

**LESSONS LEARNED STUDY ON THE
START-UP PHASE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA**

Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit

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ACRONYMNS USED

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CPD	Civilian Police Division
CITS	Communications and Information Technology Service
DCM	Director of Change Management
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation
DM	Department of Management
DO	Designated Official for Security
DOA	Director of Administration
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FMSS	Finance Management and Support Service
ICSC	International Civil Servants Commission
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IOR	Immediate Operational Requirements
ISS	Integrated Support Services
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
JLOC	Joint Logistics Operations Centre
LSD	Logistics Support Division
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOVCON	Movement Control
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPO	National Professional Officer
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management
OMS	Office of Mission Support
OO	Office of Operations
PBPU	Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit
PMCA	Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority
PMSS	Personnel Management Support Service
R and I	Receipt and Inspection
RDT	Rapid Deployment Team
SDS	Strategic Deployment Stocks
SHIRBRIG	Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations
SMT	Senior Management Team
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework



UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOE	United Nations owned equipment
UNOL	United Nations Office in Liberia
UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangements System
UNSECOORD	Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator
UNV	United Nations Volunteers Programme
USG	Under-Secretary-General
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
VAC	Vacancy Announcement Compendium
VTC	Video Teleconference



LESSONS LEARNED STUDY ON THE START-UP PHASE OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study reviews the start-up phase of UNMIL and identifies lessons learned.

This study reviews the start-up phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and identifies lessons that should be applied to other start-up peacekeeping operations. It does not examine the mission planning process or operational activities of UNMIL.

Time given to deploy UNMIL was unrealistically short.

Security Council resolution 1509 establishing UNMIL was adopted on 19 September 2003, and required that the transfer of authority to UNMIL from the Economic Community of West African States-led (ECOWAS) forces (“ECOMIL”) take place twelve days later. As a result, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had an unrealistically short time to deploy a complex operation, including the generation of 15,000 troops and the rapid deployment of an initial 119 international civilian staff.

However, thanks to mechanisms such as SDS, RDT and PMCA, the mission deployed quickly and the military component is expected to be fully deployed and operational only a few weeks behind schedule.

UNMIL was established on 1 October 2003 and the start-up phase was, in many respects, successful. Although the lead time for planning was short, the mission was deployed quickly. Despite some initial setbacks in force generation and deployment, the mission was operationally effective by late March 2004, just a few weeks later than originally planned, although some elements still remained to be deployed.¹ Soon after the handover to UNMIL, the presence of United Nations (UN) troops had dramatically improved security in the capital and the political process was on course. In addition, the use of relatively new mechanisms such as strategic deployment stocks (SDS), the rapid deployment team (RDT) roster and pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) helped expedite deployment.

However, some key lessons related to UNMIL’s start-up phase can be drawn.

Despite these achievements, this study identifies a number of key lessons related to the start-up phase of UNMIL. DPKO was not able to deploy a complex mission such as UNMIL within the 90-day timeline provided for in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report”) and this will continue to be an unrealistic benchmark unless well-trained, well-equipped troops are made available much more rapidly by Member States. The re-hatting of an under-equipped regional force such as ECOMIL drains key mission resources. Due to Liberia’s poor infrastructure and some coordination problems during planning, medical support and the transit camp in Monrovia were inadequate for operational requirements, delaying the deployment of troops. Having an adequate number of qualified civilian staff on the ground from the outset is critical, but the RDT mechanism and civilian recruitment procedures were unable to support the speed and scale of civilian deployment required. The failure to rapidly deploy logistics

¹ These elements were an Ethiopian battalion, a Senegalese battalion and a Pakistani engineering unit.

personnel, in particular, created serious operational problems for the mission. Similarly, the absence of a qualified political team, as well as staff in specialised areas such as Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) and public information, also created operational problems for the mission. The SDS mechanism, which proved valuable in providing immediate access to key equipment for Liberia, is now depleted and no mechanism currently exists for its replenishment in time for subsequent missions. PMCA generally facilitated funding of the start-up phase, but some confusion exists about its use. In addition, a certain number of standard practices related to areas such as the use of existing UN resources on the ground, assessment missions, integration, communication between headquarters and the field and coordination, need to be applied during the start-up phase of all peacekeeping operations.

This study recommends some policy changes, as well as areas where further review would be appropriate.

Key recommendations are listed in Annex 1. Annex 2 lists initiatives that are already being undertaken in

This study recommends a number of specific changes in policy, as well as a series of standard practices that DPKO should apply to all start-up operations. The study also identifies several areas where further, detailed review is recommended. The key recommendations of the report are listed below and a more detailed list is included in Annex 1, which also sets out an implementation schedule. Annex 2 lists a number of initiatives that are already underway in the Department to address problems related to mission start-ups.

Key recommendations include:

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

Specific changes in policy or procedure that DPKO should adopt immediately:

- **RDT and Staffing.** To improve and expedite civilian staffing, the rapid deployment team mechanism should be revised and changes should be made in recruitment policies.
- **PMCA.** The Office of Mission Support (OMS) should organise a “lessons learned” briefing and discussion on PMCA, and issue written guidelines on PMCA.
- **SDS.** OMS should review SDS inventory, including key security, communications and public information requirements, and ensure that all SDS shipments have load lists.

Practices that DPKO should apply in the start-up phases of all future complex missions:

- **Early appointment of senior leadership.** The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and other senior mission leadership should be appointed as early as possible, and the start-up team provided with space to carry out its work in New York.

Policy changes that should be adopted immediately, ...

... practices to be adopted in all future complex missions, ...

- Medical facilities and infrastructure. Assessment missions should conduct thorough assessments of medical facilities, transit camp sites and other infrastructure on the ground.
- Integration and co-location of the mission Headquarters. All components of peacekeeping missions should be integrated and assessment missions should seek to identify a site where the entire mission headquarters can be co-located.
- Public information. A core public information capacity, including the necessary logistical and technical capacities, should be built into every mission start-up.
- Coordination. During planning and start-up, detailed, daily meetings should take place between the Office of Operations (OO), OMS and the Military Division to ensure coordination of logistics capacities with operational requirements.
- Use of existing UN resources. Both Headquarters and new missions should make maximum use of existing UN staff, resources and expertise on the ground (such as political missions, liaison offices and the UN Country Team) and establish partnerships.
- Managing national expectations. New missions should seek to manage national expectations by proactively conveying (e.g. through a well-planned public information strategy) limitations on the UN's mandate and abilities.
- Video teleconferencing. All start-up missions should be equipped with video teleconference (VTC) facilities, and daily and weekly VTCs with Headquarters should be a standard feature of all start-up missions.

Key areas where further detailed review is recommended:

- A review of how the transition to a UN force can be made more effective, including problem areas related to:
 - re-hatting of regional forces;
 - interaction with strategic partners supporting regional forces;
 - concrete measures to improve African/ECOWAS peacekeeping capacities; and
 - early establishment of command and control and information management in missions.
- A review of whether the 90-day Brahimi report deadline for deployment of a complex peacekeeping operation is realistic, including exploration of other means for developing high readiness and rapid deployment of troops. Possibilities that might be explored include:
 - increased use of regional or bilateral arrangements;
 - enhancement of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and on-call arrangements;

... and areas where further review is recommended.

- contributions of troops by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) by region rather than country; and
 - use of contract support.
-
- A review and updating of the “Tables of Organization and Equipment” manual, to assist TCCs in configuring and preparing their contributions.
 - DPKO and the Department of Management (DM) should review arrangements for strategic lift, including the use of systems contracts, which DPKO currently uses for other services.



I. INTRODUCTION

This study, conducted by PBPU, captures lessons from UNMIL that can inform future start-up operations.

The Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU) was asked to conduct a lessons learned study of the start-up phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in order to capture lessons from the Liberia experience that could inform the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in future start-up operations.

UNMIL, designed as a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with 15,000 troops, 1,115 civilian police and over 600 civilian staff, was expected to take over authority from ECOMIL within twelve days of its establishment by the Security Council.

On 4 August 2003, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a peacekeeping force (ECOMIL) to Liberia. On 18 August 2003, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Accra by the Liberian Government and rebel groups. One month later, on 19 September 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1509, establishing UNMIL. The resolution imposed the tight deadline of 1 October 2003 for the transfer of authority from the ECOMIL forces to UNMIL. The mission was designed as a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation, with a mandate ranging from observation and monitoring of the ceasefire and support for the peace process, to Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) of former combatants and the restructuring of the police force of Liberia.² The resolution called for a force of 15,000 troops, including military observers and staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers, and the mission's civilian staffing table had 607 international posts.

This study examines key aspects of UNMIL's start-up phase, including several rapid deployment mechanisms. It does not, however, discuss the planning phase or UNMIL's actual operations.

This study examines key aspects of the start-up phase of the mission, including the generation and deployment of troops, the re-hatting of the 3,500 ECOMIL troops and civilian deployment. It also assesses several rapid deployment mechanisms which DPKO used either for the first time, or more extensively than before, in Liberia, including pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA), strategic deployment stocks (SDS) and the rapid deployment team (RDT). One concern that continually surfaced during this study was that, despite recent improvements, mission planning is still not conducted in a strategic and integrated manner. The adoption, on 23 January 2004, of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is an important step forward and the Office of Operations and the Director of Change Management (DCM) have now been tasked with reviewing the mission planning process and ensuring the effective integration of planning, both within DPKO and with peacekeeping partners. Accordingly, this study does not examine the planning phase of UNMIL. Nor does it review the mission's actual operations. It does, however, touch on select aspects of the assessment mission, coordination during planning, use of existing United Nations (UN) resources on the ground and communication between DPKO Headquarters and the field.

² UNMIL's mandate also includes several other key areas: support for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, support for humanitarian and human rights assistance, support for security reform and support for implementation of the peace process. Security Council Resolution 1509 (S/RES/1509 (2003)) sets out the detailed mandate of UNMIL.

A detailed list of recommendations is listed in Annex 1, which also sets out an implementation schedule.

II. REVIEW OF THE START-UP PHASE

Military

Force Generation and deployment. Some significant delays were experienced in troop deployment but, overall, these may have been inevitable due to the lack of lead time and the extremely tight deadline for establishment of the mission. DPKO's Force Generation Service began informally approaching possible Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) in June 2003, based on the military concept of operations that had been developed starting in May. The UNSAS (the United Nations Standby Arrangements System) was the starting point for these contacts, but did not yield many offers. The concept of operations called for full deployment and operational effectiveness by mid-March 2004, or almost 180 days after the adoption of the resolution. The interim force headquarters was established within 30 days, with the assistance of the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG). (A brief report on "lessons learned" related to SHIRBRIG is being issued separately). As of mid-March, 85% of the force had been deployed. One of the reasons for delays in deployment was that a number of countries that had offered troops subsequently had to obtain legislative or executive approvals before confirming their offers. In addition, one key contingent pulled out following its pre-deployment reconnaissance mission to Liberia. DPKO also experienced some difficulty in generating specialised units.

Re-hatting of ECOMIL troops. One of the challenges that UNMIL faced was the requirement that it re-hat all of the 3,500 ECOMIL troops on the ground. It was known that these troops would not be sufficiently equipped and would fall below UN operational and logistical requirements. In addition, however, the troops were inadequately supported and equipped by a private contractor (Pacific Architects and Engineers). As a result, UNMIL civilian support staff, who were already in high demand due to staffing shortages (see below), had to be taken away from other tasks to address the support needs of the ex-ECOMIL troops, and some UN owned equipment (UNOE) intended for other mission needs had to be diverted to the re-hatted troops. The need to provide 92 vehicles to contingents, for example, created problems for other components of the mission. This challenge, which DPKO has faced since the re-hatting of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone in 2000, is one that the Department will continue to face in upcoming missions.

Pre-deployment reconnaissance missions. UNMIL was the first mission where DPKO adopted a discrete policy of financing specific elements of TCC pre-deployment reconnaissance visits, without which some TCCs would not have been able to conduct the visits. Pre-deployment reconnaissance, which

The military concept of operations called for full deployment by mid-March 2004; force generation started in June 2003, months before the Security Council resolution.

The interim force headquarters was established within 30 days with SHIRBRIG's assistance, and the force was operationally effective by late March.

Logistical problems associated with the re-hatting of inadequately supported and equipped regional troops, including the need to redeploy civilian staff to provide logistical support, are likely to be faced by future missions involving "re-hatting".

UNMIL was the first mission where specific elements of pre-deployment reconnaissance missions were financed by DPKO.

Pre-deployment reconnaissance missions are essential to the rapid and structured deployment of military units.

The Senior Management Team recently approved a policy paper on conduct of reconnaissance visits for peacekeeping operations.

Two problems -- inadequate support staff on the ground with expertise, and outdated "Tables of Organization and Equipment" -- hampered the communication of requirements to TCCs.

The shortfall in support personnel limited rapid deployment and caused serious logistics problems.

is essential to achieving a rapid and structured military deployment schedule and should be a prerequisite for all new missions, is favoured by TCCs. Despite some initial restrictions on access due to security, the reconnaissance visits facilitated the subsequent deployment of the units concerned, as well as the negotiation of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with TCCs. While it would have been desirable for DPKO experts to be present during the reconnaissance missions, this was not possible due to a desire to restrict costs. The Senior Management Team (SMT) recently approved a policy paper on the conduct of reconnaissance visits for peacekeeping operations, which will help to clarify policies and procedures for future reconnaissance missions.

Communication of requirements to TCCs. In discussing UNMIL's needs with TCCs, DPKO was handicapped in two ways. First, throughout the start-up phase, there were not enough support staff on the ground with the expertise to advise Headquarters on exact requirements in order for TCCs to bring the right equipment with them. A second factor was that the "Tables of Organization and Equipment" manual of 1998 was outdated and provided only limited guidance to TCCs on configuring and preparing their contributions. Although all missions are different and a formulaic approach cannot be used, the manual would be more useful if it included, where possible, generic equipment lists of standard unit types, particularly enabling units. In addition, equipment lists from TCCs were not finalised in a timely manner. Due to these factors, and the short lead time available for deployment, MOU negotiations with a large number of TCCs had not been completed prior to deployment.

Logistics. While there was a push for force generation and accelerated deployment, UNMIL was unable to support this scale of deployment. In order for deployment to take place as rapidly as it did, the mission had to rely on extensive support from UNAMSIL, including continuous air and sealift of personnel, equipment and other materiel, as well as support in training, systems and administration. In addition, the mission had significant logistics problems due to a serious shortfall in support personnel during the start-up phase. For example, many arriving containers of equipment could not be immediately inspected and stored or distributed to the relevant components of the mission due to a shortage of receipt and inspection (R and I) staff and asset managers. Several other factors, including the shortage of heavy lifting equipment and internal coordination issues also affected the arriving UN owned equipment. The poor condition of Liberia's seaport and the limited capacity of airport, had been expected to delay or even halt landing and offloading of arriving cargo, especially due to the shortage of support staff. UNMIL staff mobilised effectively, however, and were able to service all arriving aircraft and vessels without significant delay.

Due to inadequate assessments and coordination problems, medical support was delayed and inadequate ...

Another serious problem was the delay in and inadequacy of medical support. Due to the insufficient medical assessment conducted in August 2003, the JFK Hospital in Monrovia, which was selected as the site for a Level 3 hospital, turned out to be inappropriate in terms of infrastructure, cleanliness and services. In addition, there was a delay of almost four months in the arrival of blood supplies. This situation was addressed by the presence of a Dutch logistics ship with a high quality medical capacity and blood supply, as well as use of blood supplies from UNAMSIL.

... and the transit camp could not meet the needs of arriving troops.

The Scheiffelin transit camp was inadequate, in terms of sewage, illumination, catering and security arrangements, to meet the demands of the inflow of troops. This, together with delays in deploying several enabling units, engineers, transport, aviation and especially hospital units, as well as the need to hold units in transit, meant that the mission had a military presence in Monrovia, but could not deploy to the sectors in a timely manner, even though UNMIL continued to press for accelerated deployment. The lack of medical support, in particular, was of serious concern to certain TCCs, who felt that their troops were being put at risk. As some of these logistics issues came to light, they were addressed in daily coordination meetings between the Office of Mission Support (OMS) and the Military Division, which improved the situation.³

Daily meetings between OMS and the Military Division improved the situation.

Not enough emphasis was placed on integration of the missions' components. This was exacerbated by the fact that UNMIL was based in three different locations in Monrovia.

Co-location and integration of mission headquarters components. UNMIL has been divided among three separate locations in Monrovia. Although this may have been unavoidable due to the poor state of infrastructure in the capital at the time the mission was established, it has seriously affected the cohesiveness of the mission. In particular, the physical separation between the civilian and military components, which are a 30-minute drive from each other, has created a "political/military divide" and perpetuated the idea of separate chains of command, which is inconsistent with UN policy. Moreover, not enough emphasis has been placed on integration of the mission's substantive, military and support components. For example, the mission has not adequately used key opportunities for integration such as in the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), the Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) and training units, and the move toward Integrated Support Services (ISS), whereby military and civilian staff share support functions in a unified structure, has been slow and incomplete.

³ A range of planning and coordination meetings, chaired by the Office of Operations, were held beginning in July 2003, both at the Departmental level and with other UN Departments, Funds and Programmes. OMS, MD and CPD also met daily throughout the planning and startup phases of UNMIL to coordinate mission plans, force generation, Memoranda of Understanding and the optimal phasing of the deployment.

Civilian Deployment

With regard to civilian deployment, late appointment of most of the mission leadership limited their participation in planning and start-up.

Senior mission leadership. The early appointment, in July 2003, of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and the fact that he and his start-up team were provided with dedicated office space in New York, was very useful. However, the Force Commander was not appointed until late September, the two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary General (DSRSGs) in early October and the Police Commissioner in early November. As a result, no one other than the SRSG was able to participate in planning in a meaningful way⁴. Moreover, they were not able to receive joint briefings in New York or begin working together as a team prior to deployment to the field.

And although the start-up team worked well together, inclusion of other expertise and a clear policy about Headquarters' lead role in staffing, would have been useful.

SRSG's start-up team. The start-up team for UNMIL was put together quickly and was able to function immediately because most of its members had worked together in the past. The team would have been strengthened, however, by the inclusion of other experiences, particularly expertise on Liberia and the sub-region and better contacts with Headquarters. In addition, DPKO had a practice, but not a clear policy, to the effect that Headquarters takes the lead in most start-up staffing decisions, in order to ensure that the overall requirements of the Department and other field missions are met, and this position was not routinely communicated to new SRSGs at the outset. This led to a number of disagreements between the SRSG and Headquarters over staff selection and caused delays in deployment.

The RDT roster, which was used extensively for the first time in UNMIL, assisted the mission greatly, but the mechanism needs to be further refined:

Rapid Deployment Roster. UNMIL represented the first extensive test of the RDT mechanism. This mechanism calls for staff to be screened, trained and, with the approval of their supervisors, placed on rosters for rapid deployment as teams⁵ during the critical first 90 days of a new or expanding peacekeeping mission. Thirty-two staff from the roster were deployed to UNMIL. The availability of the RDT roster significantly assisted the mission, but the experience also demonstrated that the mechanism needs to be refined. The main problems with RDT are outlined below; specific recommendations on how to revise the mechanism to better meet DPKO's rapid deployment needs have been sent separately to OMS.

- *The three-month RDT period was too short;*

The three-month RDT period was felt to be too short, since DPKO's Personnel Management Support Service (PMSS) was unable, in most cases, to complete the selection of RDT replacements within that timeframe, leaving key positions vacant well into the start-up phase. Because of delays in

⁴ Other senior officials were also present on the ground but in different capacities from those to which they were eventually appointed. For example, the DSRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Reconstruction and Recovery was present as Head of the UN Office in Liberia, the DSRSG for Rule of Law was present as Head of the assessment and planning team, and the Force Commander spent some time in Liberia in his capacity as Force Commander of UNMASIL.

⁵ Due to difficulties associated with recruitment, the RDT teams were never deployed as "teams". Instead, staff were drawn from the roster as needs were identified in missions.

- UNMIL was reluctant to let RDT staff return to their duty stations after 90 days due to delays in deployment of regular staff;
- RDT was more successful in identifying support staff than substantive staff;
- Managers were unwilling to lose their strongest staff for 90 days, which shows a lack of

staffing, UNMIL was reluctant to let RDT staff return to their duty stations at the end of the 90-day period, but unless their return is enforced, the mechanism cannot work. Ideally, the RDT period should be no longer than 90 days; instead, changes should be made in staffing and recruitment policies to allow the 90-day period to work.

The RDT was more successful at identifying support staff than substantive staff, and key senior posts, in particular, were not adequately covered in the roster. Another problem was that many managers were unwilling to lose their strongest staff for 90 days and, therefore, prevented them from being placed on the roster or refused to release them, while, in certain cases, less qualified candidates were able to volunteer for the list and were readily released. This lack of commitment to the principles of RDT made the mechanism less effective.

Consequently, there was a serious shortfall in civilian staff, which affected both support and substantive areas.

The inability to deploy an adequate number of staff through the RDT roster, as well as the inability to recruit replacements for RDT staff who had to return to their duty stations after 90 days, led to a serious shortfall in civilian staff, and adversely affected the mission's operations in a number of areas, including DDRR, political affairs, human rights, legal affairs and judicial affairs. It was the shortfall in logistics and support personnel, however, that had the most serious repercussions for overall mission operations, as discussed above.

And as DPKO deploys more missions simultaneously and demand for RDT candidates increases, the process is likely to be even slower.

As the next missions are deployed, the pool of eligible RDT candidates with specific skills will shrink, which will further slow down the process. Maintenance of the roster and liaison with RDT members is also a critical and time consuming responsibility and will need to be appropriately staffed. (At present, one staff member in PMSS is assigned to this task part-time).

The pace of recruitment of longer-term staff was slow ...

Staffing. The mission was dissatisfied with the slow pace of recruitment of longer-term staff, particularly external candidates and those slated to replace RDT staff. The staffing table for UNMIL included 607 international civilian posts, 119 of which were funded through pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA). As of 1 March 2004, 279 civilian posts were still unencumbered, leaving the mission with a 63% incumbency rate for support staff and a 38% incumbency rate for substantive staff,⁶ five months after it was established. Based on the observations below, a series of specific recommendations has been sent separately to the Office of Mission Support, proposing revisions to recruitment procedures for field missions.

Delays in UNMIL staffing can be attributed to a number of factors, including disagreements between PMSS and the mission over the candidates to be selected, delays on the part of the mission in selecting candidates from short-lists sent by PMSS and delays in technical clearance of candidates at

⁶ If one considers only those staff actually on the ground in Liberia (i.e. excluding the 105 candidates in "travel" or "under recruitment" status) the incumbency rate falls to 42% for support staff and 26% for substantive staff.

... resulting in key gaps after the departure of RDT staff, and forcing the mission to continue to operate in “emergency mode” well into the start-up phase.

The VAC was intended to speed up recruitment, but confusion over its procedures, and the fact that it was only open to internal candidates, adversely affected its application.

There were also some backlogs in the Travel Unit, due to an increase in the number of cases and a lack of resources.

National Professional Officers have been under-used by UNMIL, in part due to confusion over the procedures. UNVs, on the other hand, were recruited quickly, and were of high quality.

UNMIL was the second mission to use PMCA ...

Headquarters. In addition, there were delays in releasing internal staff, as well as in deploying external applicants. The failure to staff the mission in a timely manner left serious gaps after the departure of key RDT staff, as well as in key areas such as security, forcing the mission to continue to operate in “emergency mode” even after the start-up phase. Key posts such as Chief of Staff, Head of DDRR, Head of Political Affairs and Chief MOVCON (Movement Control) remained vacant even after the start-up phase. By late January, UNMIL still lacked a proper political affairs section and had very few staff with expertise of Liberia or the sub-region.

The Vacancy Announcement Compendium (VAC), which was piloted in UNMIL and pre-cleared internal candidates who had applied for generic mission posts, was intended to speed up recruitment. However, there was some confusion over how the procedure works, and the fact that it was only open to internal candidates meant that it greatly limited the pool of candidates from which to choose, particularly for posts where knowledge of the country and sub-region are important.

In addition, there were some backlogs in the Travel Unit where, due to an increase in the number of cases and a lack of resources, the Unit was only able to allocate one full-time staff member to cover UNMIL civilian staff. As recruitment starts for new operations, missions such as UNMIL, which already have very high vacancy rates at a critical time in their operations, could be adversely affected.

United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) and National Professional Officers (NPOs). The mission was pleased with the quality, geographical and gender balance of the UNVs it had on board, as well as the speed of their recruitment. With regard to NPOs, however, the mission had, as of March 2004, appointed only three of the 30 NPO posts allotted on the staffing table. This was due, in part, to confusion regarding standards and contracts. It can also be attributed to current rules of the International Commission of Civil Servants (ICSC), which require that NPOs have professional degrees. This can be unreasonable in the peacekeeping context, where many qualified young people have been unable to complete their degrees due to the conflict, but have valuable work experience instead. The use of NPOs is particularly important in a mission such as UNMIL, where national expertise is otherwise limited. This would also ensure that DPKO leaves behind a cadre of trained nationals who can take over responsibility after UNMIL has departed.

Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority and Procurement Issues

UNMIL was the second mission to use PMCA, as envisaged by the Brahimi Report. This mechanism provides the Secretary-General with the authority to draw on up to \$50 million in funding once it is likely that an operation is to be established, but before adoption of a Security Council resolution and approval

... and while it facilitated UNMIL's start-up, there was some confusion about how the mechanism is intended to work.

Concerns were also raised about UN procurement policies regarding use of standard contracts for strategic lift.

Because of SDS, UNMIL's supply of UNOE was largely adequate.

A complex mission like UNMIL, depletes critical stocks of SDS, however, and leaves insufficient time to replenish the stocks for upcoming missions.

Several smaller problems related to SDS, such as review of its inventory, can be more easily solved.

Funds were not requested or budgeted for policing start-up kits.

of a budget. PMCA can provide financing for significant expenditures such as technical assessment missions, personnel not covered in RDT, strategic lift and equipment not in SDS. PMCA was requested on 18 August 2003 and almost US\$48 million was allotted on 9 September. PMCA was generally considered to have facilitated the start-up phase of UNMIL. However, some frustrations were raised with the mechanism, which were generally due to a lack of understanding about how PMCA is intended to work. Many DPKO staff also raised concerns that UN procurement regulations do not allow the use of systems contracts for strategic lift,⁷ which they felt is a requirement if the current scale and speed of deployment is to be supported.

Strategic Deployment Stocks and Other Start-up Equipment

Notwithstanding the speed with which the mission had to be established, UNMIL's supply of UNOE during the first few months was largely adequate because of the effectiveness of SDS and transfers of equipment from other missions, especially UNAMSIL, United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Although SDS had been used in previous missions, it was used far more extensively in Liberia than in the past. However, UNMIL demonstrated that the mounting of a large, complex operation depletes critical stocks of SDS and by the time that mission's budget has been approved and funds are available (three months plus twenty days, in the case of UNMIL) there is not enough time to replenish the stocks if another complex mission is to follow. This is a particularly serious concern at present, when a number of new complex missions are being planned.

Other SDS-related problems which can be more easily resolved are the fact that some of the inventory was too generic and included items that were not needed in Liberia, while there were inadequate supplies of essential items such as generators. In addition, in some cases there were no load lists, forcing the mission to unpack everything in order to retrieve urgently-needed items. One of the successful practices used in the mission was the establishment of internet cafes. Although connections were slow due to the unstable power supply, this took some of the pressure off the IT staff and allowed them to address overall technology needs without having to provide immediate internet access and email connections on the desktop computers of all arriving staff. This practice could be standardised and the required equipment should continue to be included in SDS stocks. Other items that should be included are a communications work centre, as well as expendable items and equipment shelters.

On the policing side, the mission's activities have been hampered by the fact that no funds were requested, during the planning and budgeting phases, for

⁷ In areas other than strategic lift, the UN currently makes extensive use of systems contracts with contractors and vendors.

the purchase of basic necessities for restructuring and reform of the police. In future, policing “start-up kits” could be designed and procured through global systems contracts and, as appropriate, stocked and deployed from Brindisi to relevant missions with a policing mandate.

Security

Security equipment for start-up missions. Following the attack on UN Headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, several reviews of security arrangements both for Headquarters and field operations are being carried out and the results of these reviews are awaited. In the meantime, the development by DPKO of a “mission start-up kit list” – i.e. a comprehensive list of priority security equipment with which all start-up missions should be equipped – is an important step in improving field security. It is of concern, however, that five months into the mission, and despite the precarious security situation in Liberia, UNMIL lacked the full complement of essential security equipment such as shatter resistant film for windows, x-ray machines, bomb detectors, fire extinguishers, trauma kits, first aid kits, guns and ammunition, handcuffs and pepper spray, as well as basic equipment such as pass and ID machines. Another issue with potential implications for the mission’s ability to protect its staff is that, as of 15 March, only 27 security officers, or 33% of the number allotted to the mission, had been deployed. It should be noted that UNMIL was the first mission to include a significantly higher number of security officers, in accordance with the more robust requirements of the draft DPKO Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on security. However, security officers for UNMIL were being recruited at a time when several other missions also had a high volume of personnel needs, but security personnel resources were scarce. A note verbale sent to Permanent Missions in February 2004, requesting their assistance in identifying security personnel for peacekeeping operations, should help to address this problem.

It should also be noted that, in UNMIL, as in other peacekeeping operations, the fact that there are two lines of responsibility (DPKO for mission personnel and assets and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) for non-peacekeeping UN personnel in the country), rather than a single overall security umbrella, creates confusion and inconsistent standards, thus adversely affecting security management. This issue is central to an ongoing review of UN security being carried out at Headquarters.

Humanitarian access. Tensions arose in the early months of the mission due to the dissatisfaction of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and some agencies that their access to all areas except Monrovia and its environs was restricted due to the declaration of Phase V throughout the rest of the country. They disagreed, in particular, with the link, by the mission leadership, of the reduction in the security phase to the deployment of troops. These agencies argued that humanitarian agencies routinely operate in highly

The development of mission start-up kit lists of priority security equipment is an important step in improving mission security.

However, UNMIL lacked essential security equipment, as well as a sufficient number of security officers.

Lack of clarity on the division of labour between DPKO and UNSECOORD further hampered security management.

Furthermore, there was a tension between the need for security-related restrictions and humanitarian access.

dangerous parts of the world where no peacekeeping troops are present. There appears to be a consensus, on the other hand, that following the events of 19 August 2003 in Baghdad, peacekeeping missions understandably need to exercise extreme caution and that civilian deployment cannot commence until security concerns have been addressed. Another point of tension was the fact that the SRSG, rather than the DSRSR for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction (who has daily contacts with the Agencies), was designated DO (Designated Official for Security), and that he, in turn, delegated this authority to his Deputy for Rule of Law.

Although there will always be a tension between security restrictions and the desire of humanitarian agencies for access, the cautious approach of UNSECOORD and UNMIL to civilian deployment is understandable, as long as the system is flexible enough to balance both security needs and humanitarian requirements.

Public Information

Several good practices were followed with regard to public information, and a strong public information capacity was on the ground very quickly.

Although the importance of the public information component of peacekeeping missions is often underestimated, several good practices were followed in Liberia. First, a request for an emergency broadcast system, as well as other items for generic start-up public information kits, were included in SDS, and the necessary staff were identified and immediately deployed. As a result, a core public information team was on the ground and an immediate capacity existed on the first day of the mission. A former Department of Public Information (DPI) staff member was in Brindisi at the time of mission planning and was able to oversee all the SDS arrangements related to public information. However, no procedures were in place at the time to specifically address the transfer of public information equipment to missions.

Limited technical and logistical expertise, however, delayed the launch of the broadcast studio and communications system.

More important, the public information staff of UNMIL did not have the technical or logistical expertise to assemble and operationalise the equipment, and because of competing demands, the support required was not readily available. Thus, although the equipment had arrived and the mission was able to broadcast on the first day, which had not been the case in previous missions, the radio station, broadcast studio and communications system were not operational for at least a month after reaching Liberia. Moreover, due to the slow rate of recruitment referred to above, new staff were not recruited and departing staff were not replaced in a timely manner, despite the urgent need for an expanded public information capacity to support critical political activities such as DDRR.

Managing National Expectations

Public perception of UNMIL in Liberia is largely positive ...

Overall, there is a positive public perception of UNMIL in Liberia, particularly due to the dramatic improvement in security in the capital and the

... but slow deployment of troops outside the capital has disappointed the population ...

... and ambitious public statements have raised expectations.

fact that the political process is on course. However, the perception that deployment had been slow had begun to erode some of the good will by early 2004. Until 27 December 2003, for example, no troops had been deployed outside the capital, which was puzzling and frustrating to the population, particularly since more than 7,500 troops had already arrived in the country by 30 November 2003.

The already-high expectations that the Liberian population had of UNMIL when the mission was first established were raised even higher due to a series of well-intended but ambitious public statements by UNMIL leadership, particularly with respect to the restoring of infrastructure, the impact of troop deployment and what the DDRR programme would achieve.

Partnership with Other UN Entities on the Ground

As has been the case in the past, the establishment of a peacekeeping mission in Liberia created apprehension and morale problems amongst staff of the existing political mission -- the UN Office in Liberia (UNOL) -- as well as in the UN Country Team (UNCT). The staff and leadership of UNOL were not kept adequately informed, by Headquarters, of developments and many felt that their positions were suddenly vulnerable. OO and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) were both in touch with UNOL, but they could have coordinated better to ensure that UNOL was kept fully informed of the evolving situation. Although the SRSG encouraged the return of the UNOL team (which had been evacuated and could not immediately return due to security conditions and transport difficulties) and the mission eventually absorbed all UNOL staff for an initial period, there was nevertheless a perception that UNMIL was reluctant to hire UNOL staff into the new mission.

As far as the relationship with the UNCT was concerned, UNMIL was not sufficiently oriented toward partnership with other UN entities, although many had potentially useful knowledge and experience of the country. The DSRSG for Humanitarian Affairs and Reconstruction/Recovery met regularly with the Country Team, as part of his responsibilities, but the SRSG interacted with the UNCT infrequently, as is the case in many peacekeeping operations.

Major Political/Operational Activities -- DDRR

A separate review has been conducted of UNMIL's DDRR programme and an analysis of lessons learned in relation to the programme will be made available at a later date. This section contains more general points that may apply to other major operational activities undertaken during a mission start-up.

Inadequate use was made of the resources of the UN Office in Liberia (UNOL) and a sense of partnership did not exist between UNMIL and the UN Country Team.

A separate report will be issued on UNMIL's DDRR programme.

The DDRR programme was launched without adequate preparation and security ...

UNMIL's DDRR programme was launched on 7 December 2003. Due to a lack of preparedness and inadequate security, the situation in the cantonment site got out of hand, leading to looting and violence in the camp and elsewhere in the city. The mission explained that it felt pressure, for a variety of reasons, to launch the DDRR programme in December. These included fears that the security situation in Monrovia was deteriorating and that the situation might fall apart if the various factions were not immediately disarmed.

... and without sufficient DDR expertise or a strong political team.

The lack of staff with expertise in DDRR was of critical concern. In addition, the absence of a strong political team, with in-depth knowledge of the country or region, made it difficult for the mission to develop effective contacts with the parties to the conflict or armed factions, other than contacts that had been established by the former ECOMIL troops, and obtain accurate information about political developments in the country, notably during the DDRR process.

A major substantive activity such as DDRR cannot be launched without adequate preparation and expertise.

There is disagreement amongst UNMIL staff, UN agencies and other members of the international community as to the imperative for launching the programme at that stage. The events around the December 2003 launch made it clear, however, that a major activity such as DDRR cannot be carried out during the start-up phase of a mission without adequate in-house expertise, preparation and consultation with national, UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, and the commitment of the parties to the peace agreement.

Communication Between UNMIL and Headquarters

Communication between the Mission and Headquarters was at times strained and ineffective.

Communication between UNMIL and Headquarters was, at times, strained and ineffective. On a technical level, one reason was the insufficient use of regular, integrated (i.e. including all relevant components of the Department and the mission, both at senior and working levels, as appropriate) video teleconferences (VTCs) for dialogue on strategic and operational issues. Instead, code cables, which many viewed as an inefficient means of communication for this purpose, were relied on.

III. CONCLUSION

The recommendations in this report aim at improving DPKO's rapid deployment capacities and the effectiveness and efficiency of future start-up phases in light of the complex challenges DPKO faced in UNMIL. These challenges provide valuable lessons on which DPKO should draw, and apply in upcoming missions.

UNMIL is, in many ways, a test case of the new requirements of UN peacekeeping in the 21st century. In contrast to the slow deployments of the 1990s, DPKO now has very limited timeframes in which to mount large, complex operations in unstable regions. UNMIL had to overcome a number of challenges, including a short lead time for planning and start-up, the relative newness of mechanisms such as SDS and RDT, serious shortfalls in civilian staff, and the need to deploy and re-hat thousands of troops. The recommendations contained in this report are aimed at improving DPKO's rapid deployment capacities and increasing the efficiency and operational

effectiveness of peacekeeping operations during the critical start-up phase. Finally, the issues identified for future review, including how the transition to a UN force can be made more effective and how to enhance DPKO's ability to meet the 90-day Brahimi report deadline for deployment of complex operations, go to the core of some of the more complex challenges that DPKO faced in UNMIL, and which are bound to arise again. As a number of new peacekeeping operations are expected to be deployed in 2004, it is particularly important that the Department draws on, applies and continues to review the lessons learned from the UNMIL experience.



ANNEX 1
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

Table 1: Required Actions and Decisions

ISSUE	ACTION OR DECISION REQUIRED	TIMEFRAME	ENTITY RESPONSIBLE	IN CONSULTATION WITH
Rapid Deployment Team	Revise the RDT mechanism.	Immediately	OMS	
Staffing	Revise staffing and recruitment policies and procedures.	Immediately	OMS	
PMCA	Organise a "lessons learned" briefing and discussion on PMCA.	Next six weeks	FMSS	OO, OMS, MD and CPD
	Issue guidelines on PMCA, incorporating the draft "Users' guidelines on how to obtain PMCA" and key issues from the lessons learned briefing on PMCA.	Next two months	FMSS	
SDS	Review SDS inventory, including key security, communications and public information requirements, and ensure that all stocks deployed have load lists.	Next four weeks	OMS	DPKO Security Focal Point, CITS and DPI
Security	Evaluate the response of Member States to the request to identify security officers for peacekeeping operations.	Immediately	OMS and Focal Points for Security	
	Send the "mission start-up kit" list to all missions operating in unstable security environments and instruct them to use the Immediate Operational Requirements (IOR) mechanism to procure any priority security equipment available through retail.	Immediately	DPKO Focal Point for Security	
	Arrange meeting with OCHA to look at issue of humanitarian access.	Next six weeks	USG	DPKO Focal Point for Security
Other	Review list of ongoing DPKO projects listed in Annex 2 and set appropriate timelines for completion of these projects.	Immediately	SMT	

Table 2: General Policies and Procedures for All Start-Up Missions

ISSUE	ACTION OR DECISION REQUIRED	ENTITY RESPONSIBLE	IN CONSULTATION WITH
Staffing	Encourage early appointment of senior leadership of new missions (SRSG, Deputies, Force Commander and Police Commissioner) and their inclusion in the planning process in New York.	USG	OO, Military Division and CPD
	Prioritise early recruitment of a strong political team with in-depth knowledge of the country and sub-region.	PMSS, OO and missions	
Planning	Hold detailed, daily coordination meetings to ensure synchronisation of logistics support with operational needs and, as required, front-load missions with enabling military units, adequate support staff and handling equipment (through RDT and re-deployments from other missions, if necessary).	OO, OMS and MD	
	Distribute guidelines on PMCA to all DPKO staff involved in planning.	FMSS	
	Coordinate with DPA regarding existing UN offices on the ground to ensure full and transparent communication and ensure that Headquarters keeps the Head of Office informed of the evolving situation.	OO	DPA
	Ensure that both Headquarters and the new mission make maximum use of existing UN staff, resources and expertise on the ground (such as political missions and liaison offices).	OO	OMS and DPA
	Ensure that a core public information capacity is included in SDS and PMCA and is on the ground prior to the first day of every complex mission, and that support arrangements are in place for logistical and technical aspects of deployment and set-up of public information equipment.	OO	DPI and OMS
Integration	Ensure that all components of missions are integrated at an early stage, including through early staffing of civilian posts in Joint Mission Analysis Cells, Joint Operations Centres, Joint Logistics Operations Centres and early integration of support services through the Integrated Support Service approach.	OO, [OMS] and MD	PMSS
Security	Ensure that all start-up missions immediately receive all items listed in the “mission start-up kit list”	DPKO Focal Point for Security	OMS



Assessment Missions	Identify a single site where the entire mission can be co-located, and include specialists to conduct detailed assessments of medical facilities, transit camp sites and other infrastructure on the ground.	OMS	
	Ensure that existing standard requirements for transit camps, medical facilities, waste disposal and medical evacuation have been met on the ground prior to deployment of the main body of troops.	OMS	
	Include the UNV Programme on all multidimensional assessment missions.	OO	PMSS, UNV
	Ensure that if the access of an assessment mission is limited by security conditions, DPKO seeks information from other available sources, such as UN agencies and NGOs already on the ground.	OO	OMS and MD
Pre-Deployment Briefings	Contact the UN Development Group (UNDG) regarding the institution of a detailed briefing programme for newly-appointed SRSGs, DSRSGs, Force Commanders, Police Commissioners and their respective deputies. This should cover UN reform, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the Country Team's work on the ground.	OO, MD and CPD	UNDG
	Amend the briefing packet for new SRSGs to reflect the requirement that SRSGs meet with UNCT regularly to brief on political developments and progress.	OO	
	Include written procedures regarding selection of personnel in briefing packet for new Heads of mission.	OO, OMS	
Other Start-Up Practices	To enhance communications between Headquarters and the field, ensure that all start-up missions are equipped, from the outset, with video teleconference facilities, and institute integrated VTCs as a standard feature of all start-up missions, to be used alongside code cables for dialogue on strategic and operational issues. VTCs should have an agenda and should be followed up by a cable containing a record of decisions and any follow-up action.	OO	CITS
	Ensure that new missions manage national expectations by proactively conveying (e.g. through a well-planned public information strategy) limitations on the UN's mandate and abilities, as well as the fact that change will take time and must be nationally driven.	OO and SRSGs	

	Send strong message that the revised rapid deployment team roster will be enforced and exceptions not allowed.	Senior leadership of DPKO	
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ANNEX 2
EFFORTS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN DPKO RELATED TO
MISSION START-UPS

This study has identified the following initiatives already underway in the Department, which should be supported and expedited to increase the effectiveness of the start-up phases of upcoming missions:

- I. Deployment of staff. PMSS is working on staff deployment “templates” for different models of peacekeeping operations, which will enable DPKO to deploy personnel to new missions in a phased manner, taking into account the presence of troops, support staff and logistics capacities.
- II. Budget. FMSS is working on guidelines for (i) financial implications; (ii) pre-mandate commitment authority; and (iii) commitment authority.
- III. MOUs with TCCs. FMSS, MD and LSD are working on a “lessons learned” report aimed at improving MOU negotiations with TCCs.
- IV. SDS.
 - (A) An OMS and Department of Management working group is reviewing possible measures to shorten the length of time between the approval of budgets for peacekeeping operations and the date on which the funds are actually made available in order to have more time available for replenishment of SDS.
 - (B) DPKO, the Controller and the Department of Management are discussing possible mechanisms for funding authority for the replenishment of SDS, and this has also been raised with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). One possibility might be to increase PMCA so that it can cover replenishment of SDS. Any such mechanism would require the approval of the General Assembly.
 - (C) OMS is working on a “lessons learned” study on SDS.

ANNEX 3

INTERVIEWS

(names are in alphabetical order within each subcategory)

I. INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN NEW YORK

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Office of the Under-Secretary-General

Jean-Marie Guéhenno (Under-Secretary-General)
William Phillips (Senior Programme Officer)

Office of Operations

Hedi Annabi (Assistant Secretary-General)
Peter Due (Political Affairs Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary-General)
Kathryn Jones (Political Affairs Officer, Office of Operations)
Dmitry Titov (Director, Africa Division)
Raisedon Zenenga (Political Affairs Officer, Africa Division)

Office of Mission Support

Jane Holl Lute (Assistant-Secretary General)

Finance Management and Support Service

Beatrice Kyei-Asare (Chief, Claims and Information Management Section)
Shari Klugman (Deputy Chief, Office of the Chief)
Hugh O'Donnell (Chief, Financial Support Section)
Lydia Tamale (Claims Finance Officer, Death and Disability and Other Claims Unit)

Personnel Management and Support Service

Maha Albaharawi (Team leader, Recruitment and Placement Section)
Michael Emery (Chief, Career Development Unit)
Abdullah Fadil (Chief, Human Resources Planning Unit)
Bettina Feichtinger (Recruitment Section)
Laura Londen (Officer-in-Charge, Human Resources Planning and Development Section)
Marie-Anne Martin (Chief, Human Resources Planning and Development Section)
Mark Pedersen (Political Affairs Officer, Civilian Training Section)
Tamara Roura (Human Resources Assistant, Human Resources Planning Unit)

Military Division

Patrick Cammaert (Military Adviser, Office of the Military Adviser)
Timothy Cornett (Planning Officer, Military Planning Service)
Brendan Farrelly (Military Mission Officer, Current Military Operations)



El Hadji Mouhamahdu Kandji	(Deputy Military Advisor, Office of the Military Adviser)
Damianus Pius Masinde	(Military Planning Officer, Military Personnel Team)
Fanwell Mwape	(Planning Officer, Military Planning Service)
Nicholas Seymour	(Chief, Military Planning Service)
Darryl Watters	(Planning Officer, Force Generation Team)
<i>Logistics Support Division</i>	
Clemens Adams	(Chief, Specialist Support Service)
Ellen Aamodt	(Chief, Services Unit, Supply Section)
Luiz Carlos Da Costa	(Director, Logistics Support Division)
Kenneth Cross	(Logistics Officer, Specialist Support Service)
Russ Doran	(Transport Officer, Air Transport Section)
Paul Johnson	(Chief, Logistics Operation Section)
Maxwell Kerley	(Deputy Director, Operational Support Service)
Thomas Gerard King	(Logistics Officer, Logistics Operations Section)
Jimmy Mabaso	(Officer-in-Charge, Medical Support Section)
Stephen W. Moore	(Logistics Officer, Surface Transport Section)
Ananthanarayan Rajan	(Surface Transport Officer, Surface Transport Section)
Juha Rauhalahhti	(Logistics Officer, Logistics Support Division)
Rudy Sanchez	(Chief, Communications and Information Technology Service)
Nicolas Von Ruben	(Chief, Engineering Section)
Serguei Toropov	(Officer-in-Charge, General Supply Unit, Supply Section)
Civilian Police Division	
Kiran Bedi	(Police Adviser, Officer of the Civilian Police Adviser)
Ajay Bhatnagar	(Civilian Police Officer, Policy and Planning Section)
Amod Gurung	(Civilian Police Officer, Policy and Planning Section)
Ata Yenigun	(Civilian Police Officer, Mission Management Section)
<u>Departments, Funds and Programmes</u>	
Pamela Delargy	(Chief, Humanitarian Response Unit, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA))
Priya Marwah	(HIV and Security Officer, UNFPA)
Ahunna Eziakonwa	(Acting Chief, African Section, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA))
Ikram Hussein	(Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA)
Tuliameni Kalomoh	(Assistant Secretary General, Department of Political Affairs)
Auke Lootsma	(Regional Bureau for Africa, United Nations Development Programme)
Diana Russler	(Deputy and Director, United Nations Security Coordinator)

Frederick Schottler	(Information Officer, Department of Public Information)
Francis Sikaonga	(Security Coordination Officer, United Nations Security Coordinator)

Troop Contributing Countries

Mian Mohammad Hilal Hussain	(Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations)
Brian O'Reilly	(Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations)
Saida Muna Tasneem	(Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations)

II. INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN LIBERIA

UNMIL

Division of Administration

Savitri Butchey	(Director of Administration)
Snorri Magnusson	(Chief Security Officer)
Joseph Njoroge	(Field Security Officer)

Integrated Support Services

Michael Brown	(Chief Communications and Integrated Technology Service)
Norris R. Jorsling	(Chief Transport Officer)
Peter Maphala	(Joint Logistics Operations)
Stephen Setian	(Chief Integrated Support Services)
Guimba Sisoko	(Joint Logistics Operations)

Office of the Deputy SRSG

Rule of Law

Martin Ejidike	(Head Human Rights)
Jerome Evrard	(Civil Affairs Officer)
Mafulu Mudingombi	(Civil Affairs Officer)
Souren Seraydarian	(DSRSG - Rule of Law)
Peter Tingwa	(Head Civil Affairs)

Humanitarian, Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery & Reconstruction

Abou Moussa	(DSRSG - Humanitarian Coordination, Recovery and Reconstruction)
Satya Tripathi	(Chief Programme and Planning Officer)

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Raul Carrera	(DDRR Officer)
Patrick Coker	(Public Information Officer)
Alfred Kofi Fofie	(Senior Legal Officer)
Robert Gravelle	(Senior Political Affairs Officer)
Jacques Paul Klein	(Special Representative of the Secretary General)
Margaret Novicki	(Senior Public Information Officer)

Military

Robert Hubbersbey	(Joint Mission Analysis Cell)
Terry Jones	(Joint Military Commission)
Fefestus Okechukwu Okonkwo	(Military Commander Sector I)
Daniel Opande	(Force Commander)
Joseph Owonibi	(Deputy Force Commander)

UN Departments, Funds and Programmes

Charles Achodo	(United Nations Development Programme, Programme Officer for DDDR)
Justin Bagirishya	(Representative, United Nations World Food Programme)
Martin Bucumi	(Head of Office, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
Norah Niland	(Representative, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
Deji Popoola	(Representative, United Nations Population Fund)
S. Thiru Gnana Sambanthar	(Country Representative, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization)
Jan Snoeks	(Coordinator, United Nations Volunteer Programme)
Steven A. Ursino	(Country Director, United Nations Development Programme Liberia)

Liberian Officials and Political Parties

Sekou Damante Conneh	(Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) Chairman)
George Dweh	(Speaker of National Assembly)
John Gray	(Ex-Government of Liberia)
Moses C. T. Jarbo	(Executive Director, National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation)
Samuel Wlue	(Minister of Commerce and Industry)
Joe Wylie	(Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) Deputy Minister of Defence)

Liberian NGOs

Sheikh Kafumba Konneh	(Chairman, Inter-Religious Council)
Saa Philip-Joe	(President, Civil Society Movement of Liberia (CSM-L) and Association of Liberian Professional Organizations (ALPO))
Dan T. Sargeo	(Director, Civil Society Organization)
Ellen Johnson Serleaf	(Chairperson, National Patriotic Party)
James S. B. Wallace	(Secretary, Civil Society Organization)

Diplomatic Community

Francis Blain	(ECOWAS Representative in Liberia)
John Blaney	(Ambassador of the United States of America to Liberia)

Philippe De Breconier
Eneji E. Onubu
Francis Wellens

(European Union Representative in Liberia)
(Ambassador of Nigeria to Liberia)
(European Union, Technical Assistance
Coordinator)

International NGOs

Liz Hughes

(Humanitarian Support Personnel Programme
Representative, OXFAM)

Bruce Parmelee

(Country Representative, Community Habitat
Finance)

Reto Stocker

(Head of Delegation, International Committee of
the Red Cross)

Raymond L. Studer

(Representative, Catholic Relief Services)

III. INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN COPENHAGEN

SHIRBRIG

Gregory B. Mitchell

(Brigadier-General/Commander)

Felix Blanco

(Chief of the Policy Branch)

Lars Schmidt

(Major)

Valentin Simion

(Lieutenant Colonel)

Georgio Stirpe

(Lieutenant Colonel)