in the field that abuses, misconduct, graft would no longer be tolerated with the new approach to the campaign.

The fourth phase was the consolidation phase. This was when Huk squadron units started disintegrating slowly but surely. This was when the government formations started pushing and pushing, when we applied constant pressure and did not allow the Huks to rest. Within a short time, because they had lost the sympathy of the masses, it was an easy matter to isolate these units up in the mountains. There they ran out of food and some of them came down from the hills to surrender en masse, in groups sometimes practically dying of thirst or hunger.

This alienation of the people from the Huk was completed when the Secretary of National Defense became our President in the 1953 election, so that he had the whole government under his control and direction, to press his campaigns for the welfare of the people and against the Huk.

The surrender of Taruc was virtually the surrender of the Huk movement. But we did not stop after the surrender of Taruc. We recognized that there were certain mop-up operations that were needed. These were criminal bands disguising themselves as Huks who tried to out-live or escape the notice of the armed forces. We swung our attention to these criminal bands, criminal guerrillas, or shall I say bandit guerrillas. By 1955, even a very critical Congress recognized that after all the AFP, the men in uniform, had done a good job.

At the height of the campaign, the troop build-up of Government formations against the Huk guerrilla finally reached a total of 34,000 officers and enlisted men deployed in the field as combat forces. Of these 34,000, I would say that a good ninety percent were in combat units which had civic and social welfare missions as well as combat missions. During the last two phases of the campaign, we added to our combat units civil affairs officers and civil affairs units and kindred units. These greatly assisted in realizing Secretary Magsaysay's objective of building up acceptance of the Armed Forces by the civilian population.

In my command, which was typical, the civil affairs officer served as the liaison officer of the civil government on my staff. He was the man who was my link with the provincial governor and with the other civilian government officials in that province. He also served as my liaison officer with the civilian armed bodies that we had in my area of responsibility. These included police forces of the local governments and also home guard units, commonly known as Civilian Guards, which were formed in almost every town in the area. Such integration, such cohesion of all government and semi-government agencies was achieved that I was able to accomplish my purpose, which was to separate the armed guerrillas from the local population, and the destruction of active guerrilla units. Actions of all agencies were this well planned, well coordinated, well directed, and well supervised.

I would like now to discuss with you some actual case histories. Time prohibits detailed discussion of every device which we in the Philippines found effective in combatting these guerrillas. Actually, in the various commands which I held, about thirty different ruses, stratagems, types of unconventional operation, were found to be successful. Now we will cover one particular activity which was the result of a lot of study on our part and which was successfully used. It is one which I hope may be found useful by some of you.

This activity is what we in the 7th Battalion Combat Team called "Large Unit Infiltration." The basic idea was to infiltrate a specially trained counter-guerrilla force in enemy guise deep into enemy territory. This force, it was felt, should be able to fraternize with the local inhabitants, gathering intelligence and making contact with enemy armed units, until the most favorable opportunity arrived for striking with maximum effect, and then withdrawing to friendly territory.

We felt that this activity was one partial solution of the major problem of counter-guerrilla warfare, that of finding and finishing enemy units in large force. Usually, guerrilla enemy intelligence and warning systems are too efficient to permit major encounters.

To recapitulate, the two major objectives of this activity are to effect surprise contact with the enemy in force and to take advantage of this contact to destroy him by close combat. There are many other obvious objectives. First in importance is to gather

intelligence, especially verification of enemy order of battle. Second is the penetration and study of existing enemy systems of security. Third, the study of enemy signal communications and the extent and nature of civilian support and liaison methods. Fourth, is the appreciation and study of enemy supply methods and extent of local area support to enemy units. As a special appendix, there might be added the final identification of local government officials secretly in collusion with the enemy.

The advantages which may be gained from the adoption of this activity, which we call Force "X," are obvious from a recital of its missions. There are also disadvantages which must be considered, problems which must be solved, prerequisites which must be met. Assuming that the personnel are available, they must be screened for suitability and carefully trained until they know enemy procedures and personalities as well as the members of the enemy unit which they are to impersonate would know them. This means that before their training is finished, a favorable situation for their employment must exist and must be known in detail.

What is a favorable situation for the employment of such a unit? It is a situation when communications between enemy units are not yet well developed, or have been thoroughly disrupted for a long period. It is a situation where the enemy to be contacted knows less about the unit to be impersonated by your men than you do. Such situations most often arise when the enemy is expanding his organization vigorously, when there is as yet little contact between different centers of expansion.

Above all, the entire operation must be planned and conducted, from the start to the moment of the final strike, in absolute secrecy. Information must be given only on the strictest need-to-know basis.

I regret to say that several BCT commanders in our Army failed to give adequate consideration to the problems of employment of such forces and learned a sad lesson from their efforts.

Once the tactical opportunity has been determined to exist, an appropriate cover plan must be developed. Most often, we found, the cover for the infiltration unit will be that of being a known unit from a distant area with which communications are poor which has come on a liaison and reconnaissance mission. Needless to say,

every man in the unit must know the cover story in great detail, must know more about his supposed unit than any enemy with whom he may come in contact.

To some extent the cover story will depend upon the target, or targets selected for the operation. Targets can be only tentatively designated and assigned priorities in advance. Much should depend upon opportunities encountered. The killing of leading enemy personalities may be far more important than the destruction of a certain enemy unit. A system of priorities may be established, in which the priorities may be: One - the killing of enemy leaders or outstanding fanatics; two - the destruction of enemy elite organizations; three - the penetration and destruction of especially devoted or effective enemy support elements.

The above-mentioned targets may all be found in the area of a single operation deep in enemy territory. Time factors involved in preparation of counter-guerrilla infiltration units are variable. Don't be tempted into throwing in half-trained units. In our experience, four to six weeks of intensive training was usually found adequate. Careful screening and selection of operating personnel is of paramount importance. Based on combat experience and physical condition, selected personnel are segregated in a secret training base. Training should stress physical conditioning and adopting to enemy "personalities" (of enemy units being represented), dress, speech, manners, customs, etc. Divested of any article of clothing identifying your own force, personnel are reissued captured weapons, equipment, articles and other materiel. This is an important item. Where it is possible, captured enemy insignias, uniforms, documents, ID cards, propaganda publications, song books, indoctrination booklets etc., are freely distributed to operating personnel.

Caution should be exercised on the issuance of enemy uniforms, as civilian clothing is normally being more representative of enemy guerrilla elements. There should be no uniformity of wearing apparel, possibly with the exception of the two or three ranking members of the disguised force. Armament and equipment must show signs of wear and tear, or poor upkeep, which is characteristic of guerrilla weapons. Well kept weapons and abundance of ammunition with the disguised force is a dead give-away. However, the newer and gaudier weapons, such as pistols with pearl handles, should be given to leaders. This is common with guerrilla units.

The maximum number of ex-enemy personnel are recruited. Through careful screening and tests to establish loyalties, services of this particular type of individual will be invaluable during the training and operational phases. During the training of the troops, these individuals are useful and instructive critics. With individual cover stories, they are assigned with command, security or advance elements during actual operations. After training, the disguised force should be made to undergo rigid tests with unwitting friendly troop units. These tests will require special precautions to prevent mistaken encounters.

Now I would like to tell you about the first time we employed this device. First, you should know the basic situation at the time, which was in 1948 when the Huks were running freely all over Central Luzon. However, in the Huk ranks we had a division of authority. Those in Southern Luzon had been independent (they thought), but their commander, a Colonel Villegas, had just died. As a result, some of their units were trying hard to establish contact with the more developed forces up in Central Luzon, under Taruc, who was anxious to contact them. This was obviously a very favorable opportunity.

I designated the 16th Philippine Constabulary company as the unit to compose Force X. The Commander, Lt. Marana, after receiving his instructions, quietly screened his entire company, collected 44 enlisted men and 3 officers, and at night moved to a predesignated training base in the jungle around this area here. Force X was in existence and was isolated completely from the day they moved into that base. Only three officers from my staff were authorized to go into that secret training base.

The training the men received in that secret training base followed very closely the description I just gave. These men were divested of all items which could identify them as members of the Army. They were dressed in civilian clothes, and when they arrived in camp they received all the captured weapons that had been accumulated by my S-2 section under Major Justiniano. They were given reading material, indoctrination booklets and propaganda publications of the sort carried by Huks. They were given the things generally found on Huk dead, soiled handkerchiefs, love mementoes from girl friends. During the period of four weeks, no rank was recognized except as conferred by predesignated enemy identifications, preassigned aliases and pet names commonly used by guerrilla

units. They were addressed as comrades, brothers, members of the proletariat. They were taught Huk songs. They were taught how to deliver speeches Huk-style.

They were taught the descriptions of the leaders of the Southern Luzon guerrillas. Some of them, whose physical appearances coincided with known guerrilla leaders, posed as these personalities. They were required to take on the appearance of hunted guerrilla individuals during those days. They became, and stayed, dirty, unshaven, badly in need of haircuts. Like the enemy, these soldiers were unhappily forced away from bathrooms, shaving creams, and razor blades.

Somewhere about the second week, Justiniano came back from our national prison smuggling in three ex-Huks who were captured in Southern Luzon. These had been tested, screened, and reindocinated to our side and were brought to the training base to serve as instructors. They became around-the-clock critics of mannerisms, speeches, customs. Huks were taught certain methods of addressing a superior, certain ways to eat, certain general practices for their daily ablutions in the river. These little things were taught to the men of Force X.

While this training was going on, my troops were making a reconnaissance of the area through which Force X would supposedly pass while en route for Southern to Central Luzon. A disguised patrol, led by a sergeant, actually covered the route. It noted the trails, noted the attitude of the inhabitants, and identified the obstacles which were encountered. All this was incorporated in the cover story of Force X to insure that force would be accepted in the proposed operational areas which was called the Candaba Swamp.

When everything was set, Justiniano was ordered back to Manila to recruit several walking, wounded men from our Army hospital. He had to go from one bedside to the other and finally found two rugged enlisted men belonging to different commands who wanted to join Force X in spite of their wounds. With the addition of these personnel, the operation was ready to roll, and the operation was launched at 1700 hours, 14 April 1948.

The force almost precipitated a pitched battle when passing near a PC company in another province, while en route to their line of departure for their operational area. The operational departure was

taken from a small town, about four miles east of the highway, where they fought a carefully staged sham battle with two of my uniformed PC companies. From this they withdrew in good order, carrying with them their two wounded. Four hours later they contacted the first Huk outpost, which was of course informed of their approach and very curious as to the identity of this unit which had been fighting the PC.

They were carefully interrogated as to who they were, where they came from, where they were going, etc. Their cover stories stood up well, and their wounded lent an invaluable authenticity to their accounts. They were given guides who took them on into the Candaba Swamp until they linked up with Huk squadrons 5 and 17, under Commanders Romy and Vergara. There they were again interrogated, asked about their route from Southern Luzon. Much interest was taken in them, and they were promised that top leaders, possibly the "Supremo," Luis Taruc, would see them. Force X and the 2 squadrons (estimated strength about 120) fraternized for more than a day and a half, exchanging experiences, boasting of their respective commands. Naturally Force X was talking about the prowess of the South Luzon Huks. Squadrons 2 and 17 were talking of the prowess of the Huk Supremo. During these conversations of individuals, Force X accumulated a lot of information. Preselected individuals deliberately engaged local visitors in lively discussions about local conditions, propaganda and supply systems, etc. They found that most of the town mayors and chiefs of police were in collusion with the enemy. They found there were enlisted men in the PC company on the other side of the swamps who were giving information to the Huks. They found out how supplies were left by women in selected spots along the road to be picked up at sun-down by Huks.

The fourth day after they crossed the line of departure, another two Huk squadrons joined the combined group. These two squadrons, 4 and 21, were special killer groups. One in particular, under Commander Bundalian, was unique in its organization and in its assigned mission. It was called the enforcing squadron, assigned by the Huk Supremo to enforce Huk justice. Actually, it was a band of well trained executioners; their specialty was kidnapping civilian individuals who were suspected of disloyalty to the movement.

By the end of the 5th day, Force X was outnumbered 1 to 3. During all these five days, the Huk squadrons showed no indications of suspecting that Force X was other than what it seemed to be. No one detected



that they had with them four 60mm mortars, two light machine guns, close to about 200 hand grenades and a complete voice radio, all hidden. How was this equipment hidden? Why, some enterprising enlisted man found that mortar tubes fitted inside bamboo water tubes and so did light machine guns. Others took delight in hiding grenades and mortar shells inside watermelons, papayas, etc. The radio was in a sack of rice.

About breakfast time on the 6th day, according to the version of the Force X commander, Lt. Marana, they noticed all of a sudden that the Huks, and I'm talking about the real Huks, started getting cool, so much so that breakfast was eaten in virtual silence. Lt. Marana decided that the time to strike had come. On a prearranged signal, the members of Force X unobtrusively segregated themselves away from the Huk groups, and Lt. Marana gave the order to strike.

There was actually a slaughter in the area. Two Huk squadrons were practically deactivated as of that moment. The mortars came into play within the first two minutes when the strike was ordered. The men were instructed to throw hand grenades before using their weapons. And, within five minutes, the radio was in operation and was in contact with me and with three Philippine Constabulary companies that were alerted around the operational area ready to move in.

At the end of the battle, when the Huk withdrew, we counted 82 killed in an action that did not last more than 30 minutes. Among those identified by the town mayor of that region were three commanders including Commander Bundalian, the commander of the assassin group. Two others were commanders sent by the Huk Supremo to make a personal screening of Force X.

Of course, as soon as I received word that the fight was on, I committed my two alert companies and all the other troops I could get. For two weeks the area was saturated with troops. This resulted in 21 Huks killed and 9 captured in seven encounters in the area. Out of more than a hundred local inhabitants detained for interrogation, 17 turned out to be members of the squadrons we had deactivated.

As an interesting aftermath, about three weeks later we learned of an intense fire-fight in the middle of the swamp. Investigation disclosed that a Huk squadron from the adjoining province, on a foraging mission, had met another squadron from my province. Each thought they had stumbled on another "Force X" unit, with a resulting casualty list of 11 dead and 3 seriously wounded.

We also learned, later, what gave our operation away to the enemy. The genuine Huks decided that Force X had too much bright shiny new ammunition for a legitimate guerrilla unit.

Gentlemen, there are no hard and fast rules that will guarantee success in an operation of this kind. I told you earlier of some of the things which I think are essential, which if not observed are likely to cause failure. Success, however, can only be achieved through the maximum effort to understand the local situation and adapt to it, avoiding the obvious pitfalls and exercising cunning, training, and ability superior to that of the enemy.

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#### DISCUSSION

Query: Did the isolated position of the Philippines help or hinder the campaign against the Huk?

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). The geographical situation of the Philippines, an archipelago of 7,000 islands surrounded by ocean, was of great assistance in the campaign against the Huk, only because we realized at the very beginning the extreme importance of securing our boundaries against the enemy. Had we not been aware of this, and reasonably successful, our infinitely long shore lines and our communications difficulties would have aided the enemy.

I realize that you in South Vietnam have the same problem of a long coast line as well as the disadvantage of being situated on the same land-mass as your powerful enemy.

#### IV

### COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

by

Medardo T. Justiniano  
Major, AFP

In the Philippines we have mountains, swamps, and wilderness; we have trees so high and so thick that the sunshine never reaches the ground. In our jungles we have wild carabao, crocodiles, snakes thirty feet long, and Huks. These animals are killers, particularly the last ones.

Immediately after World War II, the leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines utilized the inherent confusion of the reconstruction period to strengthen and enhance the military position of their armed forces. While the legitimate guerrilla forces were surrendering their arms, the members of the military branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Huks did not do so. On the contrary, they sought to gather more, and secretly accumulated as many as possible. While the other guerrilla organizations were demobilizing, the Huks were busy recruiting more men for the hammer and sickle revolution.

In their recruiting, following accepted Communist strategy, the Huks exploited two courses of action for their expansion program. The first course of action was expansion by force, a course of action which was characterized by extremes of terrorism. Their actions were calculated to inject a psychology of terror into the minds of unpretentious citizens, government officials, and even the rank and file of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Murder, arson, robbery and torture meant nothing to them, and each method was employed as thought necessary in order to intimidate the people into forced submission.

Supplementing this military course of action was their second line of attack. This was expansion by indoctrination, a process which involved systematic brainwashing by trained Communist propagandists. I might mention at this point that, to enhance their capabilities in this regard, the top leaders of the Communist Party, those who later expected to overthrow

the government of the Philippines by 1951, early established a Stalin University, complete with the ideological trimmings of its Kremlin predecessor. In this institution, promising converts to the Huk cause were given advanced training in subversive techniques.

In their program of expansion by indoctrination, the Huks took advantage of each item of contention to represent the facts on either side in whatever way they felt would best suit their sinister purposes. They demonstrated an extraordinary ability in attributing all imperfections, all injustices, all misfortunes, to the democratic process. They are masters at the exploitation of this particular line, at the propagation of deceitful catchwords such as "land for the landless," "prosperity for the masses," and many others. These were carried far and wide and inculcated into the rural population.

This situation was challenging to an intelligence officer, and this situation was given to me for solution by Col Valeriano, my commanding officer. Here was a situation where the terrorized inhabitant would not even glance at soldiers for fear of reprisals by the Huk. Here was a predicament where the people were led to bind their hopes to the alluring doctrines of Communism, either because of their exposure to Huk degradation, or because of vicious propaganda expressed by the CPP stooges, exploiting trivial or even personal incidents to effect pernicious distrust of our governmental system. This situation, in which the rural and small town populations were militarily dominated by the Huk, and were ideologically captivated by Communist indoctrinators, was one which, as the intelligence officer of Colonel Valeriano, I found obviously required a major intelligence build-up. The expansion programs of the Communist Party made the success of intelligence operations seem rather problematical. Nevertheless, several methods were devised, applied and were found effective. Had they not been effective, our affairs this morning would have been necrological for the five of us, as well as two other people who are with you in the audience.

Gentlemen, I would like to discuss with you for a moment the physical background, the terrain in which we operated, for the different methods which we employed. Central Luzon, which I believe is shown on maps which have been furnished to you, might be considered roughly square. In the center is a single big mountain, called Mount Arayat. Running south from it is a large grassy swamp, called the Candaba swamp. On the east and west sides of the square are mountain ranges, some grassy, some covered with the densest kind of rain forest. The area between the mountain ranges is partly rice land, partly grass land, with numerous streams and patches of forest. Politically, the area is divided into many municipalities, and four provinces, whose common corner is on Mount Arayat. Notice on your maps how Mount

Arayat is most strategically located in the center of these four different provinces. The Huks realized the importance of Mount Arayat, and took every advantage of the complications possibly ensuing from provincial boundaries and command boundaries of our armed forces. From this central mountain (which they never made the mistake of trying to defend against a major force), the Huks maintained courier routes to all parts of the area.

Now, let me discuss the different methods we used in gathering information in this hostile area. Our collection effort was based on the direct approach method and the indirect approach method, which we combined with other methods, the use of prisoners, infiltration, etc. The direct method was a simple interrogation method wherein we invited the Huks families and known sympathizers. The wife and oftentimes wives of Huks commanders could, if they would, tell us something of value. In this approach we would interrogate them, ask them to cooperate, give them some lectures and so on. Well, of course, I'd like to tell you that if we got any information along this line, it was not very useful. We have found these people hostile no matter what method of interrogation we adopted.

The indirect method is a system wherein we use friends of the Huks. Class-mates of Huk children in school, cousins of a Huk commander, relatives of friends of associates of the Huk leaders were approached and induced to cooperate. By this system of making an indirect approach to the sources, we were able to get a lot of information.

Another very important source of our information are prisoners. I think we have been told about it in school and I know that most of you know how to use prisoners, but I would like to talk to you about how we use our prisoners. For the purpose of this discussion and for the purpose of our operation in the Philippines, we have divided prisoners into four categories.

The first category includes those prisoners who have been captured in combat. Everybody knows how to treat a prisoner captured in combat, and how to take advantage of the psychological opportunity afforded by the confusion that this man's mind is involved in. One very striking example of this was when we captured Celia Pomeroy. Celia Pomeroy is the wife of an American GI who was in the Communist Party in the Philippines. He's one of these men whose picture you have seen displayed. This Celia Pomeroy was a very intelligent Huk organizer, a graduate of our University of the Philippines. I had a chance to interrogate her ten minutes after she was captured, and I got as much information as I wanted from her during a short space of time, which compared favorably with the information secured during the one week interrogation which she was later subjected to.

The second classification of prisoners are the surrenderees. In the Huk organization when one surrendered, it meant that this fellow must have been feeling himself to be in some sort of a situation where he faced liquidation. Of course, we have given allowances for the possibility of planted surrenderees. However, I do not recall having any such prisoner during our five years of fighting with the Huks; not one surrenderee that I know of was planted into our intelligence set up.

There are a number of situations where we have found surrenderees very useful. One of them is the technique that we call the "Magic Eye." You will agree with me that fighting a Filipino or fighting an American Communist, fighting Communists among your own countrymen, is extremely difficult for an intelligence officer to identify which man is an enemy and which one is not. That constant problem we often solved by the use of surrenderees, and in which we found the Magic Eye technique effective. This Magic Eye system allowed us to take advantage of psychological opportunities and at the same time protect the life of the families of the surrenderee.

Take for instance a situation wherein we rounded up all the civilians of a town. We would construct a special tent for the prisoner, with a peephole. He would be concealed while the civilians were made to pass before this "Magic Eye," hidden in a tent. Naturally all these people would start feeling a sense of fright because they might be identified. This type of operation helped us a lot tactically and psychologically.

The third type of prisoners were those who were serving sentences in jail. I'd like to mention here that in the expansion program of the Huks they recruited all types of people, especially those who had police records, those who were known killers, and so on. Naturally when we started to operate in an area whose people and inhabitants were hostile to us, we were initially at a loss for contacts. We tried to find out from our national jails which prisoners actually hailed from that particular area. Once such a prisoner was identified, I would interrogate this fellow and try to win him over and get him to start talking. I might give him a pack of cigarettes, I might take him out for a free airing in a night club. In short, I would try to make him feel so happy and so grateful that he would give me some free information.

The fourth category were what might be called "special" prisoners. These usually were friends or close relatives either of Huks, or of people who were cooperating with us, and were made prisoners for their own protection.

In this connection, I would like to discuss with you, in continuation of Colonel Valeriano's discussion, the infiltration method, as illustrated by a particular project which we called the "Relatives Project." It is an example of the infiltration of individuals into the Huk ranks, a type of operation where maximum secrecy and security is necessary. It is a type of operation which demands a great deal from the individuals participating in it, the operative, his relatives, and his project officer alike.

"Relatives Project" dealt with the infiltration of the Huk organization in the Arayat area, in Central Luzon. In the effort to find a suitable person for infiltration, we found it necessary to contact the relatives of several Huk commanders. We did this, without identifying ourselves, until we finally were successful in locating a cooperative individual who was the cousin of a Huk commander.

We found also that this Huk Commander had joined the Huks not specifically for ideological reasons but for personal reasons. The infiltrator was trained for about two months under my personal supervision. While this was being done, necessary arrangements for cover and protection were made. This took the burning of his house, the imprisonment of his brother, and eventually the evacuation of his mother and father to protect and give cover to this infiltrator into the Hukbalahap organization. We had to find the Huks, and the government naturally had to pay for this. His mother did not know that her son was an infiltrator. The brother did not know that he was being placed in jail because we were trying to put up some sort of a ruse. But the news of these activities made them very effective. Slowly, based on his obvious grievances against the government, our agent was able to reach certain categories in the Hukbalahap and the Communist Party organization which has been explained to you by Colonel Lapus.

Our man was made a collector of the National Finance Committee. The National Finance Committee is the organization which supplied the Huks in the field with money, medicine, ammunition, weapons and other equipment. For two months, our supplies were flowing into the Huk lines, through the National Finance Committee and as a matter of fact I think Colonel Lapus will back me up here because we could not tell anybody how we spend our confidential funds, and I could not give any logical explanation at the time. For two months as I say, medicine was flowing into the Huks, ammunition was being given to the Huks, we were also giving weapons to the Huks, through this infiltrator. The purpose, of course, was to enable him to implant himself firmly into the organization and enable him to be promoted. He was eventually promoted, and

and the promotion and the amount of money we have used I think paid off, because he was able to reach Taruc himself.

Our man was made a bodyguard of Taruc, the leader of the Huk field forces, but this duty was done off and on for security purposes. Nevertheless this fellow was able to reach Taruc and we were able to get secret pictures our man took of the entire membership of the Huk organization in Candaba swamp. I think that General Lansdale, Colonel Lapus, Major Bohannon, Colonel Valeriano and General Hobbs were the only ones who knew about this.

The infiltration program went on, and the securing of reports was the most difficult thing that I had to encounter. How could the reports reach me, and how would I get instructions to the man, that was my problem. I discussed it with my commanding officer, with two officers from JUSMAAG, with Major Bohannon, and I got very important points which helped me. I'd like to tell you of some of the very interesting methods we devised which might help you also.

In order to let our man know that he must pick up our instructions to him, we devised a technique of using kites of an ordinary type. At certain pre-arranged points in the area where he operated, we would fly kites simultaneously in three different places. This was done at certain hours of the day exactly on the hour. The kites were not flown continuously, or at random times, to keep him from having to watch for them always, which military operations could have made very difficult. Further, if he were always to be seen scanning the horizon, suspicion would certainly be aroused. So that we did things on the hour. We would fly the kite at 7:00 in the morning, 8:00 in the morning, 9:00 in the morning, 10:00 in the morning, until we were sure that this signal had been received. The moment when he would see this kite, he would know a pre-arranged contact within the swamp was to be effected.

The troops of course couldn't be told anything about this operation. As a matter of fact, I lost two men when the area commander in this area attacked my men and I nearly lost my life too, but I couldn't tell him. Very often there would be no one to meet him, but he would find his messages concealed, perhaps in a messkit, or in an American first aid kit, carelessly abandoned. We would put the instructions into this kit and leave it at certain places along the designated place.

Using this system, how could we make an emergency contact at night? What do we do to make our message reach him when night infiltration is usually being conducted in this area? This is another problem that we faced because, of course, he could not see the kite at night. We devised two things.



We would fly the same kite, with a battery operated light. Then he gets his message. That's one. The other one is by the use of flares. In other words, if we believe that he may not be able to see this small light from the kite, we supplement this with flares, fired on the hour at the same designated spots.

The moment that our man would see this signal, he would know it means that he's got to be very careful because the troops are going in fast. We tell him now to find a way to save himself. It was my biggest concern, to be sure that this fellow was safe because it is so difficult to find one who could fit into the suit, train him, break all the rules necessary, burn houses, imprison somebody, and send supplies to the Huk organization.

But as I say it was very effective. As a matter of fact, I remember that before I presented the first picture taken by our infiltrator to Secretary Magsaysay, there was much skepticism about this project of mine. In fact, I suppose the late Magsaysay gave me the chance because of the confidence he had in me. He was worried about the success of this operation, but when I gave him the pictures taken by this infiltrator, he was in a conference with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Right then and there he left the General Staff conference and immediately went to General Hobbs, the Chief of JUSMAG (Joint US Military Advisory Group) and spread out all the pictures on the table of General Hobbs.

Let me tell you another thing which was done by this infiltrator. If you recall my mentioning the National Finance Committee, as I said we supplied the Huks through it, a matter which went on for two months. In the third month, Colonel Valeriano and Secretary Magsaysay decided it was time for us to hit. It was very easy for me to get out the files of what this fellow had submitted and, based on them, we were able right then and there to apprehend 1,175 members of the National Finance Committee. That destroyed the supply line of the Huk.

I have discussed with you the means by which I contacted one of our infiltrators. Now I would like to take up with you, his means for the transmission of reports to me. As Colonel Lapus has told you, the Huk organization disseminated propaganda material. One regularly issued was a magazine called Titis, or "Spark." Their propaganda was mimeographed or printed and scattered to all the rural inhabitants. It was also the medium by which I was able to get reports which were submitted to me as an intelligence officer. The way this

was done was very simple. My infiltrator would take a propaganda sheet which was being given to all the inhabitants. He would simply take a pencil, start reading, and the first word he came to that he wanted to use he would indicate by a small pencil dot under the first letter, just a small dot. And then he goes on down the line to the next word he needs, and puts a little dot under it. When the leaflet gets down to me, I take a magnifying glass, somebody starts writing down the words I call out, and I get my report.

Gentlemen, these are simple things that I want to bring up here. You may find situations where you need to do a lot of things and I hope some of these examples, plus your own ingenuity, will help you with them.

Another topic that I'd like to mention briefly, as being of much assistance in our campaign, was the reward system. The reward system is basically a money matter. In other words, for the head of a Huk, or for his capture or surrender, a reward would be given, ranging from 200 pesos to about a hundred thousand pesos. If any of you would want to earn \$50,000, that price is still offered in the Philippines for the capture of one top Communist leader, Jesus Lava. The fellow is still at large. This reward system brought up a lot of opportunities, and a lot of problems. Through it, we were able to get a number of Huk commanders and key personnel.

Next I would like to discuss psychological operations, especially in supporting intelligence operations. It is a very interesting subject and I suppose I will be criticized about some of the things I will discuss with you. You will remember that I said in the beginning of my briefing that the Huks used the psychology of fear to incite and enforce non-cooperation with the Armed Forces by the civilian masses. Naturally when we go into an area where Huks are active, the civilians, even if they are not ideologically indoctrinated, would not want to give us information because of fear, because the Huks have a practice of slicing the tongue of an informant, if they do no worse. These civilians and their families are living in very remote places; what else can they do but cooperate with the Huks. The Philippine Army cannot provide enough guards, not even one soldier for each of these families. In such areas we practiced several different techniques for gaining cooperation.

In the early days, we practiced what I might call counter-terrorism, if we may put a coined word to work. To cite one particular case, there was our operation at San Luis, the home of Taruc. All the people there, as far as I was concerned, were all Huks, were all sympathizers of the Huk organization. The

Mayor, the Chief of Police, all were Huks or sympathizers. As a matter of fact, when we went there, we asked for some water because we were so thirsty - and Colonel Valeriano got poisoned. They talked to us nicely, but when we turned our backs, what happened? Four of my men got killed there. They used a bayonet, opened up the intestines and then chopped them into pieces, and scattered the pieces for several kilometers along the roads. I know it was quite an ugly sight, but their idea was to inject some sort of terror into the civilian minds.

So, here is what we did to counteract the terror inspired by the Huk. We gathered together the civilians of the region, including the Mayor and the policemen, and took them to the bank of the river which runs by the village. On the other side, 100 to 200 yards away, were my troops in uniform. In the presence of the townspeople these troops, in full uniform, began to kill about a dozen "captured Huks." We just used our bayonets and killed them. But there was a procedure in killing them. While the civilians were gathered across the river, our troops brought out the "Huks" blindfolded, still with their equipment, and began to bayonet them one by one. While we were killing them, some were shouting out the name of the Mayor, the names of the policemen, and shouting out the names of their principal suppliers. Seeing the Huks killed before their eyes, hearing themselves named as the supporters of those we had just massacred, these civilians naturally expected to be next on the death lists.

Our psychological officers now started talking to the people. What they said was, in effect: "Now we know everything about everyone in this town, from the Mayor to the Chief of Police to all of you. Now we realize that if you came to us to give us information and everybody knows that you came to us, you might be beheaded the next day. We are going to give you ten places tonight where you can report and there we shall accept your confessions. If you confess, we will not treat you like we have these Huks." Almost all of the people reported to these spots, practically one after the other. We learned a lot of things, the Mayor was put in jail. We effectively broke the Huk support in this town.

But don't criticize me for these atrocities, gentlemen. They were not true. The people that the civilians thought we killed were our own soldiers. But, we really didn't harm them. It was a show. We used chicken blood, pigs blood and so on, to make it look real, because we cannot commit any atrocities like those committed by the Huks. We have our Constitution, our laws. But when that pretended atrocity was followed up by psychological operations, it really paid off.

Another way by which we have counteracted the psychological terror that was injected into the minds of the masses by the Huks, by instilling greater fear of us, was by the use of dead bodies. For examples, in one particular operation discussed by Colonel Valeriano, we killed a large number of Huks. We piled these dead Huks into a truck with the hands and feet dangling outside, a whole truck load of dead bodies, and we drove this truck clear around town, and through the area.

I have discussed some of the difficult phases of intelligence activities in counter-guerrilla operations during our anti-Communist campaign in the Philippines. Training, ingenuity, a stout heart, a practical knowledge of human psychology, that is of knowing people and how to treat them, are the vital ingredients necessary in accomplishing this hazardous mission. But, above all the transcendent element in our fighting for the free world, is our undying Philippine love for liberty and an ever increasing determination to survive Communist bondage and oppression.

In the Philippines, 13,000 miles from here, we are 27 million strong. As many and as big as the combined population in the area of New York, Rhode Island, Delaware, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut and New Jersey. We have contributed a humble share to our brother nations in the free world by crushing a rebellion of the Communist Party. We will continue to do our level best as the Vanguard of the free nations. Coming from all corners of the globe, let us all act in concert to fortify the framework of international solidarity. Against a wicked enemy, let us therefore break from the shackles of complacency and finally with freedom as our battle flag let us stand united as one race and one nation and bury those who seek to trample our priceless legacy of liberty and justice.

#### IV

### COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

by

Medardo T. Justiniano  
Major, AFP

In the Philippines we have mountains, swamps, and wilderness; we have trees so high and so thick that the sunshine never reaches the ground. In our jungles we have wild carabao, crocodiles, snakes thirty feet long, and Huks. These animals are killers, particularly the last ones.

Immediately after World War II, the leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines utilized the inherent confusion of the reconstruction period to strengthen and enhance the military position of their armed forces. While the legitimate guerrilla forces were surrendering their arms, the members of the military branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Huks did not do so. On the contrary, they sought to gather more, and secretly accumulated as many as possible. While the other guerrilla organizations were demobilizing, the Huks were busy recruiting more men for the hammer and sickle revolution.

In their recruiting, following accepted Communist strategy, the Huks exploited two courses of action for their expansion program. The first course of action was expansion by force, a course of action which was characterized by extremes of terrorism. Their actions were calculated to inject a psychology of terror into the minds of unpretentious citizens, government officials, and even the rank and file of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Murder, arson, robbery and torture meant nothing to them, and each method was employed as thought necessary in order to intimidate the people into forced submission.

Supplementing this military course of action was their second line of attack. This was expansion by indoctrination, a process which involved systematic brainwashing by trained Communist propagandists. I might mention at this point that, to enhance their capabilities in this regard, the top leaders of the Communist Party, those who later expected to overthrow

the government of the Philippines by 1951, early established a Stalin University, complete with the ideological trimmings of its Kremlin predecessor. In this institution, promising converts to the Huk cause were given advanced training in subversive techniques.

In their program of expansion by indoctrination, the Huks took advantage of each item of contention to represent the facts on either side in whatever way they felt would best suit their sinister purposes. They demonstrated an extraordinary ability in attributing all imperfections, all injustices, all misfortunes, to the democratic process. They are masters at the exploitation of this particular line, at the propagation of deceitful catchwords such as "land for the landless," "prosperity for the masses," and many others. These were carried far and wide and inculcated into the rural population.

This situation was challenging to an intelligence officer, and this situation was given to me for solution by Col Valeriano, my commanding officer. Here was a situation where the terrorized inhabitant would not even glance at soldiers for fear of reprisals by the Huk. Here was a predicament where the people were led to bind their hopes to the alluring doctrines of Communism, either because of their exposure to Huk degradation, or because of vicious propaganda expressed by the CPP stooges, exploiting trivial or even personal incidents to effect pernicious distrust of our governmental system. This situation, in which the rural and small town populations were militarily dominated by the Huk, and were ideologically captivated by Communist indoctrinators, was one which, as the intelligence officer of Colonel Valeriano, I found obviously required a major intelligence build-up. The expansion programs of the Communist Party made the success of intelligence operations seem rather problematical. Nevertheless, several methods were devised, applied and were found effective. Had they not been effective, our affairs this morning would have been necrological for the five of us, as well as two other people who are with you in the audience.

Gentlemen, I would like to discuss with you for a moment the physical background, the terrain in which we operated, for the different methods which we employed. Central Luzon, which I believe is shown on maps which have been furnished to you, might be considered roughly square. In the center is a single big mountain, called Mount Arayat. Running south from it is a large grassy swamp, called the Candaba swamp. On the east and west sides of the square are mountain ranges, some grassy, some covered with the densest kind of rain forest. The area between the mountain ranges is partly rice land, partly grass land, with numerous streams and patches of forest. Politically, the area is divided into many municipalities, and four provinces, whose common corner is on Mount Arayat. Notice on your maps how Mount

The second classification of prisoners are the surrenderees. In the Huk organization when one surrendered, it meant that this fellow must have been feeling himself to be in some sort of a situation where he faced liquidation. Of course, we have given allowances for the possibility of planted surrenderees. However, I do not recall having any such prisoner during our five years of fighting with the Huks; not one surrenderee that I know of was planted into our intelligence set up.

There are a number of situations where we have found surrenderees very useful. One of them is the technique that we call the "Magic Eye." You will agree with me that fighting a Filipino or fighting an American Communist, fighting Communists among your own countrymen, is extremely difficult for an intelligence officer to identify which man is an enemy and which one is not. That constant problem we often solved by the use of surrenderees, and in which we found the Magic Eye technique effective. This Magic Eye system allowed us to take advantage of psychological opportunities and at the same time protect the life of the families of the surrenderee.

Take for instance a situation wherein we rounded up all the civilians of a town. We would construct a special tent for the prisoner, with a peephole. He would be concealed while the civilians were made to pass before this "Magic Eye," hidden in a tent. Naturally all these people would start feeling a sense of fright because they might be identified. This type of operation helped us a lot tactically and psychologically.

The third type of prisoners were those who were serving sentences in jail. I'd like to mention here that in the expansion program of the Huks they recruited all types of people, especially those who had police records, those who were known killers, and so on. Naturally when we started to operate in an area whose people and inhabitants were hostile to us, we were initially at a loss for contacts. We tried to find out from our national jails which prisoners actually hailed from that particular area. Once such a prisoner was identified, I would interrogate this fellow and try to win him over and get him to start talking. I might give him a pack of cigarettes, I might take him out for a free airing in a night club. In short, I would try to make him feel so happy and so grateful that he would give me some free information.

The fourth category were what might be called "special" prisoners. These usually were friends or close relatives either of Huks, or of people who were cooperating with us, and were made prisoners for their own protection.

Arayat is most strategically located in the center of these four different provinces. The Huks realized the importance of Mount Arayat, and took every advantage of the complications possibly ensuing from provincial boundaries and command boundaries of our armed forces. From this central mountain (which they never made the mistake of trying to defend against a major force), the Huks maintained courier routes to all parts of the area.

Now, let me discuss the different methods we used in gathering information in this hostile area. Our collection effort was based on the direct approach method and the indirect approach method, which we combined with other methods, the use of prisoners, infiltration, etc. The direct method was a simple interrogation method wherein we invited the Huks families and known sympathizers. The wife and oftentimes wives of Huks commanders could, if they would, tell us something of value. In this approach we would interrogate them, ask them to cooperate, give them some lectures and so on. Well, of course, I'd like to tell you that if we got any information along this line, it was not very useful. We have found these people hostile no matter what method of interrogation we adopted.

The indirect method is a system wherein we use friends of the Huks. Class-mates of Huk children in school, cousins of a Huk commander, relatives of friends of associates of the Huk leaders were approached and induced to cooperate. By this system of making an indirect approach to the sources, we were able to get a lot of information.

Another very important source of our information are prisoners. I think we have been told about it in school and I know that most of you know how to use prisoners, but I would like to talk to you about how we use our prisoners. For the purpose of this discussion and for the purpose of our operation in the Philippines, we have divided prisoners into four categories.

The first category includes those prisoners who have been captured in combat. Everybody knows how to treat a prisoner captured in combat, and how to take advantage of the psychological opportunity afforded by the confusion that this man's mind is involved in. One very striking example of this was when we captured Celia Pomeroy. Celia Pomeroy is the wife of an American GI who was in the Communist Party in the Philippines. He's one of these men whose picture you have seen displayed. This Celia Pomeroy was a very intelligent Huk organizer, a graduate of our University of the Philippines. I had a chance to interrogate her ten minutes after she was captured, and I got as much information as I wanted from her during a short space of time, which compared favorably with the information secured during the one week interrogation which she was later subjected to.



In this connection, I would like to discuss with you, in continuation of Colonel Valeriano's discussion, the infiltration method, as illustrated by a particular project which we called the "Relatives Project." It is an example of the infiltration of individuals into the Huk ranks, a type of operation where maximum secrecy and security is necessary. It is a type of operation which demands a great deal from the individuals participating in it, the operative, his relatives, and his project officer alike.

"Relatives Project" dealt with the infiltration of the Huk organization in the Arayat area, in Central Luzon. In the effort to find a suitable person for infiltration, we found it necessary to contact the relatives of several Huk commanders. We did this, without identifying ourselves, until we finally were successful in locating a cooperative individual who was the cousin of a Huk commander.

We found also that this Huk Commander had joined the Huks not specifically for ideological reasons but for personal reasons. The infiltrator was trained for about two months under my personal supervision. While this was being done, necessary arrangements for cover and protection were made. This took the burning of his house, the imprisonment of his brother, and eventually the evacuation of his mother and father to protect and give cover to this infiltrator into the Hukbalahap organization. We had to find the Huks, and the government naturally had to pay for this. His mother did not know that her son was an infiltrator. The brother did not know that he was being placed in jail because we were trying to put up some sort of a ruse. But the news of these activities made them very effective. Slowly, based on his obvious grievances against the government, our agent was able to reach certain categories in the Hukbalahap and the Communist Party organization which has been explained to you by Colonel Lapus.

Our man was made a collector of the National Finance Committee. The National Finance Committee is the organization which supplied the Huks in the field with money, medicine, ammunition, weapons and other equipment. For two months, our supplies were flowing into the Huk lines, through the National Finance Committee and as a matter of fact I think Colonel Lapus will back me up here because we could not tell anybody how we spend our confidential funds, and I could not give any logical explanation at the time. For two months as I say, medicine was flowing into the Huks, ammunition was being given to the Huks, we were also giving weapons to the Huks, through this infiltrator. The purpose, of course, was to enable him to implant himself firmly into the organization and enable him to be promoted. He was eventually promoted, and

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Another way by which we have counteracted the psychological terror that was injected into the minds of the masses by the Huks, by instilling greater fear of us, was by the use of dead bodies. For examples, in one particular operation discussed by Colonel Valeriano, we killed a large number of Huks. We piled these dead Huks into a truck with the hands and feet dangling outside, a whole truck load of dead bodies, and we drove this truck clear around town, and through the area.

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In the Philippines, 13,000 miles from here, we are 27 million strong. As many and as big as the combined population in the area of New York, Rhode Island, Delaware, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut and New Jersey. We have contributed a humble share to our brother nations in the free world by crushing a rebellion of the Communist Party. We will continue to do our level best as the Vanguard of the free nations. Coming from all corners of the globe, let us all act in concert to fortify the framework of international solidarity. Against a wicked enemy, let us therefore break from the shackles of complacency and finally with freedom as our battle flag let us stand united as one race and one nation and bury those who seek to trample our priceless legacy of liberty and justice.

Mayor, the Chief of Police, all were Huks or sympathizers. As a matter of fact, when we went there, we asked for some water because we were so thirsty - and Colonel Valeriano got poisoned. They talked to us nicely, but when we turned our backs, what happened? Four of my men got killed there. They used a bayonet, opened up the intestines and then chopped them into pieces, and scattered the pieces for several kilometers along the roads. I know it was quite an ugly sight, but their idea was to inject some sort of terror into the civilian minds.

So, here is what we did to counteract the terror inspired by the Huk. We gathered together the civilians of the region, including the Mayor and the policemen, and took them to the bank of the river which runs by the village. On the other side, 100 to 200 yards away, were my troops in uniform. In the presence of the townspeople these troops, in full uniform, began to kill about a dozen "captured Huks." We just used our bayonets and killed them. But there was a procedure in killing them. While the civilians were gathered across the river, our troops brought out the "Huks" blindfolded, still with their equipment, and began to bayonet them one by one. While we were killing them, some were shouting out the name of the Mayor, the names of the policemen, and shouting out the names of their principal suppliers. Seeing the Huks killed before their eyes, hearing themselves named as the supporters of those we had just massacred, these civilians naturally expected to be next on the death lists.

Our psychological officers now started talking to the people. What they said was, in effect: "Now we know everything about everyone in this town, from the Mayor to the Chief of Police to all of you. Now we realize that if you came to us to give us information and everybody knows that you came to us, you might be beheaded the next day. We are going to give you ten places tonight where you can report and there we shall accept your confessions. If you confess, we will not treat you like we have these Huks." Almost all of the people reported to these spots, practically one after the other. We learned a lot of things, the Mayor was put in jail. We effectively broke the Huk support in this town.

But don't criticize me for these atrocities, gentlemen. They were not true. The people that the civilians thought we killed were our own soldiers. But, we really didn't harm them. It was a show. We used chicken blood, pigs blood and so on, to make it look real, because we cannot commit any atrocities like those committed by the Huks. We have our Constitution, our laws. But when that pretended atrocity was followed up by psychological operations, it really paid off.

#### IV

### COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

by

Medardo T. Justiniano  
Major, AFP

In the Philippines we have mountains, swamps, and wilderness; we have trees so high and so thick that the sunshine never reaches the ground. In our jungles we have wild carabao, crocodiles, snakes thirty feet long, and Huks. These animals are killers, particularly the last ones.

Immediately after World War II, the leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines utilized the inherent confusion of the reconstruction period to strengthen and enhance the military position of their armed forces. While the legitimate guerrilla forces were surrendering their arms, the members of the military branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Huks did not do so. On the contrary, they sought to gather more, and secretly accumulated as many as possible. While the other guerrilla organizations were demobilizing, the Huks were busy recruiting more men for the hammer and sickle revolution.

In their recruiting, following accepted Communist strategy, the Huks exploited two courses of action for their expansion program. The first course of action was expansion by force, a course of action which was characterized by extremes of terrorism. Their actions were calculated to inject a psychology of terror into the minds of unpretentious citizens, government officials, and even the rank and file of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Murder, arson, robbery and torture meant nothing to them, and each method was employed as thought necessary in order to intimidate the people into forced submission.

Supplementing this military course of action was their second line of attack. This was expansion by indoctrination, a process which involved systematic brainwashing by trained Communist propagandists. I might mention at this point that, to enhance their capabilities in this regard, the top leaders of the Communist Party, those who later expected to overthrow

the government of the Philippines by 1951, early established a Stalin University, complete with the ideological trimmings of its Kremlin predecessor. In this institution, promising converts to the Huk cause were given advanced training in subversive techniques.

In their program of expansion by indoctrination, the Huks took advantage of each item of contention to represent the facts on either side in whatever way they felt would best suit their sinister purposes. They demonstrated an extraordinary ability in attributing all imperfections, all injustices, all misfortunes, to the democratic process. They are masters at the exploitation of this particular line, at the propagation of deceitful catchwords such as "land for the landless," "prosperity for the masses," and many others. These were carried far and wide and inculcated into the rural population.

This situation was challenging to an intelligence officer, and this situation was given to me for solution by Col Valeriano, my commanding officer. Here was a situation where the terrorized inhabitant would not even glance at soldiers for fear of reprisals by the Huk. Here was a predicament where the people were led to bind their hopes to the alluring doctrines of Communism, either because of their exposure to Huk degradation, or because of vicious propaganda expressed by the CPP stooges, exploiting trivial or even personal incidents to effect pernicious distrust of our governmental system. This situation, in which the rural and small town populations were militarily dominated by the Huk, and were ideologically captivated by Communist indoctrinators, was one which, as the intelligence officer of Colonel Valeriano, I found obviously required a major intelligence build-up. The expansion programs of the Communist Party made the success of intelligence operations seem rather problematical. Nevertheless, several methods were devised, applied and were found effective. Had they not been effective, our affairs this morning would have been necrological for the five of us, as well as two other people who are with you in the audience.

Gentlemen, I would like to discuss with you for a moment the physical background, the terrain in which we operated, for the different methods which we employed. Central Luzon, which I believe is shown on maps which have been furnished to you, might be considered roughly square. In the center is a single big mountain, called Mount Arayat. Running south from it is a large grassy swamp, called the Candaba swamp. On the east and west sides of the square are mountain ranges, some grassy, some covered with the densest kind of rain forest. The area between the mountain ranges is partly rice land, partly grass land, with numerous streams and patches of forest. Politically, the area is divided into many municipalities, and four provinces, whose common corner is on Mount Arayat. Notice on your maps how Mount



Arayat is most strategically located in the center of these four different provinces. The Huks realized the importance of Mount Arayat, and took every advantage of the complications possibly ensuing from provincial boundaries and command boundaries of our armed forces. From this central mountain (which they never made the mistake of trying to defend against a major force), the Huks maintained courier routes to all parts of the area.

Now, let me discuss the different methods we used in gathering information in this hostile area. Our collection effort was based on the direct approach method and the indirect approach method, which we combined with other methods, the use of prisoners, infiltration, etc. The direct method was a simple interrogation method wherein we invited the Huks families and known sympathizers. The wife and oftentimes wives of Huks commanders could, if they would, tell us something of value. In this approach we would interrogate them, ask them to cooperate, give them some lectures and so on. Well, of course, I'd like to tell you that if we got any information along this line, it was not very useful. We have found these people hostile no matter what method of interrogation we adopted.

The indirect method is a system wherein we use friends of the Huks. Class-mates of Huk children in school, cousins of a Huk commander, relatives of friends of associates of the Huk leaders were approached and induced to cooperate. By this system of making an indirect approach to the sources, we were able to get a lot of information.

Another very important source of our information are prisoners. I think we have been told about it in school and I know that most of you know how to use prisoners, but I would like to talk to you about how we use our prisoners. For the purpose of this discussion and for the purpose of our operation in the Philippines, we have divided prisoners into four categories.

The first category includes those prisoners who have been captured in combat. Everybody knows how to treat a prisoner captured in combat, and how to take advantage of the psychological opportunity afforded by the confusion that this man's mind is involved in. One very striking example of this was when we captured Celia Pomeroy. Celia Pomeroy is the wife of an American GI who was in the Communist Party in the Philippines. He's one of these men whose picture you have seen displayed. This Celia Pomeroy was a very intelligent Huk organizer, a graduate of our University of the Philippines. I had a chance to interrogate her ten minutes after she was captured, and I got as much information as I wanted from her during a short space of time, which compared favorably with the information secured during the one week interrogation which she was later subjected to.

The second classification of prisoners are the surrenderees. In the Huk organization when one surrendered, it meant that this fellow must have been feeling himself to be in some sort of a situation where he faced liquidation. Of course, we have given allowances for the possibility of planted surrenderees. However, I do not recall having any such prisoner during our five years of fighting with the Huks; not one surenderee that I know of was planted into our intelligence set up.

There are a number of situations where we have found surrenderees very useful. One of them is the technique that we call the "Magic Eye." You will agree with me that fighting a Filipino or fighting an American Communist, fighting Communists among your own countrymen, is extremely difficult for an intelligence officer to identify which man is an enemy and which one is not. That constant problem we often solved by the use of surrenderees, and in which we found the Magic Eye technique effective. This Magic Eye system allowed us to take advantage of psychological opportunities and at the same time protect the life of the families of the surrenderee.

Take for instance a situation wherein we rounded up all the civilians of a town. We would construct a special tent for the prisoner, with a peephole. He would be concealed while the civilians were made to pass before this "Magic Eye," hidden in a tent. Naturally all these people would start feeling a sense of fright because they might be identified. This type of operation helped us a lot tactically and psychologically.

The third type of prisoners were those who were serving sentences in jail. I'd like to mention here that in the expansion program of the Huks they recruited all types of people, especially those who had police records, those who were known killers, and so on. Naturally when we started to operate in an area whose people and inhabitants were hostile to us, we were initially at a loss for contacts. We tried to find out from our national jails which prisoners actually hailed from that particular area. Once such a prisoner was identified, I would interrogate this fellow and try to win him over and get him to start talking. I might give him a pack of cigarettes, I might take him out for a free airing in a night club. In short, I would try to make him feel so happy and so grateful that he would give me some free information.

The fourth category were what might be called "special" prisoners. These usually were friends or close relatives either of Huks, or of people who were cooperating with us, and were made prisoners for their own protection.

In this connection, I would like to discuss with you, in continuation of Colonel Valeriano's discussion, the infiltration method, as illustrated by a particular project which we called the "Relatives Project." It is an example of the infiltration of individuals into the Huk ranks, a type of operation where maximum secrecy and security is necessary. It is a type of operation which demands a great deal from the individuals participating in it, the operative, his relatives, and his project officer alike.

"Relatives Project" dealt with the infiltration of the Huk organization in the Arayat area, in Central Luzon. In the effort to find a suitable person for infiltration, we found it necessary to contact the relatives of several Huk commanders. We did this, without identifying ourselves, until we finally were successful in locating a cooperative individual who was the cousin of a Huk commander.

We found also that this Huk Commander had joined the Huks not specifically for ideological reasons but for personal reasons. The infiltrator was trained for about two months under my personal supervision. While this was being done, necessary arrangements for cover and protection were made. This took the burning of his house, the imprisonment of his brother, and eventually the evacuation of his mother and father to protect and give cover to this infiltrator into the Hukbalahap organization. We had to find the Huks, and the government naturally had to pay for this. His mother did not know that her son was an infiltrator. The brother did not know that he was being placed in jail because we were trying to put up some sort of a ruse. But the news of these activities made them very effective. Slowly, based on his obvious grievances against the government, our agent was able to reach certain categories in the Hukbalahap and the Communist Party organization which has been explained to you by Colonel Lopus.

Our man was made a collector of the National Finance Committee. The National Finance Committee is the organization which supplied the Huks in the field with money, medicine, ammunition, weapons and other equipment. For two months, our supplies were flowing into the Huk lines, through the National Finance Committee and as a matter of fact I think Colonel Lopus will back me up here because we could not tell anybody how we spend our confidential funds, and I could not give any logical explanation at the time. For two months as I say, medicine was flowing into the Huks, ammunition was being given to the Huks, we were also giving weapons to the Huks, through this infiltrator. The purpose, of course, was to enable him to implant himself firmly into the organization and enable him to be promoted. He was eventually promoted, and

and the promotion and the amount of money we have used I think paid off, because he was able to reach Taruc himself.

Our man was made a bodyguard of Taruc, the leader of the Huk field forces, but this duty was done off and on for security purposes. Nevertheless this fellow was able to reach Taruc and we were able to get secret pictures our man took of the entire membership of the Huk organization in Candaba swamp. I think that General Lansdale, Colonel Lapus, Major Bohannon, Colonel Valeriano and General Hobbs were the only ones who knew about this.

The infiltration program went on, and the securing of reports was the most difficult thing that I had to encounter. How could the reports reach me, and how would I get instructions to the man, that was my problem. I discussed it with my commanding officer, with two officers from JUSMAAG, with Major Bohannon, and I got very important points which helped me. I'd like to tell you of some of the very interesting methods we devised which might help you also.

In order to let our man know that he must pick up our instructions to him, we devised a technique of using kites of an ordinary type. At certain pre-arranged points in the area where he operated, we would fly kites simultaneously in three different places. This was done at certain hours of the day exactly on the hour. The kites were not flown continuously, or at random times, to keep him from having to watch for them always, which military operations could have made very difficult. Further, if he were always to be seen scanning the horizon, suspicion would certainly be aroused. So that we did things on the hour. We would fly the kite at 7:00 in the morning, 8:00 in the morning, 9:00 in the morning, 10:00 in the morning, until we were sure that this signal had been received. The moment when he would see this kite, he would know a pre-arranged contact within the swamp was to be effected.

The troops of course couldn't be told anything about this operation. As a matter of fact, I lost two men when the area commander in this area attacked my men and I nearly lost my life too, but I couldn't tell him. Very often there would be no one to meet him, but he would find his messages concealed, perhaps in a messkit, or in an American first aid kit, carelessly abandoned. We would put the instructions into this kit and leave it at certain places along the designated place.

Using this system, how could we make an emergency contact at night? What do we do to make our message reach him when night infiltration is usually being conducted in this area? This is another problem that we faced because, of course, he could not see the kite at night. We devised two things.

We would fly the same kite, with a battery operated light. Then he gets his message. That's one. The other one is by the use of flares. In other words, if we believe that he may not be able to see this small light from the kite, we supplement this with flares, fired on the hour at the same designated spots.

The moment that our man would see this signal, he would know it means that he's got to be very careful because the troops are going in fast. We tell him now to find a way to save himself. It was my biggest concern, to be sure that this fellow was safe because it is so difficult to find one who could fit into the suit, train him, break all the rules necessary, burn houses, imprison somebody, and send supplies to the Huk organization.

But as I say it was very effective. As a matter of fact, I remember that before I presented the first picture taken by our infiltrator to Secretary Magsaysay, there was much skepticism about this project of mine. In fact, I suppose the late Magsaysay gave me the chance because of the confidence he had in me. He was worried about the success of this operation, but when I gave him the pictures taken by this infiltrator, he was in a conference with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Right then and there he left the General Staff conference and immediately went to General Hobbs, the Chief of JUSMAG (Joint US Military Advisory Group) and spread out all the pictures on the table of General Hobbs.

Let me tell you another thing which was done by this infiltrator. If you recall my mentioning the National Finance Committee, as I said we supplied the Huks through it, a matter which went on for two months. In the third month, Colonel Valeriano and Secretary Magsaysay decided it was time for us to hit. It was very easy for me to get out the files of what this fellow had submitted and, based on them, we were able right then and there to apprehend 1,175 members of the National Finance Committee. That destroyed the supply line of the Huk.

I have discussed with you the means by which I contacted one of our infiltrators. Now I would like to take up with you, his means for the transmission of reports to me. As Colonel Lapus has told you, the Huk organization disseminated propaganda material. One regularly issued was a magazine called Titis, or "Spark." Their propaganda was mimeographed or printed and scattered to all the rural inhabitants. It was also the medium by which I was able to get reports which were submitted to me as an intelligence officer. The way this

was done was very simple. My infiltrator would take a propaganda sheet which was being given to all the inhabitants. He would simply take a pencil, start reading, and the first word he came to that he wanted to use he would indicate by a small pencil dot under the first letter, just a small dot. And then he goes on down the line to the next word he needs, and puts a little dot under it. When the leaflet gets down to me, I take a magnifying glass, somebody starts writing down the words I call out, and I get my report.

Gentlemen, these are simple things that I want to bring up here. You may find situations where you need to do a lot of things and I hope some of these examples, plus your own ingenuity, will help you with them.

Another topic that I'd like to mention briefly, as being of much assistance in our campaign, was the reward system. The reward system is basically a money matter. In other words, for the head of a Huk, or for his capture or surrender, a reward would be given, ranging from 200 pesos to about a hundred thousand pesos. If any of you would want to earn \$50,000, that price is still offered in the Philippines for the capture of one top Communist leader, Jesus Lava. The fellow is still at large. This reward system brought up a lot of opportunities, and a lot of problems. Through it, we were able to get a number of Huk commanders and key personnel.

Next I would like to discuss psychological operations, especially in supporting intelligence operations. It is a very interesting subject and I suppose I will be criticized about some of the things I will discuss with you. You will remember that I said in the beginning of my briefing that the Huks used the psychology of fear to incite and enforce non-cooperation with the Armed Forces by the civilian masses. Naturally when we go into an area where Huks are active, the civilians, even if they are not ideologically indoctrinated, would not want to give us information because of fear, because the Huks have a practice of slicing the tongue of an informant, if they do no worse. These civilians and their families are living in very remote places; what else can they do but cooperate with the Huks. The Philippine Army cannot provide enough guards, not even one soldier for each of these families. In such areas we practiced several different techniques for gaining cooperation.

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Mayor, the Chief of Police, all were Huks or sympathizers. As a matter of fact, when we went there, we asked for some water because we were so thirsty - and Colonel Valeriano got poisoned. They talked to us nicely, but when we turned our backs, what happened? Four of my men got killed there. They used a bayonet, opened up the intestines and then chopped them into pieces, and scattered the pieces for several kilometers along the roads. I know it was quite an ugly sight, but their idea was to inject some sort of terror into the civilian minds.

So, here is what we did to counteract the terror inspired by the Huk. We gathered together the civilians of the region, including the Mayor and the policemen, and took them to the bank of the river which runs by the village. On the other side, 100 to 200 yards away, were my troops in uniform. In the presence of the townspeople these troops, in full uniform, began to kill about a dozen "captured Huks." We just used our bayonets and killed them. But there was a procedure in killing them. While the civilians were gathered across the river, our troops brought out the "Huks" blindfolded, still with their equipment, and began to bayonet them one by one. While we were killing them, some were shouting out the name of the Mayor, the names of the policemen, and shouting out the names of their principal suppliers. Seeing the Huks killed before their eyes, hearing themselves named as the supporters of those we had just massacred, these civilians naturally expected to be next on the death lists.

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V

UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

By

C. T. R. Bohannon  
Major, USAR

Unconventional operations as we saw them in the Philippines can be divided roughly into three categories: Unconventional operations designed to kill, harass, or incapacitate the armed enemy; unconventional operations designed to gain intelligence; and finally, unconventional operations designed to influence the thinking of people. These last perhaps may be understood as those meant by the term psychological operations.

First, and most interesting to some people, are those unconventional operations designed actually to damage the enemy. There were a number of such operations in the Philippines. The Armed Forces of the Philippines set up, about 1949, a Research and Development Unit, a little department of dirty tricks. They had a nice old colonel in charge, the nicest man that I have ever known and with one of the nastiest minds.

One of his brightest ideas was a double-barreled, fully automatic carbine. I won't tell you what its cyclic rate of fire was, because I never believed it myself, but it was somewhere up around 1500 rounds a minute. Naturally, you're not going to hit a hell of a lot, spitting out ammunition at that rate. On the other hand, if you are out on a one-, or two-, or three-man patrol, way back in the bushes, and you get jumped by a larger force, think of its effect. You turn something that throws as much lead as that and rattles as fast as that loose at them, they think they've run into a couple of machine guns and are apt to leave that place without further bothering you. So there's a killing weapon, and yet it is one designed to influence the actions of people, more than it is to inflict actual casualties.

Due to policy and other complications, the Armed Forces of the Philippines were unable to secure napalm to use in the quantities they desired and the way they desired to use it. So the old

colonel fooled around with coconut husks and gasoline, and this and that and the other, and came up with a very satisfactory substitute. This was much better than what was first used. I think the first home-made substitute for napalm used in this campaign was in an operation in Candaba Swamp in 1950. The Secretary of National Defense and a few other characters flew over an area which it was desired to burn, kicking out 5-gallon cans of kerosene and throwing white phosphorous hand grenades at them. It didn't really burn too much of an area, but it accomplished the job at that time.

Another aspect which the Research and Development unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines went into quite a bit was what we might call bobby-traps. These were devices designed to be planted out in the fields for the enemy to run into or devices to be inserted into the enemy's supply lines. The idea is that if you stick stuff into the enemy's supply lines, that's the surest way of getting it into the hands of the ultimate consumer. A number of interesting problems developed there. One of them was that on such things as flash lights, radios, and so on, a courier who was taking them out would be bound to experiment with them. So, if it was really a "reporting" form of supplies, you had to fix it so that the first and last report wouldn't be rendered before it got to the intended consumer.

Way back about 1903 or 1904, when the Philippine Constabulary was fighting the Moros down in the southern part of the islands, some bright guy dreamt up the idea of losing some rifle cartridges, big old 45-70 ones. They had had their loads tampered with and that, they found, had quite an effect. There are indications that something like that may have been used in the Huk campaign. Again, this was a weapon which would produce or might produce an injury to the man who used it, or two or three men. But its principal effect was psychological. If one man's rifle blows up on him, everybody else who knows about it is going to be wondering, "Is my rifle going to blow up on me the next time I fire it?" I have heard stories about outfits which shed quite a bit of ammunition and so on because of things like that. I have shown you a part of a carbine which apparently had something like that happen to it. I understand that the Huk unit from which that was recovered was notably gun-shy for sometime after that incident occurred. They tell me the man who fired it recovered.

I might say that the use of improvised gadgets and gimmicks either to influence thinking or to produce casualties is as old as the

art of warfare in the Philippines. Frankly, I've never head of anybody more ingenious than some of my Philippine friends in dreaming up things which would have a significant effect. Again, the major effect was usually on the thinking of people.

One of the classic items is the "anting-anting" or amulet, widely used since very early times as protection against the enemy. Most commonly, an anting-anting charm is supposed to turn bullets. Well, obviously it doesn't. But the man who has it on, if he believes in it, is a great deal more daring combat soldier than one who doesn't have it. If the charm happens to seem to work for him, for a while he gets a reputation which makes him seem like a very valuable leader.

Some work was done in exploiting that and other similar "magic" during the anti-Huk campaign, but actually not too much was done in the way of direct psychological attack, expressly aimed directly at the armed enemy. Most of the psywar that was aimed directly at the enemy was in the form of leaflets, surrender passes, loud-speaker broadcasts, and airplanes. Each of these did have some effect.

You heard a good deal this morning from Major Justiniano about some of the ruses and devices that were used for the collection of intelligence. One particular feature of his actions that he did not mention was his system for the pick-up messages. I think it should be brought out. Along the principal highways in the Philippines there are kilometer posts. Every kilometer there is a post telling how far it is to the next town and how far it is to Manila, the capital. His people used the practice of smearing a blob of mud or anything on a kilometer post as an indication to reporting agents, couriers or pick-ups, that there was a message at a pre-arranged direction and distance from that kilometer post. I think that that sort of thing could be applicable in many places.

I want to spend most of the time left to talk about operations intended to influence the thinking of people. You will recall that in the discussion this morning it was pointed out that the Huk movement was started by the Communists deliberately impersonating what we might call a legitimate resistance movement against the enemy occupier of the country. As they began to show their hand in actions against those who disagreed with them, those who challenged their control over the area, they began to publicize their slogans of "land for the landless," "agrarian reform," and "aid to the poor down-trodden peasantry." They peddled that idea very successfully both during and after the Japanese occupation.

In 1945 I came back to the States with a military police officer who claimed to have examined the dossiers on 10,000 members of the Huk movement without finding any evidence that a single one of them was a Communist. Six months before that, I had had a bunch of guerrillas join me carrying freshly wounded men. They also had Huk ID cards taken from Huks who had jumped them from the rear while they were attacking a Japanese patrol. Those ID cards bore the hammer and sickle which to my simple way of thinking was some evidence of some Communist interest.

The Huks, their sponsors and then sympathizers, kept pressing and pressing this idea of agrarian reform, and there was a need for agrarian reform in the area in which they were operating. The extraordinarily unfortunate part of it was that they got so many people to thinking that agrarian reform was really their objective.

I have here a column written by perhaps the most vitriolic, free-spoken columnist in a country which I believe has and had the freest press in the world. He is the man who, when his President called him in and spoke to him about the language he used in his column, came out the next day and wrote that he had been called to Malacanang Palace and told that he could no longer call a spade a spade. Therefore, gentlemen, he continued, I will no longer call a spade a spade. Hereafter when I have an occasion to refer to a spade, I shall simply call it a goddamn stinking shovel.

This joker in May of 1948 wrote: "Long before the kidnapping and brutal murder of Juan Feleo on August 24 of 1946 precipitated the armed explosion in the central provinces, I have repeatedly tried to correct the systematic campaign of information which branded the Hukbalahap as Communists." He knew better, but most of his readers didn't.

Right along with their campaign for agrarian reform, their pose of seeking land for the landless, the Communists carried on a systematic campaign of vilification against the Government. All government officials are corrupt. They're puppets. They're running dogs of the American imperialists. That last one they would try every so often, and then they'd take it off the record for a while, because somehow customer acceptance wasn't so very good.

Corruption, corruption, they cried. Sure, there was corruption. You heard this morning about some of the corruption, some of the malfeasance of government officials, some of the inefficiency of the armed forces, of the election of 1949 in which there were exploitable frauds. Those things are true, but they weren't nearly as bad, nearly as common, as they were made to seem. Isolated instances were taken out of context. Isolated cases were fabricated. Systematically, day after day, I regret to say that most of the Manila press faithfully echoed the line, "Everybody in government is corrupt, the army is no damn good, the MPCs are a bunch of bloody murderers. Before you disarm these poor Huks who are striving to protect the rights of the landless peasants, first you must disarm and jail these brutal MPCs whose hands are dyed in the blood of their innocent fellow countrymen and so on, etc."

Nobody really believed everything they read, but there was enough suspicion left so that people lost confidence in government. The Huks had a mass base of perhaps a million. That's a reasonable estimate. I'm afraid, by the middle of 1950, the government didn't have a very much bigger mass base. Of those people who were concerned with and interested in such things as the actions of government, there were probably three times as many who said to hell with the government and to hell with the Huks both as were in favor of either one.

It was in changing this situation that Mr. Magsaysay scored his greatest successes in combating the Huk. He shook up the army. I don't mean wholesale relief of officers, trials, court martials, or anything like that; he just simply shook them. And I mean they were shook. I sat in his office one afternoon. First, he called in Colonel Lapus, the G-2. If I recall correctly (that was a long time ago), he said to Colonel Lapus: Go find out personally why such and such a unit hasn't gotten its rations. He called in the G-4 to make an investigation why a lieutenant way out in the boondocks hadn't been promoted after killing a Huk leader. G-1 was sent out on an intelligence mission. What he had G-3 doing, I don't recall, but it was probably rounding up gasoline. He was ruthless in putting his foot on misbehavior by armed forces personnel.

Mr. Magsaysay was even more strenuous in emphasizing that the armed forces must make the civilians in their area realize that the armed forces were their friends and not their enemy. For example, in this Huklandia area, where the Huk forces could move fairly freely

by day and very freely by night, you would see a truck loaded with soldiers pause in a town in broad daylight for a few minutes. Everybody would be in the truck pointing his rifle out as though the truck were going to be jumped any minute. Needless to say, the civilians around didn't particularly appreciate that treatment and they would have been quite willing to jump the army.

Three months after he started shaking things up, when a truck load of soldiers pulled into a town, you could see the kids come running, because probably those soldiers had a few pieces of candy, or at least they'd tell them some jokes. People would come and hear the news from the soldiers. There were many different operations designed to demonstrate to the people that the soldiers were their friends, that the government was their government and what the hell were the Huks fighting for anyhow. The Huks claimed it was for land, that they wanted land, that they couldn't own land in Central Luzon.

Mr. Magsaysay dusted off a proposal that had been gathering dust in his office for a couple of years for an outfit known as EDCOR. Now that was originally conceived as a modification of the old Roman "colono" system, where troops would be stationed in virgin territory, would set up a village, start farming and supporting themselves, and then be discharged to live on there.

Mr. Magsaysay took that proposal, which had been approved by the Philippine Congress, and turned it into a "land for the landless" program specifically for the benefit of surrendered Huk. He placed relatively little emphasis on advertising this program directly to the Huks. Instead, he saw to it that the program was broadly publicized among the civilians throughout the Huk-infested areas. The idea, of course, was to get these civilians, the willing or unwilling mass base, to thinking and saying: "Now why should we be giving contributions to these guys, these Huks, who are coming to us? Sometimes they are nice to us, sometimes they are cruel. Why should we be supporting them and suffering for or from them? They say that they are fighting for land. If that is true, all they have to do is surrender, and Magsay will give them a homestead down in Mindanao. He will take the man, and his family too, put them down there on a piece of land, support them until their first crop is harvested, and even give him title to the land if he works it for five years. What are they really fighting for, these Huks?"

That had a terrific effect, that sequence of ideas. The Huks soon got word of it, often blunt word. Of course, they scoffed at the whole thing as a trick, but they soon found out that it wasn't, that some of their former comrades really were doing well on their new homesteads. In actual fact, as a resettlement program, EDCOR did not accomplish a great deal. I doubt if more than perhaps 300 families of Huks were resettled under that program. But I will guarantee you that at least 3,000 Huks surrendered, or simply melted peacefully back into a peaceful country life as persons who didn't want any parts of this rebellion any more. One reason was that they were made to doubt the propaganda of their own leaders; a more significant reason perhaps was the effect the thinking outlined above had on their supply, support, and even intelligence channels.

As a former guerrilla himself, Mr. Magsaysay realized full well the vital importance of popular support to any guerrilla organization. Knowing that many of the common complaints of the peasants often had all too real justification and that these were magnified many times over by the Huk propaganda, he set out to eliminate the grounds for complaint, or at least to prove to the farmers that he was sincerely trying to do so.

One of the favorite complaints of the farmers in Huklandia, as in almost every similar region in the world, was that they always lost the case if they went to law. Tenants felt they had no legal defense against their landlords, because they couldn't afford to hire lawyers. Mr. Magsaysay gave to the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines the role of public defenders. If some poor devil who couldn't afford a lawyer had a serious case, either criminal or civilian, particularly a civil suit over land tenure, all he had to do was to send word to Mr. Magsaysay's office and there would be an Army lawyer to represent him in court proceedings. The peasant knew that he would have forceful representation and that the judge would be at least as much in awe of a lawyer from Magsaysay's Army as he would be of the landlord's lawyer.

Army lawyers also assisted in the prosecution of individual Huks before the criminal courts. In this connection, I wish to mention another facet of the anti-Huk operations that has not been brought up as yet. The Huk movement was never officially recognized as constituting rebellion in the sense of conferring upon the Huks, the members of the armed forces of the Communist Party, the rights of belligerents. In practice, they could only be prosecuted

for whatever common crimes they may have committed in the course of their activities, or they could be turned loose, or they could be disposed of permanently. Prior to Mr. Magsaysay's tour as Sec/Def., very little was done in the way either of punishing or of holding on to Huks who were captured or surrendered.

Under the Philippine Constitution there is a right of habeas corpus, the same as in the U.S. Constitution. From 1946 to 1950, that right was vigorously exercised. Let us say you catch a Huk. You are supposed to turn him over immediately to civil authorities. Unless you immediately could arraign him for a common crime with a plausible showing of probable guilt, he'd be out on a writ of habeas corpus and possibly out in the hills the next day. Don't forget that the prosecuting attorney and the judge lived right in the Huk infested area and were quite as susceptible to being terrorized as anyone else.

Mr. Magsaysay secured Presidential approval of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the cases of those who could be accused of rebellion and common crimes incident to rebellion. It was a very risky move on his part. Here he was basing most of his hope of success on proving that the government and the Armed Forces were the true friends of the people; yet here he was suppressing one of their prime rights. A horrible cry went up immediately that he was turning the country into a police state. But it didn't work out that way. His office exercised extremely close control over the use of this privilege of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and there were very few serious complaints. When people promptly saw that the denial of the privilege of habeas corpus was being used justly and fairly, that it was not being used as an implement for persecution, then they accepted it.

Actions of the army to help the civilians were almost innumerable. They ranged from patrols regularly carrying medicine so that they could attend the needs of sick or injured civilians whom they might encounter in remote places to the building of roads, the rebuilding of villages, later on the building of schoolhouses. Mr. Magsaysay made it clearly understood by everyone in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the troops quickly made it clear to those with whom they came in contact, that the purpose of the army was to help the people in every way they could. First in priority to accomplish this was, of course, to suppress armed rebellion. But if there was anything soldiers could do to help the people without seriously jeopardizing the actual prosecution of an armed action against an armed enemy, they were to do it. To a remarkable extent, they did.



This all came to a climax, as General Lansdale said, with the use of the Armed Forces in the 1951 elections to guard the polls. There had been fraud in the 1949 elections. This fraud was magnified out of all recognition by the press, by gossip, by Communist propagandists, witting and unwitting, by Communist propaganda, direct and indirect, back, white, and grey, so that "everyone knew" that the 1951 elections would be a complete farce.

The President, as was customary, announced that the elections would be absolutely free and clean, that everyone eligible to vote might vote freely for the candidate of his choice. Mr. Magsaysay, as Secretary of Defense, said "Wen Apo," "Yes, Sir," and that he would personally see to it that the elections were conducted precisely as the President had publicly said that they would be. Magsaysay announced his intention of having the polling places guarded by college students in the ROTC called to active duty and by regular soldiers. He assured one and all that they might vote freely and might rely upon their vote being honestly counted. Further, he set up procedures by which anyone could telegraph to him for an investigation if he thought a polling place was improperly conducted. Mr. Magsaysay made it clear to all in the Philippines that he meant what he said in an aggressive publicity campaign well before election day.

This move on his part caught the Communists and their supporters with their trousers down around their ankles. For nearly two years, they had been pointing to elections as the irrefutable proof of the corruption of the government. The only answer which they could come up with was a campaign urging people to boycott the election. They put out all kinds of dire predictions as to what the soldier thugs would do to anyone incautious enough to vote. "Magsaysay's armed goons will surely club you or kill you, or destroy your ballots." In some areas they added pointed hints as to what the Huks would do to those incautious enough to vote. When election day came, the people had enough confidence in Magsaysay and his troops to turn out and vote, to vote in unprecedented, overwhelming numbers.

After the results were counted, everybody but the Communists were satisfied with the results. Even those who lost had to admit that they lost honestly, that they weren't counted out by someone on the opposition payroll. Most important, the elections of 1951 were the ponderous last straw which broke the camel's back, so far as armed Communist resistance in the Philippines was concerned

For over a year, the Armed Forces had been seeking to demonstrate by deeds and words that the legal government of the Philippines was a government for the people, a government whose primary purpose was service to the governed. That they included in this service relentless action against unrepentant enemies of the peoples' government underscored their claim. From that time on, the campaign was, in effect, a mopping-up operation, one which is still going on. The loss of popular support and the abyss into which sank the morale of those Huks who sincerely believed that they were fighting for the welfare of the people were dramatically illustrated in 1954.

You have heard each of us speak here today about Luis Taruc, one-time leader of the Huk field forces. Taruc was a man of great personal charm, of sincere devotion to Communism, and of sincere devotion to the welfare of the people, as he saw it. In 1954, Taruc became convinced that he could do more to help his people by coming in and surrendering to the government than by continuing to fight it. Has there been any other instance of the top Communist guerrilla leader of a country surrendering unconditionally to the government he had fought for almost fifteen years? Perhaps this was the most unconventional operation of all.

I am going to wind this up in a minute. First, however, I want to say a couple more things about the personnel who are responsible for unconventional operations, the type of individual who is likely to be successful in such operations. All sorts of qualifications have been suggested at various times as being essential to the unconventional operator. I would like to tell you about two of the most successful whom I have known.

One of these men drove a truck at the time of Bataan, of the fall of the Philippines to the Japanese, but he wound up at the time of the liberation of the Philippines leading a couple thousand guerrillas. He had himself a fine time during the enemy occupation of his country, running after the Japanese or running from the Japanese. He learned a great deal about the essentials of guerrilla warfare, about basic survival for guerrillas, which means securing popular support, among other things. But he had absolutely no use for military textbooks and military doctrine. As far as he was concerned, such things were all right for instruction at Leavenworth, but from what he had seen of it, the practical value was nil. Because he saw the big picture, because he saw the need of changing the thinking of the

people, the urgent necessity for building a sound political base, Mr. Magsaysay was an outstanding success in dealing with the over-all problem. What he thought of such subjects as the allocation of staff responsibility, I told you earlier.

The other man I am thinking of was a combat unit leader. In the field of unconventional tactical operations against the armed enemy and his mass base, this man was most successful. That man was so "GI," so thoroughly indoctrinated with conventional military thinking that, as we used to say in the Army, he wasn't born, he was issued by the company supply room. He was so "Leavenworth-minded" that after taking the short course there he went back for the long one. But, gentlemen, he did not limit his thinking to the doctrine expressed in texts. Rather, he used the "book" as a basis on which to build with the use of a thoroughly well-fertilized imagination. He could think of more stunts to harass the enemy, and make them work better, than anyone I ever knew.

I want to tell you about one of his simple little stunts. Justi, Major Justiniano, told you this morning about a more complicated one where they simulated liquidation of a bunch of simulated Huks with the objective of putting the fear of God, and the command, into the hearts of people so that they would stop collaborating with the enemy.

This guy I am telling you about developed a much simpler and more effective stunt. He knew full well that the Mayor of a certain village was actively assisting the Huk, one of their most trusted and valued men in that area. But he couldn't touch him. He did not have ironclad evidence which he could produce in court; worse, the Mayor had excellent political influence running all the way up to the Presidential Palace. (This was before the time of Magsaysay.) A good deal of thought was given to a means, short of kidnapping or assassination, by which this Mayor could be taken out of play. One day there was a little stroke of luck; the troops knocked off an important courier, carrying important documents, just outside that village.

The next morning Val drove into the village, siren blowing, armed escort and all, and called on the Mayor. He brought him out into the town square, with all the citizens fearfully crowding around, shook the Mayor by the hand and publicly congratulated and thanked him for his fine patriotic service in furnishing the

information which led to the killing of the courier. Val really laid it on thick, wouldn't listen to any protestations, made a big thing of the fine betrayal, and then climbed in his jeep and drove off.

About three o'clock the next morning that Mayor, with his family and his household goods, drove up to Colonel Valeriano's command post, seeking refuge. He was willing to tell everything he knew, do anything, confess and go to prison, anything as long as he wouldn't be left out where those wild Huks might bite him.

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#### DISCUSSION

Query: Were any special forces, other than regular troops, used in the anti-Huk campaigns.

Answer: (Maj. Bohannon). Yes. Many forces other than regular troops were used, ranging from wild mountain pygmies, Negritos, to home guard and church congregation units. However, I assume that you are thinking primarily of units in the regular establishment.

There was such a force, called the Scout-Rangers. I did not touch on it earlier, because I assumed that you people had already studied this force. It was a small organization, never larger than two companies, with the mission of executing small long-range patrols, operating for periods up to two or three weeks, in very small groups, deep in enemy or unexplored territory. Its personnel executed many very successful missions, harassing the enemy where he least expected it, securing intelligence, and guiding other forces. A Scout-Ranger team, of an officer and four men, was assigned to each BCT in active combat areas. In some BCT's, they set fine examples which got the whole BCT into the spirit of active patrolling. I certainly recommend that you study the Scout-Ranger organization, techniques, and tactics.

Query: (Gen.Lansdale). Col.Valeriano, I would like you to describe an intelligence technique which I learned from watching your operations. I might remark that I passed this idea along to the French in Indo-China in 1953, when they were having difficulty in getting information on enemy movements from their agent networks. Since then, I have learned that this method has been adopted in other countries. It's a good "export" idea for the class here. So, please tell them about your use of light aircraft for intelligence collection.

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). This was evolved from the practical experience of my subordinate commanders. It is the use of light aircraft of the L-5 or any other model to conduct daily flights planned by the operations section, by the S-3. By the flight plan, the pilot will observe certain specific points, houses or inhabited areas occupied or used by our informants on the ground.

At these places, the pilots watch for pre-arranged signals which give the intelligence we are seeking. These signals are such things as an open gate, an animal tied in the southeast corner of a yard, two windows of a house open. Those three signals would indicate three essential elements of information. The two open windows indicate that there is an enemy concentration approximately 200 strong in the area. The position of the animal tied in the yard in relation to the house indicates the direction of the enemy concentration. The open gate indicates that the enemy are planning to stay in this area.

If one has similar information from two or three points, the information is not only confirmed but the position of the enemy concentration can be pinpointed with considerable accuracy.

This system is susceptible to great variation and possesses infinite flexibility. Certain obvious precautions are necessary. The flight path of the airplane must be such as not to identify the informant. Usually this is best achieved by laying out a flight path which covers the entire area, and having the pilot fly the

same route every time. Signals must be the unobtrusive and natural-appearing use of normal items in the area and must conform to the customs of the area. Your informant can't have his windows open when all the windows in the other houses around are closed. He can't spread out his laundry to dry on a Wednesday if everybody in that area does their laundry only on Monday.

The advantages of this system are manifold. On one occasion I had to pull one battalion out of its area of responsibility and move it far away to assist in a task force operation, leaving only one company to control the area. Had it not been for the help of our two light planes and our ground spotters, it would have been impossible for this remaining company to prevent Huk attacks in the area.

Query: (Maj. Bohannon). Col. Valeriano, in your discussion of large unit infiltration you emphasized that this activity should only be employed if there was an appropriate opportunity; i. e., when undeveloped or long disrupted communications among enemy units would allow a fair chance for the infiltrators cover story to stand up.

I know that you trained a unit for a possible large unit infiltration, a "Force X," which you did not use that way, yet found very valuable. Since we believe that it is highly desirable to have such a group trained, to seize upon opportunities which may arise, I believe it would be helpful if you would discuss Charley Company.

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). I would be glad to, because I believe that the "Force X" training we gave Charley Company (of the 7th BCT) was as fully rewarding in results from the way we used those people as if they have been used on large unit infiltration. In fact, I think the history of that operation will demonstrate the value of intensive training in enemy modus operandi in almost any counter-guerrilla operations.

First, I would like to tell you the circumstances leading up to the training of Charley Company. On 20 July 1950, the writer took over the command of the 7th BCT AFP, with

headquarters at Pinaod, Bulacan. The organization was recently activated and was found to be partially organized, half-trained, and deficiently armed and equipped. It was also found that the battalion was dangerously exposed by dispersion into small garrisons which were attacked many times by superior Huk forces.

Bulacan province boasted of the best organized and best armed Huk regional command (Regional Command 3) under the leadership of Jesus Lava, a veteran Communist guerrilla leader. This Huk commander had held the initiative even before the 7th BCT was deployed in the province (20 June 1950).

The first action taken was the concentration of troop units for reorganization and training. A motorized rifle company (C Company) was organized as a mobile force to cover the province while other battalion units underwent four weeks of intensive training. This arrangement was found just enough to contain the Huks but did not deliver any hard blow.

We were fortunate in acquiring the services of veteran officers, who served with the Nenita and the Pampanga PC Command. Capt. Marana (Force X) was detailed as S-3, with Capt. Justiniano (formerly S-3 of the Nenita) assigned as BCT S-2. Between these two officers, a plan was submitted which substantially called for a repeat of Operation "PANDEMONIUM," which was staged so successfully in 1948, and which I described in my talk this morning. In spite of the fact that the Huks were well aware that Force X type units might be employed, especially under the auspices of the undersigned, the sponsoring officers earnestly believed that a Force X organization might come in "handy" in the immediate future.

Capt. Marana was assigned Project Officer for the organization, training, and equipping of the force. Charley Company, 7th BCT was the unanimous choice, it being the only unit that had not undergone the regular re-training program I had instituted. Also, it was noted that the company had young aggressive and experienced officers, who were

guerrilla leaders during World War II during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Charley Company was carefully screened, secretly, and the physically deficient were reassigned. Replacements came from volunteers coming from other battalion units. Training commenced immediately, after construction of shelters were completed at a secret training base located about seven miles southeast of BCT headquarters, deep in the Sierra Madre. It was already foreseen by S-2, that unlike Force X of the Pampanga Command, Charley Company would eventually be employed in the Sierra Madre mountain ranges.

The training course lasted about eight weeks, because the personnel involved were mostly AFP recruits who did not have as much combat experience as had the members of Force X in 1949. Essentially, the following training subjects were covered:

1. Weapons (Including jungle knife; bow and arrow; brass knuckles).
2. Marksmanship (Specialization on sniping and hip-firing).
3. Pathfinding & Tracking (Study of animal and human tracks; elimination of tracks and spoor, etc.).
4. Map Reading & Sketching (Terrain appreciation and exercises).
5. Elementary Astronomy (Ready identification of constellations, directions during darkness; dead reckoning, etc.).
6. Jungle & Field Craft (Study of local vegetation and materials for human comfort, food resources, medical values, etc.).
7. Escape & Evasion (Methods applicable in the locality).
8. Caches & Field Storage (Methods to cache rations, weapons, radio sets and military equipment).



9. Pyrotechnics (Types and kind of pyrotechnics, uses; deceptions, etc., field expedients, etc.).
10. Explosives & Demolitions ("Home-made" bombs).
11. Basic Training Subjects (First Aid, Personal Hygiene, Care of Weapons and Equipment, Camouflage, Scouting and Patrolling, etc.).
12. Physical Training (Including contact sports, unarmed combat, cross-country running, swimming, rope climbing, and gymnastics).

As in the training of Force X, Charley Company personnel were not allowed to use any regular issue military equipment, accoutrements and general issue articles while in the training base. The men were encouraged to supply themselves with locally procured gourds for drinking water, whittled sticks to serve as toothbrushes, etc. Forced to live like Huk guerrillas, the men received lectures of Huk propaganda during meal times or at any opportunity. Dress, speech, customs, known Huk habits and practices, were emphasized, with the men constantly under the critical eye of tested and trusted ex-Huks, who furnished around the clock coaching and instruction.

Daily training schedules followed the daily routine of the Nenita unit, whose activities commenced at sundown, generally terminating at noon. Field exercises were given during hours of darkness. Outdoor lectures were given during daylight hours. This method inured the men, developing "night vision," and teaching them to move with confidence and speed across rough terrain. Courage, confidence and stamina tests were always injected in these exercises, which often lasted for as long as 50 hours without rations being issued to the students.

As a whole, the unanimous evaluation was that Charley Company was better trained and prepared than Force X of 1948, for large unit infiltration missions which might be assigned. This was because of the experience factors already gained, the longer period of training, and better training supervision.

Charley Company, 7th BCT never had the opportunity of being employed in the same manner as Force X. The overall situation in

the entire campaign area since the termination of the training up to the end of the Huk campaign in 1954 did not in any instance offer the "proper setup" to make up a "plausible" cover story for a strange force trying to link up with Huk units who were already wary and still smarting from the lessons they learned from the PC in 1948. Further, there were several tragic-comedy incidents which occurred when other BCT commanders threw into the field their versions of Force X in their respective areas. They employed troops who were not trained nor prepared to perform the mission successfully. Several mistaken encounters took place between AFP units, most often between units of the same BCT.

However, after a month and a half, we found several promising situations wherein squads and sections of Charley Company were successfully employed. These missions were generally long range or deep reconnaissance missions in the Sierra Madre. The great amount of intelligence gained from these reconnaissance units were made the basis of 7th BCT operations (Talaguio, Biac Na Bata, Mount Tacbuhan) between 1950 to 1952, which resulted in the complete destruction of Huk Regional Command 3, the first major Huk command that was deactivated by Taruc.

Broken up into small teams ranging between four to twelve men, the units were assigned areas to cover. Though most of these units were not equipped with radios, they managed to submit daily situation reports on their areas which made it possible for headquarters 7th BCT to be well informed of enemy concentrations, movements and activities. These units were capable of operating in disguise or in uniform as their situation would demand at a given moment. There were many instances where a six-man team did not hesitate to attack a village sheltering no less than 20 to 30 Huks. By means of bluff and skillful use of flares at night, small units were able to contain or drive off large Huk concentrations. The training had also cultivated the resourcefulness and imagination of the students.

About mid-1951, due to high level policies of assisting local police forces and armed civilian bodies for local security purposes, in collaboration with the PC and BCTs, Charley Company was concentrated for an additional one week of instruction at BCT Headquarters. The instruction given during this period substantially resembled that given present-day Special Forces units.

Twenty-four man teams were organized to perform the following missions with municipal police forces and civilian guards in the 7th BCT area:

- (1) Serve as adviser-instructors (except in the case of local civilian guard units, NCOs take command).
- (2) Screen all personnel and submit reports. Also, take inventory of all weapons on hand. Excess to be turned in to Headquarters 7th BCT.
- (3) Submit training program (limited to basic subjects only).
- (4) Submit plan of local defense, including security measures, etc.
- (5) Function as sub-agents of the 7th BCT Civil Affairs Officer.

As can be seen, these missions were elastic, leaving many things to the initiative, energy and dedication of team leaders to assist local authorities and the populace.

The new approach drew immediate response from the general public, who felt for the first time since 1945 that they were active participants in the anti-Huk campaign. Because of better control and discipline being maintained, tested civilian guard units were enlarged and given better weapons. Relatives of civilian guards became potent anti-Huk spies in spite of lack of instruction. The whole operation snow-balled into entire communities backing up their own home guard organizations against the Huks. Much later, we found team leaders marching their home guard units to work on community projects, such as digging community wells, drainage canals, or assisting in the rice harvest. Team members were active in local socials for civic purposes, frequently winding up by delivering anti-Communist speeches.

7th BCT records show many instances where Charley Company teams led aggressive home guard units against Huk units traveling through their areas, most often with a high degree of success. Raids and ambushes were successfully

staged against unsuspecting Huks so that large areas were considered "dangerous" for Huks to travel. This also meant cutting off supplies for the Huks, a requirement which was already critical for them in 1951.

The crowning achievement of Charley Company units was their collaboration with the S-2 Section (all ex-nenita), MIS "A" & "B" Teams (partly manned by Nenita men) in breaking up the Pandi Refuge Area. The project officer in charge was Major Justiniano, who was partly responsible for the training of all personnel involved. The operation involved was titled "COVER UP."

The municipality of Pandi (the municipal capital also bears the same name) covers all back routes to Manila, sparsely populated and is not as well developed as the surrounding areas. For some-time since 1950, the S-2 Section had consistently noted that Pandi was a "quiet" sector, while neighboring municipal areas drew high operational priorities due to frequent Huk troop concentrations movements and other guerrilla activities. Personal interviews with municipal authorities drew blank stares from these individuals who invariably admitted nothing about Huks or guerrilla activities in the town of Pandi or the municipal area itself.

On the other hand, G-2 reports indicated that Huk couriers, or VIPs were accustomed to travelling through Pandi on commercial busses without being molested or investigated. Huk wounded were allegedly sheltered and convalescing in Pandi, as at about this time the home guards and police forces in other municipalities around Pandi were on the offensive against Huk foraging parties. To cite one instance, an encounter took place between a civilian guard unit led by a 7th BCT MIS operative and a 15-man Huk band at SAPANG PALAY, a village about eight miles east of Pandi. During this encounter, two Huks were killed. The Huk band fled westward with the home guards in pursuit. The withdrawing Huks completely disappeared leaving no trace. An elaborate report was submitted on this particular incident.

Operation "Cover Up" was decided. Four teams (combined MIS and Charley Company) with radio sets were organized, consisting of six to eight men, with the ranking NCO in charge. Later six more teams of the same composition were added. Assigned missions were

varied, but essentially, the teams were required to penetrate the suspect area secretly and report all observations on the inhabitants by radio. Contact frequency was every other hour on the hour. S-2 rented a house in the town of Pandi and hired a family to occupy the house as cover for MIS operatives. The latter group was assigned to effect surveillance on the municipal executive and the town chief of police, already held suspect by S-2.

Because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Huklandia since 1950, it was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely if there were good grounds. On the theory that the populace were being subjected to a deep-covered "terrorism," it was recommended that several individuals be "snatched" and brought to 7th BCT Headquarters for interrogation, hoping that these individuals, after being convinced of the protective motives of the government under skillful handling, would tell the truth about Pandi. The recommendations were approved and appropriate orders were issued.

The teams were able to snatch no less than 70 individuals from different points of the area without being detected by the inhabitants. Suspicions about hidden power of the Huks in Pandi grew, since in no single case did either the mayor or the chief of police report the disappearances of the PC or to the 7th BCT.

With good treatment and frequent appeals to the detainees, (the Secretary of National Defense participating), to cooperate with the government and promises of monetary rewards, the knowledgeable eventually came up with startling information. However, all detainees agreed on their fear of Huk reprisals. Allegations from detainee-affiants were radioed back to field teams covering Pandi for verification or confirmation. Their statements were carefully classified and analyzed and compared with past intelligence files as far back as 1948. Out of these painstaking efforts, S-2 was able to establish the following intelligence pattern:

- (1) Pandi was important to the Huk organizations in Luzon due to its proximity to the city of Manila, the center of underground activity of the Communist Party of the country;

- (2) Therefore, it was important that Pandi should not draw the attention of the AFP or PC. In order not to be garrisoned by the AFP or PC, the area must be kept a "quiet" sector, prohibiting the staging of raids, ambushes, or any Huk activity that will draw troops.
- (3) It was commonly known in the area that Huk troop concentrations are prohibited in the area. The area, as a matter of fact, was supposed to be avoided by traveling units. Foraging was done only through supply agents specifically appointed by the municipal mayor. Direct approach to houses or inhabitants was punishable by death.
- (4) Huk wounded or fugitives desirous to seek shelter in Pandi must first get proper permission from their superiors, who in turn would make proper arrangements with Pandi authorities.
- (5) Huk couriers traveling to or from Manila would receive briefings from Pandi Huk intelligence officers on the current situation at their destinations, given pass words, and taught new counter-signs,
- (6) Pandi inhabitants adjudged "reactionary" or recalcitrants were not disciplined within the municipal area, but in accordance with long-standing practice, secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandi. Several instances were cited where the mayor and the police chief conspired in the Communist's kidnap-murder of individuals whom the Huk high command ordered to be punished.
- (7) During the past years, PC garrisons had occasionally been maintained in Pandi. Although, because of their small size and poor security, they could easily have been wiped out by local Huks, these garrisons were left unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals.
- (8) Names of individuals were submitted as active Huk agents in Pandi, starting off with the mayor's name, policemen, rich and prosperous businessmen, etc.

With several sworn statements, each statement corroborating others, criminal actions were instituted against all individuals cited or involved.

The liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge area near Manila, which in a large way hamstrung their clandestine activities in the city and their liaison and control lines with their active field units in Central Luzon. Travel for Huk couriers and VIPs to and from Manila became more difficult.

I could go on almost indefinitely telling you about the accomplishments of individuals and small units formed from Charley Company. As a matter of fact, some of these men are still in the field against the Huk. I believe, however, that I have said enough to show you the value of trained soldiers who are equally well trained as enemy guerrillas. Thorough knowledge of the enemy not only permits penetration, it greatly facilitates identification, prediction of enemy actions, and the training of other personnel who must be prepared to fight, particularly the training of such groups as civilian guards.

# DAHIL SA MGA SA PILIPINAS



KAYAT NAGANAP SA  
ANTIPOLO, RIZAL ANG  
**TUNAY** NA HASAYSAYANG  
ITO NG Krimeng **HARDIE**



## UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

By

C. T. R. Bohannon  
Major, USAR

Unconventional operations as we saw them in the Philippines can be divided roughly into three categories: Unconventional operations designed to kill, harass, or incapacitate the armed enemy; unconventional operations designed to gain intelligence; and finally, unconventional operations designed to influence the thinking of people. These last perhaps may be understood as those meant by the term psychological operations.

First, and most interesting to some people, are those unconventional operations designed actually to damage the enemy. There were a number of such operations in the Philippines. The Armed Forces of the Philippines set up, about 1949, a Research and Development Unit, a little department of dirty tricks. They had a nice old colonel in charge, the nicest man that I have ever known and with one of the nastiest minds.

One of his brightest ideas was a double-barreled, fully automatic carbine. I won't tell you what its cyclic rate of fire was, because I never believed it myself, but it was somewhere up around 1500 rounds a minute. Naturally, you're not going to hit a hell of a lot, spitting out ammunition at that rate. On the other hand, if you are out on a one-, or two-, or three-man patrol, way back in the bushes, and you get jumped by a larger force, think of its effect. You turn something that throws as much lead as that and rattles as fast as that loose at them, they think they've run into a couple of machine guns and are apt to leave that place without further bothering you. So there's a killing weapon, and yet it is one designed to influence the actions of people, more than it is to inflict actual casualties.

Due to policy and other complications, the Armed Forces of the Philippines were unable to secure napalm to use in the quantities they desired and the way they desired to use it. So the old

colonel fooled around with coconut husks and gasoline, and this and that and the other, and came up with a very satisfactory substitute. This was much better than what was first used. I think the first home-made substitute for napalm used in this campaign was in an operation in Candaba Swamp in 1950. The Secretary of National Defense and a few other characters flew over an area which it was desired to burn, kicking out 5-gallon cans of kerosene and throwing white phosphorous hand grenades at them. It didn't really burn too much of an area, but it accomplished the job at that time.

Another aspect which the Research and Development unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines went into quite a bit was what we might call bobby-traps. These were devices designed to be planted out in the fields for the enemy to run into or devices to be inserted into the enemy's supply lines. The idea is that if you stick stuff into the enemy's supply lines, that's the surest way of getting it into the hands of the ultimate consumer. A number of interesting problems developed there. One of them was that on such things as flash lights, radios, and so on, a courier who was taking them out would be bound to experiment with them. So, if it was really a "reporting" form of supplies, you had to fix it so that the first and last report wouldn't be rendered before it got to the intended consumer.

Way back about 1903 or 1904, when the Philippine Constabulary was fighting the Moros down in the southern part of the islands, some bright guy dreamt up the idea of losing some rifle cartridges, big old 45-70 ones. They had had their loads tampered with and that, they found, had quite an effect. There are indications that something like that may have been used in the Huk campaign. Again, this was a weapon which would produce or might produce an injury to the man who used it, or two or three men. But its principal effect was psychological. If one man's rifle blows up on him, everybody else who knows about it is going to be wondering, "Is my rifle going to blow up on me the next time I fire it?" I have heard stories about outfits which shed quite a bit of ammunition and so on because of things like that. I have shown you a part of a carbine which apparently had something like that happen to it. I understand that the Huk unit from which that was recovered was notably gun-shy for sometime after that incident occurred. They tell me the man who fired it recovered.

I might say that the use of improvised gadgets and gimmicks either to influence thinking or to produce casualties is as old as the

art of warfare in the Philippines. Frankly, I've never head of anybody more ingenious than some of my Philippine friends in dreaming up things which would have a significant effect. Again, the major effect was usually on the thinking of people.

One of the classic items is the "anting-anting" or amulet, widely used since very early times as protection against the enemy. Most commonly, an anting-anting charm is supposed to turn bullets. Well, obviously it doesn't. But the man who has it on, if he believes in it, is a great deal more daring combat soldier than one who doesn't have it. If the charm happens to seem to work for him, for a while he gets a reputation which makes him seem like a very valuable leader.

Some work was done in exploiting that and other similar "magic" during the anti-Huk campaign, but actually not too much was done in the way of direct psychological attack, expressly aimed directly at the armed enemy. Most of the psywar that was aimed directly at the enemy was in the form of leaflets, surrender passes, loud-speaker broadcasts, and airplanes. Each of these did have some effect.

You heard a good deal this morning from Major Justiniano about some of the ruses and devices that were used for the collection of intelligence. One particular feature of his actions that he did not mention was his system for the pick-up messages. I think it should be brought out. Along the principal highways in the Philippines there are kilometer posts. Every kilometer there is a post telling how far it is to the next town and how far it is to Manila, the capital. His people used the practice of smearing a blob of mud or anything on a kilometer post as an indication to reporting agents, couriers or pick-ups, that there was a message at a pre-arranged direction and distance from that kilometer post. I think that that sort of thing could be applicable in many places.

I want to spend most of the time left to talk about operations intended to influence the thinking of people. You will recall that in the discussion this morning it was pointed out that the Huk movement was started by the Communists deliberately impersonating what we might call a legitimate resistance movement against the enemy occupier of the country. As they began to show their hand in actions against those who disagreed with them, those who challenged their control over the area, they began to publicize their slogans of "land for the landless," "agrarian reform," and "aid to the poor down-trodden peasantry." They peddled that idea very successfully both during and after the Japanese occupation.

In 1945 I came back to the States with a military police officer who claimed to have examined the dossiers on 10,000 members of the Huk movement without finding any evidence that a single one of them was a Communist. Six months before that, I had had a bunch of guerrillas join me carrying freshly wounded men. They also had Huk ID cards taken from Huks who had jumped them from the rear while they were attacking a Japanese patrol. Those ID cards bore the hammer and sickle which to my simple way of thinking was some evidence of some Communist interest.

The Huks, their sponsors and then sympathizers, kept pressing and pressing this idea of agrarian reform, and there was a need for agrarian reform in the area in which they were operating. The extraordinarily unfortunate part of it was that they got so many people to thinking that agrarian reform was really their objective.

I have here a column written by perhaps the most vitriolic, free-spoken columnist in a country which I believe has and had the freest press in the world. He is the man who, when his President called him in and spoke to him about the language he used in his column, came out the next day and wrote that he had been called to Malacanang Palace and told that he could no longer call a spade a spade. Therefore, gentlemen, he continued, I will no longer call a spade a spade. Hereafter when I have an occasion to refer to a spade, I shall simply call it a goddamn stinking shovel.

This joker in May of 1948 wrote: "Long before the kidnapping and brutal murder of Juan Feleo on August 24 of 1946 precipitated the armed explosion in the central provinces, I have repeatedly tried to correct the systematic campaign of information which branded the Hukbalahap as Communists." He knew better, but most of his readers didn't.

Right along with their campaign for agrarian reform, their pose of seeking land for the landless, the Communists carried on a systematic campaign of vilification against the Government. All government officials are corrupt. They're puppets. They're running dogs of the American imperialists. That last one they would try every so often, and then they'd take it off the record for a while, because somehow customer acceptance wasn't so very good.

Corruption, corruption, they cried. Sure, there was corruption. You heard this morning about some of the corruption, some of the malfeasance of government officials, some of the inefficiency of the armed forces, of the election of 1949 in which there were exploitable frauds. Those things are true, but they weren't nearly as bad, nearly as common, as they were made to seem. Isolated instances were taken out of context. Isolated cases were fabricated. Systematically, day after day, I regret to say that most of the Manila press faithfully echoed the line, "Everybody in government is corrupt, the army is no damn good, the MPCs are a bunch of bloody murderers. Before you disarm these poor Huks who are striving to protect the rights of the landless peasants, first you must disarm and jail these brutal MPCs whose hands are dyed in the blood of their innocent fellow countrymen and so on, etc."

Nobody really believed everything they read, but there was enough suspicion left so that people lost confidence in government. The Huks had a mass base of perhaps a million. That's a reasonable estimate. I'm afraid, by the middle of 1950, the government didn't have a very much bigger mass base. Of those people who were concerned with and interested in such things as the actions of government, there were probably three times as many who said to hell with the government and to hell with the Huks both as were in favor of either one.

It was in changing this situation that Mr. Magsaysay scored his greatest successes in combating the Huk. He shook up the army. I don't mean wholesale relief of officers, trials, court martials, or anything like that; he just simply shook them. And I mean they were shook. I sat in his office one afternoon. First, he called in Colonel Lopus, the G-2. If I recall correctly (that was a long time ago), he said to Colonel Lopus: Go find out personally why such and such a unit hasn't gotten its rations. He called in the G-4 to make an investigation why a lieutenant way out in the boondocks hadn't been promoted after killing a Huk leader. G-1 was sent out on an intelligence mission. What he had G-3 doing, I don't recall, but it was probably rounding up gasoline. He was ruthless in putting his foot on misbehavior by armed forces personnel.

Mr. Magsaysay was even more strenuous in emphasizing that the armed forces must make the civilians in their area realize that the armed forces were their friends and not their enemy. For example, in this Huklandia area, where the Huk forces could move fairly freely

by day and very freely by night, you would see a truck loaded with soldiers pause in a town in broad daylight for a few minutes. Everybody would be in the truck pointing his rifle out as though the truck were going to be jumped any minute. Needless to say, the civilians around didn't particularly appreciate that treatment and they would have been quite willing to jump the army.

Three months after he started shaking things up, when a truck load of soldiers pulled into a town, you could see the kids come running, because probably those soldiers had a few pieces of candy, or at least they'd tell them some jokes. People would come and hear the news from the soldiers. There were many different operations designed to demonstrate to the people that the soldiers were their friends, that the government was their government and what the hell were the Huks fighting for anyhow. The Huks claimed it was for land, that they wanted land, that they couldn't own land in Central Luzon.

Mr. Magsaysay dusted off a proposal that had been gathering dust in his office for a couple of years for an outfit known as EDCOR. Now that was originally conceived as a modification of the old Roman "colono" system, where troops would be stationed in virgin territory, would set up a village, start farming and supporting themselves, and then be discharged to live on there.

Mr. Magsaysay took that proposal, which had been approved by the Philippine Congress, and turned it into a "land for the landless" program specifically for the benefit of surrendered Huk. He placed relatively little emphasis on advertising this program directly to the Huks. Instead, he saw to it that the program was broadly publicized among the civilians throughout the Huk-infested areas. The idea, of course, was to get these civilians, the willing or unwilling mass base, to thinking and saying: "Now why should we be giving contributions to these guys, these Huks, who are coming to us? Sometimes they are nice to us, sometimes they are cruel. Why should we be supporting them and suffering for or from them? They say that they are fighting for land. If that is true, all they have to do is surrender, and Magsay will give them a homestead down in Mindanao. He will take the man, and his family too, put them down there on a piece of land, support them until their first crop is harvested, and even give him title to the land if he works it for five years. What are they really fighting for, these Huks?"

That had a terrific effect, that sequence of ideas. The Huks soon got word of it, often blunt word. Of course, they scoffed at the whole thing as a trick, but they soon found out that it wasn't, that some of their former comrades really were doing well on their new homesteads. In actual fact, as a resettlement program, EDCOR did not accomplish a great deal. I doubt if more than perhaps 300 families of Huks were resettled under that program. But I will guarantee you that at least 3,000 Huks surrendered, or simply melted peacefully back into a peaceful country life as persons who didn't want any parts of this rebellion any more. One reason was that they were made to doubt the propaganda of their own leaders; a more significant reason perhaps was the effect the thinking outlined above had on their supply, support, and even intelligence channels.

As a former guerrilla himself, Mr. Magsaysay realized full well the vital importance of popular support to any guerrilla organization. Knowing that many of the common complaints of the peasants often had all too real justification and that these were magnified many times over by the Huk propaganda, he set out to eliminate the grounds for complaint, or at least to prove to the farmers that he was sincerely trying to do so.

One of the favorite complaints of the farmers in Huklandia, as in almost every similar region in the world, was that they always lost the case if they went to law. Tenants felt they had no legal defense against their landlords, because they couldn't afford to hire lawyers. Mr. Magsaysay gave to the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines the role of public defenders. If some poor devil who couldn't afford a lawyer had a serious case, either criminal or civilian, particularly a civil suit over land tenure, all he had to do was to send word to Mr. Magsaysay's office and there would be an Army lawyer to represent him in court proceedings. The peasant knew that he would have forceful representation and that the judge would be at least as much in awe of a lawyer from Magsaysay's Army as he would be of the landlord's lawyer.

Army lawyers also assisted in the prosecution of individual Huks before the criminal courts. In this connection, I wish to mention another facet of the anti-Huk operations that has not been brought up as yet. The Huk movement was never officially recognized as constituting rebellion in the sense of conferring upon the Huks, the members of the armed forces of the Communist Party, the rights of belligerents. In practice, they could only be prosecuted

for whatever common crimes they may have committed in the course of their activities, or they could be turned loose, or they could be disposed of permanently. Prior to Mr. Magsaysay's tour as Sec/Def., very little was done in the way either of punishing or of holding on to Huks who were captured or surrendered.

Under the Philippine Constitution there is a right of habeas corpus, the same as in the U.S. Constitution. From 1946 to 1950, that right was vigorously exercised. Let us say you catch a Huk. You are supposed to turn him over immediately to civil authorities. Unless you immediately could arraign him for a common crime with a plausible showing of probable guilt, he'd be out on a writ of habeas corpus and possibly out in the hills the next day. Don't forget that the prosecuting attorney and the judge lived right in the Huk infested area and were quite as susceptible to being terrorized as anyone else.

Mr. Magsaysay secured Presidential approval of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the cases of those who could be accused of rebellion and common crimes incident to rebellion. It was a very risky move on his part. Here he was basing most of his hope of success on proving that the government and the Armed Forces were the true friends of the people; yet here he was suppressing one of their prime rights. A horrible cry went up immediately that he was turning the country into a police state. But it didn't work out that way. His office exercised extremely close control over the use of this privilege of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and there were very few serious complaints. When people promptly saw that the denial of the privilege of habeas corpus was being used justly and fairly, that it was not being used as an implement for persecution, then they accepted it.

Actions of the army to help the civilians were almost innumerable. They ranged from patrols regularly carrying medicine so that they could attend the needs of sick or injured civilians whom they might encounter in remote places to the building of roads, the rebuilding of villages, later on the building of schoolhouses. Mr. Magsaysay made it clearly understood by everyone in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the troops quickly made it clear to those with whom they came in contact, that the purpose of the army was to help the people in every way they could. First in priority to accomplish this was, of course, to suppress armed rebellion. But if there was anything soldiers could do to help the people without seriously jeopardizing the actual prosecution of an armed action against an armed enemy, they were to do it. To a remarkable extent, they did.



This all came to a climax, as General Lansdale said, with the use of the Armed Forces in the 1951 elections to guard the polls. There had been fraud in the 1949 elections. This fraud was magnified out of all recognition by the press, by gossip, by Communist propagandists, witting and unwitting, by Communist propaganda, direct and indirect, back, white, and grey, so that "everyone knew" that the 1951 elections would be a complete farce.

The President, as was customary, announced that the elections would be absolutely free and clean, that everyone eligible to vote might vote freely for the candidate of his choice. Mr. Magsaysay, as Secretary of Defense, said "Wen Apo," "Yes, Sir," and that he would personally see to it that the elections were conducted precisely as the President had publicly said that they would be. Magsaysay announced his intention of having the polling places guarded by college students in the ROTC called to active duty and by regular soldiers. He assured one and all that they might vote freely and might rely upon their vote being honestly counted. Further, he set up procedures by which anyone could telegraph to him for an investigation if he thought a polling place was improperly conducted. Mr. Magsaysay made it clear to all in the Philippines that he meant what he said in an aggressive publicity campaign well before election day.

This move on his part caught the Communists and their supporters with their trousers down around their ankles. For nearly two years, they had been pointing to elections as the irrefutable proof of the corruption of the government. The only answer which they could come up with was a campaign urging people to boycott the election. They put out all kinds of dire predictions as to what the soldier thugs would do to anyone incautious enough to vote. "Magsaysay's armed goons will surely club you or kill you, or destroy your ballots." In some areas they added pointed hints as to what the Huks would do to those incautious enough to vote. When election day came, the people had enough confidence in Magsaysay and his troops to turn out and vote, to vote in unprecedented, overwhelming numbers.

After the results were counted, everybody but the Communists were satisfied with the results. Even those who lost had to admit that they lost honestly, that they weren't counted out by someone on the opposition payroll. Most important, the elections of 1951 were the ponderous last straw which broke the camel's back, so far as armed Communist resistance in the Philippines was concerned

For over a year, the Armed Forces had been seeking to demonstrate by deeds and words that the legal government of the Philippines was a government for the people, a government whose primary purpose was service to the governed. That they included in this service relentless action against unrepentant enemies of the peoples' government underscored their claim. From that time on, the campaign was, in effect, a mopping-up operation, one which is still going on. The loss of popular support and the abyss into which sank the morale of those Huks who sincerely believed that they were fighting for the welfare of the people were dramatically illustrated in 1954.

You have heard each of us speak here today about Luis Taruc, one-time leader of the Huk field forces. Taruc was a man of great personal charm, of sincere devotion to Communism, and of sincere devotion to the welfare of the people, as he saw it. In 1954, Taruc became convinced that he could do more to help his people by coming in and surrendering to the government than by continuing to fight it. Has there been any other instance of the top Communist guerrilla leader of a country surrendering unconditionally to the government he had fought for almost fifteen years? Perhaps this was the most unconventional operation of all.

I am going to wind this up in a minute. First, however, I want to say a couple more things about the personnel who are responsible for unconventional operations, the type of individual who is likely to be successful in such operations. All sorts of qualifications have been suggested at various times as being essential to the unconventional operator. I would like to tell you about two of the most successful whom I have known.

One of these men drove a truck at the time of Bataan, of the fall of the Philippines to the Japanese, but he wound up at the time of the liberation of the Philippines leading a couple thousand guerrillas. He had himself a fine time during the enemy occupation of his country, running after the Japanese or running from the Japanese. He learned a great deal about the essentials of guerrilla warfare, about basic survival for guerrillas, which means securing popular support, among other things. But he had absolutely no use for military textbooks and military doctrine. As far as he was concerned, such things were all right for instruction at Leavenworth, but from what he had seen of it, the practical value was nil. Because he saw the big picture, because he saw the need of changing the thinking of the

people, the urgent necessity for building a sound political base, Mr. Magsaysay was an outstanding success in dealing with the over-all problem. What he thought of such subjects as the allocation of staff responsibility, I told you earlier.

The other man I am thinking of was a combat unit leader. In the field of unconventional tactical operations against the armed enemy and his mass base, this man was most successful. That man was so "GI," so thoroughly indoctrinated with conventional military thinking that, as we used to say in the Army, he wasn't born, he was issued by the company supply room. He was so "Leavenworth-minded" that after taking the short course there he went back for the long one. But, gentlemen, he did not limit his thinking to the doctrine expressed in texts. Rather, he used the "book" as a basis on which to build with the use of a thoroughly well-fertilized imagination. He could think of more stunts to harass the enemy, and make them work better, than anyone I ever knew.

I want to tell you about one of his simple little stunts. Justi, Major Justiniano, told you this morning about a more complicated one where they simulated liquidation of a bunch of simulated Huks with the objective of putting the fear of God, and the command, into the hearts of people so that they would stop collaborating with the enemy.

This guy I am telling you about developed a much simpler and more effective stunt. He knew full well that the Mayor of a certain village was actively assisting the Huk, one of their most trusted and valued men in that area. But he couldn't touch him. He did not have ironclad evidence which he could produce in court; worse, the Mayor had excellent political influence running all the way up to the Presidential Palace. (This was before the time of Magsaysay.) A good deal of thought was given to a means, short of kidnapping or assassination, by which this Mayor could be taken out of play. One day there was a little stroke of luck; the troops knocked off an important courier, carrying important documents, just outside that village.

The next morning Val drove into the village, siren blowing, armed escort and all, and called on the Mayor. He brought him out into the town square, with all the citizens fearfully crowding around, shook the Mayor by the hand and publicly congratulated and thanked him for his fine patriotic service in furnishing the

information which led to the killing of the courier. Val really laid it on thick, wouldn't listen to any protestations, made a big thing of the fine betrayal, and then climbed in his jeep and drove off.

About three o'clock the next morning that Mayor, with his family and his household goods, drove up to Colonel Valeriano's command post, seeking refuge. He was willing to tell everything he knew, do anything, confess and go to prison, anything as long as he wouldn't be left out where those wild Huks might bite him.

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#### DISCUSSION

Query: Were any special forces, other than regular troops, used in the anti-Huk campaigns.

Answer: (Maj. Bohannon). Yes. Many forces other than regular troops were used, ranging from wild mountain pygmies, Negritos, to home guard and church congregation units. However, I assume that you are thinking primarily of units in the regular establishment.

There was such a force, called the Scout-Rangers. I did not touch on it earlier, because I assumed that you people had already studied this force. It was a small organization, never larger than two companies, with the mission of executing small long-range patrols, operating for periods up to two or three weeks, in very small groups, deep in enemy or unexplored territory. Its personnel executed many very successful missions, harassing the enemy where he least expected it, securing intelligence, and guiding other forces. A Scout-Ranger team, of an officer and four men, was assigned to each BCT in active combat areas. In some BCT's, they set fine examples which got the whole BCT into the spirit of active patrolling. I certainly recommend that you study the Scout-Ranger organization, techniques, and tactics.

Query: (Gen.Lansdale). Col.Valeriano, I would like you to describe an intelligence technique which I learned from watching your operations. I might remark that I passed this idea along to the French in Indo-China in 1953, when they were having difficulty in getting information on enemy movements from their agent networks. Since then, I have learned that this method has been adopted in other countries. It's a good "export" idea for the class here. So, please tell them about your use of light aircraft for intelligence collection.

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). This was evolved from the practical experience of my subordinate commanders. It is the use of light aircraft of the L-5 or any other model to conduct daily flights planned by the operations section, by the S-3. By the flight plan, the pilot will observe certain specific points, houses or inhabited areas occupied or used by our informants on the ground.

At these places, the pilots watch for pre-arranged signals which give the intelligence we are seeking. These signals are such things as an open gate, an animal tied in the southeast corner of a yard, two windows of a house open. Those three signals would indicate three essential elements of information. The two open windows indicate that there is an enemy concentration approximately 200 strong in the area. The position of the animal tied in the yard in relation to the house indicates the direction of the enemy concentration. The open gate indicates that the enemy are planning to stay in this area.

If one has similar information from two or three points, the information is not only confirmed but the position of the enemy concentration can be pinpointed with considerable accuracy.

This system is susceptible to great variation and possesses infinite flexibility. Certain obvious precautions are necessary. The flight path of the airplane must be such as not to identify the informant. Usually this is best achieved by laying out a flight path which covers the entire area, and having the pilot fly the

same route every time. Signals must be the unobtrusive and natural-appearing use of normal items in the area and must conform to the customs of the area. Your informant can't have his windows open when all the windows in the other houses around are closed. He can't spread out his laundry to dry on a Wednesday if everybody in that area does their laundry only on Monday.

The advantages of this system are manifold. On one occasion I had to pull one battalion out of its area of responsibility and move it far away to assist in a task force operation, leaving only one company to control the area. Had it not been for the help of our two light planes and our ground spotters, it would have been impossible for this remaining company to prevent Huk attacks in the area.

Query: (Maj. Bohannon). Col. Valeriano, in your discussion of large unit infiltration you emphasized that this activity should only be employed if there was an appropriate opportunity; i. e., when undeveloped or long disrupted communications among enemy units would allow a fair chance for the infiltrators cover story to stand up.

I know that you trained a unit for a possible large unit infiltration, a "Force X," which you did not use that way, yet found very valuable. Since we believe that it is highly desirable to have such a group trained, to seize upon opportunities which may arise, I believe it would be helpful if you would discuss Charley Company.

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). I would be glad to, because I believe that the "Force X" training we gave Charley Company (of the 7th BCT) was as fully rewarding in results from the way we used those people as if they have been used on large unit infiltration. In fact, I think the history of that operation will demonstrate the value of intensive training in enemy modus operandi in almost any counter-guerrilla operations.

First, I would like to tell you the circumstances leading up to the training of Charley Company. On 20 July 1950, the writer took over the command of the 7th BCT AFP, with

headquarters at Pinaod, Bulacan. The organization was recently activated and was found to be partially organized, half-trained, and deficiently armed and equipped. It was also found that the battalion was dangerously exposed by dispersion into small garrisons which were attacked many times by superior Huk forces.

Bulacan province boasted of the best organized and best armed Huk regional command (Regional Command 3) under the leadership of Jesus Lava, a veteran Communist guerrilla leader. This Huk commander had held the initiative even before the 7th BCT was deployed in the province (20 June 1950).

The first action taken was the concentration of troop units for reorganization and training. A motorized rifle company (C Company) was organized as a mobile force to cover the province while other battalion units underwent four weeks of intensive training. This arrangement was found just enough to contain the Huks but did not deliver any hard blow.

We were fortunate in acquiring the services of veteran officers, who served with the Nenita and the Pampanga PC Command. Capt. Marana (Force X) was detailed as S-3, with Capt. Justiniano (formerly S-3 of the Nenita) assigned as BCT S-2. Between these two officers, a plan was submitted which substantially called for a repeat of Operation "PANDEMONIUM," which was staged so successfully in 1948, and which I described in my talk this morning. In spite of the fact that the Huks were well aware that Force X type units might be employed, especially under the auspices of the undersigned, the sponsoring officers earnestly believed that a Force X organization might come in "handy" in the immediate future.

Capt. Marana was assigned Project Officer for the organization, training, and equipping of the force. Charley Company, 7th BCT was the unanimous choice, it being the only unit that had not undergone the regular re-training program I had instituted. Also, it was noted that the company had young aggressive and experienced officers, who were

guerrilla leaders during World War II during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Charley Company was carefully screened, secretly, and the physically deficient were reassigned. Replacements came from volunteers coming from other battalion units. Training commenced immediately, after construction of shelters were completed at a secret training base located about seven miles southeast of BCT headquarters, deep in the Sierra Madre. It was already foreseen by S-2, that unlike Force X of the Pampanga Command, Charley Company would eventually be employed in the Sierra Madre mountain ranges.

The training course lasted about eight weeks, because the personnel involved were mostly AFP recruits who did not have as much combat experience as had the members of Force X in 1949. Essentially, the following training subjects were covered:

1. Weapons (Including jungle knife; bow and arrow; brass knuckles).
2. Marksmanship (Specialization on sniping and hip-firing).
3. Pathfinding & Tracking (Study of animal and human tracks; elimination of tracks and spoor, etc.).
4. Map Reading & Sketching (Terrain appreciation and exercises).
5. Elementary Astronomy (Ready identification of constellations, directions during darkness; dead reckoning, etc.).
6. Jungle & Field Craft (Study of local vegetation and materials for human comfort, food resources, medical values, etc.).
7. Escape & Evasion (Methods applicable in the locality).
8. Caches & Field Storage (Methods to cache rations, weapons, radio sets and military equipment).



9. Pyrotechnics (Types and kind of pyrotechnics, uses; deceptions, etc., field expedients, etc.).
10. Explosives & Demolitions ("Home-made" bombs).
11. Basic Training Subjects (First Aid, Personal Hygiene, Care of Weapons and Equipment, Camouflage, Scouting and Patrolling, etc.).
12. Physical Training (Including contact sports, unarmed combat, cross-country running, swimming, rope climbing, and gymnastics).

As in the training of Force X, Charley Company personnel were not allowed to use any regular issue military equipment, accoutrements and general issue articles while in the training base. The men were encouraged to supply themselves with locally procured gourds for drinking water, whittled sticks to serve as toothbrushes, etc. Forced to live like Huk guerrillas, the men received lectures of Huk propaganda during meal times or at any opportunity. Dress, speech, customs, known Huk habits and practices, were emphasized, with the men constantly under the critical eye of tested and trusted ex-Huks, who furnished around the clock coaching and instruction.

Daily training schedules followed the daily routine of the Nenita unit, whose activities commenced at sundown, generally terminating at noon. Field exercises were given during hours of darkness. Outdoor lectures were given during daylight hours. This method inured the men, developing "night vision," and teaching them to move with confidence and speed across rough terrain. Courage, confidence and stamina tests were always injected in these exercises, which often lasted for as long as 50 hours without rations being issued to the students.

As a whole, the unanimous evaluation was that Charley Company was better trained and prepared than Force X of 1948, for large unit infiltration missions which might be assigned. This was because of the experience factors already gained, the longer period of training, and better training supervision.

Charley Company, 7th BCT never had the opportunity of being employed in the same manner as Force X. The overall situation in

the entire campaign area since the termination of the training up to the end of the Huk campaign in 1954 did not in any instance offer the "proper setup" to make up a "plausible" cover story for a strange force trying to link up with Huk units who were already wary and still smarting from the lessons they learned from the PC in 1948. Further, there were several tragic-comedy incidents which occurred when other BCT commanders threw into the field their versions of Force X in their respective areas. They employed troops who were not trained nor prepared to perform the mission successfully. Several mistaken encounters took place between AFP units, most often between units of the same BCT.

However, after a month and a half, we found several promising situations wherein squads and sections of Charley Company were successfully employed. These missions were generally long range or deep reconnaissance missions in the Sierra Madre. The great amount of intelligence gained from these reconnaissance units were made the basis of 7th BCT operations (Talaguio, Biac Na Bata, Mount Tacbuan) between 1950 to 1952, which resulted in the complete destruction of Huk Regional Command 3, the first major Huk command that was deactivated by Taruc.

Broken up into small teams ranging between four to twelve men, the units were assigned areas to cover. Though most of these units were not equipped with radios, they managed to submit daily situation reports on their areas which made it possible for headquarters 7th BCT to be well informed of enemy concentrations, movements and activities. These units were capable of operating in disguise or in uniform as their situation would demand at a given moment. There were many instances where a six-man team did not hesitate to attack a village sheltering no less than 20 to 30 Huks. By means of bluff and skillful use of flares at night, small units were able to contain or drive off large Huk concentrations. The training had also cultivated the resourcefulness and imagination of the students.

About mid-1951, due to high level policies of assisting local police forces and armed civilian bodies for local security purposes, in collaboration with the PC and BCTs, Charley Company was concentrated for an additional one week of instruction at BCT Headquarters. The instruction given during this period substantially resembled that given present-day Special Forces units.

Twenty-four man teams were organized to perform the following missions with municipal police forces and civilian guards in the 7th BCT area:

- (1) Serve as adviser-instructors (except in the case of local civilian guard units, NCOs take command).
- (2) Screen all personnel and submit reports. Also, take inventory of all weapons on hand. Excess to be turned in to Headquarters 7th BCT.
- (3) Submit training program (limited to basic subjects only).
- (4) Submit plan of local defense, including security measures, etc.
- (5) Function as sub-agents of the 7th BCT Civil Affairs Officer.

As can be seen, these missions were elastic, leaving many things to the initiative, energy and dedication of team leaders to assist local authorities and the populace.

The new approach drew immediate response from the general public, who felt for the first time since 1945 that they were active participants in the anti-Huk campaign. Because of better control and discipline being maintained, tested civilian guard units were enlarged and given better weapons. Relatives of civilian guards became potent anti-Huk spies in spite of lack of instruction. The whole operation snow-balled into entire communities backing up their own home guard organizations against the Huks. Much later, we found team leaders marching their home guard units to work on community projects, such as digging community wells, drainage canals, or assisting in the rice harvest. Team members were active in local socials for civic purposes, frequently winding up by delivering anti-Communist speeches.

7th BCT records show many instances where Charley Company teams led aggressive home guard units against Huk units traveling through their areas, most often with a high degree of success. Raids and ambushes were successfully

staged against unsuspecting Huks so that large areas were considered "dangerous" for Huks to travel. This also meant cutting off supplies for the Huks, a requirement which was already critical for them in 1951.

The crowning achievement of Charley Company units was their collaboration with the S-2 Section (all ex-nenita), MIS "A" & "B" Teams (partly manned by Nenita men) in breaking up the Pandi Refuge Area. The project officer in charge was Major Justiniano, who was partly responsible for the training of all personnel involved. The operation involved was titled "COVER UP."

The municipality of Pandi (the municipal capital also bears the same name) covers all back routes to Manila, sparsely populated and is not as well developed as the surrounding areas. For some-time since 1950, the S-2 Section had consistently noted that Pandi was a "quiet" sector, while neighboring municipal areas drew high operational priorities due to frequent Huk troop concentrations, movements and other guerrilla activities. Personal interviews with municipal authorities drew blank stares from these individuals who invariably admitted nothing about Huks or guerrilla activities in the town of Pandi or the municipal area itself.

On the other hand, G-2 reports indicated that Huk couriers, or VIPs were accustomed to travelling through Pandi on commercial busses without being molested or investigated. Huk wounded were allegedly sheltered and convalescing in Pandi, as at about this time the home guards and police forces in other municipalities around Pandi were on the offensive against Huk foraging parties. To cite one instance, an encounter took place between a civilian guard unit led by a 7th BCT MIS operative and a 15-man Huk band at SAPANG PALAY, a village about eight miles east of Pandi. During this encounter, two Huks were killed. The Huk band fled westward with the home guards in pursuit. The withdrawing Huks completely disappeared leaving no trace. An elaborate report was submitted on this particular incident.

Operation "Cover Up" was decided. Four teams (combined MIS and Charley Company) with radio sets were organized, consisting of six to eight men, with the ranking NCO in charge. Later six more teams of the same composition were added. Assigned missions were

varied, but essentially, the teams were required to penetrate the suspect area secretly and report all observations on the inhabitants by radio. Contact frequency was every other hour on the hour. S-2 rented a house in the town of Pandi and hired a family to occupy the house as cover for MIS operatives. The latter group was assigned to effect surveillance on the municipal executive and the town chief of police, already held suspect by S-2.

Because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Huklandia since 1950, it was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely if there were good grounds. On the theory that the populace were being subjected to a deep-covered "terrorism," it was recommended that several individuals be "snatched" and brought to 7th BCT Headquarters for interrogation, hoping that these individuals, after being convinced of the protective motives of the government under skillful handling, would tell the truth about Pandi. The recommendations were approved and appropriate orders were issued.

The teams were able to snatch no less than 70 individuals from different points of the area without being detected by the inhabitants. Suspicions about hidden power of the Huks in Pandi grew, since in no single case did either the mayor or the chief of police report the disappearances of the PC or to the 7th BCT.

With good treatment and frequent appeals to the detainees, (the Secretary of National Defense participating), to cooperate with the government and promises of monetary rewards, the knowledgeable eventually came up with startling information. However, all detainees agreed on their fear of Huk reprisals. Allegations from detainee-affiants were radioed back to field teams covering Pandi for verification or confirmation. Their statements were carefully classified and analyzed and compared with past intelligence files as far back as 1948. Out of these painstaking efforts, S-2 was able to establish the following intelligence pattern:

- (1) Pandi was important to the Huk organizations in Luzon due to its proximity to the city of Manila, the center of underground activity of the Communist Party of the country;

- (2) Therefore, it was important that Pandi should not draw the attention of the AFP or PC. In order not to be garrisoned by the AFP or PC, the area must be kept a "quiet" sector, prohibiting the staging of raids, ambushes, or any Huk activity that will draw troops.
- (3) It was commonly known in the area that Huk troop concentrations are prohibited in the area. The area, as a matter of fact, was supposed to be avoided by traveling units. Foraging was done only through supply agents specifically appointed by the municipal mayor. Direct approach to houses or inhabitants was punishable by death.
- (4) Huk wounded or fugitives desirous to seek shelter in Pandi must first get proper permission from their superiors, who in turn would make proper arrangements with Pandi authorities.
- (5) Huk couriers traveling to or from Manila would receive briefings from Pandi Huk intelligence officers on the current situation at their destinations, given pass words, and taught new counter-signs.
- (6) Pandi inhabitants adjudged "reactionary" or recalcitrants were not disciplined within the municipal area, but in accordance with long-standing practice, secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandi. Several instances were cited where the mayor and the police chief conspired in the Communist's kidnap-murder of individuals whom the Huk high command ordered to be punished.
- (7) During the past years, PC garrisons had occasionally been maintained in Pandi. Although, because of their small size and poor security, they could easily have been wiped out by local Huks, these garrisons were left unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals.
- (8) Names of individuals were submitted as active Huk agents in Pandi, starting off with the mayor's name, policemen, rich and prosperous businessmen, etc.

With several sworn statements, each statement corroborating others, criminal actions were instituted against all individuals cited or involved.

The liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge area near Manila, which in a large way hamstrung their clandestine activities in the city and their liaison and control lines with their active field units in Central Luzon. Travel for Huk couriers and VIPs to and from Manila became more difficult.

I could go on almost indefinitely telling you about the accomplishments of individuals and small units formed from Charley Company. As a matter of fact, some of these men are still in the field against the Huk. I believe, however, that I have said enough to show you the value of trained soldiers who are equally well trained as enemy guerrillas. Thorough knowledge of the enemy not only permits penetration, it greatly facilitates identification, prediction of enemy actions, and the training of other personnel who must be prepared to fight, particularly the training of such groups as civilian guards.

# DAHIL SA MGA SA PILIPINAS



KAYAT NAGANAP SA  
ANTIPOLO, RIZAL ANG  
**TUNAY** NA KASAYSAYANG  
ITO NG Krimen **HARDIE**



## UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

By

C. T. R. Bohannon  
Major, USAR

Unconventional operations as we saw them in the Philippines can be divided roughly into three categories: Unconventional operations designed to kill, harass, or incapacitate the armed enemy; unconventional operations designed to gain intelligence; and finally, unconventional operations designed to influence the thinking of people. These last perhaps may be understood as those meant by the term psychological operations.

First, and most interesting to some people, are those unconventional operations designed actually to damage the enemy. There were a number of such operations in the Philippines. The Armed Forces of the Philippines set up, about 1949, a Research and Development Unit, a little department of dirty tricks. They had a nice old colonel in charge, the nicest man that I have ever known and with one of the nastiest minds.

One of his brightest ideas was a double-barreled, fully automatic carbine. I won't tell you what its cyclic rate of fire was, because I never believed it myself, but it was somewhere up around 1500 rounds a minute. Naturally, you're not going to hit a hell of a lot, spitting out ammunition at that rate. On the other hand, if you are out on a one-, or two-, or three-man patrol, way back in the bushes, and you get jumped by a larger force, think of its effect. You turn something that throws as much lead as that and rattles as fast as that loose at them, they think they've run into a couple of machine guns and are apt to leave that place without further bothering you. So there's a killing weapon, and yet it is one designed to influence the actions of people, more than it is to inflict actual casualties.

Due to policy and other complications, the Armed Forces of the Philippines were unable to secure napalm to use in the quantities they desired and the way they desired to use it. So the old

colonel fooled around with coconut husks and gasoline, and this and that and the other, and came up with a very satisfactory substitute. This was much better than what was first used. I think the first home-made substitute for napalm used in this campaign was in an operation in Candaba Swamp in 1950. The Secretary of National Defense and a few other characters flew over an area which it was desired to burn, kicking out 5-gallon cans of kerosene and throwing white phosphorous hand grenades at them. It didn't really burn too much of an area, but it accomplished the job at that time.

Another aspect which the Research and Development unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines went into quite a bit was what we might call bobby-traps. These were devices designed to be planted out in the fields for the enemy to run into or devices to be inserted into the enemy's supply lines. The idea is that if you stick stuff into the enemy's supply lines, that's the surest way of getting it into the hands of the ultimate consumer. A number of interesting problems developed there. One of them was that on such things as flash lights, radios, and so on, a courier who was taking them out would be bound to experiment with them. So, if it was really a "reporting" form of supplies, you had to fix it so that the first and last report wouldn't be rendered before it got to the intended consumer.

Way back about 1903 or 1904, when the Philippine Constabulary was fighting the Moros down in the southern part of the islands, some bright guy dreamt up the idea of losing some rifle cartridges, some old 45-70 ones. They had had their loads tampered with and that, they found, had quite an effect. There are indications that something like that may have been used in the Huk campaign. Again, this was a weapon which would produce or might produce an injury to the man who used it, or two or three men. But its principal effect was psychological. If one man's rifle blows up on him, everybody else who knows about it is going to be wondering, "Is my rifle going to blow up on me the next time I fire it?" I have heard stories about outfits which shed quite a bit of ammunition and so on because of things like that. I have shown you a part of a carbine which apparently had something like that happen to it. I understand that the Huk unit from which that was recovered was notably gun-shy for sometime after that incident occurred. They tell me the man who fired it recovered.

I might say that the use of improvised gadgets and gimmicks either to influence thinking or to produce casualties is as old as the

art of warfare in the Philippines. Frankly, I've never head of anybody more ingenious than some of my Philippine friends in dreaming up things which would have a significant effect. Again, the major effect was usually on the thinking of people.

One of the classic items is the "anting-anting" or amulet, widely used since very early times as protection against the enemy. Most commonly, an anting-anting charm is supposed to turn bullets. Well, obviously it doesn't. But the man who has it on, if he believes in it, is a great deal more daring combat soldier than one who doesn't have it. If the charm happens to seem to work for him, for a while he gets a reputation which makes him seem like a very valuable leader.

Some work was done in exploiting that and other similar "magic" during the anti-Huk campaign, but actually not too much was done in the way of direct psychological attack, expressly aimed directly at the armed enemy. Most of the psywar that was aimed directly at the enemy was in the form of leaflets, surrender passes, loud-speaker broadcasts, and airplanes. Each of these did have some effect.

You heard a good deal this morning from Major Justiniano about some of the ruses and devices that were used for the collection of intelligence. One particular feature of his actions that he did not mention was his system for the pick-up messages. I think it should be brought out. Along the principal highways in the Philippines there are kilometer posts. Every kilometer there is a post telling how far it is to the next town and how far it is to Manila, the capital. His people used the practice of smearing a blob of mud or anything on a kilometer post as an indication to reporting agents, couriers or pick-ups, that there was a message at a pre-arranged direction and distance from that kilometer post. I think that that sort of thing could be applicable in many places.

I want to spend most of the time left to talk about operations intended to influence the thinking of people. You will recall that in the discussion this morning it was pointed out that the Huk movement was started by the Communists deliberately impersonating what we might call a legitimate resistance movement against the enemy occupier of the country. As they began to show their hand in actions against those who disagreed with them, those who challenged their control over the area, they began to publicize their slogans of "land for the landless," "agrarian reform," and "aid to the poor down-trodden peasantry." They peddled that idea very successfully both during and after the Japanese occupation.

In 1945 I came back to the States with a military police officer who claimed to have examined the dossiers on 10,000 members of the Huk movement without finding any evidence that a single one of them was a Communist. Six months before that, I had had a bunch of guerrillas join me carrying freshly wounded men. They also had Huk ID cards taken from Huks who had jumped them from the rear while they were attacking a Japanese patrol. Those ID cards bore the hammer and sickle which to my simple way of thinking was some evidence of some Communist interest.

The Huks, their sponsors and then sympathizers, kept pressing and pressing this idea of agrarian reform, and there was a need for agrarian reform in the area in which they were operating. The extraordinarily unfortunate part of it was that they got so many people to thinking that agrarian reform was really their objective.

I have here a column written by perhaps the most vitriolic, free-spoken columnist in a country which I believe has and had the freest press in the world. He is the man who, when his President called him in and spoke to him about the language he used in his column, came out the next day and wrote that he had been called to Malacanang Palace and told that he could no longer call a spade a spade. Therefore, gentlemen, he continued, I will no longer call a spade a spade. Hereafter when I have an occasion to refer to a spade, I shall simply call it a goddamn stinking shovel.

This joker in May of 1948 wrote: "Long before the kidnapping and brutal murder of Juan Feleo on August 24 of 1946 precipitated the armed explosion in the central provinces, I have repeatedly tried to correct the systematic campaign of information which branded the Hukbalahap as Communists." He knew better, but most of his readers didn't.

Right along with their campaign for agrarian reform, their pose of seeking land for the landless, the Communists carried on a systematic campaign of vilification against the Government. All government officials are corrupt. They're puppets. They're running dogs of the American imperialists. That last one they would try every so often, and then they'd take it off the record for a while, because somehow customer acceptance wasn't so very good.

Corruption, corruption, they cried. Sure, there was corruption. You heard this morning about some of the corruption, some of the malfeasance of government officials, some of the inefficiency of the armed forces, of the election of 1949 in which there were exploitable frauds. Those things are true, but they weren't nearly as bad, nearly as common, as they were made to seem. Isolated instances were taken out of context. Isolated cases were fabricated. Systematically, day after day, I regret to say that most of the Manila press faithfully echoed the line, "Everybody in government is corrupt, the army is no damn good, the MPCs are a bunch of bloody murderers. Before you disarm these poor Huks who are striving to protect the rights of the landless peasants, first you must disarm and jail these brutal MPCs whose hands are dyed in the blood of their innocent fellow countrymen and so on, etc."

Nobody really believed everything they read, but there was enough suspicion left so that people lost confidence in government. The Huks had a mass base of perhaps a million. That's a reasonable estimate. I'm afraid, by the middle of 1950, the government didn't have a very much bigger mass base. Of those people who were concerned with and interested in such things as the actions of government, there were probably three times as many who said to hell with the government and to hell with the Huks both as were in favor of either one.

It was in changing this situation that Mr. Magsaysay scored his greatest successes in combating the Huk. He shook up the army. I don't mean wholesale relief of officers, trials, court martials, or anything like that; he just simply shook them. And I mean they were shook. I sat in his office one afternoon. First, he called in Colonel Lapus, the G-2. If I recall correctly (that was a long time ago), he said to Colonel Lapus: Go find out personally why such and such a unit hasn't gotten its rations. He called in the G-4 to make an investigation why a lieutenant way out in the boondocks hadn't been promoted after killing a Huk leader. G-1 was sent out on an intelligence mission. What he had G-3 doing, I don't recall, but it was probably rounding up gasoline. He was ruthless in putting his foot on misbehavior by armed forces personnel.

Mr. Magsaysay was even more strenuous in emphasizing that the armed forces must make the civilians in their area realize that the armed forces were their friends and not their enemy. For example, in this Huklandia area, where the Huk forces could move fairly freely

by day and very freely by night, you would see a truck loaded with soldiers pause in a town in broad daylight for a few minutes. Everybody would be in the truck pointing his rifle out as though the truck were going to be jumped any minute. Needless to say, the civilians around didn't particularly appreciate that treatment and they would have been quite willing to jump the army.

Three months after he started shaking things up, when a truck load of soldiers pulled into a town, you could see the kids come running, because probably those soldiers had a few pieces of candy, or at least they'd tell them some jokes. People would come and hear the news from the soldiers. There were many different operations designed to demonstrate to the people that the soldiers were their friends, that the government was their government and what the hell were the Huks fighting for anyhow. The Huks claimed it was for land, that they wanted land, that they couldn't own land in Central Luzon.

Mr. Magsaysay dusted off a proposal that had been gathering dust in his office for a couple of years for an outfit known as EDCOR. Now that was originally conceived as a modification of the old Roman "colono" system, where troops would be stationed in virgin territory, would set up a village, start farming and supporting themselves, and then be discharged to live on there.

Mr. Magsaysay took that proposal, which had been approved by the Philippine Congress, and turned it into a "land for the landless" program specifically for the benefit of surrendered Huk. He placed relatively little emphasis on advertising this program directly to the Huks. Instead, he saw to it that the program was broadly publicized among the civilians throughout the Huk-infested areas. The idea, of course, was to get these civilians, the willing or unwilling mass base, to thinking and saying: "Now why should we be giving contributions to these guys, these Huks, who are coming to us? Sometimes they are nice to us, sometimes they are cruel. Why should we be supporting them and suffering for or from them? They say that they are fighting for land. If that is true, all they have to do is surrender, and Magsay will give them a homestead down in Mindanao. He will take the man, and his family too, put them down there on a piece of land, support them until their first crop is harvested, and even give him title to the land if he works it for five years. What are they really fighting for, these Huks?"

for whatever common crimes they may have committed in the course of their activities, or they could be turned loose, or they could be disposed of permanently. Prior to Mr. Magsaysay's tour as Sec/Def., very little was done in the way either of punishing or of holding on to Huks who were captured or surrendered.

Under the Philippine Constitution there is a right of habeas corpus, the same as in the U.S. Constitution. From 1946 to 1950, that right was vigorously exercised. Let us say you catch a Huk. You are supposed to turn him over immediately to civil authorities. Unless you immediately could arraign him for a common crime with a plausible showing of probable guilt, he'd be out on a writ of habeas corpus and possibly out in the hills the next day. Don't forget that the prosecuting attorney and the judge lived right in the Huk infested area and were quite as susceptible to being terrorized as anyone else.

Mr. Magsaysay secured Presidential approval of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the cases of those who could be accused of rebellion and common crimes incident to rebellion. It was a very risky move on his part. Here he was basing most of his hope of success on proving that the government and the Armed Forces were the true friends of the people; yet here he was suppressing one of their prime rights. A horrible cry went up immediately that he was turning the country into a police state. But it didn't work out that way. His office exercised extremely close control over the use of this privilege of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and there were very few serious complaints. When people promptly saw that the denial of the privilege of habeas corpus was being used justly and fairly, that it was not being used as an implement for persecution, then they accepted it.

Actions of the army to help the civilians were almost innumerable. They ranged from patrols regularly carrying medicine so that they could attend the needs of sick or injured civilians whom they might encounter in remote places to the building of roads, the rebuilding of villages, later on the building of schoolhouses. Mr. Magsaysay made it clearly understood by everyone in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the troops quickly made it clear to those with whom they came in contact, that the purpose of the army was to help the people in every way they could. First in priority to accomplish this was, of course, to suppress armed rebellion. But if there was anything soldiers could do to help the people without seriously jeopardizing the actual prosecution of an armed action against an armed enemy, they were to do it. To a remarkable extent, they did.

That had a terrific effect, that sequence of ideas. The Huks soon got word of it, often blunt word. Of course, they scoffed at the whole thing as a trick, but they soon found out that it wasn't, that some of their former comrades really were doing well on their new homesteads. In actual fact, as a resettlement program, EDCOR did not accomplish a great deal. I doubt if more than perhaps 300 families of Huks were resettled under that program. But I will guarantee you that at least 3,000 Huks surrendered, or simply melted peacefully back into a peaceful country life as persons who didn't want any parts of this rebellion any more. One reason was that they were made to doubt the propaganda of their own leaders; a more significant reason perhaps was the effect the thinking outlined above had on their supply, support, and even intelligence channels.

As a former guerrilla himself, Mr. Magsaysay realized full well the vital importance of popular support to any guerrilla organization. Knowing that many of the common complaints of the peasants often had all too real justification and that these were magnified many times over by the Huk propaganda, he set out to eliminate the grounds for complaint, or at least to prove to the farmers that he was sincerely trying to do so.

One of the favorite complaints of the farmers in Huklandia, as in almost every similar region in the world, was that they always lost the case if they went to law. Tenants felt they had no legal defense against their landlords, because they couldn't afford to hire lawyers. Mr. Magsaysay gave to the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines the role of public defenders. If some poor devil who couldn't afford a lawyer had a serious case, either criminal or civilian, particularly a civil suit over land tenure, all he had to do was to send word to Mr. Magsaysay's office and there would be an Army lawyer to represent him in court proceedings. The peasant knew that he would have forceful representation and that the judge would be at least as much in awe of a lawyer from Magsaysay's Army as he would be of the landlord's lawyer.

Army lawyers also assisted in the prosecution of individual Huks before the criminal courts. In this connection, I wish to mention another facet of the anti-Huk operations that has not been brought up as yet. The Huk movement was never officially recognized as constituting rebellion in the sense of conferring upon the Huks, the members of the armed forces of the Communist Party, the rights of belligerents. In practice, they could only be prosecuted



This all came to a climax, as General Lansdale said, with the use of the Armed Forces in the 1951 elections to guard the polls. There had been fraud in the 1949 elections. This fraud was magnified out of all recognition by the press, by gossip, by Communist propagandists, witting and unwitting, by Communist propaganda, direct and indirect, back, white, and grey, so that "everyone knew" that the 1951 elections would be a complete farce.

The President, as was customary, announced that the elections would be absolutely free and clean, that everyone eligible to vote might vote freely for the candidate of his choice. Mr. Magsaysay, as Secretary of Defense, said "Wen Apo," "Yes, Sir," and that he would personally see to it that the elections were conducted precisely as the President had publicly said that they would be. Magsaysay announced his intention of having the polling places guarded by college students in the ROTC called to active duty and by regular soldiers. He assured one and all that they might vote freely and might rely upon their vote being honestly counted. Further, he set up procedures by which anyone could telegraph to him for an investigation if he thought a polling place was improperly conducted. Mr. Magsaysay made it clear to all in the Philippines that he meant what he said in an aggressive publicity campaign well before election day.

This move on his part caught the Communists and their supporters with their trousers down around their ankles. For nearly two years, they had been pointing to elections as the irrefutable proof of the corruption of the government. The only answer which they could come up with was a campaign urging people to boycott the election. They put out all kinds of dire predictions as to what the soldier thugs would do to anyone incautious enough to vote. "Magsaysay's armed goons will surely club you or kill you, or destroy your ballots." In some areas they added pointed hints as to what the Huks would do to those incautious enough to vote. When election day came, the people had enough confidence in Magsaysay and his troops to turn out and vote, to vote in unprecedented, overwhelming numbers.

After the results were counted, everybody but the Communists were satisfied with the results. Even those who lost had to admit that they lost honestly, that they weren't counted out by someone on the opposition payroll. Most important, the elections of 1951 were the ponderous last straw which broke the camel's back, so far as armed Communist resistance in the Philippines was concerned

For over a year, the Armed Forces had been seeking to demonstrate by deeds and words that the legal government of the Philippines was a government for the people, a government whose primary purpose was service to the governed. That they included in this service relentless action against unrepentant enemies of the peoples' government underscored their claim. From that time on, the campaign was, in effect, a mopping-up operation, one which is still going on. The loss of popular support and the abyss into which sank the morale of those Huks who sincerely believed that they were fighting for the welfare of the people were dramatically illustrated in 1954.

You have heard each of us speak here today about Luis Taruc, one-time leader of the Huk field forces. Taruc was a man of great personal charm, of sincere devotion to Communism, and of sincere devotion to the welfare of the people, as he saw it. In 1954, Taruc became convinced that he could do more to help his people by coming in and surrendering to the government than by continuing to fight it. Has there been any other instance of the top Communist guerrilla leader of a country surrendering unconditionally to the government he had fought for almost fifteen years? Perhaps this was the most unconventional operation of all.

I am going to wind this up in a minute. First, however, I want to say a couple more things about the personnel who are responsible for unconventional operations, the type of individual who is likely to be successful in such operations. All sorts of qualifications have been suggested at various times as being essential to the unconventional operator. I would like to tell you about two of the most successful whom I have known.

One of these men drove a truck at the time of Bataan, of the fall of the Philippines to the Japanese, but he wound up at the time of the liberation of the Philippines leading a couple thousand guerrillas. He had himself a fine time during the enemy occupation of his country, running after the Japanese or running from the Japanese. He learned a great deal about the essentials of guerrilla warfare, about basic survival for guerrillas, which means securing popular support, among other things. But he had absolutely no use for military textbooks and military doctrine. As far as he was concerned, such things were all right for instruction at Leavenworth, but from what he had seen of it, the practical value was nil. Because he saw the big picture, because he saw the need of changing the thinking of the

people, the urgent necessity for building a sound political base, Mr. Magsaysay was an outstanding success in dealing with the over-all problem. What he thought of such subjects as the allocation of staff responsibility, I told you earlier.

The other man I am thinking of was a combat unit leader. In the field of unconventional tactical operations against the armed enemy and his mass base, this man was most successful. That man was so "GI," so thoroughly indoctrinated with conventional military thinking that, as we used to say in the Army, he wasn't born, he was issued by the company supply room. He was so "Leavenworth-minded" that after taking the short course there he went back for the long one. But, gentlemen, he did not limit his thinking to the doctrine expressed in texts. Rather, he used the "book" as a basis on which to build with the use of a thoroughly well-fertilized imagination. He could think of more stunts to harass the enemy, and make them work better, than anyone I ever knew.

I want to tell you about one of his simple little stunts. Justi, Major Justiniano, told you this morning about a more complicated one where they simulated liquidation of a bunch of simulated Huks with the objective of putting the fear of God, and the command, into the hearts of people so that they would stop collaborating with the enemy.

This guy I am telling you about developed a much simpler and more effective stunt. He knew full well that the Mayor of a certain village was actively assisting the Huk, one of their most trusted and valued men in that area. But he couldn't touch him. He did not have ironclad evidence which he could produce in court; worse, the Mayor had excellent political influence running all the way up to the Presidential Palace. (This was before the time of Magsaysay.) A good deal of thought was given to a means, short of kidnapping or assassination, by which this Mayor could be taken out of play. One day there was a little stroke of luck; the troops knocked off an important courier, carrying important documents, just outside that village.

The next morning Val drove into the village, siren blowing, armed escort and all, and called on the Mayor. He brought him out into the town square, with all the citizens fearfully crowding around, shook the Mayor by the hand and publicly congratulated and thanked him for his fine patriotic service in furnishing the

information which led to the killing of the courier. Val really laid it on thick, wouldn't listen to any protestations, made a big thing of the fine betrayal, and then climbed in his jeep and drove off.

About three o'clock the next morning that Mayor, with his family and his household goods, drove up to Colonel Valeriano's command post, seeking refuge. He was willing to tell everything he knew, do anything, confess and go to prison, anything as long as he wouldn't be left out where those wild Huks might bite him.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### DISCUSSION

Query: Were any special forces, other than regular troops, used in the anti-Huk campaigns.

Answer: (Maj. Bohannon). Yes. Many forces other than regular troops were used, ranging from wild mountain pygmies, Negritos, to home guard and church congregation units. However, I assume that you are thinking primarily of units in the regular establishment.

There was such a force, called the Scout-Rangers. I did not touch on it earlier, because I assumed that you people had already studied this force. It was a small organization, never larger than two companies, with the mission of executing small long-range patrols, operating for periods up to two or three weeks, in very small groups, deep in enemy or unexplored territory. Its personnel executed many very successful missions, haraassing the enemy where he least expected it, securing intelligence, and guiding other forces. A Scout-Ranger team, of an officer and four men, was assigned to each BCT in active combat areas. In some BCT's, they set fine examples which got the whole BCT into the spirit of active patrolling. I certainly recommend that you study the Scout-Ranger organization, techniques, and tactics.

Query: (Gen.Lansdale). Col.Valeriano, I would like you to describe an intelligence technique which I learned from watching your operations. I might remark that I passed this idea along to the French in Indo-China in 1953, when they were having difficulty in getting information on enemy movements from their agent networks. Since then, I have learned that this method has been adopted in other countries. It's a good "export" idea for the class here. So, please tell them about your use of light aircraft for intelligence collection.

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). This was evolved from the practical experience of my subordinate commanders. It is the use of light aircraft of the L-5 or any other model to conduct daily flights planned by the operations section, by the S-3. By the flight plan, the pilot will observe certain specific points, houses or inhabited areas occupied or used by our informants on the ground.

At these places, the pilots watch for pre-arranged signals which give the intelligence we are seeking. These signals are such things as an open gate, an animal tied in the southeast corner of a yard, two windows of a house open. Those three signals would indicate three essential elements of information. The two open windows indicate that there is an enemy concentration approximately 200 strong in the area. The position of the animal tied in the yard in relation to the house indicates the direction of the enemy concentration. The open gate indicates that the enemy are planning to stay in this area.

If one has similar information from two or three points, the information is not only confirmed but the position of the enemy concentration can be pinpointed with considerable accuracy.

This system is susceptible to great variation and possesses infinite flexibility. Certain obvious precautions are necessary. The flight path of the airplane must be such as not to identify the informant. Usually this is best achieved by laying out a flight path which covers the entire area, and having the pilot fly the

same route every time. Signals must be the unobtrusive and natural-appearing use of normal items in the area and must conform to the customs of the area. Your informant can't have his windows open when all the windows in the other houses around are closed. He can't spread out his laundry to dry on a Wednesday if everybody in that area does their laundry only on Monday.

The advantages of this system are manifold. On one occasion I had to pull one battalion out of its area of responsibility and move it far away to assist in a task force operation, leaving only one company to control the area. Had it not been for the help of our two light planes and our ground spotters, it would have been impossible for this remaining company to prevent Huk attacks in the area.

Query: (Maj. Bohannon). Col. Valeriano, in your discussion of large unit infiltration you emphasized that this activity should only be employed if there was an appropriate opportunity; i. e., when undeveloped or long disrupted communications among enemy units would allow a fair chance for the infiltrators cover story to stand up.

I know that you trained a unit for a possible large unit infiltration, a "Force X," which you did not use that way, yet found very valuable. Since we believe that it is highly desirable to have such a group trained, to seize upon opportunities which may arise, I believe it would be helpful if you would discuss Charley Company.

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). I would be glad to, because I believe that the "Force X" training we gave Charley Company (of the 7th BCT) was as fully rewarding in results from the way we used those people as if they have been used on large unit infiltration. In fact, I think the history of that operation will demonstrate the value of intensive training in enemy modus operandi in almost any counter-guerrilla operations.

First, I would like to tell you the circumstances leading up to the training of Charley Company. On 20 July 1950, the writer took over the command of the 7th BCT AFP, with

headquarters at Pinaod, Bulacan. The organization was recently activated and was found to be partially organized, half-trained, and deficiently armed and equipped. It was also found that the battalion was dangerously exposed by dispersion into small garrisons which were attacked many times by superior Huk forces.

Bulacan province boasted of the best organized and best armed Huk regional command (Regional Command 3) under the leadership of Jesus Lava, a veteran Communist guerrilla leader. This Huk commander had held the initiative even before the 7th BCT was deployed in the province (20 June 1950).

The first action taken was the concentration of troop units for reorganization and training. A motorized rifle company (C Company) was organized as a mobile force to cover the province while other battalion units underwent four weeks of intensive training. This arrangement was found just enough to contain the Huks but did not deliver any hard blow.

We were fortunate in acquiring the services of veteran officers, who served with the Nenita and the Pampanga PC Command. Capt. Marana (Force X) was detailed as S-3, with Capt. Justiniano (formerly S-3 of the Nenita) assigned as BCT S-2. Between these two officers, a plan was submitted which substantially called for a repeat of Operation "PANDEMONIUM," which was staged so successfully in 1948, and which I described in my talk this morning. In spite of the fact that the Huks were well aware that Force X type units might be employed, especially under the auspices of the undersigned, the sponsoring officers earnestly believed that a Force X organization might come in "handy" in the immediate future.

Capt. Marana was assigned Project Officer for the organization, training, and equipping of the force. Charley Company, 7th BCT was the unanimous choice, it being the only unit that had not undergone the regular re-training program I had instituted. Also, it was noted that the company had young aggressive and experienced officers, who were

guerrilla leaders during World War II during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Charley Company was carefully screened, secretly, and the physically deficient were reassigned. Replacements came from volunteers coming from other battalion units. Training commenced immediately, after construction of shelters were completed at a secret training base located about seven miles southeast of BCT headquarters, deep in the Sierra Madre. It was already foreseen by S-2, that unlike Force X of the Pampanga Command, Charley Company would eventually be employed in the Sierra Madre mountain ranges.

The training course lasted about eight weeks, because the personnel involved were mostly AFP recruits who did not have as much combat experience as had the members of Force X in 1949. Essentially, the following training subjects were covered:

1. Weapons (Including jungle knife; bow and arrow; brass knuckles).
2. Marksmanship (Specialization on sniping and hip-firing).
3. Pathfinding & Tracking (Study of animal and human tracks; elimination of tracks and spoor, etc.).
4. Map Reading & Sketching (Terrain appreciation and exercises).
5. Elementary Astronomy (Ready identification of constellations, directions during darkness; dead reckoning, etc.).
6. Jungle & Field Craft (Study of local vegetation and materials for human comfort, food resources, medical values, etc.).
7. Escape & Evasion (Methods applicable in the locality).
8. Caches & Field Storage (Methods to cache rations, weapons, radio sets and military equipment)



9. Pyrotechnics (Types and kind of pyrotechnics, uses; deceptions, etc., field expedients, etc.).
10. Explosives & Demolitions ("Home-made" bombs).
11. Basic Training Subjects (First Aid, Personal Hygiene, Care of Weapons and Equipment, Camouflage, Scouting and Patrolling, etc.).
12. Physical Training (Including contact sports, unarmed combat, cross-country running, swimming, rope climbing, and gymnastics).

As in the training of Force X, Charley Company personnel were not allowed to use any regular issue military equipment, accoutrements and general issue articles while in the training base. The men were encouraged to supply themselves with locally procured gourds for drinking water, whittled sticks to serve as toothbrushes, etc. Forced to live like Huk guerrillas, the men received lectures of Huk propaganda during meal times or at any opportunity. Dress, speech, customs, known Huk habits and practices, were emphasized, with the men constantly under the critical eye of tested and trusted ex-Huks, who furnished around the clock coaching and instruction.

Daily training schedules followed the daily routine of the Nenita unit, whose activities commenced at sundown, generally terminating at noon. Field exercises were given during hours of darkness. Outdoor lectures were given during daylight hours. This method inured the men, developing "night vision," and teaching them to move with confidence and speed across rough terrain. Courage, confidence and stamina tests were always injected in these exercises, which often lasted for as long as 50 hours without rations being issued to the students.

As a whole, the unanimous evaluation was that Charley Company was better trained and prepared than Force X of 1948, for large unit infiltration missions which might be assigned. This was because of the experience factors already gained, the longer period of training, and better training supervision.

Charley Company, 7th BCT never had the opportunity of being employed in the same manner as Force X. The overall situation in

the entire campaign area since the termination of the training up to the end of the Huk campaign in 1954 did not in any instance offer the "proper setup" to make up a "plausible" cover story for a strange force trying to link up with Huk units who were already wary and still smarting from the lessons they learned from the PC in 1948. Further, there were several tragic-comedy incidents which occurred when other BCT commanders threw into the field their versions of Force X in their respective areas. They employed troops who were not trained nor prepared to perform the mission successfully. Several mistaken encounters took place between AFP units, most often between units of the same BCT.

However, after a month and a half, we found several promising situations wherein squads and sections of Charley Company were successfully employed. These missions were generally long range or deep reconnaissance missions in the Sierra Madre. The great amount of intelligence gained from these reconnaissance units were made the basis of 7th BCT operations (Talaguio, Biac Na Bata, Mount Tacbuhan) between 1950 to 1952, which resulted in the complete destruction of Huk Regional Command 3, the first major Huk command that was deactivated by Taruc.

Broken up into small teams ranging between four to twelve men, the units were assigned areas to cover. Though most of these units were not equipped with radios, they managed to submit daily situation reports on their areas which made it possible for headquarters 7th BCT to be well informed of enemy concentrations, movements and activities. These units were capable of operating in disguise or in uniform as their situation would demand at a given moment. There were many instances where a six-man team did not hesitate to attack a village sheltering no less than 20 to 30 Huks. By means of bluff and skillful use of flares at night, small units were able to contain or drive off large Huk concentrations. The training had also cultivated the resourcefulness and imagination of the students.

About mid-1951, due to high level policies of assisting local police forces and armed civilian bodies for local security purposes, in collaboration with the PC and BCTs, Charley Company was concentrated for an additional one week of instruction at BCT Headquarters. The instruction given during this period substantially resembled that given present-day Special Forces units.

staged against unsuspecting Huks so that large areas were considered "dangerous" for Huks to travel. This also meant cutting off supplies for the Huks, a requirement which was already critical for them in 1951.

The crowning achievement of Charley Company units was their collaboration with the S-2 Section (all ex-nenita), MIS "A" & "B" Teams (partly manned by Nenita men) in breaking up the Pandi Refuge Area. The project officer in charge was Major Justiniano, who was partly responsible for the training of all personnel involved. The operation involved was titled "COVER UP."

The municipality of Pandi (the municipal capital also bears the same name) covers all back routes to Manila, sparsely populated and is not as well developed as the surrounding areas. For some-time since 1950, the S-2 Section had consistently noted that Pandi was a "quiet" sector, while neighboring municipal areas drew high operational priorities due to frequent Huk troop concentrations, movements and other guerrilla activities. Personal interviews with municipal authorities drew blank stares from these individuals who invariably admitted nothing about Huks or guerrilla activities in the town of Pandi or the municipal area itself.

On the other hand, G-2 reports indicated that Huk couriers, or VIPs were accustomed to travelling through Pandi on commercial busses without being molested or investigated. Huk wounded were allegedly sheltered and convalescing in Pandi, as at about this time the home guards and police forces in other municipalities around Pandi were on the offensive against Huk foraging parties. To cite one instance, an encounter took place between a civilian guard unit led by a 7th BCT MIS operative and a 15-man Huk band at SAPANG PALAY, a village about eight miles east of Pandi. During this encounter, two Huks were killed. The Huk band fled westward with the home guards in pursuit. The withdrawing Huks completely disappeared leaving no trace. An elaborate report was submitted on this particular incident.

Operation "Cover Up" was decided. Four teams (combined MIS and Charley Company) with radio sets were organized, consisting of six to eight men, with the ranking NCO in charge. Later six more teams of the same composition were added. Assigned missions were

Twenty-four man teams were organized to perform the following missions with municipal police forces and civilian guards in the 7th BCT area:

- (1) Serve as adviser-instructors (except in the case of local civilian guard units, NCOs take command).
- (2) Screen all personnel and submit reports. Also, take inventory of all weapons on hand. Excess to be turned in to Headquarters 7th BCT.
- (3) Submit training program (limited to basic subjects only).
- (4) Submit plan of local defense, including security measures, etc.
- (5) Function as sub-agents of the 7th BCT Civil Affairs Officer.

As can be seen, these missions were elastic, leaving many things to the initiative, energy and dedication of team leaders to assist local authorities and the populace.

The new approach drew immediate response from the general public, who felt for the first time since 1945 that they were active participants in the anti-Huk campaign. Because of better control and discipline being maintained, tested civilian guard units were enlarged and given better weapons. Relatives of civilian guards became potent anti-Huk spies in spite of lack of instruction. The whole operation snow-balled into entire communities backing up their own home guard organizations against the Huks. Much later, we found team leaders marching their home guard units to work on community projects, such as digging community wells, drainage canals, or assisting in the rice harvest. Team members were active in local socials for civic purposes, frequently winding up by delivering anti-Communist speeches.

7th BCT records show many instances where Charley Company teams led aggressive home guard units against Huk units traveling through their areas, most often with a high degree of success. Raids and ambushes were successfully

- (2) Therefore, it was important that Pandi should not draw the attention of the AFP or PC. In order not to be garrisoned by the AFP or PC, the area must be kept a "quiet" sector, prohibiting the staging of raids, ambushes, or any Huk activity that will draw troops.
- (3) It was commonly known in the area that Huk troop concentrations are prohibited in the area. The area, as a matter of fact, was supposed to be avoided by traveling units. Foraging was done only through supply agents specifically appointed by the municipal mayor. Direct approach to houses or inhabitants was punishable by death.
- (4) Huk wounded or fugitives desirous to seek shelter in Pandi must first get proper permission from their superiors, who in turn would make proper arrangements with Pandi authorities.
- (5) Huk couriers traveling to or from Manila would receive briefings from Pandi Huk intelligence officers on the current situation at their destinations, given pass words, and taught new counter-signs.
- (6) Pandi inhabitants adjudged "reactionary" or recalcitrants were not disciplined within the municipal area, but in accordance with long-standing practice, secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandi. Several instances were cited where the mayor and the police chief conspired in the Communist's kidnap-murder of individuals whom the Huk high command ordered to be punished.
- (7) During the past years, PC garrisons had occasionally been maintained in Pandi. Although, because of their small size and poor security, they could easily have been wiped out by local Huks, these garrisons were left unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals.
- (8) Names of individuals were submitted as active Huk agents in Pandi, starting off with the mayor's name, policemen, rich and prosperous businessmen, etc.

varied, but essentially, the teams were required to penetrate the suspect area secretly and report all observations on the inhabitants by radio. Contact frequency was every other hour on the hour. S-2 rented a house in the town of Pandi and hired a family to occupy the house as cover for MIS operatives. The latter group was assigned to effect surveillance on the municipal executive and the town chief of police, already held suspect by S-2.


Because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Huklandia since 1950, it was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely if there were good grounds. On the theory that the populace were being subjected to a deep-covered "terrorism," it was recommended that several individuals be "snatched" and brought to 7th BCT Headquarters for interrogation, hoping that these individuals, after being convinced of the protective motives of the government under skillful handling, would tell the truth about Pandi. The recommendations were approved and appropriate orders were issued.

The teams were able to snatch no less than 70 individuals from different points of the area without being detected by the inhabitants. Suspicions about hidden power of the Huks in Pandi grew, since in no single case did either the mayor or the chief of police report the disappearances of the PC or to the 7th BCT.

With good treatment and frequent appeals to the detainees, (the Secretary of National Defense participating), to cooperate with the government and promises of monetary rewards, the knowledgeable eventually came up with startling information. However, all detainees agreed on their fear of Huk reprisals. Allegations from detainee-affiants were radioed back to field teams covering Pandi for verification or confirmation. Their statements were carefully classified and analyzed and compared with past intelligence files as far back as 1948. Out of these painstaking efforts, S-2 was able to establish the following intelligence pattern:

- (1) Pandi was important to the Huk organizations in Luzon due to its proximity to the city of Manila, the center of underground activity of the Communist Party of the country;

# DAHIL SA MGA SA PILIPINAS



KAYAT NAGAMAP SA  
ANTIPOLO, RIZAL ANG  
**TUNAY** NA KASAYSAYANG  
ITO NG Krimeng **HARDIE**

With several sworn statements, each statement corroborating others, criminal actions were instituted against all individuals cited or involved.

The liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge area near Manila, which in a large way hamstrung their clandestine activities in the city and their liaison and control lines with their active field units in Central Luzon. Travel for Huk couriers and VIPs to and from Manila became more difficult.

I could go on almost indefinitely telling you about the accomplishments of individuals and small units formed from Charley Company. As a matter of fact, some of these men are still in the field against the Huk. I believe, however, that I have said enough to show you the value of trained soldiers who are equally well trained as enemy guerrillas. Thorough knowledge of the enemy not only permits penetration, it greatly facilitates identification, prediction of enemy actions, and the training of other personnel who must be prepared to fight, particularly the training of such groups as civilian guards.