

**The National Security Policy Process:
The National Security Council and Interagency System**



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By

Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune

How United States foreign, defense, and other national security policies are developed, coordinated, articulated, and implemented is critically important to this nation's well being. This process begins internally with the federal agencies responsible for our national security and culminates with the President ultimately making the decisions. To do this, the President needs a defined and smoothly functioning policy development and decision-making process. Other than an extremely broad outline of who should participate in the process, there are no laws or regulations directing how policy should be developed and decisions made. Much depends on personalities and the strengths and weaknesses of the people who work for the President, as well as the management style of the President himself.

This paper is about the national security decision-making process. Although decisions affecting our security have been made since the birth of this nation, the foundations of the current system were laid immediately following World War II. This paper briefly summarizes how the process has evolved since its creation under President Truman. It describes the organizational structure and defines the roles of the key departments and agencies, including that of the National Security Council staff. Readers should keep in mind that the processes described in this paper reflect, in general, the operation of the national security interagency system. However, at times, individuals and circumstances will produce idiosyncratic ways of doing business. Finally, the paper comments upon how the interagency process is incorporating new organizational structures associated with homeland defense.

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EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM ¹

The national security decision-making process is critical to the management of the national security interests of the United States. When the President makes foreign policy statements, meets with visiting heads of state, travels abroad, or holds press conferences dealing with national security, his words usually have been carefully crafted and are the result of lengthy and detailed deliberations within the administration. U.S. presidents have been supported by some kind of interagency policymaking process in the United States government since World War I. The current interagency system involving the routinized consultations of senior department and agency officials, however, was not the creation of the President or the Executive Branch. Initially, in 1947, the National Security Council was an unwanted bureaucracy imposed upon the President by Congress, and was both little used and viewed with suspicion by the chief executive.

At the end of World War II, Congress sought to pass legislation that would, in part, reorganize the conduct of national security affairs for the U.S. government to ensure that a surprise attack upon the United States, such as that inflicted at Pearl Harbor, would never again occur². President Harry S Truman supported some kind of reorganization. When looking at the disparate pieces of information available to different elements of the United States government prior to December 7, 1941, President Truman was reported to have concluded, "If we'd all had that information in one agency, by God, I believe we could have foreseen what was going to happen in Pearl Harbor."³ To put this in a current context, Truman's reaction was not unlike that which has occurred in the aftermath of September 11th. Today, the attacks of 2001 reflect the new post-Cold War challenges of monitoring dispersed, non-state actors using asymmetric tactics.

Truman supported Congress's desire to establish a permanent, centrally managed intelligence community and a unified Department of Defense. But Congress also wanted an apparatus in the Executive Branch to ensure integration and coordination of policies across departments and agencies and to advise the president on national security interests. As a result of Pearl Harbor, but also in reaction to President Roosevelt's highly personalized management of policy during World War II, Congress established a formal national security structure that was codified in the National Security Act of 1947.⁴ Congress believed that if formal interagency consultative structures were established, intelligence and policy would be better coordinated, and experienced voices would be present to advise on Presidential decisions.

President Truman agreed with the intelligence and defense aspects of the legislation, and agreed to the need for an established advisory group, but was resistant to the idea of creating any other organization with decision-making authority or operational responsibilities within the Executive Branch.⁵ Truman

fully intended to maintain direct control of national security affairs, and any National Security Council the Congress wanted to establish would operate within his administration purely as an advisory group to be convened and recessed at the president's discretion.⁶ Consequently, Truman rarely attended NSC meetings.⁷ Meetings were chaired by the Secretary of State and often, instead of producing coordinated policy, provided a forum for interagency turf battles.⁸ Department Secretaries sought guidance and decisions in private follow-up meetings with the President.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, President Truman suddenly found the NSC's function of bringing together senior policymakers to be useful.⁹ He began convening regular meetings to develop, discuss, and coordinate policy related to the war. Truman's increased use of the NSC system brought about procedures that have endured to the present day, including interagency committees with responsibilities for specific regional and functional areas, analysis and development of policy options, and recommendations for Presidential decisions.¹⁰

The NSC and its staff grew in importance, size, and responsibilities with the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower. President Eisenhower's experience with a military staff system led him to establish an elaborate interagency structure centered on a Planning Board to coordinate policy development, and an Operations Coordinating Board for monitoring the implementation of policies.¹¹ Eisenhower also created, in 1953, the post of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, now commonly called the National Security Advisor.¹²

President Kennedy was uncomfortable with the extensive staff and committee system of the Eisenhower presidency and adopted a system where he talked directly with assistant secretaries or others in various agencies, as well as utilizing a small staff of hand-picked experts in the White House.¹³ By late 1962, there were only 12 substantive experts on the NSC staff.¹⁴ Kennedy also was responsible for converting the bowling alley in the basement of the White House West Wing into a Situation Room, where around-the-clock communications are maintained with all national security agencies, U.S. embassies, and military command posts.¹⁵

Sharing Kennedy's affinity for informal advisory arrangements, President Johnson continued with an informal advisory NSC system relying upon the National Security Advisor, a small NSC staff, ad hoc groups, and trusted friends. Johnson instituted a "Tuesday Lunch" policy discussion group that included the Secretaries of State and Defense, CIA Director, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁶ Later administrations have found similar weekly breakfasts or lunches to be useful for exploring and coordinating policy issues.

Centralized control of the interagency process, and domination of the development and execution of foreign policy by the White House staff reached its zenith under Presidents Nixon and Ford. President Nixon wanted to be certain that the White House fully controlled foreign policy. Henry Kissinger's expanded NSC staff (80 professionals) concentrated on acquiring analytical information from the departments and then refining it for the National Security Advisor. Kissinger then crafted his own written recommendations for President Nixon. The system reflected the President's preference for detailed written assessments rather than group deliberations. This system also reflected Kissinger's dominating personality, as well as his bureaucratic maneuverings to establish the NSC staff as the preeminent national security/foreign policy group in the administration¹⁷. Often, Secretary of State Rogers was not even consulted about major foreign policy decisions.¹⁸ Kissinger's roles in representing Nixon for opening relations with the PRC and negotiating the Vietnam War's Paris Peace Talks are illustrative of the extraordinary operational authority the National Security Advisor received from the President for both policy-making and implementation.

After Richard Nixon's resignation, President Ford inherited the final national security configuration of the Nixon era which found Henry Kissinger acting both as National Security Advisor and as the Secretary of State. Ford eventually appointed Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (USAF) as National Security Advisor. Kissinger maintained his role as chief foreign policy advisor to the president, and Scowcroft coordinated analyses and policy options between the executive branch departments and agencies.¹⁹

President Carter came into office wanting to ensure that he was choosing the best options in his foreign policy decisions. The interagency process initially was structured to allow for a more prominent role for the State Department. Moreover, Carter's concerns about foreign policy being overly dominated by a single individual (as it had been by Kissinger) led him to appoint a National Security Advisor (Zbigniew Brzezinski) who was independent and able to provide alternative judgments to those he received from the State Department.²⁰ As the administration progressed, Brzezinski increasingly acted as public advocate on policy issues rather than playing a more restricted role as policy broker and coordinator. Brzezinski's public discourses often led to tensions and disagreements over policy and roles between the NSC staff, State, and other departments.²¹

The Reagan administration desired a more collegial approach to decision-making and sought to establish a balanced system amongst the departments responsible for national security affairs. The National Security Advisor was downgraded from taking a leading policy development role; he reported to the Chief of Staff to the President, who exercised a coordinating role in the White House. Collegiality among powerful department heads was not successfully maintained, however, and conflicts became public, especially between the

Departments of State and Defense. The NSC staff also emerged as an independent actor, not only in formulating policy, but also in implementation. These operational activities resulted in the Iran-Contra affair that was investigated both by congress and a presidential commission.²² In 1987, the Tower Commission and congressional investigations determined that the NSC staff deviated from its policy coordination role into policymaking and operational implementation. Both investigations concluded that the mistakes of Iran-Contra were the result of inappropriate decisions by managers and individuals, not flaws in the structure or functions of the national security system.²³

Having served eight years as Vice President and participated regularly in deliberations of the Reagan administration, President George H.W. Bush became into office with definite ideas as to how the national security policy process should be organized. First, he appointed Lieutenant General (Ret.) Brent Scowcroft, recognized for his bureaucratic skills and collegial personality, to another tour as the National Security Advisor. President Bush reorganized the NSC system to include a Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and eight Policy Coordinating Committees, and sought (not always successfully) to establish a collegial system in which the NSC acted as a broker and coordinator of policy across the Executive Branch.

The Clinton administration also sought to emphasize a collegial approach within the interagency but different perspectives on policy between the NSC staff and the cabinet departments sometimes produced tensions and turf battles. Weekly lunches involving the Secretaries of State and Defense and the National Security Advisor were used by the Clinton administration as a regular senior policy forum for exploring and coordinating issues. The biggest change in the Clinton administration was the emphasis on economics as an element of U.S. national security. The NSC membership was expanded to include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, who was head of a National Economic Council (NEC) created by Clinton. The NEC was established to deal with foreign and domestic economic issues in much the same way as the NSC coordinated diplomatic and security issues, and some individuals served simultaneously on both the NSC and NEC staffs.

NSC ORGANIZATION

The National Security Council is chaired by the President and is called into session at the President's discretion. Its statutory members are the President, Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of Central Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The National Security Advisor is not a statutory member, but is responsible for determining the agenda in consultation with the other regular attendees of the NSC, ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared, recording NSC deliberations, and disseminating Presidential decisions.

In the current Bush administration, others invited to attend formal NSC meetings include the Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. When international economic issues are on the agenda, the National Security Advisor and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, as well as the Secretary of the Treasury, are expected to coordinate their activities. The Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings that address issues pertaining to their responsibilities. Heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, also are invited, when appropriate.

The National Security Advisor is the President's personal advisor responsible for the daily management of national security affairs for the President. The President alone decides national security policy, but the National Security Advisor is responsible for ensuring that the President has all the necessary information, that a full range of policy options have been identified, that the prospects and risks of each option have been identified, that legal considerations have been addressed, that difficulties in implementation have been identified, and that all NSC principals have been included in the development process. President Bush frequently has stipulated that National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice preside at NSC meetings in his absence. The National Security Advisor, appointed by the President as a personal aide, is not subject to Congressional confirmation. Thus, any attempt at oversight of the National Security Council and its staff by Congress must be conducted through meetings with the President or other principals of the National Security Council.

The professionals who work directly for the National Security Advisor constitute the NSC staff. Staff members handling substantive issues include political appointees (frequently experts from think tanks and academia), senior professionals on detail from Executive Branch departments, and military officers. The expertise of career Foreign Service Officers in foreign affairs often means that the senior positions of the NSC regional directorates are assigned to State Department personnel. This staff (see Appendix C) conducts the day-to-day management of national security affairs for the White House and currently numbers approximately 110 policy positions. Because the statutory National Security Council historically has met infrequently and has had little direct contact with the staff level components of the Executive Branch as a body, the NSC staff is commonly referred to (incorrectly) as "the NSC." Thus, when people in the Executive Branch agencies or Legislative Branch talk about calling or working with the NSC, they nearly always are referring to the NSC staff.

Formal meetings of the National Security Council have tended to be rare in previous administrations because Presidents did not see a need to hold "official" NSC meetings versus other, more informal, consultations. Presidents were inclined to manage national security affairs through direct meetings with

cabinet officers and key advisors, and through a series of committees with defined substantive responsibilities. This pattern of infrequent NSC meetings changed with the advent of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and the subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like President Truman during the Korean War, President George W. Bush found it valuable to bring together his most senior policymakers on a regular basis to formulate policies for conducting the global war on terrorism, military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the reorganization of agencies and activities to ensure the security of the U.S. homeland. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and during the height of US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush NSC met on a daily basis. In the intervening periods and subsequently, the Bush NSC has met at least weekly at the White House or through the use of secure video-teleconferences (called CIVITS) when the President has traveled or spent time at his ranch in Texas. During 2004, as the President has traveled more in relation to campaign activities, the NSC normally convenes via teleconference.

The most senior, regularly constituted interagency group is the Principals Committee (PC). The six principal Presidential advisors responsible for dealing with national security affairs are the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the National Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In different administrations, these individuals, along with the President's Chief of Staff and the Vice President, have met on a regular basis to discuss current and developing national security issues, review and coordinate policy recommendations developed by subordinate interagency groups and affected departments and agencies, and give direction for implementation or follow-up analyses. Although called by a variety of names in past administrations, this group has been called the Principals Committee since the administration of George H.W. Bush administration (1989-1993).

Other key Executive Branch officials may be called to attend Principals Committee meetings when issues related to their areas of responsibility are discussed. These invitees may include the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Affairs. When international economic issues are on the agenda, attendees may include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Secretary of Agriculture. The Bush administration also has included the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the White House Chief of Staff, the Deputy National Security Advisor, and National Security Adviser to the Vice President in PC meetings.

Subordinate to the Principals Committee is the Deputies Committee (DC). As the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum, the DC is responsible for directing the work of interagency working groups and ensuring that issues brought before the PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for high-level

deliberation. In general, the DC is where the bulk of the government's policy decisions are made in preparation for the PC's review and the President's decision. Issues decided above the DC level either are very significant national security decisions, are very contentious, or both. In some circumstances (e.g., crisis situations) a significant portion of interagency policy development and coordination may be done at the DC level rather than at lower levels.

The DC is composed of the deputy or relevant under secretaries to the cabinet secretaries. The regular DC members include the Deputy Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Under Secretary of the Treasury or Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser to the Vice President, Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Affairs, Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs (when appropriate), and the Deputy National Security Advisor (who serves as its chair except when the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs chairs meetings dealing with international economic issues). When international economic issues are on the agenda, the DC's regular membership adds the Deputy Secretary of Commerce, a Deputy United States Trade Representative, and the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture.

Subordinate to the DC are a variety of interagency working groups called Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs).²⁴ These interagency committees are composed of substantive experts and senior officials from the departments and agencies represented on the DC. Although bounded by how much control is exerted over policy issues by the PC and DC groups, PCCs historically are the main forum for interagency coordination. Contingent upon the scope of their responsibilities, some PCCs may meet regularly (weekly or even daily in a crisis situation) while others meet only when developments or planning require policy synchronization. They are responsible for managing the development and implementation of national security policies when they involve more than one government agency. PCCs provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The role of each PCC in policy development and implementation has tended to vary from administration to administration according to the amount of authority and responsibility delegated to them by the DC and PC. They are organized around either regional or functional issues. Regional PCCs normally are headed by Assistant Secretaries of State while functional PCCs are headed by senior department officials or NSC Senior Directors.

Current regional PCCs include:

- Europe and Eurasia
- Western Hemisphere
- East Asia
- South Asia
- Near East and North Africa
- Africa (State and NSC co-chair)

Functional PCCs include (the department responsible for chairing the committee is in parentheses):

- Arms Control (NSC)
- Combating Terrorism Information Strategy (NSC)
- Contingency Planning (NSC: Pol-Mil and Crisis planning)
- Counter-Terrorism Security Group (NSC)
- Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (DoD)
- Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (NSC)
- Muslim World Outreach (NSC and State co-chair)
- Global Environment (NSC and NEC co-chair)
- HIV-AIDS and Infectious Diseases (State & HHS)
- Intelligence and Counterintelligence (NSC)
- International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (State)
- International Finance (Treasury)
- International Organized Crime (NSC)
- Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense (NSC)
- Records Access and Information Security (NSC)
- Space (NSC)
- Strategic Communication (NSC& State: international public diplomacy)
- Terrorist Finance (Treasury)
- Transnational Economic Issues (NEC)
-

Although PCCs are divided into regional or functional groups, participation is not limited to people with only regional or functional expertise. Regional PCCs may contain department or agency members with functional expertise, and functional PCCs are likely to include regional experts. For example, the non-proliferation PCC may include regional experts covering countries involved with proliferation issues, and the Counter-Terrorism Security Group (which meets twice daily) includes representatives from the Department of Homeland Security.

In addition to PCC working groups, the Bush administration has found it necessary to stand up two special interagency groups to better coordinate the activities of the large commitments of US military, reconstruction, and diplomatic contingents in Afghanistan and Iraq. Neither group is a traditional PCC because both have assigned staffs to handle day-to-day operational issues, but both report to the DC in the same manner as PCCs. The Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group (chaired by the State Department's Coordinator for Afghanistan) coordinates interagency efforts on Afghanistan, evaluates progress on policy initiatives and whether progress on development benchmarks have been achieved, and notifies the DC when problems arise.

Likewise, the Iraq Policy and Operations Group (IPOG) coordinates the multi-faceted involvement of US government and private sector agencies in Iraq. Established after Iraq interim government assumed sovereignty over the country's affairs, the IPOG is chaired by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and a Senior NSC Director for Defense Policy and reports directly to the DC. The IPOG conducts daily video teleconferences on such issues as infrastructure reconstruction, security, and elections planning in Iraq,

As mentioned earlier, another major White House entity associated with national security affairs is the National Economic Council (NEC), first established in 1993 by President Clinton. It advises the President on matters related to global economic policy. By Executive Order, the NEC has four principal functions: to coordinate policy-making for domestic and international economic issues; to coordinate economic policy advice for the President; to ensure that policy decisions and programs are consistent with the President's economic goals; and to monitor implementation of the President's economic policy agenda. Over the course of the current Bush administration, international economic issues increasingly have been handled by the NSC staff, while the NEC has focused more specifically on domestic economic affairs.

The purview of the NEC extends to policy matters affecting the various sectors of the nation's economy, as well as to the overall strength of the U.S. and global macro-economies. Therefore, in general, members of the NEC are the department and agency heads whose policy jurisdictions affect the nation's economy. The NEC staff is composed of policy specialists whose expertise pertains to the Council's specific areas of decision-making. There are two Deputy Assistants to the President whose responsibilities are divided between domestic and international economic issues. The Deputy Assistant for international economic issues reports both to the Deputy National Security Adviser and the National Security Adviser as well as the NEC Director. The NEC staff also is comprised of several Special Assistants to the President who report to the Director on economic policy issues related to agriculture, commerce, energy, financial markets, fiscal policy, health care, labor, and Social Security. Several NSC staff members, who report directly to the National Security Advisor, also support and coordinate with the NEC Director.

Soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, another interagency body responsible for coordinating policies related to homeland security was established by the Bush administration. The Homeland Security Council was established on October 8, 2001 and its Principals Committee was organized as the senior interagency forum for homeland security issues. The structure and operation of the Homeland Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security are discussed briefly later in this paper.

NSC POLICY PROCESS

The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The National Security Act of 1947²⁵ directs that the function of the NSC "shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies related to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security," as well as to perform "other functions the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the government relating to the national security." The NSC has the responsibility to "assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States" and to "consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security." When the president makes a policy decision he usually will transmit the information verbally to the relevant cabinet secretaries, the National Security Advisor, or other appropriate officials. Occasionally, he will wish to ensure that there is clear understanding of policy objectives and requirements and will issue a formal decision document (which may be classified or unclassified) stating the policy in order to communicate the specifics of the decision to affected government departments and agencies, or to the general public. The current Bush administration calls these formal policy decisions National Security Presidential Directives. See Appendix A for the titles used in previous administrations.

The roles and missions of the parts of the NSC system also are influenced by historical events and developments in the different areas of U.S. national interests. For example, during the Clinton administration the NSC increasingly focused more on the relationship of economic matters and international trade to overall national security. Historically, economic issues were handled by the NSC staff and supported by the President's Council of Economic Advisers (a small office established in 1946 to provide the President with objective economic analysis and advice). The increasing complexity of macro-economic issues, however, and the extent to which national interests progressively involved economic policy led to the creation of the National Economic Council and the

appointment of an Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. The current Bush administration has continued this trend by appointing economic specialists to most of the NSC Directorates. Likewise, the historic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to the establishment of the Homeland Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security.

Historical events also affect the composition of the designated Directorates within the NSC staff—causing them to vary from one administration to the next and sometimes change during an administration. For example, until 1997, the Clinton administration had a separate NSC directorate for “Gulf War Illness Affairs,” which dealt with questions of Iraq's possession and possible use of WMD against the U.S. during the Gulf War of 1991-92. As policy concerns shifted to other areas, this office was disbanded and its remaining policy issues merged with the Defense Policy and Arms Control Directorate. When the current Bush administration came into office, NSC Directorates responsible for Russian policy and for Southeast European policy (i.e., the Balkans) were merged with the European Affairs Directorate into a single European and Eurasian Affairs Directorate, reflecting the administration’s desire to deal with Russia, Central and Southern Europe within the larger context of interrelated European affairs. Also, following the September 11 terrorists attacks, the NSC established the Office for Combating Terrorism (under a new Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism), and other NSC directorates and PCCs are devoting more time to terrorist considerations and developments that may affect homeland security.

The National Security Advisor and the Policy Process²⁶

Presidents rely heavily upon their National Security Advisor (NSA) to undertake a number of specific roles to support them in the managing national security affairs. Because the National Security Advisor is a personal aide to the President, this person must enjoy the President’s full trust and confidence. The 1987 report of the Tower Commission on the operation of the NSC staff identified a number of specific roles for National Security Advisors that have evolved and proven beneficial to the President in the effective management of national security affairs:²⁷

- He (now she) is an “honest broker” for the NSC process. He assures that issues are clearly presented to the President; that all reasonable options, together with an analysis of their disadvantages and risks, are brought to his attention; and that the views of the President’s other principal advisors are accurately conveyed.
- He provides advice from the President’s vantage point, unalloyed by institutional responsibilities and biases. Unlike the Secretaries of State or Defense, who have substantial organizations for which they are responsible, the President is the National Security Advisor’s only constituency.

- He monitors the actions taken by the executive departments in implementing the President's national security policies. He questions whether these actions are consistent with Presidential decisions and whether, over time, the underlying policies continue to serve U.S. interests.
- He assumes a special role in crisis management. The rapid pace of developments during crises often draws the National Security Advisor into an even more active role of advising the President on the implications for national security of unfolding events. He fulfills the need for prompt and coordinated action under Presidential control (often with secrecy being essential) and in communicating Presidential needs and directives to the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.
- He reaches out for new ideas and initiatives that will give substance to broad Presidential objectives for national security.
- He keeps the President informed about international events and developments in the Congress and the Executive Branch that affect the President's policies and priorities.

The emphasis placed upon these various roles as they are described in the Tower Commission varies from administration to administration according to the President's preferences for managing national security affairs, the National Security Advisor's interpretation of his or her role, and the personalities and styles of the various members of the Principals Committee and other policymaking bodies. For example, current NSA, Dr. Condoleeza Rice, has focused more on advising the President and ensuring coordination of policy between departments, and less on initiating policy at the NSC and directly monitoring the implementation of policy in Executive Branch departments.

In general, the National Security Advisor's (NSA) primary roles are to advise the President, advance the President's national security policy agenda, and oversee the effective operation of the interagency system. The NSA must be able to manage the process of integrating information and policy considerations affecting national interests across the spectrum of government agencies and instruments of power and foreign policy, prioritizing their strategic importance, and synthesizing them into concise issues and options for the President's consideration. The NSA should bring to the President only those issues that have been vetted through the interagency system so that he can benefit from the counsel of those departments with concomitant responsibilities and authorities. The NSA also must ensure that, given demands upon the President's time from such a wide variety of policy issues and political constituencies, the President only has to deal with those problems that require his level of involvement. This is a delicate management problem to not usurp the President's authority on "lower level" issues, while, at the same time, not consume his limited time on issues that others have been delegated the authority to decide. Protecting the President's time involves not only concisely and effectively presenting issues to the President, but also managing the constant demands of visiting dignitaries and

modern telecommunications that allow foreign governments the capability to communicate directly with the White House. Increasingly the ability for government leaders to converse directly means the NSA must manage the President's direct communications and act as a gatekeeper for the President to determine who warrants access to directly discuss national security matters.

On occasion, protecting the President's time requires the NSA to meet with foreign officials to deliver or receive messages, or discuss U.S. policy (as Rice did in meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in July 2001, April 2003, and May 2004). The Tower Commission strongly cautioned that neither the National Security Advisor nor the NSC staff should be engaged in operations, or the implementation of policy, as happened during the Iran-Contra affair. Nevertheless, although the Department of State clearly has the responsibility for dealing with foreign officials and implementing foreign policy, the NSA may act as the President's emissary to the extent that the President wishes to use the National Security Advisor in this manner—although this role has been utilized sparingly in recent administrations.

The National Security Advisor also has responsibilities beyond national security affairs that affect the President's domestic political standing. This involves the NSA's dealings with Congress and the media. The NSA must work alongside other executive branch officials to build trust with Congress in order to facilitate cooperation between the branches to achieve the administration's national security objectives. Moreover, the NSA must avoid, if possible, any appearance of national security decisions being driven by domestic politics (e.g., emphasizing international crises to divert attention from a domestic political problem), both because national security affairs should be dealt with on their own merits, and because of the need to build bi-partisan consensus on foreign policy issues. As such, one additional responsibility of the NSA is insulating the NSC staff from any political pressure--either from other components of the White House staff responsible for domestic political affairs or from political interests outside the White House. This can be a difficult mission because national security priorities often are influenced by domestic politics or have domestic implications. Consequently, the NSA must focus on advising the President about broader national security problems while being mindful of domestic political factors that may influence the acceptability of policy options.

The National Security Advisor's dealings with the media are complicated because while the Secretary of State is primarily responsible for the overall management and explanation of foreign policy, the NSA often acts as an "explicator" of policy to the media. The NSA must balance secrecy requirements with the public's right to know, and the unrelenting pressure from the media for information on a daily basis. Secrets are difficult to maintain in a democracy with a massive bureaucracy and a free press. According to former NSC staffers, news reporting and analysis generally lags policy decisions by 3-4 days and is

about 60-80% accurate, depending upon the news operation and its familiarity with the issues being covered.

Thus, to be effective, the National Security Advisor must have the trust of the President, the principals of the departments and agencies involved in national security matters, substantive experts in the bureaucracy, numerous foreign leaders and their ministries, members of both parties in the Congress, and the news media. He (or she) must be able to manage this series of complex interrelationships and promote cooperation rather than competition among the various stakeholders. In an increasingly complex, multi-dimensional policy world still possessing strategic threats, the NSA must effectively administer advice and access to the President to enable him to effectively do this part of his job.

A list of the individuals who have served as the National Security Advisor, and the dates they served, is attached at Appendix B.

The NSC Staff and the Policy Process

Like the National Security Advisor, the roles and missions undertaken by the NSC staff have evolved over time. Variations from one administration to another are due largely to presidential preferences as to specific NSC roles, organizational and management preferences of the National Security Advisor, and changes brought about through the necessity of responding to crises or complex national security problems. A close working relationship between the President and his cabinet secretaries may result in those departments dominating the development and implementation of national security policy. Alternatively, greater dependence by the President on the National Security Advisor and interagency rivalries sometimes can lead to a more active role in initiating and guiding policy for the NSC staff. Historical events also can limit or expand the roles taken on by the NSC. For example, the establishment of the National Economic Council in 1993 resulted from the increasing importance and complexity of economic issues in national security policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the growth of fledgling market economics in former communist countries. Likewise, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 increased the involvement of the NSC staff in counter-terrorism policymaking for both domestic and international venues, and the political and military complexities of U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have emphasized the roles of DoD and the State Department in policy development and implementation. During the last half of the current administration, the NSC established a new Directorate for Strategic Planning and Southwest Asia Affairs designed to conduct strategic planning and coordination across the NSC as well as handle Southwest Asia affairs because of the expertise of the Directorate's head, Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Strategic Planning to the National Security Advisor, Ambassador Robert Blackwill. Ambassador Blackwill also is

the President's personal representative on Iraqi issues. The structural changes in the NSC and the complex challenges of Iraq and the global war on terrorism have increased the role of the NSC in policymaking on Iraq and international economic affairs in recent years.

Some of the responsibilities of the NSC staff that have evolved over time as a result of bureaucratic dynamics and historical developments include:²⁸

- Direct support to the President in crisis management.
- Liaison with foreign governments.
- Support for negotiations in Presidential summits.²⁹
- Articulation of the President's policies to other departments and, at times, to the U.S. public (through the National Security Advisor).
- Coordination of summit meetings and overseas travel by the President.
- Support to the President during telephone conversations with foreign leaders.
- Coordination of the interagency policy process and policy implementation follow-up.

The wide-ranging duties and activities of the NSC staff result from the fact that the National Security Advisor and the NSC staff work directly for the President. Although the Secretaries of State and Defense are cabinet level officials who belong to the formal National Security Council, they have no authority over the NSC staff. To the extent that the National Security Advisor and his/her staff take on functions seen as the prerogative of departments or agencies, tensions and turf battles can develop that may affect the ability of an administration to develop and coordinate policy.

For example, President Nixon's desire to control U.S. foreign policy led him to support National Security Advisor Kissinger's efforts to direct a number of foreign policy issues, including normalizing bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China, conducting the war in Vietnam and eventually chairing the peace talks with North Vietnam in Paris. This led to a dominant role by the NSC staff in the development and implementation of policy in a number of areas while supporting the National Security Advisor. During the Nixon and Ford administrations (1973-1975), Henry Kissinger served concurrently as the National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. This arrangement most likely will never occur again, in part, because this arrangement defeats the objective of having the National Security Advisor act as an honest broker of policy among the various Executive Branch agencies involved in national security affairs.

Although the Secretary of State, by law, is responsible for the development and implementation of foreign policy, the President ultimately decides who among his national security team has what duties and responsibilities. Presidents who do not wish to be involved in the details and implementation of foreign policy delegate that authority to the Secretary of State. On the other

hand, Presidents who wish to be intimately involved usually rely heavily upon the National Security Advisor to help formulate foreign policy and keep them updated on developments.

A President's willingness to delegate authority for managing specific national security issues to his National Security Advisor also occasionally has resulted in the NSC staff assuming responsibility both for policy planning and execution. This is the situation that developed during the Reagan administration, resulting in the Iran-Contra affair.

Principals and Deputies Committees and the Policy Process

The Principals Committee (PC) acts as the President's senior level policy review and coordination group. In effect, the PC is the same as the National Security Council without the President and Vice President (although Vice President Cheney regularly participates in PC meetings in the current Bush administration). The PC's mission is to ensure that, as much as possible, policy decisions brought to the President reflect a consensus within the departments and agencies. If the process works as intended, the President does not have to spend time on uncoordinated policy recommendations and can focus on high level problems and those issues upon which the departments and agencies could not reach a consensus. In administrations where there are strong rivalries among senior advisors (such as the Kissinger-Secretary of State Rogers enmity during the Nixon administration, or the competition between National Security Advisor Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance during the Carter administration), policy coordination frequently breaks down. Even when strong disagreements (or rivalries) occur between senior policy advisors such as the Secretaries of State and Defense (e.g., Shultz and Weinberger during the Reagan administration), regularly scheduled PC meetings allow for such differences to be aired and identified, and consensus policy recommendations coordinated where agreement exists.

Typically, the Principals Committee meets as required, usually once or twice each week to review policy on pressing matters, but may meet less or more frequently depending upon circumstances such as crisis situations or just prior to major summit meetings. Currently, the PC in the Bush administration meets four times a week. Two 45-minute meetings are held back-to-back on Tuesday afternoons, and a second series of two 45-minute meetings are held back-to-back on Thursday mornings. Each 45-minute meeting usually covers one major policy topic. During the last year, meetings topics frequently have included discussions of the overall strategies for Iraq, Afghanistan, the global war on terrorism, and Sudan. Other issues that are time sensitive and involve critical US interests (such as the protracted fighting between US forces and Iraqi insurgents in Najaf during the summer of 2004) also are likely to be discussed at the PC level. In general, as the Bush 43 administration nears the end of its first term,

there has been more involvement at the PC level on honing and ensuring the successful implementation of existing policies rather than developing many new policy initiatives.

In addition (or sometimes in lieu of formal PC meetings), weekly informal meetings involving the Secretaries of State and Defense, and National Security Advisor often are held over breakfast or lunch, or via conference calls or CIVITS secure video teleconferences. Likewise, the Deputies Committee (DC) normally meets four or five times a week (as well as less or more frequently according to circumstances) to review PCC recommendations, deliberate issues upon which the PCCs could not reach a consensus, and decide what matters should be forwarded to the PC. Currently, the DC meets on Tuesday mornings for two 45-minute back-to-back meetings, and on Thursday afternoons for two 45-minute back-to-back meetings. When needed, additional meetings may be held on Wednesdays. Issues worked during the last year in the Bush administration at the DC level include Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Venezuela, Colombia, intelligence community reform (including the establishment of a task force chaired by Dr. Rice), defense trade issues, space policy, and the global war on terrorism. Like the PC during the last year of the administration's first term, the DC has been more involved with refining and ensuring the successful implementation of existing policies rather than developing many new policy initiatives.

Issues forwarded to the PC include policy recommendations made at the DC and PCC level, and policy issues upon which an interagency consensus could not be reached at the PCC and DC levels (although sometimes President Bush prefers the PC to see an array of analyses and options rather than a single, consensus position).

During crisis periods, the PC, DC, and PCCs meet frequently. For example, during crises such as the 1991 Gulf War, 1999 Kosovo crisis, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in September 2001, and the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, a typical day often included:

- Departmental meetings with Secretaries or Deputy Secretaries in the early morning to review developments, responsibilities, taskings, and policy issues of concern to the mission of each department.
- In mid-morning, the DC meets, sometimes conducted via secure teleconferencing with senior staff and area/functional experts, to develop interagency positions on developments and new policy issues. This DC meeting might be followed immediately by a meeting of the DC senior members (without supporting staff) to discuss sensitive intelligence or policy issues.
- In late morning or early afternoon, the PC meets to discuss the results and unresolved issues of the DC, consider strategic policy directions, and determine what issues need to be brought to the attention of the President. PC members may then meet with the President (who usually

receives updates on the crisis situation from the National Security Advisor throughout the day).

- In mid or late afternoon, the DC again meets to discuss the implementation of decisions reached by the PC and President, and discuss the results of PCC meetings that have been held throughout the day (individual PCCs may meet more than once a day during crisis periods).
- Individual members of the DC are likely to have a late afternoon meeting with their Principal to confer about developments of the day, and a subsequent meeting with their staffs to discuss the day's decisions, developments, and next steps. Depending upon the circumstances of the day, the PC may have an additional evening meeting and subsequent consultation with the President.

This kind of high operational tempo may persist for several weeks or months, depending upon the duration of the crisis and the need to involve the President and cabinet level officers on a daily basis.

Policy Coordination Committees and the Policy Process

Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) deal with a range of national security issues that cut across the responsibilities of Executive Branch departments and agencies. Issues may be regional, such as U.S. policy toward Iraq or NATO expansion, or functional, such as arms control agreements with Russia or terrorism in South Asia.

PCC work is different than that performed in the departments or agencies. Departmental or agency planning focuses on achieving agency objectives on a regional and operational level. Coordination is focused on departmental ways and means and is based upon internal agency doctrine and processes. Contentious issues are resolved internally at senior levels. PCC planning is focused more on advance planning at the political and strategic level. Policy-makers want flexibility and a range of options that are politically acceptable and minimize the risk of failure. Interagency groups also must develop policy options that advance U.S. interests through coordinated actions involving several departments and agencies. An effective interagency process reduces the complexity of the policy decisions and focuses the planning on mission success factors. This means that policy planning must integrate desired policy aims and synchronize the efforts of the different departments and agencies. Planning to advance U.S. interests is likely to involve multi-agency, and multilateral considerations.

Collaboration is central to a PCC's success, but teamwork and unity is vulnerable to political risks, bureaucratic equities, and personal relationships. Because U.S. interests and foreign policy have tended to remain fairly stable

from administration to administration, an informal policy consensus often exists across agencies when dealing with routine matters. But, policy disagreements and turf battles are inevitable because of different departmental objectives and priorities, disagreements about the dynamics or implications of developing situations, or because departments are seeking to evolve or formulate new roles and missions. Also, hard problems do not lend themselves to easy solutions, and frequently there are genuine differences between departments over the best ways, means, and objectives for dealing with a national security problem. Moreover, because regional experts tend to dominate on overall policy approaches (even though they may lack expertise on many functional issues), different interpretations of events or credibility issues may arise within the PCC group. These issues must be openly addressed to enable the group to collaborate effectively, refine core policy issues, and achieve a consensus policy document. As one former NSC staff member observed, the easiest outcome to produce in the interagency process is to prevent policy from being made. The wide range of issues, the different policy perspectives of various departments, the nature of bureaucratic politics, contests over turf and responsibilities, disagreements over which department has the lead, and the clash of personalities and egos all place a premium on ensuring that the equities of all involved agencies are considered, and on building an informal policy consensus amongst the players.

The operational dynamics of individual PCCs, like most working group entities, vary according to the personalities (and, sometimes, personal agenda) of the individuals who are in charge of, or participate in, them. In general, however, most PCCs undertake a five-part process when working on a policy issue:

- Define the problem. This includes assessing what U.S. national interests and strategic objectives are involved, reviewing intelligence reports, and seeking to determine some understanding of the dynamics of the situation (including what is known, what is assumed, and what is unknown) and the interests and motivations of the actors involved. Is there a consensus on the issues at stake for the U.S. and the implications of acting or not acting? This part of the process also includes identifying additional information and intelligence needs and levying requirements to the intelligence and diplomatic communities.
- Clarify PCC processes and intra-group “rules of engagement.” Develop broad principles to guide the way the interagency group should think about a problem and craft a strategy for addressing it.
- Articulate policy objectives, assess options, and develop an overall strategy for U.S. policy. Deliberations may include preventive strategies, or strategies for responses to possible developments as policies are implemented. Mission areas for the departments and agencies should be

clarified and component strategies (including identifying capabilities and resource needs) developed that, eventually, are integrated into a single strategic approach. “Strawman” proposals are useful for clarifying departmental perspectives. Strategies usually are required for consulting with friends and allies, and developing multilateral consensus on strategic objectives and operational activities. Other considerations include monitoring the implementation of complex, multi-dimensional activities (which may include the activities of several departments), and anticipating transition dynamics as policies begin to produce expected and unanticipated effects.

- Identify policy instruments and component strategies (including ways and means) to achieve the desired policy objectives. Operational planning must be clarified and coordinated among the agencies involved, and integrated missions must be identified and coordinated where appropriate. A process must be developed that steers around interagency and bureaucratic roadblocks. The standard operating procedures in departments and agencies may have difficulty working with coordinated interagency plans and gaps may develop in implementation. PCCs must seek ways to talk with operational-level staff to determine potential problems and solicit suggestions for effective implementation.
- Draft an integrated policy document. Ideally, this document should confirm the strategic approach, objectives, scope of effort and timelines, requirements and preparatory actions, chains of command, communication, and responsibilities (independent and shared) and accountability for the departments. It also should identify assets, resource, and logistical requirements. Mechanisms should be established for integration at all levels as policies are implemented. Key judgments about the situation, the important policy issues, and recommendations should be identified for the Deputies and Principals Committees. The Deputies and Principals need enough detail (but not too much) to be able to understand the dynamics of the situation, the major issues at stake, and implications for our national security. Depending upon the preferences of the incumbent administration, the PCC may be tasked to recommend a single policy option or multiple options, and provide majority and dissenting positions.

Although regional or functional PCCs deal with issues unique to their area of responsibility, there are a number of issues that most, if not all, PCCs find useful to consider. These include assessments of:

- Whether there is a compelling necessity for action. Are there threats to vital (or critical or important) U.S. interests? Is there an imperative for the U.S. to act? Are there viable alternatives to U.S. action?

- Desired U.S. objectives and the level of commitment to those objectives (by the departments and agencies, Congress, and U.S. public). Are the objectives clear and directly linked to U.S. interests?
- The level of U.S. resolve in its policy commitments as perceived by the countries the policies are targeted toward, other states in the region; allied, friendly, neutral and hostile states. The PCCs also should consider how the U.S. Congress and the U.S. public are likely to perceive the administration's resolve on proposed policies.
- The capabilities and willingness of allies, friends, and neutrals to support U.S. policy objectives and initiatives. Is there a consensus by key states or actors on the issue? What are their national interests? To what extent will they benefit or experience costs for supporting U.S. policy? What resources (political or otherwise) will they be willing to commit in support of the policy objectives; are they willing to act in a combined or coordinated manner?
- The likely reaction of regional states, allies, friends, neutrals, or hostile states that might oppose U.S. objectives. What are their calculations of costs and risks versus benefits to opposing the U.S.?
- The likely reaction of the United Nations or other international organizations to U.S. objectives. What are their calculations of costs versus benefits to supporting or opposing the U.S.?
- Costs and risks in implementing the policy versus costs and risks of inaction?
- Supporting or opposing legal authorities (e.g., international law, U.N. resolutions).
- The effects of stalled policy initiatives, and the administration's willingness to escalate (e.g., incentives, influence, coercion, etc.) to achieve policy objectives.
- Receptivity to considerations of alternative policies, and strategies for achieving the policy objectives in the face of stalled initiatives.
- The inherent limitations in trying to influence the course of events in achieving policy objectives.
- The effects of policy actions over time, including unintended consequences.
- Expected costs and benefits for those departments and agencies involved.

Some policy issues are even more complex and involve multidimensional assessments of allies and friends, neutrals, international organizations, and affected populations. For example, policy planning for peacekeeping or humanitarian missions would include consideration of issues related to:

- Diplomatic collaboration to solicit participants and build coalitions for delivering humanitarian assistance and deploying military forces (if required).
- The role of regional groups and organizations
- The role of the United Nations or other international organizations

- Cease-fire / disengagement / stabilization in the crisis area
- Prisoner exchange between warring parties
- Weapons control / demobilization
- De-mining
- Humanitarian relief
- Refugee / displaced person return
- Internal political cooperation
- Counter-terrorism
- Anti-official corruption / illicit criminal operations
- Strengthening local or regional institutions or organizations
- Management of factions / actors in the crisis area with political objectives incompatible with, or in direct opposition to U.S. objectives and who will seek to thwart U.S. actions
- Political transition / elections / democratization
- Rule of law / police / criminal justice
- Atrocities / abuses / war crimes prosecution
- Civil and social order
- National reconciliation
- Economic reform and restoration / private investment
- Public diplomacy
- Flash point management

Likewise, a PCC dealing with trade issues would involve considerations related to domestic and foreign economic and political issues, international laws and organizations, and different concerns for the departments and agencies involved.

Managing the process by which a PCC conducts business is complicated given the range and complexity of issues addressed. Lessons learned in the PCC process for promoting collaboration and high performance include maintaining a focus on a “high conceptual level.” This includes having participants support the following objectives:

Share an understanding of principles, goals, and priorities

- Bureaucratic interests must be represented, but remember that the final objective is good policy.
- Fully understand the policy context and preferences of their department principals, as well as those represented by others around the table.
- Expand individual frames of reference to gain an understanding of diplomatic, political, military, economic, humanitarian, development, and legal perspectives on the policy problem at hand.
- Seek a broad situation assessment, utilizing a wide range of intelligence, diplomatic, allies and friends, and NGO sources.
- Search for ambiguous assumptions and information gaps.

- Focus on a realistic time horizon.
- Clarify the tough value trade-offs in the policy decisions.
- Match commitments with political will.

Support a prudent consensus approach

- Agree on an effective process plan.
- Strengthen interagency team identity.
- Control internal politics among team members.
- Foster competitive--and constructive--debate.
- Forge a consensus approach for action. Build support with those sharing similar perspectives, and bring in supporting material from outside actors not directly involved in meetings but who can affect final acceptance of policy decisions (e.g., congressmen, staffers, trade interests, NGOs, etc.). This consideration should be weighed against the desires of higher level policy groups who prefer to have multiple analyses and options to contemplate in order to determine their own policy recommendations. Awareness of the preferences and operating styles of senior policy groups is crucial for working effectively at the PCC level.
- Keep your boss informed of developments, don't let him or her be blindsided in a higher level policy forum.

Maintain vigilance over intra-group management

- Be well prepared on substantive issues, legal constraints, and the bureaucratic/policy preferences of your principal and the other agencies represented.
- Adjust and self-correct for changing conditions or ineffective group practices.
- Manage time, including competing commitments and responsibilities.
- Seek to be constructive and be willing to compromise and make trade offs.
- Participants in such meetings are not immune to considerations of their professional reputations and careers. Professionalism and the constructive handling of disagreements are important to successful operations.
- Keep pace--stay ahead of the crisis environment.
- Anticipate media/press issues and congressional concerns.

Meetings in response to crisis conditions are likely to experience additional complications. Crises are characterized by fast moving events, pressure to act quickly to minimize damage or prevent crisis escalation, partial and sometimes confusing or conflicting information or intelligence, and the complexities of multi-tasking and coordinating the activities of a wide range of actors and interested parties.

For the individual, the keys to being an effective member of a crisis management team are (1) maintaining involvement, (2) maintaining alertness, (3) maintaining a strategic focus, and (4) being unbiased. Maintaining involvement includes being an active team participant, making insightful (but not redundant) contributions at meetings, knowing your department's positions and equities, keeping senior officials in your department informed, staying abreast of the latest developments (e.g., reading the intelligence reports and embassy cables), doing a share of the drafting of papers, and being reliable (i.e., producing what you say you are going to do). Maintaining alertness means having physical and mental stamina. Crises that last weeks and months are tough physically. They require perseverance and a willingness to spend long hours attending meetings and doing follow up work (as in the case, for example, of the Counter-Terrorism Security Group PCC which meets twice daily). Maintaining a strategic focus means concentrating on strategic interests and broad objectives, and not getting bogged down in tactical or trivial issues that are the responsibilities of the policy implementing departments. Being unbiased means being able to step back from the crisis periodically to see if interests, dynamics, or its strategic context have changed. Effective PCCs must be able to periodically question assumptions established earlier in the crisis management cycle.

KEY DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS

Department of State

Under the constitution, the executive branch and the Congress have constitutional responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy. President George Washington's first cabinet included Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. The Secretary of State is fourth in line of succession to the presidency.

Within the executive branch, the Department of State is the lead foreign affairs agency and the Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor. The Department also supports the foreign affairs activities of other U.S. Government entities, including the Department of Commerce and the Agency for International Development.

In addition, as the lead foreign affairs agency, the Department of State has the primary role in:

- Leading interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy;
- Managing the foreign affairs budget and other foreign affairs resources;

- Leading and coordinating U.S. representation abroad, and conveying U.S. foreign policy to foreign governments and international organizations through U.S. embassies and consulates in foreign countries and diplomatic missions to international organizations;
- Conducting negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties on issues ranging from trade to nuclear weapons; and
- Coordinating and supporting international activities of other U.S. agencies and officials.

The Department of State, like many other cabinet departments, is a centralized organization, with the Secretary of State at the helm. Beneath the Secretary in the senior hierarchy are other principals --the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, and Counselor of the Department. In rank order, assistant secretaries for regional bureaus follow. (See Appendix D for a State Department organizational chart)

Although the Department of State is the lead government foreign affairs agency, it does not dictate foreign policy for the US government. Because so many executive branch departments have international programs, there is an inherent difference in perspective at interagency meetings. Secretary Colin Powell, in his testimony before Congress (April 23, 2003), addressed the phenomenon in this way: “With respect to what’s going on within the administration, it’s not the first time I have seen discussions within the administration between one department or another. I have seen four straight administrations at a senior level; and thus it has been, and thus it has always been, and thus it should be. There should be tension within the national security team, and from that tension, arguments are surfaced for the President. And the one who decides, the one who makes the foreign policy decisions for the United States of America, is not the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense or the National Security Advisor. It’s the President.”

In conducting international affairs, the Secretary attends cabinet meetings, NSC meetings chaired by the National Security Advisor, and PCs. When the Secretary is traveling abroad, a deputy may be designated to attend as State’s senior representative. For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell has designated Deputy Secretary Armitage to attend PCs in his absence. Similarly, Deputy Secretary Armitage has asked Undersecretaries of Assistant Secretaries to attend DCs, on occasion. Undersecretary for Economic and Business Affairs Alan Larson is a prime example of an undersecretary who has attended PCs and DCs, in part because of the expertise he brings to bear. Regarding PCCs, assistant secretaries or their deputies usually attend. Delegating others to attend interagency meetings has been a fairly common practice in all administrations.

Frequently, special senior interagency committees are established. During the Clinton administration, an interagency “Coordinating Sub Group” on terrorism, whose members included State’s Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism

Affairs and similarly ranked officials from DOD, FBI and CIA, met under the chairmanship of a senior NSC official. This practice persists in the current Bush administration. For example, there is an “Executive Steering Group”, chaired by a senior NSC advisor, which deals with a wide variety of issues (including Iraq) and a Counter-Terrorism Security Group that reports directly to the Deputies Committee.

After the August 1998 bombings at the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Secretary of State Albright appointed Accountability Review Boards (ARBs) for both events.³⁰ These boards were chaired by retired Admiral William Crowe, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and later US Ambassador to Great Britain. This was done in accordance with US laws that mandate convening such boards anytime there is a security-related incident causing serious injury, loss of life, or significant damage of property at or related to a US mission abroad. In brief, ARBs investigate and to make recommendations. Retired and active duty representatives from State, the FBI, CIA, and the private sector served on the two boards.

Among the recommendations from the ARBs chaired by Crowe was an appropriation of \$1.4 billion a year for at least ten years for embassy construction and repair. Madeleine Albright writes in her autobiography: “By the time I left office, we had gained agreement for appropriations close to the level recommended by Admiral Crowe, an agreement that was critical because we had learned that the dangers to our personnel were no longer localized but global. There was no such thing as a low-risk post. If we had soft spots, we could expect our enemies to exploit them.”

Below this level, there are numerous other interagency groups. They may meet recurrently or just once. After Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm, there were a series of interagency sessions on a wide range of U.S. policy issues in the Gulf. Similarly, during the Clinton administration, the State Department called a one-time interagency meeting on Lebanon when the issue of the passport restriction on American citizens was under review. Officers at the GS-15 or equivalent rank were asked to attend from a wide array of agencies--DoD, FAA, CIA and the like. Likewise, a variety of interagency meetings were held before, during and after Operation Iraqi Freedom. The purpose of such meetings may not be to decide the issue, but to exchange views and lay groundwork for issues expected to be considered by PCCs, DCs, and PCs. Staff work for such meetings may be narrowly focused, and handled even by a single office in a bureau.

By contrast, the staff work done for the secretary and his principals for interagency meetings is more elaborate. The Office of the Executive Secretary (S/ES) is key. S/ES is located on State’s “seventh floor” and is comprised of some 175 plus employees. It is responsible for coordinating State Department’s internal operations, liaising between the bureaus and principals, running the

State Department's 24\7 operations center, organizing and staffing the Secretary's foreign travel, and liaising between the NSC and other executive branch departments. More specifically, S/ES is responsible for tasking papers within State Department for interagency meetings involving the principals. S/ES sets the due dates for these papers in line with the time of the meetings.

An Executive Secretary and four Deputy Executive Secretaries lead S/S. The Executive Secretary traditionally is a very senior, career Foreign Service officer.

The relationship between State's Executive Secretary and Executive Secretaries in the National Security Council and the Department of Defense is very important. It is often through their communications, both verbally and in writing that notification of high-level meetings is made. State Executive Secretaries also may receive debriefs from their counterparts on decisions from more informal meetings or discussions among the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor.

One aspect of the State Department which sets it apart vis-a-vis the interagency process is its own special composition. In his memoirs, James Baker, former Secretary of State under Bush 41, wrote that, "Without a doubt, the State Department has the most unique bureaucratic culture I've ever encountered. In most of the federal government, the work is guided by a small number of political appointees who work together with civil service—the career bureaucracy that is designated to be above politics and provide institutional memory and substantive expertise. But at State there is also the Foreign Service, the elite corps of foreign affairs officers who staff the Department's country and functional desks in Washington and our embassies abroad."³¹

At interagency meetings, the State Department representatives, whether in support of a principal or on their own, bring to the table a wealth of on the ground, in-depth experiences in dealing with foreign governments and cultures from around the globe, which helps frame their recommendations and conclusions. In addition, by virtue of State's position as the lead government agency in foreign affairs, the State Department has an unusual breadth of information to tap—from all agencies. In his memoirs, Secretary Shultz wrote that, "As secretary, I could see that I had at hand an extraordinary information machine: it could produce a flow of reports on what was happening in real time, background on what had been done before and how that had worked, analyses of alternative courses of action, and ideas on what might be done. The Department is a great engine of diplomacy for the secretary to use in carrying out the president's foreign policy."³²

Department of Defense

To understand and have an appreciation of the Department of Defense's role in the interagency process, it is instructive to look briefly at DoD's history and how it evolved into the organization it is today.

First, one should remember that the department did not exist, nor did the Joint Chiefs of Staff receive statutory authority, until the late 1940s. Up until and through the Second World War, there were two military departments--War and Navy. Both the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy reported directly to the President. Conflicting judgments often arose between the Army and Navy over critical issues, including allocation of resources, strategic priorities, and command arrangements. Disagreements sometimes affected how military operations were conducted. To coordinate efforts during WW II, some 75 inter-service agencies and inter-departmental committees were formed. These ad hoc arrangements worked, but only because of the nation's vast resources were we able to compensate for mistakes, inefficiencies, and internal divisions.

The National Security Act of 1947 created a National Military Establishment (NME) headed by a Secretary of Defense. The three secretaries of the military departments (including the Secretary of the newly formed Air Force) retained their powers, subject only to the authority of the Secretary of Defense to exercise "general direction, authority, and control." The newly formed National Security Council, chaired by the President, included the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. During this nascent phase of the NSC, the military's perspectives were well represented by occupying four of the seven NSC seats.

The NME was replaced by the Department of Defense under provisions of the 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act. The 1949 Amendment also increased the powers of the Secretary of Defense, diminished those of the military departments, and provided for a Chairman to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, with this amendment, the secretaries of the military departments lost their membership on the NSC.

There were two legislative acts during the Eisenhower administration (1953 and 1958) that consolidated more authority in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. Given President Eisenhower's military background, it should be no surprise that he was a firm believer in centralized control and a clearly defined chain of command. A fairly strong Secretary of Defense, together with a weakly structured Joint Chiefs of Staff that functioned as a committee, prevailed through the 1960s (mainly the McNamara years) and the 1970s. It was not until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that the military gained a greater voice in interagency affairs. The Act provided, among other things, for a stronger and more active Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who would be the principal

adviser to the President, the NSC, and Secretary of Defense (as compared to a Chairman who previously represented the views of the four Chiefs of the Services). Goldwater-Nichols also significantly increased the powers of the combatant commanders and clarified the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders. This ascension of the commanders, in effect, further weakened the influence of the individual service secretaries and chiefs.

Today, the Department of Defense is a centralized organization with power clearly resting in the hands of the Secretary of Defense and, secondarily, in the hands of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense, together with the Command-in-Chief, epitomizes the principle of “civilian control of the military.” Ultimate authority within the Department of Defense rests with the Secretary. The three Service Secretaries report directly to him, as do the senior civilian officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who has the ultimate authority in the military chain of command, also reports to the Secretary of Defense. While the unified combatant commanders, by statute, report to the Secretary of Defense, by practice they clear (or at least discuss) all positions with the CJCS prior to communicating with the Secretary. (See Appendix E for a Defense Department organizational chart)

The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the primary Defense players in the interagency arena. They represent the Department at NSC meetings chaired by the President, and at Principal Committee meetings chaired by the National Security Adviser. Their deputies, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attend the Deputies Committee meetings (throughout the first Bush and the Clinton administrations, however, the Secretary of Defense was represented at the DC meetings by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy).

At the staff level, virtually all the work in DoD for interagency deliberations is done in the Policy organization for OSD and in the J-5 directorate (Strategy, Plans and Policy) for the Joint Staff. Attendees at the Policy Coordination Committee meetings and lower lever interagency groups are Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and GS-15s from Policy and one- or two-star flag officers and action officers (O-5s and O-6s) from J-5. With regard to homeland security issues, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security is the single point of contact for the many directorates and agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, and also represents Northern Command in the interagency. Hardly ever are there representatives from the unified commands or the individual services at interagency meetings. The possible exception might be if a combatant commander is specifically invited by the President (or National Security Adviser) to attend a meeting. People from the Joint Staff are quite protective of the fact that they work to fulfill the statutory

responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

Historically, some Presidents have preferred to hear a coordinated DoD position while others wished to hear counter-arguments and multiple options. Especially since Goldwater-Nichols, the military's views should be submitted separately from OSD's. Moreover, President Bush, in general, prefers to hear all views, including disagreements between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when circumstances allow. However, crisis conditions may affect the President's willingness to pursue extensive debates on competing options. For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense expressed opinions at a strategy session of senior Presidential advisors. At the conclusion of the meeting, the President's Chief of Staff pulled the two participants aside and admonished, "The President will expect one person to speak for the Department of Defense."³³ Some DoD officials believe strongly that if the OSD civilians and the military have a coordinated position and speak as one voice, the Department's views carry more weight and DoD officials can be more effective in the interagency process.

Another example of differing voices occurred during the initial deliberations in August 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait. After a meeting with the President, then Secretary of Defense Cheney chastised General Powell, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for offering an opinion that the Secretary perceived as political advice. "Colin," he said, "you're the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You're not Secretary of State. You're not the National Security Advisor anymore. And you're not Secretary of Defense. So stick to military matters."³⁴

This is not to say, however, that military officers should not speak at interagency meetings. They should speak. They are obligated to give their best military advice on the issue at hand. Often, military officers are criticized for not speaking out more forcefully. Their reluctance to speak might be because they do not want to be viewed (especially at the lower officer levels) as presenting the views of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Another reason for their reluctance may be more personality driven, i.e., a certain amount of intimidation by the senior civilians around the table. Nevertheless, some senior flag officers believe strongly that military officers also should comment on non-military matters. They argue that military officers bring a strategic perspective to interagency groups that can help clarify (or question) assumptions, identify conflicting interests, or raise questions about unintended second or third order effects of proposed policies.

Even so, it is important that the proper military advice be given. Most of the civilians at interagency meetings have little or no experience with military operations. They generally do not have an appreciation for what happens "behind the scenes" of any successful military operation. Without getting into the

weeds, military officers need to explain what could be accomplished with the use of military forces, and what are the limitations. At the same time, the military should expect at the conclusion of these deliberations to have a clear set of objectives and parameters within which to operate. During the Clinton administration's debates over Somalia and Bosnia, for example, the military's voices were often not heard (or ignored), while the civilians pushed the military into ill-defined situations abroad.

Traditionally, the Department of Defense performs a secondary (or support) role to State's lead in foreign policy, but plays an active role at interagency meetings in determining the parameters, or tools, of our foreign policy. From DoD's perspective, its two primary concerns are possible uses of military forces and expenditure of Defense resources. During the current war on terrorism with military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (and supporting anti-terrorist military actions by other countries), however, DoD plays a more equal role in foreign policy discussions because of coalition military considerations, and political-military and security problems in the two countries. Historically, though, DoD frequently has resisted the involvement of U.S. troops because situations were assessed to not constitute a proper military mission or there are other alternatives available (i.e., other countries' military forces, UN, NGOs). The Department's position in such meetings often is to withhold use of U.S. forces unless they, and only they, possess the capability to perform a function that protects or promotes U.S. security interests.

Ultimately the decision to use military forces may be based upon political interests and not DoD's judgments about the "best" use of combatant forces. For example, in the days leading up to the decision to deploy U.S. forces into Somalia in 1992 to assist humanitarian operations responding to widespread famine, the combatant commander of the U.S. Central Command argued about the deleterious impact on military readiness for dealing with potential threats to higher level U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East region. Nevertheless, the political decision that the acute humanitarian and U.S. international leadership interests at the time required U.S. intervention and overrode DoD's concerns about the impact on traditional mission capabilities.

The second frequent Department of Defense concern is the expenditure of resources. Policymakers rarely consider the cost of operations directed by the NSC. This usually is due to the urgency of taking action or a tendency to ignore (or avoid) the fact that ultimately someone has to pay the bill. There also is a common belief that "DoD possesses all the resources." While it is true that Defense's budget is many times larger than the Department of State's, for example, there are laws and regulations on precisely how and for what purposes DoD's money may be spent. So, just as use of military forces is not necessarily the best, or only, solution, careful attention needs to be paid to the cost of such actions taken through the interagency process, and to who will pay those costs.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have broadened the scope of DoD's contacts, roles and missions in the interagency arena. In response to the terrorist attacks, DoD approved the concept of Joint and Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) to improve interagency cooperation and improve operational effectiveness for all Regional Combatant Commands, JFCOM, TRANSCOM, and NORTHCOM. JIACGs are tailored to meet the requirements and challenges of each Combatant Commander's AOR, and may include representatives from a wide range of USG agencies, the intelligence community, and even non-governmental organizations such as the American Red Cross.

According to Joint Forces Command which is piloting the program, the JIACG concept seeks to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the government.³⁵ The JIACG is intended to be a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

Proposed JIACG functions include:

- Participate in combatant command staff crisis planning and assessment.
- Advise the combatant command staff on civilian agency campaign planning.
- Work civilian-military campaign planning issues.
- Provide civilian agency perspectives during military operational planning activities and exercises.
- Present unique civilian agency approaches, capabilities & limitations to the military campaign planners.
- Provide vital links to Washington civilian agency campaign planners.
- Arrange interfaces for a number of useful agency crisis planning activities.
- Conduct outreach to key civilian international and regional contacts.

In day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters, the JIACG group supports the standing joint force headquarters core element (SJFHQ) planners by advising on civilian agency operations and plans, and providing perspective on civilian agency approaches, capabilities and limitations to develop a coordinated use of national power.

When a joint task force forms and deploys, the JIACG extends this support to the commander's staff through the JFHQ political-military planning staff. This becomes the mechanism to plan the best mix of capabilities to achieve the desired effects that include the full range of diplomatic, information, and economic interagency activities.

In the aftermath of September 11, DoD also established the Northern Command (See Appendix F for a NORTHCOM organizational chart) to conduct operations to deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the

United States, its territories, and interests within its assigned area of responsibility; the US and its territories (excluding Hawaii), Canada, Mexico and portions of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. NORTHCOM has both a homeland defense mission, and a military support to civilian authorities homeland security mission including consequence management operations as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security, interagency activities range from incident response, to operational planning, to joint exercises between the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command on topics such as multiple hazard biological or chemical incidents; threats to infrastructure, aviation, or shipping facilities; airport, port, and border security; and support to civil authorities.

Northern Command works closely with the Department of Homeland Security on issues such as the coordinating and de-conflicting responsibilities for maritime awareness and interdiction, military support to civil authorities (including how to fulfill incident response requirements that local authorities can't meet such as provision of mobile chemical-biological laboratories—and who pays for the costs), use of other National Guard and Reserve forces in support of civil authorities, and questions about limitations under *Posse Comitatus* provisions.³⁶ The homeland defense\ homeland security requirements for NORTHCOM means that it often is involved in very non-traditional operations for a regional unified command. Recent examples of NORTHCOM activities include conducting routine Combat Air Patrols over various US cities, support for recovery operations of the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, surveillance operations during the Washington, D.C. sniper attacks of 2002, wildfire control during 2003 and 2004, hurricane relief to Florida in August-September 2004.

According to senior NORTHCOM commanders, some of the biggest challenges facing the command include:

- Planning for active duty, reserve, and National Guard requirement contingencies for homeland defense or support to civil authorities.
- Managing planning requirements to draw operational forces from other commands since NORTHCOM lacks a commensurate indigenous force structure.
- Educating regional combatant commands to be cognizant that their assets also may be called upon for CONUS incident response operations (e.g., multiple, simultaneous WMD attacks).
 - In addition to theater operational considerations, regional combatant commands also should consider potential future support to homeland defense or security operations.
 - Regional combatant commands that conduct theater planning for units with unique capabilities (e.g., chem.-bio recon\ response units) also should plan for possible deployments to CONUS for homeland defense requirements.
- Educating regional combatant commands to recognize that terrorist threats to CONUS are global in nature and cut across regional AORs.

- Regional combatant commands must be cognizant that theater policies, decisions and actions affect security in CONUS
- Regional combatant commands must recognize that AOR “seams” constitute potential vulnerabilities to homeland defense and security.
- Planning for integrating and synchronizing the activities of DoD, DHS, state and local entities, and NGOs to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.
- Provide early situational awareness, conduct effective operations when required, and facilitate planning for future operations.

The Intelligence Community

The primary role of the intelligence community in the process of national security decision-making is to provide information that will help policy-makers understand the situation they are dealing with. Information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and other intelligence community components provides analysis about what is happening on the ground, what is the nature of the geographic area of concern, who are the actors, what is their disposition, and what are their likely intentions. The latter is the most difficult analysis for the intelligence community to produce and often is the most contentious. (See Appendix G for an Intelligence Community organizational chart)

Including representatives from the intelligence community in PCCs or other policy planning groups is critical because reviewing existing intelligence information and determining requirements for additional intelligence collection and analysis should be one of the first steps in considering national security issues. Analysis from the intelligence community will help decision-makers better understand the actual conditions (political, social, economic, military, transportation, communications, public health, etc.) in other countries, the capabilities of groups or countries in the area, the motivations and likely intentions of leaders, the interests and capabilities of other stakeholders, and what the potential threats are to U.S. interests and personnel both abroad and within the United States. The intelligence community also can provide assessments of the likely effects (near and long term) of proposed courses of action on specific individuals, groups, or national and regional populations. However, remember that you will never get all the information you want or feel that you need. The intelligence community is highly capable, but not omniscient.

Ultimately, it is up to the policy maker to decide how he or she uses intelligence; and there are many reasons why a policy maker will or will not use intelligence. For example, intelligence information enhances power in policy discussions when it bolsters one’s own position, but it may be discounted if it

calls into question the wisdom of following a preferred policy path. Policymakers must work out how to resolve often conflicting information or unknowns resulting from incomplete intelligence. For example, recent debates over national missile defense reflect differing interpretations of intelligence analyses about the technical capabilities and intentions of terrorist groups or states hostile to the United States. Policymakers may request focused analyses from specific intelligence agencies, or community-wide assessments in the form of Special National Intelligence Estimates. Conversely, policymakers may resist additional intelligence analysis if they worry that their policy positions will not be supported by the results.

Although the intelligence community's mission is to produce objective analyses that support the policy process, it often is drawn into policy deliberations by providing assessments about the likely outcome of proposed courses of action, by determining what kinds of policies are most likely to influence leaders or groups, and by advising on whether different factions in foreign governments (including intelligence services) are likely to help or hinder the implementation of policies. The involvement of the current Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, with Israeli and Palestinian security services on security issues in a possible peace agreement reflects how intelligence sometimes has a direct involvement in the implementation of U.S. policy. If directed by the President, the Central Intelligence Agency also can be used to implement foreign policy through the use of covert action—secret activities in which the involvement of the United States is concealed and denied.

Homeland Security

In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks and the continuing terrorist threats to the United States, President Bush established the Homeland Security Council in October 2001, and a new Department for Homeland Security in March 2003.

Homeland Security Council Organization³⁷

The Homeland Security Council was established on October 8, 2001 and serves as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies. The members of the HSC include the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and such other officers of the executive branch as the President may from time to

time designate. The Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff to the Vice President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Counsel to the President, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget also are invited to attend any Council meeting. The Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have regularly attended HSC meetings during the Bush administration, and the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies and other senior officials are invited to attend Council meetings when appropriate.

The HSC meets at the President's direction and in the last year has met about once a month. When the President is absent from a meeting of the Council, at the President's direction, the Vice President may preside. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security is responsible for determining the agenda, ensuring that necessary papers are prepared, and recording Council actions and Presidential decisions. Like the National Security Advisor in matters of national security, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security serves as the President's key homeland security advisor in the White House and serves as the head of the HSC staff. Currently the HSC staff conducts the day-to-day management of homeland security affairs for the White House and numbers approximately 48 policy positions including representatives from Department of Homeland Security agencies, Foreign Service Officers, DoD representatives, CIA officers, FBI agents and representatives from other Executive Branch agencies.

The Principals Committee of the Homeland Security Council is organized as the senior interagency forum for homeland security issues. The HSC/PC tends to meet less frequently than its NSC/PC counterpart, usually once every two to three weeks, although more frequently if circumstances demand. The HSC/PC is composed of the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, Treasury, Transportation, and Health and Human Services, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, FBI Director, FEMA Director, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, and the Assistant to the Vice President and Chief of Staff. The meetings are chaired by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Affairs and the National Security Advisor is invited to attend all meetings.

Other key Executive Branch officials may be called to attend HSC/Principals Committee meetings when issues related to their areas of responsibility are discussed. These invitees may include the Secretaries of State, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Energy, Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Deputy National

Security Adviser for Combating Terrorism, and the White House Counsel. The Deputy Director of the Office of Homeland Security serves as the Executive Secretary of the HSC.

The HSC system also has a Deputies Committee and PCCs. The role of the HSC/DC is to ensure that issues brought before the HSC or HSC/PC have been properly analyzed and prepared for action. Like its NSC/DC counterpart, the HSC/DC tends to meet weekly (or more frequently when needed). The regular members of the HSC/DC include the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services, Deputy Directors of the Office of Management and Budget, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and FEMA. The HSC/DC meetings are chaired by the Deputy Director of the Department of Homeland Security and the Deputy National Security Advisor is invited to attend all meetings.

Other officials who may be invited to attend HSC/DC meetings when issues pertaining to their departmental responsibilities or areas of expertise are involved include Deputy Secretaries of State, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Energy, Veterans Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency, the Deputy National Security Adviser for Combating Terrorism, and the Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security. The Executive Secretary of the Office of Homeland Security serves as the Executive Secretary of the HSC/DC.

Much of the coordination between NSC and HSC areas of responsibilities takes place at the DC level. Because there are so many concerns containing issues that overlap both national security and homeland security, joint NSC\DC and HSC\DC meetings are common.

Mirroring the NSC system, there are a variety of interagency Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) subordinate to the HSC/DC. These interagency committees are composed of substantive experts and senior officials from the departments and agencies represented on the DC.

Currently there are eleven HSC PCCs (all chaired by HSC directors).

- Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence
- Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation
- Law Enforcement and Investigation
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequences Management
- Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security
- Domestic Transportation Security
- Research and Development
- Medical and Public Health Preparedness
- Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management
- Economic Consequences

- Public Affairs

As the DHS has more firmly established its planning and operational functions during the past year, HSC PCCs have diminished as the main forum for interagency coordination. Increasingly, functional departments at DHS take the lead on homeland security issues and organize the coordination activities between DHS components and other USG agencies and departments. For example, the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS now takes the lead on interagency coordination of S&T issues because of the concentration of expertise in that department. Nevertheless, some PCCs like the DTRIM (Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management) meet monthly to coordinate the taskings and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies on issues before the HSC Deputies Committee.

The HSC and the Policy Process

The primary role of the HSC and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security is to advise the President on homeland security matters. Many people contend there is not a discernible difference between national security and homeland security. One flows into the other. If national security focuses on protecting U.S. interests around the world, homeland security begins at the nation's water's edge and protects our interests internally from terrorist threats, presumably emanating from abroad. As defined in the President's *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, "homeland security" is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce American's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Homeland security programs focus on activities within the United States and its territories, or on activities in support of domestically-based systems and processes. While homeland security concerns and national security concerns both encompass threats to the US, homeland security includes not only issues pertaining to attacks within the US by foreign interests or factions, but also attacks perpetrated by domestic groups not affiliated with external organizations or nations. Homeland security also addresses circumstances that occur within US borders, such as responses to national disasters and emergencies such as the series of hurricanes that struck Florida in August and September of 2004. Thus, while the NSC addresses activities outside of the US and combating terrorism overseas, at a minimum, national security and homeland security have large areas of overlapping responsibilities. This is particularly evident when examining the make-up of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council.

The members of the HSC include the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Director of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and such other officers of the executive branch as the President may from time to time designate. The Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff to the Vice President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Counsel to the President, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget also are invited to attend any Council meeting. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities.

A comparison of NSC and HSC organizations reveals that all 11 members (or statutory advisors or frequent substantive invitees) of the NSC are official HSC members (the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence,) or invited participants (the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Chief of Staff to the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security, the White House Counsel, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget) on the HSC. At the staff level, some NSC directors are members of HSC PCCs and some directorates of the NSC (such as the Office for Combating Terrorism) have daily contact with HSC directorates. This duplication of membership between the NSC and the HSC illustrates the post September 11, 2001 evolution and overlap of homeland security and more traditional international national security affairs. President Bush has held formal joint NSC-HSC meetings.

Regardless of its relationship to the NSC, the HSC has established four priorities in policy development. First, supporting the President and his objective of ensuring the security of the United States. Second, ensuring that policies associated with homeland security are based upon strategic national security interests and not political pressures. However, because homeland security is inextricably intertwined with domestic U.S. politics, the HSC has a series of appointed advisory committees to ensure that public, corporate, institutional, and state and local concerns are considered in policymaking. For example, the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council has four Senior Advisory Committees to guarantee a broad range of inputs: (1) State and Local Officials; (2) Academia and Policy Research; (3) Private Sector; and (4) Emergency Services, Law Enforcement, and Public Health and Hospitals. Other advisory committees include the National Infrastructure Assurance Council (which advises on issues such as the security of information systems for critical infrastructure supporting banking and finance, transportation, energy, manufacturing, and emergency government services) and the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee. The challenge for the HSC is to take into account the local

domestic political effects of homeland security policy while crafting policies that ensure the overall security of the United States.

The third priority for the HSC is to recommend policies to the President that are integrated and have been coordinated across the government. When circumstances involving global terrorism with domestic implications occur, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the National Security Advisor) are expected to act in concert. However, because homeland security emphasizes domestic as well as international aspects, HSC coordination challenges can involve a wider range of domestically oriented Executive Branch agencies, the Congress, and state, local and private interests. Homeland security policies tend to be domestically and defensively oriented rather than international and “offensive” (e.g., involving military or law enforcement operations in coordination with foreign governments). Preventive strategies for domestic defense that are likely to require state-level resource commitments; affect immigration, trade, or other economic issues; produce outcomes that are harder to visibly demonstrate (i.e., policies that produce greater security means that potential attacks are thwarted and become “non-events”); and affect a wide range of federal, state, and local (not to mention private sector) entities are highly likely to have local political as well as national security effects.

The fourth policy priority for the HSC is to promote the integration and integrity of the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its collaboration with other departments and agencies with homeland security responsibilities. In order to protect the nation against further terrorist attacks, the HSC must coordinate the policy recommendations of the DHS and other agencies responsible for intelligence and threat analysis, border and airport security, critical infrastructure protection, and emergency response.

Like the Principals Committee for the NSC, the PC for the HSC acts as the President’s senior level policy review and coordination, and seeks to ensure that, as much as possible, policy decisions brought to the President reflect a consensus within the relevant departments and agencies. Typically the HSC PC meets regularly, but adjusts its frequency depending upon circumstances such as crisis situations or increased threat levels. The types of issues considered by the PC and DC of the HSC include cyber-security; bioterrorism; air, rail, road and maritime security; preparedness and protection against terrorism and natural disasters; intelligence and information sharing; and coordination and communication with Federal, State, and local authorities, as well as the private sector.

The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the HSC staff (as well as Principals and Deputies when appropriate) are responsible for ensuring interagency coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, other Cabinet Departments, and the Intelligence Community (including the CIA,

the Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), and the Terrorist Threat Information Center (TTIC). Furthermore, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security meets regularly with the President's other senior advisors, as well as the Vice President's senior advisors, and staff from other White House offices.

Department of Homeland Security

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was formed on March 1, 2003 through the merger of 22 agencies (over 180,000 personnel) of the federal government. Headed by a cabinet-level Secretary of Homeland Security, the stated mission of DHS is to lead a unified national effort to secure America through preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation. DHS also "will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce"³⁸. In order to accomplish this mission, DHS has identified six "Strategic Goals":³⁹

Awareness -- Identify and understand threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts and disseminate timely information to the country's homeland security partners and the American public.

Prevention -- Detect, deter and mitigate threats to the US homeland.

Protection -- Safeguard the American people and their freedoms, critical infrastructure, property and the economy of the Nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.

Response -- Lead, manage and coordinate the national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.

Recovery -- Lead national, state, local and private sector efforts to restore services and rebuild communities after acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.

Service -- Serve the public effectively by facilitating lawful trade, travel and immigration.

Organizational Excellence -- Value the Department's most important resource, its people, and create a culture that promotes a common identity, innovation, mutual respect, accountability and teamwork to achieve efficiencies, effectiveness, and operational synergies.

DHS is charged with analyzing intelligence, assessing threats, guarding US borders and airports, protecting the critical infrastructure of the country, and coordinating emergency response (including natural disaster assistance). The

Department has assumed responsibility for the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service (including the Border Patrol), the Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and several other designated agencies. The intelligence function includes the analysis information and intelligence from the FBI, CIA, and other federal agencies to assess the terrorist threat to the American homeland.

To perform its mission, DHS has five major divisions, or "Directorates" (See Appendix H for a DHS organizational chart):⁴⁰

I. Border and Transportation Security (BTS): BTS is responsible for maintaining the security of US nation's borders and transportation systems. The largest of the Directorates, it is home to agencies such as the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs Service, the border security functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

II. Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR): This Directorate ensures that the US is prepared for, and able to recover from, terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

III. Science and Technology (S & T): This Directorate coordinates the Department's efforts in research and development, including preparing for and responding to the full range of terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction.

IV. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP): IAIP merges the capability to identify and assess a broad range of intelligence information concerning threats to the homeland under one roof, issue timely warnings, and take appropriate preventive and protective action.

V. Management: This Directorate is responsible for budget, management and personnel issues in DHS.

Besides the five Directorates of DHS, several other critical agencies were incorporated into the new department or are being newly created:

- United States Coast Guard: The Commandant of the Coast Guard reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. However, the USCG also works closely with the Under Secretary of Border and Transportation Security as well as maintaining its existing independent identity as a military service. Upon declaration of war or when the President so directs, the Coast Guard would operate as an element of the Department of Defense, consistent with existing law.
- United States Secret Service: The primary mission of the Secret Service is the protection of the President and other government leaders, as well as

security for designated national events. The Secret Service is also the primary agency responsible for protecting U.S. currency from counterfeiters and safeguarding Americans from credit card fraud.

- Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: While BTS is responsible for enforcement of US immigration laws, the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services dedicates its full energies to providing efficient immigration services and easing the transition to American citizenship. The Director of Citizenship and Immigration Services reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.
- Office of State and Local Government Coordination: This office ensures that close coordination takes place with state and local first responders, emergency services and governments.
- Office of Private Sector Liaison: The Office of Private Sector Liaison provides America's business community a direct line of communication to the Department of Homeland Security. The office works directly with individual businesses and through trade associations and other non-governmental organizations to foster dialogue between the Private Sector and the Department of Homeland Security on the full range of issues and challenges faced by America's business sector in the post 9-11 world.
- Office of Inspector General: The Office of Inspector General serves as an independent and objective inspection, audit, and investigative body to promote effectiveness, efficiency, and economy in the Department of Homeland Security's programs and operations, and to prevent and detect fraud, abuse, mismanagement, and waste in such programs and operations.

Because of the overlapping issues between the global war on terrorism, homeland defense, and homeland security, DHS works through the Defense Department's Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense with a number of DoD and other USG entities, including Northern Command as mentioned above in the section on the Department of Defense. In addition to DoD, DHS works on a daily basis with the CIA and other elements of the Intelligence Community, as well as the FBI to coordinate intelligence as well as strategic intelligence analysis. Like other agencies with responsibilities for national security operations, DHS mans a 24-hour watch center for threat analysis and emergency response.

DHS also has increased its outreach to state and local authorities as well as to the private sector. DHS has an Office of State and Local Government Coordination and has just established a National Infrastructure Center. The Coordination office is responsible for evaluating to what extent events or policies may affect state and local governments. This office is engaged in daily telephone conferences with state and local officials down to the state county level. Since September 11, 2001, DHS has coordinated the establishment of a network of individual state homeland security advisors to enable coordinated actions and policies across state lines.

The new Department of Homeland Security and the HSC face several daunting challenges based upon the breadth of their responsibilities and number of Federal entities involved. Trying to coordinate activities that range from the Coast Guard to the Secret Service to FEMA will be difficult. Although now merged into a single Department for more than a year, the component agencies will need time to understand each other's roles and missions. Similarly, it will take time to define the areas of responsibility, develop common doctrine and procedures, and to learn how to work together. The national security process is fairly manageable because it involves a limited number of key players—State, Defense (including the JCS), the CIA, and NSC staff—all of whom know each other. In contrast, the HSC has eight departments and agencies, plus the White House, directly involved, and another eight possibly involved depending upon the issue being addressed. Given all the equities involved, coordinated papers and recommended courses of action will be difficult to achieve. Undoubtedly, these bureaucratic difficulties will be overcome in time. We cannot afford for this system not to work because the stakes are so great.

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL NOMENCLATURE OF PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DECISION DOCUMENTS

Truman	National Security Council papers (NSC)
Eisenhower	National Security Council papers (NSC)
Kennedy	National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)
Johnson	National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)
Nixon/Ford	National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)
Carter	Presidential Directive (PD)
Reagan	National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
Bush	National Security Directive (NSD)
Clinton	Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)
Bush	National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)

Note: Presidents use Executive Orders and NSPDs (or their historical equivalents) to authorize most executive actions. In addition, the President uses directives called “findings” to authorize covert actions.

APPENDIX B

ASSISTANTS TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

On March 23, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The following is a list of the people who have occupied this position:


Robert Cutler	March 23, 1953	April 2, 1955
Dillon Anderson	April 2, 1955	September 1, 1956
Robert Cutler	January 7, 1957	June 24, 1958
Gordon Gray	June 24, 1958	January 13, 1961
McGeorge Bundy	January 20, 1961	February 28, 1966
Walt W. Rostow	April 1, 1966	December 2, 1968
Henry A. Kissinger	December 2, 1968	November 3, 1975*
Brent Scowcroft	November 3, 1975	January 20, 1977
Zbigniew Brzezinski	January 20, 1977	January 21, 1981
Richard V. Allen	January 21, 1981	January 4, 1982
William P. Clark	January 4, 1982	October 17, 1983
Robert C. McFarlane	October 17, 1983	December 4, 1985
John M. Poindexter	December 4, 1985	November 25, 1986
Frank C. Carlucci	December 2, 1986	November 23, 1987
Colin L. Powell	November 23, 1987	January 20, 1989
Brent Scowcroft	January 20, 1989	January 20, 1993
W. Anthony Lake	January 20, 1993	March 14, 1997
Samuel R. Berger	March 14, 1997	January 20, 2001
Condoleezza Rice	January 20, 2001	Present

* Henry Kissinger served concurrently as Secretary of State from September 21, 1973 until November 3, 1975.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION CHART (Sept 2004)

Appendix C:


Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs




*Heads of these offices carry the title: Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director.

Department of Defense


Appendix E:



Date: May 2003



U.S. Intelligence Community



ENDNOTES

¹ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>. Also see Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 68-83 for a more detailed history of NSC organization and operations through the Reagan administration.

² The need to restructure the national security apparatus, in fact, had been long recognized. Between 1921 and 1945, 50 bills had been introduced into Congress to reorganize the War and Navy Departments. None was successful in being enacted into law.

³ See Clark Clifford, “The workings of the national security system: past, present, and future,” *SAIS Review*, Winter-Spring 1988, interview with Philip Geyelin, pp. 19-20.

⁴ See Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 68-69; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp 56-57.

⁵ See Clark Clifford, “The workings of the national security system: past, present, and future,” *SAIS Review*, Winter-Spring 1988, interview with Philip Geyelin, pp. 19-20.; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp 56-57; Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” *Foreign Policy*, 69, Winter 1987-88, pg. 83.

⁶ See Clark Clifford, “The workings of the national security system: past, present, and future,” *SAIS Review*, Winter-Spring 1988, interview with Philip Geyelin, pp. 19-20.

⁷ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Joseph G. Bock, J.G., & Duncan L. Clarke, “The National Security Assistant and the White House Staff: National Security Policy Decisionmaking and Domestic Political Considerations, 1947-1984, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, *XVI*, 2, 1986, pp.258-260.; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 68-69; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp 56-57; Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” *Foreign Policy*, 69, Winter 1987-88, pg. 83.

⁸ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; William P. Bundy, “The national security process,” *International Security*, *7*, 3, 1983, pp. 96-97; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 68-69.

⁹ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*,

Winter 1989, pp 56-57; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, 69, Winter 1987-88, pg. 83.

¹⁰ See "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997", (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Paul S. Stevens, "The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp 56-57.

¹¹ See "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997", (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Joseph G. Bock, J.G., & Duncan L. Clarke, "The National Security Assistant and the White House Staff: National Security Policy Decisionmaking and Domestic Political Considerations, 1947-1984, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVI, 2, 1986, pp.260-261; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 70-71; Stevens, P.S. (1989), The national security council: past and prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1998, 55-62. pp. 57-58; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, 69, Winter 1987-88, pg. 83-85.

¹² See Joseph G. Bock, J.G., & Duncan L. Clarke, "The National Security Assistant and the White House Staff: National Security Policy Decisionmaking and Domestic Political Considerations, 1947-1984, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVI, 2, 1986, pp.258-260 regarding Eisenhower's action. The designations Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and National Security Advisor tend to be used interchangeably by the White House and government agencies although the former is the official title. The media nearly always uses the designation of National Security Advisor. The position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs evolved from the original position specified in the National Security of 1947 establishing that "(t)he (National Security) Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary" (National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 101. [U.S.C. 402] (c)). President Nixon later upgraded the position from that of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to that of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a higher ranking position title in the Executive Office of the President. The title "National Security Adviser" also first came into widespread use during the Nixon administration. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, 69, Winter 1987-88, pg. 83-86.

¹³ See "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997", (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Paul S. Stevens, "The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pg 58; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 71-72; Joseph G. Bock, J.G., & Duncan L. Clarke, "The National Security Assistant and the White House Staff: National Security Policy Decisionmaking and Domestic Political Considerations, 1947-1984, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVI, 2, 1986, pp. 261-262.

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- ¹⁴ “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>.
- ¹⁵ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pg 58;
- ¹⁶ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 71-72; Bock, J.G., & Duncan L. Clarke, “The National Security Assistant and the White House Staff: National Security Policy Decisionmaking and Domestic Political Considerations, 1947-1984, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVI, 2, 1986, pp.262-263; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pg 58.
- ¹⁷ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” *Foreign Policy*, 69, Winter 1987-88, pg. 86-88; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 73-74; Clifford, Clark (1988), The workings of the national security system: past, present, and future. *SAIS Review*, Winter-Spring 1988, interview with Philip Geyelin, pp. 21-22.
- ¹⁸ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” *Foreign Policy*, 69, Winter 1987-88, pg. 86-88; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 73-74;
- ¹⁹ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 73-74; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp 58-59.
- ²⁰ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 74-75; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp 59-60; Kevin V. Mulcahy, K. “The secretary of state and the national security advisor: foreign policymaking in the Carter and Reagan administrations,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVI, 2, 1986, pp.281-282.
- ²¹ See “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997”, (August 2004), U.S. Government White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Carnes Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp 74-75; Paul S. Stevens, “The National Security Council: Past and Prologue. *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp 59-60;

Kevin V. Mulcahy, K. "The secretary of state and the national security advisor: foreign policymaking in the Carter and Reagan administrations," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVI, 2, 1986, pp.283-284.

²² During the early 1980's, the Reagan administration supported guerrillas (called "Contras") fighting against Nicaragua's Sandinista regime backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union. By 1984 the Democrat-controlled U.S. Congress had passed and strengthened the Boland Amendment which severely restricted U.S. financial support for the Contras. President Reagan instructed his National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, to find alternative means to support the Contra effort. Meanwhile, Iran was engaged in a bloody war of attrition with Iraq, and Tehran secretly approached the U.S. to obtain spare parts and weapons for its military forces. Despite a congressional embargo against any arms sales to Iran because of the seizure of the U.S. embassy and its staff in 1979, and opposition from Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the White House (supported by CIA director William Casey) decided to sell weapons to Tehran both to generate funds to support the Contras, and to encourage the release of Americans still being held hostage by Iranian supported Muslim radicals in Lebanon. When a Lebanese magazine printed a story about the secret dealings in November 1986, the U.S. congress launched investigations and President Reagan appointed an independent inquiry committee chaired by former Senator John Tower and an independent counsel to investigate criminal wrongdoing. Fourteen people were indicted and six were convicted (most for conspiracy or lying to Congress). Later, President George H.W. Bush issued pardons to McFarlane, his successor ADM John Poindexter, two CIA officers, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger before his trial began.

²³ See *Report of the President's Special Review Board*, February 26, 1987

²⁴ These groups were called Interagency Working Groups (IWGs, pronounced "i-wigs") during the Clinton Administration. They also were called Policy Coordination Committees, or PCCs, during the administration of George W. Bush (1989-1992).

²⁵ As amended.

²⁶ See United States Institute of Peace, *Passing the Baton: Challenges of Statecraft for the New Administration*. Washington, D.C., 2001; *Report of the President's Special Review Board*, February 26, 1987

²⁷ See *Report of the President's Special Review Board*, February 26, 1987

²⁸ See *Report of the President's Special Review Board*, February 26, 1987

²⁹ Primary support for summits dealing primarily with economic issues are supported by the National Economic Council staff or a designated Assistant Secretary or Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for the political-economic issues of the summit.

³⁰ See Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Miramax Books, 2003)

³¹ See James A. Baker, III, *The Politics of Diplomacy* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1995)

³² See George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993).

³³ See B. Woodward, & D. Balz, "At Camp David: Advise and dissent," *The Washington Post*, January 31, 2002.

³⁴ See Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 465.

³⁵ See Joint Forces Command website (September 2004):

http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm

³⁶ "POSSE COMITATUS ACT" (18 USC 1385): A Reconstruction Era criminal law proscribing use of Army (later, Air Force) to "execute the laws" except where expressly authorized by Constitution or Congress. Limit on use of military for civilian law enforcement also applies to Navy by regulation. Dec '81 additional laws were enacted (codified 10 USC 371-78) clarifying permissible military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies--including the Coast Guard--especially in combating drug smuggling into the United States. Posse Comitatus clarifications emphasize supportive and technical assistance (e.g., use of facilities, vessels, aircraft, intelligence, tech aid, surveillance, etc.) while generally prohibiting direct participation of DoD personnel in law enforcement (e.g., search, seizure, and arrests). Source:

<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/Factcards/PosseComitatus.html>

³⁷ See Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, October 29, 2001

³⁸ See Department of Homeland Security Website: DHS Organization (September 2004) http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp

³⁹ See Department of Homeland Security Website: DHS Organization (September 2004) http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp

⁴⁰ See Department of Homeland Security Website: <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/>, DHS Organization: Department Components. September, 2004