

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**CURRENT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CAPABILITY VERSUS FUTURE WAR REQUIREMENTS**

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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## ABSTRACT

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This paper deals with current Unconventional Warfare doctrine and capabilities and their role in future war. I discuss the current UW doctrine, thinking and the US capability. I then apply that to several opposing schools of thought about future war. Those schools are broken down by symmetry and technical ability. (high-tech vs low-tech and symmetric vs asymmetric) Essentially, I argue that with some modification, present UW doctrine, thinking and capability will be key for American victory in future conflict.



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## CURRENT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CAPABILITY VERSUS FUTURE WAR REQUIREMENTS

Strategic leaders are charged with looking into the future while living in the present. They must compare their present organization and capabilities against the perceived requirements of the future. Frequently organizations are *forced* to change *after* they find themselves no longer relevant in an ever-changing environment.<sup>1</sup> The key to strategic leadership in successful organizations is changing *before* finding oneself slipping into irrelevancy. The leadership of all major organizations, from Microsoft Corporation and Ford Motor Company to the Executive Branch of the US Government, must continually work with one eye on the present and one eye on the future.<sup>2</sup>

The US Army as an organization is no different in this quest for continued relevancy, and indeed, has life and death requirements for strategic leadership. The conventional forces in America's army are in the beginning stages of a transformation.<sup>3</sup> This transformation is aimed at keeping the Army relevant in future conflicts by making it more deployable and lethal. Likewise, the unconventional forces in the US Army must also focus on continuous learning and strategic leadership to maximize their effectiveness in their role in achieving American national security objectives.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the future relevancy of the US Army Special Forces (SF), with a specific focus on SF organization and Unconventional Warfare (UW) capabilities. SF history, organization, and current UW capability will first be described. Alternative theories for possible future conflicts will then be analyzed, and SF UW capability will be assessed in light of these future requirements. As a result of this analysis I will provide recommendations regarding the role of SF in future wars, and specific requirements for SF to optimally perform this role.

The U. S. Army Special Forces are an elite group of soldiers who are well-trained and uniquely qualified to meet the objectives in many types of unconventional missions. They are likely candidates for playing an important role in future wars.<sup>4</sup> To provide focus I will specifically discuss the Special Forces (SF) branch of the Army, not all of the Army's Special Operation Forces (SOF) units. The other Army elements of SOF (that will not be discussed) are the Army Rangers, Special Operations Aviation (SOA), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP). After a description of current SF capabilities I will describe possible wars of the future. While there is no way to be certain of the future, I will describe four types of conflict that a variety of strategic experts have suggested may prove common in the future. I will limit my prediction of the future to the year 2025; to predict anything after that would be very unreliable. I

will follow each future war description with an analysis of the possible SF capabilities, limitations and recommendations.

Although there are a great many parallels between the ongoing global war against terrorism and the four types of future operations discussed herein, it is not the appropriate objective of this analysis to specifically address the role of SF in the current war against terrorism. To analyze the current war against terrorism would be appropriate for an “armchair quarterback” but is not conducive to the study of future doctrine and operations. The first future operation to be discussed is Fourth Generation Warfare, which is perhaps the most popular prediction of future war. In this type of asymmetric conflict, the adversaries are not always nations, but may be divided along class, race or religious lines. The second operation is a Major Theater War (MTW), which is perhaps the easiest for most Americans to understand since it has been most common in our history. Our current military establishment is ostensibly designed to fight two near-simultaneous Major Theater Wars.<sup>5</sup> A third type of war we must be capable of is preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. This type of warfare could be against nation states or rival factions but, because of its destructive potential, will have little room for error. The last of the future operations to be discussed are Small Scale Contingencies (SSC). While common today, SSC operations like Humanitarian Assistance, Peace Keeping and especially Information Warfare will become even more common in the next 25 years.

After describing our current capabilities with regard to each type of future conflict, I will discuss what role the Special Forces of tomorrow will play in these conflicts. It is the premise of this paper that, due to the varied training, cultural awareness, and individual maturity of the SF soldier, SF will become an even more applicable resource in the military operations of the future.

Because of this increased role of SF in future wars, I will support my recommendations that, over the next 25-30 years, SF continue with its rigorous selection and training processes. Like the rest of the US Army, however, SF must transform. The US Army will need to increase the number of SF Groups and organize them to fight as stand-alone forces, with their own SOA capability. They must train to become proficient informational warriors and more capable nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) combatants. SF must increase early deployments to traditionally non-democratic regions. Finally, SF must be continually equipped with cutting edge technology of all types in order to perform effectively in meeting these future war objectives.

## **US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES**

The Special Forces of today's Army, like the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of WWII, has a long history of brave soldiers defeating the enemy in the black of night, using ingenuity and courage to hurdle any obstacle. The OSS was the original modern SF organization, first organized to conduct unconventional operations against the German and Japanese forces in occupied territory. Like the earlier American Special Operations forces, Rogers Rangers and Francis Marion's forces, the OSS was disbanded after the war. In the summer of 1952, the United States established its first full time Unconventional Warfare (UW) unit, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Since that time, UW has been the 'bread and butter' mission of every SF unit. Special Forces are the only forces in our nation's arsenal primarily focused on UW. The Group's first commander was Colonel Aaron Bank. Bank was a Jedburg veteran of European OSS operations and a driving force during the early 1950s in establishing a UW unit. Shortly after his return from Korea in 1950 to begin the job of trying to "sell" the concept of SF units, Banks was one the key players in writing the roles, missions and organizational tables for an SF Group. Those roles, missions and organizational tables have not changed significantly in 50 years and will be described briefly below.<sup>6</sup>

## **SF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

The basic unit around which SF is organized is an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), or "A-team". An A-Team has ten NCOs, two each with of the following specialties: demolition, medical, communications, and weapons. All team members are cross-trained in each of these specialties. The team's senior two NCOs are specially trained in intelligence and operations skills. An A-Team also has two officers, a team technician (CW2) and a commander. Six A-Teams (each commanded by a captain) make up a Company. The SF company is commanded by a Major and has a Sergeant Major as the senior NCO. In order to command and control those 6 A-Teams, the commander has a B-Team made up of the same specialties. An SF Battalion has three SF companies and one support company and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The battalion staff is called a C-Team and is organized much like conventional battalion staffs. An SF Group has three battalions and is commanded by a colonel.<sup>7</sup>

Each SF Group is regionally oriented and trains primarily to conduct Unconventional Warfare in its assigned region of the world. The regional training includes language proficiency, geographically specific combat and survival skills, and cultural awareness. The five active duty SF groups (1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th) are oriented respectively to Asia, Africa, the Middle East,

Central/ South America and Europe. Thus, when fully manned, there are 240 twelve man A-teams on active duty. Each one is trained and equipped to recruit and organize one indigenous battalion. This makes SF one of the most significant “force multipliers” in America’s inventory.<sup>8</sup>

### **UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: THE BREAD AND BUTTER OF SPECIAL FORCES**

All SF units, from ODAs to Groups, whether stationed in Europe, the US or Asia, have the same mission focus. That focus is Unconventional Warfare (UW). The current definition of UW, per Joint Publication 1-02 (1994) is “a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and evasion and escape.”<sup>9</sup> This is clearly a broad and even ambiguous mission. The UW umbrella allows SF to train on a myriad of supporting tasks including: 1) Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 2) Guerilla Warfare (GW), (always conducted with combined forces), 3) Special Reconnaissance (SR), 4) Direct Action (DA) and 5) Counter terrorism (CT) (which can be conducted unilaterally and/or with combined forces). Unlike conventional forces, SF conducts these missions across the spectra of peace, conflict and war.<sup>10</sup> Since all of these missions must be conducted by the same soldiers, the key to mission success is the unique capability of the people. UW is best summed up as “fighting our nations’ wars *by, with and through* others.”<sup>11</sup>

### **ANALYSIS OF FUTURE WARS**

Having briefly defined Special Forces organization and its primary mission, the following section will describe four types of war which are likely in the future. Following each description will be an analysis of SF’s potential role in that type of conflict.

#### **FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE**

In order to understand the term “fourth generation warfare,” we must first answer the question, “What are the other three generations?” The first three generations center around technical advancements and the tactical changes they drove. First generation warfare is recognized by the tactics of forces marching in rigid line and column formations. These tactics were virtually dictated by the limitations of both sides’ use of the smoothbore musket. As weapons grew in effectiveness and as breechloaders, machineguns and barbed wire began to proliferate the battlefield, second generation warfare developed, based on the separation of fire and movement rather than its combined mass. Third generation warfare grew out of the need to

bypass firepower with broad sweeping movements. The "Blitzkrieg" of World War Two is a good example of this.<sup>12</sup>

Fourth Generation warfare will be on a much broader front than its predecessors. It is based on the assumption that the nation-state societies of the world will be violently challenged and eventually thrown into chaos. If this is the case, the future major wars will not be limited to the military of nation "A" fighting the military of nation "B." In such a scenario, the fighting will not be limited to nation-state relationships. Rather, opposing factions will be divided by race, religion, or class.

The means of struggle in this type of warfare are not just destructive weapons but must include a combination of more passive means as well. These could be economic and psychological, as well as physical. To those not directly involved in the fighting, fourth generation warfare could often be described as low intensity.

Like the fighting style, the end state for which the fourth generation warriors are fighting will differ greatly from that of their nation-state predecessors. Their goals may range from the agricultural rights of a region or economic trading rights of an important commodity to total religious or racial dominance within a region.

In the past it has been easy to understand what the belligerents were fighting to attain. The objective of the conflict was usually regional hegemony or national sovereignty. The less easily-understood goals of future wars will make combating them more difficult than ever. These goals are often perceived as less "rational" to those with a nation-state view of the world. However, we must never dismiss the fourth generation warrior as being "irrational." His rationale is simply based on a different set of goals than our own.

Who will fight in such a conflict? Possibly one side of the fight will be waged by professional armies in support of established nation-states fighting for the status-quo. But the bulk of belligerents will be discontented, angry world citizens with little to lose and everything to gain. They may be barefoot peasants from any region of the world fighting for a better way of life, or they might be religious extremists fighting for their god. They will probably be less organized and more poorly equipped than our current understanding of an army, but they may be more willing, or even, eager to die for their cause than the uniformed professional of a nation-state. Fourth generation warriors may be from every age group and both sexes, wearing a mix of uniforms and civilian clothes. They may shift their roles from soldier to civilian and back again with the tides of battle.<sup>13</sup>

These soldiers will not have the benefits of a supporting government or the training and organization of professional armies. Rather, they will be armed with a variety of small arms,

consisting of individual weapons and whatever crew-served weapons they can steal from other forces. Mixed in with these more conventional weapons will be an array of home-made weapons ranging from Molotov Cocktails to deadly chemical agents like the ones used in the 1994 subway gas attack in Japan, or the recent mailings of Anthrax.

The emergence of these loose-knit, lightly armed organizations with flexible and very decentralized command and control calls for a shift in tactics. In lieu of the force-on-force maneuver warfare of the third generation, we will see a rise in guerilla tactics. Guerilla tactics may begin with targets of terror and not what we might define as “legitimate” military targets. Thus, many of these operations may begin with the new warriors fighting with what we now call terrorist tactics and eventually grow into small unit light infantry operations. Attacks in the fourth generation will be much more fluid, shifting across the spectrum of military, political, informational and economic operations.

Some would argue that this definition of future warfare is, in fact, only a repetition of earlier tribal warfare. As we look across the globe today we see that some societies are currently engaged in such struggles. In the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and throughout Africa, chaos is not difficult to foresee. It is a moot point to argue whether this is the future or a repetition of the past. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, much of the world is free from the iron-fisted rule that kept the peace so long. Disaffected groups are now able to revert to local wars of self-determination. We can usually assume that it is in the future interests of the United States to try to preempt chaos in favor of the nation-state system, with hopes of furthering democracy and capitalism.<sup>14</sup>

### **Special Forces' Role in Fourth Generation Warfare**

What will be the role of the United States Army's Unconventional Warfare force (SF) in Fourth Generation warfare? After a cursory study of this view of the future, it is difficult to imagine a force capable of combating such a complicated and unpredictable enemy. Yet, after closer study, it is possible to find some achievable requirements.

Information is just as key in this type of operation as it is in current warfare, perhaps more so. Special Forces have, and must continue to develop, a unique capability in gathering information. The key to gathering information in the fast developing fourth generation warfare is early intervention with a low signature. This can even prevent or preempt the beginning of a conflict. SF units can overtly or covertly infiltrate into a region prior to major hostilities. With SF units already on the ground in an area as the conflict unfolds, our National Command Authority (NCA) has a better chance at a proper assessment. Early intervention by SF units will not only

funnel priceless information to strategic decision makers, it will also play a major part in preparing a faction for our follow-on support, if required.

Early and frequent intervention will also continue to improve the regional focus of SF units. Once a unit has been assigned a region and its soldiers begin to learn the nuances of the people and culture, the soldiers must frequent the region to maintain and enhance their proficiency.

When an SF unit of any size has gained expertise in its region, and members of the unit have gotten early and frequent access to troubled regions of the world, they can then begin gathering specific information as required by higher level decision makers. These intelligence requirements could vary from specific target data, such as otherwise unavailable details of bridge or dam construction, to the organizational charts of rival factions in tribal wars.

In addition to gathering information about the potential hot spots around the world, in fourth generation warfare SF will play a greater role in aiding established third world nation-states to defend themselves against such threats. This task falls under the established SF mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). If it is in our nation's interest to aid a struggling nation in its fight against chaos (or someone else's definition of "order"), SF advisors can act as the military arm of the "country team", which represents all elements of US national power and usually works out of the American Embassy. In this type of conflict a purely military solution will almost never solve the problem alone. In coordination with social, political and economic changes, SF FID teams can help remove the cause of military unrest.

The final SF contribution to fourth generation warfare to be discussed is their capability to execute unilateral direct action and strategic reconnaissance missions with a low on-the-ground signature. Because of the small size and proportionally high fire-power of an SF team, they are able to conduct operations with much less visibility than their conventional counterparts. Special Forces teams can often hit a target and return home before the enemy knows what has happened. It is the unique combination of regional expertise, realistic training and striking power that will make SF units valuable in the next generation of war.

### **Recommendations for SF in Fourth Generation Warfare**

In order to maximize their potential contribution in meeting US objectives in fourth generation warfare, SF must continue the rigorous assessment and training of its soldiers. In fourth generation warfare the winning factor will be the quality and perseverance of the soldiers more than the mechanical instruments they possess.

SF must also assess and acquire more troops in the future. With increased demand for SF troopers, we desperately need to fill to our authorized strength, and eventually field more

than the current five groups. To man the current and new groups, we must expand our recruiting base. This could be done with three initiatives, including increased inter-service transfers, increased non-US recruits, and increased “off-the-street” recruiting. Each of these recruiting initiatives will be discussed below.

First, the number of interservice transfers allowed into Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS, the selection device for SF) must be increased. Almost 100,000 soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen ETS every year.<sup>15</sup> Some of them, with proper assessment and training, could earn the Green Beret. I recommend SF recruiters increase motivation to apply for SF selection by making an offer to each of the thousands of soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen who ETS every year. That offer must include a total transfer of time in grade and time in service. In addition to the current gates for assessment and selection into SF, the non-Army potential SF candidate must have the support of his losing chain of command and be able to pass a security check. After SF selection and training, an USMC rifleman (or USAF security policeman) could make as good an SF soldier as an Army rifleman.

The second recruiting initiative, and the most drastic recommendation for change to the current recruiting methods, is the recruitment of more non-US citizens with proven records. At the end of World War II, displaced foreign citizens could earn US citizenship after serving a tour in the US military. These foreign nationals provided great expertise to the units they joined.<sup>16</sup> Many of them eventually found their way into the newly formed Special Forces. It is not recommended that we open our arms now to any displaced person as we did then. The risk of getting a criminal or active insurgent is too high. However, the US has a wide range of friends and allies with sufficient legal systems to determine which of their citizens are at risk. I recommend that we actively recruit soldiers from these other nations as these men leave their armed service after a tour of duty. In addition to the standard SFAS requirements, the prerequisites would include: 1) fluency in English (with recommended fluency in another language as well), 2) Written and verbal recommendation from their losing chain of command, 3) Passing of a security investigation done in concert with their former national intelligence agency, and 4) Oral interview by an SF recruiter. As compensation to the soldier, upon completion of the SFQC, he would: earn US citizenship, be able to transfer some rank and time in service (for example, a former German E7 with ten years of service, may get paid as an American E6 with seven years of service) and be eligible to serve until retirement just as any other US soldier. Those foreign soldiers could become SF troopers and provide great regional expertise to their teams.

An example of the foreign recruitment process is as follows: A soldier is leaving the service from a nation with whom the US Government has close ties and cooperation (e.g. Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia). He is contacted by our recruiters who interview the potential candidate and his chain of command. He's then given a series of English language, physical fitness and aptitude tests. If he meet the standards on all of these, our recruiter coordinates with the US and his losing nation for a background check. From this point on, he continues like an American through the gates of Special Forces Assessment and Selection. This new SF trooper, and others like him with European or Asian military experience and cultural knowledge, can contribute greatly to our nation's UW capability.

The third recruiting initiative recommended for increasing SF force numbers is to allow more off-the-street recruits to apply for SF. There are a number of young Americans who join the Army so they can join SF. Currently these soldiers must usually wait until they are E-4s or above to apply for SFAS. In the meantime, their motivation to stay in the conventional army long enough to apply for SF may get diverted or diluted and they become a lost potential recruit. In order to maximize the motivation of civilian recruits who already know about SF and know this is where they want to be, the increase of direct application into SFAS from civilian status is recommended. As with the recruitment of foreigners, additional measurements of aptitudes and integrity may be required since these recruits do not have a proven US military performance record.

The recruiting initiatives recommended above are necessary to man current SF Groups as well as additional Groups necessary for future operations. These additional SF Groups (along with the standing Groups of today) must be organized to train as they fight. Currently, an SF Group is not a stand-alone force. It must be augmented prior to employment for a UW mission. SF Groups, like their cavalry regimental counterparts, must be organized with all of the required go-to-war support elements. Specifically, Groups must have their own aviation assets for training and operational infiltration and more Combat Support forces for logistical support. It is recommended that each deployable organization in USASFC (A) be manned to 115 percent of their authorized strength. This would ensure that our nation's only Unconventional Warfare force would be fully manned at the beginning of an operational deployment. If manned at only 100 percent (vice the recommended 115 percent) they would still deploy short handed given the inevitable injuries of high-risk training, necessary NCOPD schools (ANOC, BNOC, SGMA, etc.), and the special skill schools (language, Ranger, SFUWO, MFF, etc.).

A final recommendation to meet fourth generation warfare requirements is that SF units should be trained and equipped with the latest technology. While it is not fiscally practical to

equip the entire military with new equipment every time equipment is improved, it is much more feasible to maintain the very small number of SF battalions with the most potent weapon and communications systems possible.

## MAJOR THEATER WARS

Besides fourth generational warfare, another popular prediction of future wars focuses on "Major Theater Wars," or MTW. While fourth generational warfare occurs when the existence of the nation-state model is assumed to be antiquated, or at least challenged, this is not the case with MTWs. An MTW will probably exist between two rival nation-states. It will be fought along traditional, primarily conventional lines. Success in future MTWs will depend on fighting with, and against, an ever increasing amount of "high-tech" equipment. This "high-tech" equipment is designed to enhance information gathering, communication, target acquisition and protection.

As the name implies, an MTW is usually not a minor conflict within a nation's borders or between neighboring nations. An MTW may very well begin with a small border clash. If this clash is allowed to continue unchecked, and if the region is already in a state of tension, then such a border clash could easily spread across the region, thus creating an MTW. A prime example of this is in the former Yugoslavia. With enough time, the conflicts within that former nation could sweep the region and grow into an MTW between the Moslem nations to the east and the Slavic nations bordering the former Yugoslavia. This would have major effects on every aspect of east European life as a minimum and it may have global repercussions. As demonstrated many times this century, the US will defend the democratic status-quo of Europe.

The United States military is organized, trained and equipped to fight two near-simultaneous MTWs.<sup>17</sup> We showed our ability to fight and win one MTW in the Gulf War 1990-91. While the Gulf region still holds potential for an MTW, other potential MTW areas are Korea, areas of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and around the former Yugoslavia. Certainly all of these areas hold the potential for a major conventional fight. We cannot expect to continually repeat the bloodless victory of 1991. How then can Army Special Forces best be used in the next MTW?

### **Unconventional Warriors' Role in a Major Theater War**

The traditional SF role as our nations' unconventional warriors and the supporting tasks mentioned at the beginning of this paper (FID, GW, SR, DA and CT) are all well-suited to support a conventional conflict like an MTW. There may be few differences between an MTW and what we previously described as third generational warfare. It is the ability of SF units to transcend the many spectra of warfare that makes them unique. Operations providing early

interface of SF soldiers in and around contested areas are paramount. Knowledge of key incidents and key individuals being passed to the NCA are also paramount. Under the summary definition of Unconventional Warriors as being those who fight “by, with and through” others, in an MTW SF units will be tasked to perform various liaison jobs with indigenous, surrogate, coalition and American conventional and unconventional forces. Thus, a small number of highly trained SF soldiers, working with established or newly created contacts, can act as a force multiplier bringing large numbers of friendly forces to bear on the enemy.

The role of liaison among the different types of forces is a difficult one. In addition to the normal tactical and regional expertise required by the SF soldier, he now must possess a clear understanding of conventional doctrine, capabilities, and tactics. While acting as a liaison officer (LNO), this junior SF officer or NCO will be tasked to keep both headquarters (conventional and SOF) informed of all aspects of the mission. While acting as an “advisor” to indigenous forces, he will undoubtedly be tasked to encourage those forces to operate in a specific way.

Coordinating operations with an American Joint Task Force requires SF soldiers to be proficient in two very different forms of war. Being an LNO or advisor to an allied or coalition army unit requires an even more versatile soldier. In addition to dual proficiency in conventional and unconventional warfare, the allied LNO must also understand the operational differences between armies and facilitate the operations of those armies that are operationally challenged. This is less of a problem with many of our more developed NATO allies. However, with many of our still-developing allies, the challenge is multiplied due to their seeming inability to ‘keep up’ with our operations and information management. Third-world nations do not train and are not able to maneuver and react with the speed of the American military.

In addition to the traditional roles of SF, the requirement to act as interface between armies in an MTW will require a talented and versatile soldier. The advisor/LNO must be a fast learner in order to overcome the initial problems of working within a foreign environment. He must be regionally oriented to the area, people and the indigenous military. Most of all, he must be open-minded enough to realize different organizations from varied societies must be treated differently, and he must have the wherewithal to optimize their performance within the framework of an American field army.

### **Recommendations for SF in an MTW**

America’s Unconventional Warriors must continue in their role as “global scouts.”<sup>18</sup> Early and frequent introduction of SF into virtually every theater will give regional CINCs the ability to conduct pre-conflict intervention. To do this, we must change the mindset of our nation’s

strategic leadership. There are, of course, risks to conducting global scout operations, called “mil-to-mil contacts.” Mil-to-mil contacts include unit and individual training programs and many types of contact teams. What if the U.S. Government has a mil-to-mil contact with the “wrong type” of people? Are we to only contact, and therefore influence, our friends and allies and not the nations or peoples “sitting on the fence” of democracy?

In a 1997 Washington Post series of articles, writer Dana Priest claims that we have, in fact, had many such contacts with the wrong people. Specifically, she argues that Special Operations Forces (SOF) have “established military ties in at least 110 countries.” She lists several examples of Special Forces soldiers working and training with several less-than-democratic armies “from Cambodia to Kazakhstan.” She argues for greatly restricting mil-to-mil contacts.<sup>19</sup> Such a restriction of mil-to-mil contacts might counter what she perceives as the major risk of having official U.S. government contact with “bad people.” This is not a new or unique dilemma, Jesus said to the Pharisees: “They that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.”<sup>20</sup> A less biblical metaphor is a police officer on a counter-vice squad. Could that officer be effective if he/she was not able to operate with and around drug users and prostitutes?

In addition to acting as global scouts, SF must continue to recruit men capable of quick learning and keeping an open mind. Of course, if SF units are to act as interface between armies, this skill must be integrated into SF training. SF soldiers should “shadow” conventional US units as they deploy on major training exercises like National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations. Likewise, SF units should increase their interface with our allies and those nations on the fringes of alignment with US values, culture and economy. The deployment of a very few SF soldiers to various foreign training exercises now will have big benefits during the next MTW.

## COUNTER-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

One of the most frightening aspects of our times is the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). WMDs are generally defined as either nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Because of their extreme effectiveness and relative low cost, WMDs are sought after by many third world nations and rival factions. The spread of WMDs is outlawed in most of the agreements on rules of modern warfare.

I'll discuss two reasons for the current concern that WMDs will proliferate. One is the technological advancement of weaponeering. This enables relatively poor nations, or sub-national factions, to be able to produce or buy powerful weapons. Almost any angry chemist

can produce a potent weapon in his or her basement for a few hundred dollars. Combine this spread of technology with the dissident factions scattered around the globe, and the result is trouble. Examples of this are the use of Sarin in the Japanese subway lines and recent anthrax attacks through our US mail system.

The other concern for the spread of WMDs is the breakdown of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union imploded, it had the largest magazine of WMDs in the world. The nation broke apart due to economic impotence, not any external military threat. When a region is literally dying for lack of hard currency, and when that same region has an abundance of saleable weapons, it is only to be expected that some of these weapons will find their way onto the world market, no matter how responsibly the new Russian government acts. We may never know the exact number of weapons that have been sold on the international black market. Even the most conservative estimate would express high concern over the black market issue. It is certainly in our vital national interest to curtail these black market sales. How are our nation's Unconventional Warriors able to add to the national effort to restrict, monitor and counter the spread of WMDs?

### **UW and Counter-Proliferation of WMD's**

The role of SF units in these types of operations will be much more strategic than in the other future-war possibilities already discussed. SF counter-WMD operations will be of a strategic nature because of the high level of national, even global, interest in this task, and because of the national intelligence assets required to successfully execute counter-proliferation operations. Even though SF units are the most versatile in the Army, I caution that they should not be tasked to act as technical weaponry advisors or experts for these operations.

The primary missions for SF in counter-WMD operations will be to continue ongoing global reconnaissance. Coordinating and monitoring surrogate forces working in and around regions torn between democracy and chaos will give SF great access to information not otherwise available. First, as global scouts, SF can learn when WMD are being produced or transferred in a general area. Then the SF group with regional expertise in that area of the world can be tasked to gather specific information. They can infiltrate an SF team already familiar with the area and region to conduct reconnaissance of a point, route or area. Once the team gathers the information it needs, it can return home or continue the operation to the next phase if necessary.

The target that has been identified by the SF team, either unilaterally, or "by, with and through" others, may range from a backyard chemical shop to a modern industrial complex. If

the enemy is purchasing, not producing, WMDs, the target might be a transfer point like a railhead or shipping port. Key personalities and organizations can also become targets.

Once the target has been located and identified, the next phase may be to destroy or recover the weapons. The fragility, location or political situation around the target will determine the best strategic means of interdicting it. If the National Command Authority determines that ground forces can best destroy the target and provide assured destruction, what better force to do this than Army SF? They have conducted the reconnaissance and area assessment. SF teams can be infiltrated into the target area to conduct the operation using covert or overt means. The destruction itself can also be overt or covert. Since SF teams have a variety of demolition and communication equipment with them, the team conducting the SR could be retasked to conduct the DA phase of the operations while they are still in the area of operations (AO), thus giving the NCA strategic versatility in ambiguous and ever-changing situations.

### **Recommendations for SF in Counter-WMD Operations**

In order for SF units to most effectively accomplish counter-WMD missions, some additional training is recommended. First, SF units must emphasize advanced NBC training and understand the science of WMD. Currently, most SF units simply comply with the Army common skills standards for survival in an NBC environment. Little priority is placed on much more than donning the protective mask in 15 seconds and similar tasks. In order to counter WMDs, SF soldiers must learn the components of the weapon systems and how to destroy them. They must learn the active ingredients of the chemical or biological munitions, in addition to understanding the scientific conditions needed to achieve the desired reaction. After increasing their basic knowledge, SF teams could be augmented with experts in the field of WMD. These attachments would greatly enhance our national ability to solve WMD problems early in a potential crisis with regional, tactical and technical expertise.

In addition to more detailed NBC training, SF units must add a more focused demolition task to their repertoire. Traditionally, SF engineers learn to blow up bridges, communication centers and power plants. They must learn different techniques of explosive ordinance destruction (EOD). Then they must combine this EOD skill with the knowledge of WMDs, their capabilities, and vulnerabilities. This combination, when added to their proficiency in DA missions, will enable them to combat the proliferation of WMDs.

Finally, to best employ our only full time UW force to counter the proliferation of WMD, we must be willing to allow them to operate on the edges of democracy. To truly act as global scouts, they must be frequently located in and around those regions that will most likely attempt

to proliferate WMD. If we, as a nation, accept this limited risk now, we may avert a significant risk of future WMD warfare. This recommendation is of value for all potential future conflicts.

## **ANALYSIS OF COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES**

The term collateral activities is very broad in its definition. For the purpose of this paper I will discuss three major collateral activities. First, I will discuss Humanitarian Assistance (HA) missions, and how they might be affected by the future. Then I will cover Peace Keeping (PK), with special emphasis on working under the provisions of the United Nations Charter, chapters 6 and 7. Finally I will discuss Information Operations (IO). This last topic is not limited to collateral operations, but I posit that information requirements and the recommendations presented here will cover combat and non-combat equally and are applicable in virtually all scenarios.

### **HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

Humanitarian Assistance operations are conducted by American armed forces when our NCA decides to reduce the suffering of a society<sup>21</sup>. That suffering may be caused by a natural disaster, like a famine or flood, or it may be caused by a man-made disaster, like a war or embargo. The disaster itself may include trauma, starvation, and disease and probable all three. It usually involves hundreds or thousands of casualties.

A common scenario for an HA operation should go like this: The American people, and their elected officials, become aware of a humanitarian crisis in some third world region. This disaster, for example, may be due to a poor year at harvest combined with a worsening economic situation. The media shows starving children and begging parents daily on the TV and in the papers. The President determines we have a responsibility to help in the disaster, and that it is in our national interest to do so. The military quickly sends an area assessment team into country to determine the scope of the problem and how we can help. Shortly afterwards, the military ships soldiers and equipment to the region and begins setting up aid distribution centers. At these distribution centers aid is handed to those in need and the death toll begins to recede. Meanwhile the State Department has sent civilian advisors to the region to aid in correcting the agricultural and economic problems so that the disaster does not repeat itself.

### **Unconventional Roles in Future HA Operations**

Special Forces have always had a key role in HA. I expect that role will increase due to the unique requirements for HA operations. Initial forces into the region should be organized into small, multipurpose, regionally-oriented teams trained to assess the situation quickly with

particular concern for medical and infrastructure shortfalls. SF units fill those requirements in their standard A-Team organization. The SF have had a lasting interest in every HA for the last decade. In many such operations, SF units were the first Americans in the disaster area and therefore conducted an impromptu area assessment. Without early intervention, many HA situations can easily bear the seeds of an insurgency or regional conflict. The early introduction of global scouts can identify and often mitigate the potential unrest.

### **Recommendations for SF in HA Operations**

How can SF improve its response capability in future HA operations? As recommended earlier, SF must continue to improve its regional focus by constantly sending teams into remote regions. This will increase SF knowledge of the area as well as contributing to American popularity in the area. Just as important, it will give our NCA an early warning of pending disaster so that they have the option of being more proactive with humanitarian aid and immediate response.

### **PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

One of the many modern military terms that one would not find in a military dictionary of the 1940's or 50's is "Peace Support." In the current environment of proficient and prolific killing machines, our global society can not afford to be swept into a global war. In an instance when two rivals are fighting, and the majority of their international neighbors want to see the conflict end, a third party can be placed in the area to keep or to force peace on the belligerents. This third party (the peace keepers (PK) or peace enforcers (PE)) must be more powerful, or at least potentially more powerful, than the two fighting forces. The UN Charter in chapters 6 and 7 authorizes the use of varying amounts of force in order to force or support a peaceful settlement<sup>22</sup>.

The normal Peace Support (PS) scenario, for now and in the foreseeable future, will revolve around the United Nations. Imagine a region that is gradually drifting into armed conflict. This conflict may be inter- or intra-national. The nature of the conflict is such that the UN (and the US) do not clearly pick a side to support and favor. The UN then sends PS troops into the region to separate the fighting forces IAW chapters 6 or 7 (depending on the amount of force required). This may be with or without the consent of the fighting factions. When dealing with warring factions, the attainment of a cease fire may be accomplished with the mere threat of force, not the violence itself. This PS scenario has been recently attempted in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East with varying degrees of success. Success in such ventures is certainly not guaranteed. Some reasons that complete success is not achieved

include ambiguous end-states, complicated command structure and varied levels of commitment among the UN members and combatants. The difficulty of achieving success, however, should not deter the international community from such ventures.

### **SF Role in PS Missions**

What role will SF have in this ever-increasing and increasingly more difficult military operation? Because of the regional expertise of the SF soldier and the fact that he alone is trained, equipped and organized to fight “by, with and through” others, he will continue to act as interface between various factions. SF teams should be tasked to conduct liaison at other UN force headquarters as well with the warring factions. Liaisons in this situation must know not only the military capabilities and operations of the forces with whom they work, but also be able to facilitate conflict resolution and problem solving at various levels and over various subjects.

Another key task for SF soldiers in this situation, as in all others addressed in this paper, is to gather information. Situational awareness is the most important commodity when conducting PS operations. SF units can offer a great source of human intelligence (HUMINT) as they travel the streets between opposing forces, as is currently being done in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Gathering information as closely as possible to the source is the best way to determine the actual intent of the warring commanders. Once the UN force knows the intent of the two opposing commanders, it can better keep the peace and prevent itself from becoming surprised or decisively engaged in combat.

While conducting PS operations the SF commander will have two missions. One is to keep the opposing forces apart and the other is to provide for the security of his own force. Interface with adjacent units and timely intelligence are imperative to providing force security. However, if all else fails, the prudent commander will always have a quick reaction force (QRF) on hand to immediately quell any threat to his forces. Under some limited circumstances, SF units could be tasked with the QRF mission. They are well armed, can be task-organized, and generally react well to high stress conditions. Their maturity and cultural awareness may also serve to provide a more measured response than that of a conventional maneuver unit.

It is possible that US military forces will be used as peacekeepers within our own country. This was the case with the Joint Task Force-Los Angeles after the Rodney King riots. If needed, Special Forces can have a role in these operations as well. The need for a well trained and versatile group of men capable of independent action is applicable here as well.<sup>23</sup>

### **Recommendations for SF in Future PS Operations**

What should SF do to be more capable of successfully playing their potential role in future PS operations? In addition to the suggestions already mentioned, SF units must become proficient with non-lethal weapons technology. These new munitions could be of great value in riot control at home or overseas. These munitions include rubber and wooden bullets and "stun" grenades designed not to kill or permanently wound the target.

The SF soldier must also become more proficient in some lethal means as well. The use of sniper teams is a good deterrent to crowd agitators.<sup>24</sup> In some situations, one person may be targeted when that person is in the process of whipping a mob into a frenzy. While this example does not sound like "peacekeeping," it may greatly enhance the peace. These capabilities and tactics must be incorporated into the rules of engagement (ROE) to ensure any potential legal issues are deconflicted before a conflict. Historically, all ROE allows US soldiers to defend themselves and their comrades.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The military use of information as a weapon and as something to be controlled is not limited to non-combat operations. In fact, information management spans the gamut of not only military operations, but all elements of national power. Information warfare will be just as important in fourth generation warfare as it will be in any future MTW or counter-WMD operation. Information, or misinformation, can change the perception of reality. How one perceives reality determines how one reacts to reality, which in turn determines the new reality. Therefore, he who controls information can determine reality.

The Tofflers write in their book War and Anti-War<sup>25</sup> that the history of warfare, and of the world, is in its third phase: the information age. The first two were the agrarian age and the industrial age. The difference between information warfare and industrial warfare is that we no longer depend just on manpower and hardware to win battles. Now software, or "invisible information," can greatly influence the war. By keeping the enemy from the information he requires through electronic, passive or active means, one can disrupt his decision cycle. By controlling publication and frequencies of the media, one can influence his popular support and possibly spark a revolt in his ranks.

Not only is it important to control tactical information like commanders' radios and TV perceptions of reality, it is just as important to control technical information. This form of information might be weapons control data or banking transactions. In short, information may 'make or break' any element of national power.

### **Role of SF in Information Operations**

What role will SF play in this increasing type of warfare? SF units should be prepared to conduct offensive and defensive Information Operations (IO). In conducting offensive IO, the SF unit must be able to target military, economic or psychological targets. In a less than open combat conflict, it might prove necessary to freeze the financial or trade operations of a region. For example, an SF team might be tasked to covertly infiltrate the target and modify an internal computer system. A covert modification might be insertion of an electronic virus or a switch in the computer program's decision loop. An overt mission might be the physical destruction of fiber optic nodes. Depending on the severity of the modification or destruction, this type of operation could freeze the trade of a particular commodity within the region for an extended time. This break in trade might be just what the NCA needs to accomplish its overall objective.

Another offensive information target will be the psychological well-being of the populations in a conflict. Winning the hearts and minds of warring nations has long been an item of concern. In the future we will be able to use the information highway in this battle. An SF team might be tasked to take over a communication station, either by force or by stealth. Unlike in the past, when the destruction of this station would be the objective, now we might be able to turn the communication station into a weapon against the enemy. By working "by, with and through" others, the Unconventional Warrior could communicate the appropriate message across the airwaves in whatever format was needed, or temporarily disable such a station without destruction.

A final point is that the military technical uses of information are endless. In the future our forces will be centered around 'smart' weapons. SF units will be organized with smart weapons and will be even more capable of massing decisive fires anywhere on the battlefield. Enemy forces may also be armed with smart weapons and offensive IO capability. We must ensure that we are not totally dependent on our information dominance, or that dependency may become a vulnerability.

### **Recommendations for SF in Information Operations**

What must our SF units do to be more capable of conducting information operations across the spectrum of warfare? I recommend we reorganize our A-Teams to include an information expert. This expertise area is too broad to be picked up as another duty for any of the team members. I suggest that an additional Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), 18I, be added to the TO&E of each A-Team initially, and B and C-Teams eventually. These 18Is must have their own phase of training in the Special Forces Qualification Course at Ft. Bragg. Their training must include all SF common tasks in addition to their MOS-specific tasks like computer

programming and sabotage. Only when this base of expertise is established and refined can it be cross-trained to the entire SF organization. When these skills are sufficiently embedded in the SF community, SF units will be ready to carry the information war to the enemy across the spectrum of intensity.

## **SUMMARY**

Our nation's Unconventional Warriors have long been recognized as a professional and versatile combat force. They will undoubtedly be called upon in the future wars I have described here to continue their contributions. In the next few pages I will summarize a few recommendations that, if followed, will heighten the SF capability to fight in future wars.

## **ORGANIZATION**

The initiatives described above increase an already heavy deployment requirement. I've recommended adding two information warriors (MOS 18I) to each ODA and eventually every ODB/ODC, and reorganizing each Group into a self-contained UW task force with its own air support. In addition, I've recommended that SF teams spend as much as a third of their time training overseas to increase their regional expertise and to act as "global scouts." Also added are more detailed NBC and IW tasks. All of these requirements are in addition to the current collection of operational requirements that keep the average ODA deployed up to 6 months each year. Thus, the preparation and conduct of future Warfare will require an increased number of Unconventional Warriors.

To meet that requirement, the US military must increase the number of SF Groups from five active groups to eight. Those Groups should be manned at 115% of the current "authorized" strength. Since "SOF Forces can not be mass produced during a time of crisis," we must start now<sup>26</sup>.

To grow a larger force we must increase our recruiting base. First, we must open our ranks more freely to non-US citizens. We could give US citizenship to any non-citizen who serves a complete tour on an ODA. These foreign recruits could be from the ranks of our close allies (a German or Italian soldier leaving that country's military) or, if proper police records exist, right off of the street of a foreign town. Second, we must aggressively recruit from our sister services. Many a good Marine ETSs that, with some good SF mentoring, could be a good UW warrior. Finally, we could take a greater number of soldiers into SF from basic training. While our UW capability would suffer if the preponderance of the force were made up of young soldiers, one man per ODA could be mentored into a great UW trooper with little risk to the mission.

## EMPLOYMENT

Our nation must be ready to accept the risk of committing UW forces early while the conflict is still developing. Often, pre-hostility involvement by SF troops can quell the violence before it grows into a regional conflict. If violence does spread throughout the region, early intervention by SF soldiers would greatly enhance our information capability and ultimately our UW capability, in addition to increasing options available to the regional CINC.

## TRAINING

I have recommended the idea of training more with foreign and American conventional forces during major training exercises. In addition to more interface with conventional units and with the people throughout the region, SF soldiers must train more on all aspects of WMD. They must become more proficient than just the common skills required by all soldiers for surviving in an NBC environment. They must understand the theory and techniques of WMD proliferation, deployment and operation. They must also become more expert in WMD identification, disposal and EOD. Then, when augmented by WMD experts, they can solve one of our greatest challenges.

Special Forces soldiers should be sent all around the world to observe armed conflicts and to act as impartial observers. This would not only improve the regional knowledge of the soldier and his understanding of the regional military issues, but also provide him priceless personal combat experience at an acceptable level of risk.

Selected soldiers should even spend a short (one or two month) tour training within Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). They could work within the NGO operations or plans office, bringing with them their military organizational skills. This would greatly enhance the ability to perform liaison duties during Humanitarian Operations. The natural resistance to such infiltration could gradually be overcome by developing good relations and by giving governmental preference to those NGO's who participate in such programs.

## EQUIPMENT

It is the dream of every commander to have his force equipped with state-of-the-art-equipment, and to have that equipment updated whenever it can be replaced by a better piece of gear. Economic realities do not allow this to happen often. Resource allocations are usually split between research for future systems and purchasing of current ones. Since SF is a small and lightly armed force with a strategic and ever-growing mission, it should be constantly equipped with the latest equipment. This will allow it to be maintained as a viable force across the spectrum of conflict. The equipment used by the SF soldier must be

reliable under the most extreme conditions. It must be versatile enough to operate in any of the future war possibilities. It must also be small and light enough to be carried by a man with a backpack whenever possible.

## **CONCLUSION**

As long as we continue to select, assess and train high quality soldiers into Special Forces, SF will act as a force multiplier on the battlefield of the future. By incorporating a few recommended changes, America's Unconventional Warriors will have an even greater positive effect on future military operations across the spectrum of conflict. The future will not look like the past and our future SF forces must be raised to transform as a norm.

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## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).
- <sup>2</sup> Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Doubleday, 1990).
- <sup>3</sup> Williamson Murray (ed.), Army Transformation: A View from the U.S. Army War College, Chapter 1: Introduction (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 2001), pp. 1-25.
- <sup>4</sup> Michael R. Kershner, "Army Special Forces' Training Focuses On Unconventional Warfare," Army, July, 2001, p.23
- <sup>5</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 21.
- <sup>6</sup> Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Beret, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 183
- <sup>7</sup> Smith, p.186.
- <sup>8</sup> Class notes, Special Forces Qualification Course, March 1988.
- <sup>9</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994)
- <sup>10</sup> Kershner, p.23
- <sup>11</sup> Mark Boyett, COL SF: Discussion at SF Commanders' Conference, Fall, 1999
- <sup>12</sup> William Lind, Keith Nightentgale, et al. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Military Review October, 1989, p. 24-33. .
- <sup>13</sup> Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p.193-227
- <sup>14</sup> William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy For a Global Age (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), p.4
- <sup>15</sup> Class Notes, Oct, 2001, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
- <sup>16</sup> Bank, p. 186.
- <sup>17</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 21.
- <sup>18</sup> Peter J. Schoomaker, "Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead" 1998; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1998/s19980201-schoomaker.html>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2002

<sup>19</sup> Dana Priest, "Free from Oversight, U.S. Military Trains Foreign Troops," Washington Post, 12 July 1998, sec. A, p. A 01.

<sup>20</sup> Matthew, 9:12

<sup>21</sup> Clinton, p.4

<sup>22</sup> UN Charter, public domain, May 2000, available from <http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter>>; Internet; accessed

<sup>23</sup> John Allison, Major, USMC, (Personal Interview, April 1995)

<sup>24</sup> The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the commandant's Lecture Series (USMC Command and Staff College 1995)

<sup>25</sup> Alvin Toffler, War and Anti-war, (Boston, 1993)

<sup>26</sup> Class Notes, Dec 2001, AWC, lecture on "SOF Truths"

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