

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLE OF GROZNY, 1994-1995

HI386: CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE SINCE 1945

SECTION Z1

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“The Rebels could only be dislodged by desperate fighting among the buildings of the town. It was impossible and impracticable to attempt to relieve the press by throwing troops into the streets, where they could only be shot down, unable to return the fire. The Rebels fired on us from windows and doors and from behind houses. We had no choice but to rush the houses, breaking in doors to drive them from the town. My regiments did not falter, but in future I should much prefer to fight in open fields, than amid buildings and town streets.”

Norman J. Hall, Colonel  
17th Michigan Volunteers  
Fredericksburg, Virginia  
11 December 1862<sup>1</sup>

Colonel Hall said this about urban warfare almost a century and a half ago, and unfortunately, the same attitude holds true today for much of the United States Army. Military Operations in Urban Terrain, or MOUT, is one of the most feared types of operations facing the soldiers and officers of the Army. Historically, MOUT has always been the bloodiest type of battle, from the Peloponnesian War over two thousand years ago to the first Battle of Grozny, only five years ago.<sup>2</sup> MOUT is not a mission, nor is it simply a type of terrain. Instead, MOUT is an entirely different environment. The following table, taken from a 1999 report published by the RAND Arroyo Research Center, details differences between MOUT and other environments:

**Some differences between Urban and other types of terrain<sup>3</sup>**

	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Desert</b>	<b>Jungle</b>	<b>Mountain</b>
Number of noncombatants	High	Low	Low	Low
Amount of valuable infrastructure	High	Low	Low	Low
Presence of multidimensional battlespace	Yes	No	Some	Yes
Restrictive rules of engagement	Yes	No	No	No
Detection, observation, engagement ranges	Short	Long	Short	Medium
Avenues of approach	Many	Many	Few	Few
Freedom of movement and maneuver – mechanized forces	Low	High	Low	Medium
Communications functionality	Degraded	Normal	Normal	Degraded
Logistical requirements	High	High	Medium	Medium

<sup>1</sup>David Grange, presentation given at the RAND Arroyo-TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, Santa Monica, CA, March 22-23, 2000.

<sup>2</sup>James N. Miller, presentation given at the RAND Arroyo-TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, Santa Monica, CA, March 22-23, 2000.

<sup>3</sup>Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, *The Art of Darkness* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2000), 9.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain are going to be unavoidable in the future: the world's cities are going to be the battleground. First, cities are naturally strategically key terrain. Cities are usually the economic, political, and psychological centers of gravity of states. Cities are where the nation keeps its treasured possessions, museums, banks, and businesses.<sup>4</sup> On the tactical level of battle, high ground is often key terrain. With the control of high ground, a tactical force can maintain good fields of fire, clear observation, and control the battlefield. Strategically, by taking over a city, a force can control much of the enemy nation's most important economic and domestic resources.

The second reason that cities are going to be the battleground of the near future is that more and more people are moving into urban areas, especially in developing countries. These states are historically less stable than the developed world. Thus, the least stable areas of the world are going to have more urban terrain. In 2000, there are 30 megacities – cities with a population of more than eight million people – and of these, there are 21 in the Third World. By 2015, however, it is estimated that there will be 36 megacities, 23 of which will be in Asia alone.<sup>5</sup> Currently, half of the world's population lives in cities. “By 2025, the figure is expected to reach 85 percent.”<sup>6</sup> Since so many people are going to be in the cities, this will make the control of the urban areas vital to any strategic victory.

The final reason why urban warfare is going to be unavoidable is that the enemies of the United States are not complete idiots. It would be foolish for America to assume that for the past fifty years the rest of the world, enemy or ally, has not been keeping close track of the U.S. military's capabilities. They have seen the fact that the United States, in the past forty or fifty years, has been quite successful in open battle. The rest of the world has also seen the rise of the United States from one of many world powers to one half of a bipolar world to a virtual

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<sup>4</sup>Miller, presentation.

<sup>5</sup>Harry A. Frank, “Perspectives on Future Maritime Environment”, (Quantico, VA: February 2000).

<sup>6</sup>General Accounting Office, “MILITARY CAPABILITIES: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces for Combat in Urban Areas” (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, February 2000), 6.

hegemon, with no equal in the world. In order to have a chance at victory, therefore, a future enemy of the U.S. will need to fight an asymmetric war. Asymmetric warfare involves using all possible methods in order to gain an advantage over a naturally stronger enemy. Much like David's victory over Goliath, a smaller enemy of the U.S. is going to have to find a way to counteract America's military might. One of the easiest ways to do this is by dictating the battleground. It follows that since the U.S. is so successful in open terrain, such as the Iraqi desert in 1991, it would be most advantageous to engage the U.S. in exactly the opposite – some sort of restrictive terrain. As shown in the table above, MOUT is the most restrictive of all types of environments. The end result is that it will be most advantageous for a future enemy to fight an asymmetric war against the U.S., and the easiest way to gain that asymmetry is to wage war in urban terrain.<sup>7</sup>

The United States has not been involved in high-intensity Military Operations in Urban Terrain to any significant extent since the Battle for Hue during the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War, in 1968. The only recent opportunities that the US Army has had to perform in urban terrain have been during peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other types of Stability and Support Operations, SASO. There have been a limited number of instances in which the Army has fought in low-intensity conflicts in urban environments, but these have been minimal in frequency. Due to the fact that the US has not been involved in a recent high-intensity urban conflict, there is not a strong enough sense of urgency to create a specific set of tactics, techniques and procedures, (TTPs) or doctrine for MOUT. A study started by the General Accounting Office in October 1998 and released at the end of February 2000 summarizes some of the major problems that the military confronts in the face of the impending urban warfare threat. The report states that the US military has not conducted urban training jointly, has not constructed adequate training facilities, and has not focused enough intelligence on the urban

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<sup>7</sup>Miller, presentation.

environment.<sup>8</sup> This is a serious deficiency of the Army's preparation for MOUT, and if it is not corrected, the price will be the lives of American soldiers. There must be a concerted effort by the U.S. military to learn lessons from recent conflicts, so that America does not make the same mistakes as others have made.

Though the United States has not been involved in a high-intensity urban operation, the Russian military has. In late 1994/early 1995 the Russian military invaded the republic of Chechnya, and launched an assault against the Chechen capital city of Grozny. Since the Russian military resembles the American military as far as size and equipment are concerned, there are many lessons that the US Army can glean from the Russian experience in Grozny. From the very start, the Russian operation was insufficiently planned, poorly executed, and practically doomed to disaster.

On November 30<sup>th</sup> 1994, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, issued a decree, number 2137c "On steps to reestablish constitutional law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic."<sup>9</sup> This decree authorized the formation of a military unit that was tasked to blockade and enter Grozny in order to disarm the illegal rebels who were there. The chairman of the newly-created group was Pavel Grachev, the Russian Republic's Minister of Defense.<sup>10</sup> Grachev had already had experience dealing with the Republic of Chechnya. In 1992, as the Russian Army was evacuating its equipment from the Chechen Republic and the Chechens attempted to gain their independence, approximately 80% of the Russian equipment fell into Chechen hands. Then, in March of that year, Grachev signed a directive that turned over 50% of the Russian Army equipment then in Chechnya to President Djohar Dudaev. Directly after 50% of the equipment was transferred, however, almost all of the other half of the equipment was

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<sup>8</sup>General Accounting Office, 20.

<sup>9</sup>Anatoliy Kulikov, presentation given at the RAND Arroyo-TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, Santa Monica, CA, March 22-23, 2000.

<sup>10</sup>Stasys Knezys and Romanas Sedlickas, *The War in Chechnya*, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 54.

captured.<sup>11</sup> Eventually, Dudaev became the leader of the Chechen rebel forces that opposed Grachev in 1994. Grachev, therefore, was one of the principal suppliers of the weapons that were used against him less than three years later. This was not the only mistake that Grachev would make in dealing with Chechnya.

Chechnya, under the leadership of President Dudaev, declared its independence from Russia in October 1991.<sup>12</sup> Yeltsin, however, opposed Chechnya's declaration, and was determined to prevent Chechnya from breaking away. In November 1994, opposition forces made an attempt to overthrow the Dudaev government. The opposition was supported by the Russian Army, though the Russian administration denied this. Dudaev's forces captured numerous Russian prisoners, however, and showed them on television.<sup>13</sup> This forced Yeltsin's hand, and he felt that he had to use force in order to bring the Chechens back under Russian control. In order to ensure that the other semi-autonomous former Soviet regions did not take their cues from Chechnya, Chechnya had to be dealt with swiftly and severely. This is the reason why the operation to blockade and the assault of Grozny had to be planned and executed within a few days. The lack of time for planning and preparation was a major cause of the problems that the Russian Army had in Grozny.

Another part of the root cause for the poor performance of the Russian forces in Grozny was the arrogance of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. After the opposition forces were unable to defeat Dudaev's Chechens in November of 1994, Grachev said publicly that it was unprofessional to use tanks and artillery in a city. He also said that "several hours and one paratroop regiment would have sufficed for Russian military professionals to take the presidential palace" in Grozny.<sup>14</sup> This overconfidence served the Russian Army poorly in the month and a half to follow. Not only was Grachev himself overconfident, but his entire staff was

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 37.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>13</sup>Timothy Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," *Parameters* (Summer 1999): 88.

as well. They went into the war in Chechnya thinking that they could defeat the Chechen band of rag-tag rebels easily.

The overconfidence of the overall Russian commander and his forces and the extremely short timeline imposed by the Russian political leadership were only the strategic causes for the near-failure of the Russian forces in Grozny, however. There were other, critical problems on the tactical and operational level. These problems could have been avoided, and the U.S. Army can learn many lessons from them.

The most important set of lessons to be learned from the Russian forces' performance in the Battle of Grozny is in the area of preparation. Preparation for any type of combat can be broken down into intelligence preparation and training. The first of these, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, or IPB, is not an easy task to accomplish. IPB, detailed in the Army's Field Manual 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, consists of four parts. The first part is to define the battlefield environment. This entails determining on what type of terrain the upcoming battle will be fought, what factors in the environment will affect the actions of the friendly and enemy forces, and what the actual area of interest is, so that the commander does not attempt to gain unnecessary information. The second part of the IPB is to describe the battlefield's effects. This step consists of analyzing the actual effect that the environment will have on the operation. It entails looking at factors such as general terrain, weather, demographics, and politics. The third step of the IPB process is the evaluation of the threat. At the heart of this step is the determination of the characteristics of the threat, to include threat models if the enemy is well known. It is at this step that threat doctrinal templates are created. The final step is the culmination of the previous three steps. During step four of the IPB, the environment and its effects are used to analyze the probable courses of action for the threat. The

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<sup>14</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 50.

final step of the IPB is the most important, because it gives the commander a strong idea of what to expect from the enemy forces, based on the terrain and the enemy's doctrine.<sup>15</sup>

In order to have adequate IPB, a force must have resources, time, and access to information. The Russians had access to information, and resources, but they did not have time, due to the sense of urgency impressed upon them by their commander and their political leaders. This lack of time compounded all of their problems and caused them to execute an extremely poor IPB. The first thing that the Russian forces did wrong in the IPB process was that they did not gain nearly enough information about the city of Grozny itself.<sup>16</sup> They did not have accurate maps, which is one of the most important parts of the IPB process. The first step of the IPB process is to define the battlefield environment, and the other three steps build upon the first step. Therefore, once the Russians decided to commence the assault on Grozny without having accurate, dependable maps, they would absolutely not be able to have a quality Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The Russian forces did have maps of Grozny, but they were small-scale military maps, of 1:50,000 or 1:100,000.<sup>17</sup> Such small-scale maps are insufficient for IPB for MOUT, since they do not show enough detail. In order to perform a proper IPB, the Russian commanders should have been using 1:25,000 or 1:12,500 scale maps, which would have shown the detail necessary for planning an urban operation.<sup>18</sup> In addition, military maps are generally not adequate for MOUT, unless they are special city maps.<sup>19</sup> A map listing at least the street names would have been extremely useful to the Russian commanders, since they could then use the landmarks and street names for coordination efforts. Further, the lowest-level commanders needed the maps. Unfortunately, "none of the Russian troops [had] maps of the

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<sup>15</sup>FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 2-1.

<sup>16</sup>Lester W. Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny" [journal online] (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: *INSS Strategic Forum*, July 1995, accessed 24 August 1999); available from <http://call.army.mil/call/fmsso/fmsopubs/issues/grozny.htm>; Internet.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas*. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), Paragraph 5-22.

objective”<sup>20</sup> and many vehicles became disoriented during the initial penetration of Grozny. To add to their problems, the Chechens moved the street signs around the city, confusing the Russians that did have maps.<sup>21</sup> The lower-echelon commanders basically knew nothing about the city that they were getting ready to enter. “Unit and subordinate unit commanders had not been familiarized with the layout of the city, the features of the main thoroughfares and streets and their configuration, or with the features of the buildings’ underground construction and the layouts of utility and sewer tunnels.”<sup>22</sup>

If maps were not available, however, there were other ways to gain information about the city of Grozny. Aerial photographs would have been beneficial. Satellite imagery would also have been beneficial to the commanders on the ground, but “Russian satellites had been turned off to save money and few aerial photography missions were conducted.”<sup>23</sup> This was a serious error, and could easily have been prevented.

The Russian forces completely failed the third step of the IPB process. In their analysis of the threat, the Russians did not do nearly enough to ensure a successful operation. The analysis of the threat should have included a detailed look at the Chechens, their culture, attitudes, and military capabilities. The Chechens, though once a part of the Soviet Union, are much different from the Russians. Chechnya is a Muslim nation, and as such, has a completely different culture from Russia. The Chechens fighting in Grozny are members of a society based upon two principles: *adat* and *teip*.<sup>24</sup>

*Adat* is a system of retribution. It is an “eye for an eye” type of mentality, stronger than any state-instituted law or rule. The Chechens are a very religious people, and they are extremely strong in their beliefs. The Russians failed to realize this, and as such they were not

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<sup>20</sup>Adam Geibel, “The Battle for Grozny” [article on-line] (*Infantry Magazine*, accessed 3 September 1999); available from <http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/grozny.html>; Internet.

<sup>21</sup>Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny,” 91.

<sup>22</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 104.

<sup>23</sup>Grau, “Changing Russian Urban Tactics.”

<sup>24</sup>Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny,” 90.

ready to deal with the Chechens' way of fighting. At one point during the battle, for example, the Chechens were able to capture a number of Russian prisoners. Though they could easily have killed them all, or kept them all, instead they killed two of them, and let the rest of the Russians go free. This was due to the fact that the Russians had killed two Chechens earlier. The Chechen belief in *adat* dictated that they only kill two Russians, and exactly two Russians, in retaliation for their killed brethren.<sup>25</sup> If they had known that this was the way the Chechens would fight, the Russians might have changed either their tactics or their procedures for dealing with captured Chechens. Instead, the Russian soldiers showed no mercy to the Chechens, often committing atrocities against Chechen POWs and noncombatants. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, recently visited the Russian Federation, and spoke out against the war crimes committed against the Chechen people. She "listened to testimony of summary executions, intimidation, looting by military personnel, disproportionate use of force, attacks on civilian convoys, rape and other violations."<sup>26</sup> The Russian Army, by allowing such things to happen, only brought vengeance upon itself from its Chechen enemies.

Along with the tradition of *adat*, the Chechens have a tribal type of social structure. Called *teip*, this method of organization allows the Chechens to maintain a tight organizational system, which is adaptable to various levels of threat. Each *teip* can be traced back twelve generations to a common ancestor. The *teip* is made up of two or three villages, each of which has 400 to 600 people, from which the *teip* can call up to 600 fighters.<sup>27</sup> When there is no external threat, the various *teips* tend to war amongst themselves, but when an outside threat shows itself, the Chechens band together against it. There are a total of 150 *teips* in Chechnya, a

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>United Nations, "United Nations Press Release" [On-line] (accessed 4 April 2000); available from <http://www.unhchr.ch/hurricane/hurricane.nsf/45ee90b46a08ca5a802565fd004e2473/780782e4bd49d4e3802568b7004ce227?OpenDocument>; Internet; homepage: *United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights* [On-line]; available from <http://www.unhchr.ch/>; Internet.

<sup>27</sup>Theodore Karasik, "Chechen Clan Military Tactics and Russian Warfare" [article on-line] (*Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, March 15, 2000, accessed 22 March 2000); available from <http://www.cacianalyst.org/Headline1.htm>; Internet.

majority of which banded together against the Russian Army in December of 1994 when they moved to blockade Grozny.<sup>28</sup> Since the Russians did not perform adequate IPB, they did not take this banding together of the Chechens into account. If they had, they might have realized the difficulty that they would have had in even approaching Grozny. This would almost certainly have affected the manner in which they approached the movement towards Grozny, and the amount of time that they allotted for the movement.

In addition to these two aspects of the Chechen culture, there was an intense hatred of Russians in general. From the 17<sup>th</sup> century to the present, Russia had been violently imposing its will on the Chechen people. This process started with Russia's expansion in 1663, continued through the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and reached a low point in 1865 when Russia deported 700,000 Chechens in order to quell the Chechen resistance. The worst action taken against the Chechens came in 1944, during Stalin's regime. The Chechen people, upon Hitler's approach to the Caucasus region, seized the opportunity to revolt once again. Stalin, however, dealt with them severely, deporting "more than 60 percent of all of the inhabitants of the territory of Chechnya, including almost the whole Chechen nation."<sup>29</sup> These events, over time, only served to create more hatred than the Russians could deal with. The culminating point became the Battle of Grozny, when the Chechens were finally able to deal with the Russians on their own terms.

The final step in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is to "determine threat courses of action."<sup>30</sup> This entails taking a detailed look at the terrain, the enemy, and how these two things will work together during the impending operation. The Russian Army, again, failed to correctly perform this step. The Russians did not sufficiently analyze their enemy, they did not sufficiently analyze the terrain or its effects, and thus they were unable to sufficiently analyze the enemy courses of action. This failure is one of the reasons why the Chechens were

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<sup>28</sup>Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny," 90.

<sup>29</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 12-14.

<sup>30</sup>FM 34-130, 2-1.

so successful: they were able to modify their course of action so that it was best suited for the urban terrain.

The Chechens were able to fight the Russian Army so effectively due to their specific strategy and tactics. Their overall strategy was to fight an asymmetric war. The Chechens knew that there was no way that they would be able to defeat the Russian Army in open warfare. In order to gain success, they would have to bring the Russians into an uneven fight. The best way for the Chechens to do this was to bring the Russians into the heart of Chechnya, the city of Grozny.

The Chechen leaders also used a strategy of attrition. They knew that the Russians would not accept large numbers of casualties, and that the more costly the war became for the Russian Army, the less the Russians would be willing to keep fighting.<sup>31</sup> At this point in the war against Chechnya, about 80 percent of the population of Russia was critical of the operation,<sup>32</sup> and this was due in large part to the Chechens' strategy of attrition.

The Russian Army, on the other hand, did not have the proper strategy to fight the Chechens. Instead of adapting to the situation as it arose, the Russians continued with their conventional tactics. Grachev's forces had specific objectives in their penetration of Grozny, and these were all directed at conventional centers of gravity. The Russians attempted to take over the presidential palace as their primary target, with secondary targets being other government buildings, television and radio facilities, and "other important structures [in Grozny]."<sup>33</sup> Though the Russian Army was eventually able to capture the presidential palace, "it was only of political significance" and did not mean the end of the war. On the contrary, the city was still primarily under Chechen control, and the rest of the Chechen Republic was almost

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<sup>31</sup>Arthur L. Speyer, presentation given at the RAND Arroyo-TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, Santa Monica, CA, March 22-23, 2000.

<sup>32</sup>General Anatoliy Kulikov, interview by author, Santa Monica, CA, 22 March 2000.

<sup>33</sup>Kulikov, Presentation.

completely under Chechen control.<sup>34</sup> The situation by the end of January, 1995 was due to President Yeltsin's desire to impose his will upon the Chechens – he sacrificed everything, including the time needed for a proper offensive, for political reasons.<sup>35</sup>

Not only did the Russians fail to analyze the Chechens' strategy, they also failed to analyze Chechen tactics. The Chechens were able to fight the Russians using a “chessboard type of maneuver” that the Russians were not prepared to fight.<sup>36</sup> Because they were fighting using their *teips* and their chess-like maneuver, the Chechens were fighting using an unusual type of tactic. They based their tactics on the German army's experience when they defended Berlin against the Russians in World War II, but the tactics were different enough that the Russians did not recognize them. These partisan tactics, adapted to the urban environment, worked extremely well against the Russian conventional forces.<sup>37</sup> The combination of the urban battlefield and the composition and organization of the Chechen forces allowed them to strike at the Russian rear areas with ease.<sup>38</sup> The Chechen organization, though fundamentally based upon the tradition of the *teip*, was also based in strong tactical thought.

The Chechen fighters fought in eight-man groups, each of which typically had two machine guns, two rocket propelled grenade, (RPG) gunners, and one each scout/sniper, rifleman/medic, rifleman/ammo bearer, and rifleman/radioman. With this small squad-sized element the Chechens were highly mobile, but still maintained their lethality. Three groups would make up a team of about 25 fighters. Rarely would more than three of these teams be involved in an engagement, which allowed the Chechens to break contact quickly, and avoid capture by the Russians. To add to their mobility, the Chechens did not wear body armor. They thought that this would slow them down and prevent them from being able to fight efficiently.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 112.

<sup>35</sup>Kulikov, Interview.

<sup>36</sup>Speyer, presentation.

<sup>37</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 51.

<sup>38</sup>Speyer, Presentation.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

The Chechens used the urban terrain to their advantage by funneling the Russian armored columns into kill zones. First the lead and trail vehicles would be destroyed, effectively trapping the rest of the vehicles in the street. This would be done by the best Chechen RPG gunners, of whom there were not many. They would then leave the immediate area so they would not be killed in the ensuing battle.<sup>40</sup> Then the less-experienced gunners would destroy the rest of the Russian column. In this way the better RPG gunners would not be at much risk. The snipers and machine gunners would suppress any supporting dismounted infantry while the RPG gunners destroyed the vehicles.<sup>41</sup> In this manner, they would be able to destroy the Russian armored columns piecemeal.

The Chechens learned quickly how best to use the buildings of Grozny as defensive positions. They found that the main guns of the Russian tanks were unable to elevate enough to fire upon the upper floors of the buildings, or low enough to fire upon the basements.<sup>42</sup> The Chechens also learned that the Russians were indiscriminate about their use of fire support, and would call in artillery strikes on any building from which shots were fired. The Chechens would use only the middle floors of buildings, therefore, and maintained safe areas in the basements. In this way, they could stay off of the roofs and away from the indirect fire of the Russians. To add to the canyon-like effect of the streets, the Chechens boarded up and blocked off all ground-floor entrances and windows of the buildings. Thus, when an ambush was sprung, the Russian dismounts were unable to take cover inside the buildings.<sup>43</sup>

Another area in which the Russian Army was lacking during its preparation phase was in its training. The Russian commander, Pavel Grachev, had a free hand to do whatever was necessary to capture Dudaev and suppress the rebels in Chechnya. He had control over Internal

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<sup>40</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 106.

<sup>41</sup>Lester W. Grau, "Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience" [journal on-line] (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: *Red Thrust Star*, January 1997, accessed 27 August 1999); available from <http://call.army.mil/call/fmsso/fmsopubs/issues/rusav/rusav.htm>; Internet.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Speyer, Presentation.

Affairs troops, Counterintelligence troops, Border Troops and various other government and military organizations.<sup>44</sup> He planned to use all of these forces in an attack consisting of four stages. The first stage was the preparation phase. Second came the movement to blockade Grozny. Third, the Russian forces would penetrate the city itself and take over the presidential palace, government buildings, and other important buildings. Finally, Interior Ministry troops were “tasked with finding and confiscating weaponry and armaments from illegal armed bands and the population at large throughout the Chechen Republic.”<sup>45</sup> This was the plan of attack for Grachev’s forces. Unfortunately, this plan did not work, and the Russians did not modify it to account for missteps.

The first problem the Russian forces had was in assembling the units from so many different commands. Due to major deficiencies and poor conditions in the Russian armed forces, the Internal Affairs Army, for example, had only 80 percent of its allotted officers, and 62 percent of its enlisted and noncommissioned soldiers. The average Internal Affairs units had 50 percent of their allocated weapons and equipment, with some units having up to 80 percent.<sup>46</sup> Thus, when it came time to organize the Russian forces for the assault on Grozny, “companies were formed out of battalions, battalions out of regiments, and combined regiments from divisions, selecting from each at least somewhat capable soldiers and officers.”<sup>47</sup> This caused command and control problems before the assault was even launched. The problems only increased after the forces began the movement towards Grozny on December 11<sup>th</sup> of 1994, however.<sup>48</sup>

The units were to approach Grozny along three major avenues of advance. There was one group approaching from Mozdok under the command of the First Deputy Commander of the Northern Caucasus Military District, General-Lieutenant Chilindin. There was also a group

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<sup>44</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 55.

<sup>45</sup>Kulikov, presentation.

<sup>46</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 56.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 59.

approaching from Vladikavkaz under the command of the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, General-Lieutenant Chindarov, and a group approaching from Kizliar under the command of the 8<sup>th</sup> Guards Army Corps Commander, General-Lieutenant Rokhlin.<sup>49</sup> These three groups were to meet and form a ring around Grozny, in order to cut off any Chechen reinforcements from entering the city. Almost immediately, however, the force from Vladikavkaz, which was to seal off the southern border of Grozny, was blocked by local inhabitants before it could make any headway. This led to a failure to seal Grozny as had been planned, and this allowed the Chechens to continuously reinforce their troops during the urban battle.

The reason for the delay of the Vladikavkaz group was that the commander of the Mozdok group asked permission to change the step-off time from 0500 to 0800. This change posed no problems for the Mozdok group, but it seriously affected the Vladikavkaz group. Their assembly area was in a black market car lot, and by 0800 there were many people there. These people used their civilian lines of communication, and spread the word that the Russian force was moving out. Thus, by 0900 the southern force was blocked by civilians.<sup>50</sup> The loss of surprise, aggravated by the three-hour delay in start time, resulted in the loss of a solid blockade of Grozny.

One point that the Vladikavkaz incident brings up is the method by which the Russian Army dealt with Chechen and other civilians. The northern group coming from Mozdok was also delayed by civilians. That group was prepared, however, and was able to deal with the civilians decisively. The southern group, however, upon encountering resistance, did not use force decisively.<sup>51</sup> Thus, they were delayed and failed to seal their sector, and this factor contributed heavily to the difficulty that the Russian Army had in taking Grozny.

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<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 71.

<sup>49</sup>Kulikov, presentation.

<sup>50</sup>Kulikov, interview.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

The Russian Army did not use the little time it had effectively. Subordinate units, instead of taking their time in the assembly area and using it to train for the upcoming urban battle, spent the time wastefully. “Just days before kicking off the operation into Grozny, a unit that was deployed at the Mosdok staging area conducted the following training: assembly and disassembly of equipment; range firing and field training; company tactical exercises and driving combat vehicles; battalion field training; driver testing; and alert drills.”<sup>52</sup> Instead of concentrating on room clearing, reducing obstacles, or other MOUT-specific training, the Russian soldiers were still training on the basic soldier skills.

Not only were the Russian forces inadequately trained in MOUT, they were inadequately trained in just about every aspect of military operations. They “had not conducted a regiment or division-scale field training exercise in over two years and most battalions were lucky to conduct field training once a year.”<sup>53</sup> The Russian Armed Forces were in a “poor state of combat readiness in general” according to Russian military experts.<sup>54</sup>

Meanwhile, as the Russian forces spent a minimal amount of time preparing for the assault of Grozny, the Chechens were putting the final touches on their defense. Dudaev and his forces had been planning on fighting in Grozny for two years before the actual battle. They even involved a city manager and a city engineer in the planning process, knowing that these people, though civilians and not necessarily tactically proficient, would know best how to defend the city.<sup>55</sup> The Chechens also realized that they did not have to stop the Russians before they entered the city. Instead, as stated earlier, they could draw the Russian forces into the streets of Grozny, and deal with them on the asymmetrical urban battlefield. “The first echelon of the armored columns were allowed to pass through to the center of the city almost without

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<sup>52</sup>Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny”, 93.

<sup>53</sup>Grau, “Changing Russian Urban Tactics”

<sup>54</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 80.

<sup>55</sup>Speyer, presentation.

hindrance.”<sup>56</sup> This was a tactical decision reached through careful deliberation and analysis of the situation – the Chechens had been preparing for this specific battle for years.

The Russian Army had major problems properly using combined arms. This negated the effect of their armor capability, and made the battle even more asymmetrical. The Russians did not execute a combined arms fight until after they had learned their lesson by losing large numbers of armored vehicles.<sup>57</sup> There were many reasons for this failure.

First, because the assaulting units were made up of parts of so many other units, there was often not enough infantry to support the armor’s movement. “Since there are no ready divisions in the Russian Army, small units were assembled into composite units and sent to fight. Infantry fighting vehicles had their crews, but little or no infantry on board. In some cases, officers were driving since soldiers were not available.”<sup>58</sup> Along with the fact that there was so little supporting infantry, the soldiers that were there did not know one another, since they had been working together for less than two weeks before the start of combat.

The importance of an effective combined arms team became very evident in this MOU situation. One of the major problems with sending tanks in by themselves was that they were not able to engage targets above or below the first floor. The main barrel on the T-72 tank, for instance, will not elevate higher than 14° or lower than –6°, which is not enough to engage above or below the first floor of a building at close range.<sup>59</sup> To add insult to injury, the Chechens developed a tactic of engaging Russian tanks with more than one RPG simultaneously. The tanks, however, were only able to return fire against one position at a time. To solve this problem the Russian forces started using anti-aircraft guns along with the tanks during the assault. The ZSU-23-4 was a perfect platform for urban warfare. Being an anti-aircraft weapon,

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<sup>56</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 107.

<sup>57</sup>Grau, “Changing Russian Urban Tactics”.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>United States Naval Institute, “Periscope” [On-line] (accessed 5 April 2000); available from <http://www.periscope.ucg.com/weapons/gcv/tanks/w0004244.html>; Internet; homepage: *Periscope* [On-line]; available from <http://www.periscope.ucg.com/>; Internet.

it was able to elevate to 85°, which was sufficient to reach the upper floors of most buildings at close range.<sup>60</sup> It was also able to engage multiple targets quickly, which meant that even when there were multiple Chechen RPG gunners, the Russians could return effective fire.<sup>61</sup>

Another area in which the Russian forces were insufficiently prepared was command and control. The ultimate reason that the command was so poor was due to the conglomeration of the forces that the Russians assembled for the Grozny operation. This is not an excuse for poor leadership and command, however. The subordinate leaders of the operation did not even know what their mission was for the penetration of the city. There were instances in which Russian vehicles would penetrate to the depths of Grozny, only to stop, not knowing what to do with their success.

The Russian Army was not ready for the physical and psychological effects of MOUT. As has been previously mentioned, the Chechens were ruthless when dealing with Russians. They had no qualms about killing Russian POW's in retribution for the Russians' having done the same. The Chechens would also use the Russian POW's as human shields, in order to gain a psychological advantage. "Chechens would hang Russian wounded and dead upside down in the windows of defended positions forcing the Russians to fire at their comrades in order to engage rebels."<sup>62</sup> This was surely a difficult thing for the Russian soldiers to deal with, especially since so many were very inexperienced. The Russians quickly learned that MOUT is second only to weapons of mass destruction in terms of the psychological and emotional toll on the combatants.<sup>63</sup>

The Chechens also used deception against the Russians. Due to the fact that the Chechens were fighting in their homeland, they looked the same as the indigenous people. Chechen snipers and RPG gunners would fire on Russian columns and then mix in with the local

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid., available from <http://www.periscope.ucg.com/weapons/gcv/airdef/w0004217.html>; Internet.

<sup>61</sup>Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics".

<sup>62</sup>Karasik. "Chechen Clan Military Tactics and Russian Warfare".

<sup>63</sup>Geibel, "The Battle for Grozny".

populace, and even amongst the Russian soldiers he had just been shooting. To remedy this, the Russians would stop all Chechen men to take off their shirts. “Soldiers would look for bruises on the shoulder from weapon recoil, for powder burns on forearms, or for a silver lining around cuffs (from mortar or artillery propellant bags). They also smelled clothing for gunpowder and looked for traces of it under fingernails or on arms or legs.”<sup>64</sup> Though this was time-consuming, it was just about the only way that the Russians could readily identify Chechen soldiers from the local populace.

Since Chechnya was a part of the former Soviet Union, many Chechens spoke Russian. This helped the Chechens on two ways. First, they could transmit radio messages in the open, on an unsecured frequency, speaking in Chechen. The Russians had a difficult time translating Chechen, thus the Chechens did not have to worry about complicated scrambling or encoding equipment for their radios. The Russians, on the other hand, could not transmit in the open. They tried, and the Chechens were able to intercept the Russian communications. Since so many Chechens spoke Russian, they easily translated the Russian messages.<sup>65</sup> The Chechens would also use this to their advantage by transmitting false messages on the open Russian radio networks.<sup>66</sup> This was a very effective way for the Chechens to conduct psychological operations against the Russians. Second, the Chechens were able to dress in Russian uniforms and strike in the Russians’ rear areas.<sup>67</sup> This understandably caused consternation for the Russian leaders, since they had to guard against infiltration at all times.

Due to the fact that this was an urban battle, an integral part of the terrain or the battlefield was the civilian population. The Russians performed extremely poorly in their relations with the native Chechens. As has already been discussed, there was a long-standing hatred between the Russians and the Chechens. This was not limited to the Chechens who took

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<sup>64</sup>Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny”, 94-95.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 97.

<sup>66</sup>Karasik, “Chechen Clan Military Tactics and Russian Warfare”.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

up arms against Russia, but also included those that were innocent bystanders. In fact, the Russians' performance during the conduct of the war pushed some Chechens from the latter group to the former. "President Dudajev's ally in this war was Russian aircraft. Bombs falling on the communities increased the civilian casualties and at the same time enlarged the Chechen fighters' numbers. Cursing Yeltsin, Grachev, and even Dudajev, those who had not considered fighting on Dudajev's side now took weapons into their hands."<sup>68</sup> The Russians killed civilians with indiscriminate bombing and artillery, including some of their countrymen who lived in the center of Grozny.<sup>69</sup> Civil-military relations in Chechnya were horrible.

Admittedly, some of the problems that the Russian forces faced in Grozny were specific to their being Russian. For instance, the major problem that the Russians faced was their lack of preparation, both in the area of intelligence and in the area of training. If the Americans ever have to enter a MOUT environment, these problems will not be the same, since the U.S. Army is better prepared. This is not necessarily the case, though.

The Russians were unable to obtain timely, accurate intelligence about the Chechen defenses due to their satellites being turned off.<sup>70</sup> This could be considered a Russian-specific problem, but it isn't. The General Accounting Office report, released in February 2000, states multiple problems with current urban intelligence gathering capabilities and efforts. "According to one unit intelligence official, adequate urban intelligence is available on less than 1 percent of the countries the unit is tasked to support under current war plans."<sup>71</sup> Though these are not problems with funding or lack of resources, they still produce the same result – a lack of intelligence. The intelligence problem, therefore, is not really a Russian-specific problem.

Another problem that might be considered Russian-specific is the poor public-relations effort on the part of the Russian forces. One of the reasons that the fighting in Chechnya was so

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<sup>68</sup>Knezys and Sedlickas, 85.

<sup>69</sup>Thomas, "Classroom", 95.

<sup>70</sup>Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics."

<sup>71</sup>General Accounting Office, 20.

bitter and bloody was due to a combination of the Chechen tradition of *adat*, a long-standing hatred between the Chechens and Russians, and an unprofessional, brutal Russian force. Though the modern American Army is much more professional than the Russian Army which invaded Grozny in 1995, the U.S. is not above reproach in the area of public relations. The most recent instance of an American urban operation, for example, brings up many problems with the way that the Americans dealt with the indigenous people. The American soldiers involved in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 held the Somalis in contempt, and the Somalis likewise.<sup>72</sup> This is not an isolated case, however, and it is not inconceivable that the United States, in the future, will garner as much animosity as the Russians did in Chechnya.

Another possibly Russian-specific problem is that the forces that entered Grozny were not composed of the right number of infantry, armor, field artillery, and other supporting units. Too many Russian tanks made advances without covering infantry, and the Russian infantry fighting vehicles assaulted Grozny, often without mounted infantrymen.<sup>73</sup> This same problem, unfortunately, could confront the U.S. Army, although hopefully to a lesser extent. In a presentation given in March 2000, MG David Grange, (U.S. Army – Retired) stated that there are too few infantry troops in the heavy divisions. MG Grange is the former commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division in Germany, and commanded Task Force Eagle in Bosnia, as well as U.S. troops in Kosovo and Macedonia. Speaking from experience, MG Grange related problems with the combined arms capabilities of heavy divisions.<sup>74</sup> This is a problem which, if not corrected, could lead to problems in the future similar to the problems experienced by the Russians in Grozny.

It could be argued that the situation imposed on the Russian Army by President Yeltsin was specific to their situation. However, this is not just a Russian problem. For instance, the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 was a result of political indecision concerning the exact mission of

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<sup>72</sup>Mark Bowden, *Blackhawk Down*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 75.

the United States forces in Somalia. Though the United States thought their mission in Somalia would be a Peacekeeping operation, the United Nations added the mission to capture the rebel leader after an attack by his forces on Pakistani soldiers. The U.N. passed Security Council Resolution 837, calling for the capture of the rebel leader, Aidid, and his top lieutenants.<sup>75</sup> If anything, the problems faced by the Russian Army that were directly attributable to their political leadership are a call to the United States to spend more time training for MOUT now. Due to an ever-changing world situation, and the virtual hegemony of the United States, there is a distinct possibility that United States forces will be sent into a MOUT environment with little or no time to prepare. If the U.S. is not trained to perform a MOUT mission, be it a SASO mission, or a high-intensity conflict, then they will perform only as well as the Russians did in Grozny.

The Russians were not prepared for the urban Battle of Grozny. This is again, however, not a Russian-specific problem. Currently, few U.S. Army units are able to perform worthwhile MOUT training. Most conventional units do not have the resources or time to train for MOUT. The Ranger Regiment, however, has a dedicated MOUT training program. This program focuses on four major areas: physical fitness, medical skills, marksmanship, and battle training.<sup>76</sup> Analysis of recent MOUT activity has revealed these to be the most valuable areas in which to train.

Physical fitness is vital to a force engaged in MOUT. Due to the nature of urban warfare, soldiers must be able to climb stairwells, run across open areas, and perform many other tasks. Studies have shown that physical exertion and exhaustion leads to mental exhaustion. Urban warfare is already considered second only to weapons of mass destruction in the area of mental

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<sup>73</sup>Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics."

<sup>74</sup>Grange, presentation.

<sup>75</sup> Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 14.

<sup>76</sup>Michael T. Hall, and Michael T. Kennedy, presentation given at the RAND Arroyo-TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, Santa Monica, CA, March 22-23, 2000.

stress,<sup>77</sup> so it is imperative that soldiers start out with as much mental strength as possible. This, according to the Ranger Regiment, is best done by having an adequate supply of physical strength. They work on foot marches, combat-focused physical training, and close-quarter combatives.<sup>78</sup> These things will help the Rangers to survive the “significant physical and mental stress”<sup>79</sup> of urban warfare.

As important as being in good shape is being able to stay in good shape, especially medically. For this reason, the Rangers focus much of their attention on medical training. They have a 48:1 ratio of soldiers to medics,<sup>80</sup> so each individual soldier must be trained to perform combat lifesaver functions on fellow Rangers. MOUT produces different casualties from normal military operations. In a typical combat operation, approximately 60% of the wounds are due to fragmentation. In a MOUT environment, however, 52% of the wounds are due to gunshots, which are more difficult to take care of. Additionally, the methods for treating hemorrhaging are approximately 2000 years old, and need to be updated.<sup>81</sup> Medics have a high casualty rate in a MOUT environment, due to their staying with casualties where they fell rather than dragging the wounded soldiers to cover to treat them.<sup>82</sup> This needs to be addressed in training, so that it carries over into combat naturally.

The third area of training for the Rangers is in marksmanship. The reason that such a high percentage of wounds in urban warfare are gunshot wounds is that the urban battle is a close-quarters fight. It is imperative, therefore, that soldiers be excellent marksmen. Normal Army marksmanship drills do not sufficiently replicate the conditions of MOUT. Therefore, the Rangers have a specific training regimen that builds urban fighting skills. They spend much of

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<sup>77</sup>Geibel, “The Battle for Grozny”.

<sup>78</sup>Hall and Kennedy, presentation.

<sup>79</sup>David Sheaffer, “Combat Health Support,” *CALL Newsletter No. 99-16, Urban Combat Operations* (November 1999): 8-2.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>John Holcomb, presentation given at the RAND Arroyo-TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, Santa Monica, CA, March 22-23, 2000.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

their time on the basics of marksmanship, much like the Russian forces waiting to invade Grozny. They continue, however, with their training, moving on to night training. All of the Rangers must qualify at night, but with the normal daytime Army standards. The next two phases of marksmanship incorporate the MOUT environment. Close quarter marksmanship is the method by which the Rangers learn specific techniques for fighting in cities. The final phase is the Combat (Stress) Fire event. This incorporates all aspects of a MOUT environment, and is performed with a full combat load, exactly as a Ranger should actually enter combat. This phase can be tailored to specific unit sizes, capabilities, and time constraints.<sup>83</sup>

The final phase of marksmanship is also the final phase of the Ranger MOUT Training process. Battle Drills are conducted at the squad, platoon, and company levels. Though the conventional wisdom is that the squad is the most important unit to be trained, the Rangers have learned that the platoon should get three times as much MOUT training as the company or squad. Even when training as a platoon, therefore, the squad is still training together. In this way, the squad, considered to be the most important unit in a MOUT environment, gets the most training, but the platoon also gets quite a bit.<sup>84</sup>

The Ranger Regiment has a quality training program for a MOUT environment. This program, however, is not indicative of the level of training available to the majority of Army units. Though many units are conducting MOUT training, they are not doing it often enough, and not in good enough facilities. Currently, the best MOUT training facility in the United States is the Shugart-Gordon MOUT Site in Fort Polk, LA. This site is the Department of Defense's best facility due to its dedicated opposing force, instrumentation, and large training area. The major problem is that "it lacks structures over three stories; an extensive underground network; and the dense clutter of people, vehicles, and buildings of a functioning city."<sup>85</sup> An additional problem

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<sup>83</sup>Hall and Kennedy, presentation.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>General Accounting Office, 14.

with this training center is that units are only able to conduct MOUT training once a year at most. In order to circumvent these limitations, some units conduct their own MOUT training.

For many reasons, the United States will almost unavoidably become involved with a Military Operation in Urban Terrain, MOUT, in the near future. The world population is shifting to the cities, the cities in the unstable third world are growing more quickly than the rest of the world, and cities are becoming more important strategically. Urban areas can now be considered strategic key terrain, since they are the centers of commerce, politics, and culture for all nations. Unfortunately, cities are some of the worst places in the world in which to fight. Urban warfare is completely different from any other type of warfare, be it in mountains, desert, or jungle warfare. The enemies of the United States realize that the U.S. Army is not prepared to fight in an urban environment. Therefore, these enemies will most likely attempt to draw the United States Army into an urban battle in order to counteract the U.S. superiority in technology and military power. Thus, in order to prepare for the future urban threat, the United States needs to concentrate on preparing for MOUT. Unfortunately, due to the fact that the U.S. has only been involved in high-intensity MOUT once since the Battle for Hue in 1968, MOUT is not on the forefront of military planning and training. There is only one recent example of a U.S. urban battle, the Battle of Mogadishu, and since it was conducted by a Special Operations Force, it is not indicative of how a future battle might be fought.

The United States Army needs to take a serious look at its ability to perform a MOUT mission. The problem facing the U.S. can not be solved by technology alone; however, there are some issues that can be solved through technological means. One of the most effective weapons that the Russians had in the Battle of Grozny was the ZSU-23-4.<sup>86</sup> The Americans do not have a similar weapon – the closest thing to a ZSU-23-4 is a Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle, but it

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<sup>86</sup>Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny”, 95.

has just one 25 mm gun, which will only elevate to 60°, which is not nearly as much as the ZSU-23-4.<sup>87</sup> The Army is also looking into using the Light Armored Vehicle, LAV, for the next generation of medium brigades, the Brigade Combat Team. The LAV also has one 25 mm gun, able to elevate to 60°<sup>88</sup> which is not as effective as four 23 mm guns able to elevate to 85°.<sup>89</sup> The Army should look into a mobile gun platform similar to the ZSU-23-4, with better elevation capabilities. Since nothing similar is in the current inventory, this platform should be considered for development.

As was previously mentioned, the Army, under the suggestion and direction of the Army Chief of Staff, is developing a Brigade Combat Team, BCT. This force would be the median between the current light brigades and heavy brigades. The problem with the current brigade structure is that the light brigades are not survivable enough, and don't have enough firepower. The heavy brigades, on the other hand, are too heavy, and not easily deployable. To solve this, the Brigade Combat Team is being developed. One of the main aspects of the BCT is that all of its equipment must fit into a C-130 aircraft.<sup>90</sup> Therefore, the vehicles in the BCT are medium sized, which means that they have less armor than current U.S. Army vehicles. The vehicles that the Army is looking at to supply this new BCT are not all tracked either. Quite a few of the possibilities are wheeled vehicles. Part of the reasoning behind this is that the wheeled vehicles perform better on roads, and they are self deployable; whereas tracked vehicles, in order to travel or deploy long distances, need to be put on flatbed trucks.<sup>91</sup> There are two major problems with this concept – medium vehicles are not armored heavily enough to survive urban warfare, and wheeled vehicles do not have the mobility needed in an urban environment. Many of the

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<sup>87</sup>United States Naval Institute, “Periscope”, available from <http://www.periscope.ucg.com/weapons/gcv/apc/w0003657.html>; Internet.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., available from <http://www.periscope.ucg.com/weapons/gcv/apc/w0003655.html>; Internet.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., available from <http://www.periscope.ucg.com/weapons/gcv/airdef/w0004217.html>; Internet.

<sup>90</sup>United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at Fort Lewis and the Planned Performance Demonstration at Fort Knox” [On-line] (accessed 30 April 2000); available from [http://www.army.mil/armyvision/briefing\\_tradoc\\_press.htm](http://www.army.mil/armyvision/briefing_tradoc_press.htm); Internet; homepage: *United States Army Homepage* [On-line]; available from <http://www.army.mil/>; Internet.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

Russian vehicles lost in the Battle of Grozny were lost when the Chechens found and exploited weak spots in their armor. Where the vehicles' armor was reinforced, or, in the case of the tanks, where there was reactive armor, very few kill shots were made. However, the Chechens quickly learned that the top armor of almost all of the vehicles was more vulnerable.<sup>92</sup> The problem with mobility can be seen in the vertical obstacle clearance capabilities of example tracked and wheeled vehicles. The M2 Bradley is able to clear a three foot obstacle,<sup>93</sup> while the LAV, which has eight wheels, is only able to clear a one foot, eight inch vertical obstacle.<sup>94</sup> In an urban environment, there are many short obstacles, some placed by the enemy and some a natural part of the city. If a vehicle is not able to climb over these obstacles, then it will become trapped in the street, and the Chechen tactics of taking out the lead and rear vehicles will work well against U.S. forces. Therefore, the Army should investigate the obstacle clearing capabilities of some of their possible future vehicles, as well as their survivability in combat, especially against anti-armor weapons launched from upper floors of buildings.

In order to learn the proper way to conduct MOUT, the United States must look to other recent examples. The best of these is the Russian experience in Chechnya. Since the Russian Army of 1994 was similar to the current United States Army, the Battle of Grozny is similar to something that might happen to the U.S. Army. The Russian operation to take the city of Grozny was ultimately a success. However, there were many problems with the operation, before and during its execution. The Battle of Grozny was a modern example of a Military Operation in Urban Terrain, MOUT. In this battle were many examples of the pitfalls inherent in MOUT and as such this battle is one of the most useful tools that the U.S. Army can use to prepare for its inevitable future in a MOUT involvement.

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<sup>92</sup>Grau, "Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability."

<sup>93</sup>United States Naval Institute, "Periscope", available from <http://www.periscope.ucg.com/weapons/gcv/apc/w0003657.html>; Internet.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., available from <http://www.periscope.ucg.com/weapons/gcv/apc/w0003655.html>; Internet.

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