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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned

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About the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned: The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is part of the Training and Education Command (TECOM) of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), located at MCB Quantico, VA. The MCCLL mission is to collect, analyze, manage, and disseminate knowledge gained through operational experiences, exercises, and supporting activities in order to enable Marines to achieve higher levels of performance and to provide information and analysis on emerging issues and trends in support of operational commanders and the Commandant of the Marine Corps Title 10 responsibilities. MCCLL manages the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS) and the Consolidated Data Repository (CDR) databases, and reports findings, trends and issues through verbal, written and electronic media.

Visit the MCCLL Website at: www.mccll.usmc.mil

Customer relations management support for the MCCLL Website and questions about the newsletter should be directed to: harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil or michael.jones@usmc.mil Telephone: 703.432.1279   DSN: 378.1279

From the Director: Supporting the Lessons Learned Community

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has begun the process of assisting a number of DoD and intelligence organizations in planning their transition to lessons learned systems that are based on the software of the MCCLL Lessons Management System (LMS). This effort is an outgrowth of the selection in April 2006 of the LMS as the input support tool for use by the Combatant Commands (COCOM), Services, Combat Support Agencies (CSA), National Guard Bureau (NGB), and interagencies. The selection process that resulted in this decision was highlighted in an article in last month's MCCLL newsletter.

The implementation plan for the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) will soon be promulgated as the roadmap that outlines the process to be followed within the joint community to incorporate the LMS as the lessons learned input support tool. This plan is currently being staffed and should begin the formal coordination process early in July. The implementation plan describes how the JLLIS will be deployed, installed and transitioned into an operational system. Once approved, the implementation plan will provide guidance for incorporating the LMS into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) and will outline how the LMS will serve as one "pillar" of the joint system, while the JCOA Central Repository will be serve as the other.

Even before the final plans are in place for the transition of the JLLIS into an operational system, the MCCLL information technology (IT) staff is busy providing technical support to a number of agencies, including the J7 Joint Lessons Learned Branch (JLLB), the Joint Improvised Explosive Ordnance (IED) Defeat Task Force Organization (JIEDDO), and a number of other DoD and intelligence agencies.

MCCLL is proud to be a participant in this process, and we invite other commands and agencies to contact us for additional information on the features and capabilities of our system. The MCCLL point of contact for this effort is our Integration and Technology Branch Head, LtCol Donald Hawkins, at donald.hawkins@usmc.mil.

> Your observations and comments on this or any other topics are welcome. Please contact the MCCLL Director, Col Monte E. Dunard, USMCR, at:
>
> monte.dunard@usmc.mil   Telephone: 703.432.1286   DSN: 378-1286

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Traumatic Brain Injuries in the Iraqi Theater of Operations: Traditionally, traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) have been defined as either penetrating injuries in which the integrity of an individual's head is violated by a foreign body such as a bullet or shrapnel, or non-penetrating in which there is no apparent damage to the skull. The latter is typically caused by a blunt impact such as that experienced in a motor vehicle accident. Due to the experiences of coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), there is likely a requirement for a third category: explosive blast TBI, usually caused by an improvised explosive device (IED).

Irrespective of the category of TBI, the resulting force applied to the head disrupts brain function. In severe cases, the effects are obvious; however, in mild to moderate cases, the diagnosis can be difficult. In these cases, the patient may experience changes in personality, cognition, and memory impairment that can impact his/her ability to make life and death decisions.

Due to the common occurrence of TBI in OIF/OEF, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) sponsored two neurologists in May 2006 to administer surveys and interview health care providers at 15 medical units in the Marine Corps area of Operations (AO) in Al Anbar Province, Iraq. Units were surveyed in Taqqadum, Fallujah, Al Asad, Al Qaim, Korean Village and Haditha by CAPT J. P. Feerick, MC, USNR, and CDR T. M. Johnson, MC, USN. The focus was on non-penetrating head injuries and mild to moderate TBI, with the objective of determining current practices, training, and equipment in the diagnosis and treatment of TBI.

The results of the collection effort have now been documented in the MCCLL topical paper: **Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI): Management of Mild to Moderate TBI in the Iraqi Theater of Operations.**

Among the principal causes of traumatic brain injuries in OIF are roadside bomb attacks. Here, Marines and sailors assess the Iraqi Army response to such an attack. During this mock casualty exercise in Camp Al Asad, Iraqi soldiers lift a Navy corpsman from RCT-7 onto a stretcher.

Some key observations and lessons from the MCCLL TBI report are:

- **Pre-deployment training:**
    - All deploying medical care providers should receive documented, continuing medical education (CME) on TBI assessment and management.

- **In-theater practices:**
    - Marines should be encouraged to seek medical attention whenever exposed to blast or head injury.
    - Guidance concerning field operations should be promulgated to field providers.
    - Medically evacuated patients with high risk for TBI should be routinely screened.
    - Evidence-based practice guidelines should be used to determine when to order head CAT scans, as well as other tests.
    - Further study is needed to determine the requirement for improved accessibility to CT scanners.
    - Health care providers should be given better opthalmoscopes/otoscopes and additional training in their use as an aid in the diagnosis of tympanic membrane damage.

- **Post-deployment:**
    - Post-deployment health assessment should include one or more TBI-related screening questions.
    - Trauma registries should be actively reviewed for TBI intervention and outcome data.

For a complete discussion of these and other TBI issues, please see the complete report at: **Management of Mild to Moderate TBI in the Iraqi Theater of Operations.**

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned

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Update: Legal Services Support & Counterinsurgency Operations

In last month's newsletter, a MCCLL topical report was featured that addressed the provision of **Legal Services Support to Operational Commanders**. One of the recommendations in the report was for the continuance of the current practice of assigning a judge advocate (JA) to each infantry battalion in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since the publication of the report, its author, Col Ray Ruhlmann, the MCCLL Judge Advocate representative, has written a paper expanding upon this recommendation by identifying ways in which the battalion Judge Advocate can be a force multiplier in Marine Corps battalion counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. Among the ways discussed in the paper in which the JA can provide support to the battalion and serve as a force multiplier are:

- Assist coalition efforts in implementing the rule of law.

- Provide guidance on adhering to targeting and rules of engagement (ROE) requirements in stability and support operations (SASO).

- Provide training and briefings to Marines on legal issues.

Col Ruhlmann points out that it is critical that the JA assigned to an infantry battalion be experienced in operational law and that he/she be assigned to the battalion well before deployment. The Bn JA needs to be involved in the work-up phase before deployment in order to participate in pre-deployment planning with the battalion commander and other staff sections so that they can gain confidence in the JA's ability to contribute to the battalion mission. A long-term relationship with the battalion will provide time for the JA to build good working relationships with the battalion staff, as well as with battalion Marines, thereby building support for his training efforts.

Although quoting the old saying, "First, we shoot all the lawyers," may be a popular pastime (even among Marines), it is important to realize that the legal profession has a valuable contribution to make in COIN/SASO operations and can truly be a force multiplier in the rule of law process. Col Ruhlmann's complete paper is now available at: **The Battalion Judge Advocate as a Counterinsurgency Force Multiplier**.

The Battalion Staff Judge Advocate from the 3d Bn, 5th Marines, teaches a class on Core Values to Marines of the Headquarters and Support Company.

Feedback: Small Craft Company

In our May 2006 newsletter, an article featured the Marine Corps Small Craft Company (SCC) deployed in support of the 1st Marine Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II. This company was deactivated in September 2005 and its mission will be assumed by the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC).   Following publication of the article, MCCLL received feedback from Maj Roberto Martinez the CO of the Marine Detachment who had originally requested assistance from MCCLL in capturing lessons from the deployment of SCC. In feedback to MCCLL concerning our newsletter article, Maj Martinez stated that "your collection efforts in January and February are appreciated and the report and subsequent summary article do a note-worthy job of capturing most of the highlights of their deployment and operations. One item that I am sincerely disappointed in seeing is the choice of the photograph utilized in the May article. As described in the article as well as the report, the Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC) was the work-horse of the Company that allowed them to achieve their successes and the SURC saved lives, while the CRRC was the least utilized of all SCC craft in Iraq and wouldn't stand up against an arrow."

MCCLL apologizes for the use of the particular photograph that accompanied the article. Its use was strictly a lack of knowledge on our part. The photograph to the left of the SURC would have been more representative of the missions performed by the SCC in OIF-II.

(Note that the Marine Corps has now begun training the new Navy Riverine Force in combat skills at the School of Infantry (East) (see the recent news article referenced later in this newsletter).

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Sensitive Site Exploitation: The exploitation of captured enemy material is critical to the prosecution of combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Among the potential uses for information from enemy material are: (1) the extraction of actionable intelligence for front-line units, (2) the development of evidence to ensure that enemy combatants remain incarcerated, and (3) the dissemination of information to help mold public opinion.

During the early stages of OIF in 2003, numerous sensitive sites were uncovered, that Marine units identified and reported as being of interest to Sensitive Site Exploitation Teams (SSTs). However, at that time, the SSTs were over extended and there were delays in arriving at the sites; therefore, the maneuver units often were required to leave personnel behind to guard the sites. Even today, the SSTs remain in high demand, so maneuver units continue to be key to the capture and control of enemy documents and other materials. Maneuver units must be prepared to detain a wide array of individuals and related documents; detainees include enemy prisoners of war, terrorists, and civilians. Irrespective of the particular category, units must be prepared to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for all detainees, together with the confiscated material, in accordance with applicable domestic law, international law, and military policy.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has now developed a topical paper that summarizes lessons and observations from OIF concerning the exploitation of enemy material. This paper was produced in close collaboration with Capt Matthew Nieland, USMC, an intelligence officer who served with the I MEF G2 as the Officer in Charge of a Human intelligence Exploitation Team (HET) during OIF II. The paper is now available at: **Intelligence Exploitation of Enemy Material: Lessons and Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)**.

A Marine from Co. C, 1st Bn, 6th Marines, searches a detainee outside a residence in Fallujah that had been raided by fellow Marines and Iraqi soldiers. The Marines were searching for weapons and material that could be exploited for intelligence and other purposes.

Selected recommendations from the topical paper on the exploitation of enemy material:

- **An Exploitation Center should be established in the MEF area of operations in Iraq.**
  - If Marines are not available to man the center, it should be staffed with contract linguists and contract intelligence analysts.
- **Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) should be trained to conduct sensitive site exploitation and document exploitation.**
  - As necessary, ISF should be prepared to staff the Exploitation Center.
- **The following process is recommended for handling captured enemy personnel and material in Iraq.**
  1. An infantry battalion raids the target and detains suspected insurgents. An SST gathers enemy documents, computers and material.
  2. Within 18 hours, the battalion sends detainees and captured material to the RDF.
  3. The captured material is passed to the MEF/Division/Regiment Exploitation Center for processing. Information is passed to interrogators to aid in interrogations, and any actionable intelligence is provided to infantry battalions.
  4. Detainees are moved to a central detention facility. DRRB reviews the case to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to send it to court. If so, the case is forwarded to the Central Criminal Court, and evidence is collected at Exploitation Center for use in prosecuting the case.

Please refer to the MCCLL report for a complete discussion of these and other observations and lessons learned: **Intelligence Exploitation of Enemy Material.**

The TECOM Lessons Integration Division (T-LID): Working to Improve Training

In order to improve the handoff from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to the training community, the Training and Education Command (TECOM) in 2005 established the TECOM Lessons Integration Division (T-LID). The objective was to help ensure that validated lessons result, when appropriate, in changes in training.   T-LID was specifically tasked to apply the research conducted by MCCLL and integrate it into current training. In other words, T-LID became the active interface between the MCCLL and the training establishment.

One of the initial T-LID projects was to address the requirement for changes in tactical vehicle operator training and licensing. This effort responded to numerous after action reports and lessons submitted to MCCLL. The article below outlines the background and scope of the efforts by T-LID to implement necessary changes in training and licensing.

Marine from Co. W, 1st Bn, 6th Marines, provides security from atop a Marine Armor Kit (MAK) equipped HMMWV in a street in downtown Fallujah. T-LID is working to ensure that all drivers (school trained and incidental) are better prepared for combat through training on armored HMMWVs.

Changes in Tactical Vehicle Operator Training and Licensing

From August 2003 up to the end of last year, one of the major issues arising from OIF/OEF was convoy operations. At that time, MCCLL, then EFCAT, wrote its first report on convoy operations, pointing out various challenges and training deficiencies as a result of the Marine Corps' experience in both theaters. Subsequent interviews conducted by MCCLL teams and reports written by the analytical team (following several conferences held in mid-2005 and the return of several battalions to CONUS through 2005) indicated that these challenges and deficiencies had not yet been resolved.

By the time TECOM G-3 stood up its Lessons Integration Division (T-LID) last year, tasking it to apply the research conducted by MCCLL by integrating those lessons into current training, "convoy operations" had become one of the top three high-visibility items at TECOM and MCCDC. In September, 2005, the T-LID began its own research, using the MCCLL reports and lessons as a starting point and analyzed other sources such as the reports written by the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Air Land Sea Applications Center (ALSA). By the end of the month, the T-LID had identified four specific training deficiencies which needed to be addressed rapidly:

- Lack of sufficient trained vehicle operators at the infantry battalion level.
- Little to no proficiency in basic tactical vehicle recovery, in particular, with vehicle self- recovery.
- Lack of sufficient training for CSS convoy personnel in convoy defense/crew served weapons.
- Lack of advanced combat vehicle operator training.

Following its integration process, the T-LID informally vetted these four issues with the formal Motor Transport schools at Ft Leonard Wood and Camp Johnson. At the end of October, the T-LID and MCCLL collaborated on the development of an on-line forum, to formally vet these issues with the schools, the occupational field and the operating forces. After the subsequent Motor Transport conference held in December, the T-LID/MCCLL team widened the field of collaboration to include the (Ground Training Branch) and the Occupational Field sponsors, and conducted a second forum. The result of that second forum was to further discuss these issues at the upcoming Motor Transport Licensing Conference, and expand the scope of that conference to address three of the four above issues. (CSS convoy defense/crew served weapons training was to be treated in another forum.) Improvements to the training of incidental and school trained drivers would be directed and *standardized Marine Corps-wide* in the areas of (1) Incidental Motor Vehicle Operator Licensing Course (HMMWV), (2) Advanced Tactical Motor Vehicle Operator Course (ATMVOC), (3) In-theater sustainment training, (4) tracking system, and (5) operational risk assessment.

See the

MCCLL IT Team

The "backbone" of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is the group of four experienced members of the information technology (IT) staff who provide the knowledge and skills necessary for the development and maintenance of the MCCLL website and the Lessons Management System (LMS). Under the direction of LtCol Donald Hawkins, the Integration and Technology Branch Head, these individuals often labor behind the scenes, but their expertise and skills are essential in providing upgrades to the MCCLL LMS that ensure that it remains the "best of breed" among the military services lessons learned systems, as highlighted in last month's newsletter.

The members of the MCCLL IT Team (from left to right: Tom Cropper, Miguel Campos, Gregg Hunter and John Shackelford) have diverse skills that make them ideally suited to perform the intense development and maintenance activities of the MCCLL website and Lessons Management System (LMS).

Mr. Tom Cropper is the principal developer of the LMS and the webmaster for the MCCLL website. He spearheaded the implementation of the initial version of the LMS in Spring 2005, ensuring that the LMS, together with the associated Consolidated Data Repository (CDR), was introduced as a user-friendly web-based system allowing Marine users deployed around the world to enter lessons into the system. As noted in previous newsletters, Mr. Cropper subsequently tailored the features and capabilities of the LMS for the Iraqi Lessons Learned Center (ILLC) and the Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI) (see the February newsletter). With the selection of the MCCLL LMS as the "best of breed" input support tool for use by the Combatant Commands (COCOM), Services, Combat Support Agencies (CSA), National Guard Bureau (NGB), and interagencies, Mr. Cropper has begun working with many agencies on their implementation of the LMS software to meet their varied requirements.

Mr. John Shackelford has been with the MCCLL staff since January 2003, initially as developer and maintainer of the legacy Research Document Repository (RDR) system database. Once the MCCLL transitioned to the new LMS in the Spring of 2005, Mr. Shackelford became one of the web developers for the new system. Among his accomplishments have been implementation of enhanced security protection for documents in the MCCLL CDR and implementation of the mail list for distribution of the MCCLL newsletters and other products .

Mr. Miguel Campos joined the MCCLL team in June 2005 as the system administrator with responsibility for maintaining network connectivity for legacy and NMCI workstations; troubleshooting all desktops, laptops, and servers; and maintaining and configuring MCCLL servers. Mr. Campos also orders hardware and software, creates and deletes user accounts, prepares and submits IT documentation and issues and collects gear for the MCCLL focused collection teams.

The newest member of the IT staff is Mr. Gregg Hunter, who joined the team in September 2005 to lead development of the Mobile LMS (MLMS). Mr. Hunter oversaw a team of developers at Penn State University in the effort to extend the LMS to a client application for users in low bandwidth environments. Many users in combat environment or on ships will now have the ability to review and enter lessons learned on their laptops and periodically upload them to the Quantico server (when bandwidth allows) or export them to any file media or to email. The development effort for the MLMS is essentially complete, and Mr. Hunter is currently working on the Application Support Plan (ASP) for the MLMS in order for the system to receive accreditation for use over the NMCI.

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Interview with the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa

Recently, Senior Analysts with the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) interviewed MajGen Timothy Ghormley, USMC, who was assigned as the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Horn of Africa (HOA) from May 2005 to April 2006. During the interview, MajGen Ghormley addressed both the general challenges faced in leading combined joint task forces and the specific challenges faced in the Horn of Africa, which encompasses over 2.1 million square miles and 4,827 miles of coastlines. The region includes the countries of Dijibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Uganda. Egypt and Saudi Arabia lie on the periphery of HOA and provide a significant influence on the area.

The CJTF HOA consists of approximately 600 personnel headquartered at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, with about half of the force deployed forward in various countries at any one time. Additionally, a 200-man aviation detachment is in general support in Djibouti. The CJTF consists primarily of civil affairs (CA) teams and military-to-military (Mil-Mil) teams tasked to train local host nation military forces.

Some of the key observations made by MajGen Ghormely during the interview were:

- Well-trained CA professionals and foreign military trainers are essential to success in missions conducted in the Horn of Africa.
- CA must remain separate from Mil-Mil training; the missions are mutually exclusive and cannot be confused in the eyes of the local population; typical CA projects include construction of schools and medical centers and medical/dental civil action projects.
- Distributed operations are the rule in the HOA; some teams are deployed over 1500 miles from the headquarters, with the closest teams being 400 miles away.
- Aircraft support is essential to success.
- Situational awareness is vital, including knowing the background and origins of individuals with which you deal and the politics and religious makeup of each region.
- Non-traditional CJTF missions are often based on personal relationships.
- Department of State (DOS) and DoD often have differing views on strategy, objectives and measures of effectiveness. Constant attention must be paid to overcoming misunderstandings among agencies.
- MajGen Ghormley noted that measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are difficult to establish and gauge for the HOA mission. He indicated that some potential measures are:
  - Establishment of secure areas in which non-government organizations (NGOs) can operate.
  - Increased cooperation with host nation militaries as a result of Mil-Mil training contacts.
  - A low or zero incident rate of human rights issues by foreign militaries after receiving training from U.S. and coalition forces.
  - Requests from other regions for CA and Mil-Mil training support.
- CJTF HOA needs include:
  - More and better communications equipment
  - Additional construction equipment, especially well drilling
  - Civilian sport utility vehicles for CA projects (rather than HMMWVs).

A complete summary of the interview with MajGen Ghormely is available here.

Students representing seven countries from around the world visit the Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya as part of the CJTF Horn of Africa Coordinators Course.

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned

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Interview with the I MEF (Forward) Liaison Officer to USAID

In early June 2006, the Director, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), along with MCCLL Senior Analysts, had the opportunity to interview the I MEF (Forward) Liaison Officer (LNO) to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Col Jonathan Brazee, 3d Civil Affairs Group (CAG), assumed the position as LNO to USAID in January 2006 (with a background that includes owning his own business and running businesses overseas). During the interview, he provided a number of candid comments concerning the challenges faced by the USAID in Iraq, as well as related challenges faced by U.S. forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and those he faced as the LNO to USAID. He stressed the importance of learning as much as possible about the agency that you support and the challenge of working through the interagency process.

Among Col Brazee's observations were the following:

- Arabic language classes need improvement; 20 useful phrases should be learned.
- Enhanced Marksmanship Program (EMP) training was useful and necessary.
- Close coordination is essential with previous LNOs.
- Approach the position with an open mind; take your rank off your collar.
- Telecommunications is a major issue.
- Iraqi political infighting is also a significant issue; it takes some time to get to the point in any discussion.
- Protect your interpreters and do not let them take unsafe actions.
- Each agency has its own culture which must be learned in order to be effective.
- Keep all commanders "in the loop".

A brief summary of the key points raised by Col Brazee during the MCCLL interview is available here.

Supplies provided by the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are delivered by Marines from the 22d MEU (SOC) to a clinic in Hit, Iraq.

News

Marines Extend Satellite Communications

By Bob Brewin, Federal Computer Week, June 26, 2006

The Marine Corps has started to bridge the digital divide among combat units in Iraq by deploying broadband satellite communications systems at the battalion and company levels, said Brig. Gen. Joseph Dunford, the Marine Corps' operations director. By moving communications capabilities down the organizational structure, the Marines have given companies, which generally have about 125 soldiers, the same communications assets previously assigned to regiments and divisions.

Speaking last week at AFCEA International's annual TechNet International conference in Washington, D.C., Dunford said modern warfare calls for the use of broadband communications by all Marine infantry battalions and companies. The Marines need to extend the use of satellite assets far forward, Dunford said. Based on his experience as a regiment combat team commander in Iraq in 2003, he concluded that existing terrestrial communications systems cannot fulfill modern warfare demands. Dunford said he had only limited bandwidth available for communications with his battalions and companies on the march to Baghdad. The Marines were using Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radios, which have a data transfer rate that peaks at about 100 kilobits/sec. They also had to rely on voice communications via VHF Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System devices or send human messengers back and forth.

See the complete article

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Effects Based Operations

Military planners have always hoped that the day would eventually come in which technology would be able to reduce casualties dramatically and limit the need for ground combat. Currently, military technologists use the term, "effects-based operations (EBO)", to refer to this concept. An example of this concept was the "Shock and Awe" campaign that initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It was designed to demonstrate our superior technology and lead to immediate surrender. It did not quite work out that way.

Ralph Peters has written an excellent article in the Armed Forces Journal (AFJ) that addresses the issues raised by the concept of EBO:

Bloodless theories, bloody wars: Easy-win concepts crumble in combat

By Ralph Peters

Armed Forces Journal   April 2006

During the Second World War, American and British air-campaign planners attempted to force the Nazi war machine into collapse by attacking crucial links in Germany's national infrastructure. According to the theory, hitting well-selected individual targets would paralyze entire systems. So, at an enormous cost in lives and aircraft, we went after German rail junctions and ball-bearing plants, engine factories and Romanian oil fields.

We were, in short, executing Effects-Based Operations, or EBO, the current darling among "revolutionary" concepts.

Of course, the Wehrmacht had to be defeated on the ground. The Allied bombing campaign certainly aided in that defeat, but it was not decisive in itself. No matter how many railroad marshalling yards we struck, the Reichsbahn found work-arounds. As for bombing the industrial infrastructure, at the end of the war more than 90 percent of Germany's production capabilities remained intact (contrary to popular belief), giving the defeated country a launching pad for its postwar "economic miracle." In early 1945, German combat aircraft production was increasing. Those expensive attacks on "vital" nodes helped the war effort but could not have won the war alone had they lasted for a generation. Germany's lack of home-country petroleum reserves severely hampered the Nazis — but the advance of the Red Army did vastly more to interrupt fuel supplies from the east than did the EBO efforts of the 1940s.

The primary problem we face in preparing for future wars is an intellectually corrupt budgeting and procurement process, a system that forces the services — especially the Navy and Air Force — to make extravagant, impossible-to-fulfill claims for the weapons they wish to buy. It isn't possible to argue that a system will be "useful." To appear competitive, each system has to be "revolutionary."

Compounding the damage, each of the services (except the Marine Corps) has fallen into the trap of designing its strategy to fit the systems it wants, rather than devising an honest long-term strategy, then pursuing the weapons best-fitted to support that strategy.

We have gotten the process exactly wrong.

When the first early man discovered that he could bind a sharp stone to a stick with a leather thong, you can be certain that he turned immediately to his pals across the campfire and shouted, "I've just achieved the ultimate revolution in military affairs!"

Contemporary generals such as Mattis and Wallace are the heirs of Sherman and Sheridan — not afraid to fight and ever ready to ride to the sound of the guns**.** On the other side, you have the theorists, who have them outnumbered, if not outgunned. No matter the empirical evidence, theorists will always insist that they know a better, easier way to wage war than the men who must actually fight it. Compounded by the power of the defense industry and the political momentum of legacy weapons systems, the theorists win. In peacetime.

Even as our soldiers and Marines fight primitive (but intelligent) enemies in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, we're told that the evidence before our eyes doesn't really mean anything, that the next war is going to be different, that technology really will do the trick this time. If the United States still exists a hundred years from how, I have no doubt that your great-great-grandchildren will also be assured that, while the theorists were wrong for the past century (or two, or three), they really have it figured out now and that technology really is going to be decisive this time.

Appropriate technologies are essential. But flesh and blood wins wars. The only Effects-Based Operations that mean anything are those that destroy the enemy's military, the opposing leadership and the population's collective will. Bombing well-selected targets helps. But only killing wins wars.

Oh, and a last note on Effects-Based Operations: Any combat doctrine that cannot be explained clearly and concisely will fail.

See more of the article

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Marines Teach "Brown Water" Skills
By Chris Mazzolini

While every Marine may be a rifleman, every sailor isn't. But a select group of sailors with a new riverine group will become intimately familiar with their rifles. They arrived at Camp Geiger this week to begin a six-week training course to learn basic infantry skills and develop a warrior ethos within the newly formed river forces, the Navy's first return to "brown water" since Vietnam. The riverine mission - patrolling and fighting on inland waterways - has lately been the province of the Marines, and it's leathernecks who have been fighting on the hostile rivers of Iraq. That will change in 2007, when the Navy's first riverine squadrons become deployable fighting forces.

But first: back to basics. That's where the Marines of Camp Geiger come in. The 222 sailors with Navy Riverine Squadron 1 arrived at the School of Infantry on Wednesday, when they began a course similar to Marine Combat Training, said Capt. Frank Dillbeck, the Marine in charge of training the sailors. "This is the foundation of a whole predeployment training plan," he said. "This is their first day of the basics, their first step into the odyssey."

The important lessons the sailors learn, Dillbeck said, are quick response to orders and how to develop the "muscle memory" necessary to respond instinctively in a combat situation. They are not learning team or squad tactics; instead, they are learning how to be individually proficient with their weapons. There are differences between the sailor's curriculum and the training received regularly by Marines fresh out of boot camp. The sailors will learn their own weapons, the M-4 assault rifle and M9 pistol, and they will train together with their unit members, everyone from the commander down to the lowest sailor.

See more of the article

An Effective Tool Against Insurgent Snipers: Marine Snipers

Many of the counter-sniper lessons entered into the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Lessons Management System (LMS) point out that one of the most effective weapons that the coalition forces have against insurgent snipers are our own Marine snipers. A recent news article highlights one example of successful employment of friendly snipers.

Darkhorse snipers kill insurgent sniper, recover stolen Marine sniper rifle

By Cpl. Mark Sixbey, Regimental Combat Team 5

CAMP HABBANIYAH, Iraq (June 20, 2006) -- Scout snipers from 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment killed an enemy sniper and recovered a Marine sniper rifle lost nearly two years ago during a mission near Habbaniyah June 16. The rifle was the one formerly used by four Marines of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment who were killed on a rooftop in Ramadi June 21, 2004. Sniper Section Four was in a hide when the spotter observed a military-aged male inside a nearby parked car videotaping a passing patrol of amphibious assault vehicles. The Marines saw a rifle stock by the insurgent's side. We were in the right place at the right time," said Sgt. Kevin Homestead an infantryman from K Company serving as a spotter for the sniper team that day.

They first radioed the passing Marines and told them they were being watched by an enemy sniper and to stay low. The insurgent then sealed his own fate by preparing the weapon. The twenty-one-year-old Marine sniper, who declined to be interviewed – aimed in at the gunman's head behind the rear side window. He recited a mantra in his head. Breathe, relax, aim, squeeze, surprise. The enemy sniper died with the gun in his lap. They dialed K Company – or Samurai 6 – and reported the target was dead. "We then saw another military-aged male cross the street and enter the passenger side door," said Homestead, 26, from Ontario, Ore. "He was surprised to see the other shooter was killed."

The second insurgent scurried around the car and jumped in the driver's seat. With the sniper now spotting for him, Homestead aimed in with his M-4 carbine and put three bullets in the driver before he could start the car. A squad of K Company Marines came to the position and saw the sniper dead and the driver shot three times. The driver died as soon as the squad arrived on scene. They pulled out the sniper rifle and immediately recognized that it was an M-40A1, the same used by the snipers of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment in 2004.

See the remainder of the article.

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Tactics of the Crescent Moon

Book Review

The books on the **Commandant's Professional Reading List** have been supplemented by a list of books for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. These books can be reviewed on the **Commandant's Supplemental Reading List**. One of the Tier One books listed on the supplemental list in the category of terrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) is this month's recommended and well-received book by H. John Poole that provides Marines with a a good overview of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by extremist Islamic-motivated movements:

Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods by H. John Poole

Reviewed by MSgt James E. Gardiner

Leatherneck Magazine

"Tactics of the Crescent Moon" comes none too soon for deployed U.S. military personnel. Little, if any, of their military intelligence has been tactically interpreted. Without an infantry background and combat experience, U.S. analysts can do little more than identify enemy goals.

H. John Poole's book fills that void. It shows, for the first time in any detail, how Muslim militants fight at short range. Its author is well versed in small-unit conventional and unconventional warfare. A retired Marine infantryman, he has traveled the world extensively and still works with active-duty units.

Poole has assisted in training the infantry battalions of Second Marine Division, the support battalions of Second Force Service Support Group and several squadrons of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing. Additionally, he has lectured during professional military education periods at the School of Infantry, East and at the Staff Noncommissioned Officer Academy at Camp Geiger, N.C., and the Naval Special Warfare Group at Norfolk, Va. He has researched and written four previous books: "The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare," "One More Bridge to Cross: Lowering the Cost of War," "Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower," and "The Tiger's Way: A U.S. Private's Best Chance for Survival."

Of all these books, "Tactics of the Crescent Moon" is the most important because of its tactical assessment of the enemy, which may help turn the tide of this war. From vast amounts of intelligence, he has extracted the small-unit tactical trends. While the enemy's combat methods may seem amateurish, they are nonetheless extremely effective. In the past, those same methods have forced the Israeli Army out of Southern Lebanon and the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan. To make matters worse, the enemy's tactics are ever-changing and improving. In the book's foreword, Major General Ray L. Smith, USMC (Ret) warns that the current crop of enemy "irregulars have flexible and adaptable training techniques and tactical methods." This book will help the reader to counter those operational methods.

"Tactics of the Crescent Moon" also points out the U.S. military's failure to evolve tactically at the small-unit level. From actual combat experience and research, the author projects a thorough understanding of the evolution of small-unit tactics and offers much-needed insight into the methods small-unit leaders can develop to overcome this newest enemy. This book provides important battlefield intelligence you can't get any other way. As pointed out by our own most recent intelligence, we are no longer fighting a ragtag group, but an enemy that understands our capabilities, our limitations and an enemy that is developing methods to counter them.