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CAMPAIGN DESIGN FOR WINNING THE WAR...AND THE PEACE

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Abstract

The current Western interpretation of campaign design must reunite with its strategic roots of ends and means in its quest to seek ways of winning both the war and the peace in the post 9/11 era. To that end, a new model of campaign design must acknowledge the inherent incoherence of strategy and impose a focus on evolving strategic objectives, rather than maintaining the current obsession with the Centre of Gravity. This implies that routine re-evaluation of the ends must be incorporated into a Commander's daily activities. If necessary, that evaluation must also instigate a full review of the entire campaign design, from first principles. The author postulates that the ends of that campaign should be characterized by a set of *Campaign Termination Conditions*, coinciding with the end of the war and the beginning of the peace, and incorporating the full achievement of policy. To that effect, a series of military operations need to succeed each other. The conditions achieved at the end of one operation are a set of dynamic, forward looking *Sequel Conditions*, eliminating the concept of end-state and their associated criteria. Within each operation, *Enabling Effects* will continue that thread, eliminating the use of Decisive Points, and allowing the sequencing of desired effects, which could then be incorporated into *Effects Lines of Operation*. These would integrate all instruments of national or coalition power and be directed at military strategic objectives, rather than a Centre of Gravity or an enemy force. These *Effects Lines of Operation* may thus cross *Sequel Conditions*, allowing continuity of effort between an operation and its sequel. In turn, they may be translated into *Component Task Lines of Operation* relevant to the force's subordinate components.

Introduction

It had all started so well. The most battle-worthy, best-trained, equipped and led army in the world had made a stunning advance in enemy country. It had defeated the enemy army and captured its national capital. By all rules of classical warfare, this should have been the end of it. But the enemy continued to resist. Soon, scattered elements were hitting back hard and the long lines of communication were threatened. Hostile neighbouring countries began to see the opportunities...

Hopefully, the parallels between Napoléon's campaign of 1812 in Russia and the US-led campaign in Iraq end here. Yet, the issues raised by this historical vignette remain at the core of our understanding of war, and the relationship between policy, strategy and operational art.¹ Statesmen and generals have sought to explain this relationship ever since Socrates urged one of his students to go learn the art of war from a famous visiting general, only to hear him report, upon his return, that he had learned "tactics and nothing else."² Succeeding generations of practitioners and theorists deduced or postulated a number of elements, concepts and theories about warfare that form the basis of current Western doctrine. In the words of Aron:

Le stratège utilise les combats et les victoires en vue d'une fin que le chef d'État détermine et qui ne se confond pas avec la victoire militaire et n'exige pas toujours la destruction des forces armées de l'ennemi.³

¹ There are many synonymous terms for the various levels of war. For simplicity, this paper uses: policy to convey much of what is implied in other terms such as geostrategy, grand strategy, war aims etc; strategy when referring to determination of military ends and means; and operational art when discussing the employment of military forces to achieve strategic objectives.

² Xenophon, *The Memorabilia*, Book III-1, translated by H.G. Dakyns; available from <http://www.textkit.com/files/memorabilia.pdf>; Internet, accessed 24 September 2004, 83.

³ "The strategist uses battles and victories towards an end that is determined by the head of state. That end does not equate to military victory and it does not always demand the destruction of the enemy's

Recent history has merely reminded us of the paradox of the campaign of 1812 in Russia. Indeed, the numerous critiques, opinions and analysis of the recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq center around one critical question, best posed by Kagan: “Why has the United States been so successful in recent wars and encountered so much difficulty in securing its political aims after the shooting stopped?”⁴ The answer, for some, is political.⁵ Kagan offers a more subtle view that the problem lies not only in politics but also with the US “method of warfare.” He singles out concepts such as “shock and awe” and “network centric warfare” as guilty of fostering an ability to produce “stunning military victories but ...

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repeatedly in US doctrine and echoed in NATO joint doctrine.¹⁰ If doctrine is sound at this level, the problem, if any, then surely lays elsewhere and suspicion must fall on the ways in which strategy is met. That, of course, is the province of operational art and campaign design, a field whose construct is considered by Greer to be “incapable of providing planners and commanders the means of designing campaigns and major operations [today’s] full spectrum operations require.”¹¹ To solve this problem, Greer offers five alternative approaches but their linkages to the higher purpose of war are not apparent. Yet any solution must begin by an examination of the artificial separation between operational art and its parent field of strategy.¹² From there, one comes to the conclusion that the current Western mode of resolving armed conflict lacks the integrity and the comprehensive approach required between strategy and operational art, as well as between military and civil means. The current Western interpretation of campaign design must therefore reunite with its strategic roots of ends and means in its quest to seek ways of winning both the war and the peace in the post 9/11 era.

In support of this thesis, an analysis of the key elements of campaign design will conclude that flawed concepts, artificial blinkers and unbalanced focus on certain elements can lead to a compartmentalized and invalid approach. A review of the nature and compelling characteristics of strategic ends and means will then set the scene for a

¹⁰ See for example *Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Department of Defence: 14 November 2000) II-5; and *Allied Joint Publication 3, Allied Joint Operations*, (NATO: September 2002), 6-1.

¹¹ James K. Greer, “Operational Art for the Objective Force”, *Military Review* Vol 82 Issue 5, (Sep/Oct 2002), 23.

¹² For a thorough discussion of this particular topic, see Allan English, *The Operational Art: Theory, Practice and Implications for the Future* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 15 March 2003).

discussion of an improved manner of campaign design, one conducive to better ways of realizing strategy in the 21st Century.

The Current Interpretation of Campaign Design

A campaign may be defined as “a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographic area...”¹³ - a view that espouses the Clausewitzian concept that war serves policy, and that military campaigns are conducted in concert with “other instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic, and informational – to achieve strategic objectives.”¹⁴ The genesis and object of campaign design are therefore intrinsically strategic. Campaign design seeks to devise ways in which strategic ends are met through the employment of strategically generated means. It entails the formulation of a commander’s vision and the application of the operational art in the conduct of the campaign.¹⁵ To assist in what is essentially a creative process aimed at solving complex military problems, commanders and campaign planners use a number of “elements”¹⁶ such as Centre of Gravity, Decisive Points, Lines of Operation, etc. Although an argument can be made that, depending on nationality, these elements are applied differently through distinct methods of integration in wider planning processes and separate approaches to decision making,¹⁷ their

¹³ AJP 3-0, G-3.

¹⁴ Department of Defence, *Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, 25 January 2002, vii.

¹⁵ Department of National Defence, *B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: Department of national Defence, 2000-12-18), 3-1; and *JP 3.0*, I-1.

¹⁶ US Joint doctrine terms some of these “Facets of Operational Art” (*JP 3-0*), whilst US Army doctrine calls them “Elements of Operational Design” (*FM-3, Operations*, June 2001). Canadian Forces doctrine uses the term “Operational concepts in campaign design” (*B-GJ-005-500/FP-00, CF Operational Planning Process*, 6 November 2002). Meanwhile, NATO doctrine uses “Planning tools/Key operational concepts” (*AJP-3*). Finally, UK doctrine calls them Campaign Planning Concepts (*JDP 01 (Study Draft)* 25 October 2003). For simplicity, this paper will use the term “elements of campaign design”.

¹⁷ See for example Howard.G Coombs, *Perspectives on Operational Thought* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 4 June 2004), 8.

definitions, logic and structural interrelationship display a surprising commonality across the major NATO nations. Unfortunately, as alluded to earlier, these elements “...hamstring planner’s and commander’s abilities to design and construct effective, coherent campaigns for operations across the spectrum of conflict in today’s security environment.”¹⁸

The first weakness of these elements is that they create a pervasive dichotomy between ends and ways. Indeed, whilst “Campaign planners should never lose sight of the fact that strategic objectives must dominate the campaign planning process at every juncture,”¹⁹ they are admonished, two paragraphs later, that “Above all, the [operational] concept must make it explicitly clear that the focus is on the destruction or neutralization of the adversary’s COGs.”²⁰ Since the Centre of Gravity is more often than not defined, at the operational level, as the enemy armed forces (or a key element thereof),²¹ the result is an undue focus on seeking battle rather than the attainment of policy itself. Such a focus stems from a predisposition to concentrate on the destruction of the enemy armed forces. An understanding of this predisposition and its rival approach, true operational art, is essential before any further discussion of the interpretation of campaign design.

The yearning of military forces to fight the enemy is natural and, indeed, desirable to a degree, so one might well ask why this inclination is so dangerous. The difficulty

¹⁸ James K. Greer, “Operational Art...”, 22-23.

¹⁹ *JP 5-00.1*, II-11.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II-12.

²¹ For example, during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, General Schwarzkopf designated the Iraqi Republican Guards as the operational level centre of gravity. See also more theoretical works such as Joe Strange, “Centres of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian foundation so that we can all speak the same language”, in *Perspectives on Warfighting, No 4, 2nd Edition*, (Quantico: Marine Corps University, 1996).

occurs when the method, fighting, takes on some of the attributes of an end *per se*. As Leonhard observes: "...because the battle is the focus, it also becomes an imperative that sooner or later (and the sooner the better) the opposing armies must clash – strength on strength."²² The roots of this quest for battle are deep. In Western civilization, it is ingrained in cultural tradition, values and even religious scripture. When Goliath cries "I defy the ranks of Israel this day: give me a man, that we may fight together,"²³ David answers the call by attacking the enemy strength.²⁴ When Hector accepts battle with Achilles, he does so out of honour and his attack of enemy strength, related in Homer's Iliad, becomes the very model of heroic behaviour. According to Dixon, military codes of honour "...are designed to ensure that threatening situations are met by fight rather than flight."²⁵ A quick look at four thousand years of history reveals that we can extrapolate this individual behaviour at a collective level, since the desire to settle conflict through battle is the norm. It was codified in the writings of Clausewitz, who declared that:

...the very concept of war will permit us to make the following unequivocal statements: 1. Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war, and, so far as positive action is concerned, the principal way to achieve our object. 2. Such destruction of forces can *usually* be accomplished only by fighting.²⁶

Despite the timid qualifier in the second proposition, such a view gave rise to the concept of the Battle of Annihilation (*Vernichtungsschlacht*), according to which, "in order to defeat the opponent's massive army, the entire volume of military activity must be

²² Robert Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver, Maneuver-warfare theory and AirLand Battle*, (Novato: Presidio, 1991), 14.

²³ *The Bible, 1 Samuel: 16*, (London: Collins) 254.

²⁴ Interestingly, by using what could be termed an asymmetrical tactic.

²⁵ Norman Dixon, *On the psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Pimlico, 1994), 197.

²⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press: 1984), 258, italics in the original.

initially integrated into a single, linear battle in which it would be destroyed.”²⁷ Here was an ideology, according to Naveh, that had an “overpowering vitality”, a “magnetic attraction” and an “addictive impact” on succeeding generations of military theorists and practitioners who, unfortunately, lacked the cognitive tools to assess the validity of Clausewitz’s work.²⁸ In Echevarria’s analysis, the corollary is the subsumption of a way of war into a way of battle, a practice shared by the United States and its major allies.²⁹ Despite major changes in the means of waging such a battle since Clausewitz’s time and the introduction of operational art in some US doctrine beginning in 1986, as late as 1993, *FM 100-5*, the US Army doctrine for operations, stated “The objectives of military forces in war is victory over the opposing military forces...” albeit one that “seeks to end conflict on terms favorable to US interests.”³⁰ One had to wait for the publication of *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, in 2001, for a more subtle view that “The fundamental principle for employment of US joint forces is to commit decisive force to ensure achievement of the objectives established by the National Command Authorities.”³¹ Nevertheless, lingering elements of *Vernichtungsschlacht* remain in doctrine as alluded to earlier and as will be demonstrated below.

In contrast to this quest for battle, stands a competing viewpoint, one in which the achievement of policy predominates over battle. That view finds expression in Sun Tzu’s dictum that “...attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle

²⁷ Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence, The Evolution of Operational Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 16.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 71.

²⁹ Echevarria, *Toward...*, 1-7.

³⁰ *FM 100-5, Operations* (United States: Department of the Army, June 1993), 1-4.

³¹ *JP 3-0*, ix.

of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence."³² The will to eschew battle, when possible, in favour of more shrewd operations still capable of achieving policy is another, albeit less frequent thread that runs through history. It is exemplified by several campaigns such as those of Belisarius, du Guesclin, Wallenstein, Napoléon at Ulm etc. It reappears under Liddell-Hart's pen as a pronouncement that "...battle is but one of the means to the end of strategy."³³ Underpinning this idea is the notion of originality, creativity, art, even, in "the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives"³⁴ or, put another way, "when, where, and under what conditions the combatant commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required."³⁵ In other words, operational art.

These two competing views are related to the debate about manoeuvrist and attritionist theories of operations. The difference is that whilst the latter debate is generally situated at the tactical and operational levels of war, the former sits squarely at the strategic-operational interface. Its most pernicious effect is that it can generate cognitive dissonance in the design of a strategy or campaign. In early 1942, for example, British and American strategists argued over whether it was best to commence immediately a build up for a direct attack of German forces over the English Channel, or else undertake a more indirect approach aimed at collapsing the Wehrmacht by strategic encirclement, from Norway through to the Mediterranean, capitalizing on the expected uprising of conquered nations, and with a cross-channel assault figuring only as a

³² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Ralph Sawyer and Mei-chun Lee Sawyer (New-York: Barnes and Noble, 1994), 177.

³³ Basil Liddell-Hart, *The Strategy of Indirect Approach* (London: Faber and Faber, 1941), 192.

³⁴ *JP 5-00.1*, I-1.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, II-11 & 12.

relatively minor “coup de grâce.”³⁶ More recently, as we have seen, the military defeats of Taliban and Iraqi forces also highlight the risk of a gulf between military victory and the achievement of policy. In all these cases, we find a dichotomy of thought, born of a conflicting predisposition to *Vernichtungsschlacht* or a more artful way of achieving policy. This dichotomy is present in the elements of campaign design, which we can now examine. For that, we shall focus on those elements that apply most in the planning stage of a campaign: Centre of Gravity, Decisive Points, Lines of Operation³⁷ and Arrangement of Operations.

The Centre of Gravity was first postulated by Clausewitz and was introduced in current Western doctrine by the authors of the 1986 edition of the US Army’s *FM 100-5, Operations* manual. It is now interpreted using many variations of the joint US definition: “Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”³⁸ Western doctrine is fixated on Centre of Gravity formulation and it is no exaggeration to say that this concept has spawned a cult-like following, as evidenced by the massive literature devoted to it, some of it reading more like the exegesis of holy Clausewitzian scripture.³⁹ The volume of discussion generated by this concept attests, in fact, to its somewhat nebulous nature. Yet it remains, no doubt, a useful way of analyzing the strengths and, by extension, weaknesses of the enemy as well as of our own forces. The danger is that when its

³⁶ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (United States: The War Department, 1959), 10-11.

³⁷ Whilst US Doctrine places Lines of Operation as a subset of the facet of “Operational Reach and Approach”, (partly as a result of the more geographic connotation of its US definition) NATO doctrine considers it a “key operational concept.”

³⁸ *JP 5.00-1*, GL-3.

³⁹ See for example, Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing our Warfighting Doctrine-Again!* (Carlisle: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002).

importance is elevated above that of our own strategic objectives it acts as a pole of attraction, as we shall see later, for many other elements of campaign design. Indeed, faulty reasoning, based on vague doctrinal definitions, can lead to the successful attack and destruction of an enemy capability, thought to be a Centre of Gravity, and still remain far from achieving the political aim. If, for example, “Baghdad” was the enemy Centre of Gravity of the US-led campaign in Iraq, then we may wish to consider, as Kagan points out, that “The true center of gravity in a war of regime change lies not in the destruction of the old system, but in the creation of the new one.”⁴⁰ Or, at the very least, we should consider whether the first Centre of Gravity changes to the second in coincidence with the transition from decisive to post-conflict operations.

We must also question the validity of a concept whose premise is that “...sufficient connectivity exists among the various parts of the enemy to form an overarching system (or structure) that acts with a certain unity...”⁴¹ Indeed, the contemporary operating environment has seen the rise of trans-national terrorism, the resurgence of certain other types of irregular war and the loose alignment of autonomous threat organizations, all of which call for a much more subtle and refined appreciation of that concept.

Finally, excessive focus on the enemy Centre of Gravity, during both planning and conduct of operations, tends to make one lose sight of the *enemy* aim and objectives. An appreciation of these aim and objectives is essential for campaign planners to gain insights about the effects required to protect our own Centre of Gravity, to negate an

⁴⁰ Kagan, “War and ...”.

⁴¹ Echeverria, *Clausewitz’s Centre of ...*, 16.

enemy objective, etc. But the importance of the Centre of Gravity as currently understood is especially dangerous because many other elements of campaign design are conceived only in terms of it.

Decisive Points are one such element, first postulated by Jomini, who envisioned them as points “capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise.”⁴² The term was also resurrected from obscurity by the authors of the US Army’s *FM 100-5, Operations* manual in 1986. Its new definitions offer campaign planners ample room to characterize it, ranging from a geographic location, an event, a system, a function or a condition. The only thing we can be sure of is that a Decisive Point implies an intermediate step on the way to victory. US doctrine emphasizes the advantage it confers over the enemy generally,⁴³ instead of accomplishing effects useful to the attainment of strategic objectives. Such a separation from strategy is even more pronounced in NATO and Canadian doctrine, both of which specifically define it as a point from which a Centre of Gravity can be threatened.⁴⁴ Another potential weakness is that it may foster an incremental approach that could jeopardize key operational art concepts such as simultaneity and depth, which are essential in creating “operational shock” in the enemy system. Finally, the very term makes *Decisive* Points ideal candidates for confusion with *Decision* Points, a very different concept.⁴⁵ Yet wisely chosen Decisive Points are useful elements of campaign

⁴² Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Wesport, Greenwood Press), 78.

⁴³ *JP 5-00.1*, GL-5

⁴⁴ *AJP-3*, 3-7.

⁴⁵ “The point in space and time where the commander or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a specific friendly course of action.” DOD Dictionary, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/d/01517.html>; Internet, accessed on 18 October 2004.

design, because there will always be certain imperatives for accomplishing a set of effects before others can be attempted or achieved. We will return to this idea later.

The real danger comes when the concept of Lines of Operation is introduced. Again, this is a Jominian term, which comes to us courtesy of the same 1986 edition of FM 100-5. Its original meaning only intended the *roads* that "... the army would follow to reach one of these decisive points."⁴⁶ US doctrine today defines them as lines "which connect a series of decisive points",⁴⁷ retaining a geographic slant ("directional lines linking geographic decisive points"⁴⁸), not found in NATO doctrine, which is more conceptual. Interestingly, NATO doctrine envisions them as a form of "critical path"⁴⁹. In both doctrines, however, Lines of Operation lead to the Centre of Gravity or "the defeat of an adversary force,"⁵⁰ rather than the achievement of strategic objectives.

The notion that campaign events can be neatly laid out on linear, sequential lines using Cartesian logic ignores the chaotic, random nature of war and the complexity of enemy systems.⁵¹ Whilst there is merit to Critical Path Analysis, we must remember that it was developed as a business solution to the management of large defence projects in the 1950s. For example, the fact that the keel of a ship must be laid before the installation of bulkheads is a fine critical path in the relatively closed, predictable field of shipbuilding. But does, say, the establishment of air superiority, a typical Decisive Point

⁴⁶ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 91.

⁴⁷ *JP 5-00.1*, B-1; and *AJP-3*, 3-8

⁴⁸ *JP 5-00.1*, B-1

⁴⁹ *AJP-3*, 3-8.

⁵⁰ *JP 3*, 3-8; and *JP 5-00.1*, B-1.

⁵¹ For a discussion of systems theory and its application in operational art, see Naveh, *In Pursuit of...*, Chapter 1.

in campaign design, really need to take place before other effects, such as securing a border or many types of information operations?

Although there is great value, as we shall see later, in wisely used Lines of Operation, the resulting typical construct of a campaign design looks like the box in Figure 1:




Figure 1. Link between Decisive Points, Lines of Operation, Center of Gravity and End State
 Extracted and simplified from AJP-3, *Allied Joint Operations*, (September 2002), 3B-1.

As is plain from this diagram, current elements of campaign design do not seem related to our own Centre of Gravity. Lines of Operation focus on the achievement of one effect: destruction or neutralization of the enemy Centre of Gravity. What then? Is the end state automatically attained as suggested by this drawing? The facile retort that an unattained end state meant that a wrong Centre of Gravity had been chosen reinforces the danger inherent in that concept. A more subtle view could reside in the nature of the Centre of Gravity itself. Indeed, doctrine provides some clues, but they are buried in the

details. For instance, one finds allusions to the transitory nature of Centre of Gravity.⁵² Presumably, then, once a Centre of Gravity is attained, it morphs into a different one, or a new one is determined. The difficulty is that the entire campaign plan is based on the old Centre of Gravity. Are campaign plans therefore “transitory in nature” so that they can match the transitory Centre of Gravity to which they are anchored? Another explanation, that beyond the Centre of Gravity we would enter a sequel operation, is unconvincing. Indeed, the whole point of campaign design is to imagine a solution aiming at the achievement of a strategic objective. If that objective is not achieved post-Centre of Gravity neutralization, then that campaign plan has, by definition, not yet concluded. Rather, it may be that military objectives are incremental and not necessarily coincident with the achievement of policy, a point we will return to later.

Finally, the arrangement of operations, called in NATO doctrine “sequencing and phasing,” is the “arrangement of activities within an operation in terms of time and space, and resources.”⁵³ This framework, which may involve phases, is superimposed on the construct at Figure 1. Inherent in this definition is the assumption that sufficient resources are available, ultimately, to achieve the aim. This may not always be the case, as we shall also see later.

The current interpretation of campaign design is, therefore, based on a juxtaposition of land-centric Clausewitzian and Jominian principles. Centres of Gravity, Decisive Points and Lines of Operation, while useful individually, have inherent conceptual and interpretative weaknesses that can be compounded when employed in

⁵² *JP 5-00.1*, 11-7; and *JP 3-0*, III-22.

⁵³ *AJP-3*, 3-8.

concert. Essentially, their main flaw is that beyond the enemy Centre of Gravity, one is left in a void, hoping that things will turn out all right or, in the rather more elegant words of AJP-3, that “the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from resuming hostilities.”⁵⁴ A better way must be found but, for that, we must first consider the strategic ends.

The Ends

Strategy, declared Liddell-Hart, consists of “the art of distributing military *means* to fulfill the *ends* of policy”.⁵⁵ Since campaign design frames the *ways* of using means to achieve ends, a thorough understanding of these ends is therefore key to the present argument. The nature of these ends form the basis of entire fields of study such as security studies and international studies: therefore we can only summarize here some of their key characteristics, as they relate to the direction of military operations. Let us start at the very top.

The highest policy goal of any nation is security. In World War II, for example, “The ultimate purpose of the (Western Allies) was to remove a potential menace to themselves, and thus ensure their own security.”⁵⁶ But what is security? At its core, according to Buzan *et al*, “security is about survival,”⁵⁷ giving the term “vital interest” its literal sense. The conditions for survival usually revolve around the absence of threat, the sustainment of life, etc. Security is often accompanied by policy goals based on national

⁵⁴ *AJ- 3*, 6-1.

⁵⁵ Basil Liddell-Hart, *The strategy of Indirect Approach*, 187. Italics added.

⁵⁶ Basil Liddell-Hart, *History of the Second World War* (London: Pan, 1973), 1.

⁵⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security, A New Framework Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 21.

interests such as the increase of influence, wealth and power. Altruism, the promotion of certain values, even proselytism, are other goals that may influence a state's policy. Of all these broad goals, however, and notwithstanding differing interpretations of the aims of non-state actors⁵⁸, only narrowly defined national security can justify the expense of a nation's "blood and treasure". Indeed, in the words of Field-Marshal Haig, who was not shy about accepting casualties, "Few of us believe that the democratization of Germany is worth the loss of a single Englishman."⁵⁹ From a procedural point of view, the US National Security Act of 1947 "ensures that there is a methodical linking of security objectives to national policy" whilst in other countries the process is more of an ad hoc nature and, in NATO, is the purview of the Military Sub-Committee of the North Atlantic Council.⁶⁰

The end result should satisfy the notion that "the object in war is to attain a better peace."⁶¹ As obvious as such a statement may be, it is of no help in charting a course of action in a situation of conflict. More precise policy goals are required. For example, in the context of Iraq in 2003, the United Kingdom's wider policy goals included:

- a) Efforts to resolve other causes of regional instability, including the Middle East Peace Process;
- b) Wider political engagement with Arab countries and the Islamic world;
- c) Efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD; and
- d) The elimination of terrorism as a force in international affairs.⁶²

⁵⁸ See, for example, Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 196-205.

⁵⁹ Quoted in John Gooch, "Soldiers, Strategy and War Aims in Britain 1914-1918" in Barry Hunt and Adrian Preston, *War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War 1914-1918* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977), 30.

⁶⁰ Coombs, *Perspectives on...*, 10-12.

⁶¹ Basil Liddell-Hart, *The Strategy of ...*, 202.

⁶² Hansard, *Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw)* (London: United Kingdom Parliament, 7 January 2003); available from

These goals fall within the category of the “broad generalities of peace, prosperity, cooperation and good will – unimpeachable as ideals but of little use in determining the specific objectives we are likely to pursue.”⁶³ Much policy, then, will tend to be broad and perhaps vague. But it is also dynamic in nature. For instance, Liddell-Hart distinguished between “permanent policy,” which provides the national policy goal and “policy in execution”⁶⁴ which we would now call national or coalition strategy.⁶⁵ To pursue the above example, the United Kingdom’s policy pertaining to Iraq was formulated as follows:

Our prime objective is to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated programmes and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles (BM), as set out in [United Nations Security Council Resolutions]. This would reduce Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbours and the region, and prevent Iraq using WMD against its own people. UNSCRs also require Iraq to renounce terrorism, and return captured Kuwaitis and property taken from Kuwait.⁶⁶

The end result, which could be interpreted as a political end-state, was envisioned like this:

We would like Iraq to become a stable, united and law abiding state, within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective and representative government for its own people.⁶⁷

In this example, we have a policy objective and end-state that is perhaps unprecedented in its clarity. Yet, for a military planner, it is still too broad and diffuse. Indeed, Flavin

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030107/wmstext/30107m01.htm#30107m01.html_spm3; Internet; accessed 28 Sept 2004.

⁶³ General Maxwell Taylor, *Precarious Security* (New York:W.W. Norton and Co, 1976), 17-18.

⁶⁴ Liddell-Hart, *The Strategy of ...* 187.

⁶⁵ Defined as “The art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.” *JP 3-0*, GL-8.

⁶⁶ Hansard, *Statement by...*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

contends, "...military forces will rarely receive political objectives that contain the clarity they desire".⁶⁸

As a result, we must now enter the province of military strategy, and the formulation of military strategic objectives and end-states. Objectives may be defined as "The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operation should be directed."⁶⁹ At the strategic level, US doctrine distinguishes between, on one hand, "supporting military objectives"⁷⁰ to political objectives, or "military objectives" or, still, "military strategic objectives"⁷¹ and, on the other hand, "objectives applicable to the combatant command or theater," also known as "Theater Strategic Objectives."⁷² Sometimes, certain national or policy objectives will be of a clear military nature, without being labeled as such. For instance, Canada's "National Objectives" in support of the US-led campaign in Afghanistan in November 2001 did not discern between political and military objectives.⁷³ There may be wisdom in this, since it affords both flexibility and unity of purpose. The broader question is which strategic objective does a campaign seek to achieve? Is there only one or are there many? Are some military ones attained before others? These are valid questions, which we shall answer later.

⁶⁸ William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters* (Carlisle: US Army War College, Autumn 2003), 97.

⁶⁹ US DOD Dictionary, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/o/03768.html>; Internet; accessed on 12 Decemeber 2004.

⁷⁰ *JP 1*, II-5, II-6.

⁷¹ *JP 5-00.1*, II-2, GL-8.

⁷² *JP 3-0*, III-3, III-9.

⁷³ Objective Number 2, for example, "Take the appropriate military action to compel the Taliban to cease harbouring, and co-operating with Al-Qaeda" was clearly military whilst Objective Number 3 "Isolate the Taliban regime from all international support" was more diplomatic in nature. Department of National Defence, *Operation Apollo – Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive* (Ottawa: DND, April 2003), B-2/41.

To return to the formulation of military objectives, even if they are clearly identified as such, they will likely be further translated into tasks to the operational level commander, or, still, as mission elements. This, presumably, provides direction of a sufficiently precise nature to allow commencement of campaign design. To continue the above example, “tasks to the coalition” were to:

- a. overcome the resistance of Iraqi security forces;
- b. deny the Iraqi regime the use of weapons of mass destruction now and in the future;
- c. remove the Iraqi regime...⁷⁴

But the quest for clarity does not end here. Starting in the late 1980s, and in the wake of the 1984 “Powell-Weinberger Doctrine” which called for “clearly defined political and military objectives,”⁷⁵ the end-state emerged as a new concept for helping envision the aim. Defined as “The set of required *conditions* that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives,”⁷⁶ the end-state can therefore be interpreted either in the classical sense of the word condition, meaning a prerequisite to something else (now sometimes known as a “pre-condition”) or as a mode of being, that is, the state in which something, or a system of things is set.

Even this was not enough for military staffs, though, and “End State Criteria,” “Criteria for Success” or “Termination Criteria” were devised to measure success in

⁷⁴ United Kingdom, *Operations in Iraq, First Reflections* (London: Director general Corporate Communications, July 2003), 39. Another example, in a defensive context, is the direction given to MacArthur on 30 March 1942: “...hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for future operations against Japan, and in order to check the Japanese conquest of South West Pacific Area [...] Check the enemy advance towards Australia and its lines of communication.” Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-42* (Washington: The War Department, 1953), 171-172.

⁷⁵ Weinberger Doctrine, available from http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/mil/html/mh_057800_weinbergerdo.htm; Internet; accessed on 28 September 2004.

⁷⁶ *JP 5-00.1*, GL-5

attaining the end-state. A criterion is defined as a “test ... or standard by which anything is judged or estimated.”⁷⁷ Doctrinal definitions highlight the measurement of success, and the need to make more specific “end-states [which] are broad in nature.”⁷⁸ For example, the military end-state for a peace support operation in Guatemala was defined as:

Force reductions in accordance with the Guatemalan Peace Accord, including the re-insertion of demobilized URNG combatants in a legal manner into civil, political, socio-economic and institutional life of Guatemala.⁷⁹

The “Criteria for Military Success” supporting this end-state were:

- a. Early start to disarmament and re-integration process, and constant progress throughout.
- b. Impartiality during the disarmament and re-integration process.
- c. Synchronization with efforts of Canadian civil agencies....⁸⁰

Since the need for such criteria is negated if end-state conditions are clear and specific, it follows that this unnecessary category of elements can be eliminated here and focus be placed on *conditions* as the basis of transitions between major operations.

In some cases, even more precision and definition are applied. In the US context, a Regional Combatant Commander may define operational, or campaign, objectives and end-states.⁸¹ Some have even added “campaign imperatives” to assist in orienting their campaign. Even NATO doctrine, which generally retains only strategic objectives as the basis of campaign planning, mentions operational objectives in its glossary of terms,⁸²

⁷⁷ Oxford English Dictionary; available from <http://dictionary.oed.com/>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2004.

⁷⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process, B-GJ-005-500/FP-00* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 6 November 2002), 4-5.

⁷⁹ Department of National Defence, *Strategic Planning Guidance – Guatemala* (Ottawa: DND Canada, Dec 1996), 1.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *JP 5-00.1*, C-5; and *JP 3*, I-9.

⁸² *AJP 3*, G-10.

although practice often considers them to be the same as strategic objectives. All of the above objectives, of course, come with associated end-states. Such a proliferation of objectives, end-states and criteria for success exist to satisfy the military quest for clarity. However, whilst that clarity might be achievable in conventional, decisive combat operations, it often remains elusive or ambiguous in peace support or counter-insurgency operations. But there are other difficulties. The very terms can also be dangerous. The traditional understanding of objectives as a geographic or physical element, for instance, tends to skew their significance. As well, an “End-state” automatically conveys a sense that the job is finished when it is reached. In fact, the set of conditions achieved may well require long-term military commitments or operations to sustain it, or else simply act as the start-state for follow-on operations. More importantly, this pseudo clarity means that operational commanders may be lulled into a false sense of certainty and a belief that strategic ends are set in stone upon receipt of the strategic initiating direction. The dynamic nature of strategy may soon invalidate all this clarity.

Strategy is always alive, and nowhere more so than within that tenuous, consistently high-strung link between policy and military strategy. The immense difficulty of translating policy into strategy should not be underestimated. It is arduous and takes time. In World War II after Pearl Harbour, for example, the US had already deployed some 132,000 troops to the Pacific Theatre before some semblance of a coherent coalition strategy could be formulated during the “Arcadia” conference of 22 December 1941- 14 January 1942. In addition to the meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt, this conference alone required some 12 meetings at the Chief of Staff level and ten more at the lead planner level. Even then, the priority of theatres was a decision

that had to be deferred to later.⁸³ Strategy formulation is also intellectually perplexing. In World War I, for example:

...the political version of Britain's most ambitious and fervidly proclaimed aim – the destruction of Prussian militarism -...dictated victories over Germany of such magnitude as to permit changing the social fabric and the political structure of Germany.⁸⁴

In contrast, the military view was that “the fundamental strategic objective was to inflict a military defeat upon Germany of sufficient magnitude as to cure her of her relish for a role as a world power.”⁸⁵ Not surprisingly, debate of British war aims was never allowed in cabinet and long blocked from parliament,⁸⁶ for fear of exposing rifts in national policy. In World War II, Eisenhower expressed this same difficulty when he confided “The struggle to secure the adoption by all concerned of a common concept of strategical objectives is wearing me down.”⁸⁷

Personality will also make the formulation of policy difficult. In World War II, for example, an exasperated British Chief of the Imperial General Staff confided that:

Politicians still suffer from that little knowledge of military matters which gives them unwarranted confidence that they are born strategists ! As a result they confuse issues, affect decisions, and convert simple problems and plans into confused tangles and hopeless muddles...It is all desperately depressing.⁸⁸

At the same time, the US Chiefs of Staff found in Roosevelt a wartime president who overruled them on only two occasions. One of these, the landing in North Africa in 1942,

⁸³ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (United States: The War Department, 1953), 97-98, 119.

⁸⁴ John Gooch, “Soldiers...”, 24.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁸⁷ Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, 156.

⁸⁸ Alan Brooke, *Diary*, quoted in David Rigby, *The Combined Chiefs of Staff and Anglo-American Strategic Coordination in World War II* (PhD Thesis, Brandeis University, 1996), 119.

illustrates how purely political reasons can drive strategy itself, as opposed to merely stipulating the ends. Although US strategic planners were opposed to such an operation, Roosevelt “considered it very important to morale, to give this country a feeling that they are at war, to give the Germans the reverse effect, to have American troops somewhere in active fighting across the Atlantic.”⁸⁹ Military officers are apt to see such political reasons as something sinister, when, in fact, they merely reflect the nature of politics, which is “the shaping of human behaviour for the purpose of governing large groups of people.”⁹⁰ Roosevelt was simply the best judge of how to maintain the public support necessary to the prosecution of a cataclysmic war like World War II.⁹¹ In this case, it meant possibly forsaking sounder shorter-term strategy for longer-term prospects of victory.

Another aspect of the dynamic nature of the strategic environment is that military strategy itself changes over time. Evolving policy might be one reason.⁹² But steadiness of policy is no guarantee of a correspondingly steady military strategy. For example, in the 1999 Kosovo campaign, despite five clear and enduring policy goals,⁹³ strategy changed at least three times.⁹⁴ Such fluctuations are by no means confined to modern warfare. In World War II, for example, according to Greenfield, Allied military strategy

⁸⁹ George C. Marshal, *Notes on Meeting at White House*, 23 Dec 1941, quoted in Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, ...*, 105.

⁹⁰ Barry Buzan *et al*, *Security, A New Framework ...*, 142.

⁹¹ Incidentally, Roosevelt was also very detailed in the way he later implemented this decision, outlining, for example, how many divisions were to go where, how fast, the rerouting of airplanes etc. Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, ...* 273.

⁹² *JP 1*, II-6.

⁹³ These goals were formulated by the US and communicated to NATO Ambassadors on 22 March 1999. Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), 10.

⁹⁴ William M. Arkin, “Operation Allied Force: The Most precise Application of Air Power in History,” in Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, *War over Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University press, 2001), 4, 10, 12 & 16.

experienced no less than eight major decisions involving significant change between 1942 and 1945, or about once every five months.⁹⁵ Each of these decisions had far ranging repercussions for theatre or operational level commanders. Thus, military strategic objectives are rarely enduring, and campaign design must be sufficiently agile to adjust to their fluctuations.

Compounding this difficulty are the different interests and objectives of coalition powers. To use the World War I example again, France's war aims went beyond the destruction of Prussian militarism and the re-establishment of an independent Belgium. It included the restitution of the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, as well as the territory lost in the early stages of the war,⁹⁶ and explains why France accepted the highest number of casualties per capita of all the World War I participants.⁹⁷ These different objectives, and the degree to which a country fears for its survival, therefore create fundamental differences in the options open to its statesmen, and will determine the nature of that country's commitment in terms of "blood and treasure", with a corresponding impact on the formulation of strategy.

In the end, we must understand the nature and effect of military objectives and end-states, which are not really ends as such, but rather interpretations of the ends. The more objectives and end-states are allowed to proliferate, the more they add filters, distance and, possibly, obfuscation between operations and policy. Figuratively, they form the outline of the box in which AJP-3 places campaign design. Yet military systems

⁹⁵ Kent Roberts Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II: A reconsideration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 4-10.

⁹⁶ John Gooch, *Soldiers...*, 21, 44.

⁹⁷ Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, (Toronto: Bantam, 1980), 488. See also Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919* (New York: Random House, 2003), 26-28.

are not closed systems. They are open, complex systems, firmly integrated within broader societal, political, cultural and economic systems. Boxing campaign design in a construct using hermetic definitions of military objectives and end-states may have value – but we must be aware of the dangers of losing sight of the aim. The logical, linear derivation of strategy from policy is thus affected by intrinsic fluctuations, making it somewhat of an iterative, parallel process. Acknowledging the inherent difficulties and incoherence, even, of strategy leads us to a new campaign design model, one in which the entire chain of military strategic objectives becomes a constantly reappraised focal point.

The Means

Once campaign planners are satisfied that they have some understanding of the strategic ends they must attain, they then need to turn their attention to the means required to prosecute the campaign. This is no simple matter, because it involves many levels of authority, results in very different national commitments and, especially, exceeds the scope of purely military forces.

The military strategic level is the first to make an estimate of the military means required, an essential condition to gaining political approval for a strategic course of action. Since detailed operational level planning has not yet begun, only a general idea of the force required can result from this process or, in the words of the official historian of the US Army in World War II, “a ‘guess’ of what the task force commander might consider necessary”.⁹⁸ Even then, differing assumptions and potential concepts mean that

⁹⁸ Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, 114.

these estimates can vary greatly.⁹⁹ A further complication is the fluctuating nature of a commitment. It is now accepted, for instance, that post-conflict operations may involve more troops than decisive combat operations.¹⁰⁰ Beyond the requirement for the establishment of security and all the other responsibilities of an occupying power,¹⁰¹ such a force is also instrumental in providing the strategic leverage alluded to before. For example, as late as 20 May 1919, some seven months after the armistice that terminated World War I, the Allies directed the deployment of a force of 42 divisions, including 200,000 Americans troops, and moved towards renewing the blockade of Germany, “preparing for the possibility that the Germans would not sign the peace treaty.”¹⁰² Elsewhere, the powers controlling the long Versailles treaty negotiations quickly saw their leverage decrease commensurately with the demobilization of their armed forces.¹⁰³ Strategic level forecasts of the means required are therefore imprecise, difficult and changing – all the more reason for campaign planners to keep a sharp eye on the changing strategic situation.

Once a strategic course of action has some level of political agreement, there occurs, especially in a coalition environment, a complex set of negotiations, involving “statements of requirement” by operational level commanders, troop-contributing conferences etc. Such a dynamic is a facet of the inseparable relationship between the

⁹⁹ See, for example the narrative of strategic planning for the landing in North Africa in 1942 in *Ibid.*, 105-107.

¹⁰⁰ See for example James D. Scudieri, *Iraq 2003-4 and Mesopotamia 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means* (Carlisle: US Army War College Centre for Strategic Leadership, Student Issue Paper S04-07, August 2004), 16; and Fallows, *Blind Into Baghdad*, 64-65, 72.

¹⁰¹ As stipulated in the 1907 Hague Convention, 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 First Additional Protocol 1949, in *AJP* 3, 6-7.

¹⁰² Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a post-conflict Scenario* (Carlisle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003), 13; and Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 471-472.

¹⁰³ Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 159, 267-8.

operational and the strategic levels. The most likely outcome of the force generation process is a multinational force of very different capabilities but, more importantly, differing mandates and political limitations. This may cause some dismay in certain officers who forget Slim's adage that "...there's only one thing worse than having allies – that's not having any."¹⁰⁴ National limitations to military missions and tasks are particularly misunderstood by senior coalition officers, as they appear to run against the military ethos of teamwork, sharing of risk, etc. In fact, they merely reflect each nation's appreciation of the threat to their own national security. The resulting commitment may thus be limited to a general willingness to help out and share some of the burden of a campaign that may have only an indirect bearing on a nation's interest. Indeed, unless national survival or security is directly threatened, most democracies will, sensibly, assign mandates and rules of engagement that will restrict the employment of their contingent within a coalition. This is a policy and strategic issue, and successful operational level commanders of the past are those who have understood how to design their campaign design accordingly. Yet nowhere in doctrine do we find mention of this. Presumably, then, forces are assumed to be available, trained, able and without limitations.

In limited war, this is an assumption that can lead to cognitive dissonance in the campaign design, as exemplified by NATO's 1999 campaign in Kosovo. As a humanitarian intervention, the character of this campaign was essentially altruistic. Certainly, none of the NATO countries' survival was threatened, which contributed to "significant disagreement ... inside both the US and NATO militaries with regard to

¹⁰⁴ William Slim, *Higher Command in War*, Transcript of 1952 address to US Army Command and General Staff College (New York: Brown University Press, 1999), 9-16.

strategy and priorities.”¹⁰⁵ The operational level commander was, *de facto*, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, who understood:

how fragile and tentative was the consensus within the Alliance in support of any military action. If commanders became too insistent in demanding a more aggressive approach to using force, they would undermine that consensus and – without a shot having been fired – hand Slobodan Milosevic a victory.¹⁰⁶

In other words, Clark understood that the preservation of NATO’s cohesion rested in the acceptance that national objectives and, hence, acceptance of risk, differed with each NATO country’s appreciation of the threat to their own security. The means placed at SACEUR’s disposal were therefore limited: air forces only with, initially, important limitations, expressed as national Rules of Engagement (ROE), strict NATO targeting restrictions and national vetting of that targeting. Even US forces were limited by the Clinton administration’s policy for this campaign.¹⁰⁷ Finally, the lack of a land component¹⁰⁸ meant that Serb land forces could freely adopt a posture on the ground that allowed them to minimize their exposure to allied air power.

In this context, an important disagreement occurred between Clark and his Air Component Commander, Lieutenant-General Short. This disagreement, especially over the definition of the enemy Centre of Gravity, can be directly traced to Short’s intent to prosecute an air operation by the rules of conventional war as understood by the US Air Force, and practiced during the Gulf War of 1991.¹⁰⁹ Such an idealized approach to campaign design was at odds with the strategic imperatives of that campaign. The

¹⁰⁵ Arkin, *Operation Allied Force...*, 4.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰⁷ “Nimble Lion” which was the US-only contingency plan contained strict limitations on targeting. President Clinton and secretary of Defense Cohen were also clear that no ground troops would be committed. *Ibid.*, 3-4, 8-9.

¹⁰⁸ Other than the initially ineffectual Kosovo Liberation Army.

¹⁰⁹ Arkin, *Operation Allied Force...*, 4-5.

outcome went beyond healthy debate in the planning stages of an operation. It resulted in personal acrimony between the two key commanders, one that appeared to have communicated down to their own subordinate commanders. More importantly, it caused a campaign design that did not seem able to reconcile the two approaches. The eventual adoption of a “strategic attack line,” simultaneously with a “tactical line of operation” may have been intended to satisfy both Clark’s and Short’s visions of the campaign, but did nothing for unity of effort.¹¹⁰

On a different level, the means can be so lacking that achievement of the end state is in question or is impossible, even with a sequenced approach to operations. Once again, the remoteness of ends to the contributing nation’s vital interests usually explains the discrepancy. The case of Afghanistan is illustrative and is typified by the fact that the NATO Alliance, whose countries possess over 15,000 helicopters, only offered six of them for service in that, NATO’s only major active operation. In fact, Afghanistan had in its first post-conflict year only 0.18 international soldiers in a stability role per 1,000 inhabitants, compared with 18.6 in Bosnia, 20 in Kosovo and 100 in post World War II Germany.¹¹¹ Campaign design must therefore offer methods of quantifying shortfalls and determining the impact. Should more modest ends be recommended? Or is a campaign that has culminated while maintaining a modicum of stability sufficient? Again, doctrine is silent on this issue.

The greatest difficulty in evaluating the means of a campaign lies, though, in another dimension. With the understanding that military systems are not closed systems,

¹¹⁰ Arkin, “Operation Allied Force...”, 6.

¹¹¹ James Dobbins *et al*, *America’s role in nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003), 136, 150, 151.

comes the notion that they must interact with all instruments of national or coalition power in the achievement of the aim. In US doctrine, this is recognized as the diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of national power, shortened under the acronym of DIME.¹¹² We find the same idea in the concept of the Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) approach to operations.¹¹³ Canada's current operation in Afghanistan has embraced a related concept, one that also comes with a sharp moniker: the "3D Approach" of defence, diplomacy and development, "involving unprecedented levels of coordination among government departments and agencies."¹¹⁴ Whilst the idea of this kind of integration is not a new concept, recent operations have highlighted their critical importance. Unfortunately, campaign design largely ignores this requirement for integration. More often than not, operational planning is in a box, as in Figure 1, with civil-military input limited to the J9 CIMIC staff. In fairness, AJP-3 does consider strategic, or interagency, lines of operation, but outside of this box. The requirement for a tight supporting and supported relationship between agencies is also acknowledged in US doctrine,¹¹⁵ but not translated into an integrated set of campaign design elements. We should now examine the ways of doing so.

¹¹² *JP 1*, I-5 to I-8.

¹¹³ See for example Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept Draft 4.4* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, DCDS, 21 May 2004), 17.

¹¹⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Beyond Peace: Canada in Afghanistan," in *Canada World View*, Issue 20 (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, Autumn 2003), 4. See also Paul Martin, Address by prime Minister Paul Martin at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister, 14 April 2004) available from <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=172>; Internet, accessed on 10 August 2004.

¹¹⁵ *JP 5.00-1*, II-5.

Ways

Recently, a number of new approaches to campaign design or elements thereof have been proposed to solve some of the challenges posed by the contemporary operating environment.¹¹⁶ They range from a refinement of the currently used elements to broad theories that have not yet yielded practical and integrated aids to commanders and campaign planners. In keeping with the thesis of this paper, which postulates the primacy of the integration of campaign design with strategy, the author will propose here an innovative, comprehensive approach that attempts to synthesize some new elements with more established ones.

The first element to consider in campaign design is an improved and dynamic analysis of the ends. Vertically layered and precisely defined objectives and end-states must be treated with caution during planning. They must also be constantly re-appraised during the course of the campaign. In the profusion of boards, meetings and conferences that make up the daily routine of an operational level headquarters, time must be set aside for the commander's long term planners and political advisor, or Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group (JIACG) to consider the evolving policy and military strategic objectives, as well as the conditions that must be set, or effects achieved, by the current operation for its sequel. Pursuing this line of reasoning further, the daily "Campaign Assessment" now being proposed under the aegis of emerging Effects Based Operations

¹¹⁶ Greer, for example, summarizes five, apparently exclusive, alternatives: Current doctrine, Systems Approach, Effects-Based Operations, Destroy-Dislocate-Disintegrate and Center of Gravity to Critical Vulnerability. Greer, *Operational Art for ...*, 27-28.

doctrine¹¹⁷, should measure effects currently achieved as part of a campaign against the *evolving* and *subsequent* set of conditions required, instead of those initially envisioned as defining the strategic end-state. The corollary here is that when the strategic objectives evolve in such a fashion, that evolution should impel a validation of the entire campaign design, from first principles.

This raises the question of the nature of succeeding military objectives. In a purist view, there should be only one campaign, in which military objectives and policy match precisely and coincidentally. For instance, a military objective such as “regional stability ensured by indigenous security forces” would mean that everything else involved, including, say, the defeat of the enemy and regime change, would be a matter of Decisive Points and other such elements of campaign design. Another possibility is a more segmented approach, with two or three major military operations succeeding each other to achieve that same end. But to choose either way, we must first answer a key question: when a does a campaign end?

The end of a campaign is closely tied to the definition of war itself. According to Echevarria, “Failure to see the purpose for which a war is fought *as part of war itself*, amounts to treating battle as an end rather than means.”¹¹⁸ More to the point, as Flavin observed:

Conflict termination and resolution are not the same thing. Conflict resolution is a long process. It is primarily a civil problem that may require military support.

¹¹⁷ Stephen Runals, *Effects-Based Planning and Operations, An overview* (Quadripartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference, 2 June 2004), 22-25.

¹¹⁸ Echevarria, *Toward...*, 18.

Through advantageous conflict termination, however, the military can set the conditions for successful conflict resolution.”¹¹⁹

To understand how military operations fit in between the two, it is useful to consider a US Army War College construct that envisions post-decisive operations in a war of regime change as occurring in four phases: security, stabilization, building of institutions and handover/redeployment. After handover, military forces may stay, but only in a supporting role to civil reconstruction efforts that may last for years after the eventual full withdrawal of military forces.¹²⁰ From a military perspective, then, the actions and effects required vary greatly over time, especially if we include the prior phases of a campaign, typically deterrence, seizing the initiative, etc. This will usually be exacerbated by the relief of forces by succeeding ones occurring at critical junctures in the campaign. The case of the land component of the initial US campaign in Iraq is illustrative of such post “end-state” planning being left entirely to another organization, one with which insufficient contact had a clear negative impact.¹²¹

According to Echevarria, the short length of today’s campaigns also means that planners no longer have the leisure to prepare for conflict resolution activities as they had in past wars lasting years.¹²² Indeed, in World War II, “...formal doctrine for military government (and) a School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, and thinking began there about postwar reconstruction...” as early as the Spring of 1942. Nevertheless, the importance, complexity and effort required of post conflict operations mean “There is no quick route to nation-building. Five years seems the

¹¹⁹ Flavin, *Planning for...*, 96.

¹²⁰ Crane, *Reconstructing Iraq...*, 43-44.

¹²¹ Confidential interview, February 2004.

¹²² Echevarria, *Toward...* 13-14.

minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy” and “...while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure.”¹²³ An ad hoc approach to operational level campaign design in a JIMP context is, therefore, insufficient. In such an environment, procedural elements of JIMP campaign design thus need to be institutionalized to ensure systematic consideration and integration of all relevant instruments of national or coalition power.

If we accept that there is a single JIMP campaign, then military operations must be sequenced across its entire breadth and depth. This implies that military objectives must support the attainment of policy in full. There can thus be no question of “end-state” at artificial junctures in that campaign. Yet, it would be impractical and unrealistic for military planners to attempt the production of a single operations plan covering such a vast endeavour in its entirety. One need only consider the plight of US Central Command planners after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 to convince oneself of that. A succession of operations, each being a sequel of the previous, should therefore remain as critical segments of a campaign. Using Effects-Based Operations terminology, it would be more accurate to formulate the conclusion of each of these operations as an assemblage of conditions established by the effects resulting from of a series of actions.¹²⁴ Taking this idea further, the author postulates that this set of effects constitutes the condition, or enabler, for the sequel operation. We will thus call them here *Sequel Conditions* and eliminate the use of end-states and their associated criteria. But the adoption of *Sequel Conditions* implies more than the replacement of the concept of end-state or a mere change in terminology. Indeed, these conditions are oriented towards a

¹²³ Dobbins, *America’s Role ...*, 166.

¹²⁴ Stephen Runals, *Effects...*

beginning, rather than an end: they are forward looking, dynamic and evolving. The final such set of conditions would coincide with the full achievement of policy objectives and will be termed here *Campaign Termination Conditions*.

By grouping related conditions into subsets, we may obtain *Objectives*, a useful categorization that serves to focus effort and facilitate the communication of the commander's intent. In keeping with the thesis of this paper, a distinction between military strategic and operational objectives should, in theory, be avoided, and all *Campaign Termination* and *Sequel Conditions* be set by the strategic levels. Yet, we have seen that the realities of the formulation of strategy may not allow this. The operational level commander and campaign planners must therefore have the liberty to adopt or deduce appropriate conditions and objectives that repeat and, if necessary, supplement military strategic objectives. This liberty must, however, be limited by a strict definition of operational objectives that would integrate them to the evolving set of military strategic objectives or conditions whilst at the same time avoiding unnecessary amplification of same. Therein lies the real value of this construct: the replacement of related, but separate elements such as end-state, objectives and criteria by a single set of evolving conditions that can be grouped into subsets aimed at defining transitions between major operations.

Within an operation, certain sets of effects, or conditions, will need to be achieved before others or, put another way, arranged and sequenced. The author will call these simply *Enabling Effects*, and forgo the use of Decisive Points, an unclear concept that, too often, is expressed in terms of our own actions or supporting operations. Again, this is

more than a change in terminology. Sets of effects are eminently flexible, adapted, precise and focused on the enemy, the environment and the strategic objectives. They may be achieved under a military or a civil lead. Finally, they allow greater consideration of second and third order effects, a key element when planning sequel operations.

The derivation of *Enabling Effects* from *Sequel Conditions* that themselves stem from *Campaign Termination Conditions* could then lead to the determination of *Effects Lines of Operation*, linking civil and military sets of effects and conditions. Whilst *Effects Lines of Operation* could be limited to the portrayal of a generic sequence of *Enabling Effects*, or critical path, it might be more advantageous for them to reflect a theme or sector of effects, as will be seen later. Some *Effects Lines of Operation* might also extend beyond *Sequel Conditions*, allowing continuity of effects between an operation and its sequel. From here, it is possible for campaign planners to formulate *Tasks* to subordinate components, some of which were previously understood as Decisive Points, like the securing of lines of communication, the establishment of air superiority etc. In turn, this would allow the development of *Component Task Lines of Operations*. The result would be a clear, coherent and comprehensive view of campaign effects, one that translates into a task structure suited to the force's components.

Another set of procedural elements is linked to the nature of the means of prosecuting the campaign. The national objectives and limitations of each troop contributing nation's forces are here a factor that should drive a sober appreciation of achievable ends or acceptable culminating points, as well as appropriate sets of effects. More importantly, the activities conducted by the other instruments of national, coalition

or international power need gr

essentially, a line of operation with its own decisive points.¹²⁷ The lack of a common approach to strategic level interagency planning should therefore be understood as a possible limitation by operational level planners but not one that ought to restrain practical solutions at the operational level.

Effects Lines of Operation, suitably refined, offer potential at the operational level for clarifying the respective roles of military and civil forces. The use of *Civil*, or *Military Effects Lines of Operation* is helpful terminology, as long as it is understood that they imply a “supporting/supported” framework, which excludes stove piping. This would have the advantage of “opening the box” of campaign design and forcing commanders and planners to consult, cooperate and integrate the actions of other instruments of national or coalition power with their own military means. One of the finest examples of this kind of mutual support is found in the synergy achieved by the French in Algeria, between some 400 civil development teams, local Algerian leadership and French Army forces.¹²⁸ That this relationship was not without complications and stresses remains, however, a constant of contemporary operations. In Bosnia, for example, the High Representative charged with implementing the Dayton Accord, as well as the other major international organizations involved in that country, only agreed in February 2001 to use a “Multi-Year Road Map”¹²⁹ which had been developed by the NATO Stabilization Force in July 2000. This document is, for all practical purposes, an operational level

¹²⁷ Gordon M. Wells, *The Center of Gravity Fad: Consequence of the Absence of an Overarching American theory of War* (Arlington: Association of the American Army Institute of Land Warfare, No 01-1, March 2001), 2, 6, 8.

¹²⁸ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: Penguin, 1987) 109, 165, 220.

¹²⁹ Kerensa Hardy, “Multi-Year Road Map tracks SFOR progress” in *SFOR Informer Online*; available from <http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/112/s112p03a/t0105033a.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2004.

interagency campaign plan using several Lines of Operation corresponding to different sectors of activity, such as Economy, Good Governance, Rule of Law, General Security, Entity Armed Forces Reductions etc. Each of these Lines of Operation has multiple, sequential sets of conditions to achieve - in effect, *Enabling Effects*. But such an approach presupposes coalition or international military and political control over the host nation. An adapted version is required when a military force is in support of a sovereign government, as is now the case with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

One of the characteristics of *Civil Effects Lines of Operation* is that they often aim at long-term policy objectives. This means that they extend through *Military Sequel Conditions*, which tend to succeed each other at shorter intervals. The significance of that is in requirement for military operations to support or, at least, not be counter productive to the achievement of effects that, on the surface, may seem beyond the scope of the military objective. Sometimes, the differences are irreconcilable. For instance, it may be necessary to destroy some of the key infrastructure of an enemy country in order to ensure its military defeat, even though the ultimate policy objective might be to turn that country into a prosperous, stable, peaceful one. Such military necessity is inevitable, but an understanding of policy objectives will minimize it. Often, though, the differences are caused by a deliberately narrow interpretation of the military mission. Policies such as the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine foster the avoidance of “mission creep” which often results in tension between narrowly defined military “end-states” and unfulfilled policy

objectives. One need look no further than Haiti or Bosnia for an illustration of this dilemma. Campaign design must therefore link succeeding sets of *Sequel Conditions* to *Military Effects Lines of Operations*, which must themselves be matched with an appropriate military force structure. In other words, strategists and campaign planners must accept that peace will not necessarily follow a victorious battle, and that military operations will occur over the long term, sometimes as the main effort, sometimes not, and will always evolve within the continuum of policy.

Another key element in the above construct is that *Effects Lines of Operation* are not directed at a conceptual Centre of Gravity. They aim at the achievement of strategic or operational objectives, through *Sequel Conditions* or *Campaign Termination Conditions*. In the Afghan model cited above, Centre of Gravity analysis was used to understand the environment in order to help determine focus, main effort and sequencing. This hints at the true purpose of Centre of Gravity analysis, which is to understand the enemy system as well as we do ours. Many methods may serve that purpose. The old “Intelligence Appreciation of the Situation” was one such method, using inductive logic to draw major deductions, or probable inferences, from a variety of factors in a holistic way, leading to the imagination of possible enemy courses of action and ultimately, of our own options. Another method is Operational Net Assessment, which is an ambitious attempt to use “...systems analysis [to] reveal ... critical nodes and vulnerabilities that may be used in effects-based operations [and] recognize... the adversary's goals,

intentions, strengths, weaknesses, and behaviors.”¹³⁰ Finally, we have Strange’s CG-CC-CR-CV method, which dissects Centres of Gravity into Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirement and Critical Vulnerabilities.¹³¹ The weakness of the latter method, compared to the first two, is that it does not expressly consider the enemy policy and strategic goals and objectives, from which it is often possible to derive certain elements of campaign design. However, these three methods do attempt to understand the enemy in a complex, holistic and more or less nuanced manner. All have value, and the selection of one over the other will likely have more to do with the skill and availability of a sufficient staff afforded enough time. As such, though, these methods are preferable to the determination of a single, ill-defined and possibly irrelevant Centre of Gravity as the basis for all subsequent campaign design. Centres of Gravity should, therefore, be retained as a useful, but not essential way of understanding key elements of our own or enemy systems and should not be confused with a proper analysis of these systems using better, more adapted methods.

In summary, then, *Effects Lines of Operation* link civil or military *Enabling Effects*. They may extend beyond sets of *Sequel Conditions*, spanning more than one military mandate or operation. They aim at the achievement of *Operational Objectives*, themselves aggregates of conditions, which, together, make up *Sequel Conditions* or *Campaign Termination Conditions*. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship.

¹³⁰ United States Joint Forces Command, “*Operational Net Assessment*,” http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_ona.htm; internet; accessed 22 September 2004.

¹³¹ Strange, *Centers of gravity*....




Figure 2: Theoretical relationship between proposed elements of Campaign Design

Conclusion

Campaign design involves the finding of ways to achieve strategic ends using strategically generated means. Its current interpretation has produced stunning military victories but has not guaranteed the achievement of policy. This is the product of a lingering belief in *Vernichtungsschlacht*, or the quest for a battle of annihilation, and an over reliance on ill-defined concepts such as the Centre of Gravity, which becomes a pole

of attraction for all campaign design elements, even at the expense of the achievement of the policy aim.

Attempts to find solutions to this situation begin with a thorough analysis of the nature of the ends, allowing us to conclude that the new model of campaign design must acknowledge the inherent incoherence of strategy. Indeed, the enormous difficulty of deriving objectives from policy, as well as the dynamic nature of the strategic environment mean that commanders and campaign planners must keep a constant watch over the effects they seek to achieve, and not constrain themselves to early, unchanging and hermetic objectives and “end-states” that may in fact isolate them from the fulfillment of that policy.

The strategic level also generates the means made available to operational level commanders but these come with many limitations. The numbers and capabilities may be insufficient, and restrictions on their employment will be attached as a result of the national objectives of respective troop-contributing countries. The civil-military nature of any campaign, a reflection of the open system nature of military operations, will also increase the challenge of coordinating, harmonizing and integrating the various instruments of coalition or national power into a cohesive whole.

A new model of campaign design must therefore impose a focus on strategic objectives, rather than maintaining the current obsession with the Centre of Gravity. For that purpose, routine re-evaluation of the ends must be incorporated into a Commander’s daily activities. If necessary, that evaluation must also instigate a full review of the entire campaign design, from first principles. The corollary is that the ends of that campaign, or

Campaign Termination Conditions, must be understood to coincide with the end of the war and the beginning of the peace, incorporating the full achievement of policy. To that effect, a series of military operations need to succeed each other. Within each operation, *Enabling Effects* will continue that thread, allowing the sequencing of desired effects and their incorporation into *Effects Lines of Operation* integrating all instruments of national or coalition power. These, in turn, may be translated into *Component Task Lines of Operation* relevant to the force's subordinate components.

The means of prosecuting a campaign must also be understood, and their impact on campaign design appreciated. The result may be the acceptance of culmination or a recommendation to adjust the ends. More importantly, all instruments of national, coalition or international power must be integrated into a cohesive whole at the operational level. This goes beyond the use of dedicated staffs or coordinating mechanisms. Inter-agency lines of operation, perhaps using supported/supporting relationships, will allow as focused, cooperative and harmonized approach to achieving policy as is feasible.

Finally, the Centre of Gravity must be relegated to what it is: a useful way of conceptualizing the enemy, the environment and own forces. It should not replace a thorough understanding of that enemy and of ourselves, which alone can provide commanders and campaign planners the ability to create and visualize ways of attaining strategic objectives. *Effects Lines of Operation* must therefore be directed at the achievement of Military Strategic Objectives, rather than the destruction or neutralization of a Centre of Gravity or enemy force.

Campaign design must thus have at its disposal the appropriate elements to fulfill policy. Whilst this reinforces the idea of operational art as a separate field of practice and study, it also underscores that it cannot isolate itself from its strategic roots. A new model of campaign design is a necessity to ensure that tighter integration. But with closer integration comes a tendency to blur the distinctions between levels of war and also between civil and military operations within a campaign. As we refine our ability to prosecute such campaigns, we may well come to a reassessment of these distinctions.

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