

DEFENSE IS FROM MARS STATE IS FROM VENUS

Improving Communications and Promoting National Security

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Unprecedented challenge and change are the only consistent characteristics of a post Cold War world rapidly approaching the end of the millennium. Today we have a world in which sophisticated weapons, information technology, and global communications are available on the open market; the contrast between rich and poor nation states is increasingly sharp; and the ability of terrorist organizations to directly threaten United States interests is increasing daily.

Within this uncertain, ambiguous, and complex strategic security landscape the character of international relationships and conflicts is also evolving at an unparalleled pace. United States national security agencies have struggled to keep up. Our strategy has changed from one of forward presence and containment to one of global engagement, where American leadership and involvement are critical to our national security¹.

Two pillars of our national security strategy - Department of State (diplomacy), and the Department of Defense (military) - are increasingly thrust together in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian missions such as Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia to develop and implement agreements or programs for achieving foreign policy goals. Although these two agencies take their direction from the President, and are not the only agencies involved in foreign policy, they are critical members of the overall team. Both were unprepared for the dramatic shift in the domestic and international landscapes following the Cold War, particularly those that occurred so quickly, and both have scrambled to define their new roles.

The scope of foreign policy issues in today's world order, where the United States finds itself a hegemon expected to ensure regional stability, stop ethnic genocide and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to provide military forces and leadership in support of political objectives, is extensive. For both Defense and State, problems have arisen from trying to do too much-to make too many changes and to move in too many new directions - resulting in a struggle to set priorities fast enough

to keep pace with world events. In addition, all of these changes in the foreign policy world have occurred in a domestic political climate characterized by declining Defense and State budgets and increasing service requirements.

It is interesting to compare the views today with those of several years ago. In 1928, Democratic vice presidential candidate, Senator Joseph T. Robinson, told a London audience that U.S. support of World War I was motivated by "the twin desire to keep clear of foreign involvement and to assume no burdens in enforcing the peace."² Today the realities of the international environment require the military and foreign service professional to increase the breadth and depth in the scope of their duties - particularly in areas of engaged global leadership, international accountability, and political dialogue. This mandates a requirement for coordination, cooperation, and familiarity that capitalizes on the inherent strengths of both Defense and State and recognizes the requirement for a "one team-one fight" approach to foreign policy.

Today's shift to a more integrated approach-from beginning to end-is also a noticeable departure from the days when foreign policy was conducted by the statesman until it was apparent that diplomacy had run its course and war was inevitable- at which point it was turned over to the military. This approach is captured in the following statement made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Secretary of War Henry Stimson a few days before Pearl Harbor, *I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox-the Army and Navy.*³

Contrast this with the comments of George Shultz, Secretary of State during the Reagan administration, *I am a great believer that strength and diplomacy go together; it is never one or the other. Today foreign policy is a unified diplomatic, military, and intelligence effort that must be tightly integrated- a team approach. It is wrong to say we have gone as far as we can with diplomacy and it's now time for the military option. To do so is to fail.*⁴

A "marriage of necessity and convenience" between two temperamental cultures (Defense and State) is slowly evolving; a relationship based on trust and respect; but with each still wary of the other. To achieve foreign policy goals both must clearly recognize, acknowledge, and respect the differences of the other. In the end this will dramatically reduce confusion, friction, and conflict while improving communication.

Close cooperation between the Department of State and the Department of Defense has always been essential - the two have worked in concert. Military officers have been used in many capacities in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy throughout the nation's history. Today's challenges, however, are creating new

demands on both agencies. To satisfy the increased demands requires each agency to develop an understanding and appreciation for the other that includes their respective approaches to problem solving, capabilities and limitations, organizational structure, training programs and the external considerations that impact on each. Donald Bletz noted that "...in a certain sense they are mutually dependent variables. A change in character of one produces a corresponding change in the character of the other."⁵ Former Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry expressed it this way, *Since the end of the Cold War, the political and military issues have become so complicated and inextricably linked it is absolutely imperative that the State Department and Department of Defense have a close working relationship.*⁶

Once we understand the differences in our two agencies we are well on the way to using them to our advantage- capitalizing on our respective strengths and special skills. A recent Presidential Decision Directive, PDD 56, recognizes that effective responses to the broad array of future threats will require multidimensional operations composed of political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and military/security professionals.⁷ To get there we need a greater emphasis on joint training programs and problem-solving exercises involving case studies and potential contingency operations, increased "career enhancing" cross-agency employment opportunities, and joint civil/military implementation teams during times of crisis.

These two cultures are as alien as life forms from two competing planets, the warriors from Mars and the diplomats from Venus. Similar in many respects professionalism, dedication and competence - Martians and Venutians often have an antagonistic relationship. They are generally polar opposites in character, in approach to problem solving, and in worldview. Recognizing and exploring these differences is the first step towards accepting the Post-Cold War circumstances have pushed the two cultures together in an uncomfortable marriage of necessity.

A successful, long-term "relationship" requires a thorough understanding of the character traits, institutional values, and personality preferences of the "significant other". The current peacekeeping effort in Bosnia, considered a harbinger of the future, provides a relevant case study for examination of this crucial relationship. The lessons learned, both positive and negative, lead to several recommendations for improving communication and increasing interaction (avoiding costly therapy). Ultimately, when Mars and Venus are aligned, i.e. when they work together, national security is strengthened.

LIFE ON MARS

Character Traits

Martians used to be plentiful in American society. Today, however, they are rarely seen and may be hard to recognize. Most have very short hair, know how to stand up straight, and are sometimes found in odd clothing- white, green, and blue suits. They wear decorations with symbolic meanings only they understand and appreciate. They speak an odd language filled with cryptic words and expressions-"duty", "integrity", and "honor", for example, plus "force-multiplier", "template the battlefield", and "bogey".

Martians value competence, efficiency, and achievement. They are professional, conservative, goal oriented, time conscious, and detail driven. No plan is to complete if there is time remaining before crossing the line of departure. The eighty percent solution can always be improved upon, tweaked, and refined. They are early to everything; believe in rehearsals and more rehearsals; are mission/task oriented, autonomous, self-motivated, "give me a mission and get out of my way" type of people - bottom-line problem solvers.

They are not, generally, empathetic, intuitive listeners. Nor is patience one of their greatest virtues. Their world is painted black and white-not gray. Uniformity and teamwork, not individualism, are the values each member embraces. Membership requires a uniform. The highest possible standards, professional and personal, are demanded, and absolutely essential for success. They are, for the most part, married, have families, and are better educated than society. Perhaps Samuel Huntington captured the essence of the military mind best when he wrote, *In order is found peace; in discipline, fulfillment; in community, security... the military life subordinates man to duty for society's purposes. In its severity, regularity, discipline, the military society shares the characteristics of the religious order.*⁸

The Landscape of Mars

Mars itself is a hierarchical and bureaucratic institution struggling to adapt to peace. It is painfully attempting, often as a result of significant external pressure, to reengineer itself to live with decreased resources, today's political realities, and an evolving national security strategy. It must do this with an active force structure that is one-third smaller than at its peak in 1987.

It is an institution rocked by recent highly publicized issues such as sexual harassment indictments, decisions on gender integrated training, lower fitness levels

of incoming recruits, service academy integrity violations, and perhaps the single greatest issue; a society demanding reform, efficiency, and "correctness".

Individual services have reacted differently, some have embraced change, although not enthusiastically, while others regard it with skepticism through the lens of history and refuse to adapt. Each continues to reinforce basic core competencies and values while articulating a vision for, and a roadmap to the future that often resembles the past. "Jointness", a Congressional mandate, is another factor with which each service must contend.

Mars is an institution stretched to the breaking point- one that is beginning to show the strain of prolonged, repetitive deployments, insufficient budgets, and decreased quality of life. Although not the demoralized, drug ridden "hollow" force of the past, it is clearly a force on a perilous glideslope. Trends such as lower recruiting quality standards, spare parts shortages, pilot and specialized personnel retention problems, increasing deferred maintenance, and a marked decrease in modernization dollars are cause for concern.

Overall, Martians operate in landscape of crisis, interservice rivalry, and sensitivity training that is approaching critical mass. Often the decisive battleground is in the halls of Congress and for the public support of the American people.

Decision Making on Mars

Martians use a formal, linear, sequential problem solving process, a step-by-step guide that ensures a thorough problem, analysis, selection of one best course of action, and finally the "approved solution". The decision-making process is episodic with a definable, achievable "endstate" the ultimate goal. Martians are adept at making Powerpoint slide presentations using many colors, imbedded action sequences, and pictures. By necessity, they have laptop computers, laser pointers, color printers, and multi-format presentation display machines. Results are published in thick reports structured around five primary sections. Everyone is required to know the plan, expected branches and sequels, the commander's intent⁹, and their specific subordinate actions in the scheme of maneuver. In times of crisis a shortened "crisis action planning process" is employed - again, a formal procedure serves as the skeleton from which a plan is developed. Many potential contingency operations around the world have been anticipated, analyzed, courses of action developed, and filed away for use, if required. Martians like to plan - they hate surprises, and abhor disorder.

A Warrior's Change of Mission

Martians have always served to "fight and win our nation's wars" and this remains true today. They exist, are trained, and must be able to kill. However, the character of war has changed. Although it is still a ubiquitous struggle, it is now, however; dominated by the ability to gather, process, safeguard, and exchange information. This has resulted in a shift from a warrior, combat arms ethos to a techno-centric focus on stealth, digitization, precision strike and over-the-horizon integrated sensor-to-shooter systems where information management is the predominant factor. This evolution has had other noticeable effects. Patience and restraint are as important, if not more so, than combat operations, direct killing is a horror to be avoided while guided munitions that may indiscriminately kill hundreds of non-combatants is acceptable, and "the threat" takes new forms - from anthrax to terrorism.

The forms of war span the conflict spectrum from high intensity conventional warfare at one end, to complex contingency operations at the other end, with an overall expectation that war should be resolved quickly, with few casualties, and at a reasonable price tag. The expeditionary, nine-one-one, nature of today's conflicts has significantly increased the service member's days away from home and has forced the military to reexamine its basic force structure, readiness posture, and its ability to handle two nearly-simultaneous regional conflicts. It is a struggle to do more with less, and a realization that, in the end you can only do less-with-less.

LIFE ON VENUS

Character Traits

Venutians are an extremely small minority in America. They are natural leaders who have successfully navigated a difficult examination process to enter their profession. They are well-educated, serious and intelligent like Martians, they value duty, honor and integrity, though they are less vocal in their support of those values. They are most often spotted overseas in Embassies and at "official events" where they represent the United States. They also feel at home in Washington, D.C. In the Midwest or other parts of the United States, a Venutian is often an alien, more conversant on international issues than domestic ones. Venutians frequently find that explaining what they do for a living is met with blank stares. Clothes are unimportant necessities for many Venutians, but they would never be caught in a uniform. For male Venutians the normal style of dress is a dark three-piece suit. The female Venutian is often in ethnic garb, or business clothes that do not stand out in a crowd. Although their work demands an ability to make small talk in a seemingly endless round of official cocktail parties and ceremonies, most are happiest when left alone

to quietly do their work. Venutians also speak a somewhat foreign variant of English - acronyms and unusual words like "consul", "demarche" and "cable traffic" are part of everyday speech.

Venutians value competence, intellectual ability, and individual achievement. They are analysts who report world events - much less interested in "facts" than in how what happened relates to a larger picture. They believe in intuition and psychology. Planning is anathema to most Venutians. They see so many different paths, depending upon how future events will play out, that they are hard-pressed to come up with one plan that they feel has any validity. They generally prefer a more fluid approach that is event-driven. They are goal-oriented, but the goals they strive to achieve are often broadly defined, rather than specific.

Venutians are less concerned with punctuality. In fact, they are often late, especially for internal or interagency meetings - "what's a few minutes late when I was in the middle of an important discussion with the Foreign Minister of country X". Timeliness is not particularly valued - there is little recognition that you might be wasting other people's time by making them wait or by canceling a meeting at the last minute. If the other issue that held you up or forced you to cancel was important, then "what's the problem?"

Like Martians, Venutians are generally not good listeners (unless they are in reporting mode, in which case they are excellent listeners). Their world is painted gray - very little in it is black or white. Individualism is rewarded above teamwork and most Venutians thrive on being given an assignment where they alone can excel. They intellectually believe in the importance of teamwork, but in practice, find it a difficult model to use.

The Landscape of Venus

Most Venutians serve in one of four areas- political, economic, consular or administrative. Different skills are required in each. They generally serve two or three-year assignments in an Embassy or in Washington before moving to a new position. Venus is an individualistic, but bureaucratic institution. It has a hierarchical structure on paper, but, in practice, there is little respect for the hierarchy. It is plagued by difficult management challenges, including the potential consolidation of two other federal agencies with State, the need for infrastructure improvements, and the challenge of operating in more areas with less money.

There is always a healthy tension between Venutians in Washington and those serving in overseas posts - events and decisions look different depending upon one's

vantage point. Often those in Washington better understand the domestic political climate and regional issues; those overseas better understand the nuances of the bilateral relationship and the personalities of the local leaders. Both perspectives are important and when it works, as it should, both contribute to coherent foreign policy decisions.

Institutional values on Venus are fluid. Loyalty is important but so is an opportunity to protest actions with which one disagrees (a dissent channel for cables is available for this purpose). The employee evaluation system rewards individual efforts more than teamwork. If, by virtue of a hostile outside environment, Venutians are forced to live together in a "compound" or joined housing, then each often keeps his/her door closed when home and may avoid group activities.

Decision-Making on Venus

Venutians enjoy the process of problem-solving, seeing endless possible solutions and analyzing each of them before finally arriving at a preferred course of action. In contrast to the episodic decision-making process on Mars, for Venutians decision-making is continuous and rarely conclusive. It is a constant process, a lifecycle with no end. Venutians lead through ideas to what needs to be done, a "lets think about it differently, or have you considered it from this angle". They can be tough minded with others, act strongly and forcefully in the field of ideas, and are basically intellectually challenging people focused on implementing long-range visions.

Venutians use an informal problem-solving process. Rarely do they proceed in a step-by-seep approach; rather, they prefer brainstorming. Venutians build on an open exchange of ideas, concepts, and thoughts provided by all at the table - regardless of their position in the hierarchy. When attending a meeting, the Venutian might bring a notepad and perhaps take a note or two. When making a presentation, it will generally not be one with color-guided PowerPoint slides, each containing five points all nicely set out; rather it will be in the nature of a conceptual approach. A few thoughts may have been jotted on a notepad to trigger ideas, but a formal agenda is unlikely. A Venutian is comfortable with the concept of negotiation or even trade-offs to reach agreement "Compromise" is in their vocabulary, recognition that a feasible solution involves give and take.

The cable is the Venutian's stock in trade. Even in today's computer world, most information between overseas and Washington is transmitted via cable. The ability to write good cables is one of a Venutian's most valued skills. They are taught to analyze and write, to develop options for action, and to look not only at the facts, but also at what caused those facts. Oddly enough, particularly in Washington, the ability

to read cables is not nearly so valued. Overseas, cables often contain instructions and are read more closely, but Washington decision-makers are so busy and intuitive that they often skim the summary paragraph and the subject line and never get to the more detailed discussion.

What is the Mission?

Venutians raison d'etre is to promote U.S. interests abroad - whether those are peace, democracy, or commercial interests. They are always forward deployed and in action in their primary areas of responsibility. Venutians support and assist American citizens who travel or work abroad. They report on political and economic events and atmosphere, analyze those events, and recommend action based on them. The power a Venutian comes in his/her ability to communicate and to influence the actions of local leaders - not through force, but by using their intellect to persuade, i.e. diplomacy. Their talk is their action. They negotiate - using the threat of force, economic rewards or punishments, whatever they have in their diplomatic arsenal - to achieve their objectives. A crucial difference between the missions of Martians and Venutians is that losing a war is much more serious than losing a negotiation.

The interests represented by U.S. embassies overseas and policy offices in Washington are diverse and broad. All are part of the "big picture" in our bilateral relationship with a particular country and our multi-lateral interests in the region. In the area of national security, as in all other areas, Venutians are always attuned to this "big picture" when deciding the appropriate course of action.

TYPE CASTING

The Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was designed by the mother-daughter team of Isabel Myers and Katharine Briggs in the early 1940's. Based on the teachings of Carl Jung, a Swiss psychiatrist, it is designed to reveal basic personality preferences. The central theory is that behavior, which is susceptible to growth and development, is a product of a relatively unchanging personality type¹⁰. As a tool, the MBTI has been used by both the Department of Defense and the Department of State in training programs to explain management challenges and to teach that not everyone uses the same processes to analyze information.

It would be a mistake to use differences in MBTI profiles as an excuse for our misunderstandings; rather it is a useful tool that can help highlight legitimate differences in perception based on our own personality biases. Understanding those differences is the first step in figuring out how to make them work towards joint

problem solving, not against it There are four paired preferences used to determine personality preference:

E-I Extroversion vs. Introversion;

E 's: are interested in people and events, external, blurt out thoughts, interactive, do-think-do

I 's: internal, reflection, think-do-think, depth, concentration, ideas

N-S Intuition vs. Sensation;

N 's: are innovative, theoretical; brainstorm alternatives, consider the future, hunches, insights, look at trends and patterns

S 's: practical, factual, resist radical approaches, step-by-step, the five senses, implement ideas, determine realistic constraints

T-F Thinking vs. Feeling;

T 's: justice, logical, critical, reasonable, firm but fair, principles, objective

F 's: heart, subjective, mercy, empathy, compassion, mercy, harmony, compliment, empathy

J-P Judging vs. Perceiving;

J 's: regulate, control, goal-oriented, decisive, organized.

P 's: spontaneous, flow, adapt, tentative, open, flexible, let life happen.¹¹

The primary MBTI profile of military personnel is ISTJ (Introverted, Sensing, Thinking, Judging). In the military 30% are ISTJs. The general population is only 6% ISTJ.¹²

*ISTJs are often called inspectors. They have a keen sense of right and wrong, especially in their area of interest and/or responsibility. They are noted for devotion to duty. Punctuality is a watchword of the ISTJ... ISTJ's often give the initial impression of being aloof and perhaps somewhat cold... ISTJs are most at home with 'just the facts, Ma'am". They seem to perform at highest efficiency when employing a step-by-step approach... ISTJs are easily frustrated by the inconsistencies of others...But they usually keep their feelings to themselves unless they are asked. And when asked they don't mince words. Truth wins out over tact...His SJ orientations draws the ISTJ into the service of established institutions.*¹³

*ISTJ's are factual, dedicated, thorough, systematic, steadfast, practical, organized, realistic, duty bound sensible, painstaking, and reliable.*¹⁴

*SJ's seek order in their environment. They understand duty. They are organized, dependable, and conservative. They tend to solve problems by reliance on past experience, and they dislike ambiguity.*¹⁵ *Authority is in the system; credentials are important.*¹⁶

Someone once quipped that ISTJ stands for "I Seldom Tell Jokes"¹⁷. Their strengths include their strong sense of responsibility and duty to the organization. These are the organization's backbone. Their weaknesses include their rigidity and narrow focus on meeting rules and regulations.¹⁸

ISTJs prefer goals that are simple and attainable. They invented the "KISS" (Keep it Simple Stupid) principle¹⁹. Simple means straight forward, no frills, and understandable by everyone...attainable goals are those that you can get your hands on and get to work.²⁰

In contrast, most Department of State personnel fall into the INTJ category. That small one letter difference in the profile makes for some large differences in thinking. In the State Department- 47% are NT's, four times as many as in the general population (12%).²¹ INTJ's constitute less than 1% of the general population. INTJ's are idea people. Others may see what is [authors' note: the ISTJ perhaps?] and wonder why, INTJ's see what might be and say "Why not?"²³

INTJ's view the world in terms of endless possibilities, to be manipulated, conceptualized, systematized, and translated through objective decisions. They convey confidence, stability, competence, intellectual insight, and self-assurance. Their propensity is to improve just about anything, even things that are working well; they'll "fix it even if it ain't broke". Team building, goal setting, and time management are all marvelous concepts - for others. Generally they would much rather write about, think about, or even improve upon any of these ideas than engage in the actual processes.²⁴

INTJ's are independent, logical, critical original Systems minded, firm, visionary, theoretical, demanding, private, global and autonomous.²⁵

[They are] Driven by their inner vision of possibilities. Determined to the point of stubbornness. Intensely individualistic... Stimulated by difficulties, and most ingenious in solving them. Willing to concede that the impossible takes a while longer - but not much. More interested in pioneering a new road than in anything to be found along the beaten path. Motivated by inspiration, which they value above everything else and use confidently for their best achievements in any field they choose...²⁶

Their strengths include their ability to think systemically and strategically. These are the natural analysts. Their weaknesses include their tendency to make things more complex than necessary and their impatience with incompetency.²⁷

The S-N difference between the Martians and Venutians describes opposite ways of perceiving or acquiring information. It is clear that these 'tested" MBTI differences correlate very closely with the actual way in which real life Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers operate. Another way to look at the difference: the N person (Foreign Service) sees "The forest" and the S person (Military Officer) sees "the trees." ²⁸

The differences are measured through a more-or-less objective lens-why is that significant? One of the benefits of understanding type differences is that, as our agencies interact in group decision-making processes, accommodation may be necessary to achieve meaningful participation of all at the table. If participants "shut-down" because they can't relate to the process, then team-building efforts will fall and constructive dialogue will be lost. Without some understanding of how someone gathers information, communication is extremely difficult. An INTJ prefers to gather data in an abstract and conceptual manner while an ISTJ prefers the concrete and tactile.²⁹ The ISTJ sees ethics as specific and immediate while the INTJ views it as situational, part of a grand system of universal truths.³⁰ Defense and State gather and process information differently, a function of their respective organizations and individual personality preferences.

*Major adjustments in civil-military relations are never easy. The heart of the problem is an enduring tension: to succeed at warfighting, the military must be distinct in values, attitudes, procedures, and organization.*³¹

There are, of course, different personality types in both the military and the diplomatic corps. But the dominant characteristics affect the nature of each of those organizations -providing the internal "culture" of the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Even one whose personality type is different than the majority understands how his/her organization functions - in effect, the "personality" of the organization takes precedence over the individual's. We tend to promote those individuals whose character traits and skills are similar to our own - those who understand and work within these institutional norms.

As an example of this difference in type at work: An interagency meeting is called. DOD and DOS personnel are in attendance and are discussing national security policy, let's say on what our posture should be vis-a-vis Iran. The military personnel arrive on time, with charts, handouts, overhead transparencies and every point they want to make outlined on paper. The DOS personnel straggle in' some on time, some a few minutes late, with little or nothing in writing, ideas that are all over the map and no set presentation. They may not know exactly what they want to get out of the meeting, but they do know that they want a discussion that will generate ideas. The

military sees the state folks as completely unorganized and the discussion as rambling. The state personnel see the military folks as myopic, unable to brainstorm, with an inflexible approach and rigid ideas. This rigidity they see as contributing little to a thorough discussion of options. Both sides are frustrated and leave feeling that the other had little to contribute to a productive outcome or a decision on how to handle relations with Iran. Robert Beecroft, former Charge in Bosnia, put it best, *The military wants a roadmap before they start the journey, the foreign service officer gets in the car, starts driving and then says, "OK - who has the compass?"*³²

Opposites Attract - So Why is Everything So Difficult?

Without the awareness that we are supposed to be different, Defense and State become frustrated and at cross-purposes. We expect the other bureaucracy to be like us. We hope they will 'think like we think' and 'react to world events like we would react'.

Can these differences in the way military officers and foreign service officers perceive problems and solutions actually make for a better outcome? Yes. If the tension is properly managed, it can force each side to break out of its patterns to achieve a common goal. Leaders need to understand that there is a time and place for sensing and a time and place for intuition in the process of finding solutions to complex problems. This means that there is a balance between control and flexibility, reality and vision that must be recognized and achieved. If a team is to be successful, then its members must attempt to see things through the eyes of those who have a different lens. The goal is to arrive at an acceptable solution that all can support. This process will often be a frustrating one. In MBTI language, sensing/intuition preferences are difficult to overcome. One author suggests that these differences are "The source of most miscommunication, misunderstanding, vilification, defamation, and denigration. This difference places the widest gulf between people."³³

It is a good thing that many military personnel are sensors. The ability to fight and win wars is dependent upon the typical ISTJ characteristics, e.g. a strong sense of duty and attention to the smallest detail. What military personnel deal with in a war-fighting context is very much the here and now. Synchronizing and sequencing of operations is critical. When it is decided that X military objective must be attained by a certain time on a certain date, preliminary steps are backward-planned to ensure that all elements are in place and prepared when the deadline for action is reached. Incomplete planning or failure to fully coordinate specific events will result in mission failure and possible loss of life.

Sensors want facts, trust facts, remember facts, and believe in experience and

history.³⁴ The battlefield is one place where it makes "sense" to have a stronger emphasis on the immediate experience and to have persons who are better observers. Military objectives are normally quantifiable and pragmatic, not based on personal relationships. The "endstate" is generally clear, definable, and achievable.

Likewise, it is important that diplomatic personnel are more intuitive. In their work, they deal directly on a personal level with foreign leaders. The ability to understand and analyze the personalities of the contacts, with whom they work and seek to influence, is critical to their success. They must be able to take a longer view, to fully explore options and to understand the consequences of choosing one option over the other in the "bigger picture" context of the bilateral and multilateral relationship with Country X. The work of diplomacy requires flexibility, openness to new ways of getting along in the world, and seeing the variety of options and possibilities available for dealing with a sticky foreign policy issue. Rarely are diplomatic issues resolved in a quantifiable, pragmatic way. Rather, the process of diplomacy is messy, time consuming, chaotic, and the results might be left a bit murky on purpose - though some would say this is also true of war.

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Secretary of State George Shultz were impressed more by the similarities in the personnel in our two agencies than by the differences.³⁵ Secretary Perry believes that Defense and State are unique among U.S. government agencies. Each has a separate professional corps - the military officer and the foreign service officer. He described the two groups in terms of "professionalism, dedication and competence" and said that he could pick out members of these groups from other government employees "in or out of uniform". Secretary Shultz agreed.³⁶ That is a good sign. If the former Secretaries of Defense and State are able to see positive similarities, then overcoming whatever differences exist in establishing a good working relationship should be a manageable proposition.

BOSNIA - A CASE STUDY

The current peacekeeping effort in Bosnia provides a case study in which Defense and State are both deeply involved in a coalition effort to maintain regional stability and achieve a lasting peace. Warring factions in Bosnia ceased hostilities when a peace agreement was reached in November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. A formal "peace" was established on December 14, 1995, in Paris, with the signing of a "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina", known as the Dayton Peace Accords, by official representatives of the three former warring factions. The Accords spelled out both military and civilian agreements among the parties. Transfer of authority from UNPROFOR (United

Nations Protection Force), charged with peacekeeping prior to Dayton, to IFOR (the NATO Implementation Force) occurred on December 20, 1995. British, French and American forces were each assigned a specific sector within Bosnia. The 1st Armored Division assumed responsibility for the American sector. The original one-year military deployment is now on the verge of a second extension.

Understanding their piece in the overall mosaic required both the diplomatic and military personnel to visualize a reconstructed Bosnia. An understanding of the broader economic, social, diplomatic and military goals, and, to the extent possible, the personality of the key players was important to understanding how to implement individual parts of the whole.

The military operation, run by NATO, is the test case for multilateral operations. The military mandate was to separate the warring parties, enforce a cease-fire, and ensure freedom of movement. IFOR rapidly undertook this mission, quickly separating the parties and making it clear to the population that it would enforce the Dayton agreement. Despite extraordinary weather problems, extensive mine fields, and an aggressive implementation timeline, the separation of warring factions was achieved by the D+30 milestone.³⁷ The military result was a "cessation of hostilities", or as General William Nash, Commander of the 1st Armored Division, described it, "IFOR achieved the absence of war, which is not the same as peace; yet the absence of war may be the only contribution the military forces employed can make. Military forces simply set the conditions for peace and must recognize that the process may be as important as the product."³⁸

The military mission was straightforward. U.S. forces were ready to deploy almost as soon as the Dayton Accords were signed. General Nash was in Dayton during the negotiations to fully understand mission requirements. As the process evolved and changes were made in the agreement, the 1st Armored Division, located in Germany, modified its training plan in response to those changes. Training was, throughout the negotiation phase, kept dynamic, relevant and realistic- "if the zone of separation changed during the negotiations- it immediately changed in training."³⁹

The essence of the American military approach was captured by Secretary Perry's statement (quoted by General Nash) that we would be "the biggest, meanest, toughest dog in town". Nash went on to say "we were not arbitrating or mediating we were insisting, compelling compliance. Compliance was non-negotiable."⁴⁰

The civilian implementation operation was put in the hands of a Dayton-created international organization known as the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Things were not quite so smooth on the civilian side. OHR was a European-led operation and we forgot that the Europeans do not operate exactly as we do, in fact,

one could posit that Europeans are from Neptune. (The role of personality type and perceptions of history as factors in coalition management could be the subject of another study.) Tasks were more complex and there was no team of implementation experts in place during the negotiation phase to determine how best to proceed once final agreement was reached. Change happened quickly in Bosnia, but it was not always the change that had been anticipated-which meant constant reevaluation to determine the proper response to move the process forward.

The State Department, in Washington and at the Embassy in Sarajevo, was the overseer of U.S. foreign policy. It was the job of State Department officers to ensure that efforts undertaken by other groups did not undermine U.S. policy - strict enforcement of the Dayton provisions. The coordination function was difficult to perform. There were numerous important actors in Sarajevo, in Europe and in Washington with responsibility for various implementation efforts. Lines of authority and coordination responsibility were often unclear. When a coordination problem arose) the response was often to throw more bodies at it, rather than to come up with a better management solution.

For the military, which responds to plans and clear lines of authority, this situation was untenable. For State it was chaotic, but not unusual. They proceeded to adapt and to compensate so that important work was accomplished. General Nash summed up the changes in the military method of doing business that became apparent in Bosnia,

In the past, the Army had a problem with civil-military operations. We wanted the civilians out of the way so that the military could do its job. Now it is our job to make the civilians successful. The military provides the support. State is the lead agency.

⁴¹

Wearing Two Hats

One of the biggest problems confronting both agencies in Bosnia is the "two-hat" problem. IFOR/SFOR⁴² is a U.S.-led NATO operation, not a U.S. unilateral one. The U.S. military commander in charge of IFOR/SFOR therefore represented NATO but was also the senior military officer in charge of U.S. forces. This led to confusion between American military and diplomatic personnel. There was a concern on the part of the military officers that they not be seen as favoring the Americans over other members of the coalition. On the diplomatic side, there was concern because our mandate was to support U.S., not NATO, policy decisions. The American military officials were, in effect, caught in the middle on those few occasions when NATO policy and U.S. policy did not mesh. There may be a different decision on the

best way to handle this situation depending upon the circumstances of a particular deployment. The bottom line, however, is that decisions must be made and must be clear to everyone - military and diplomatic personnel alike, if we are to avoid misunderstandings.

Tensions

One of the constant refrains heard in Washington and Bosnia is that the military mission was and is a great success, but the civilian side is not. The implication is that the military does its job better than the Department of State or other civilian agencies. There is even a suggestion that perhaps the military could have better handled the entire reconstruction effort. This perception, which is heard from military leaders and others, graphically illustrates the differences in the way Defense and State approach, or even define, problems and solutions. State officers agree that the military has done an excellent job in Bosnia. They do not, however, feel that the civilian implementation effort is a failure. Nor do they feel that the military should have been more involved than they were on the civilian side. There is a perception that the military sometimes overstepped and created, rather than solved, problems in the civilian reconstruction effort.

One view expressed was that the military leaders were sometimes making political decisions that they did not have the background or training to make - and that they sometimes "got it wrong". When that happened, in the view of the State Department officers, it made a tough job even tougher. The military personnel, however, felt like a void existed and a decision was required - right or wrong.

The Department of State could take a page or two from the Department of Defense playbook. A specially-trained, interdisciplinary implementation team lead by the State Department, consisting of members of foreign affairs agencies, NGO's and perhaps even U.N. members, who were prepared to deploy immediately after the Dayton agreement was signed, might have made the process flow more smoothly. The designated State Department official would have authority over those involved to ensure unity of effort, responsive support, and overall efficiency. Such a group could have taken an active role in working with the Europeans to structure the OHR and perhaps have avoided comments like, "OHR silent the first two months trying to find offices, desks and chairs."⁴³

On the other hand, DOD needs to understand that the civilian implementation world contains greater complexities. It is much easier to delineate specific military goals for which there is an equally specific plan of action. On the civilian side, the

personality of the players and psychology are as important to the outcome of a particular strategy as the action plan itself. The military tends to discount the importance of subtleties and personality because the nature of a military mission is to take a much more objective, black and white approach. Both skill sets are required, and each can solve different, but related, parts of the same problem.

Rather than military officers attempting to become more involved in politics or political decision-making, they should focus on developing relationships with the diplomatic/political players. This will permit them to understand both the subtleties of the situation, and their role in improving it. Remaining within the scope of our core competencies is critical. They should not attempt to turn themselves into diplomats or politicians. At times in Bosnia, the respective missions of Defense and State appeared to diverge - the military was trying to separate the factions, while State was attempting to build unity, cooperation, and tolerance - an integration effort. This divergence was deliberate, however, not accidental. In fact, both were working to accomplish their respective missions within the intent of the Dayton Accords.

The Future: Avoiding Costly Therapy

Effective therapy involves first acknowledging that a problem exists, followed by an effort to fully understand it, and finally a willingness to modify our behavior - accommodating the opinions, personalities, and recommendations of others. The problem exists - different cultures and personalities are forced to work together as a team to solve complex, foreign policy issues. The symptoms are frustration, misunderstanding, confusion, and at times, anger. Left untreated, they could lead to mission failures, casualties, and even serious foreign/defense policy problems.

The "treatment" requires a cooperative attitude that recognizes the differences and, in fact, capitalizes on them. It will mean some changes to professional education courses, methods of making decisions, and increased joint training opportunities. It does not mean trying to make each more like the other. Samuel Huntington noted, "...the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself.

There is a natural tendency on the part of military officers and foreign service officers to think that they understand more than they do about each other, and to discount the need for increased interaction. Constructive interaction is essential. With familiarity grows understanding (not, we hope, contempt) and with understanding comes cooperation.

As Secretary Perry and Secretary Shultz noted, improving communication between

the respective agencies starts at the top - with clear expectations from the Secretaries of Defense and State. They must set the tone of cooperation, encourage and support open dialogue, and be willing to replace those who are impediments and unwilling to be team players. The weekly ABC breakfast (attended by Albright, Berger and Cohen) establishes an informal atmosphere of cooperation that percolates through their respective organizations.

Relationship therapy is an on-going process. Changes do not occur overnight. There are setbacks and there are successes. The symptoms still pop up at inopportune times. But relief is possible. The following are several proposals worth consideration. At the working level, these prescriptions, if used as directed, might eventually lead to a lasting and productive relationship between the aliens of Mars and Venus.

1. **Org Charts and Phone Books.**

Military personnel understand and require a clear line of authority. Without it they will be less productive contributors to the process, and may even lose respect for both the process and other agency personnel -or they will dominate, even in matters outside their normal expertise. Although it may be contrary to State Department norms to specifically define the roles of each member of the team, and to assign ultimate responsibility (this is a common problem that the DOS must seek to overcome - we don't need five people in charge of a particular problem, we need one, and everyone else involved should report to/coordinate with that person), it is a critical first step in productive relationships with the military.

2. **Begin at the Beginning.**

Expose personnel to the other agency and to differences in their skills and perspectives early in the training cycle - don't wait until stereotypes are already formed. Use case studies and guest speakers to teach/reinforce lessons learned. In addition, professional education programs already in place should be sustained and encouraged. It is important that Foreign Service Officers continue to attend military senior service colleges (War College, NDU, ICAF). In that setting, the participants have the unique opportunity (including the time and resources) to argue, challenge, investigate and critique new ideas and to engage in constructive, open dialogue.

Consider rotating State political officers to observe military unit rotations through the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.⁴⁵ Foreign Area

Officers (FAOs) in the military must be carefully selected, trained, and promoted. In the past poor promotion rates for FAOs and a general disregard for their value resulted in many quality officers deciding against FAO training. Today's environment places an emphasis on officers with language, cultural, and formal academic training specific to a country or region. This combined with pol/mil experience is essential in effectively managing the expected conflicts of tomorrow.

3. **Cultural Crossovers.**

Change the nature of cross-agency "excursion tours". It is clear from comments received both from career military officers and career foreign service officers that these positions are currently undervalued - they are not seen as "pure" enough, and they are definitely not seen as "career-enhancing". Both Defense and State should create incentives to make such positions attractive. Perhaps a place to begin is linking these political-military assignments to attractive follow-on assignments.

4. **Establishing the Future Orbit.**

Ensure that the promotion board precepts for DOS officers stress the importance of political-military (pol-mil) experience, particularly for political officers who want to be promoted into the senior foreign service (this was apparently just removed from the precepts - it should be placed there, once again, and emphasized as positive, unique experience.) Officers should, if possible, have had some pol/mil experience - in the Department's Pol/Mil bureau, a pol-mil position overseas, a POLAD (Political Advisor) position, or an excursion tour to the Pentagon. Such experience should qualify as multi-functional. Likewise, make it attractive to senior military officers to serve in a State Department assignment - perhaps fulfill the "joint service" requirement (many already do) as does any other joint position within the military. Make sure positions each agency wants the other to fill have interesting job content - ensure they are not "make-work" assignments, but rather positions with access to senior personnel, authority, and exposure to the workings of the other agency. Improve the attractiveness of the POLAD program and recruit quality officers for those positions.

5. **"Beam Them Over".**

Use military personnel as speakers in DOS training programs, including the course taken upon entering the Foreign Service. Likewise, include State

Department personnel as speakers in military basic/advanced and senior officer training programs - to include the Armed Forces Staff College. Give quality officers incentives to serve as those speakers. Expand the number of Senior Service College Fellowships at major academic institutions for both State and Military personnel. This provides an opportunity and perspective not available in the regular senior service colleges.

6. **Breaking Rice Bowls.**

Avoid turf battles and parochial interests - reward personnel who make contacts with counterparts in the other agency and return with ideas- e.g. a new technology that may have a broader application. A crisis response team organized around a State Department nucleus consisting of military, NGO, regional experts, USAID, and other key agencies, should be formed. Leadership provided through a single designated State Department representative with the authority to execute National Command Authority guidance, approve coordination measures with the UN and NATO, and who is ultimately responsible and accountable for U.S. actions in response to the crisis, will solve many of the problems evident in Bosnia. For the military it is also a difficult realization that we will not (likely) fight the Fulda Gap ⁴⁶ scenario in the 21st Century instead, complex contingency operations are the expectation. This requires a perspective beyond the military, even while continuing to focus on basic war fighting skills. Tough, well trained, disciplined soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines can keep the peace, as well as fight and win conventional conflicts.⁴⁷ As one soldier described it, "instead of the 82nd on the right and the 101st on the left, it is now USAID on the right and the USSR on the left."

7. **Situational Therapy.**

Develop joint crisis exercises and simulations that require personnel from State, the military, and other agencies to work together in developing and implementing policies consistent with Presidential Decision Directives; and U.S. policy in a specific region. Senior retired representatives could observe and provide valuable insights into recommendations made by participants in the exercises.

Develop short courses, 1-2 weeks in length that are made up of 50% military and 50% foreign service officers.⁴⁸ Use a case study approach - Bosnia and Haiti perhaps. Topics could include 'Next Steps: What Happens after a Peace Agreement is Signed', 'New Approaches to Conflict Resolution', 'Lessons

Learned - Doing it Better Next Time", "The Different Models for Military and Civilian Implementation". A recent State Department course entitled "Current Policy Focus: America's Role in Peace Operations", with enrollment open to the entire foreign policy community is a step in the right direction. Procedures for exchange of intelligence with coalition forces, refugee repatriation, infrastructure improvement, jobs programs, and measure to ensure senior personnel overcome personality biases can also be discussed.

8. **Checkbook Politics.**

Today, fewer members of Congress than ever before have previous military experience- in fact, those with military experience are the exception rather than the rule. A great number do not own passports, and have not traveled abroad prior to their congressional appointments. For Defense and State this means that some may have a limited background in foreign policy and international affairs, including the consequences of international conflicts on U.S. national security. The military has done a better job educating Congress with regard to how the military works than has the Department of State. Informed Congressional Representatives are critically important, particularly in this period of constrained resources and expanded requirements. Informing Congress is a joint responsibility both must undertake-perhaps a joint strategy would produce greater results. This will mean that each agency must put aside concerns about its own budgets and work for the good of the whole process - which will have the effect of increasing the budget for each member of the team. Mid-level strategists in both agencies should meet and work on a plan to aggressively target the education of Congress.

Training, Training, and More Training.

The military is out in front of the Department of State on training issues. The military trains its officers at each stage of the game. They have intermediate service schools, the War College program, and the National Training Center where new ideas, concepts and equipment are tested and validated. Training is stressed at every level of service. It is also true, of course, that they have time to train - if they were forced to fight a war each year, the intensive training regimen would suffer.

The State Department culture is the opposite. As General Nash commented "you go to great lengths, through a very competitive testing process, to get the country's best and brightest into the foreign service, and then you assume that they don't need

training to be effective diplomats."49 In fact, that is exactly the assumption that is made. Foreign Service Officers often assume it themselves - and it is characteristic of their tendency to be intuitive thinkers - "what can they teach me that I can't learn better on the job?" Many adopt the attitude that they must be smarter than the average person or they would not have made it through the rigorous testing process. Then they go on to assume that also means any additional academic or formal training is redundant.

In the Department of State, because of frequent transfers, there are often gaps between an officer and his/her successor. Pressure is put on the new candidate to skip training and "get out to post". The message is clear that a career is better served by not irritating the new boss than by asking to attend recommended training. The implication is that if one is qualified enough to be selected for a particular position, s/he should not require additional formal training in order to succeed. This attitude may be misguided but it is, unfortunately, very much in evidence throughout the Foreign Service.

There is no organized "intermediate" or "senior" training program that every foreign service officer must take. A year of long-term or senior training is considered by many in the State Department as a "lost year" towards promotion - training is not valued by the promotion boards, nor by many of the senior officers in the Department. Many top DOS personnel go to "hot" jobs in-lieu-of senior training. The Department of State should adopt a similar attitude toward training to that of the military and structure a program for on-going training that is an expected and accepted part of every officer's career.

CONCLUSION: ALIGNING THE PLANETS

PDD 56 recognizes the new reality of complex contingency operations and suggests an interdisciplinary team approach to management. Defense and State are inherently different through culture, personality, and training. Different is not bad. Simply recognizing the natural differences in our cultures is the first step in overcoming biases, prejudices and the stereotypes that limit our ability to work effectively together. The next step is a willingness to "go where no man has gone before" to study and respect alien cultures. Finally, we must institutionalize, through training programs that start on entry and continue through an officer's career, the concept of "one-team, one-fight". Modern conflict will not allow deviation from that old cliché: the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

What we have suggested are ways in which we might bring our planets into alignment-by increasing our understanding of the others methods of working and processing information, capitalizing on those skills that one group has in greater measure than the other, and using that knowledge to meet foreign policy goals. As in male/female relationships, timing and approach are critical. Viva La difference!

END NOTES

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1 *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, The White House, May 1997, 2.

2 Donald F. Bletz, *The Role of the Military Professional in US. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 23.

3 *Ibid.*, 30.

4 George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, 1982 to 1989, Interviewed by authors, 13 Apr 1998, Stanford University.

5 Bletz, 75.

6 William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, 1994 to 1997, Interviewed by authors, 9 Mar 1998, Stanford University.

7 White Paper, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations:*

Presidential Decision Directive, May 1997.

8 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and The State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1964), 465.

9 The "commander's intent" is a document prepared by the commander to outline the purpose, method and endstate of the upcoming operation. The "intent" is known and understood by all subordinate commanders.

10 *Ibid.*, 4

11 Sandra Krebs Hirsh and Jean M. Kusnsnerow, *Introduction to Type in Organizations- Individual Interpretive Guide*, (Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1990), 14.

12 Ted Strickler, *The US: Foreign Service: A Fit of Crisis or a Crisis of Fit*, (The National War College, March 1985), Exhibit 4. ISTJ reference is also found in *Type Talk at Work*, by Otto Kroeger with Janet M. Thuesen, page 57 and again on page 303. They further elaborate on the military specifically stating that 58% are

introverted, 72% are sensing, 90% are thinking, and 80% are judging.

13 Joe Butt, ISTJ profile on Sunsite internet site, 15 October 1997.

14 Hirsh and Kurnmerow, 14.

15 Isabel Briggs Myers and Mary H. Mccauley, *A Guide to the Development and Use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator*, (Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1985), 36.

16 Otto Kroeger with Janet M. Thuesen, *Type Talk at Work*, New York: Delacorte Press, 1992), 57. 17 17 17 Ibid,305.

18 Ibid., 289.

19 Ibid, 70.

20 Ibid., 70-71.

21 Kroeger with Thuesen, 56.

22 David Keirsey and Marilyn Bates, *Please Understand Me-Character and Temperament Types*, (Del Mar: Prometheus Nemesis Book Company), 180.

23 Butt, Joe, *INTJ Profile*, Sunsite Internet Site, 15 October 1997. 24

24 Kroeger with Thuesen, 3204.

25 Hirsh and Kursnerow, 14.

26 Isabel Briggs Myers with Peter B. Myers, *Gifts Differing*, (Palo Alto, Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc., 1980), 112.

27 Kroeger with Thuesen, 289.

28 Ibid., 35.

29 Ibid., 52.

30 Ibid., 207.

31 COL (ret) William Allen, *American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues. Enduring Problems*.

32 Robert M. Beecroft, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Affairs, State Department Political-Military Bureau, Telephone interview by R. Hansen, 20 April 1998.

33 Kiersey and Bates, 17.

34 Ibid., 17.

35 George P. Shultz and William J. Perry, interviews.

36 Ibid.

37 Executive Summary of Operation Joint Endeavor, Center for Army Lessons Learned, available from <http://call.army.mil/call/tIR!BHCAAT1IEXECSUMM.HTM>

38 Major General (ret) William Nash, 1st Armored Division Commander, Dec.1995 to Nov.1996, interviewed by the authors, 16 Apr 98.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 When the original one-year deployment of NATO forces was extended in Bosnia, the name of the force was changed from IFOR (Implementation Force) to SFOR (Stabilization Force).

43 Major General (ret) William Nash interview. AAHuntington, 71.

44 Huntington, 71.

45 The National Training Center, NTC, is the Army's premier force-on-force instrumented training facility in the California desert at Fort Irwin. The finest opposing force in the world, OPFOR, conducts force-on-force engagements with rotating U.S. combat units over a three-week period. At the end of each engagement, a critical after-action review (AAR) is conducted. The program also consists of a live-fire scenario against a simulated threat. Members of Congress often rotate through Ft. Irwin to observe the exercises.

46 The Fulda Gap was the expected first confrontation point of any Cold War invasion through Germany. The reference to the Fulda Gap evokes a clash of combat forces involving massive armor, artillery, aviation and infantry formations.

47 Major General (ret) William Nash, interview. He is paraphrased concerning the Fulda Gap scenario and the requirement for tough soldiers to execute peacekeeping operations, such as in Bosnia.

48 This suggestion was offered by Secretary William J. Perry during interview with authors.

49 Major General (ret) William Nash, interview.