FOREWORD

The "Handbook for Military Support of Pacification" has been developed as a basic reference document designed for use by United States forces, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and Free World Military Assistance Forces operating in the Republic of Vietnam. Prior to its publication, it was distributed in draft form to the field for a three month evaluation and has been completely coordinated with the Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. In the near future, the handbook will be published in the Vietnamese language by The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

In view of the recent dynamic changes in the government of Vietnam and the pacification program, it is considered that the publication of this handbook at this time is especially appropriate.

The handbook will be revised periodically by this headquarters. New pages will be distributed for insertion into the handbook when appropriate. Recommended changes or suggestions for improvement should be forwarded to Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, ATTN: MACJ3, APO 96222.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Pacification, as it applies in the Republic of Vietnam is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity. The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units, if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies. Once adequate security has been established, Revolutionary Development (RD) can begin. An understanding of pacification is necessary in order to execute the tasks which the reader may be called on to perform.

   a. Revolutionary Development, the leading edge of pacification, is the formalized government of Vietnam program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, in specified hamlets generally within RD campaign areas. It includes the local security for those hamlets and the political, economic, and social activities at that level.

   b. Nation building is the economic, political, and social activity having an impact nationwide and/or in urban centers. It is related to pacification in that it builds on the results of pacification and contributes to the establishment of a viable economic and social community.

2. The military plays an indispensable role in pacification. Without initial military security operations to establish the essential secure environment, the civil aspects of pacification cannot progress. Only under relatively secure conditions can progress be made in the rectification of the political, economic, and sociological imbalances which are the root causes of, and support the continuation of insurgency. In this handbook, the role of the military forces in providing territorial security for pacification and the relationship between the military and civil agencies involved will be explained.
3. The purpose of this handbook is to give the reader an understanding of the pacification process, with particular emphasis on the doctrine for provision of territorial security and the conduct of RD programs. However, the detailed execution and administration of the pacification concept is subject to rapid evolution as it adapts to changing situations. Therefore, it will be necessary to use this handbook in conjunction with current directives.
CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES OF PACIFICATION

Section I

BACKGROUND

4. Although the present objectives of pacification do not differ in significant points from former programs and plans, both GVN and US planners have benefited from the mistakes as well as the successes of the past. As a result of lessons learned, the present pacification process, from initiation of the planning cycle until successful execution, is significantly different from those of past years. The following discussion traces the major trends to the present programs.

5. The Chien Thang (Victory) National Pacification Plan published in 1964 was the first comprehensive GVN document on pacification. The Chien Thang established the "spreading oil spot" concept for its two phases --- restoration of security (clearing and securing), and development --- and outlined military support for the 1964 pacification effort, but the overall military and civil aspects of the 1964 pacification plan lacked coordination. Accurate and timely programming of US and GVN requirements for manpower, funds, and material was not achieved. As a result, information from province governments on their resource requirements was not gathered until September 1964.

6. On 25 December 1964, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces - Joint General Staff (RVNAF - JGS) published AB 139, the military portion of the 1965 pacification plan. This plan incorporated certain Mission Council proposals to improve definitions, roles and missions, and, in these respects, corrected some of the weaknesses of the Chien Thang plan. Improved military-civil coordination was achieved, and instructions on programming were published in December that extended the 1964 pacification plan and budget into 1965. On 5 April 1965 the GVN supplanted the term "pacification" with "rural construction". This term was changed to "Revolutionary Development" in February 1966 (Honolulu).

7. On 11 November 1965, the GVN Central Rural Construction Council published its 1966 RD plan. It directed provinces, under the aegis of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, to develop integrated plans for 1966 in coordination with and subject to the approval of division and corps commanders. Provincial plans were required to be signed by the Province Chief and by both a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representative.

8. On 15 December 1965, JGS/RVNAF published AB 140, the basic GVN military plan for support of 1966 rural construction activities.
was published to the field to assist the US advisors in providing advice and assistance to their counterparts in the preparation of the provincial plans.

14. In early November 1966, the Ministry of Revolutionary Development dispatched four teams to the field for the purpose of providing assistance to individual provinces in the development of their plans. Review and approval of the provincial plans was accomplished by the Minister of Revolutionary Development, assisted by a combined US/GVN team, between 14 November and 23 December. It might be noted that the appropriate ARVN division and corps commanders were required to endorse the province plan prior to its submission to the Minister for approval in order to signify his concurrence and ability to support it militarily. Consequently, military planning for the Combined Campaign Plan - 1967, AB 142 was coordinated closely and integrated with RD plans.

15. For the first time, the Combined Campaign Plan - 1967, AB 142 established definite RD missions for ARVN and US/FWMAF forces. ARVN’s primary responsibility was to provide the military support to RD, while the primary responsibility of US/FWMAF was to seek out and destroy VC/NVA main force units, base areas, and LOCs. Secondly, however, US/FWMAF assisted RD by providing security within and around its Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) and bases. These balanced mission assignments ensured the increased military support essential to the progress of RD.

16. The Combined Campaign Plan - 1968, AB 143 requires subordinate headquarters to coordinate their military plans with provincial RD plans. Each province chief in developing his plan establishes his individual goals based on the guidelines, civilian, and military resources available, and progress of RD within his province. In effect, the 1968 National Revolutionary Development Plan consists of 44 province plans and the supporting military plans. In developing future Combined Campaign Plans, it is envisioned that the same type of careful coordination will be accomplished so that each plan succeeds the other in logical fashion.

Section II

CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES

17. PACIFICATION.

a. Behind the shield provided by the containment and offensive operations of the US/FWMAF and ARVN forces in Vietnam, a GVN pacification program of systematic and accelerated activities in
military, political, economic and sociological programs is being conducted with the assistance of the US. It is supported by and provides the foundation for nation building activities. Pacification has three objectives:

(1) To provide sustained territorial and internal security against VC local forces, guerrillas, terrorists, subversives and VC infrastructure of a level adequate to permit the uninterrupted and accelerated conduct of economic, social and political programs;

(2) To establish an effective political structure at the local level capable of responding to and eliciting the participation of the people; and,

(3) To stimulate self-sustaining economic activity capable of expansion.

b. The pacification campaign to provide sustained territorial security in the countryside and concurrently to introduce political, economic and social reforms which will establish conditions favorable for further growth and stability, is just as important as anti-aggression operations. Operations to annihilate the enemy while clearly essential to pacification, are, by themselves, inadequate. The people must be separated and won over from the enemy—and this can be done only with the active cooperation of the people themselves.

c. The essential first step towards pacification is to create a secure environment in which activities designed to elicit the participation of the people in the elimination of injustice, fear and misery can begin with some promises of success. The requisite degree of security is to be applied by the RVNAF forces, the National Police and the Revolutionary Development cadre groups themselves, in closely coordinated combinations that will vary from place to place depending upon the threat and the importance of the area. Ultimately, the people themselves participate in their own defense.

d. Concurrent with the provision of territorial security, efforts to identify and eliminate or neutralize the VC infrastructure are intensified.

e. Integral to pacification is RD which covers those specific endeavors undertaken by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development in the hamlets and villages. It includes all organized efforts to extend GVN presence and control throughout the country through the use of the RD cadre groups, the Montagnard Truong Son teams, Civil-Military RD teams and similar teams as well as hamlet and village sponsored self-help projects.
f. Political, and sociological programs designed to develop local government and to gain the participation of the people are called New Life Development programs. Introduced by the RD cadre groups or other means, these programs provide for the stimulation of, and support for, self-sustaining economic and political activity, which is strengthened and continued through community development follow-on programs.

18. SECURITY.

a. The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is defined as security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies.

b. The principal RVNAF forces for territorial security are Popular Forces (PF) and Regional Forces (RF). ARVN battalions will be assigned to the territorial security force where the PF and the RF strengths are inadequate. The two parts to territorial security are:

(1) Security for areas undergoing RD; and

(2) Security for other important areas including previously pacified areas, LOC, resources and government centers.

19. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

a. Within the pacification process, RD is conducted in specified areas to focus priority government effort, to bring the people under GVN control and to provide them with a new life. In these RD areas, the GVN, through its RD cadre groups, establishes a channel of communications between the people and their government and, through their productive work, gains the support and loyalty of the people. RD transforms hamlets and villages into Real New Life Hamlets (Ap Doi Moi) where a new life will be developed for the people within a secure environment and where improved standards of living will prevail for all. Annex A lists RD hamlet definitions, criteria and objectives.

b. Security for RD, as stated above, is provided by territorial security forces. Security is maintained, ideally, in the following manner:

(1) Revolutionary Development Peoples Groups (RDPPG), or hamlet self-defense forces, provide active and passive defense for the hamlet to include shelters, gathering of intelligence for military forces, warning to the population of attack and similar actions. When these forces are armed, they will provide for internal security of the
hamlet and may establish guard posts, listening posts and patrols, depending upon their capability and the situation.

(2) RF/PF conduct security operations in the immediate vicinity of the hamlets and villages, while ARVN forces primarily conduct security operations on the periphery of the campaign area.

(3) The National Police Field Force in coordination with the Special Police is responsible for collecting and processing information so as to track down and eliminate the VC Infrastructure. The National Police are also responsible for suppressing riots and disturbances among the people and supporting with police operations the pacification and revolutionary development programs. The National Police also have the capability of supporting RVNAF on search operations that involve the civil population.

c. The role of the civil and selected military elements is to initiate political, economic and social activities within hamlets and villages, to establish firm government control and to involve the people in these activities. This involvement is achieved through organized teams augmented and assisted by personnel from other GVN agencies, who work in hamlets of the selected villages.

20. PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS.

a. Because pacification is an integrated military and civil undertaking, joint planning and supervision must be exercised at all echelons. The GVN is organized to effect this joint planning and supervision as follows:

(1) RD councils composed of both military and civil representatives function at national through district level. At the national level, the Central RD Council develops policies and manages the overall program. Many civil activities are administered through the Ministry of Revolutionary Development to the provinces and the districts. The technical ministries' activities are administered directly to the province from the ministry. Military activities are administered through the Ministry of Defense and subordinate RVNAF echelons to province and district levels. Regional, provincial, DTA, and district RD councils review RD activities and ensure that the military and civil aspects are coordinated. More detailed discussion of RD councils will be found in Chapter 3.

(2) Detailed RD plans developed at province/sector level are reviewed by regional RD councils and approved by the Minister of Revolutionary Development. Approved province RD plans are implemented
at province and district level. Military support is provided by military forces operating either in direct support of sector and subsector or under the operational control of commanders of these areas as appropriate. The military plans will be designed to support the achievement of the goals as stated in established province RD plans.

(3) New detailed RD plans are developed and submitted for approval as previously undeveloped areas become available either because of military successes or changes in the security situation.

b. In the areas planned for pacification, RD campaigns will be organized at the province or district level or at the level of any appropriate military unit according to the degree of importance. RD campaigns are not organized in all areas chosen for the development of hamlets; however, if available forces can be put into use, campaigns can be organized in the areas operated by three or more RD cadre groups. The limits of the campaign encompass the RD area and the necessary contiguous territory to provide security for the RD area.

(1) Participation in the campaign is required for the ARVN units attached in support of the RD campaign. These may include the RF/PF, RD cadre groups, RDPG, personnel of regional military agencies and administrative and technical personnel belonging to the various civil services and offices in the province. National Police, including National Police Field Force (NPFF) may be furnished to carry out police functions during these operations.

(2) The province chief/sector commander will designate campaign commanders. The campaign commander will be responsible to the province chief/sector commander for direction of the RD campaign.

21. PROVINCE PACIFICATION.

a. In coordination with the province senior advisor, the province chief will prepare a Combined Province Pacification Plan which will include provisions for security for previously pacified areas, areas undergoing RD and areas in which other pacification activities are underway.

b. ARVN units employed in support of RD will operate normally under the operational control of province/sector. The authority that exercises control will designate a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) or tactical area of interest (TAO1) for the unit; this TAOR/I must be approved by corps.

c. Psychological operations are directed at the people in the area as well as at the enemy. Whether the people be initially
friendly, uncommitted or hostile toward the government, the objective of PSYOPS— as of all RD— is to persuade the people to support the GVN. To this end, disciplined, well behaved troops showing a friendly, sincere interest in the people and a respect for individual rights and property will have the most favorable impact upon the local people. PSYOPS themes will include explanations of why troops are in the area and what RD can do for the people by their cooperating with the GVN. Against the enemy, the PSYOPS objective is to persuade the individual soldier to stop supporting the enemy cause and to rally to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi and Doan Ket programs. Hence, PSYOPS themes will stress the positive benefits of RD and sow doubt about the justice of an enemy cause that opposes RD.

d. Military civic action is conducted by all military elements in cooperation with province and district officials in such a manner as to ensure maximum credit to the GVN. The use of military management and technical skills is emphasized. Civic action programs of all US/FWMAF and RVNAF will be coordinated at province level with the province chief or his designated military commander.
22. This chapter discusses the many governmental agencies, military and civilian, Vietnamese and United States, which are participating in or supporting pacification. Although each major agency is discussed separately, it must be borne in mind continually that there is a complex interaction between all of these separate agencies at every level of the military or civil government. At some levels, military and civilian functions blend and the same individual is responsible for both. The primary task of the United States agencies in Vietnam is to advise, support and assist the GVN counterpart agencies. The US Mission Agency which has primary military and civilian responsibility for support of pacification is USMACV. It is necessary to keep the distinction between military and civil responsibilities in mind during the discussion that follows, as it will assist in determining who and what agency has primary responsibility for a given function and in what channels it operates.

Section II

GVN ORGANIZATION

23. GENERAL.

The government of Vietnam is in a transition stage at this time in that an elected constitutional structure has just come into being. The present government cannot be divided simply into "civil organization" and "military organization". The military government of Vietnam had by its very nature introduced military officers into every level of the government. Many of them occupied then, and will occupy in the future, governmental positions concerned only with civilian functions. Others now occupy positions concerned only with military functions. However, there remain many whose job assignments combine military and civilian functions in a single office. This is not only a characteristic of the present government but is a foreseeable long term trend, as many of the most able and experienced Vietnamese administrators are in uniform. It is important to understand the distinction between the purely military line officer and the officer whose responsibilities include both military and civilian functions, as the actual responsibility may vary considerably from apparent rank.
a. Presently, the top echelon of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is essentially civilian in character, although military or former military personnel presently occupy some of the top-ranking and policy-making positions. Currently, this echelon consists of the President, Vice President, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Revolutionary Development. Below the top echelon, the majority of the governmental employees are civilian. Elections recently completed in September and October 1967, represented final steps toward constitutional government which had its beginning in September 1966. During that month the newly elected Constituent Assembly was convened.

b. The Constituent Assembly set about drafting a constitution which was unanimously approved in March 1967. The form of government ordained in the constitution is a modified presidential system. The constitution calls for a President as Chief of State who will designate a Prime Minister and a Cabinet to implement the government's policies and manage the affairs of the nation. It also provides for a two chamber legislature known as the National Assembly.

c. An independent judiciary is established with the highest legal authority vested in the Supreme Court. An Inspectorate is provided for by appointment. This body of representatives has the duty of guarding against corruption and other acts harmful to the national interest at all levels of government and in public and private agencies.

d. Revolutionary development councils composed of both military and civil representatives function at national through district level. At the national level, the Central RD Council (CRDC) develops policies and manages the overall program. Its organization is shown at Figure 3-1. Many civil activities are administered initially by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development to provinces and districts until they are taken over by the appropriate technical ministry. The activities of technical ministries are administered directly to the province from the ministry. Military activities are administered by the Ministry of Defense through subordinate RVNAF echelons to province and district levels. Regional, provincial, DTA, and district RD councils review RD activities and ensure that the military and civil aspects are coordinated. The CRDC has the following specific duties:

(1) To determine the basic RD policy.

(2) To examine and approve all RD plans and programs.

e. The CRDC has a Permanent Bureau. The chief is the Secretary General of the CRDC who is also the Minister of RD. The
CENRAL REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

Prime Minister
Chairman

Minister of Revolutionary Development
Secretary General

Minister of Defense

Minister of Home Affairs

Minister of Public Works

Minister of Land Reform and Agriculture

Minister of Health

Minister of Social Welfare and Refugees

Minister of Chieu Hoi

Minister of Tribal Minorities Development

Minister of Education

Minister of the Prime Minister's Office

Under-Secretary for Primary, Secondary and Mass Education

Under-Secretary for School Youth

Commander-in-Chief, ARVN

All Corps Commanders—concurrently Government Representatives

Figure 3-1
permanent bureau which is, for all practical purposes, the Ministry of RD, acts as an executive agency for the CRDC, and as such, executes all decisions made by the CRDC and coordinates with all ministries to assure smooth operation. Regional, provincial, DTA, and district RD councils also have permanent bureaus which function in much the same way. See Figure 3-2.

f. The corps commander has civil as well as military responsibilities, is responsible for governmental functions within a region, and is concurrently the GVN regional representative. The region boundaries correspond to the military corps boundaries known as Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). The corps commander is assisted in his civil functions by a Deputy for Civilian and Territorial Affairs, and by regional deputies from the ministries in Saigon.

g. The commander of the Division Tactical Area (DTA) has limited responsibilities pertaining to civilian governmental functions. His role is discussed more fully in paragraph 38.

h. The province chief is the "key" man for success of the pacification program. He is responsible for developing a province pacification plan containing a detailed RD plan. Further, he is responsible for the control of all civil and military resources to be applied in support of pacification. Each technical ministry has a service representative in each province, but the province chief is, as an individual, responsible for all government functions within his province. The province chiefs are supervised through Region/CTZ for some functions, directly by Region/CTZ for other functions, and directly from the central government for others. The technical ministries give guidance directly to the service chiefs. This gives rise, on occasion, to policy conflicts which must be resolved by the province chief or higher authority.

i. The main operational element for the civil aspects of RD is the RD cadre group which is composed of 59 RD cadre (Fig 3-3). As soon as the required degree of military security is established, the RD cadre groups are introduced into the hamlet and begin the task of organization and development. The RD cadre group consists of three main elements:

(1) Staff (7 men) responsible for:

(a) Command and Control.

(b) Coordination.

(c) Reporting.
GVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS

Central RD Council

Permanent RD Bureau (Secretary General of CRDC)

Region RD Council

Permanent RD Bureau

Division RD Council

Permanent RD Bureau

Province RD Council

Permanent RD Bureau

District RD Council

RECAPITULATION: Total Military: 1,198 Total Civilian: 127

Permanent RD Bureau

14 Mil **
10 Civ
24 Total

10 Mil **
2 Civ
12 Total

9 Mil **
2 Civ
11 Total

5 Mil **

(*Figure on Div Bureaus includes CMD and 24th Special Tactical Zone. (Rung Sat Special Zone has no RD council). Permanent Bureaus are authorized for 124 districts and three autonomous cities where priority revolutionary development activities are taking place.)

(**The JGS has requested RVNAF Force Structure spaces for these billets. MACV J3 has stated that the spaces should be filled by civilians.)

Figure 3-2

15
(2) Reconstruction Inter-Team (18 men) responsible for:

(a) Studying and improving the political, cultural, social and economic situation.

(b) Determining the aspirations of the people.

(c) Planning self-help projects.

(d) Motivating and assisting the people to build their own hamlet.

(3) Militia Inter-Team (34 men) responsible for:

(a) Making security plans to protect the RD cadre and the hamlet inhabitants.

(b) Coordinating with the Census Grievance unit of the reconstruction inter-team to discover and eliminate the VC infrastructure.

(c) Organizing and training the Revolutionary Development Peoples Groups (RDPG) as self-defense forces.

j. The basic RD cadre group may be augmented by technical cadre from any GVN ministry in order to give proper emphasis or additional assistance in developmental areas outside the competence of the RD cadre group. For example, textile, fisheries, lumber products, ceramic products; these and other special problems might require specialized cadre skills applicable only in a limited geographical area and/or for a limited period of time. The province chief in these cases may request technical augmentation of his RD cadre group from the appropriate ministry in Saigon.

k. The RD cadre group operates under the operational control of the province chief, principally within the hamlets, to establish initial government administration, organize the people for self-defense, and initiate simple economic and social development projects to win the confidence and loyalty of the people. A Provincial Revolutionary Development Cadre Group (Fig 3-4) provides the province chief with a planning and control group to assist him in the execution of his responsibilities.

25. NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE ORGANIZATION.

a. The National Police Field Force (NPFF) is a component of the GVN National Police. It consists of lightly armed tactical elements, whose major function is, in collaboration with the Special
PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
CADRE GROUP

Province Cadre Chief
and
Deputy

Administration
Section

Techniques
and
Operations
Section

Psychological
Warfare
Section

Security
Section

Figure 3-4
Police Branch, to eliminate the VC infrastructure in the district, village, and hamlet. Once this task is discharged, the NPFF has the primary responsibility of preventing VC resurgence and the ultimate mission of safeguarding the extension of other National Police presence into the rural area. The NPFF operates within the direct line of National Police command and supports other local police elements. The basic NPFF operating unit is the company.

b. Command of the NPFF is exercised by Commander, NPFF, who is an Assistant Director General of NPFF. Necessary staff is provided by the Directorate General of National Police.

c. Every member of the NPFF is fully trained as a policeman and is further trained in the counterinsurgency aspects of military operations. The internal administration, logistical support, and disciplinary functions of the NPFF are designed to support tactical operations as well as to carry out their primary mission of VC infrastructure eradication in collaboration with the Special Police Branch.

d. Extending the supervisory and reporting capability of Headquarters NPFF in Saigon, the Commander, NPFF, is represented at the headquarters of regions and provinces by officers of NPFF attached to the offices of the Regional Chief of Police and Province Chief of Police respectively. The duty of these officers is to ensure continuous and adequate logistic and administrative support from Headquarters NPFF; to keep Commander, NPFF continuously informed on all aspects of the status of his companies; and to ensure a proper working relationship between NPFF company commanders and the province/district administration. In particular, they ensure that the NPFF field elements are used only for those purposes for which they have been provided; i.e., VC infrastructure eradication and necessary field operations at the village level. NPFF are not responsible for providing the personal security of province or district chiefs; their equipment is not to be diverted to non-NPFF elements; nor should they be used as scouts for ARVN/RF/PP tactical operations.

e. It is the prerogative of the province chief to decide which districts will employ NPFF as part of his province plan. He may decide that:

(1) The local security has so deteriorated that NPFF will be withdrawn because they cannot handle the local situation.

(2) The local security has so improved that NPFF operations will pass to the uniformed National Police.

f. It is the responsibility of the Province Chief of Police to ensure that the police administrative and intelligence machinery
cooperate and coordinate with all other government agencies (particularly the armed forces).

g. It is the task of the NPFF representative at Province Headquarters to ensure that the NPFF companies are operationally effective.

h. Relationships - District Chief/District Chief of Police/ NPFF Company Commander.

(1) The district chief will decide in which villages of his district the NPFF Platoons will be deployed. Subsequent redeployment will reduce the operational effectiveness of the NPFF, depending on the intelligence posture, familiarity with the area, and the degree of rapport established with the local population.

i. Relationship - Village Chief/NPFF Platoon Commander. The NPFF Platoon Commander will work in close and cordial association with the village chief of the village to which his platoon is assigned. However, the village chief has no authority over the Platoon; and the Platoon Commander has no authority over the Village Chief. The relationship of NPFF is collaboration with the village and hamlet authorities.

j. Organization:

(1) The basic NPFF unit is the company.

(2) Normal deployment calls for one company to each "task district" (a district selected by the province chief for NPFF operations). A task district will contain several "task villages", which have been selected by the District Chief for NPFF operations.

(3) The company is a flexible sized unit. The number of Platoons will vary with the number of task villages in the district.

(4) The allocation of companies to a province will vary with the number of task districts in the province.

(5) Weapons. Although there is a nationally established TOE, allocation of weapons within a platoon is at the discretion of platoon leader who may decide to group all shotguns, or all BARs or all rifles, or any combination appropriate to his task. Similarly, unless otherwise directed, the squad leader may group his weapons.

(6) Vehicles. The allocation of vehicles provides for
one truck, 1/4 ton (Jeep) per platoon and one for company headquarters. In addition, the company headquarters is authorized two trucks, 1 1/2 ton.

k. The Public Safety Division, MACCORDS, is responsible for providing advisors to the NPFF as well as programming the support provided to the NPFF by the United States.

26. MILITARY FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION.

a. The Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (JGS/RVNAF) is the senior Vietnamese military headquarters in Vietnam. The Deputy Chief of the JCS, RVNAF assists the Chief of JGS in all matters pertaining to RVNAF and directs RVNAF's support of RD and Pacification programs. The Deputy is also the commander and responsible to the Chief for all matters pertaining to RF and PF affairs.

b. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) includes the regular Army (ARVN), Air Force (VNAF), Navy (VNN), Marine Corps (VNMC) and the Regional Force and the Popular Force (RF/PP). The basic missions of VNAF and VNN are to provide support to ARVN. The battalions of the VNMC, along with ARVN airborne battalions, normally in general reserve, will be allocated to the operational control of a corps commander for specific operations. Normally, RF units are under the command of the province chief/sector commander and PF platoons are under the command of the district chief/subsector commander. The military command echelon below the JCS/RVNAF is the corps.

c. In his military role, the corps commander is responsible for all military operations within his assigned area of responsibility.

d. ARVN.

(1) The general mission of the ARVN, at corps level and below, is to plan and execute military operations in support of the joint military effort, and to support the RF/PP and civil pacification effort at province level.

(2) Below corps level, ARVN is organized along conventional US lines into divisions, regiments and battalions (Figure 3-5). Divisions are assigned military responsibility for division tactical areas (DTA). Subordinate elements of the division may be assigned tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) for providing military support of pacification. The boundaries between DTAs and the designation of TAORs are normally based on the provincial political boundaries.

(3) Division, regimental and battalion headquarters are dispersed within the DTA, sited in the large towns and cities. Although
physically located within provinces and districts, ARVN tactical units remain within the ARVN chain of command unless higher authority has directed otherwise. Therefore, the normal relationship between commanders of ARVN units and the province/district chief is mutual liaison and coordination. However, when assigned to provide territorial security for pacification, ARVN units normally will be placed under the operational control of the sector commander who may also be the province chief.

e. Regional Force/Popular Force.

(1) An RVNAF reorganization study recently completed and approved by both MACV and JGS/RVNAF calls for modification of the RVNAF organizational structure. Charts in this handbook dealing with RF/PF reflect the current organization and, in so far as possible, the pending changes as known at the time of publication.

(2) The mission of Popular Force (PF) platoons operating in a contiguous belt or zone outside the hamlet or village is to conduct night saturation patrols and to establish and maintain outposts, thus providing local security for RD. The Popular Forces organize civic groups to participate in local security in rural areas, support the Pacification Program and assist in the protection of vital highways and key installations when Regional Forces (RF) are not available. The RF company operating throughout another belt contiguous to that of the PF, but more distant from the hamlet or village, has a similar mission of providing local security to RD. Regional Forces will also protect villages, hamlets, population resources, communications systems and other fixed installations when Popular Forces are not available.

(3) The Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) is the military organization specifically established for assignment to the command of the sector and subsector commanders. Although RF/PF is within the RVNAF command structure, its function more nearly approximates that of militia rather than that of regular forces (Fig 3-6). It can be seen from the subparagraph above that its mission is more locally oriented than the mission of ARVN. Its organization and equipment is considerably lighter than that of a corresponding ARVN organization, consequently its combat firepower and effectiveness are not comparable to an equivalent ARVN organization. In spite of these limitations, the RF/PF has consistently demonstrated its capability in the field. RF/PF collectively constitute approximately one-half of the manpower in the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(4) As the general rule, the Regional Force is province oriented while the Popular Force is district oriented. This does not, however, preclude inter-district or inter-provincial combat operations or limited duty station transfers for RF personnel. A typical provincial organization is shown at Figure 3-7. The number of RF companies will vary from province to province, depending upon size, population and priority of the province. The same applies to the number of PF platoons assigned to a district.
NOTE:  
(1) Upon reorganization of RVNAF in CY68, the corps commander deals directly with the province chief on matters of RD.
(2) No responsibility for supervision of RF/PF administration, training or logistics beginning in the first half of CY68.
(3) To be deleted in the first half of CY68.
RF/PF ORGANIZATION WITHIN A PROVINCE/SECTOR

Province
Chief/Sector
Commander

Sector
Headquarters

A&DSL
Company

Mechanized
Platoon

River
* Boat
Company

RF
Company

District
Chief/Sub-
sector
Commander

Intelligence
Platoon

Subsector
Headquarters

Subsector
Intelligence
Squads

PF
Platoon

Village

* Not found in all Provinces

Figure 3-7
(5) PF platoons usually are assigned as village or hamlet security forces. They also are used for Line of Communications (LOC) and bridge security, for maintaining outposts, intelligence and security patrols, and night and day ambushes. Generally, the PF is assigned to the command of the subsector commander, but is supported logistically by the province Administrative and Direct Support Logistical Company (A&DDSL CO).

(6) RF units are assigned to the sector commander. He may retain operational control or may place them under the operational control of the subsector commander. The sector commander may employ multi-company formations and conduct combat operations over a relatively long period of time. In some cases the sector commander will employ one or two RF companies as a province reaction force. In addition, the RF is used normally for the defense of the more critical outposts and forward operating bases within the sector. RF battalions, while subordinate to the sector commanders, are assigned special missions by the corps.

f. Paramilitary Forces. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) forces are paramilitary forces under Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) command. The LLDB are advised and supported by the US Army Special Forces (USASF). Since many of the missions, tasks and operations of these forces are classified, a discussion of the CIDG program in this handbook is not possible. The reader may refer to Annex K (Employment of CIDG) to the Combined Campaign Plan 1968, AB 143, for a more detailed discussion of CIDG forces and their employment.

Section III

US ORGANIZATION

27. GENERAL.

a. The Ambassador of the United States is the personal representative of the President of the United States to the Government of South Vietnam. He is the senior member of the US Mission, and is responsible for the conduct of all United States Governmental activities in Vietnam.

b. The Embassy, Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA), and US Military Assistance Command - Vietnam (USMACV) are the United States Government Agencies presently in Vietnam. Collectively, they comprise the US Mission which is identified as the US Country Team.
c. The Embassy provides facilities and staff to support the Ambassador and is responsible for all exchanges between the US Government and the RVN at the national level.

d. JUSPAO is organized to meet the specific public affairs requirements imposed by United States interests in Vietnam.

e. USAID is responsible for assisting and advising on the development of the civilian economy. It provides advice and support over the entire spectrum of nonmilitary assistance in Vietnam.

f. USMACV is charged with the dual responsibility for providing military assistance support to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and, as a subordinate unified command under the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), for the command of US military forces committed to assist the RVN. By agreement, COMUSMACV coordinates the activities of the military forces contributed by other Free World Nations in support of the RVN.

g. The top coordinating body is the US Mission Council. The council is also the senior advisory body to the Ambassador. The senior officer or senior member of each US agency is a member of the Mission Council.

28. CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS) STAFF ELEMENT ORGANIZATION.

a. The Commander, USMACV (COMUSMACV) has the responsibility to provide single manager direction of all US civil/military pacification activities in the RVN. The Deputy to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) is responsible to COMUSMACV for discharging these duties. Specifically, he is charged by COMUSMACV with supervising the formulation and execution of all policies and programs, military and civilian, which support the RVN's pacification program.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, is assigned the following responsibilities:

   (1) Advise COMUSMACV, MACV staff elements, and all US civilian agencies on all aspects of US civil/military support for the RVN pacification program.

   (2) Develop joint and combined plans, policies, concepts, and programs concerning US civil/military support for pacification, in conjunction with RVN authorities.
(3) Supervise the execution of plans and programs for US civil/military support of pacification.

(4) Provide advice and assistance to the RVN, including the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD), RVNAF, Joint General Staff (JGS), and other RVN agencies on US civil/military support for pacification including US advisory and logistical support.

(5) Develop requirements for military and civil assets (US and RVN) to support pacification.

(6) Serve as the contact point for sponsoring agencies for RD programs. Maintain liaison with supporting agencies in representing their interest in civil non-RD programs and activities in the field. Maintain direct operational communications with field elements for these programs.

(7) Be responsible for program coordination with the various US mission civil agencies in the planning and implementing of community development and nation building activities.

(8) Provide a MACV focal point for economic warfare including population and resources control and for civic action by US forces.

(9) Evaluate all civil/military pacification activities including the provision of territorial security for pacification by US/FWMAF/RVN military forces and report on the progress, status, and problems of pacification support.

(10) Act on all pacification support policy matters pertaining to subordinate echelons.

(11) Direct advisory relationships with the RVN on pacification matters.

(12) Exercise overall staff monitorship, in conjunction with the other HQ MACV staff agencies in their areas of primary staff interest, for the RF/FF Advisory Group in all matters related to the pacification effort.

c. Region/CTZ: The staff element organization for CORDS conforms generally to Figure 3-8 allowing for differences in the situation in the various regions or Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ), provinces, and districts.
REGION/CTZ CORDS ORGANIZATION

Force Commander/Senior Advisor

Deputy Force Commander  Deputy For CORDS

Chief of Staff

Force General Staff

Asst Chief of Staff for CORDS

Deputy Senior Advisor (Military)

Mgmt. Support  Plans & Programs  Reports

Chieu Hoi  NLD  RD  Refugee  Psy Op  Public Safety

US Units

Province Advisory Team

ARNV Div Advisory Team

ARNV Regt Advisory Team

ARNV Bn Advisory Team

District Advisory Team

--- Coordination--Military and CORDS matters.

- - - - - Operational Control when unit assigned on RD direct support mission.

Figure 3-8
(1) The Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support to the Force Commander/Senior Advisor (SA) in all the corps is a civilian. He is charged with supervising the formulation and execution of all military and civil plans, policies, and programs which support the RVN's pacification program including civic action performed by US units.

(2) The Deputy Senior Advisor (DSA) assists the Deputy for CORDS in all matters relating to RVNAF military support for pacification.

(3) The Assistant Deputy for CORDS at region/CTZ level is a civilian. He heads an integrated civil/military staff which parallels the MACCORDS organization. He also directs headquarters based RD-related and non-RD technical programs.

d. Province.

(1) An integrated military/civilian advisory team is assigned to each province.

(2) The province senior advisor is the province team chief. He may be military or civilian. The province senior advisor is chosen by the Force Commander/Senior Advisor and his deputy for CORDS, with the concurrence of the Deputy COMUSMACV of CORDS. If the province senior advisor is military, the deputy province senior advisor must be civilian and vice versa.

(3) The province senior advisor receives operational direction from the Deputy for CORDS to the Force Commander/Senior Advisor. Province teams receive military administrative and logistical support from the ARVN division advisory teams.

(4) Where ARVN units are in direct support of pacification in a province, advisors to these units will be under the operational control of the province senior advisor.

(5) The province senior advisor serves as principal advisor to the province chief. However, technical advice will be given to the province chief or his representative by the most qualified member of the province team. The province senior advisor must be made aware of the advice given and will establish policies to which this advice will conform.

e. District.

(1) The district advisory team is an integrated military/civilian team.
(2) The district team advises the district chief on military/civil matters and implements all US military/civil support programs within the district.

(3) The district senior advisor is the district team chief. He is selected by the province senior advisor with the concurrence of the Deputy for CORDS to the Force Commander/SA. The district senior advisor and the deputy senior advisor may be either military or civilian. If one is military, the other must be civilian if there is a civilian representative present at district level.

29. US MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

a. USMACV is the US mission agency charged with the responsibility for military support of pacification. By exercising its influence through advisory channels, MACV guides and advises ARVN in the execution of that part of its mission related to the military support of pacification. By virtue of its operational command authority over US military components and operational control over Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), MACV assigns missions to its subordinate commanders which contribute to or directly support the pacification effort.

b. US Military Advisory Organization:

(1) US advisory detachments are provided to the RVNAF regular forces down to battalion or equivalent level (Fig 3-9). The advisory chain of command parallels the RVNAF chain of command. The organization of the US advisory detachment also provides for an independent communication capability which parallels that of ARVN, extending from USMACV through corps, division and regiment to battalion.

(2) The US Force Commander in I, II and III CTZ also functions as the Senior Advisor. This dual responsibility of the CG, III MAF, CG, I FFORCEC and CG, II FFORCEC allows effective coordination between RVNAF and US/FWMAF units conducting combat operations in support of pacification. IV Corps, which does not have a corresponding US tactical commander, has only a Senior Advisor and advisory detachment.

(3) Within each corps the senior advisor at each echelon is responsible for the US military advisory effort in the geographical area encompassed by his counterpart commander. The province senior advisor is supervised by the corps senior advisor of the corps in which the province is located.

c. US/FWMAF:

(1) COMUSMACV exercises operational command through the
* CG, III MAF is I Corps SA
CG, I FFORCEV is II Corps SA
CG, II FFORCEV is III Corps SA
SA, IV Corps is IV Corps SA

Figure 3-9
service component commanders over all US forces in the RVN. The FWMAF maintain their national identity, but by agreement are under the operational control of COMUSMACV.

(2) The primary responsibility of US/FWMAF is the destruction of VC/NVA main force units and neutralization of VC/NVA base areas. US/FWMAF will also conduct military operations in support of RD within assigned Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) and in the vicinity of US/FWMAF base areas.
CHAPTER 4

US AND VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION

Section I

GENERAL

30. Achievement of GVN/US objectives in the Republic of Vietnam requires the full utilization of all available civilian and military resources and complete continuing coordination between all agencies at all levels. The following procedures have been directed by the Ambassador and COMUSMACV and agreed to by GVN officials.

a. The primary channel of communications and liaison between US tactical commanders and US civilian agencies or GVN officials at the province level will be through the MACV province senior advisor.

b. US/FWMAF tactical units will establish liaison with the MACV province senior advisor during operations within the province to ensure coordination of military operations and military civic action with provincial plans and operations.

c. The senior US tactical commander and MACV senior advisors will hold periodic meetings to ensure complete and continuing coordination of all military and civilian activities.

31. Chapter 3 discussed the major civil and military organizations, US and GVN, which have responsibility to support pacification. This chapter will discuss the interrelationship between these various agencies at Province, DTA and CTZ levels.

Section II

PROVINCIAL LEVEL

32. One of the principal indicators of success of GVN/US strategy in the Republic of Vietnam is the results achieved by the pacification program. The key individual in the planning and execution of the pacification program at the province level is the province chief who is responsible for preparing the province pacification plan. After the plan has been reviewed and approved at CTZ level, the province chief is responsible for its detailed execution.

33. The province pacification plan is a single plan incorporating all aspects of pacification, including territorial security for RD campaigns, territorial security for previously pacified areas, hamlet security, the RD plan to include RD campaign plans, other activities
associated with RD, and other community development activities. The plan lists the budgetary and commodity support required for RD and establishes time phased objectives and goals. After the plans are approved, the monetary and commodity resources are furnished directly to the province chief from the national level in accordance with the established time frame. Military resources required in excess of available RF/PF are provided by the appropriate DTA Commander.

34. An RD campaign is a device for control, coordination and integration of military, RD cadre groups, and administrative elements in support of RD in province priority RD areas. In those areas, an RD campaign must be organized where three or more RD cadre groups operate. The limits of the campaign will encompass the RD area and the necessary territory to provide security for the RD area.

35. The province pacification plans are of major importance to both GVN and US agencies as they directly affect budgeting, procurement, and military planning. For this reason, advisory effort is as essential during the planning phase as during the execution of RD. The preparation of realistic plans requires the closest coordination between the advisory agencies and the province chief. Additionally, the province level advisory detachments must coordinate with the district advisory level and the DTA or CTZ advisory level as appropriate. Advisory relationships are illustrated in Figure 4-1. (It should be noted that the Region/CTZ and Province/Sector levels are separated to illustrate separate chains of direction, command and advice for both civil and military functioning.)

36. At the province level, there are three major limiting factors to the rate of progress of pacification. These are: (1) availability of military resources; (2) availability of financial and material resources; (3) availability of RD cadre groups.

a. Military resources are essential to the establishment of the secure environment in which pacification can proceed. The MACV province advisor has full responsibility for providing assistance and advice. During the planning phase, he is concerned with the feasibility of the plan, the impact of the plan on assigned and programmed forces and the availability of forces from DTA to support the plan. He assists in the preparation of the security plan. During execution, he provides advice on the employment of forces to achieve the objectives of the plan.

b. Responsibility for furnishing the financial and material resources rests with the various ministries in Saigon. Allocation is made directly to the province chief concerned. Many factors may
Figure 4-1
contribute to delays in obtaining these resources; slippages in shipment and handling, delays in procurement, in-country transportation delays and administrative delays. US assistance in resolving these difficulties is furnished by the province advisory team.

c. RD cadre are recruited at the local level, trained at the RD Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau and upon return to the province are organized into RD cadre groups. The approved province pacification plan is the basis for allocation of RD cadre groups to be organized in each province. In addition to RD cadre groups, the province chief may form Civil-Military RD teams from local resources. These teams are similar to the RD cadre group, however, they do not receive the same training. Consequently, they may be employed only in hamlets other than Ap Doi Moi undergoing RD. If the province chief needs US assistance to resolve difficulties encountered, he may request aid from the province senior advisor.

37. During execution of the plan, constant coordination is required between the GVN officials and the MACV advisors in order that a full interchange of information be achieved. Adjustments of schedules must be made in response to day to day developments in the province. RD is a step by step process, necessarily geared to achieving certain criteria or achievement at one stage, step, or area before going to the next; therefore, the flow of material must be adjusted to the actual need and expenditures; military operations must be planned and executed so as to exploit progress previously achieved. Premature commitment of resources probably may fail to achieve the desired result and therefore, will be wasteful. Military civic actions in particular must be coordinated with the provincial plan in order to ensure that they contribute to the overall program. US commanders will coordinate their civic action program through the province/district advisors.

Section III

DTA LEVEL

38. The DTA commander is responsible for providing military support for pacification. During the planning phase, the DTA commander should assist in the development of the province pacification plan prior to its submission to the CTZ commander for approval. By assisting in preparation of the pacification plan the DTA commander can determine if he can provide the required degree of military support. The MACV division senior advisor has the responsibility of advising and assisting the DTA commander during the planning and execution phases. A continuous interchange of information must be maintained between the DTA and province advisors.
39. It must be kept in mind during the planning phase that all material, financial and civil personnel resources required to support the plan will be geared to the planned rate of military progress. Due to the lead times for many of these resources, subsequent reprogramming is difficult and tends to become less responsive to changing situations than is desirable. Therefore, the review of the province plans must be characterized by a realistic assessment of the total impact on ARVN resources, the expected length of time that forces will be committed, and the anticipated VC/NVA reaction. Overly optimistic estimates during the review may result in subsequent over-commitment of ARVN forces during execution to the point where the DTA commanders lose the degree of flexibility necessary to respond to changing situations. Conversely, overly pessimistic reviews will result in military resources being available but not contributing to progress in pacification. During execution, the progress of pacification must be monitored continuously in order to detect as early as possible any significant deviations from the plan which will require modifications or adjustments in the program.

40. The commander always should retain sufficient flexibility to exploit unexpected successes or to reinforce areas where the program may require additional forces to remain on schedule. The DTA commander should avoid committing his total force, thereby losing his flexibility. Unless reinforced, he has no recourse but to reallocate his available forces within the DTA, thus increasing security forces at one point only at the cost of reduction at another. Once pacification programs are initiated in any given area, continuation of security is vital in gaining the support of the people.

41. The division senior advisors, as far as US agencies representatives are concerned, are in the most advantageous position to detect impending military over-commitments. To prevent military over-commitment, the division senior advisor must be prepared to recommend alternate courses of action such as reprogramming, reinforcement from corps or general reserve forces or realignment of missions. Such recommendations must be the product of close coordination between the US agencies involved in order to preclude diverse and conflicting advice at each level.

Section IV

CTZ LEVEL

42. US/FWMAF have a primary mission of destruction of the VC/NVA main force units and secondarily that of providing military security within their respective TAORs. The primary US/FWMAF mission in itself
supports and complements ARVN in their primary mission. The major threat to progress inside a selected RD area will be the VC/NVA main force units outside the area who may seek to penetrate and disrupt GVN efforts. Accomplishment of the US/FWMAF mission by destroying this threat directly benefits the progress of pacification.

43. Conversely, the planned employment of ARVN in extending territorial security for pacification will have a long-range effect on probable areas of US/FWMAF operations. As GVN influence is extended and as ARVN causes the eviction of significant VC/NVA main force units, probable areas for US/FWMAF operations will become more clearly defined.

44. During clearing operations for a new area, US/FWMAF operations may support directly or reinforce those of ARVN.

a. Combined ARVN/US/FWMAF operations may be the most desirable initial step in a heavily contested area, taking maximum advantage of the massive initial forces available to locate and destroy VC/NVA main force units. When the enemy threat has been reduced to manageable proportions, the US/FWMAF may be withdrawn for employment elsewhere while ARVN continues with their primary mission.

b. US/FWMAF may be tasked to provide contingency reserve forces in the event ARVN commanders become over-committed during clearing operations. Such assignment normally will be of limited duration, only until the ARVN commander reconstitutes a reserve force or additional forces are deployed from general reserve.

c. US/FWMAF may be required temporarily to assume responsibility for providing territorial security for pacification. A situation which may require this commitment would be one where VC/NVA forces are making a determined offensive to destroy RD progress in the area. ARVN forces may, under such conditions, become depleted by combat and partially ineffective. Under these circumstances, US/FWMAF may be committed temporarily pending the reorganization of ARVN capabilities. As the commitment of US/FWMAF in such a role tends to compromise their primary mission, it will be done only on order of COMUSMACV or as part of the approved plan developed by a senior field commander.

45. The above factors indicate the requirement for the close and continuous coordination and exchange of current information that must be accomplished between the ARVN corps headquarters and the US tactical command. ARVN plans for the support of pacification and its progress in providing this support is of vital concern to US/FWMAF, just as the results of US/FWMAF operations are of vital concern to ARVN commanders.
46. In addition to ensuring coordination between ARVN and US/FWMAF, the force commander/senior advisor is responsible for providing advice and assistance to the ARVN corps commander in the execution of his primary mission. The Deputy for CORDS will be in close and continuous contact with the various aspects of pacification.

Section V

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

47. Area Security Coordinating Center (ASCC). An ASCC is an ad hoc group which may be employed at province and/or district level for the purpose of coordinating military and civic action activities at the appropriate level among participating elements, formed from resources available to the participating forces and agencies.

a. The ASCC has a coordinating rather than a command function. In a joint operation at district level, for example, the district chief, and the US/ARVN battalion commanders would be the key participants and the decision makers. They will be assisted by the district senior advisor.

b. Three of the major functions of an ASCC are to:

(1) Plan and coordinate military and civil operations in the area of operations.

(2) Direct the support afforded to the RD cadre groups and coordinate military civic actions.

(3) Coordinate and exploit the activities of the Combined Intelligence Center.

c. Normally, the US/ARVN battalion commanders provide direct support to the district chief but retain control of their units during military and civic action operations. If present, the US battalion commander, who is normally the highest ranking military representative, will make every effort to ensure all parties work as a team. In so doing, he would set the example by his attitude and actions. Success of the concept of the ASCC depends on the smooth, harmonious relationship established among its members.

d. The district chief will be consulted on civic action projects in order to support his RD plan and ensure maximum utilization of these resources. The military commanders will endeavor to support his desires to the best of their ability.
48. **Combined Intelligence Center (CIC).** The CIC is an agency set up to collect and process tactical intelligence at the lowest level to facilitate swift combat reaction. Conceptually, it is designed to take advantage of the inputs from all possible intelligence gathering agencies. In addition, every effort is made to obtain the up-to-the-minute information necessary to penetrate the enemy infrastructure. Experience has shown that any wasted motion will permit the enemy to evade contact and escape. Close cooperation and energetic follow-up by all agencies concerned are the keys to success. Intelligence gathered by use of interrogation centers and document exploitation along with clandestine operations form the basis for an outstanding operational capability.

49. **District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC).** In selected districts where they are now operating or are to be established combined GVN/US DIOCC's will be operated for the purpose of achieving rapid evaluation and dissemination of infrastructure intelligence and for the purpose of planning quick reaction operations targeted on disrupting, harassing, capturing, and eliminating local VC infrastructure. The US senior province advisor is charged with advising the GVN on establishing DIOCC's and assisting in their efficient functioning.

50. **RD Campaign Headquarters.** In those provinces where an RD campaign has been planned, a campaign headquarters will be set up by a designated campaign commander and will include representatives from the forces and agencies participating in the campaign. The province chief is responsible for assigning adequate personnel (military, administrative, and technical) to the campaign headquarters so that the campaign commander can coordinate the military, civil affairs, and RD activities within the framework of the campaign.
CHAPTER 5

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Section I

GENERAL

51. In Chapter 1, Section II, the concepts and objectives of pacification were discussed. The overall strategic concept includes these separate but mutually supporting tasks:

a. Military Offensive. US/FWMAF have been assigned primary responsibility for conducting the military offensive to defeat the VC/NVA main force units. RVNAF participates in this task when possible in conjunction with their primary task of military support of pacification. It should be noted that in IV CTZ, RVNAF currently has the primary task for the military offensive as well as the support of pacification.

b. Revolutionary Development. RVNAF and GVN civil elements conduct this task with RVNAF having the primary responsibility for providing territorial security for RD. US/FWMAF is assigned this responsibility when directed by COMUSMACV. This task is conducted in three phases which are clearing, securing, and developing.

c. Nation Building. Government of Vietnam civil elements conduct this task with assistance of US/FW civil agencies to complete the development of a nation-wide political, economic and social institutions necessary for a viable, free noncommunist Republic of Vietnam.

52. This chapter will present certain of the tactics and techniques applicable to operations of the military offensive and those in support of pacification when US/FWMAF/RVNAF are supporting a GVN/US civil effort. In all cases, military operations should be so conducted as to be integrated fully with civil pacification objectives.

Section II

TACTICS

53. US/ARVN doctrine and tactics are being reviewed continuously to determine their adequacy and effectiveness in the combat environment of Vietnam. This continual review has proved that combat doctrine as published and taught in US service schools is valid for application in Vietnam. The "Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam", April 1967, is a valuable source of tactical guidance in concentrated form to augment the standard doctrinal sources. Additionally, "Combat Tips" and
"Lessons Learned" are published by the various headquarters from time to time to update doctrine and to disseminate information on successful combat tactics and techniques. This body of doctrine is valid for and applicable to the conduct of the military offensive and military operations in support of pacification. In actuality, military support of pacification is a unit mission, not a special and identifiable military maneuver. In order to accomplish this mission, units will employ standard tactics and techniques adapted as necessary to meet the requirements of terrain, enemy forces, and rules of engagement.

54. In the initial phase of pacification, offensive operations are conducted to clear the area. By definition, an area is cleared when organized VC/NVA main force and guerrilla units have been destroyed or evicted. During this phase, the clearing forces normally will operate in company and battalion size operations, although regiment or division size operations may be required initially, depending on VC/NVA capabilities and probable reaction. Later, when the VC/NVA cannot operate in large formations, the clearing force will be able to operate correspondingly in smaller formations covering larger areas. Saturation patrolling, day and night operations, and search and destroy operations will be conducted to locate, engage, and destroy remaining main force and local guerrilla units. Psychological operations will be conducted in support of these activities with emphasis on persuading the VC/NVA military and civil cadres to defect from the VC/NVA cause and rally to the GVN. In coordination with province officials, short term, high impact civic action projects are accomplished. The area will be outposted to give surveillance and early warning of enemy movements. Larger scale operations will move outward to the perimeter of the area undergoing clearing and/or in adjacent areas, in order to prevent the VC/NVA from reentering. During clearing, military operations will be oriented on the enemy within a designated area.

55. In securing an area, continued emphasis is placed on small unit operations (company and platoon), outposting, day and night ambushes, and security missions. Military operations are oriented on providing area security, but are characterized by aggressive offensive operations throughout the area. Psychological operations, particularly in civic actions, are intensified. Securing continues until the VC capability is reduced to individual terrorist activities.

Section III

TECHNIQUES

56. GENERAL. A number of techniques have evolved as US and RVNAF forces have worked together in coordinated military operations. The techniques described here in no way describe the limits of this type of operation. Imagination and adaptability to local circumstances
are the only limits to the development of other similar techniques.

57. PATROLLING. Saturation patrolling previously has been identified as one of the principle tactics of clearing and securing operations. US forces have developed several variations of this tactic, variously identified as SATURATION PATROLLING, RECONDO, CHECKERBOARD, and HUNTER KILLER. All have basic similarities, the minor variations primarily being adaptations to the existing state of training, terrain, enemy, and resources availability (primarily helicopters).

a. SATURATION PATROLLING as a Technique for Finding and Fixing the Enemy. SATURATION PATROLLING is the most expeditious and effective means of finding and fixing the enemy in a specified area of operations (AO).

(1) To implement this technique an infantry battalion base of operations, with supporting artillery and an appropriate security/reaction force, is centrally located in an AO. Rifle companies may occupy different bases of operations, from which platoon and squad patrols are dispatched. The positioning of the 4.2 inch mortar platoon in a company base of operations increases the patrol range while remaining within range of indirect fire support. Platoons and squads may be airlifted into landing zones several thousand meters from the company or battalion base of operations to search assigned areas generally leading back to either a base area or a predetermined ambush site. A variation of this technique is to land separate elements of a company in several landing zones and have them converge on a common, selected location while searching the area of operation enroute. When patrols and companies are issued two or three days rations, disclosure of friendly unit locations by resupply helicopters is eliminated. There are many variations of this technique, all involving rapid movement and helicopter support. Centrally locating the battalion base of operations enables an infantry battalion to search and clear an area of approximately 144 square miles without moving its base or displacing the supporting artillery.

(2) SATURATION PATROLLING by helicopters has certain disadvantages which should be noted. First, heliborne assaults require extensive artillery and air preparations on selected landing zones. This, in conjunction with the presence of large numbers of helicopters, definitely alerts the enemy to the intended area of operations. Secondly, the enemy can be expected to leave the area, hide, or move into prepared and advantageous positions to fight on his own terms.

b. RECONDO - CHECKERBOARD Concept of Operations. The CHECKERBOARD concept is a tactical technique whereby patrols—steadily moving from one small topographical square to the next—are played like checker pieces, intending to jump or block the enemy.
(1) The key to this operation is the dispersal of counter-guerrilla equipped units, preferably Platoons, in night operations. These units, provided an increased communications capability and light equipment to increase mobility, are called RECONDO patrols. These RECONDO patrols are kept constantly on the move and normally occupy the same position for one or two days only. They are delegated the authority to exploit enemy targets within their capability. Control is decentralized to the lowest level possible, and the primary direction from higher headquarters is in the form of specific geographic areas in which each patrol concentrates its efforts. Experience has demonstrated that decentralized execution tends to foster maximum ingenuity, initiative, and guile on the part of the small unit leader. Since such operations provide a good flow of current intelligence, sizeable enemy units are located occasionally. The RECONDO patrols act autonomously in their assigned area of responsibility until an enemy unit is located, or the area threatened. Battalion headquarters thereafter directs various adjacent units to occupy blocking or ambush along likely avenues of escape, while others are directed to converge on the target. The overall battalion objective is to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces. Where RECONDO squads or Platoons encounter superior forces, the requirement is to fix the enemy until adjacent units can converge and/or additional forces can be introduced by helicopter.

(2) The best method of employment is to have two companies infiltrate and saturate the TAOR in a CHECKERBOARD configuration. Each company employs its Platoons in the following manner:

(a) At night one squad from each platoon, as required, moves out approximately 3-6 kilometers, remains overnight, and is in place the following day with the mission of observing selected trails or suspected enemy areas from concealed locations.

(b) The following night each platoon (-) infiltrates to positions where the squad has previously been located, and a squad again moves forward 3-6 kilometers.

(c) This procedure is followed until contact with the enemy forces is established at which time the squad or platoon attempts to exploit. In the event the enemy force is too large to destroy, contact is maintained and the battalion commander assumes control to employ the resources within his capability. These resources can be other CHECKERBOARD units, a reserve company, or the normally available brigade reserve and supporting elements.

c. HUNTER-KILLER Concept. The HUNTER-KILLER force consists of two components carefully tailored to the mission, situation, weather,
and terrain; a swift, highly mobile, lightly equipped, hunter element to seek out the enemy; and a much larger, heavily supported killer force which remains centrally poised and carefully positioned ready to pounce on and destroy enemy located by the hunters. As the hunt progresses, the killers carefully monitor its progress and tentatively plan commitments that might materialize.

(1) When the killers are committed, the principle of mass (sudden application of overwhelming force) both in combat power and helicopter lift must be observed. The size of the committed force will depend on the situation. The principle of economy of force will also be followed - measured forces might be applied. To provide rest for the constantly moving hunters, rifle platoons from the killer force should be rotated with those of the hunter force. In this manner, the hunter phase would be maintained for considerable periods, but there always would be fresh units in the killer force ready to close with the enemy.

(2) This concept offers many advantages. In this war the big problem is to find the enemy. Large areas can be searched with minimum cost in manpower and helicopter time; infantrymen do not wear themselves out searching; the "stay time" of a battalion or brigade in the field with all supporting elements is increased; searches of remote areas are easier to support; and fresh units are always ready to pounce upon any force located.

58. CORDON AND SEARCH.

a. The CORDON AND SEARCH may be used alone or may be integrated with the County Fair, Hamlet Festival or Go Team, which will be discussed later. The concept of the CORDON AND SEARCH operation is to form a blockade around the target area - usually a hamlet - prevent movement into or out of the target area with one force, and then conduct a detailed search with a separate force. The CORDON AND SEARCH is most effective when the cordon is established silently and under the cover of darkness. This frequently will entrap draft evaders, deserters, and local guerrillas or VC local forces who have spent the night in the hamlet; therefore, the cordonng forces must maintain surveillance and be prepared to engage enemy forces inside the perimeter as well as outside the perimeter.

b. Although the cordonning force may be ARVN, US, or FWMAF, the searching force should always be Vietnamese. They may be ARVN, RF/PF or NPFF. The searching force should receive special training on the tactics and techniques of conducting a search, should be organized into search teams, each with specific assigned tasks, and should be briefed on the specific area or hamlet to be searched. Whenever possible, aerial photographs or a sand table should be used
during the briefing, in order that each team leader knows and understands his responsibilities.

c. For the purpose of the following discussion, a sizeable searching force is assumed, i.e., an RF company. The actual searching force may be considerably smaller, but the principles still apply. Each man, team, squad, or platoon must be selected for, trained for, and preferably rehearsed for a specific job during a specific search phase. The search will produce proper results only when it is well coordinated and carefully controlled during execution. The search should be as thorough as time permits: a sloppy or halfhearted search does not achieve satisfactory results.

d. The search operation can be divided into two phases - first, the sweep, and second, the deliberate search. Prior to initiating the sweep, the searching force moves as close as possible to the objective before detection. If possible, movement will be made under the cover of darkness, maintaining light and noise discipline.

e. Sweep.

(1) The sweep phase should be conducted rapidly, taking advantage of the element of surprise. The purpose of the sweep is to inspect rapidly the objective area, seize arms, ammunition, or other contraband before it can be hidden; detect any obvious booby traps; immobilize the population; and apprehend any suspected persons for further questioning. The sweep must be executed rapidly and decisively. The physical layout and the availability of approaches to the objective area may require that the sweep be conducted only from one point. It will be more effective, however, if a converging sweep can be initiated from two or more approaches.

(2) The sweep phase is terminated when the entire objective area has been given a visual inspection or when resistance or the threat of resistance by entrapped VC forces is encountered. Sweep forces always must be prepared for offensive combat if resistance develops.

f. Organization for the sweep should include the following functional teams, which may consist of from two or three men to a squad in strength:

(1) **Command Group**: Maintains overall command and control over the search operation. Maintains communication with the commander of the cordonning force and with the overall commander for the operation.

(2) **Sub-Command Group**: If two or more search sectors are established, each should have a senior NCO or an officer in charge.
The commander should maintain radio communications with the search force commander. He should control directly the fire support team.

(3) **Fire Support Team:** This team consists of a minimum of one automatic rifle or light machine gun, with crew. It displaces as required under control of the commander or sub-commander so as to be prepared to provide supporting fires to search teams if opposition is encountered. If converging sectors of search are being used, care must be exercised to preclude endangering friendly personnel.

(4) **Search Teams:** This team conducts a rapid visual search of each habitation and its surrounding ground. During the sweep, emphasis is on maintaining speed, to search as rapidly as possible to detect contraband or apprehend suspicious persons before they can be hidden. If such are located, they should be taken immediately to the command group for safe keeping by only one or two of the search team while the balance of the team continues the search. The search team should be equipped with signs, marking tape, or other means of marking booby traps or mines for later destruction. The location of mines, booby traps, tunnels, and underground bunkers should be reported immediately to the command group.

(5) **Loud Speaker Team:** A portable bull horn or loud speaker is considered essential for establishing rapid and positive control of the population. If possible, a minimum of one loud speaker per search sector under the immediate control of the commander/sub-commander should be provided.

g. Tunnels and bunkers normally will not be searched during the sweep however, surveillance of entrances must be maintained. Smoke or CS may be placed inside for immediate flushing action. If an extensive network of tunnels is detected, the search commander may consider this to be a sufficient threat so as to require a suspension of the sweep and an initiation of a deliberate search, which includes tunnel flushing and destruction/denial operations. If significant opposition is encountered, the cordoning force may reinforce the searching force and reduce the hamlet by normal combat action.

h. **Deliberate Search.**

(1) Upon completion of the sweep, the deliberate search phase of the search operation is initiated. This phase is characterized by a detailed and methodical search of the entire objective area. The search force is organized into functional teams, each of which has received training and is equipped to carry out a specific search procedure.
(2) Mines and booby traps must be located, marked and neutralized or destroyed.

(3) Tunnels that have been by-passed and kept under surveillance during the sweep phase are flushed with CS or smoke; either may cause personnel inside to come out and also will assist in detecting additional tunnel entrances. Considerable success has been experienced employing tunnel search teams which actually make a detailed search of the tunnel complex to kill or capture the enemy and capture weapons, documents, and other supplies.

(4) Each house or hut receives a methodical search. Walls and roofs are tapped or probed to detect hiding places or contraband. Floors are probed. A few bucketfuls of water spread evenly over the floor frequently will detect buried objects, as recently disturbed earth is more porous than the packed earth and absorbs water faster. Flagstones or hearth stones are examined carefully for evidence of being removable and, if in doubt, are lifted and the area beneath probed. Again, water poured over the area will be absorbed more rapidly between stones that have been disturbed. Family altars are examined carefully but with consideration for the religious sensitivities of the inhabitant. Sleeping platforms are dismantled and searched, the earth probed. Frequently, glazed pottery jugs are dug in beneath the sleeping platforms, to be used for hasty shelter or storage. These jugs are lifted and the interior of the hole examined and probed. Conventional mine sweeping gear or other metallic detectors may be used to sweep the walls and roof, but the usual amount of random metal - tie wires, nails and scrap - usually gives a high percentage of false reading. Exterior and interior measurements are taken to determine if walls or partitions of unusual thickness are present. Bagged rice is probed or, if possible, weighed on an improvised beam scale to determine if any contraband is hidden inside.

(5) The outside area is examined carefully to detect evidence of buried objects, particularly around and under bushes and trees. Tree trunks are tapped with a hammer or rock to locate hidden openings. Caches frequently are located on platforms hidden by the foliage on the tree limbs. Wells must be inspected carefully by a search team member physically descending inside; tunnels frequently are constructed exiting into well shafts. Fish weirs and holding ponds must be examined carefully for underwater entrances to caves or tunnels. Grave sites should be examined carefully but with consideration for the religious sensitivities of the local inhabitant.

(6) Care must be exercised to return the searched area to its normal state of order and repair as in those cases where no evidence of enemy complicity is found.
i. Added details which must be considered are that:

(1) The search force commander must allocate tasks and areas to ensure that the entire area is subjected to a detailed search.

(2) The senior member of the family, preferable the male member, should be inside the house with the search team during the search. This will tend to discourage looting by the search team. After the search has been completed, the search force commander assembles the hamlet elders and determines if any looting was done by the search teams.

(3) During the deliberate search of the area, interrogation teams assemble the inhabitants, conduct a documentation inspection, and as appropriate, conduct a detailed interrogation of selected subjects.

59. COMBINED CORDON AND SEARCH TECHNIQUES.

a. Three specific variations of cordon and search have been developed in Vietnam. Each of these utilize both US and Vietnamese personnel. Although these techniques may be used during support of RD, they are used primarily during clearing operations. These techniques are:

(1) The Hamlet Festival.

(2) The Go Team.

(3) The County Fair.

b. Basically, the three techniques are similar in that all include the cordonning of the hamlet selected for the operation, a search of the hamlet by GVN forces, and finally, conduct of PSYOP for the purpose of evidencing GVN concern for the people of the area. First, the Hamlet Festival concept will be described in brief. Then the Go Team and County Fair will be covered, pointing out the significant differences which require amplification.

c. Annex B describes the Hamlet Festival layout and task organization and functions of the RVNAF teams of the Hamlet Festival conceived and employed by the 1st US Infantry Division. The physical layout and the task organization shown in the annex are idealized; both may vary according to terrain, equipment available, and mission requirements.
a. The Hamlet Festival operation conceptually includes three components: the external cordon of military forces; the search force, always Vietnamese; and the Hamlet Festival force, also Vietnamese. These operate as a permanent task force under a combined staff of US and GVN personnel. It is used most profitably where military security and GVN civil influence are planned to be permanent.

b. In the actual operation, the military force moves in under cover of darkness and establishes a cordon around the hamlet: the search force then enters. As the search force enters, VC, ARVN deserters, and other illegal residents will attempt to escape: the cordon force will apprehend them. The searchers, normally RF/PF or NPFF units, assemble all males and females in the 15-45 age bracket and screen them. Search techniques are discussed in paragraph 58.

c. As this search is being conducted, the remaining hamlet residents are assembled for a Hamlet Festival. The purpose of this phase of the operation is to subject the people to intensive propaganda for the purpose of indicating to them that there does exist concern for their welfare on the part of the GVN. Food, clothing, agricultural advice, medical attention, all these are utilized as material evidences of the GVN concern. In addition, ID cards and family identity books are issued and lectures and entertainment are provided.

61. GO TEAM.

a. The Go Team differs from the Hamlet Festival in these respects:

(1) A combined staff for the operation is not required.

(2) The purpose of the operation is not to establish a permanent GVN presence, but rather to assist the progress of a military operation by clearing hamlets in the operation area and by providing evidence of GVN concern for the people even though adequate security is not available for the introduction of revolutionary development teams.

b. The operation of the team is similar to the conduct of the Hamlet Festival, except that a formal festival layout is not used. The Go Team consists of:

(1) Police or RF/PF units who conduct the search and elicit intelligence.

(2) A specially trained Vietnamese team which operates
with the US unit and assists in conducting night ambushes and patrols.

(3) Hoi Chanh, if available, who operates in the same manner as in the Hamlet Festival.

(4) PSYWAR/CA personnel who also operate in the same manner as in the Hamlet Festival.

(5) The intelligence team which gathers and confirms information and attempts to recruit informants and agents for future use.

(6) Medical personnel who attend to the simple medical needs of the people and thus provide a very tangible example of GVN interest.

c. Upon completion of the search and the Go Team's function, the entire operation moves on. The Go Team operation usually can be accomplished in a single day. It is most important in the Go Team operation that the people fully understand that the GVN presence is only temporary so that they do not needlessly expose themselves to the threat of later VC reprisal.

62. COUNTY FAIR.

The County Fair is much like the Hamlet Festival but is on a lesser scale. It falls half-way between Hamlet Festival and the Go Team. US units provide the tactical cordon within which GVN teams similar in composition and mission to the Go Teams, carry out their operation. The County Fair may be used in clearing operations in areas in which the GVN does not intend immediately to maintain its presence permanently, but desires to prepare the population for later assimilation. No attempts are made to obtain a commitment to GVN by the population at the time of the County Fair.

63. COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM.

a. The Combined Action Program, bringing together US Marines in III MAF and Vietnamese Popular Forces into wholly integrated units of platoon size, was initiated in August 1965. From a modest beginning of one Combined Action Platoon at Phu Bai in August 1965, the program had grown by May 1967, to 75 platoons. The program has exhibited strength and promise from the start. Villages with a Combined Action Platoon have moved rapidly toward a condition of peace and stability. A clear evidence of a Combined Action Platoon's effectiveness is the fact that the VC have never been able to re-establish control over a village protected by a Combined Action Platoon. In order to provide for effective operations and the orderly expansion of the Combined
Action Program and to ensure its integration into the Revolutionary Development Campaign Plan, items of joint policy have been agreed to between the I ARVN Corps and III MAF. These policy items are directive in nature and are distributed in a Vietnamese translation of this instruction to the military units of I ARVN Corps.

b. The basic Combined Action unit is the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) composed of one PF platoon equipped according to the TOE with a combat strength of 35 PF soldiers, and a Marine rifle squad of 14 Marines plus one Navy corpsman. The PF platoon retains its basic organization, while the Marines become advisors to the entire platoon, with the Marine squad leader serving as the advisor to the Vietnamese platoon leader. The individual Marines are integrated into the PF squads. Within the CAP, command relationships are on a coordination and cooperation basis between the PF platoon leader and the Marine squad leader. The Marine squad leader does not command the PF element of the CAP, nor does the PF platoon leader command the Marine squad.

c. The Missions/Tasks of the CAP are to:

(1) Destroy the VC infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.

(2) Provide public security and help maintain law and order.

(3) Protect the friendly political/social infrastructure.

(4) Protect bases and communication lines within the village and hamlets in which they are located by conducting day and night patrols and ambushes in their assigned areas.

(5) Contribute to combined operations with RF and other PF, ARVN or FWMAF in their area of activity.

(6) Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the VC.

(7) Participate and assist in RD activities to the maximum extent possible with the accomplishment of the foregoing missions/tasks.

d. The subsector commander (district Chief) exercises control over the CAP through the Combined Action Team (CAT) located at subsector headquarters. The Combined Action Team is composed of a VN section of 1 or 2 officers and the necessary enlisted personnel and one or more
Combined Action Company Headquarters of 1 Marine officer and 5 enlisted USMC; plus liaison personnel from FWMAF units as required, such as artillery liaison and fire support coordination personnel. The CAT is designed to evolve into a complete operations center for the subsector commander to direct and coordinate the security efforts of CAPs, PF platoons, and RD cadre groups in the district with ARVN, FWMAF units, and RD campaign activities. The actions of the CAT include all matters necessary to accomplish the missions set forth in subparagraph c above.

e. The activation of a CAP or the relocation of the Marine element of a CAP mutually determined by CG, I Corps and CG, III MAF is based upon recommendations made by subsector commanders forwarded through ARVN or III MAF Combined Action Program channels. In general, CAP locations are selected to contribute directly to the accomplishment of the RD Campaign Plan, to provide defense of the LOCs, and to solve particular security problems unique to a given district such as those caused by the influx of refugees.

f. The training objective of the CAP is to enhance combat effectiveness of the PF platoon as soon as feasible in order to relocate the USMC squad in another hamlet/village area. Subsector commanders, insofar as practicable, attempt to keep the PF platoons in the same hamlet for a sufficient period of time to accomplish this training objective. All members of PF platoons assigned for duty in a CAP have completed basic military training. Additional on-the-job training is conducted by the Marine squad leader, operating in coordination with the PF platoon leader. Additional training guidance is provided from time to time to the elements of the CAP through the I Corps and III MAF Combined Action Program channels. Marine/Navy personnel assigned to the Combined Action Program as replacements or to form new CAPs attend the Combined Action School in DaNang or Phu Bai prior to such assignment.

g. The Combined Action Program is still in the development stage, but is is anticipated that shortly, certain platoons will have progressed to the point at which the Marine squad can be withdrawn and moved to a new area. It is estimated that the Marine squad will spend from six to twelve months with each PF platoon. Results of the program to date are the quantum jump in efficiency of the reinforced platoons and the consequent proportional increase in the degree of security that they are able to provide.
64. Training objectives to improve the effectiveness of ARVN and RF/PF units in the role of supporting pacification are:

a. To assist ARVN and RF/PF units to understand the reasons for and importance of military support of pacification.

b. To teach tactics and techniques for providing the secure environment that is essential to pacification by means of in place training.

c. To emphasize the necessity for close coordination and cooperation between ARVN, RF/PF, RD cadre groups, National Police, civilian agencies, and the population.

d. To outline procedures to assist the population in achieving local community and public service projects.

65. This chapter will trace the organization for training for ARVN, RF and PF as it now exists and briefly discuss trends for the future.

Section II

MOBILE TRAINING TEAM OPERATIONS

66. To meet the objectives stated in Section I above, mobile training teams (MTT) were organized by ARVN to indoctrinate and re-orient ARVN and RF/PF.

67. The ARVN training is conducted by 14 MTTs each consisting of 12 officers. Each of the four corps and ten divisions is represented by a team. RF training is conducted by 68 MTTs, each consisting of four officers. Every province has at least one team; provinces with a large number of RF units have two or three teams. ARVN RD MTTs are assisted by one US officer advisor and RF RD MTTs by one US officer advisor per province. ARVN RD MTTs received a two week course of instruction during the period 1 - 15 Dec 66. RF RD MTTs received an improved three week course of instruction which incorporated specialized instruction tailored to RF functions during the period 17 Jan - 3 Feb 67. Advisor conferences were conducted at the conclusion of
each course. Training for PF MTTs was conducted initially for 4 MTTs from the national level and 44 MTTs from the provinces. Each team consisted of five members (2 officers and 3 NCOs). These PF MTTs in turn, trained 241 subsector MTTs which conduct RD training for PF Platoons concurrently with existing motivation indoctrination training under a revised motivation Indoctrination/Revolutionary Development Program.

68. US forces in the various Corps Tactical Zones currently have several types of organizations and concepts to assist in the training and improvement of RF/PF units.

a. Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs). MATs, consisting of five US, and two ARVN personnel, are employed to advise and assist RF/PF units on field fortifications, barrier systems, request and adjustment of indirect fires, small unit operations with emphasis on night operations and ambushes, patrols, weapons employment, emergency medical care, and other topics related to RF/PF missions. In addition, MATs assist units in the improvement of their administrative and logistic support procedures, and provide liaison with nearby US military forces. The US members of the MATs are assigned to the Province Advisory Team and are normally placed under the operational control of a District Advisor. They work and live with the RF/PF units in the field, returning to district compounds as necessary for instructions, supplies, and rest.

b. The Combined Mobile Improvement Teams (CMIT) and Combined Mobile Training Teams (CMTT) are currently used in II CTZ. While the organization and concept of operation may vary somewhat to meet specific requirements, the mission is similar to MATs, i.e., to improve the training and effectiveness of RF/PF units. CMIT and CMTT are programmed for conversion to MATs during 1968.

c. The Combined Action Platoon (CAP) and the Combined Action Company (CAC) are used in the I CTZ by the US Marines. The CAP or CAC consists of a squad or more of Marines and an RF or PF unit. The mission of the Marines is to advise, train, and assist the Vietnamese unit, while participating in all of its operations and activities. MATs, composed of US Army personnel, are also employed in I CTZ.

69. ARVN RD MTTs initiated the first cycle of training during the period 3 - 10 Jan 67. ARVN maneuver, combat support, and combat service support battalions were trained throughout the year. The RF initiated the first cycle of training on 28 February 1967 and units were trained throughout the year. PF RD training of units started on 2 May 1967, and was continued throughout the year.
70. The RD training program has convinced ARVN and RF/PF commanders that other training can be conducted as effectively at the unit level. Further, most commanders realize that the RD training has improved the ability of the unit to carry out its operational mission. Advisors and commanders alike must take advantage of the momentum achieved. The unit assigned to perform an RD mission must execute its required RD tasks as a primary role. However, an aggressive commander can improve the effectiveness of his unit while he is on an RD mission by training concurrently with RD operations. For example, the advisor can encourage his counterpart to require his units not committed actively to RD to work on improving individual weapon marksmanship, crew served weapons proficiency, small unit tactics, patrol and ambush techniques, search techniques, maintenance of weapons and equipment, and other subjects directly related to the RD and other operational missions. Throughout all phases of the training, the advisor can emphasize the role and responsibilities of junior leaders. Patrolling techniques also can be improved by requiring briefings, debriefings, and after action critiques as a standard operating procedure for all patrols.

71. As a result of strong command emphasis, thorough planning and preparation, and excellent advisory supervision and assistance, the RD training program has been successful. The program must continue to receive a high degree of advisory and command supervision at all levels. It is essential that this training be prepared and presented effectively to all ARVN and RF/PF personnel concerned if the vital RD effort is to succeed. Senior US commanders and all US advisors personally must assume active roles in this undertaking and work closely with their counterparts to facilitate successful training. Advisors must take positive steps to ensure success of the training. By their presence at RD training, they demonstrate to the troops their active and continuing support of RD. Advisors must strive to ensure that the greatest possible number of officers and NCOs participate in this vital instruction. Guidance and command policy pertaining to the advisory effort is covered in directives as listed in paragraph 74.

72. JGS/CTA has directed corps and divisions to allocate 20% of their quarterly training funds to support the ARVN RD training. RF and PF are receiving comparable training funds to support their programs. Funds for training aids material and services are essential to an effective training program. In some instances, RD MTT chiefs may need advisory assistance to obtain the fiscal assets authorized. Training aids to support the RD training are available through ARVN channels at the Training Aids Center in Saigon and the Subcenters located at Da Nang, Nha Trang and Can Tho. Aids include training films, projection equipment, outdoor projection boxes, megaphones, etc. Advisors and commanders are encouraged to supervise operation and maintenance of aids. Spare parts and maintenance support are available at the Training Aids Center and Subcenters.
73. A Revolutionary Development Refresher (RDR) training program which will retrain ARVN battalions in military support of pacification began in November 1967. The training will be accomplished by corps and division MTTs under a two-week POI for maneuver battalions and a reduced one-week POI for combat support and combat service support battalions. All battalions are scheduled to complete RDR training by November 1968.

74. The current basic references, both JGS and MACV, applicable to the RD training mission are as follows:


- b. JGS/CTA CONF Memo #6576, dated 23 Dec 66, Subject: Training of Regional Forces in Support of the Rural Reconstruction Program.

- c. JGS Dir #0046, dated 5 Jan 67, Subject: Military Support of RF.

- d. JGS/CTA Memo #0849, dated 17 Feb 67, Subject: Correction of Deficiencies in Training of the Rural Revolutionary Development Military Support Units.

- e. CTA Memo #1159, dated 3 Mar 67, Subject: Military Support for RD Training Plan for PF Units.

- f. JGS/CTA Msg #6724, dated 4 Mar 67, Subject: Training Funds for RF RD Training.

- g. MACV Dir 350-5, dated 21 Oct 67, Subject: Revolutionary Development Refresher (RDR) Training.

- h. MACT CONF Msg #54593, dated 27 Dec 66, Subject: Support of RD Training.

- i. MACT CONF Msg #002, dated 1 Jan 67, Subject: RF RD Training.

Section III

FUTURE TRENDS

75. The training of ARVN, RF and PF has been further augmented during recent combined operations such as FAIRFAX/RANG DONG. Vietnamese and US commanders have exchanged squads, platoons and companies with good success. RF/PF have worked in direct support of
US forces. US forces have assisted ARVN, RF and PF by providing combat and combat support units in direct support of Vietnamese operations. Both forces have benefited from this exchange. US forces have learned much from their Vietnamese friends who have detailed knowledge of the terrain and enemy. The Vietnamese have proved adept at learning from and adapting to the tactics and techniques being demonstrated in combat by US forces. Both Vietnamese and US forces should take advantage of every opportunity during coordinated military operations to exchange units.
S
2 - SJS
2 - J1
2 - J2
1 - J31
1 - J32
1 - J33
150 - J34
2 - COC
3 - COC (JOD)
2 - J4
2 - J5
2 - J6
150 - MAGCOWS
1 - MACDC
1 - MAGSA
100 - MACT
1 - MAGCI
2 - MAGSOAG
2 - FWMAO
50 - FWMAO (AFV)
12 - FWMAO (ROK-V)
2 - FWMAO (NZV Force)
2 - FWMAO (MAGROC-V)
2 - FWMAO (RMTAGOV)
2 - FWMAO (PHILCAG)
1 - Combined Studies
1 - ACTIV
5 - OSD/ARPA
1 - Mil History
2 - AFTU
2 - NRDU
1 - USAHAC
10 - Cdr, 7th AF
4 - MATTLO
50 - CG, III MAF
400 - CG, USARV (175 each to I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV)
10 - Each Chief, AF Adv Gp;
Chief, US Naval Adv Gp;
Railway Security Adv Det
300 - Each SA, CMD, Abn Div;
RF/PF, Marine Adv Gp (3 to
each Sr Adv down to and
including Bn and subsector
level)
30 - Each SA, CMD, Abn Div,
RF/PF, Marine Adv Gp (3 to
each Sr Adv down to and
including Bn and subsector
level)
5 - Each SA I, II, III, IV & V ALC
5 - COMNAVFORV
15 - CO, 5th SFG (Abn)
5 - JGS, J3
200 - JGS, Central Training Agency
10 - Chairman, JCS
10 - CSA
5 - CSAF
10 - GNO
10 - CMC
10 - AGSI
5 - DCSOPS
25 - SACSA
20 - ACTIV Ln Off, AFSFOR
5 - CINPAC
5 - CINPACAF
14 - CINCAL
5 - CINCLANT
1 - USCINCEUR
2 - CINCSTRIKE
2 - USCINCOS
5 - CINCLANTFLT
10 - CINCUSAUS
5 - CINCUSAUSPAAC
2 - HQ USAFSTRIKE
2 - HQ USARSTRIKE
5 - US Army Forces Southern Command
14 - CG, USARAL
2 - CG, 1st US Army
2 - CG, 3rd US Army
2 - CG, 4th US Army
2 - CG, 5th US Army
2 - CG, 6th US Army
2 - CG, 7th US Army
2 - CG, 8th US Army
5 - CG, XVIII Abn Corps
5 - CG, III Corps
5 - CG, 82d Abn Div
5 - CG, 1st Arm Div
5 - CG, 2d Armd Div
DISTRIBUTION:

5 - CG, 5th Mech Div
15 - CG, USACDC
2 - CG, USACDEC
1 - CO, USAGDIA
3 - COMPHIBPAC
3 - COMPHIBTRAPAC
3 - COMPHIBTRALANT
5 - COMUSMACHTAI
2 - COMUSJAPAN
10 - CHMAACCHINA
2 - CHMAAGJAPAN
2 - CHPROMAAGKOREA
2 - CHMILTAGINDONESIA
2 - CHMEDTBURMA
2 - Chief, ARPA RDFU (THAI)
10 - Chief, JUSMAG, PHIL
12 - JFK Center SW
5 - Defense Document Center
3 - CO, Seal Tm 1
3 - CO, Seal Tm 2
7 - COMRIVFLOT ONE
6 - COMCOSRON ONE
6 - COMRIVRON FIVE
2 - COMDT, NWC
5 - COMDT, AFSC
2 - COMDT, ICAF
5 - COMDT, USAWC
2 - COMDT, Air War College
2 - President, Naval War College
5 - COMDT, USAINTS
5 - COMDT, USAARMS
10 - COMDT, USAIS
5 - COMDT, USAAVNS
2 - COMDT, USA Jungle Warfare Sch
2 - COMDT, PMG Sch
2 - COMDT, USA Trans Sch
2 - COMDT, USA Sig Sch
2 - COMDT, USMC Sch
2 - COMDT, USN Amph Sch
12 - COMDT, USA QA Sch
2 - COMDT, USAPHIS
2 - COMDT, USAQMS
6 - COMDT, USASWS
2 - COMDT, USAAD Sch
5 - COMDT, USAAMS
2 - COMDT, USAOGMS
2 - COMDT, USAOC&S
2 - COMDT, USAES
5 - COMDT, USACGSC
5 - COMDT, USARPAC Intell Sch
2 - Supt, USNA
2 - Supt, USNPGS
3 - Supt, USMA
2 - Supt, USAFA
5 - USA Sch of Americas
2 - CO, NAVPHILBSCOL CORO
5 - MAI
1 - Dir, US Air Univ Library
1 - Dir, Special Air Warfare Sch
ANNEX A

RD HAMLET CRITERIA

The purpose of this annex is to set forth definitions and criteria utilized to describe the hamlet system.

A. There are three categories to be considered.

1. **AP DOI MOI** (Real New Life Hamlet): An Ap Doi Moi (ADM) is a hamlet designated in a provincial RD plan for a program of development under the supervision of a RD cadre group to achieve the eleven objectives (aspirations) in the framework of the 1968 RD program, the ADM will represent a prosperous community, capable of further political, social, and economic growth on its own.

2. **AP BINH DINH** (Pacification Hamlet): An Ap Binh Dinh (ABD) is a hamlet designated in a provincial RD plan for a program of construction to achieve the first two of the 11 objectives (aspirations). Construction activities may be accomplished under the supervision of an RD cadre group or other authorized GVN personnel. ABD may have more objectives depending on the capabilities of the social organization. The recruiting and training of self-defense forces, the organizing of a defense system against guerrilla forces, and the electing of a hamlet government council should be underway. An ABD should be ready for conversion to an ADM in the following year. Normally, an ABD hamlet will be located on the periphery of the area in which ADM are being developed, along critical LOC, or adjacent to a military installation.

3. **AP TAN SINH** (New Life Hamlet): An Ap Tan Sinh (ATS) is a hamlet which has achieved a six-point criteria prior to 31 December 1966 and is designated in a provincial RD plan to be maintained under the supervision of a RD cadre group or other authorized GVN personnel. ATS hamlets that no longer meet the standard will be consolidated to achieve again the six-point criteria shown in paragraph C below.

B. **AP DOI MOI OBJECTIVES.**

1. Eliminate the VC infrastructure.
2. Eliminate corrupt practices and discharge corrupt officials.
3. Develop a new spirit.
4. Establish popular government and social organizations.
5. Organize the people for self-defense.

7. Eliminate disease and unsanitary conditions.

8. Implement land reform.

9. Develop agriculture and handicraft industries.

10. Improve lines of communications.

11. Reward deserving soldiers, public servants, and citizens who have contributed to RD programs.

C. SIX POINT CRITERIA.

1. A census of residents has been completed; the VC infrastructure has been destroyed or neutralized.

2. Self-defense forces have been selected and trained and also equipped, as appropriate.

3. An effective hamlet defense system has been established.

4. A liaison and logistics system has been organized.

5. A social organization has been established.

6. A popular hamlet government has been elected.
ANNEX B

THE HAMLET FESTIVAL

1. The purpose of this annex is to set forth the task organization and functions of the RVNAF teams of the Hamlet Festival force employed in a cordon and search operation. In addition, a discussion of the physical layout of the Hamlet Festival is presented.

2. Task Organization and Functions of RVNAF Teams.

   a. GVN Provincial Teams.

      (1) **RD cadre group.** When available, RD cadre groups will initiate RD tasks.

      (2) **National Police.** This force checks all individuals for proper identification and family census papers. They conduct a thorough search of houses and the surrounding area for contraband and attempt to extract and/or confirm intelligence.

      (3) **PF Platoons.** Platoons gather and/or confirm information and attempt to recruit informants and agents for future use.

      (4) **Vietnamese Information Service (VIS).** This team provides two entertainment groups; a jazz combo and the cultural team. The VIS also provides movies and literature for distribution.

      (5) **Hoi Chanh.** If available, Hoi Chanh act as guides, identify VC, their families, caches, assembly areas, and lines of communications. In addition, they explain the Chieu Hoi program and its benefits from their own point of view and urge people to encourage their VC relatives and friends to rally to the GVN.

      (6) **Interrogation Team.** Interrogates suspected persons and provides intelligence information to the commander of the operation.

      (7) **Cultural Team.** Presents traditional dances and pantomimes and other entertainment.

      (8) **Agricultural Team.** Presents information about farming and explains how the GVN can assist the farmer.

      (9) **Youth Services Team.** This team is designed to entertain and control the children at the hamlet.

      (10) **RF/PF Band.** This unit provides music for the hamlet area.
b. ARVN Teams.

(1) Civic Action Team. This team is used to guide and control the population. During the festival this group hands out clothes and food packages to the population.

(2) PSYWAR Team. This team presents the GVN policy, disseminates pro-GVN literature, organizes games and additional entertainment, and explains the presence of US/FWMAF troops in VN, particularly in the targeted village.

(3) Cultural Team. Complements the efforts of the province cultural team.

(4) ARVN Band. Provides music for the hamlet area if an RF/FF band is not available.

c. Additional ARVN groups utilized on occasion, include:

(1) Medical Teams, assisted by MEDCAP personnel available, attend to the needs of the population and serve as an example of the government's interest in the people.

(2) A specially trained Vietnamese team, sometimes known as counterterror troops, assist US forces in the conduct of night ambushes and patrols.

3. Figure B-1-1 depicts a typical layout of a Hamlet Festival. In this idealized condition, the area is fenced in or marked off and is arranged so that when hamlet or village residents are guided through the area they proceed to exhibits and events in a logical manner. Entertainment and food are available. Agricultural service is provided. Each person is required to go through the identification area where a temporary ID card is provided for those that do not have one. After this they pass through an interrogation area. Selected individuals are questioned for intelligence information and each family is given a quantity of rice.

4. Actual US participation in the Hamlet Festival normally is limited to a security role; plus logistical support for the operation, as required.
* ○ - Indicates water point.

Figure B-1.1

B-3
ANNEX C

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

This annex presents terms and abbreviations found in the handbook. In addition, some often heard words and abbreviations are included for information purposes.

A & DSL Company - Administrative and Direct Support Logistics Company. There is at least one per sector for support of RF/FF with Personnel Finance, Maintenance, Supply, Medical and Transportation sections.

AIK - Assistance in kind. Those materials and services which MACV furnishes the GVN without reimbursement.

AO - Area of operation.

ARVN - Army of Vietnam. The common term used to refer to regular army forces to include airborne and ranger units.

ALC - Area Logistic Command. An ARVN organization that provides logistical support to units within a specified area.


CARE - Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere.

CAG - Combined Action Team. A control element in the Combined Action Program.

CHIEU HOI - The "Open Arms" program for encouraging the VC to defect to the GVN side.

CIC - Combined Intelligence Center.

CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Local Vietnamese or an ethnic paramilitary force.


C-1
CORDS - Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The MACV agency that provides single manager direction of all US civil/military pacification activities in RVN.

CRDC - Combined Revolutionary Development Council.

CRS - Catholic Relief Service.

CSCC - Combat Support Coordination Center.

CTZ - Corps Tactical Zone. The geographical area of responsibility of a Corps, but frequently erroneously used to refer to the Corps Headquar ters itself; e.g., "CTZ will review...", "DTA will submit to CTZ...". The term "Region" is sometimes used interchangeably with CTZ. Both areas encompass the same geographical areas.

DGNP - Director General, National Police.

DIOCC - District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center.

DSA - Deputy Senior Advisor.

DSU - Direct Support Unit. The third echelon technical service support unit. Each serves in a particular technical service chain; e.g., Ord DSU, QM DSU.

DTA - Division Tactical Area. The geographical area of responsibility of a division, but frequently erroneously used to refer to the division headquarters itself, as with CTZ above.

FWMAF - Free World Military Assistance Forces.

GVN - Government of South Vietnam. Used to refer to the national government, to the entire governmental structure, or as an adjective to describe one of its agents or agencies.

Hoi Chanh - A returnee coming in under the Chieu Hoi "Open Arms" program.
Hop Tac
- "Working Together". The program for priority attention to expanding GVN control in critical areas. Hop Tac I is the program to expand the Saigon-Cholon base.

HSAS
- Headquarters Support Activity Saigon.

IVS
- International Voluntary Services.

JUSPAO
- Joint United States Public Affairs Office. Services US interest as well as advising Vietnamese in the information and psychological operations field.

LLDB
- Vietnamese Special Forces.

MAF
- Marine Amphibious Force.

MEDCAP
- Medical Civic Action Program.

MILPHAP
- Military Provincial Hospital Assistance Program. Under this program, 16 man Free World medical teams render medical assistance to province hospitals.

NAVFORV
- Naval Forces, Vietnam.

NAVSUPPACT
- Naval Support Activity.

NPFF
- National Police Field Force.

OSA
- Office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador.

PAD
- Public Administration Division. A USAID agency with interest chiefly in assisting in the development of the Vietnamese governmental organization and administration.

PAT
- Peoples Action Team. 34 man Armed Propaganda Team which is incorporated now in the Revolutionary Development Cadre Group.

PAVN
- Peoples Army Vietnam. North Vietnamese regular forces.

PHD
- Public Health Division. A USAID agency with interest in assisting the Vietnamese public health program.
PF - Popular Forces. Military forces recruited and employed within a district; organized into platoons.

PSD - Public Safety Division. A MACCORDS agency which assists Vietnamese development of police forces.

RD - Revolutionary Development.

RF - Regional Forces. Military forces recruited and employed within a province. Organized as companies primarily.

RVN - Republic of Vietnam. The nation itself although sometimes used interchangeably with GVN when referring to the government or with SVN when referring to the land.

RVNAF - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. All armed forces of the RVN; all services.

STAT - Seabees Technical Assistance Team. A construction team which drills wells, constructs sewers, and accomplishes other public works type projects. These teams also initiate self-help projects and render technical assistance.

SVN - South Vietnam. Generally connotes the land itself.

TAOI - Tactical Area of Interest.

TAOR - Tactical Area of Responsibility.

US Mission - The entire United States team, headed by the US Ambassador and including all US forces and agencies assigned to Vietnam to assist the South Vietnamese Government.

USAID - United States Agency for International Development. The section of the US Mission generally responsible for the civil side of US advice and assistance, with the exception of that related to the information service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USARV</td>
<td>United States Army, Vietnam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASF</td>
<td>United States Army Special Forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAC</td>
<td>Village Administration Committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Viet Cong. Communist insurgents against the South Vietnamese Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCC</td>
<td>Village Citizens Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIS</td>
<td>Vietnamese Information Service.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VN</td>
<td>Vietnam, Vietnamese.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNAF</td>
<td>Vietnamese Air Force.</td>
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<td>VNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNMC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps.</td>
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