

OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA UNITS



Reviewed and approved for reprinting 24 June 1965.

This reprint contains effective pages only of the basic manual and changes 1 and 2. Upon insertion of change 3 the manual will be current as of 14 December 1964.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14 August 1962

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

This publication, FMFM-21, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES, is one of a series of Fleet Marine Force Manuals expressing the tactics and techniques to be employed in operations and training by the operating forces of the Marine Corps. FMFM-21 has the following specific purpose: To present the tactics and techniques utilized by Marine Corps landing forces against guerrilla forces and to serve as a basic text for use in the Marine Corps educational system. It is made available to the other services for information and such use as they may desire.

2. SCOPE


This manual outlines the origin, objectives, and characteristics of guerrilla warfare as well as the tactics and techniques employed by guerrilla forces. It takes its departure from the U. S. Marine Corps publication, "Small Wars Manual, 1940," and places emphasis on the planning and conduct of operations against guerrillas by Marine Corps forces. Additionally, it considers the employment of friendly guerrilla forces in support of amphibious operations.

3. CHANGES

Recommendations for improving this manual are invited. Comments and recommended changes should be forwarded to the Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities, Quantico, Virginia.

4. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.


WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff


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Change 1 to FMFM-21

1. FMFM-21, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES, dated 14 August 1962, has been redesignated FMFM 8-2, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA UNITS.
2. Change FMFM-21, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES to FMFM 8-2, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA UNITS on the cover, Foreword and page iii. Change FMFM-21 to FMFM 8-2, wherever it appears in the manual.
3. Make the following additional pen changes:
 - a. Paragraph 702b(21), page 51. Change reference to FMFM-24 to FMFM 3-3.
 - b. Paragraph 806c, page 64. Change reference to FMFM-15 to FMFM 2-2.
 - c. Paragraph 904a, page 69. Change reference to FMFM-20, Logistics, to FMFM 4-1, Logistic and Personnel Support.
 - d. Bibliography, page 127. Change reference to FMFM-24 to FMFM 3-3. Change reference to FMFM-15 to FMFM 2-2. Change reference to FMFM-20, Logistics, to FMFM 4-1, Logistic and Personnel Support.
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
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
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SECTION 1: GUERRILLA WARFARE

101. GENERAL

◆ a. Throughout military history, guerrilla warfare has formed a powerful weapon in the hands of insurgent forces in their efforts to seize power from constituted authority. Given even limited popular support, numerically inferior guerrilla forces have the capability of defeating or greatly reducing the effectiveness of regularly organized military organizations unless the threat is met by positive counteraction. In weak or newly emerging nations, guerrilla warfare can effectively prevent such nations from establishing or maintaining stable governments. Instability in government is an invitation to the communist block to "fish in troubled waters." Inasmuch as there is an increasing number of nations who are going through the evolution from colonies to statehood, there is a greatly increased number of nations who are faced with this type of revolution. There is a growing need for a full understanding of the entire problem of subversive insurgency, and for a knowledge of the techniques involved in its defeat.

◆ b. It will be evident in such a study that counter guerrilla activity is a prime element of a comprehensive counterinsurgency program. It complements companion efforts to improve economic and educational levels, to stabilize and improve the political and psychological climate, to firm up the civic status, and to assist its armed forces in developing their own strength in order to contribute to national stability. These more peaceful actions, however, will often not be sufficient in themselves, and the task of meeting and defeating a guerrilla problem--created on the enemy's terms--may face our military forces. It is the purpose of this manual to outline the counter guerrilla tasks which are within the capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force.

102. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

◆ a. Insurgency Defined--A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily

communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

▶ b. Counterinsurgency Defined.--Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

c. Application.--Although counterinsurgency extends into fields which are not primary areas of Marine Corps endeavor, Marine Corps forces must be prepared to undertake counterinsurgency operations when directed. Operations against guerrillas as treated herein, are a major element of counterinsurgent activity.

103. GUERRILLA WARFARE DEFINED

▶ Guerrilla warfare is defined as military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

104. GUERRILLA DEFINED

▶ A guerrilla is defined as a combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

105. TYPES OF GUERRILLA FORCES

a. Guerrilla Forces Emerging From a Defeated Military Organization.--As military forces of a recognized government are defeated or forced to withdraw, members of these defeated forces, local civilians, or both, organize as guerrillas to disrupt enemy operations. A military force assigned the mission of reestablishing the recognized government may operate in conjunction

with this type guerrilla force. See section 12.

b. Guerrilla Forces Opposed to the Existing Government.--Guerrilla forces may be formed to fight for a new political order through the destruction of the existing patterns of society. Guerrillas attempt to obtain popular support through passive consent or terror.

c. External Military Forces Introduced Into a Country.--Military personnel may come from another country to assist the guerrillas. This assistance may come in the form of individuals "volunteering" or in regularly organized military forces. Initially, individuals may furnish guidance on organization, tactics, and techniques, and may become key leaders. They can determine requirements for military equipment and for technicians who can be provided to operate or to instruct in the operation and maintenance of equipment unfamiliar to the guerrillas. Certain guerrillas can be evacuated to another country for specialized training unavailable in their locality. When guerrilla forces control a sufficiently large area to the extent that it can absorb additional forces, external military forces may be introduced.

106. EVOLUTION OF FORCES

a. Resistance stems from the dissatisfaction of some part of the population. The dissatisfaction may be real, imagined or incited and is usually centered around a desire for--

(1) Political change.

(2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression.

(3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.

(4) Economic and social improvement.

(5) Religious expression.

b. Resistance movements may form locally or be inspired by "sponsoring powers." The evolution of the guerrilla force usually follows a sequence of events that form a pattern:

(1) The existence of a dissident group.

(2) The emergence of groups which are willing to bear arms.

(3) The appearance of strong, determined leaders to further organize and orient these groups. As members of underground organizations are identified and resistance grows, guerrilla bands form in secure areas to become the military arm of the guerrilla force.

(4) Initial successes are exploited to convince elements of the population to support an effective guerrilla organization.

(5) Seeking and accepting support from external sources.

(6) The employment of equipment and personnel furnished by external sources.

(7) The integration of the guerrilla forces into a regular military organization.

107. LEGAL STATUS AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949

a. The Law of Land Warfare.--The law of land warfare says

that members of organized resistance movements opposing our military forces are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war if they meet the following requirements:

(1) They are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

(2) They wear a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.

(3) They bear arms openly.

(4) They conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. Geneva Conventions of 1949

(1) If both sides in a civil war or revolt request and receive military support from foreign powers, the opposing foreign powers may not be at war with each other. In such a situation and when the belligerents have not been recognized as such, only Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies. Article 3 is quoted below:

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply as a minimum the following provisions:

"(1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat (put out of the fighting) by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any

other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

"(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;

"(b) Taking of hostages;

"(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

"(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

"(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the international committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force by means of special agreements all or part of the other provisions of the present convention.

"The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

(2) The parties to such a conflict are the legally constituted government and the challenging insurgent force. Customs of war give other States the right to intervene in a civil war if cruelties not permitted by international codes are practiced by either party.

(3) Although the Geneva Conventions are binding only in the

Territories of the contracting nations, the provisions of Article 3 should be applied whenever adhered to by the opposing forces or when they can be carried out without jeopardy to the military mission.

108. CHARACTERISTICS

a. Characteristics Contributing to Successful Guerrilla Operations

▶ (1) Surprise.-- Surprise is the principle of war most essential to successful guerrilla operations. The guerrilla obtains surprise by operating in vast areas that offer concealment and freedom of movement and by conducting operations at night. Through surprise, the guerrilla seeks to overcome the enemy's advantage of numbers, organization, and supporting arms. He masses his forces at selected times and places to attack where defensive forces are weakest. Following the attack, he can quickly disperse his forces to designated areas.

▶ (2) Mobility.-- To achieve surprise and avoid fixed positions, the guerrilla relies on mobility. He obtains mobility afoot by being lightly armed, having detailed knowledge of the terrain, and by being relatively free of heavy logistic burdens. Mobility afoot offers advantages when operating in inclement weather, in reduced visibility, and in terrain which would be an obstacle to a more heavily equipped enemy. Even under adverse conditions, the foot-mobile guerrilla converges on a target, strikes unexpectedly, and swiftly disperses prior to the arrival of a stronger opposing force.

▶ (3) Civilian Support.-- The guerrilla seeks to obtain or maintain

the active support of the populace in his area of operations. This support will be forthcoming in direct proportion to the feeling that is generated by the effectiveness of the guerrilla campaign or the ineffectiveness of the opposing authority. If the guerrilla force cannot gain the active support of the populace, it still attempts to make them at least passive in their support of the opposition.

▶ (a) In general, the populace will probably contain three factions: guerrilla supporters; opposition supporters; and those who, for one reason or another, prefer not to become involved (neutralist). Among the active supporters there are guerrilla auxiliaries, collaborators, and informers. These supporters and the guerrilla force will attempt to achieve the support of the neutral group through the use of propaganda, economic assistance, and by making them indirect participants through the distribution of captured goods, food, and property. Terroristic methods such as assassination, murder, and the taking of hostages are often resorted to by some guerrilla units.

▶ (b) With civilian support the guerrilla force can solve many of its logistical support problems. The civilian population will provide manpower; specialists from the various professions, such as doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers, and skilled technicians; food, clothing, and equipment; hiding places; arms and ammunition; and intelligence.

▶ (4) Area Familiarity.--If he is a native of the area, the guerrilla has three advantages over the opposition, first, when not fighting he can appear to be a harmless

civilian; second, he may have an intimate working knowledge of the terrain over which he operates; and third, he may have personal contacts with the population which may provide partial solutions to his problems of intelligence, supply and communications. If he is not a native, the guerrilla will seek to obtain these three advantages as rapidly as possible in the area in which his band has been assigned to operate.

(5) Depth of Operations.--Guerrillas frequently are organized into many small units which are dispersed over a large area. This provides depth to their operations, simplifies logistics, and makes it difficult to locate them. They attack flanks, rear areas, small or isolated outposts, lines of communications, poorly trained and armed village guards and similar objectives which are least prepared for or capable of combat.

(6) Favorable Terrain.--Mountains, swamps, forests, and jungles are favorable to guerrillas because their primary means of mobility is on foot. These areas do not favor a force that is dependent upon fixed lines of communications, extensive logistic support, heavy supporting arms, and mechanical means of transportation.

▶ (7) Intelligence System.--By establishing an intelligence system composed of indigenous military personnel and civilians who are employed by the opposition authority and its military forces, the guerrilla can acquire accurate and timely information.

(8) Communications.--Communications used by guerrillas may vary from complex communication-electronic equipment to

audio, visual, and messengers. Guerrillas will utilize the civilian communication system as well as fishermen, travelers, and workmen as messengers and observers. Every sympathetic civilian is a potential member of the communication system.

(9) External Support.-- The guerrillas can usually obtain food and light weapons from local civilian sources, but may depend heavily on external sources for communication equipment, technical personnel, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. External support greatly expands the potential of the guerrilla forces.

b. Characteristics Limiting Guerrilla Operations

(1) Lack of Mass.-- A limitation of the guerrilla force is its inability to achieve a final victory without external assistance. It is incapable of concentrating combat power for any extended period, unable to exploit success, and thus compelled to accept something short of victory.

(2) Lack of Means.-- Guerrillas must often depend on seized arms and equipment and are usually denied, by nonavailability of both equipment and technicians, the use of weapons other than small arms.

(3) Betrayal.-- The guerrilla is vulnerable to betrayal by members of his organization.

◆ (4) Volunteers Without Contract.-- The guerrilla commander leads a band of people who regard themselves as patriotic civilians rather than soldiers. They have no contract to bind them to their duties and may at anytime consider family obligations, crop

harvests, or business to be more important than the overall guerrilla cause.

(5) Lack of Training and Discipline.-- Basically a civilian, the average guerrilla lacks the formal knowledge and the discipline which results from military training. This deficiency severely limits effectiveness, particularly during the early stages of guerrilla organization. Time, the will of the leaders, and imported military personnel and technicians may eventually lessen the seriousness of these deficiencies.

◆ (6) Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare.-- The average guerrilla is susceptible to psychological warfare operations directed against him. The guerrilla may become disheartened and disillusioned with the guerrilla cause if skillful propaganda exploits his failures. For the most part, people become guerrillas because they are dissatisfied with existing conditions. To convince them that they no longer have reason to be dissatisfied is to remove their reason for being guerrillas.

109. OBJECTIVES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

a. The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to contribute to the defeat of the enemy. As most guerrilla forces possess certain limitations, their specific objectives cannot be decisive military action, such as seizing and holding terrain, until expanded and formalized to the extent of conventional forces.

b. The broad objectives of guerrilla warfare are to--

(1) Reduce the enemy's combat effectiveness.

(2) Delay and disrupt enemy operations.

(3) Weaken the morale and will to resist of enemy forces.

(4) Limit the enemy's development and exploitation of the territory it occupies.

(5) Develop and strengthen the will of the people to resist the established government.

c. To achieve these broad objectives, the guerrilla assumes the role of a swift, silent, disappearing combatant who selects the time and place of battle. His objectives are accomplished by--

(1) Attacking and interrupting the enemy's lines of communication.

(2) Inflicting casualties on and harassing the enemy's forces.

(3) Destroying enemy supplies and installations.

(4) Capturing enemy supplies.

(5) Terrorizing the enemy.

110. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. Independence, varying size, and flexibility characterize the guerrilla organization. Some of the factors influencing organization and control are:

(1) The extent of ambushes and raids.

(2) Terrain and enemy capabilities.

(3) Requirements for mobility and surprise (which tend to restrict the size of weapons to be used).

(4) Conducting psychological warfare and political indoctrination--

(a) To ensure continued loyalty and proper political ideology within the guerrilla ranks.

(b) To gain or control civilian support.

(c) To demoralize and to cause the defection of the enemy forces.

(5) The manufacture, salvage and repair of small arms and demolitions.

(6) Training of new recruits.

(7) Providing for limited logistic support.

(8) Security of the guerrilla base.

(9) Guerrilla strength.

(10) Degree of outside support and control.

b. Guerrilla tactical units are usually small bands of 20 to 30 men; however, several bands may join together to form units of considerable size.

c. Guerrillas may employ young and old, male or female, in supporting organizations and hard core cadres that mend, repair, clean, cook, farm and perform other similar duties. The hard core cadres, properly led, are capable of achieving selected limited objectives

to regenerate support of wavering populace.

d. The guerrilla commander will establish succession of command and designate alternate base areas. Members of the organization normally do not question the commander's authority.

e. Widely separated small units operating over large areas necessitate decentralized control and provide operational latitude for the small unit commander. The commander provides the necessary guidance and direction to his unit commanders but normally leaves implementation to his subordinates. Exceptions to this general rule are:

(1) Emergency measures conducted against enemy forces which threaten the security of the guerrilla force.

(2) Targets assigned specifically to an area commander by the overall commander.

111. GUERRILLA WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

a. Guerrillas usually possess a variety of light infantry weapons. Rarely will they employ any weapon heavier than an 81mm mortar or a 75mm recoilless rifle. Demolitions are required for the destruction of rail lines, roads, and for making grenades and mines to use in raids, ambushes, etc. They improvise additional weapons such as hand-thrown fire bombs; sharpened sticks or nails set in ditches near ambush sites and trails; thin wires stretched across roads and trails at night at heights designed to decapitate vehicle drivers.

b. Equipment requirements vary according to the weather and

terrain. Shelters are usually made from available vegetation. A small bowl for eating and a pack are the usual equipment carried by the guerrilla. Leaders usually carry fieldglasses, compasses, and maps. Radios are used to contact external agencies.

112. GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. Planning Considerations.-- The guerrilla considers the size of the enemy forces, dispositions, and their movements. He obtains a thorough knowledge of the terrain, road nets, and trails before making a plan. Large-scale operations are avoided, unless tactical surprise and a highly favorable ratio of numerical superiority is assured. The use of small detachments to strike surprise blows at isolated installations, convoys, columns, or detachments is considered in each plan. Consideration is given to the withdrawal and dispersal of the force. Although all operations are normally conducted at night, the degree of visibility required at night may receive special consideration along with the weather.

b. Areas of Operation

(1) Guerrilla operations may extend throughout the entire area of conflict and can be divided into three general categories:

(a) Area Controlled Effectively by Guerrillas.-- This area is usually characterized by extremely difficult terrain and is the area in which the guerrilla has his headquarters and camps.

(b) Area Controlled Effectively by Guerrillas' Enemy.-- Raiding operations in this area are executed only by small guerrilla units or by individuals.

◆ (c) Area Not Controlled by Either Force.-- This is the principal battleground for the guerrilla, and he will attempt to bring more of it under his domination. Large guerrilla forces enter this area and any enemy force is apt to encounter ambush or harassment.

(2) As the situation in a given area becomes more favorable to the guerrilla, the area controlled may expand to the extent that enemy forces find themselves in a virtual siege by the guerrillas.

(3) Areas of operation will normally be aligned within political subdivisions and placed under the jurisdiction of subordinate guerrilla commanders. They will exercise civilian control measures, conduct food and supply collection, levy and collect taxes, and carry out operations against the enemy.

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

◆ (1) Intelligence.-- Acquiring area operation intelligence is of primary importance to the guerrilla force and its external sponsoring forces. The guerrilla's existence will depend on his knowledge of the terrain, enemy strength, organization, movements, dispositions, armament and habits. In addition, the guerrilla may be the source of information for a sponsoring force. The close relationship between guerrilla units and the civilian populace affords many valuable contacts that may provide information of enemy operations, weapons, dispositions, habits, and morale. The relationship frequently extends to political, economic, administrative, or psychological processes.

(2) Counterintelligence. - - Guerrilla counterintelligence agents

are used to cover all areas of guerrilla operations. Because of the possibility of enemy infiltration and betrayal by his own guerrillas, he must continually seek out spies and informers. Personnel recruited for guerrilla forces are carefully screened before joining and closely observed after joining.

d. Covert Operations

(1) Civil Disturbances.-- While civil disturbances are not essentially military in nature, they can be an effective means to a military end. They are usually associated with urban areas, for they depend on population masses for effectiveness. To incite a major disturbance enables the guerrilla to achieve some of the effects of combat without actually engaging his forces. Civil unrest directed against the guerrilla's enemy causes that enemy to divert forces, change policies, and weakens his combat power.

(2) Sabotage.-- Sabotage is a most effective weapon of covert operations. Properly planned and carried out by both active guerrillas and sympathetic civilians, it affects all phases of the enemy war effort. Physically, it reduces his war potential, which reduces his morale. Sabotage causes the enemy to divert troops to security missions. The guerrilla's successes against the enemy tend to encourage civilians not previously active to commit acts of petty sabotage. These petty acts further harass and confuse the enemy. Successful sabotage results have tremendous propaganda value. These results are hailed as symbols of the resistance, serving to stimulate morale of the guerrilla movement.

(3) Terrorism. - - Guerrilla forces may terrorize to intimidate

or subjugate the civil population in order to ensure support. Acts of violence including murder, arson, bombings, and kidnappings are normally directed toward elements of the population who lack adequate protection or self-defense.

e. Overt Operations

(1) Ambush

(a) The value of ambush lies in the surprise and shock effect. In planning an ambush, the guerrilla commander has an advantage in selecting the terrain, position, and time, which enables him to employ a small force to achieve results. The ambush is employed against moving or temporarily halted targets to kill the enemy and to capture his supplies and equipment.

(b) Three conditions for an ambush are desirable: terrain of a constricting nature, a method of halting or sealing off the target, and the delivery of maximum firepower in a short period of time.

(c) The ambush force usually permits enemy security elements to pass through the main ambush area. Attack of the main body commences upon a prearranged signal and is normally of short duration followed by rapid withdrawal. If the enemy cannot react or reinforce, the guerrilla may stay long enough to salvage any usable equipment and destroy the rest. To cover movement to and from the ambush area, the guerrilla employs extensive security measures. To cover his withdrawal, the guerrilla may employ secondary ambushes to destroy or delay the enemy reinforcements.

(d) If the ambush fails, the guerrilla withdraws on prearranged signal and disperses in many

directions, falling back to secondary ambush sites to destroy or delay any pursuing enemy.

(2) Raids

(a) Like the ambush, the raid is dependent upon surprise for effectiveness. However, it is directed against stationary targets and is therefore more complicated and risky.

(b) The purpose of the raid is normally the destruction of key enemy installations or the capture of personnel, supplies or equipment. The side effects of harassment and reduction of enemy morale may prove as beneficial as the destruction of the target.

(c) Guerrilla raids differ very little from raids planned and executed by conventional forces. Three elements are generally required to accomplish the mission: a force designated to eliminate enemy security; a force to accomplish the mission; and a force to cover the withdrawal.

f. Security

(1) Because of his precarious position, the guerrilla must maintain strict security. His relatively weak forces depend almost entirely upon secrecy and deception for their existence. Security is the primary protective measure against surprise, espionage, observation, and interference by the enemy. Only those personnel actively involved in directing guerrilla operations are permitted knowledge of guerrilla dispositions. False information may be disseminated to deceive the enemy and to assist in covering security leaks.

(2) Measures adopted to maintain security include locating

the camp and its installations in difficult terrain, keeping these facilities mobile, and maintaining alternate locations in a continual state of preparedness. Radio and other communication facilities maintain strictest security and are frequently moved to avoid detection.

(3) Maintenance of adequate security control of the civil population is a pressing security problem. It requires the guerrilla to have continual knowledge of all personnel movement in his area and to maintain up-to-date information on known and suspected security risks.

g. Defensive Considerations

(1) Guerrilla units avoid defensive combat. Their relative lack of mass and means places them at a distinct disadvantage in static defense against regular forces. If forced to assume the defensive, the guerrilla takes every possible advantage of terrain and mobility to avoid being fixed in position.

(2) Encirclement is a major threat to the guerrilla force. The security system is oriented to provide warning of encirclement in adequate time to react. Plans are made and rehearsed that provide many alternate routes of egress from the installation or scene of action. The guerrilla leader, upon being encircled, has three possibilities for survival:

(a) Plan and execute a breakout at the earliest possible time.


(b) Dissolve his units and disappear on an individual basis, abandoning much of his equipment and supplies in order to survive to fight again.

(c) Hold his force together, find the nearest defensible terrain, and organize the strongest possible perimeter defense.

(3) The breakout is usually the most feasible course of action. If he chooses to dissolve his force, the guerrilla commander may lose much of his equipment and may suffer the loss of an organization which must be rebuilt. A breakout requires careful planning. The guerrilla force attempts to slip through existing gaps. When no gaps exist, the force seeks weak points in the enemy's encirclement. If it becomes evident the breakout will fail, the guerrilla commander divides his forces into small units to infiltrate enemy lines to predesignated assembly areas.

(4) Guerrilla forces exterior to the encircled area may be of great assistance to the encircled forces by executing diversionary attacks.

(5) When required, the short-duration defense of a position may be planned as an adjunct to other operations to gain time to accomplish a mission, to hold the enemy's main body while other units attack his flanks and rear, to allow time for reassembly of forces, or to protect their withdrawal.



SECTION 2: LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

201. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps forces may be called upon to participate in counterinsurgency operations in countries with which the United States has mutual security or other agreements or at the request of a country with which no prior agreement exists. A Marine Corps force may operate as part of a larger military force in counterinsurgency situations or it may be the only or principal U. S. force so engaged.

b. In countries with governments friendly to the United States, counterinsurgency operations of U.S. forces will be in accordance with the provisions of agreements between the United States Government and the government of the country concerned.

c. In some instances, U. S. diplomatic representation may not be present in the country where operations are to take place. Frequently, however, U. S. diplomatic and other agencies will be active in

the country. In such cases, military operations must be fully coordinated with those of other U. S. agencies involved.

202. MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER UNITED STATES AGENCIES

A clear understanding of the relationships between the military forces involved and other U. S. agencies which may be in the country is essential in order that counterinsurgency operations of all concerned may be properly coordinated. Other U. S. agencies which may be involved include:

a. Chief of Diplomatic Mission.-- The chief of the United States diplomatic mission, the ambassador if one is designated, is normally the senior authority on foreign policy and the senior coordinator of the activities of all U. S. governmental agencies in the country to which he is accredited. The chief of the diplomatic mission does not command U. S. military forces operating in the country.

► b. United States Embassy.-- The ambassador's staff includes political, economic, cultural, administrative and armed service sections, staffed by officers trained in their specialty and with experience in the country to which assigned. They maintain contact with their counterparts, both in the local government and other U. S. governmental agencies. The chief of mission closely coordinates the activities of the U. S. Operations Mission (USOM), which is the country agency of the Agency for International Development (AID); and, the United States Information Service (USIS), the country agency of the United States Information Agency (USIA). The USIS office is concerned with the field of cultural, information, and educational exchange between the United States and the local government. This agency usually operates offices at the large population centers and under certain conditions, one-man offices in small towns of a host country. Within countries receiving U. S. economic aid, the aid program is administered by the USOM Director. While the Director is responsible to the Agency for International Development in Washington, his activities in the host country are coordinated by the chief of the diplomatic mission. The Director, AID, in Washington reports directly to the Secretary of State.

c. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).--Countries in receipt of United States military aid normally have a MAAG present to supervise and administer the military assistance program. MAAG activities are conducted under the direction of the Department of Defense, through the unified commander involved. MAAG relationships with the chief of diplomatic mission are usually prescribed in executive orders or other instruc-

tions. The chief of mission provides foreign policy guidance to ensure that MAAG efforts are in accord with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. Depending upon the mission of the particular MAAG, these activities assist the host government in such matters as reorganization, equipping, training and logistical support of military forces. They may be joint or uniservice.

d. The Country Team.--With many U. S. agencies operating in a foreign country, their areas of interest and responsibility often overlap. The best interests of the United States and the host country are served if activities of these agencies are well coordinated. The chief of the diplomatic mission may accomplish coordination in part through regular meetings of the "Country Team," a working group made up of representatives of all major U. S. governmental organizations operating in the country. In countries where U. S. military forces are based, the military commander or his representative normally participates as a member of this team.

203. COORDINATION PROCEDURES

a. General.--U. S. military forces operating in a foreign country fall within the chain of command extending from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified commander to whose command the forces are assigned. Although the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, if present, is not in this chain of command, close coordination of military activities is effected with the diplomatic mission and other U. S. agencies. In some cases, relationships between the diplomatic representative and the military commander may be further delineated by executive order.

b. Staff Functioning.--Deviations from normal staff responsibilities, procedures and techniques within the landing force are avoided in dealing with outside agencies. Although one senior representative to the Embassy's liaison office or country team should be appointed, the general and special staff continue to supervise and coordinate matters within their usual areas of staff responsibility. The necessity for a controlled, coordinated effort by all elements of the landing force in dealing with outside agencies is analogous to the importance of the overall unity of effort of all U. S. agencies within the country concerned. Unilateral, uncoordinated action by landing force staff members is avoided. However, individual staff officers may work directly with U. S. agencies or local governmental authorities within the limits of established policies.

c. Landing Force-Diplomatic Mission Coordination

(1) The relationship between the landing force and the diplomatic mission is primarily one of coordination. Instructions concerning these relationships should be set forth in initiating directives. Coordination is facilitated by the establishment of formal liaison with the diplomatic mission and by participation of landing force representatives in the activities of the country team and civil affairs committees, if formed.

(2) Members of the diplomatic mission may not be familiar with landing force methods of operation. Orientation briefings for these officials should be arranged at an early date to avoid misunderstanding. Orientation briefings by the diplomatic mission staff for the

landing force are of equal importance. The landing force may develop and recommend procedures to the diplomatic mission as necessary for the conduct of business between the landing force and agencies of the local government.

d. Landing Force-MAAG Coordination.--Relationships between the landing force and MAAG are normally conducted on a basis of coordination as defined in directives from higher authority. The missions of these two military activities may differ greatly. The Chief, MAAG, can be of great assistance to the landing force commander. Being well established in the country, the MAAG will have working agreements with the local military commanders and will be familiar with conditions in the country as well as with the personalities involved both in the local government and U. S. Diplomatic Corps. Assistance from the MAAG in the initial days of operation will be particularly valuable.

204. STATUS OF ARMED FORCES AGREEMENT

Status of Armed Forces agreements are necessary when counter-insurgency operations are conducted within a friendly foreign country. If a status of Armed Forces agreement already exists prior to arrival of the landing force, its provisions may be extended to include personnel of the landing force. However, if no such agreement exists, one should be negotiated as soon as possible. This will normally be accomplished through diplomatic channels. The landing force may submit recommendations to the diplomatic mission as appropriate and assist the mission as required in drafting proposed agreements.

205. LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES

a. General.--Prior to or immediately upon arrival of the landing force in the foreign country, the landing force commander should establish contact with appropriate officials of the foreign government. Contact is made initially through the U. S. diplomatic mission, if one is present, and may continue through the diplomatic mission during the early phase of the operation. When the landing force is firmly established and operating ashore, the defense ministry of the host government may become the principal point of contact for the conduct of routine landing force business with the local government.

b. Subordinate Military Commanders.--Subordinate military commanders assigned independent missions establish liaison with local officials in their area and, work through and cooperate with these authorities within limits established by higher authority. Detailed in-

structions should be issued to subordinate commanders concerning their relationship with local military and civil officials. At times it is advisable to assign diplomatic advisers to subordinate commands.

c. Participation in Governmental Functions.--A landing force involved in a counterinsurgency operation will not, as a rule, participate in local police, judicial or other governmental functions unless required by the exigencies of the situation. The landing force may reinforce local police and military forces in the suppression of dissident forces. One of the most important duties to be performed by a commander in an operation against guerrilla forces is to gain the cooperation and assistance of local police and judicial agencies. Police and judicial pressure in suppressing underground organizations, combating sabotage, controlling traffic in arms and ammunition, and enforcement of criminal and civil laws provide both direct and indirect assistance to the landing force commander.



SECTION 3: INTELLIGENCE

301. GENERAL

a. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential for successful operations against guerrilla forces. To conduct counter-guerrilla operations without sound intelligence wastes time, material, and troop effort. Guerrilla forces, employing highly effective intelligence and counterintelligence measures, are difficult to locate and identify, requiring a much greater intelligence and counterintelligence effort than required for conventional combat operations. The intangible aspects of guerrilla warfare, together with the civilian support normally provided the guerrilla force, create intelligence obstacles that can be overcome only by patient determination and the utmost resourcefulness.

b. Rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence is essential. The elusiveness and mobility of small guerrilla forces quickly outdates information concerning their location. Reaction time for the conduct of combat operations is a

critical factor and reactions must be based on reliable intelligence.

c. A larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel is required in counter-guerrilla operations than for normal operations. Special attention must be given to obtaining adequate interrogator-translator assets, and qualified interpreters.

d. Every Marine must have an understanding of the basic techniques and value of intelligence and counterintelligence in counter-guerrilla operations. This is necessary because of his own immediate requirements in many situations and because of the requirements of higher headquarters. Each man must be observant and alert to everything he sees and hears. He reports anything unusual concerning the civil population and the guerrilla force, no matter how trivial. Counter-guerrilla operations feature many small unit operations, and commander of such a unit must be prepared to process, evaluate and act promptly on the observations made by members of his unit.

302. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The guerrilla force, the civil population and the terrain are virtually inseparable factors in guerrilla warfare. To destroy the guerrilla movement and prevent its resurgence, detailed intelligence is required of all three as follows:

a. Guerrilla Force.-- The following intelligence is sought concerning the guerrilla force:

(1) Factors which caused the development of the guerrilla force.

(2) Relationship between guerrilla and civil population.

(3) Relationship with and support from any external sponsoring power.

(4) Capability of the guerrilla force to provide its own food, by growing, seizure, or civilian support.

▶ (5) Organization, composition, disposition, and identification of the guerrilla force.

(6) Capability of guerrilla forces to attack installations and disrupt lines of communications.

(7) Guerrilla force methods of operation.

(8) The strength and combat efficiency of the guerrilla force; to include status of training, effectiveness of communications, and morale.

(9) Location of guerrilla camps, assembly areas, rendezvous points and trails.

(10) Guerrilla force arms and armament.

b. Civil Population.-- Because of the inseparable nature of the guerrilla force and civil population which usually exists, much of the intelligence developed in one is applicable to the other. Intelligence concerning the civil population includes:

(1) Identification of hostile and friendly elements.

(2) Motivation and loyalties of various segments of the population.

(3) Size and proportion of civil population likely to engage in or support guerrilla activities.

(4) Effect of local authorities and police on civil population.

(5) Capability of the area to furnish food.

(6) Availability of water and fuels.

(7) Vulnerability of friendly civil population to terror tactics.

(8) Potential effect of civil population control measures such as relocation, search and seizure, movement restrictions, food control and curfews.

(9) Psychological vulnerabilities.

c. Terrain.-- An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary for effective counter guerrilla operations. Terrain information is continuously collected and processed, and the resulting intelligence is promptly disseminated. Up-to-date photo maps are prepared. Terrain models may be constructed

and used for briefing commanders, staffs, and troops. Particular effort is made to collect information concerning the following:

(1) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla bases or hideouts. Such areas usually have the following characteristics:

(a) Difficulty of access, as in mountains, jungles, or swamps.

(b) Concealment from aerial reconnaissance.

(c) Covered withdrawal routes.

(d) Located within one day's foot movement from small civilian settlements that could provide food, information, and warning.

(e) Adequate water supply.

(2) Roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas.

(3) Roads and trails in the vicinity of friendly installations and lines of communications.

(4) Location of critical fords, bridges, and ferries; information on the seasons of the year when the streams are at flood stage.

(5) Areas where drinking water is not available.

(6) Areas where foot travel is difficult or impossible.

(7) Availability and suitability of potential helicopter landing sites.

(8) Location of likely guerrilla or counter guerrilla ambush sites.

(9) Location of all small settlements and farms in and near suspected guerrilla areas.

(10) When guerrillas are known or suspected to have contact with an external sponsoring power; location of areas suitable for air drops, boat or submarine rendezvous, and roads and trails leading into external area of sponsoring power or neutral country friendly to the guerrillas.

303. INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION AND ITS FUNCTIONS

a. The nature of the enemy, the tactical deployment of friendly units, the presence of both friendly and hostile civilians, and the presence of indigenous military and para-military units, dictate modification of normal intelligence procedure. Intelligence section organization and functions are modified as required at all levels of command having an intelligence section. The criteria is the nature and extent of the intelligence effort required to support the mission, availability of qualified intelligence personnel within the landing force as a whole, and the personal preferences of the intelligence officer and the commander. Combat operations normally will require augmentation with interrogator-translators, air observers, counterintelligence personnel, order of battle analysts, interpreters, and possibly imagery interpreters, reconnaissance and surveillance specialists and technical intelligence personnel.

b. The intelligence section at landing force level may be organized by the establishment of special subsections to accommodate a special function and by creating one or more new subsections from conventional

subsections to reflect the emphasis on certain basic tasks. For example, a covert collection unit is usually required to supervise agent activities, and/or a records subsection may be created from conventional subsection to develop and maintain extensive records concerning the civil population and guerrilla force. The most important counter guerrilla intelligence functions, which may or may not be conducted by the organization of subsections for each, include the following:

▶ (1) Combat Intelligence.-- The primary requirement of combat intelligence is to locate the guerrilla force. Emphasis is placed on overt collection of information. Most of the functions of the conventional combat intelligence subsection are applicable. Special attention is given to the rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence. Careful attention to seemingly minor guerrilla preparations and activities, is essential to the development of meaningful intelligence on impending guerrilla operations.

(2) Clandestine Collection.-- Clandestine collection is extremely important in counter guerrilla operations. Every effort is made to infiltrate the guerrilla force and hostile civilian elements with reliable agents. Indigenous persons are usually capable of infiltrating the guerrilla force; they have an intimate knowledge of the local populace, conditions, and terrain, and often have prior knowledge of, or connections with, members of the guerrilla force. Potential agents are carefully screened to ensure that they are not double agents; their reliability is constantly checked. The recruiting, training and handling of agents requires highly trained intelligence personnel. Because of the sensitive nature of agent opera-

tions and the emphasis placed on clandestine collections, this function is usually separated from combat intelligence. However, the results of clandestine collection are given to the combat intelligence subsection.

▶ (3) Aerial Reconnaissance.-- Functions of the aerial reconnaissance subsection are essentially the same as for conventional operations. Special attention is directed toward preplanned and on-call reconnaissance and observation missions in direct support of widely separated battalions and smaller units. Included will be a continuing requirement to ensure, under various and differing tactical situations, compatibility of communications equipment and frequency assignments between supporting aircraft and supported ground element, particularly with regard to units smaller than battalion. See paragraph 703 for details on aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Psychological Operations.-- The added emphasis of psychological operations requires that all intelligence be evaluated in terms of psychological application. The efforts of the intelligence section and the psychological operations agencies are closely related. For example, the intelligence section is interested in the guerrilla food supply; whereas, psychological operations agencies are interested in whether or not appeals developed on a food theme would cause disaffection, or even surrenders. In addition to working closely with each other, intelligence personnel and psychological operations personnel provide mutual assistance in the execution of their respective tasks. See paragraph 405 for a discussion of psychological operations.

(5) Records.-- Records on guerrilla commanders and

members, and key members of the hostile civil population should be maintained. Frequently the operations or behavior of these individuals develop a pattern which, if recognized, may aid materially in the conduct of operations against them. The names and locations of families, relatives, and friends of known guerrillas are obtained. These persons are valuable sources of information, and may be used as a lure for trapping guerrillas. In communities friendly to the guerrilla force, some persons are responsible for collecting food and providing other aid for the guerrillas, such as relaying messages and providing temporary security. Every effort must be made to discover these persons. Instead of immediate arrest it is better to watch their activities and seek to apprehend the guerrillas contacting them. For developing guerrilla files a special effort is made to obtain birth, fingerprint, police, medical, church, school and prison records.

◆ (6) Interrogator - Translators and Linguists.--Fleet Marine Force interrogator-translator teams are limited in number and language spread, consequently, commands preparing for operations against guerrilla forces should utilize available personnel having appropriate language and document reading capabilities as intelligence augmentation personnel. These personnel must be afforded maximum possible combat intelligence training prior to embarkation. They are then integrated into the intelligence section and employed under the close supervision of the attached interrogator-translator team personnel. In the area of operations, landing force commands normally will employ indigenous personnel as interpreters and translators, however, it is essential that these

personnel be carefully screened and constantly supervised by qualified intelligence personnel.

(7) Counterintelligence. -- Guerrilla forces depend primarily upon secrecy and surprise to offset the superior combat power of the counter guerrilla force. Since the degree of surprise achieved will depend largely on the effectiveness of the guerrillas' intelligence agencies, intensive effort must be made to expose, thwart, destroy, or neutralize his intelligence system. To assist in achieving surprise in counter guerrilla operations and to counter the guerrilla intelligence system in general, the counterintelligence subsection emphasizes the following counterintelligence measures:

(a) Background investigation of personnel in sensitive assignments.

(b) Screening of civilian personnel employed by the military.

(c) Surveillance of known or suspected guerrilla force agents.

(d) Censorship or suspension of civil communications.

(e) Control of civilian movement as required.

(f) Checks on the internal security of all installations.

(g) Indoctrination of military personnel in all aspects of security.

(h) The apprehension and reemployment of guerrilla force agents.

(i) Security classification and control of plans, orders, and reports.

(j) Release information on a need-to-know basis.

(k) Organize on functional or area lines which will serve to limit the compromise of sensitive information through espionage, unwitting disclosure, or disclosure by POWs or defectors.

(8) Miscellaneous Functions.--Other functions, which may take on added importance in counter-guerrilla operations and require additional specialists, include such fields as communications, sociology, politics, and agriculture.

(9) Administrative.--Those functions handled by the administrative subsection are not unusual in counter-guerrilla operations, unless there is a requirement for large-scale maps in sufficient quantities for distribution down to and including the rifle squad level.

304. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING AGENCIES AND SOURCES

a. Intelligence collecting agents include trained agents, intelligence specialists, various civilian agencies and individuals, and troop units. Units and individual troops play a prominent part in the collection effort. All troops must realize the importance of reporting, as accurately as possible, every piece of information which they obtain about the guerrilla force, civil population, and the topography of the area.

b. The sources from which information is obtained include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Patrol Reports.--A primary source in the collection effort is the patrol reports regarding: food cultivation, food dumps, camps,

trails and roads, arms and ammunition, mines and explosives, equipment and tactics.

(2) Surrendered and Captured Guerrillas

A surrendered guerrilla is an extremely valuable source of information and can be of considerable use to both the intelligence section and tactical units. In order to obtain the best information, the following points are considered:

(a) The fact that a guerrilla is a prisoner must be kept secret in order to use his surrender to our advantage.

(b) Interrogation should be limited to as few people as possible.

(c) Operating unit commanders may hold prisoners for tactical reasons, but should report any lengthy retention.

(d) At times, the tactical commander who takes the prisoner can assume the responsibility of immediately using the guerrilla. A surrendered guerrilla should not be used on immediate followup operations if he is likely to be of greater value to the intelligence section (a surrendered guerrilla who is willing to go back alone to gain information or to solicit further surrenders).

(3) Captured Documents.--All captured documents acquired should be forwarded immediately to the landing force intelligence section for translation. When documents are found in packs, they must be retained intact.

(4) Dead Guerrillas

(a) Sometimes the identification of dead guerrillas will be the only means of identifying the organization in the area. Identification is best accomplished at the intelligence section. Deterioration of the body beyond identification can be prevented by--

1. Rapidly moving the body out of the area of operation and delivering it to the intelligence section. Owing to the speed at which bodies decompose, ground evacuation should be used only when the carry time will be less than 8 hours.

2. Using helicopters when the carry time is unacceptably long or there is urgency in obtaining identification.

(b) Identification techniques can be applied on the spot and include the following:

1. Photographs. -- For successful photography of the body, the face should be washed and the hair should be brushed back from the face. The eyes should be opened before photographing. A minimum of two full photos at short range should be taken.

2. Fingerprints. -- In fingerprinting, the main principle to be observed is cleanliness of both the equipment and the fingers to be printed.

3. Description.-- The following information is required for a description:

- a. Sex.
- b. Race.
- c. Apparent age.

d. Height, build, and facial features.

e. Teeth, scars, and deformities.

(5) Information Obtained From Civilians and Agents.--Unit intelligence sections should be notified of any civilian possessing information of intelligence interest. Agents are handled in accordance with procedures discussed in paragraph 303. Normally, subordinate units of the landing force should not develop their own agents or informers to acquire information.

(6) Captured Communications Equipment

(a) It is of great importance that all captured communication equipment be recovered for inspection. Units capturing guerrilla equipment should note the following:

1. Type of set; i.e., transmitter/receiver, transmitter or receiver.

2. Make, name, and number of set.

3. Location at time of capture.

4. Frequencies shown on dials at time of capture.

5. Direction of the aerial (including compass bearing).

(b) Captured equipment is expeditiously reported to the unit intelligence section. Frequency dials are carefully read before the set is moved and, if possible, locked to prevent change during transit.

(7) Monitoring

(a) Units receiving a signal of unknown origin should

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immediately report it to the intelligence section. This report includes frequency and call sign. All information obtained during the monitoring is sent to the intelligence center.

(b) Documents relating to communication and those found in proximity to communications equipment are sent to the intelligence section as quickly as possible.

(8) Food Cultivation

(a) Guerrillas may be forced to cultivate for food supply. If this occurs, either the crops are destroyed or used as lure to trap the guerrilla. Guidance will be necessary from experts to say whether the amount of cultivation is sufficient only for the local population, or if it is so large that the guerrillas may live off it as well.

(b) Units discovering cultivations will report--

1. Location.
2. Size.
3. Type.
4. Condition; e.g.,

Stage 1 - Freshly cut
Stage 2 - Cut and cleared
Stage 3 - Prepared and hoed
Stage 4 - Growing crops tended

Stage 5 - Growing crops untended
Stage 6 - Harvested
Stage 7 - Disused and overgrown.

(9) Arms and Ammunition

(a) Units recovering arms and ammunition from guerrillas will report--

1. Description and identification of weapons.

2. Quantity and caliber of ammunition.

3. Date ammunition was manufactured and whether or not the ammunition is serviceable.

4. Whether or not the ammunition has been reloaded.

(b) All captured arms and ammunition will be reported to the unit intelligence section.

(c) All mines and explosives are recovered. Several of each type are turned in for technical examination. If this is not possible, a full report should be rendered stating whether the equipment was serviceable or not and listing any identification marks or numbers.

(10) Aerial Reconnaissance--Aerial reconnaissance, both visual and photographic is discussed in paragraph 703.



SECTION 4: OPERATIONS

401. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps experience and knowledge in planning for amphibious operations offer a distinct advantage in planning counter guerrilla operations. Those procedures, characteristics, and techniques involved in planning operations against guerrillas which are similar to planning the amphibious assault include the following:

(1) The concurrent participation of diversified forces, including nonmilitary agencies, requires close and continuous cooperation between all echelons of the forces involved. At higher echelons, parallel planning starts with the inception of the operation.

(2) The complex nature of counter guerrilla operations requires maximum attention to detail in planning at all echelons of command.

(3) Many unforeseen contingencies arise from the fact that contact with guerrilla forces does

not initially exist and is unpredictable during the operation. Accordingly, plans must be flexible and responsive to meet the problems of combat and make the most effective use of forces available.

b. LFM-02, Doctrine for Landing Forces, provides additional information concerning the landing force in counterinsurgency operations.

c. This section covers such features of counter guerrilla operations as area organization, combat forces, organization of forces, conduct of combat operations, and psychological operations.

402. PLANNING COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. General Considerations

(1) The establishment of strict control within the resistance area is required, particularly when a close relationship exists between the civil population and the guerrillas. Positive control is essential

in order to isolate guerrilla elements from each other, the local population, and support from external sources.

(2) A number of diversified actions such as tactical operations, psychological warfare, civil populace control, and civic action (political, social and economic) are conducted concurrently. This requires a single authority at each level of operation to assure agreement of purpose, coordination, and control.

(3) The establishment of an effective intelligence system is mandatory. Friendly troop deployments, the nature of the enemy, and the requirement for detailed information of the area and its civil population impose special requirements. Additional intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel are required.

(4) Specific strengths and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be determined so that operations will minimize the former and exploit the latter. The strength of the guerrilla force usually includes: motivation, knowledge of the area, and irregular tactics characterized by surprise, mobility, and offensive action. Weaknesses usually include: dependence on an unreliable supply system and general support of the civil population, and lack of good communications, air support, and heavy weapons.

(5) Although counter guerrilla operations differ from normal combat, the traditional principles of war must be considered in planning and execution. The most rigidly applied principle is the offensive; constant pressure is maintained on the guerrilla force. Mobility is largely achieved by well-trained, fast moving, unburdened infantry and by use of helicopters. Surprise is accom-

plished by superior mobility, offensive action, and good security, including deception. Mass is usually characterized, not by heavy fire power and large troop concentrations, but by sufficient forces at the right place at the right time. Economy of force is reflected in the organization of forces and organization of the area to assure that only essential forces are employed and that the most advantageous dispositions are made. Guerrillas rely heavily on surprise; good security will minimize this problem and at the same time enhance the achievement of surprise by counter guerrilla forces. Cooperation is carefully observed between counter guerrilla forces and with civil authority. Although the overall operation is complex in nature, simplicity, particularly in plans, is observed at the lowest echelons. Unlike normal operations, objectives essential to accomplishing the mission are seldom related to geographic features; in counter guerrilla operations the primary objective is destruction of the guerrilla force.

(6) The majority of counter guerrilla operations consist of small unit actions. Because of the nature of guerrilla warfare, small units are required to establish control over the area and to make contact with the guerrillas. Small units are capable of engaging most contacts because most guerrilla groups are small in size. In addition to providing detailed coverage of an area, small units have the degree of mobility to respond to guerrilla activity.

(7) The organization of the area and the organization of forces are interrelated problems that require particular attention in planning. The entire area of operations is subdivided into geographic areas



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(2) The complex nature of counter guerrilla operations requires maximum attention to detail in planning at all echelons of command.

(3) Many unforeseen contingencies arise from the fact that contact with guerrilla forces does

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(7) The organization of the area and the organization of forces are interrelated problems that require particular attention in planning. The entire area of operations is subdivided into geographic areas

or areas coinciding with internal political subdivisions. Specific areas of responsibility are assigned to subordinate forces capable of conducting independent counter-guerrilla operations within their area from a base or bases established within or adjacent to the area. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the civilian attitude, the guerrilla activity, and the estimated guerrilla force. Organization will usually require the forming of battalion size task forces, which will be assigned an area responsibility.

(8) Terrain will influence the organization of the area, the size and composition of forces, and the tactics and techniques employed by the counter-guerrilla force.

(9) The extreme dispersion of units in operations against guerrilla forces places a heavy demand on the communications means throughout the counter-guerrilla force. Augmentation by communication personnel and equipment is usually required.

b. Specific Considerations

Planning for military operations against guerrilla forces requires a detailed estimate of the situation. Close attention is given to both the civil (political, economic, social) and the military situations. The following specific factors are considered in the commander's estimate:

(1) Terrain and weather

(a) Suitability of terrain and road net for both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations.

(b) Existence of possible guerrilla bases.

(c) Effect of weather and seasons of the year on both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations.

(2) Inhabitants

(a) Loyalty of various segments of the population to the enemy and their morale, strength of will to resist, and willingness to undergo hardship. Particular attention is given to the following:

1. Farmers and other rural dwellers.

2. Criminals and "tough" elements.

3. Persons known to adhere to the ideologies of the guerrillas.

4. Former members of armed forces.

5. All persons with strong leadership capabilities or tendencies.

(b) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in guerrilla force and guerrilla support activities.

(c) Size and proportion of population likely to support our forces.

(d) Relative susceptibility of various elements of the population to enemy and/or friendly propaganda.

(e) Knowledge of the attitudes, customs, and traditions of the indigenous population.

(3) The resources available to the guerrilla force, including--

(a) The capability of the area to furnish food.

(b) The capability of friendly forces to control the harvest, storage, and distribution of food.

(c) The availability of water and fuels.

(d) The availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other supplies.

(4) Guerrilla force relations with any external sponsoring power, including--

(a) Direction and coordination of guerrilla activities.

(b) Communications with the guerrilla force.

(c) Capability to send organizers and supplies to the area.

(5) The organization of existing guerrilla forces and their activities, including--

(a) Their origin and development.

(b) Their strength, morale, and status of training.

(c) The personality of the leaders.

(d) Relations with the civil populace.

(e) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.

(f) Status of equipment and supplies.

(g) Effectiveness of communications.

(h) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence.

(6) The size and composition of friendly forces available for operations against the guerrillas, including--

(a) Own forces.

(b) Other military units available in the area if needed.

(c) Civil police, militia, and self-defense units.

(7) The existing policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of the civilian population and the guerrilla force.

403. AREA ORGANIZATION, COMBAT BASES AND ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

a. General

(1) The operational area and military forces must be organized to provide--

(a) Unity of action and area administration with civil forces.

(b) Secure bases from which to conduct operations.

(c) Security detachments for protecting critical military and civil installations, essential routes of communication, and key communities.

(d) Forces for conducting tactical operations against guerrilla forces.

(e) Forces for civil populace control and tasks of a police nature such as road blocks and search and seizure.

(2) To minimize the requirement for military units, maximum use is made of indigenous

organizations and individuals, consistent with their reliability and capability, and policy agreements. Organizations such as village self-defense units, police, or friendly guerrillas may exist or be organized to provide local defense and to assist in establishing and maintaining civil populace control. Support for indigenous organizations, such as arms, ammunition, food, and communication equipment, is normally required. Individuals may be employed as laborers, informants, guides, interpreters, and translators. For detailed discussion, see section 10.

(3) Terrain will affect the organization of the area and the organization of forces. Area boundaries should not divide key terrain features. Guerrillas are likely to exist in areas of rugged or inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps. Such areas are difficult to control and therefore may limit the size of the lower echelon areas of responsibility and influence the organization of forces as a result of the following:

(a) The requirement for extensive patrolling emphasizes the role of infantry.

(b) The use of combat support elements may be precluded or their effectiveness limited. This is particularly true in the case of tanks, trucks and certain artillery pieces.

(c) The importance of air support, particularly helicopters, is emphasized.

b. Area Organization

(1) The entire area of operations is subdivided into areas of

responsibility using clearly defined boundaries. Although it is desirable for areas of responsibility to coincide with political subdivisions to ensure maximum cooperation from civil authorities, in many cases boundaries must be dictated by overriding military considerations.

(2) Areas of responsibility are normally assigned to infantry battalions. Sectors of the area of responsibility may be further assigned to subordinate rifle companies. It may be necessary to further assign definite sectors to platoons.

(3) The size of the area assigned to a battalion depends on the terrain, the nature of the guerrilla activity, size of the guerrilla force, the forces available, and the mission. For example, if the area is heavily infested with guerrillas, sufficient forces are available, and artillery is assigned to battalions, the limits of their areas may roughly correspond to the range of artillery fire support. On the other hand, it is conceivable that battalions may be assigned areas as large as 300 square miles. Naturally, a battalion cannot expect to operate concurrently over an area that large. If the battalion commander cannot assign company sectors encompassing the entire area, he must divide the area into sectors and determine a priority for their occupation and clearance, coordinating with adjacent units, as necessary. In such cases, particular attention must be paid to the movement and regroupment of guerrillas from occupied sectors to cleared sectors.

(4) Area or sector boundaries should not prevent the pursuit of guerrilla forces into an adjacent

area or sector. Operation orders, SOPs, or other means of coordination should provide for this contingency.

(5) It must be realized there are no firmly established rules or principles governing area organization. The differences in areas, which are certain to exist, must be accommodated by flexibility in both planning and execution. Changes in the situation, or experience factors, will often produce changes to the initial area organization.

(6) For the benefit of troops and civil populace and for purposes of security, it is desirable to identify the degree of control existing in any specific area. The following designations based on traffic light colors may be used:

▶ (a) RED AREA.--Area under part-time or continuous control of guerrillas. Any persons therein are suspected members of the guerrilla force. Troops will maintain a combat status and vehicles must travel in convoys with an armed escort.

(b) YELLOW AREA.--Area in which guerrilla forces periodically appear but which is under neither friendly nor guerrilla control. Troops must carry individual weapons in such areas and must not move alone. Vehicles must have at least one guard, armed, riding in the open. Curfew and other population control measures are strongly enforced.

(c) GREEN AREA.--Area under positive friendly control. Stringent population control measures are lifted. Troops must not move alone. Vehicles may travel without guards.

c. Combat Bases

(1) Combat bases are established by battalions within or immediately adjacent to their area of responsibility. In some cases, particularly where the area is large, rifle companies may be required to establish combat bases in their sections. Patrols, operating from battalion or company bases, may establish temporary patrol bases to extend their operations. (See app. A.) A combat base is not a static installation; it is moved as often as is necessary for security purposes and to remain within effective striking range of guerrilla forces. When practicable, helicopters and ground vehicles are employed extensively for deployment and support of troops to reduce the number of combat bases.

(2) A combat base is the focal point for all tactical operations conducted in the area concerned; however, the base may also accommodate elements conducting non-tactical missions in the area. The size of the base will vary with the size of the unit and will be in response to security considerations.

(3) A combat base is located to facilitate its own security. The defense of the base is a major consideration since the majority of troops will be absent most of the time, conducting operations. Whenever possible, bases are established on the most defensible terrain in the area. Positions encircling the area are prepared and protective obstacles are employed. Outposts and listening posts are established well forward of the defensive positions and occupied at all times.

(4) The comfort and health of the troops are major considerations in the organization of a combat

base. Whenever practical, overhead shelter is provided. Messing facilities are established and operated to meet the irregular arrival and departure of forces. Either standard or field expedient showers should be constructed; this and other water needs require an adequate water supply. Some form of physical recreation is provided. Although the highest standards of discipline and sanitation are maintained in the combat base, troops not on guard should be made to feel that it is a place to rest and relax. To maintain good morale in his unit is one of the major challenges presented to a commander during counter-guerrilla operations.

d. Organization of Forces

(1) The flexibility inherent in the Fleet Marine Force for forming task groupments to conduct amphibious operations is readily adaptable to counter-guerrilla operations. The doctrine for organizing battalion landing teams is particularly applicable. It is not only significant that FMF units can be rapidly task organized for counter-guerrilla operations, but it is equally important that while so employed they retain the capability to revert quickly to the amphibious role for which they are primarily designed.

(2) The organization, training, and equipment of FMF units for helicopterborne operations in the amphibious assault especially qualify such units for counter-guerrilla operations.

▶ (3) The force initially committed should be carefully organized to effect destruction of the guerrillas. Insufficient combat power and faulty organization can only lead to a long frustrating period of inde-

cisive activity. Initial assignment of insufficient forces may ultimately require use of a larger force than would have been required originally. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the guerrilla force, and the attitude of the civilian population. The fact that guerrilla forces usually operate in extremely difficult terrain and without air support, heavy caliber weapons, and armor, reduces the requirement for certain types of combat support forces and combat service support forces. On the other hand, the nature of guerrilla force operations usually requires that the counter-guerrilla force be provided with augmentation in such fields as psychological warfare, civil affairs/military government, intelligence, and communications.

(4) Whatever the size of the overall force operating against guerrillas, the formation of battalion size task forces will normally be required. The independent or semi-independent nature of the operations and the diversified missions normally require that a battalion receive augmentation and/or unit reinforcements prior to the conduct of operations. Reinforcements may include appropriate units of reconnaissance, artillery, tanks, motor transport, amphibian vehicles, and engineers. Augmentation may include intelligence, psychological warfare, civil affairs, communications, maintenance, military police, medical, and aviation.

(5) Battalion task forces must be prepared to revert to normal land combat operations under their parent regiments, when the hostile threat requires action by larger forces.

(6) Within the battalion task force and/or its subordinate rifle

companies, units are most frequently organized as follows:

(a) Patrols.--Patrols are extensively used and may vary in size from a squad to a reinforced company. Patrols must be specifically organized and equipped to perform one or more of a variety of missions, and if necessary, for extended commitment over a long period of time. Organization may include appropriate civilian augmentation to include local guides, trackers, and members of the civil police. See appendix A for a discussion of patrolling.

(b) Reaction Force.--A mobile reaction force is located at each combat base and is organized and equipped to rapidly engage reported guerrilla forces or reinforce other friendly forces. This force ranges in size from a reinforced platoon to a reinforced company and is capable of rapid movement by foot, surface vehicle, or helicopter.

404. CONDUCT OF COUNTERGUERRILLA MILITARY OPERATIONS

a. The doctrine for the conduct of counter guerrilla operations is based on both experience and theory. Experience has shown that there is no pat solution to the problem of defeating guerrillas, that variations in method of operation will be required with each new situation. Among other things, guerrilla-counter guerrilla warfare is a contest of imagination, ingenuity, and improvisation by the opposing commanders. Commanders must be ever alert to change or adapt their tactics to meet the specific situation at hand.

b. In general, counter guerrilla operations are conducted in the following sequence:

(1) A commander assigned the mission of combating a guerrilla force moves his unit into the area, establishes subordinate areas of responsibility and combat bases, and employs appropriate security measures. Subparagraph 403c discusses combat bases, section 5 discusses troop and installation security, and appendix C deals with the security of transportation.

(2) Measures directed at populace control and isolation of the guerrilla force from all forms of support are initiated. Much of this effort is accomplished by police-type operations and conducted by either military or civil forces or a combination of both. For a discussion of civil populace control measures see appendix B. A discussion of search procedures is contained in appendix A. Military responsibilities in connection with the civil populace are discussed in section 10. Psychological operations are commenced to create civilian support for the counter guerrilla effort and civilian and guerrilla disaffection from the guerrilla cause. Paragraph 405 discusses psychological operations. Denial operations (discussed below) to deny guerrilla contact with, and support by an external sponsoring power, are initiated.

(3) Harassing operations, primarily patrolling, are conducted against the guerrilla force. Harassing operations in general are discussed below and the tactics and techniques of patrolling are discussed in appendix A. Reaction operations (discussed below) are conducted in response to guerrilla activity directed against the civil community or military installations and forces, or when contact with guerrillas is made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Once a guerrilla force has been located and can be fixed, elimination operations (discussed below) are conducted against it.

(5) After the destruction of the guerrilla force, military forces may participate in the efforts to prevent its resurgence.

c. While the sequence above is considered normal, it is not intended to indicate that one step of the sequence must be successfully concluded before the initiation of the next. Conversely, the conduct of these steps should overlap in time, with police-type operations, psychological operations, and combat operations being conducted concurrently.

d. In general, the four types of combat operations normally conducted against guerrillas include denial operations, harassing operations, reaction operations and elimination operations. For a discussion of small unit tactics and techniques in connection with these operations, see appendix A. The four types of combat operations are as follows:

(1) Denial Operations

(a) Operations to deny the guerrilla force contact with, and support by an external sponsoring power are initiated early and conducted concurrently with other operations. Denial operations require effective measures to secure border or seacoast areas to prevent communications and supply operations between a sponsoring power and the guerrilla force. The scope of these operations will vary and will be determined by such factors as the extent of the border or seacoast

area, terrain, and methods and extent of external support.

(b) The method of contact and delivery of personnel, supplies, and equipment whether by air, land, or water must be determined at the earliest possible time. Border areas are secured by the use of patrols, static security posts, ground and aerial observers, and reaction forces. Extensive use is made of informers and agents. When time and resources permit, wire and other obstacles, minefields, and cleared areas are established along the border. Radio direction finding and jamming may be required. Ground surveillance radar is used. Interdiction by various fire support means may be employed and when appropriate, blockade operations by Navy ships and craft.

(c) The achievement of success in denial operations may be exceedingly difficult. External support is an important feature of guerrilla operations and as denial operations are intensified, hostile methods of contact will become more elusive, and often frustrating to a commander of a counterguerrilla force. Persistence and ingenuity will be essential to success.

(2) Harassing Operations

(a) Harassing operations are conducted night or day to prevent guerrillas from resting, conducting operations, and receiving support. Such operations will inflict casualties, and gain detailed knowledge about the terrain and the enemy. Harassing operations are executed primarily by extended patrols and larger combat units. Aviation elements and various fire support means will be employed as appropriate.

(b) Harassing operations are conducted primarily by the use of --

1. Aerial and ground reconnaissance to locate guerrilla units, bases, and camps.

2. Continuous aerial surveillance during daylight hours.

3. Extensive patrols and raids against guerrilla bases, camps, outposts, and supply caches.

4. Ambushes.

5. Air strikes and artillery fires.

6. Mining guerrilla routes of communication.

(3) Reaction Operations

(a) Reaction operations are conducted by mobile combat reaction forces operating from combat bases. Reaction operations are conducted in response to guerrilla activity directed against civil or military installations and forces, or when contact with guerrillas is made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance. Reaction operations are often conducted in connection with denial and/or harassing operations.

(b) When a guerrilla force is located, the reaction force deploys rapidly to engage and destroy the guerrilla force. If the guerrilla force cannot be contained and destroyed, contact is maintained, reinforcements are dispatched if needed, and the guerrillas are pursued. Reaction operations will often consist primarily of a pursuit. In such cases, efforts are made to envelop and cut off the retreating guerrillas. Once the escape of the guerrilla force has been

blocked, the attack is continued to destroy it. The mobility required to envelope and block is provided by helicopters, ground vehicles, and by accelerated foot movement.

(c) Throughout counter-guerrilla operations, commanders at all echelons continually locate possible targets at which the guerrilla might strike and prepare plans for decisive reaction. Guerrilla targets might include important road and railroad junctions, desolate stretches of road and railroad, bridges, key military and police installations, civilian communities, public utilities, public gathering places, and homes of important persons. Reaction plans for such situations are simple, prepared in detail, and rehearsed. To be effective, these plans must be based on the best possible intelligence of the area and the enemy force. Potential guerrilla targets should be carefully reconnoitered. To facilitate reaction to a guerrilla attack on such targets, each target and rendezvous points near the target are assigned a code identification. Whenever possible, helicopter landing zones or truck release points are used as rendezvous points. By use of a code designation for the potential target and rendezvous points, orders to the reaction force can be simplified.

(d) Since guerrilla forces are most active during the hours of darkness, reaction forces must be prepared to conduct operations under the same conditions.

(4) Elimination Operations

(a) Guerrillas not destroyed by denial, harassing, and reaction operations are often forced by such operations into situations which will require elimination operations aimed at their destruction.

Elimination operations are difficult to execute and, consequently, should be planned in great detail. Troops are thoroughly briefed and, when practicable, rehearsed. Deception operations are conducted to prevent premature disclosure of the operation. Elimination operations usually possess the following characteristics:

1. A guerrilla force is definitely located. This may be accomplished during the conduct of denial, harassing, or reaction operations. Forces conducting elimination operations are rarely committed to operations in suspected areas.

2. The guerrilla force is in a reasonably vulnerable situation, susceptible of being fixed in position, or engaged by surprise attack by the counterguerrilla forces.

3. The guerrilla force is most often of considerable size.

4. A force conducting elimination operations is normally much larger than the located guerrilla force. Depending on the size and location of the guerrilla force and the tactics to be employed, it will vary in size from a reinforced company to a reinforced division; however, one or two reinforced battalions will be most common.

5. As a prerequisite to destruction of the guerrilla force, every effort is made to contain it. In elimination operations, the degree of success is most often proportionate to the degree of containment. A frontal assault will rarely find an objective, because the guerrilla will seldom defend terrain, favoring withdrawal or escape to engagement. Efforts to fix or contain the

guerrilla force will include encirclement, double envelopment, blocking positions on routes of escape, use of supporting fires, or the convergence of two or more forces on the guerrilla force. If the situation does not favor or permit containment, it may prove successful to conduct surprise attacks against the guerrilla force, followed by aggressive pursuit.

6. The final steps taken to contain a guerrilla force, and all operations conducted against the guerrillas after containment, are accomplished during daylight hours. Escape is the normal guerrilla reaction to being contained, and darkness facilitates its achievement.

7. Mobility requirements suggest the employment of helicopterborne troops whenever possible. The use of helicopterborne troops allows a greater freedom of movement, more rapid execution, and an excellent chance of achieving surprise.

(b) The encirclement of guerrilla forces offers by far the greatest possibility for fixing or containing them and achieving decisive results. The remainder of this paragraph (404) discusses the considerations related to encirclement and the various destruction tactics used when encirclement is achieved.

(c) The terrain, size of the guerrilla force, and troop availability will determine the troop density of the encirclement. In turn, troop density will dictate the destruction tactics following encirclement. The encirclement usually requires a high relative preponderance of friendly troops; however, fire power, aerial surveillance, and the use of helicopterborne reserves can substantially lessen the troop requirement.

▶ (d) The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation is aimed at sudden, complete encirclement which will completely surprise the guerrillas. Surprise and security may be achieved by conducting the movement to encirclement during the hours of darkness. The encirclement should be completed during early daylight hours to permit good visibility for the remainder of the operation.

(e) Speed is emphasized throughout the early phases of the advance to the line of encirclement. Maximum use of helicopterborne troops will contribute speed to the early phases of the encirclement. The most critical period in the operation is the occupation of the line of encirclement. A guerrilla force may be expected to react immediately upon discovering that it is encircled. To attempt escape, the guerrillas will probe for gaps, attack weak points to force a gap, or attempt infiltration of the encirclement, individually or by small groups. Accordingly, every effort is made to simultaneously occupy the entire line of encirclement or if this is not possible, the most likely escape routes are covered first. In addition, upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units immediately occupy defensive positions, and deploy strong patrols to their front so that early warning of attempted guerrilla breakouts may be received.

(f) Aviation plays an important role in operations featuring encirclement. Attack aircraft are employed in a close air support role. Observation aircraft and helicopters are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and as a command vehicle for the commander to control his forces. Helicopters are used to rapidly transport troops to

the line of encirclement, or to shift forces from one area to another.

(g) Once the encirclement is established, the elimination of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly. This may be accomplished in any of the following ways:

1. The guerrillas are enticed to surrender by psychological warfare techniques such as loudspeaker broadcasting and use of leaflets. This technique has proven effective historically and should not be disregarded.

2. Operations may consist of a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the line is progressively shortened, more units are removed from the line and added to the reserve forces. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by progressive contraction; however, against larger forces, it is more probable that at some point the contraction will reach a "critical mass," requiring some action other than further contraction.

3. Another technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide the area, followed by the destruction of the guerrillas in each sub-area. This technique may also be used in conjunction with contraction of the line of encirclement, after "critical mass" occurs.

4. Another technique, usually employed after some degree of contraction, is to have a holding force on one or more sides of the perimeter while part of the line of encirclement forces the guerrillas against the stationary force by offensive action. Either element

may effect the actual destruction, but the majority of it will usually be accomplished by the attacking element, while the stationary element holds the guerrilla force in place. This technique is most effective when the blocking or stationary force is located on, or immediately in the rear of a natural terrain obstacle.

5. Variations of the operations described above include such techniques as having forces encircle an area and await the enemy attempt to escape as he is subjected to intense saturation type indirect fire and/or attack by tactical aircraft. Flushing fires are discussed in paragraph 802.

▶ 405. OPERATIONS FROM MOBILE SEA BASES

a. Landing force units operating against guerrilla units from a mobile sea base are an effective means of combating insurgency. As previously discussed in subparagraph 403c, the doctrine for operations against guerrilla units normally requires that combat bases be established to serve as a focal point for operations. The mobile sea base concept is entirely compatible with this doctrine.

b. Counterinsurgency forces based at sea possess the mobility and flexibility required for operations against guerrilla units. Furthermore, the problems associated with a buildup of forces ashore for support and security are greatly reduced.

c. The inherent mobility of the amphibious task force as a whole, combined with that of helicopterborne units, will normally ensure a mobile sea base superiority in this capability.

d. Operations against guerrilla units which are conducted from mobile sea bases may employ either landing craft and/or amphibian vehicles, helicopters, or a combination of these movement means as follows:

(1) Helicopters are particularly suited to operations against guerrilla units and to operations from mobile sea bases. Helicopters can lift landing force elements directly from the mobile sea base into surprise attacks against guerrilla units or to positions to block avenues of escape during encirclement operations. Helicopterborne forces operating from mobile sea bases are free from dependence on beaches, airfields, or overland lines of communications.

(2) Landing craft and/or amphibian vehicles will be the primary movement means in situations where unfavorable geographic or meteorological conditions restrict the employment of helicopters. Generally, areas possessing a system of waterways near the coast will be favorable for landing craft and amphibian vehicle employment.

(3) The use of both helicopters and waterborne craft and vehicles will provide the ideal tactical movement means in some situations. Operations of this type may include landing by one means and withdrawal by another. Other examples include the convergence of forces against insurgent elements, or the conduct of encirclement operations where there is a significant advantage in the commitment of forces from several directions.

e. Landing force operations from a mobile sea base may be conducted as independent operations, as a part of an amphibious operation,

or in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations already in progress. The concept of employment in each of these general categories is discussed in the following subparagraphs:

(1) When operations from a mobile sea base are conducted as independent operations comprising the total military effort of the counterinsurgency, their speed and flexibility contribute to their effectiveness. During periods of political uncertainty, for example, the establishment of a military force ashore may be an untimely, undesirable, or irrevocable move. In contrast, in operations from a mobile sea base, the landing force may be committed at a precise time and place, with ready withdrawal as an inherent operational characteristic.

(2) Forces operating from a mobile sea base may be employed as part of large-scale counterinsurgency amphibious operations as follows:

(a) To initiate operations preparatory to the full employment of larger forces at a particular time and place.

(b) To determine the whereabouts of insurgent forces and to develop the situation ashore in order that the remaining forces may be committed at the most advantageous time and place.

(c) To exploit those situations where other landing force elements have contacted or contained insurgent forces.

(d) To conduct denial and/or interdiction operations aimed at isolating the insurgents from their source of supply.

(3) Forces operating from a mobile sea base may be employed in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations already in progress. In these situations the landing force may be employed either as a reaction force in coordination with forces ashore, or as a force to operate in areas otherwise inaccessible.

f. The Navy elements of a mobile sea base force; e.g., landing craft with operating personnel, may be employed in support of land forces, either U.S. or indigenous. Navy support capabilities include troop mobility on inland waterways, resupply, surveillance, denial of waterways to insurgents, and training of indigenous personnel in the naval aspects of warfare in inland waterways areas.

g. The doctrine for operations against guerrilla units expressed in other sections of this manual is valid for such operations conducted from a mobile sea base. Although mobile sea base forces are effective in harassing and denial operations, they are particularly suited to the conduct of reaction and elimination operations.

h. Employment considerations which require emphasis include the following:

(1) Regardless of the size of the force or the mission, an element of appropriate size is retained, normally aboard ship, as a reaction force to rapidly engage reported insurgent forces or reinforce other friendly forces.

(2) To minimize delay in reaction and elimination operations, the following preparatory measures

are initiated early in the operation and developed throughout:

(a) Potential landing beaches and helicopter landing zones are selected, reconnoitered, classified as to suitability, and are assigned an identifying code.

(b) Potential targets for insurgent action are located, reconnoitered, and assigned a code identification. Reaction plans for such situations are prepared in detail, and whenever possible are rehearsed.

(3) Forces conducting harassing operations such as ambush and raid patrols are committed and withdrawn according to precise schedules and usually remain ashore for several days.

(4) Two general types of employment apply to mobile sea base helicopterborne forces in reaction or elimination operations.

(a) The simultaneous landing of units adjacent to insurgent forces in landing zones favoring immediate encirclement. This employment exploits surprise and avoids troop exhaustion but is dependent upon the availability of suitable landing zones.

(b) The second means of employment involves landing, assembly, and reorganization prior to the attack or pursuit of guerrilla units. Coordinated action is facilitated by establishing control of small units before engaging the insurgent forces, thereby minimizing danger to helicopters and troops in the landing phase.

(5) A high state of operational readiness is essential. The requirement for quick response to situations ashore frequently will be a dominant factor.

(6) The capability to withdraw and return to the parent ship is an inherent characteristic of operations from a mobile sea base. A major consideration is the determination of the time of withdrawal. In certain harassing operations such as patrolling, the hour of withdrawal can be preplanned. In reaction or elimination operations, or at any other time contact with insurgent forces is made, withdrawal is not conducted until the insurgent force is destroyed or contact is completely broken. Based upon these contingencies, planning for operations from a mobile sea base must ensure flexibility and freedom of action for forces ashore.

(7) Fire support will include field artillery, either previously established ashore or accompanying the combat units; naval gunfire to the limit of its ranges; and air support. The air support capability should be emphasized as it may be the only fire support means available in operations at great distances inland.

i. The depth of operations ashore may be extended significantly by the temporary establishment of austere helicopter bases at points near the extreme radius of action from parent ships. These temporary bases are essentially refueling stations and when helicopters are the only means of stockpiling fuel, their availability for other operations is greatly reduced. Therefore, a decision to conduct operations beyond the helicopters' radius of action from their parent ship must be carefully weighed, and should employ minimum forces necessary to accomplish the mission. When helicopter bases are established, they should be simple, well-guarded, and should exist for a limited duration.

If for no other reason, these operations should be conducted periodically for the purpose of convincing the insurgents that they have no safe haven beyond the radius of action of the helicopters from their parent ship.

▶ 406. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. In a counter guerrilla warfare situation the mission of psychological operations is to support combat operations and to assist military and civilian agencies in the control and administration of the area of operations.

b. Although most psychological operations are planned and directed by the highest echelon concerned with conducting counter guerrilla operations, all personnel participating in the operation should have an understanding of the purpose, capabilities, and certain of the procedures of psychological operations. Commanders at lower echelons must be prepared to--

(1) Constantly seek guerrilla psychological vulnerabilities to be exploited.

(2) Request psychological operations to provide direct support of combat operations.

(3) Request psychological operations to facilitate civilian control and promote cooperation among the civil populace.

(4) Assist in the conduct of psychological operations and in the evaluations of its results.

(5) Plan and conduct limited psychological operations such as loudspeaker appeals directed at guerrillas during combat operations.

c. FM 33-5, Psychological Operations, provides basic information with regard to the capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare, its organization, procedures, methods, and techniques. It further describes the procurement and use of intelligence for psychological warfare, the nature of propaganda and the means of communications utilized in its dissemination, and the operational employment of psychological warfare in support of military operations.

d. Psychological indications are those evidences or manifestation of attitudes, whether positive or negative, which may point to the existence of guerrilla or civilian psychological strengths and vulnerabilities capable of being exploited by propaganda. Personnel participating in combat operations against the guerrillas and those in contact with the civil populace must be alert to psychological indications. Essential elements of information (EEI) may be announced to assist in the determination of indications. Indications may be vague clues, definite signs, or information pointing to the existence of psychological strengths and vulnerabilities. Examples might be hunger (or lack of hunger) in recently captured guerrillas; obvious resentment against (or respect for) their leaders among prisoners; worry (or lack of worry) among civilians or captured guerrillas about conditions in the area.

e. Propaganda is planned and employed in operations against guerrillas to achieve the following:

(1) Demoralize, divide, and disorganize the guerrilla force.

(2) Induce defection of guerrilla force members.

(3) Reduce or eliminate civilian support of the guerrilla force.

(4) Dissuade civilians from participating in covert activities on the side of the guerrilla force.

(5) Win the support of non-committed civilians.

(6) Preserve and strengthen friendly civilian support.

(7) Win approval for the presence of the military force.

f. For purposes of planning and conducting the propaganda program, the population in the area is divided into the following target audiences:

(1) Guerrilla units.

(2) Underground elements.

(3) Civilians sympathetic to the guerrilla; those who provide information, supplies, refuge and other assistance to the guerrillas and the underground.

(4) Uncommitted civilians.

(5) Civilians sympathetic to the forces operating against the guerrillas.

g. Propaganda themes are based on recognizable aspects of friendly civil programs and on the following potentially divisive characteristics of target audiences:

(1) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the guerrilla force and civil populace.

(2) Rivalries between guerrilla leaders.

(3) Danger of betrayal.

(4) Harsh living conditions of guerrilla force.

(5) Scarcity of arms and supplies.

(6) Selfish motivation of opportunists and apparent supporters of the guerrilla forces.

h. The use of persuasion, as opposed to direct order, is implicit in most psychological warfare techniques. The aim of psychological warfare techniques should be to employ reason, logic, and emotional appeals to persuade the target audiences to adopt a course of action rather than to order it to take such a course of action. When the guerrilla force or its civilian supporters are demoralized, the authoritative approach may be effective.

i. The granting of amnesty and rewards may induce the guerrilla and his civilian supporters to defect from the guerrilla movement.

j. The conduct and attitudes of the individual participant in operations against guerrillas will have a decided psychological influence on the civil populace, and indirectly the guerrilla force.

k. Psychological warfare media are the means or channels of communications to the guerrilla force and civil populace. Media of particular interest to the force conducting operations against guerrillas include the following:


(1) Leaflets.-- Leaflets and other printed materials are disseminated by artillery, aircraft, patrols, and agents. Depending on the character of the target audience and the purpose of the leaflet, it

may be either primarily textual or primarily pictorial. A leaflet is a permanent record of the message to which the reader may refer until it has become impressed upon his mind. Weather and enemy counter-measures may reduce the effectiveness of leaflets. Surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes have proved valuable in past operations against guerrillas.

(2) Loudspeakers. -- Loudspeaker sets mounted on vehicles or aircraft as well as lightweight public address equipment that can be hand carried are employed in close support missions. Loudspeaker appeals may be made from aircraft over areas known or suspected to contain guerrillas. During elimination operations, particularly when an encirclement is achieved, loudspeaker surrender appeals are made to the guerrillas. If effective, such appeals will reduce the number of casualties that would result from stubborn resistance. Loudspeaker

appeals should be brief, and made in simple, easily understood language. Important phrases should be repeated throughout the appeal for emphasis and clarification. Surrender appeals should always include specific instructions on how to surrender. Loudspeaker messages are particularly effective when used in conjunction with specific combat actions. For example, a message to an encircled force may be an ultimatum prefaced by an artillery barrage and concluding with a threat of redoubled barrage if the ultimatum is not obeyed. Such threats must be kept, and on schedule.

(3) Radio Broadcasts. -- Radio broadcasts beamed toward areas within the effective range of the transmitter form an effective medium to reach both guerrilla and civilian targets. The audience is limited however, to those who have access to receiving sets of appropriate wave length and who will listen if they can.



SECTION 5: SECURITY

501. GENERAL

In areas threatened by a guerrilla force, security measures must be taken to safeguard troops, installations, key civilian communities, and lines of communication. The scope of guerrilla activity threatens all elements of the forces operating against them. The guerrilla characteristics, capabilities, and weaknesses must be constantly studied to determine the pattern for security and the emphasis to be placed on its various aspects. Vigilance and sound security measures will not only minimize interference with operations, but will tend to discourage guerrilla operations.

502. SECURITY MEASURES

Security measures are either active or passive in nature; the best security is provided by a combination of both. Actions and measures which enhance security against guerrilla threat include the following:

a. Offensive Operations.-- Constant pressure is maintained

against the guerrilla force. Harassing operations to include patrols, raids, ambushes, air attack, and use of supporting fires deny the guerrilla the opportunity to conduct operations.

b. Adequate Warning.-- Adequate warning is essential to timely reaction. The forces, agencies, and devices employed in normal land combat are used to provide warning. Depending on the situation, these include such things as: advance, flank, and rear guards; outposts; patrols; and ground surveillance radar. Continuous ground and aerial reconnaissance is conducted to detect threats to security. Maximum use is made of civilian informants and other indigenous personnel.

◆ c. Timely Reaction.-- All elements and personnel of a counter-guerrilla force, including the means of mobility, must be prepared to react instantly to a security threat. Reaction forces, discussed in paragraphs 403 and 404, are particularly suitable when adequate warning is provided. Immediate action drills are discussed in appendix A. In all

situations, all personnel keep their weapons available for instant use.

d. Effective Communications--Effective communications are essential to adequate warning, control of security activities, and timely reaction. Multiple and emergency means are established to ensure reliable communications in the event of failure of the primary system as a result of malfunction, destruction of facilities, or guerrilla interference.

e. Use of Obstacles and Aids--Appropriate use is made of physical obstacles and aids such as wire, mines, illumination, searchlight and restricted areas.

f. Deception--Deceptive operations, including communications, are conducted when appropriate. Deceptive measures such as cover, concealment, and camouflage are employed.

g. Care in the Establishment of Installations--Special attention is given to the selection of combat bases, patrol bases, and all other installations. Paragraph 403 discusses the establishment of combat bases and appendix A covers the organization of patrol bases. To economize on manpower, it is important to select sites for installations that readily lend themselves to defense. Since guerrillas are not as heavily armed as conventional ground forces, it is desirable to group installations together so that they may be guarded as a unit. The routine means of securing an installation are altered frequently to prevent the guerrilla force from obtaining detailed accurate information about the composition and habits of the defense.

h. Security of Lines of Communications--For a discussion of

techniques used in transportation security, see appendix C.

i. Designations of Clearance of an Area--To facilitate security, a system is established for the designation of the degree of control existing in any specific area. Such a system, based on traffic light colors, is described in paragraph 403.

j. Police-Type Operations and Civilian Control--Police-type operations and civilian control measures are essential to security. Curfew, movement restrictions, roadblocks, search and seizure and related measures are common. Techniques of civilian control are covered in appendix B; certain police-type operations are covered in appendix A. As a defense against espionage and sabotage within installations, rigid security measures are enforced on native labor, to include screening, identification, and supervision.

k. Supply Discipline--Supply discipline must be strictly enforced, and it must be emphasized to troops that supplies lost, traded, or thrown away may be recovered by the guerrillas and used against them. Arms and equipment must be salvaged from battle areas and from civilians who have collected them.

l. Troop Indoctrination--Psychological indoctrination of troops must minimize the anxieties which may stem from the nature of guerrilla operations; on the other hand, contempt for the guerrilla must be guarded against. Troops in areas considered secure may acquire a sense of false security and relax their vigilance. In units that have not experienced a guerrilla surprise attack, methodical supervision to maintain security discipline will be necessary. Since guerrilla force

operations may be spasmodic, long quiet periods will require particular attention to security vigilance.

m. Static Security Posts.--A static security post is any organized security system for the protection of fixed critical military or civil installations, or critical points along lines of communications, such as terminals, tunnels, and bridges. The size of the post will vary with the size and importance of the installation or point being secured. It may vary from a two-man bridge guard to a reinforced company securing a key communication center or civilian community. The following factors are considered in establishing static security posts:

(1) To preserve the tactical integrity of military units of the counterguerrilla force, maximum use of indigenous forces is made, consistent with their capability and reliability. Militia, self-defense forces, and police may be employed for this task. Every effort is made to avoid the piece-meal commitment of combat forces to static security duty.

(2) The outpost is organized for the security of both the installation and the security force. The security measures described above are particularly applicable.

(3) Static security posts in remote areas will necessarily be larger than those closer to supporting forces. Remote posts are maintained with a supply level to meet the contingency of isolation from their combat base.

503. REAR AREA SECURITY

a. Rear area security in a conventional operation includes the planning for and employment of anti-

guerrilla measures when a guerrilla threat exists. Because the rear area is threatened by other enemy action in addition to guerrilla action, rear area security embraces a variety of defensive measures; it cannot be directed only at the guerrilla menace. Both prior to and during a conventional operation, the enemy's capabilities to interfere with the operation are carefully assessed and the security of the rear area is established to accommodate the various possibilities. Accordingly, rear area security measures often represent a compromise based on enemy capabilities. For example, dispersion required under nuclear threat encourages and favors guerrilla action; when both threats exist, units are dispersed and particular attention is paid to the guerrilla threat. On the other hand, when a nuclear threat does not exist, dispersion is minimized to provide security measures against guerrilla threat.

b. When a guerrilla threat exists in a conventional operation, security of the rear area includes the use of the security measures covered in paragraph 502, as appropriate. Additional factors in rear area security which must be considered include the following:

(1) The accomplishment of the primary mission must not lose precedence, and whenever possible, enemy actions are overcome with minimum interruption to it.

(2) A commander is usually assigned responsibility for the overall security of the rear area. As rear area defense commander, he is responsible for the integration of local security plans into the overall area plan. His plans provide for unity of effort and ensure the most efficient use of available defensive means.

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(3) Specific combat units may be assigned the mission of assisting in security of the rear area. The type and size of the force depend on the characteristics and size of the area, enemy capabilities, and availability of forces. When the guerrilla threat is significant and the rear area units and installations cannot successfully cope with it, reserve elements of the combat units are assigned the mission of conducting antiguerrilla operations. This

assignment must be considered as a secondary and temporary mission. When a major guerrilla threat is anticipated, combat units other than reserve elements may be assigned to the operation to conduct antiguerrilla operations as a primary mission. Combat units assigned an anti-guerrilla mission conduct operations similar to the counter-guerrilla combat operations covered in paragraph 404.



SECTION 6: COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

601. GENERAL

a. In general, the communications capability within the Fleet Marine Forces is adaptable to counter guerrilla operations. The similarity of communications requirements between amphibious operations and counter guerrilla operations includes such things as the need for communications for command of the force as a whole, for special forms of control, and for coordination between diversified forces in the conduct of common or related operations.

b. The terrain in which the guerrilla usually operates and the methods of counter guerrilla operations impose definite limitations on the normal employment of the infantry communication system. Mountains, jungles, and other areas with heavy vegetation greatly reduce the rated distance capability of FM radios which are normally used for tactical radio nets. The lack of roads, trails, or good trafficability severely restrict the employment of vehicular

radio sets. The problem is complicated further by the wide separation of units and extensive long-range patrol operations.

602. REQUIREMENTS

a. The communication system must provide the commander with the capability of control and maneuver, rapid reporting of guerrilla movements, security and warning, and for handling normal administrative and logistic requirements. A communication system is required between military and civil agencies. Ground-to-air communication is established for all air-supported ground operations. Operations characterized by continuous small unit actions require a communication system that is reliable, rapid, secure, and flexible. A clandestine communication system is often required between intelligence agents and headquarters of higher echelons. The use of civilian police, self-defense units and friendly guerrillas in civilian population control or small scale operations requires a

communication system for coordination and control by the counter-guerrilla force.

b. The added burden placed on the communication system requires that the problem be met by ingenuity and improvisation as well as augmentation by personnel and equipment.

603. COMMUNICATION MEANS

a. Radio.--Radio is the primary means of communication. Great reliance is placed on portable radio equipment, capable of necessary transmission distances to control units operating in widespread areas. All units, particularly the infantry battalion and its subordinate units, require portable radios to facilitate mobility. Infantry platoons may be employed in situations that require a net of their own to coordinate patrols, raids and ambushes. Transmissions must be kept to a minimum so that high priority traffic such as reporting guerrilla contact and issuance of orders to reaction forces can be rapidly transmitted. Pre-determined codes will greatly assist in shortening transmission times. Emission control will enhance security and surprise. The counter-guerrilla force radio equipment will include the following:

(1) High Frequency (HF).--High frequency radio sets are used extensively; in some instances they may be required by rifle squads. HF sets are commonly used to pass intelligence information and control patrols during denial and harassing operations, and to control and coordinate units participating in reaction and elimination operations. In situations where increased ranges are required, HF radios may be employed rather than very high frequency (VHF) equipment. When op-

erating in areas with heavy vegetation, the effectiveness of vertical antennas is greatly reduced, and the use of half-wave and three-quarter wave horizontal antennas is required. To give satisfactory results, antennas must be set up in cleared areas and/or elevated above the surrounding vegetation. The noise level of HF receivers can be reduced by using CW emission instead of voice transmissions and by using headsets rather than speakers. The use of single sideband (SSB) radios will greatly increase capabilities in the HF range.

(2) Very High Frequency (VHF).--FM radio sets are used to the extent that line of sight transmission conditions exist. These sets are used for short-range ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications. In this connection, aircraft may be used effectively for temporary relay of radio traffic to support a specific short-term action.

(3) Ultra High Frequency (UHF).--UHF radio sets are used for ground-to-air and air-to-air communications. Additional UHF sets may be required to accommodate the increase in air support activity.

b. Wire.--Wire communication is used to the maximum extent possible. Normally, the vulnerability of wire communication to guerrilla force action dictates that wire be used only in secure areas and within combat bases and installations. However, if the area of operations is covered largely by heavy jungle growth, helicopters may be used to lay wire which will rest on top of, or high up in the growth. This technique will make it difficult for the guerrillas to locate or destroy the line.

c. Radio Relay.--Radio relay use is consistent with line of sight

conditions and mobility of the equipment. Radio relay sites are protected against guerrilla force raids and sabotage and should be located, when possible, in secure areas or installations.

d. Messenger.--Messengers are the most secure and reliable means of communication and the best means of transmitting maps, overlays, and long messages. Helicopterborne messengers are most often employed. Messengers who travel by vehicles must be provided security guards or travel with armed convoys. Reliable indigenous persons may be used; they are less conspicuous and usually have a thorough knowledge of the area, including trails. Aircraft can be used to drop and pick up messages.

e. Visual.--The use of arm and hand signals, semaphore, lights, smoke, pyrotechnics, mirrors, and panels find considerable application in counter guerrilla operations, particularly at the small unit level. Panels for ground-to-air signaling and marking, and pyrotechnics for prearranged signals are the most frequently required visual means other than arm and hand signals. In patrolling, ambushing, and other small unit operations where surprise and security are essential, additional arm and hand signals may be devised.

f. Sound.--The use of sound devices such as sirens, whistles, bugles, and weapon-firing may be used to signal the commencement of an attack or ambush, or for warning purposes. The use of less audible techniques such as rifle-tapping or twig-snapping may be used for warning at night, in patrol bases, or during patrolling. Airborne loudspeakers may be particularly effective in controlling the movement of large

units or transmitting messages to isolated units or patrols.

604. SECURITY

a. It must never be assumed that guerrilla forces do not have the capability of performing communication intelligence operations or countermeasures. Normal security precautions must be observed since a guerrilla force must be credited with the capability of tapping wire lines, monitoring radio transmissions, and receiving information from a sponsoring power or a conventional enemy force that can conduct communications intelligence operations.

b. All communication facilities are considered important targets by guerrilla forces and must be protected from sabotage or guerrilla attack.

605. COMMUNICATION COUNTERMEASURES


a. While the guerrilla force usually will not possess sophisticated communication equipment or training comparable to the counter guerrilla force, it will normally depend to some extent on radio communication for contact with a sponsoring power, its underground element, and for control and coordination of its subordinate elements. There are different objectives to consider in countering a guerrilla force's communications. These are:

- (1) Intercept and decode his transmissions.
- (2) Intercept his couriers.
- (3) Jam his radio traffic.
- (4) Deceive and mislead him by false transmissions.

(5) Find and destroy or capture his communication equipment.

b. The countermeasure mission assigned will depend on the desired result or product. If communications intelligence is desired, then subparagraphs (1) and (2), above, are the objectives. If the guerrilla force depends on his communication equipment for information and control in a fast moving tactical situation, and it is desired

to deny him that information and control, then subparagraphs (3) and (4), above, are the objectives. However, it should be kept in mind that communication deception is an exacting technique that requires as much knowledge of the enemy as he has of himself. Probably the final objective will be subparagraph (5), above, and would take place concurrent with the destruction or capture of the guerrilla force itself.



SECTION 7: AIR SUPPORT

701. GENERAL

Marine aircraft and air support tactics and techniques are readily adaptable to operations against guerrillas. Attack aircraft, helicopters, fixed-wing transports, and observation aircraft can contribute to the defeat of a guerrilla force. The employment of aircraft for reconnaissance is greater than normal. Helicopters are particularly important; they provide the means for rapid response to the tactical situation. The use of attack aircraft to support pursuits, raids, reaction operations and elimination operations utilizes both the mobility and the firepower of these aircraft to the maximum and will have a deteriorating effect on the morale of the guerrilla force. Extensive patrolling by small units will place them at distances beyond normal support and for long periods of time. These units will utilize air support for resupply, reconnaissance, evacuation, firepower, and contact with parent unit.

702. HELICOPTER SUPPORT

a. In recent years, the advent of the helicopter is the most significant innovation in the conduct of operations against guerrillas. When applied to these operations, its influence on the principles of war is remarkable. Most favorably affected is the principle of movement, which in turn influences the application of such fundamental principles as offensive, mass, surprise, and economy of force. The use of helicopters greatly reduces the ratio of opposing forces. In this connection, two principles are enhanced; economy of force - which requires the most advantageous distribution of the forces available, and its corollary, mass-- which requires the concentration of combat power at the decisive place at the decisive time. Finally, the helicopter helps provide for the application of the principle of the offensive, which is the basis of tactical doctrine for defeating guerrillas.

b. Although the employment of helicopters may be limited by

such factors as availability, terrain, and weather conditions, the possible advantages offered by helicopters should challenge the imagination of commanders at all echelons. Helicopters may be used--

▶ (1) To conduct aerial reconnaissance and maintain observation over known or suspected guerrilla areas in order to develop more accurate intelligence. The hover capability will facilitate detailed investigation of a specific area, but will increase the vulnerability of the helicopter to ground fire. (See par. 703.)

(2) To keep detected guerrillas, suspected guerrillas, or civilians under constant surveillance during daylight.

(3) To familiarize commanders and key personnel with the terrain and other characteristics of the area. (See par. 703.)

(4) As a means for natives, defectors, and patrol leaders to identify guerrilla camps, routes, etc., that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to describe by map inspection.

(5) To transport reaction forces, weapons, and equipment quickly to an area where the guerrillas can be engaged. This procedure will also assure the commitment of fresh troops. In addition, the transported force can be supplied with heavier weapons and more ammunition than guerrillas can carry.

(6) To keep guerrilla movements under surveillance during a fire fight, move troops from one area of the fire fight to another, and air lift troops not in direct contact to points along routes of escape.

(7) To introduce and extricate patrols and roadblocks in isolated areas.

(8) In an assault support capacity, by using the assault support helicopter (ASH) concept; and suppressive fires by hand-held weapons from transport helicopters.

(9) To resupply, deliver maintenance personnel, or withdraw damaged equipment for rear area repair.

(10) To provide reconnaissance/surveillance escort for armored columns or vehicular convoys. In this connection, they may be used to deliver troops ahead of the column for such tasks as obstacle removal, traffic control, and security in villages along the route. (See par. 703.)

(11) For psychological operations, such as leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker broadcasts. In addition, the frequent appearance of helicopters at many places and over a wide area has certain psychological value, suggesting intensity in the operations against the guerrillas.

(12) To evacuate casualties. This is of prime importance in the case of isolated units and patrols.

(13) To facilitate line-of-sight radio communications by acting as relay, to conduct wire laying missions when feasible, and to perform courier service.

(14) To assist in winning the support of the civilian population by rapidly transporting troops to besieged communities and conducting various mercy missions such as flood evacuation and the delivery of needed food, supplies, and medicine.

(15) To transport civil affairs personnel and indigenous authorities to isolated villages and areas, permitting better control and a wider coverage of influence.

(16) To apply defoliation material on guerrilla crops, camps and assembly areas.

(17) As a means for command control.

(18) As a means of establishing, maintaining, and checking isolated static security posts.

(19) To adjust fires, artillery, mortars and naval gunfire, and to direct and control various air support missions.

(20) In target acquisition and damage assessment.

(21) To conduct photographic missions employing hand-held cameras. (See par. 703.)

► For more details on helicopter employment, refer to FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations.

c. Employment Considerations

(1) As indicated above, the capabilities of the helicopter are many and varied; however, the availability of helicopters for conducting multiple missions may be limited. In planning helicopter support, potential missions must be carefully weighed to determine priorities. Other transportation means available must be considered. In planning for a particular operation, the nature and extent of helicopter participation should be estimated as early as possible.

(2) The location and development of helicopter bases, and the establishment of adequate maintenance facilities, is a prime consideration in planning.

(3) The requirements for efficient utilization and immediate response must be weighed. The requirement for immediate response is best satisfied by helicopters remaining in a standby alert at tactical unit combat bases; however, in certain situations, a more centralized control of helicopters may provide more efficient utilization.

(4) The helicopter unit and the units to be lifted must give special consideration to the problems of loading and unloading. Pilots must be capable of rapidly computing loads to reflect the changes in atmospheric conditions, wind, and distances to be flown.

(5) The commander of a unit to be lifted and the helicopter unit commander jointly select landing zones. The troop commander is primarily concerned with selecting zones that can support his tactical plan. The helicopter unit commander is concerned with the tactical aspects such as the ability of helicopters to get in and out of the landing zone, the number that can operate in the zone at one time, and whether or not landing sites require improvement.

(6) Operations against guerrillas may be conducted over a wide area and the opportunities to engage the guerrillas may be extremely limited. Accordingly, time and other conditions permitting, potential helicopter landing zones throughout the operational area should be selected and reconnoitered. These potential zones should be classified as to suitability

and given an identification (by a combination of letters and numbers) so that helicopters may be employed with a minimum of delay.

(7) There may be a requirement for the development of helicopter sites in rugged and/or densely overgrown terrain. In this case, teams composed of infantry and engineer personnel equipped with suitable tools and demolitions to clear sites and trained to debark from hovering helicopters are employed. Preparing an area for delivery of an emergency resupply with an externally-carried load requires little more than clearing an area roughly twice the size of the helicopter.

(8) Additional communication equipment and personnel may be needed to assure adequate ground-to-helicopter contact and overall helicopter coordination and control.

(9) Helicopter security presents several problems. Due to the effectiveness of the helicopter, raids on helicopter bases and grounded helicopters, and guerrilla efforts to induce helicopters into ambushes or to mine potential landing zones, can be expected and must be carefully guarded against. Special attention must be paid to security of the landing zones. Pathfinders are used to determine landing zone conditions, the presence or absence of enemy, and to furnish guidance. Another method is the advance landing of a heliteam to scout and secure the landing area and report on existing conditions. The guerrillas' normal lack of anti-air weapons and air support reduces the inflight danger to helicopters. Nevertheless, the security of helicopter approach and retirement lanes against fire is essential; protection means such as the use of

attack aircraft escort must be provided when circumstances warrant.

703. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION

a. Various types of aircraft are used to provide photographic reconnaissance and observation and adjustment of fire in support of the operation. As appropriate, many of the helicopter capabilities listed in subparagraph 702b should be considered in the employment of the Marine Observation Squadron.

b. Aerial photographs provide recorded information that can be assessed objectively and reproduced in quantity. Photographic reconnaissance is conducted to provide map substitutes or supplements and to obtain information on such things as targets, target damage assessment, illegal cultivations, clearings, roads, and trails. Photographic reconnaissance is valuable in confirming intelligence from other sources. Most photographic reconnaissance missions are conducted by high performance aircraft of the Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron. However, the Marine Observation Squadron has a limited capability; aerial observers, using hand-held cameras, are capable of providing pinpoint photography of specific areas or targets.

c. Visual reconnaissance plays an important part in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations. Direct communication between the reconnaissance aircraft and tactical unit headquarters is essential. In conducting visual reconnaissance missions, the following methods are employed:

(1) An area search is a general, continuous search covering

the entire area for intelligence information and the detection of changes. Accordingly, the same observer should be assigned to reconnoiter a specific area. Although guerrillas will seldom be seen, except when surprised or on the run, there will be signs of his existence even in areas possessing good concealment.

(2) A specific search is one conducted to obtain specified information concerning a limited area. It may be used to follow up information gained from agent or informer reports, ground reconnaissance, or photographic or other visual reconnaissance. Possible drop zone and helicopter landing sites are also reconnoitered to determine their suitability.

(3) A route reconnaissance is essentially a specific search. It is conducted for the purpose of determining route conditions, to report on convoy movements, and to provide security escort for convoys. Particular emphasis is placed on locating ambush sites. Helicopters may be assigned for short trips involving convoy escort. OE aircraft are better for longer trips. High performance aircraft may be used for armed reconnaissance of the route.

(4) Contact reconnaissances are conducted to locate and reestablish contact with patrols who have lost communications with tactical headquarters. Long-range patrols may include the preplanned use of contact reconnaissance for prescribed times and locations. These missions may also be used to maintain contact between widely separated units.

(5) Troop commanders and key personnel are flown on aerial

topographic reconnaissances of the area of operations. To ensure maximum benefit, a thorough briefing should be conducted before the flight. Prominent landmarks should be marked on the map that the passenger takes with him. Normally, these flights are limited to 1 hour; the passenger's powers of observation diminish rapidly after that period. Although limited, the 1-hour duration does not apply to trained aerial observers.

704. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

a. General

(1) Close air support may be difficult to provide and of limited value because of the guerrilla capability for dispersion, effective camouflage, moving and fighting at night, and his tactics of clinging to his enemy or of mingling with the populace. Satisfactory results can be achieved, however, when air support can react promptly under the guidance of a forward air controller (FAC) or tactical air controller (airborne) (TAC(A)) to attack observed guerrillas.

(2) Because of extensive patrol action, the traditional bomb line may not be practical and unit commanders may find it necessary to establish troop safety lines for specific operations. Positive identification of targets is difficult in jungle and overgrown country. Extensive briefing for pilots, SOP for air-ground operations, communications, and control require emphasis. As targets are fleeting, instantaneous response is required for decisive action. A minimum reaction time is possible only when adequate communications nets and procedures have been established for request and control of attack aircraft.

(3) In guerrilla warfare, on-call missions will take on added importance. Every effort must be made to shorten time required for planning and executing the close air support mission. Immediate engagement of targets as they appear will allow little time for briefing. Ordnance loads will be predetermined on the basis of experience. Although preplanned close air support provides the most effective utilization of aircraft, ground alert or airborne alert will be the most practicable basis of employment for quick response.

b. Capabilities.--Close air support provides supporting fires that other supporting arms cannot, due to range, defilade, or the limitations of terrain. Aircraft may be the only fire support available to ground units conducting long-range combat operations. The ability of the pilot to observe the target area permits him to see and fire on targets not visible to ground forces. His reconnaissance may often provide valuable information concerning guerrilla movements and location. Close air support can be used to conduct flushing fires on the guerrilla.

c. Control.--In jungle areas or other difficult terrain, forward air controllers may be unable to see the target or the attacking aircraft. Marking friendly positions by use of panels may not be effective in densely overgrown areas; colored balloons on long cords or smoke may be used. A tactical air coordinator (airborne) may be necessary to control the mission. Marine Observation Squadron aircraft can be used effectively as a TAC(A). The radio equipment, endurance, and low speed of the aircraft, and the capa-

bilities provided by trained aerial observers, are particularly valuable as a TAC(A) in operations against guerrillas.

d. Effects.--Choice of weapons presents a close air support problem. Heavy growth affords a degree of protection from blast and fragments. Rocket attack and strafing in jungle areas are relatively ineffective; weapons with high blast effect are more suitable. In open country, strafing is the most accurate and effective weapon to use against personnel. When friendly positions are easily identifiable, strafing runs can be pressed very close to their lines. When authorized, fragmentary bombs with VT fuses, napalm, or chemical and biological agents are effective on concentrations of guerrillas. The advantages of nonlethal biological/chemical weapons are many. Since the guerrilla is not prepared to defend against these agents, large areas can be denied him, and casualties are relatively easy to inflict. The most effective method of dispensing smoke, chemicals, and biological agents is by aerial delivery.

e. Search and Attack.--Air support in operations against guerrillas is difficult to define due to the absence of a bomb line. Missions that are controlled may be called close air support, others are called search and attack or armored reconnaissance missions. Armed reconnaissance is normally run as a specific search mission. All available means of collecting target information are exploited. Harassing attacks in suspected areas of guerrilla activity by armed reconnaissance can be most effective, but care must be taken not to subject civilians to attack.

705. FIXED-WING TRANSPORT SUPPORT

a. Fixed-wing transport aircraft have the capability of operating from relatively short, unimproved fields. This, coupled with their air delivery capability, provides a significant extension to the logistic and operational resources of forces engaged in operations against guerrillas. Utilization of fixed-wing aircraft, however, imposes logistic support requirements that must be considered. Weather and terrain are also limiting factors in fixed-wing air operations. Fixed-wing transport operations may be classified as administrative or tactical air movements.

b. Administrative air movements consist of the movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Tactical considerations in loading, movement, and unloading are of minor importance. Aircraft are loaded to most efficiently utilize cargo spaces. Such movements may be divided into--

(1) Scheduled flights, conducted on a predetermined recurring basis.


(2) Unscheduled flights, conducted on an as-required basis.

c. Tactical air movements consist of movement of forces, personnel, and cargo in which loading, movement, and unloading are determined by tactical considerations. Such movements, to accomplish a specific tactical mission, are made into or near enemy controlled territory. Counter guerrilla forces are prepared to conduct--

(1) Air landed operations wherein the tactical units are disembarked after the aircraft has landed.

(2) Air delivery operations wherein supplies and equipment are unloaded from the aircraft in flight.

d. Fixed-wing transport support is utilized for many of the same purposes as are helicopters. Such support is especially useful when missions are beyond the lift and/or range capabilities of the helicopter. (See par. 903.)



SECTION 8: COMBAT SUPPORT

801. GENERAL

Employment of combat support may be limited in guerrilla warfare. Rugged terrain that provides the guerrilla an area for operating forbids unlimited movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles and restricts the employment of supporting weapons. The employment of artillery, naval gunfire, and mechanized units in quantity may not be possible, although every effort is made to provide maximum combat support consistent with realistic requirements. Areas that possess navigable coastal and inland waters will be suited for the employment of naval ships and craft. Support provided by reconnaissance and engineer units can be most effective in rugged terrain. In planning the amount and type of combat support required, a detailed study of the terrain is conducted. Care is taken in planning the combat support to assure that it can be effectively employed. The unnecessary burden that will be imposed on logistics and the additional problem of security associated with noneffective units is to be avoided. Generally, combat support that is helicopter

transportable can provide effective support in guerrilla operations.

802. FIELD ARTILLERY

a. General.--Field artillery properly employed against guerrilla forces is a major asset to the commander. Proper employment of artillery is attained by modifying the conventional principles, techniques, and tactics. The vague enemy situation and difficult terrain require the artillery commander to exploit every means to provide adequate and continuous fire support. Although the principle of massed artillery fires is applicable against guerrilla forces, most firing will be accurate surprise fires on temporary and fleeting guerrilla targets.

(1) Counterguerrilla Operations.--The planning, composition, and employment of artillery units is based on the landing force plan of operation. The artillery plan is based on a careful study of the terrain, road nets, and the enemy situation. Support may be required for numerous patrols, ambushes, roadblocks, and similar guerrilla-type operations.

(2) Conventional Operations.--The planning, organization, and employment of artillery in conventional operations differs from counter guerrilla in that two concurrent operations may be conducted, one against guerrilla forces and the other against conventional forces. Diversion of artillery from the primary mission is a guerrilla tactic and diversion must be avoided. When required, a specific force, including artillery, is assigned to conduct operations against guerrilla forces which significantly threaten conventional operations. This force operates in the same manner as it would for counter guerrilla operations.

b. Organization for Combat.--Artillery must provide adequate fire support, including massing of fires; and the weapons employed should be those that can best support the operation. There is no standard organization for operations conducted against guerrillas. The artillery units are organized to be employed in specific terrain, to combat a certain size guerrilla force, and to support the tactics and techniques to be employed during a particular operation.

(1) Light Artillery Support.--As light artillery can be moved by helicopter, fixed-winged aircraft, landing craft, and on the ground, it can be delivered to areas that are inaccessible to other artillery.

(2) Medium Artillery Support.--Medium artillery, self-propelled and towed, provide increased accuracy and range over light artillery. However, medium artillery requires better roads and stronger bridges.

(3) Heavy Artillery Support.--Although restricted to good roads and strong bridges, its long

range can provide support to deep patrols and widely separated units.

(4) Amphibian Howitzer.--The amphibian howitzer (LVTH) can be employed in areas possessing poor roads, little or no bridging, and in areas too wet or otherwise unsuitable for conventional artillery. Its 360-degree turret traverse also affords rapid support in any direction.

(5) Searchlight Support.--Searchlights can be employed to prevent infiltration, limit night movement of guerrillas, locate friendly patrols, and for patrol orientation. They can also be employed to assist in night close air support.

(6) Target Acquisition Agencies.--If guerrillas employ mortars or artillery, sound, flash, and radar ranging can be utilized. Artillery aerial observers should be of sufficient numbers to provide constant surveillance. Because of the numerous patrols, an increase in the number of forward observers may be required.

(7) Survey Capability.--In addition to normal survey requirements, need exists for a greater number of surveyed control points (SCP) throughout areas to facilitate target location, transfer firing data and computation of corrections to be applied to firing data. Extensive survey operations can also aid in orientation of patrols. To accomplish such extensive survey, augmentation of additional survey teams will normally be required. In engagements of short duration where SCPs have not been established, fire will generally be directed from an observed firing chart. In these instances, artillery units can rapidly establish common direction by simultaneous astronomical observation. Helicopters can provide a

valuable asset to rapid survey of the area of operations to establish a common grid.

(8) Changes, Modifications and Additions.-- The changes, modifications, and additions that are incorporated in the artillery structure are carefully considered. Special training may be necessary if animals, new type equipment, or special procedures are employed.

c. Artillery Staff Planning.-- Staff estimates are prepared for the commander to assist him in making decisions. The decision to provide artillery support in operations against guerrillas will require imagination on the part of the staff in preparing its plan.

(1) Intelligence.-- The target acquisition agencies are exploited to locate targets. Rapid processing of target intelligence is vital in order to deliver fires as expeditiously as possible.

(2) Operations.-- Fire planning and fire direction techniques follow the conventional methods. Fire direction should remain centralized insofar as possible; however, decentralization may often be necessary due to widely dispersed operations and special task assignments. The operation may require decentralization of mutual defensive fires, countermortar fires, harassing and interdiction fires, flushing and barrier fires, and fires to support attacks. Coordination and control of fires require detailed planning. Training of personnel should include training in guerrilla warfare and in techniques required for operating any special equipment.

(3) Logistics.-- If related to the total guerrillas killed, ammunition expenditures by artillery may

appear excessive. The requirement for displacement of artillery may result in greater than normal POL consumption. Position area security may require abnormal amounts of barbed wire, concertina, tripflares, and anti-personnel mines. Other specialized equipment is considered in planning. The movement of supplies, protection of dumps, and distribution of widely dispersed units must be provided for.

d. Fire Support.-- In addition to the normal fire support plans, certain fires peculiar to operations against guerrilla forces must be planned. These plans are innovations or variations of fire plans utilized in conventional artillery support. Among these are:

(1) Countermortar Fires.-- The normal countermortar techniques are utilized in target accumulation, target selection, and target attack. However, in operations against guerrillas, the target will be even more fleeting and temporary than in normal countermortar operations. Accordingly, rapid dissemination of countermortar target information is essential in order that a quick response can be made by supporting arms. Plans are prepared on active locations.

(2) Counter guerrilla Fires.-- The accumulation and collection of counter guerrilla targets are provided by the normal target acquisition agencies and the infantry sources. Fires are planned on guerrilla installations, camp areas, communications routes, and known positions. Many of these targets may be unoccupied during firing of a counter guerrilla program; nevertheless, effective neutralization of installations may be obtained. A counter guerrilla program of fires can be prepared preliminary to

supporting an infantry attack on guerrilla areas. Individual fires may be prepared to force the guerrilla into a particular area.

◆ (3) Defensive Fire Plans.--

Defensive fire plans are devised to protect rear area installations, to prevent infiltration in strength, and as mutual fires in defense of other installations. Defensive fire plans require careful coordination and control when planned concentrations are near friendly military installations and occupied civilian areas.

◆ (4) Harassing Fires.--

Harassing fires are designed to disturb the rest of the guerrilla, to curtail his movement, and by threat of loss, to lower his morale.

◆ (5) Interdiction Fires.--

Interdiction fires are fires placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.

◆ (6) Reconnaissance by Fire.--

Reconnaissance by fire is a method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause him to disclose his presence by movement or return fire. It is accomplished by firing on suspected target areas to produce a reaction from the guerrilla force. Because the fire may expose guerrilla installations by destroying natural cover and camouflage, aerial photographs are taken before and after the program is fired. Maximum aerial observation is used during the firing to detect and report guerrilla activity.

◆ (7) Flushing Fires.--

These fires are prepared to support infantry operations by "flushing" the guerrilla into an ambush. They are employed in rough and difficult terrain and in vegetation near defined

paths, roads, and streams that are used as routes of communication.

◆ (8) Barrier Fires.--

Barrier fires are planned to support infantry operations by denying guerrillas ingress or egress in the area of operations, preventing escape and denying the guerrilla reinforcements.

◆ (9) Deception Fires.--

These fires are placed away from friendly troops and are designed to deceive the guerrillas and to cover friendly troop movements. Deception fires can be used to distract and mislead the guerrilla force while friendly troops approach from other directions.

◆ (10) Illumination Fires.--

The illumination fire plan is made to assist friendly troops, by exposing guerrilla activity, and deterring infiltration. It can be utilized for orientating lost patrols.

◆ (11) Survey by Fire.--

Location of guerrilla activity can be provided from replot data. Survey by fire using center of impact (CI) and high burst (HB) techniques with HE, WP, and illumination shells will give accurate location of targets, patrols, etc. Patrols that possess the necessary communications can determine their position or those of the enemy from adjusted coordinates provided by the artillery FDC.

◆ (12) Chemical Fires.--

Chemical fires may be utilized effectively against guerrilla forces to screen friendly troop movements, to confuse the enemy, and for casualty effect. White phosphorus (WP) is best suited to marking guerrilla activity for air or infantry attack. WP can also be used as a casualty agent, to burn vegetation, and destroy supplies. Other toxic

and nontoxic chemical shells are ideally suited to counter guerrilla tactical operations against a foe ill-prepared for it.

▶ (13) Biological Fires.-- Missiles and rockets of field artillery can deliver biological fires against personnel, animals, and crops which contribute to the guerrilla effort. These fires are ideally suited to counter guerrilla operations since nonlethal doses can be utilized to retard the activity of the guerrilla in areas that are inhabited by friendly or neutral civilians. These people can be treated or even inoculated against the biological agents used. Food can be issued to replace crops and animals of friendly civilians lost through this action.

e. Employment Considerations.-- The employment of artillery requires movement to complement the infantry scheme of maneuver. Selecting position areas in rough terrain to extend the range and support capability for infantry units operating in widely dispersed areas will require extensive reconnoitering. To prevent wasteful expenditure of ammunition, forward observers and artillery air observers should be provided with a target criteria. This criteria should state what comprises a counter guerrilla target and the normal means and amount of artillery fire to be used. The coordination of fires on rear areas, farms, and built-up areas is based on guidance received from the artillery commander.

(1) RSOP.-- Reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position will follow the normal principles. Security and all-around fire capability are emphasized. A search for easily accessible position areas is made to prevent the requirement

for building extensive roads, clearing areas, and cutting access ways. This also applies in selecting position areas for helicopterborne and airpack artillery. Security measures on the march and while occupying the position are considered. A compact position area is desirable, providing there is little or no threat of enemy counterfires.

(2) Security.-- Security measures against guerrilla infiltration and attack are carefully considered by the artillery commander. In addition to planning the normal local security, employment of direct fire utilizing time-fused shells, ricochet burst with delay-fused shells, and beehive rounds to defend against guerrilla attack are considered. Direct fire sectors can be assigned to each gun section as is done in antimechanized defense. Illumination of approaches into the position are planned. Illumination fires can be included in mutual defensive artillery fires. When not committed elsewhere, the mortar battery of the direct support battalion can provide defensive fires for the battalion installations. Joint installations and command post for artillery and infantry can provide greater protection and simplify the local defense problem. Passive defense techniques are considered. The use of wire, trip-flares, and antipersonnel mines may be extensive. Emphasis is placed on the training, equipping, and employment of the security section. When organic personnel and weapons are inadequate in providing for security, the commander may obtain additional security means from the supported commander.

(3) Movement.-- When providing support for operations conducted over a large area, artillery is frequently moved. Adequate roads

and bridges are necessary for movement on land. Roads and access ways can be improved somewhat by organic means. In some instances, engineer support will be required to construct bridges and roads. Self-propelled artillery is particularly hampered by its size and weight when moving in rugged and undeveloped terrain. When land movement is not possible, helicopterborne or airpack artillery delivered by aerial drop are substituted.

(4) Coordination.--Fire support is carefully planned. Guide lines provided by the commander and the use of the "traffic light" system of areas contained in subparagraph 403b, will facilitate coordination. A criteria is stated by the commander to specify the number of guerrillas and the size and type installations that constitute a legitimate artillery target. The amount of ammunition that may be expended against counter guerrilla targets may be stated, if required. The commanders can control fire discipline and preclude unnecessary expenditures of ammunition.

(5) Observation.--In order to provide the most effective support, it is important that a completely integrated observation plan be instituted to cover each area of operation. The following observation means should be fully integrated.

(a) Observation Posts.-- Artillery and infantry observation posts should be established in conjunction with each other and fully coordinated by the intelligence officers.

(b) Aerial Observers.-- The intelligence and operations officers coordinate infantry and artillery aerial observers surveillance of the area of operations. In

addition to performing observation and photographic missions these observers relay requests of ground observers with patrols.

(c) Electronic Surveillance.-- The ground surveillance and countermortar radars of infantry and artillery should be integrated in the observation plan. Limitations imposed by terrain and vegetation may be overcome by local or isolated area employment. Adequate protection for equipment and operators must be provided.

f. Execution of Artillery Operations.-- Weapons such as tanks, anti-tanks, and amphibian howitzers may be included in certain fire support operations. If employed, heavy and medium artillery will normally execute fire missions on distant targets while light artillery may be able to accompany the task forces in many operations.

(1) Artillery Support Considerations.-- In providing artillery support all problem areas need to be carefully analyzed. Range and trajectory capabilities, the cross-country mobility of self-propelled artillery, the use of helicopterborne artillery, air delivery and resupply, and the capability of artillery communications are examined. Ammunition requirements must be considered.

(2) Techniques of Support.-- Forward observers with patrols, reconnaissance elements and large or small task organizations will increase the number of guerrilla sightings and targets of opportunity. Forward observers operating in dense vegetation or rugged terrain should be capable of adjusting fire by sound. To provide for troop safety, fire for effect on initial data is placed at a greater distance

from troops than in normal operations. Within transfer limits, adjustments on check points or terrain features will assure accurate surprise fire on guerrilla activity and provide for troop safety. Trained aerial observers will be of particular value in adjusting fires, coordinating movements, reporting guerrilla activities, locating friendly elements, and acting as radio relay station for ground elements. Calibrated artillery pieces, the use of survey, registration, and metro corrections will ensure greater accuracy and troop safety.

(3) Native Guides.--Native guides and interpreters may be necessary in batteries and battalions to assist in movement from one position area to another. Their knowledge of the terrain and language can often preclude delay by assisting in the reconnaissance for position areas and routes. They can be invaluable to the observers and commanders for orientation and target information.

(4) Offensive Action.--As offensive operations progress, forces are directed toward isolation, encirclement, and destruction of guerrilla units. The value of artillery increases during this period. Planning of artillery fires, target acquisition, and attack of guerrilla targets may approach conventional warfare. The use of flushing fires to force the guerrilla in a desired direction and barrier fires to seal off the possibility of withdrawal and to deny reinforcements, is applicable. The destruction of guerrilla installations, the constant harassing and interdiction of facilities and routes of communications, will hamper and destroy the morale of guerrilla forces. Artillery is positioned to support the scheme of maneuver against a fixed guerrilla

force, to exploit the maximum number of weapons, and to provide massed fires.

(5) Pursuit.--Artillery is invaluable in the pursuit of escaping guerrilla elements. The demoralizing effect of artillery fires on a defeated guerrilla force should not be overlooked. Helicopterborne artillery is ideally suited to accompany the infantry pursuit of guerrilla remnants.

803. NAVAL GUNFIRE

The demoralizing effect of naval gunfire on guerrillas may justify the use of gunfire support against targets smaller than would normally be considered appropriate or when there is little probability of inflicting material damage. Naval gunfire spotters should be provided for platoon or larger size units operating within range. When assigning spotters to units of less than company size, alternate communications must be provided in instances where normal communication equipment would adversely affect the unit's mobility. Spotting teams must be trained in operational techniques, preferably with the same units with which they will be employed. Maximum use should be made of air spotters.

804. MECHANIZED UNITS

a. Tanks and ONTOS.--The long-range firepower of the tank can be exploited in many areas where its mobility is restricted. Tanks may be employed for mobile roadblocks, mobile CPs, convoy escorts, and for a "show of force" to indicate strength to the civilian population. Convoy protection against ambush can be provided by ONTOS in addition to furnishing fire support in other combat situations.

b. Amphibian Vehicles.--The ability of amphibian vehicles to provide infantry transport, direct and indirect fire support, a command post or fire direction center, and flexible communications with other ground units or air elements will greatly enhance operations. In areas where waterways offer the most readily available avenue of mobility, the LVT is especially valuable. Amphibian vehicle/infantry teams employed in connection with helicopterborne force may have the requisite mobility and firepower to outmaneuver and destroy an elusive enemy.

805. NBC WEAPONS

a. Nuclear Weapons.--Nuclear employment requires a well-defined target. In counter guerrilla operations, seldom will there be a target of sufficient size to justify the use of a nuclear weapon.

b. Chemical and Biological Weapons.--Under certain conditions chemical and biological (CB) weapons may increase the combat power of counter guerrilla forces. Employment of such weapons will require proper authorization, a decision which will have been taken in concert with the friendly government and forces. Our own and friendly forces operating in proximity to CB targets must have protection suitable for the agent selected for attack. It is unlikely that guerrilla forces can obtain CB defensive equipment. Where guerrillas are relatively weak, they will typically be well-concealed and located in remote areas. Lethal C or B agent attacks over large areas by support aircraft during carefully selected weather conditions offer the optimum means for destruction of these forces. Persistent lethal or persistent vesicle chemical agents may deny routes or

areas to guerrillas in isolated regions. When guerrillas are strong, they may be found close to or mingled among a noncombatant population. In this situation nonlethal incapacitating chemical or biological agents are ideal. The period of incapacitation must be long enough so that counter guerrilla forces may move in, disarm and imprison belligerents, and seek out hidden arms. A means of identifying hostile persons is required in this sorting process. See appendix B, paragraph 10, for riot control by chemical agents.

806. RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

a. Reconnaissance units, with their mobility and operational capabilities, provide the commander with valuable means in conducting operations against guerrilla forces. Their most important role is to gather information.

b. The reconnaissance battalion, Marine division, has the mission of conducting reconnaissance in support of the division and/or its subordinate elements. Reconnaissance personnel can be used as helicopterborne forces for deep reconnaissances, for attacking small isolated forces, and for reconnoitering helicopter landing sites and drop zones. In counter guerrilla operations, consideration may be given to employing the battalion or subordinate units as a mobile reserve. In antiguerrilla operations, units may be employed to conduct limited tactical operations against located guerrilla bands, patrol rear areas, reconnoiter isolated areas between tactical units, and provide convoy escort.

▶ c. See FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance, for detailed discussion of missions, organization,

and concept of employment of reconnaissance units.

807. ENGINEERS

a. Included among the engineer tasks which face the tactical unit commander are:

(1) Neutralization of guerrilla mines, booby traps, and obstacles in tactical operations.

(2) Clearing vegetation along potential ambush sites.

(3) Destruction of facilities and/or areas of value only to the guerrilla force.

(4) The construction and/or maintenance of roads to operational areas to ensure rapid employment against guerrilla forces.

(5) Operation of ferries at river crossing sites in areas where guerrillas can readily destroy bridging.

(6) Possible construction of secure settlements for the civil population.

b. Field expedients should receive emphasis. All units should be proficient in simple engineer work such as erection of barbed wire fences, obstacle clearance, and field expedient bridging. To make maximum use of the civilian population, engineer personnel may be used to train and supervise laborers.

c. Mining and mine removal cannot be overemphasized. Training in employment of our own mines, and mines and booby traps employed by the guerrilla, should be

stressed. A favorite tactic of the guerrilla is to employ mines on trails, roads, and in built-up areas. Once he becomes familiar with our selection of helicopter landing sites, these too may be mined. All units should train in mining and mine removal to deny the guerrilla freedom of movement and to assist in defense of all installations.

808. NAVAL SHIPS AND CRAFT

a. Naval ships can be employed to disrupt guerrilla supply channels maintained by local coastal or river craft, provide sea transport for rapid concentration of ground forces, attack guerrilla formations in areas close to the sea, and prevent seaward infiltration or escape of guerrilla forces.

b. If terrain and inland waterways are suitable, small craft can aid the mobility of tactical units. Combat support may be provided through LCVPs, LCMs, and LCUs by mounting mortars, tanks, and artillery for fire support directly from the landing craft, or when infantry is available to provide protection, weapons may be landed to provide support. These and other craft can provide service support such as evacuating casualties, supplying and resupplying, operating ferries and by providing craft with jury-rigged helicopter platforms where this would be the only means for landing.

c. Precautionary steps must be taken against guerrilla countermeasures involving ambushes employing recoilless rifles, "frogmen" with demolitions, or underwater mines.



SECTION 9: LOGISTICS

901. GENERAL

Operations against guerrillas present special logistic problems that require detailed planning. The logistic support system must be flexible enough to provide self-sufficiency for the tactical unit, preplanned resupply, and prepositioned supplies and service installations. Security must be established to protect supplies against raids and ambush even in "safe" areas. Although some type of transportation can usually be provided, units must be prepared to man-carry supplies or utilize pack animals. Individual preventive maintenance on all equipment must be stressed. Medical requirements include mobile units with surgical capability; greater self-sufficiency of medical personnel attached to tactical units, and thorough first aid proficiency on the part of all personnel.

902. SUPPLY

a. Planning.--Forces operating against guerrillas should carry a minimum of supplies in order to

maintain their mobility. Small units should be prepared to live off the land when necessary. The commander must determine the amount and type of supplies needed for the entire operation. After estimating the expected resupply transportation support and the supplies which will be available locally, he must decide both the supplies to be carried with the unit and stock levels to be maintained at the resupply base(s).

b. Types.--Generally, the major supply requirements are for Class I and V. The amount of Class III supplies required will depend on the amount of automotive transportation included in the tactical organization, plus the amount needed to maintain communications facilities. Necessary Class II items should be available at pre-positioned locations on an "as-required" basis. There may be a requirement to provide essential items of Class I and medical supplies to civilians.

c. Procurement.--Replenishment schedules must be planned utilizing prearranged delivery of

supplies to tactical units by air, land or water transportation. While emergency combat rations can suffice for a few days, provisions should be made to deliver standard rations periodically. Smokeless heat tablets should be provided. Class III may be procured locally, but care should be taken to determine its reliability; delivery will generally be possible by 5-gallon containers only. Local procurement should not deprive the civil populace of scarce materials. On the other hand, only the necessary amounts of Class I, medical supplies, and clothing should normally be supplied to civilians. No Class III or V should be turned over to civilians unless specific authority has been granted.

d. Pre-positioned Supplies.--Temporary supply points should be established at static defense or security installations to replenish troops and supplies.

903. TRANSPORTATION

a. General.--The success of operations depends, to a large measure, on transportation support that can be maintained. This applies to tactical displacements, supply and service support, and the evacuation of casualties. Resources of the guerrilla tend to limit him to foot mobility. Forces operating against guerrillas will also frequently rely on foot mobility; wheeled vehicles will often provide such forces a decided advantage. See appendix C for discussion of transportation security.

b. Helicopters.--Helicopterborne forces arrive fresh and are quickly deployed. Helicopter support during combat is particularly desirable since resupply, reinforcement, and evacuation by other means are often infeasible. The use of helicopters for supply and evacuation

offers a high degree of logistic support flexibility from the highest echelon down to the squad patrol. (See par. 702.)

c. Fixed-Wing Transport.--Fixed-wing aircraft delivery is perhaps the most satisfactory means of resupply for tactical units beyond helicopter range. (See par. 705.) If electronic guidance systems are available, all-weather parachute or free-drops can be used. The chief disadvantages of this method are that the locations and sizes of the drops may give information to the opposing guerrillas as to the location and size of the receiving unit and that some supplies may drift into areas where they will be recovered by the enemy. There is also a damage risk.

d. Landing Craft.--Landing craft can be used to move troops, supplies, and surface vehicles on inland waterways. Armament can be mounted on the landing craft for combat support. Tanks and supply laden vehicles can either be off-loaded or used while waterborne. (See par. 808 and app. C.)

e. Rail.--Existing rail facilities may offer good transportation over part of the supply route but will seldom extend to the forward areas. Since rail shipments are easily sabotaged or ambushed, security considerations may often rule out use of rails even though otherwise feasible. See appendix C for discussion of security measures for rail movement.

f. Land Vehicles.--Rugged terrain usually limits the types of vehicles which can be used in the forward areas. However, LVTs, track-laying prime movers, and mechanical mules may provide cross-country mobility.

g. Other Means.--When no other transportation is available, troops move on foot and supplies are man-packed. Native carriers and/or pack animals can be employed. When pack animals are used, their owners or other native handlers should be hired, if possible.

904. SERVICE

◆ a. General.--It will not be feasible to attach heavy maintenance support units to tactical organizations; therefore, they should be located at the bases or static defense installation closest to the combat areas. For the organization of maintenance support areas see FMFM 4-1, Logistics and Personnel Support. Preventive maintenance should be given a high priority. Contact repair teams may be flown to the tactical locations for unit replacement repairs or unserviceable equipment may be helicopter lifted to the support area. Movement of the tactical unit should not be delayed by lengthy maintenance operations. Inoperative vehicles which cannot be repaired or evacuated should be destroyed or cannibalized.

b. Planning.--Service support planning must consider the complete operation, the organization of the force, and its equipment. Spare parts and replacements must be spotted at locations where they can be easily transported to the tactical areas. When extended operations are planned, it may be advisable to attach repair teams to the tactical units. Only essential combat replacement items should be stocked. Time must be allocated before and after each mission for repairs and replacements.

◆ c. Execution.--Emphasis is placed on replacement of component parts by mobile maintenance teams

helicopter-lifted. Temporary repairs and local civilian repair facilities should be used as much as possible. Requests for service support will be passed over normal command or administrative radio channels to the logistic support area commander.

d. Security.--Maintenance personnel must be trained and equipped to protect themselves and their installations from guerrilla attacks and sabotage. In addition, the commanders of the tactical units concerned must provide for their safety when they are working in their tactical areas.

905. MEDICAL TREATMENT, EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. General.--Medical support must be as flexible as the tactical operation. Flexible, mobile medical support units, with a surgical capability, support tactical operations against guerrillas from the nearest base or static installation. Small unit casualties are evacuated to medical units by the most expeditious means available, usually helicopter. Further evacuation will be in accordance with normal doctrine.

b. Initial Care.--Initial emergency medical treatment is by organic hospital corpsmen. The use of small tactical units in widely dispersed areas requires that each man be trained in basic first aid measures so that he may save his own life or that of another because the unit may be required to hold casualties for extended periods of time before evacuation. First aid training must emphasize practical application of emergency treatment.

◆ c. Evacuation.--Organic medical personnel should be placed with the companies and platoons, especially when units are operating

at considerable distance from the parent unit. Only necessary medical supplies and equipment are carried by medical personnel. Evacuation is accomplished by the most practical means available. Unit commanders must make every effort to evacuate casualties as they occur so as not to reduce tactical mobility. (Helicopters should be considered the primary evacuation means for isolated units or long-range patrols, even when helicopter landing sites do not exist in the vicinity. A long-range, platoon-size patrol with casualties can clear a helicopter landing site in much less time than it would take to evacuate the casualties overland. Engineer personnel with tools and demolitions could debark from hovering helicopters to assist in clearing a site. It is a matter of hours versus days.) Company and platoon medical personnel are required to establish casualty collecting points pending evacuation. Evacuation plans must be carefully coordinated at the lowest levels. Radio nets and procedures for requesting evacuation helicopters are identical to those used in amphibious warfare. Procedures for locating and marking evacuation stations for both day and night evacuation operations must be established

prior to commencement of operations.

d. Treatment of Civilians.-- Use of military medical personnel to assist in treatment of civilians is a powerful psychological weapon to gain support of the local population. Medical personnel should assist, particularly when civilian casualties are the result of guerrilla actions, but without depleting stocks required by troops.

906. SANITATION AND PERSONAL HYGIENE

The importance of hygiene and sanitation must be emphasized. Every effort is made to prevent sick casualties through good sanitation and hygiene practices. Individuals and small units may often be isolated from sanitary food and water supplies. Most local diseases can be controlled and prevented. Depending on the area of operations, head nets, insect repellents, and water purification tablets should be issued. All troops must receive intensive indoctrination in preventive measures prior to being committed to combat if they are to continue as a potent fighting force. Care of the feet is of prime importance.



SECTION 10: CIVIL POPULATION CONSIDERATIONS

1001. GENERAL

Successful operations against guerrillas will depend to a large extent upon the attitude of the civil populace. One of the guerrilla's greatest assets lies in his identification with a popular cause and his ability to conceal himself within the populace. His success depends on civil populace support. Based on the attitude of the civilian populace, the military/civilian relationship will range from severe populace control--where the populace is sympathetic to the guerrilla cause--to limited control and a generous program of civic action, where the populace is sympathetic with the counter guerrilla efforts. Civil affairs and civic action are the major factors in developing favorable public opinion. They are an effective instrument for fostering active civilian opposition to the guerrilla force and active participation in, and support of operations against guerrillas. (See app. B.)

1002. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

a. Objectives--Civil administration conducted by military

forces should accomplish the following:

- (1) Support military operations.
- (2) Fulfill obligations arising from treaties, agreements, or customary law.
- (3) Implement United States policies.
- (4) Provide for smooth and prompt transition back to civil control.

b. Responsibility The commander's responsibilities may vary from complete social and economic control to limited security control in specified combat areas. He may be authorized civil controls in combat zones similar to those exercised in occupied areas, but any such authority will be specified in treaties or other agreements with the local governing bodies.

- (1) In territory dominated by a guerrilla force, the commander

may be assigned responsibility for absolute control subject only to the limits set by International Law and regulations contained in policy directives. See NAVMC 2500, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government, and FMs of the 41 series.

(2) In areas where the government friendly to the United States has sufficient control, the commander's responsibilities will usually be limited to advice, assistance, and negotiations.

(3) Total responsibility for control over liberated areas is rapidly transferred to the local government. Premature transfer, however, may threaten the stability of the reestablished power. Close liaison and ample support is provided for the reestablished government and its organized forces until it is entirely self-sufficient. Such support may be administered through advisory and liaison groups.

c. Approach.--Commanders must realize that operations against guerrillas will seldom solve the problems of the area in which they occur. The guerrilla force is only a symptom of the overall problem which caused the resistance movement to arise in the first place. Throughout military operations, a positive program of civil assistance must be conducted to eliminate the original cause of the resistance movement. While administration will normally be conducted by the civilian agencies of the National Government in situations short of war, the military force will normally possess many of the technical, managerial, and administrative skills needed and may be called on to provide assistance for portions of the program such as:

(1) Stabilization of social and political institutions.

(2) Development of a balanced economy.

(3) Establishment of acceptable living standards.

(4) Provision of individual and group equality.

(5) Establishment of an acceptable educational program.

1003. POPULACE CONTROL

a. General.--Rigid and strict control and stern administrative measures are imposed on a populace that is collaborating with guerrilla forces. Public attitudes must be judged carefully. Control and restrictions are relaxed on a populace in direct proportion to its efforts to cooperate. The sincere will of the civilians to oppose the guerrilla force should be supported. The basic objective is to physically and ideologically isolate the guerrilla force from the populace.

b. Measures.--Administrative measures and punishment are exercised with care. If the people become so frustrated as the result of control and punishment that they feel their lot might just as well be thrown in with the guerrillas, the purpose of the control measures is defeated. However, rigid enforcement and stern punishment are necessary. Half-heartedness or laxness will breed contempt and defiance. Violators are apprehended and justly punished. The guerrilla force may initiate acts of violence in communities that are cooperating. Unjust or misplaced punishment is vigorously exploited by the guerrillas. Every means is used to publicize the nature of offenses for which

punishment is imposed. The populace must be made to realize that the action is taken to enforce law and order.

c. Methods.--Administrative measures to suppress an unfriendly populace and minimize its ability to collaborate with guerrilla forces may include:

- (1) Employment of road-blocks.
- (2) Search and seizure operations.
- (3) Constant surveillance by block control.
- (4) Apprehension of guerrilla sympathizers.
- (5) Prevention of political meetings and rallies.
- (6) Registration and documentation of all civilians.
- (7) Inspection of individual identification documents, permits, and passes.
- (8) Restrictions on public and private transportation and communication means.
- (9) Controlling all movement.
- (10) Curfew.
- (11) Censorship.
- (12) Control of the production, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs and protection of food-producing areas.
- (13) Controlled possession of arms, ammunition, demolitions, drugs, medicine, and money.

(14) Complete evacuation of areas, if necessary.

1004. CIVIC ACTION

a. General.--Civic action is performed by military forces utilizing military manpower and material resources in cooperation with civil authorities to socially and economically better the civilian community. Opposition to the guerrilla force and local support for counterguerrilla efforts are a by-product of civic action. It should not be regarded as a gift, but as a method through which the civilians may effectively support the government.

b. Public Assistance.--Local civic action may include--

(1) Construction or rehabilitation of transportation and communication means, schools, hospitals, churches, and utility systems.

(2) Assistance in agricultural production.

(3) Provision of emergency food, and supplies, and clothing.

c. Local Employment.--Civic action programs are often designed to employ the maximum number of civilians until a suitable economy is established. The energies of unemployed and perhaps discontented civilians, should be directed into constructive channels supporting the purpose of the friendly campaign.

1005. CIVIL FORCES AND LOCAL INDIVIDUALS

a. General.--To lessen the requirement for military personnel, maximum use is made of local individuals and civil forces sympathetic

to the friendly cause. The use and control of such forces depends on national and local policy agreements and suitable security screening. Civil forces require assistance and support by the military force. Assistance is required in an advisory capacity for organization, training, and the planning of operations. Support is required in supplying arms, ammunition, food, transportation, and communications equipment.

b. Use.-- Careful evaluation is made of the civil force's potential use so as to realize their full effectiveness. Their utilization must be based on sound intelligence and planning. The premature organization and exploitation of such forces may invite treachery. Commanders must first establish an efficient counterintelligence organization to screen persons available for use. Guerrillas may be expected to infiltrate agents into any locally organized unit. Even when there is some doubt about their loyalty, individuals may still be used on certain nonsensitive duties to release more troops for military operations. It may also be possible to use them in other areas where they do not have a close relationship with the local populace. Within some areas, sympathetic nationals may be too few to assist in combating the guerrilla force. Within a guerrilla force it is not uncommon to find subordinate elements opposing each other over political or organizational differences. Properly maneuvered, the factions may even be induced to fight each other. A guerrilla movement split by internal strife is far easier to deal with than a completely unified force. The employment of civil

forces and individuals may include the following:

◆ (1) Self-Defense.-- Local individuals of both sexes who have had any kind of military experience or training should be organized into self-defense units. Self-defense units are organized according to villages, counties, and provinces. The units must be capable of repelling terrorists attacks and preventing loss of supplies and equipment. If possible self-defense forces should be sufficiently strong to enable them to hold an attacking guerrilla force until the arrival of mobile military reaction forces.

(2) Police.-- Local and regional police are employed primarily to assist in establishing and maintaining order in urban areas. They are most effective in areas which are densely populated. Other national or military-like units are effective in maintaining order in rural and remote areas.

◆ (3) Allied Force.-- Whenever possible, friendly units native to an area are employed against guerrillas. Their familiarity with the country, people, language, and customs makes them invaluable. The military commander controls friendly units capable of combat operations through a liaison party and logistic support. These units are usually organized, trained, and possess equipment prior to their utilization and are employed in small scale combat operations. Allied forces using weapons, uniforms, ammunition, and other equipment that differs from ours imposes a

complex logistic burden that must be resolved. Those civil forces and local individuals without experience or training may be employed as--

(a) Intelligence agents and informers.

(b) Propaganda agents.

(c) Government and key civil leaders.

(d) Security forces.

(e) Labor and service forces.

(f) Trackers and guides.

(g) Interpreters and translators.



SECTION 11: TROOP INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING

1101. GENERAL

◆ a. A separate and distinct program of training is neither necessary nor desirable to prepare military forces for operations against guerrilla forces. However, there is a necessity that training for operations against guerrilla forces be effectively integrated into all phases of the prescribed training program for all units. Troops must be trained to realize that the prime difference between conventional warfare and operations against a guerrilla force is the nature of the opposing force. A military force, well-trained in counterguerrilla operations, will be capable of minimizing the strengths and exploiting the weakness of a guerrilla force.

◆ b. The success of operations against guerrillas is affected by the attitude of the civilian population in the area. It is important that the local populace be favorably impressed by the standard of conduct of all units. Troops are oriented in their relations with the civil populace, the ideological and social cus-

toms of the country, and in respecting public and private property. Needless destruction of public and private property, and abusive use of police and military power against civilians cannot be tolerated. Claim officers should be available throughout the area of operations for immediate settlement of claims when property is damaged or destroyed. A friendly, courteous, and considerate manner toward the population as a whole by all units in a country will have a direct bearing on military operations. If this positive attitude is achieved, civil agencies and the civilian population will assist in the detection and control of guerrillas.

1102. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

a. Troops should be indoctrinated in the political, social, economic, religious, and racial conditions, customs and conflicts in the country. Furthermore, it must be understood that the basic causes of the situation may stem from a variety of political, social, economic

or religious problems. The application of purely military measures alone may not be sufficient to achieve the purpose of the operation; however, the efficiency of military operations can be greatly increased when troops understand the total problem.

b. The guerrilla resistance encountered may not be confined entirely to those bearing arms, but may also come from elements of the population providing moral and material support to the guerrilla. Such resistance may come from a majority of the population, or it may be confined to a strong minority with vested political, economic, or religious interests that thrive on chaos or political unrest in the country. On the other hand, a situation may arise where the bulk of the population is economically stable. Under these circumstances, a condition of political unrest would adversely affect the popular interest, and the bulk of the population may be expected to support the intervening force, providing it is apparent that the objective of the intervention is the speedy reestablishment of political stability.

c. Normally, the bulk of the population of the country is not in sympathy with those dissident forces which operate to their social and economic disadvantage. However, through ignorance, fear of reprisal, local political conditions, or other factors, the people in an area may be compelled to support such forces. Similarly, ignorance on the part of personnel of the landing force with respect to social customs, religious customs, superstitions, racial and ethnic loyalties, background of an area, and the basis of the local economy may serve to turn popular opinion against the landing force. An understanding of these various social, religious, and economic fac-

tors by all elements of the landing force is essential to accomplishment of the military mission and indeed, the entire military/diplomatic effort.

d. The following considerations, with respect to the character of a local population, must receive continuing attention by the landing force and its various elements.

(1) Social customs, such as class or racial distinctions, dress, etc., must be recognized and accorded due consideration.

(2) Local political alignments and affiliations must be understood and recognized; any appearance of political favoritism by personnel of the landing force must be avoided.

(3) Religious customs must be recognized and respected.

(4) An understanding of the basis of the local economy, and the economic status of the various segments of the local population is vital to an intelligent appreciation of the attitudes of the population toward the operation.

1103. MORALE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

a. Troops must be indoctrinated to appreciate the effectiveness of guerrilla forces and never to underrate them. To regard guerrillas as inferior, opponents may lead to carelessness and may result in serious losses. Conversely, guerrilla capabilities must not be overrated. Analysis of historical events will reveal that a well-trained, well-equipped, well-organized, well-led, aggressive military force is more than a match for any guerrilla force.

b. Troops employed in operations against guerrillas are subjected to morale and psychological pressures different from those found in normal operations. Commanders at all echelons must conduct an indoctrination and training program which will offset these pressures, which result in a large degree from the following:

(1) The difficulty in realizing or observing tangible results in arduous and often unexciting operations. Operating against an elusive, destructive force that seldom offers a clear target, that shows little interest in seizing and holding terrain, that disintegrates before opposition, and then reforms and strikes again, is quite different from operating against the more tangible forces encountered in normal combat.

(2) Severe living and operating conditions in difficult terrain.

(3) The long periods of inactivity which may occur when troops are assigned to static security duty.

(4) A reluctance to take repressive measures against women, children, and old men who may be active and willing supporters of the guerrilla force or who must be resettled or concentrated for security reasons.

(5) Anxieties resulting from reported or observed guerrilla force atrocities and conversely, the impulse to take vindictive retaliatory measures because of such atrocities.

1104. MAJOR TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS

a. All troops subject to participation in counter guerrilla operations must be aware of the characteristics of the individual guerrilla and methods of guerrilla operations.

In addition, all troops must be trained in both active and passive measures which they can employ for their own safety and for effective countering of the guerrilla force. Since there are no front lines or rear areas as such in counter guerrilla operations, combat support and combat service support troops must be alert to the possibility of guerrilla attack on their installations, at times combat service support troops may find themselves, on short notice, taking an active part in tactical operations. Similarly, all troops should be familiar with the control measures imposed upon the populace which may require extensive troop effort throughout an operation.

b. Since an enemy guerrilla force will always strive to attack with maximum surprise, often at unusual times and places, troops must be trained and disciplined to be constantly on the alert. Extensive use of immediate reaction drills during training is required. Furthermore, once contact has been made with a guerrilla force, there is seldom time for the issuance of detailed orders for the conduct of the operation. Success will often result from the immediate coordinated reaction the unit makes in the absence of orders or a detailed reconnaissance.

c. The semi-independent nature of operations against guerrilla forces requires that, insofar as possible, troops be cross trained in the use of communication equipment and all individual and crew-served weapons.

d. The employment of helicopters in unit training should be emphasized. The possible advantages of the helicopter, listed in paragraph 702, should be exploited in training exercise.

e. Marksmanship training should emphasize accurate and quick

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firing. The fleeting nature of most guerrilla contacts and the need for total destruction of all members of a guerrilla force requires that all troops be capable of firing quickly and accurately.

f. Individual and unit training must develop an aggressive and offensive state of mind in each individual, for it is by offensive action only that a guerrilla force will be destroyed.

1105. INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT TRAINING

In addition to the above considerations, normal individual and small unit training should emphasize--

- (1) Physical conditioning.
- (2) Tactics and techniques for combat in urban areas, mountains, deserts, swamps, and jungles.
- (3) Long-range combat patrolling.
- (4) Techniques of raids, ambushes, and ruses, and techniques to counter these operations.
- (5) Night operations.
- (6) Aerial resupply techniques.
- (7) Riot control.
- (8) Police-type patrolling and operations of roadblocks.
- (9) Techniques of search and seizure operations.
- (10) Survival techniques.
- (11) Target identification.

(12) Use of animal transport.

(13) Convoy escort and security.

(14) Use and detection of mines, demolitions, and booby traps.

(15) Counterintelligence and interrogation.

(16) Fieldcraft and improvisation.

(17) Tracking and land navigation.

(18) Advanced first aid and preventive medicine measures.

(19) Silent movement.

(20) Observation.

(21) Boat handling.

(22) River crossing expedients.

(23) Map and compass training.

(24) Carrying casualties without the aid of modern medical equipment.

(25) Navigation without the aid of land marks.

1106. ORIENTATION

a. Prior to entry into an area of operations, troops receive an orientation on the nature of the terrain and weather, unusual health hazards, characteristics of the populace, their relations with the civil populace and the ideological, social, and political situation in the country.

b. Troop orientation should stress that the local populace must be favorably impressed by their standards of conduct and by the efficiency with which they pursue their duties.

1107. TROOP INDOCTRINATION

a. Troops should be thoroughly indoctrinated concerning the situation in areas where their commitment is possible.



SECTION 12: GUERRILLAS IN SUPPORT OF THE LANDING FORCE

1201. GENERAL

a. The development and support of friendly guerrilla forces, as well as the doctrine and plans for their employment, are primarily the responsibility of the U. S. Army.

b. Marine landing forces may conduct operations with support or assistance from guerrilla forces located within or near the objective area. Because of the complex nature and value of guerrilla support, an understanding of their organization, capabilities, and limitations is essential. See FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations.

1202. COORDINATION AND CONTROL

a. In an amphibious operation, the establishing authority will specify in the initiating directive the amphibious task force commander's responsibilities and authority in connection with the guerrilla forces. Operational control of guerrilla forces is initially assigned to

the amphibious task force commander and is subsequently passed on to the landing force commander. Coordination and control of guerrilla forces will rarely be delegated below landing force level.

b. A liaison detachment with detailed knowledge of the guerrilla force will be assigned to the headquarters that is charged with the operational control of the guerrillas. This detachment provides the communications link with the guerrilla forces and makes recommendations concerning their employment.

1203. CAPABILITIES

a. Guerrilla forces may be employed to conduct the following prelanding operations:

(1) Conduct cover and deception operations to deceive the enemy as to the time and/or place of the landing.

(2) Interdict enemy lines of communication to delay or deny the enemy approach to the beachhead

or withdrawal from the beach-head.

(3) Gather information for intelligence purposes.

(4) Provide evasion and escape assistance to downed aviators, reconnaissance units, etc.

(5) Assist in the conduct of psychological operations.

(6) Capture designated indigenous personnel.

(7) Seize key installations to prevent destruction by the enemy.

(8) Conduct operations to isolate selected portions of the objective area.

(9) Seize and hold portions of the landing area to facilitate the landing.

(10) Seize and/or clear and mark landing zones or seize and hold adjacent key terrain.

b. Once the landing has taken place the above tasks may be intensified and the guerrillas may be assigned additional missions to:

(1) Conduct reconnaissance operations for the landing force.

(2) Operate as a regular tactical unit, after being trained and equipped.

(3) Provide for rear area security.

(4) Assist Civil Affairs personnel.

1204. LIMITATIONS

a. The landing force should not formulate plans that are dependent on specific guerrilla successes. Significant guerrilla support limitations are:

(1) Infiltration of guerrilla forces by enemy agents could cause the compromise of landing force plans. Only information essential to guerrilla operations should be provided and counterintelligence must be applied.

(2) Existence of guerrillas in the area of operations may restrict fire support including offensive air support.

(3) Communications between guerrillas and the amphibious task force or landing force may be unreliable.

(4) Lack of training, weapons, or supplies may prevent guerrillas from conducting operations of a significant nature.

(5) Normal dispersion of guerrilla forces reduces their reaction time to orders from higher headquarters.

b. Certain of the limitations described above may be overcome by the introduction of contact teams into the area prior to landing to establish better communications with the amphibious task force or landing force and to exercise more positive control over the guerrilla.

APPENDIX A

SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL

a. Scope.--Operations against guerrillas are characterized by aggressive small unit actions. They are conducted by numerous squads, platoons, and companies operating continually throughout the guerrilla area. This appendix contains the tactics and techniques employed by these units. All small unit leaders and their men should thoroughly understand the contents of this appendix. It includes establishing a patrol base, patrolling, attacking a guerrilla camp, ambushes, counterambush action, and search procedures.

b. Historical Examples.--To show the importance of small unit operations, two historical examples are given: an operation conducted in August 1954 in the Philippines and an operation in 1954-55 in Malaya.

(1) The Alert Platoon.--Counter guerrilla operations were conducted by the Philippine Army during the period 1946-60. Beginning in September 1950, through personal leadership and increased intelligence efforts, concentrated offensives were launched. Once dispersed, the guerrillas were gradually hunted down by small units.

Typical of the small unit response was the action of the alert platoon of the 17th BCT (Battalion Combat Team) in the vicinity of Manila, 16-17 August 1954. About midnight an intelligence agent reported the presence of ten guerrillas bivouacked in a hut, preparing for an attack. Immediately the alert platoon was dispatched in a vehicle to a point about a mile short of the hut. With two civilian guides, the platoon proceeded on foot to the objective. The terrain and a full moon favored their movement. Trails to the hut were easily followed.

About 200 yards from the objective, the platoon leader divided his platoon into two groups and gave instructions. At 0430, 17 August, the first group advanced toward the objective while members of the second group positioned themselves along the guerrilla's avenue of withdrawal on the right flank of the objective. So that members of the assault group could deliver a large volume of fire, they formed into skirmishers about 60 yards from the objective. The guerrilla sentry opened fire, but was immediately knocked down. A fire fight with the guerrillas in the hut continued for about 20 minutes and then they broke contact. Attempting to withdraw, they were shot by members of the second group from their ambush positions. This was only one of hundreds of such actions that took place during this period.

(2) Operation "Nassau."--During the period 1948-1960, the British conducted many difficult operations in Malaya. By 1951, the British forces established well-defined objectives and then began their counter guerrilla operation.

Victory in this counterguerrilla operation is primarily attributed to good intelligence work, effective communications, rapid deployment of troops, and food control measures. Rapid deployment was achieved by deploying small units in battalion controlled operations.

Operation "NASSAU," typical of the battalion-sized operations in Malaya, began in December 1954, and ended in September 1955. The South Swamp of Kuala Langat covers an area of over 100 square miles. It is a dense jungle with trees up to 150 feet tall where visibility is limited to about 30 yards. After several assassinations, a British battalion was assigned to the area. Food control was achieved through a system of rationing, convoys, gate checks, and searches. One company began operations in the swamp about 21 December 1954. On 9 January 1955, full-scale tactical operations began; artillery, mortars, and aircraft began harassing fires in South Swamp. Originally, the plan was to bomb and shell the swamp day and night so that the terrorists would be driven out into ambushes; but the terrorists were well-prepared to stay indefinitely. Food parties came out occasionally, but the civil population was too afraid to report them.

Plans were modified; harassing fires were reduced to nighttime only. Ambushes continued and patrolling inside the swamp was intensified. Operations of this nature continued for 3 months without results. Finally on 21 March, an ambush party, after 45 hours of waiting, succeeded in killing 2 of 8 terrorists. The first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on the operations map and local morale rose a little.

Another month passed before it was learned that terrorists were making a contact inside the swamp. One platoon established an ambush; one terrorist appeared and was killed. May passed without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by a patrol accounted for one killed and one captured. A few days later, after 4 fruitless days of patrolling, one platoon en route to camp accounted for two more terrorists. The No. 3 terrorist in the area surrendered and reported that food control was so effective that one terrorist had been murdered in a quarrel over food.

On 7 July, two additional companies were assigned to the area; patrolling and harassing fires were intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and one of them led a platoon patrol to the terrorist leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp, killing four including the leader. Other patrols accounted for four more; by the end of July, 23 terrorists remained in the swamp with no food or communications with the outside world. Restrictions on the civil population were lifted.

This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillery shells, 30,000 rounds of mortar ammunition, and 2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed or captured. Each terrorist represented 1,500 man-days of patrolling or waiting in ambushes. "NASSAU" was considered a success for the end of the emergency was one step nearer.

2. ESTABLISHING A PATROL BASE

a. General.--To cover the entire area of guerrilla operations, it is usually necessary to establish temporary patrol bases some distance from the parent bases. Temporary patrol bases are established by company or smaller units and occupied for a few days or less.

◆ b. Deception.--A patrol base is secretly occupied. Secrecy is maintained by practicing deception techniques that are carefully planned. Deception plans should include the following considerations:

- (1) If possible, the march to the base is conducted at night.
- (2) The route selected avoids centers of population.
- (3) If necessary, local inhabitants met by the patrol in remote areas are detained.
- (4) Inhabitants of areas that cannot be avoided are deceived by marching in a direction which indicates that the patrol is going to some other area.
- (5) At night, in the desert, or in dense vegetation, navigation and control require special consideration.
- (6) Scouts operate forward of the main body of the patrol.
- (7) Bases are located beyond areas that are patrolled daily.
- (8) If security permits, smokeless fuel is burned.
- (9) The base is not established on an existing trail and normally not more than one trail should be made into the base and it is camouflaged and guarded.
- (10) After a reconnaissance the base is occupied as quickly and quietly as possible. Security is established beyond sight and hearing of the base.
- (11) The route to the base is selected by use of photos, maps, ground and aerial reconnaissance.
- (12) If practical, the patrol leader makes an aerial reconnaissance.
- (13) Terrain features that are easily identified are selected as check-points and rest breaks.
- (14) Daily aerial and ground reconnaissance is continued. If necessary, other cover operations can be conducted.

c. Locating the Base

- (1) The base must be located so that the patrol can carry out its assigned mission.
- (2) It must be secret and secure. A patrol operating from a base unknown to the enemy increases the possibility of guerrilla contact. A secure base permits the troops to rest.
- (3) The base must have facilities or terrain suited for the erection of adequate radio antennas.
- (4) If it is anticipated that an air drop or a helicopter resupply will be required, the base should have a convenient drop zone or landing point. These are generally better if located on high ground. For security reasons, the drop zone or landing point should not be located too close to the base.
- ◆ (5) The base should allow men to sleep in comfort. Dry ground that drains quickly affords the best location.

◆ d. Layout of a Base.--All units should have a SOP for quickly establishing a base. After a SOP has been used during training, laying out a base becomes simple routine. The patrol leader indicates the center of the base and the base direction. The members of the patrol then take up positions in their assigned areas and are checked and corrected as necessary.

e. Sequence of Establishment.--A suggested sequence for establishing a base in jungle or heavy woods is as follows:

(1) Leaving the Road or Trail.--The jungle and heavy woods provide the best security from surprise and the best conditions for defense. Generally the best method to use in leaving the trail or road is--

- (a) Select the point to leave the trail or road.
- (b) Maintain security while the column moves off the trail.
- (c) Have men at the end of the column camouflage the area where the exit was made from the trail.
- (d) Continue movement until a suitable bivouac site is reached.

(2) Occupation of the Bivouac Site

(a) This occupation is based on a platoon of three squads, but the force may be larger or smaller. Using the clock method of designation, the patrol leader sends for his squad leaders and then selects the center of the base.

(b) Upon arrival of the squad leaders, the patrol leader stands in the center of the base, indicates 12 o'clock, and then designates the area to be occupied by each squad.

(c) Each squad moves into its assigned area under the control of its squad leader.

(d) Each squad establishes security posts to the front of its assigned position. The security is normally maintained by one fire team and the remaining two prepare their positions for defense.

(3) Digging-in.--The extent of digging is dependent upon the length of time the position is to be occupied. Shelters are not erected until adequate individual protection is assured. The clearing of fields of fire will be accomplished concurrently. All field works are camouflaged as they are constructed.

(4) Sentries.--Upon completion of their defensive positions, each squad security patrol is replaced by at least one sentry, the exact number depending upon visibility and likelihood of contact. During darkness, the sentries are posted forward of the squad position but closer than posted during daylight. Squads may have to post additional sentries on the trail and on key terrain features.

(5) Water.--A reconnaissance is made for a suitable water point. A spot is selected for drinking and for bathing. Normally, baths at the patrol base are not taken when the patrol is there for 24 hours or less. Individuals should fill canteens for other members of their squad. Security is provided.

(6) Garbage.--Each squad will dig a garbage pit to reduce the fly and rat menace. It will be covered periodically.

(7) Perimeter Path and Marking Trails.--Narrow paths are cleared from platoon headquarters to the center of each squad position and then

around the inside of the perimeter to facilitate movement. A vine, rope, or wire may be strung waist high along each path as a guide.

f. Base Alert.--The critical periods for defending the base are dawn and dusk. During these periods, the entire patrol remains in an alert status. The base alert serves the following purposes:

(1) Enables each man to see the disposition of his neighbors and the nature of the ground to his front and flanks.

(2) Allows the men to adjust their eyes to the changing light so they will acquire a mental picture of front and flanks.

(3) Provides a definite cut-off period for the change of routine. Beginning with evening alert, all movement and noise cease and lights are extinguished. After the morning alert, the daily routine begins.

(4) Enables the area squad leaders to check details while all men are positioned. This will include a check on maintenance of weapons, equipment, ammunition, etc.

g. Alarm.--The patrol must have a suitable alarm system to signal the approach of either friendly or enemy troops. This alarm system should not sound foreign to the operational area and must be one that can not be easily detected by the enemy. The system must be designed so as to allow sufficient reaction time by the patrol.

h. Administration of a Base

(1) Cooking Fires and Smoking.--The smell of cooking and smoke can carry up to 200 meters in the woods or jungle. These fires are not allowed when the base position is close to the enemy, or when guerrilla patrols are active. If cooking is permitted during daylight hours, smokeless fuel only is used.

(2) Location of Heads.--Heads are located in protected areas.

(3) Disposal of Garbage.--Garbage and trash must be disposed of as it occurs. Before evacuating a base, the patrol leader ensures that all trash and food are buried and camouflaged.

(4) Water Purification.--The patrol leader must ensure that water is sterilized.

(5) Cooking.--When each man carries his own rations, cooking will be done on an individual basis. If 5-in-1 or 10-in-1 type rations are carried, other group cooking arrangements are made.

i. Leaving a Base.--Before leaving the base all signs of occupation are removed. Any shelters are destroyed. The area is left to appear as though it had not been occupied.

3. PATROLLING

a. General.--The only way successful operations against guerrillas can be accomplished is by conducting aggressive small unit patrols. To make contact with guerrillas is difficult, and infantry troops will be occupied primarily with patrol activity. Routine patrolling seldom produces positive results. Because of the terrain, vegetation, and enemy tactics,

d. Planning and Preparation by the Patrol Leader.--The patrol leader listens carefully to the patrol order and after making sure he

modifications to normal techniques may be necessary. Patrols need to be all-purpose, prepared to fight, ambush, pursue, and reconnoiter.

b. Patrol Authority.-- The authority to conduct patrols is decentralized as much as practicable. Although overall patrolling policy and certain special patrols may be determined by higher headquarters, the extensive patrol activity and rapid response usually required makes it desirable to assign patrol authority to lower echelons. Battalion, company, or platoon level may be assigned patrol authority. Flexibility is the prime consideration. Specific authority will be determined by such things as terrain, guerrilla activity, coordination problems, and troop availability. The actual control of patrols and the decentralization of authority are improved by the assignment of operational areas of responsibility to a battalion which, in turn, may subdivide its area into company areas. The assignment of operational areas will require considerable coordination to avoid patrol clashes, to permit the pursuit of guerrillas from one area to another, etc. Coordination may be achieved laterally between commands or by their parent command(s). Although patrol authority may be decentralized, patrol activity will be reported to higher headquarters. To prescribe and facilitate control and coordination, SOPs may be devised.

◆ c. Planning and Preparation by the Command.-- The echelon which has the authority for conducting patrols has numerous responsibilities in connection with their planning and preparation. Depending on the echelon, responsibilities may include all or most of the following:

(1) Training.-- Prepares training programs and exercises relative to patrolling with emphasis on the locale and situation wherein operations are to be conducted.

(2) Selection of Patrol Leaders.-- Selection is based upon experience and leadership abilities. Insofar as possible, rotation of patrol leaders is accomplished to avoid excessive use of a selected few.

(3) Formulation and Assignment of Patrol Missions.-- Only the commander of the echelon which has the authority for conducting patrols can approve the assignment of patrol missions.

(4) Issuance of the Patrol Order.-- Issues the patrol order to the patrol leader. This order provides the instructions, information, and guidance needed by the patrol leader to plan, prepare, and accomplish the mission.

(5) Coordination.-- Ensures coordination among the staff, patrol leader, and other units.

(6) Assignment of Control Measures.-- Assigns control measures such as time of departure, time of return, checkpoints, general route, and communications.

(7) Arrangements for Support.-- Includes such arrangements as may be necessary to provide fire support, logistic support, transportation, and the assignment of personnel with special qualifications needed to accomplish the mission.

(8) Supervision.-- Commanders and staff officers actively supervise all phases of patrol planning and preparation, giving patrols the benefit of their own training and experience.

(9) Debriefing.-- Debriefs patrol upon return.

(c) Weapons, ammunition, and equipment the patrol will carry.

(d) Who will accompany patrol leader on reconnaissance and

▶ d. Planning and Preparation by the Patrol Leader.--The patrol leader listens carefully to the patrol order, and after making sure he understands all instructions, information, and guidance, uses the patrol planning steps to assist his planning and preparation to ensure accomplishment of the patrol mission. The patrol planning steps are:

(1) Plan Use of Time.-- The patrol leader mentally outlines everything that must be done before departing on his mission and allots time for each action. The technique of "backward planning" helps ensure that time is allowed for all necessary actions. The sequence may vary according to such factors as availability of personnel for coordination, times at which a reconnaissance can be made, and extent of coordination by the command echelon.

(2) Study the Situation.--Enemy and friendly troop dispositions, strengths, and capabilities will influence the patrol's route, size, organization, weapons, and equipment.

(3) Make a Map Study.--A thorough map study will assist in the reconnaissance and may influence patrol size, organization, equipment, and route.

(4) Coordinate.--The patrol must coordinate movement in friendly areas, fire support, and transportation. The commander may perform some of the coordination, but the patrol leader should double check to ensure complete understanding.

(5) Select Map, Weapons and Equipment.--Selection of men and weapons will normally be limited to the patrol leader's own unit, and the size is usually prescribed by the command.

(6) Issue a Warning Order.--As soon as possible, the patrol leader issues a warning order to all members of the patrol. See subparagraph e.

(7) Make a Reconnaissance.--While the patrol prepares, the patrol leader makes a visual (aerial, if possible) reconnaissance.

(8) Complete detailed plans.

(9) Issue the Patrol Leader's Order.--See subparagraph f. In a clear, concise, forceful manner, the patrol leader orally issues the detailed plan to the patrol. By the use of visual aids and questions, he seeks to determine if all members of the patrol understand their jobs.

(10) Inspect and Rehearse.--The patrol leader holds an inspection before and after rehearsals to determine the physical and mental state of preparation of the patrol. He holds rehearsals (day and night, if the patrol operates at night) to ensure operational proficiency of the patrol. In rehearsals the patrol members must become thoroughly familiar with the action they are to take during the patrol.

▶ e. Format for Patrol Warning Order.--The patrol warning order consists of the following minimum items of information:

(1) A brief statement of the enemy and friendly situation.

(2) Mission of the patrol.

(3) General instructions:

(a) General and special organization.

(b) Uniform and equipment common to all, to include identification and camouflage measures.

- (c) Weapons, ammunition, and equipment the patrol will carry.
 - (d) Who will accompany patrol leader on reconnaissance and who will supervise patrol members' preparation during patrol leader's absence.
 - (e) Instructions for obtaining rations, water, weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
 - (f) The chain of command.
 - (g) A time schedule for the patrol's guidance. As a minimum, include meal times and the time, place, and uniform for receiving the patrol leader's order.
-

▶ f. Format for Patrol Leader's Order

(1) Situation

- (a) Enemy forces.--Weather, terrain, identification, location, activity, and strength.
- (b) Friendly forces.--Mission of next higher unit, location, and planned actions of units on right and left, fire support available for patrol, mission, and route of other patrols.
- (c) Attachments and detachments.

(2) Mission.--What the patrol is going to accomplish.

(3) Execution.--Subparagraph for each subordinate unit.

- (a) Concept of operation.
- (b) Specific duties of elements, teams, and individuals.
- (c) Coordinating instructions

- 1. Time of departure and return.
- 2. Formation and order of movement.
- 3. Route and alternate route of return.
- 4. Departure and reentry of friendly area(s).
- 5. Rallying points and actions at rallying points.
- 6. Actions on enemy contact.
- 7. Actions at danger areas.
- 8. Actions at objective.
- 9. Rehearsals and inspections.
- 10. Debriefing.

(4) Administration and Logistics

- (a) Rations.
- (b) Arms and ammunition.
- (c) Uniform and equipment (state which members will carry and use them).
- (d) Method of handling wounded and prisoners.

(5) Command and Communications-Electronics

(a) Communications

1. Signals to be used within the patrol.
2. Communications with higher headquarters - radio call signs, primary and alternate frequencies, times to report, and special code to be used.
3. Challenge and password.

(b) Command

1. Chain of command.
2. Location of patrol leader and assistant patrol leader in formation.

g. Administrative Help.--A simple plan, or SOP, must be understood by all patrol members and cover the following items:

- (1) Cleaning of weapons and equipment.
- (2) Turning in of special equipment drawn for the patrol. This may include certain types of Class V items.
- (3) Personal washing and hygiene, to include availability of small items of medical supplies.
- (4) Food and rest.
- (5) Use of exchange facilities, if available.
- (6) Discussion of mistakes among members of the patrol, if not covered at the debriefing.

h. Debriefing

(1) Return to Base.--It is essential that there be a SOP for the reception of patrols upon returning to base. This can have considerable morale value in a campaign in which most patrols will be routine, and contact the exception.

(2) Debriefing.--The use of a debriefing form greatly simplifies the job of the patrol leader in making his report. As the patrols return from the operational area, they are immediately debriefed. The entire patrol may be brought into the building or tent being used. A terrain model or large scale map is used to trace the patrol route and to correlate various bits and pieces of information. A relaxed, calm, informal, unhurried atmosphere must prevail. The debriefing officer fills in the debriefing form, as the debriefing progresses.

(3) Sample Patrol Debriefing Report

Designation of patrol

Date

TO:

MAPS:

- A. Size and Composition of Patrol.
- B. Task (mission).
- C. Time of Departure.
- D. Time of Return.
- E. Routes Out and Back (show sketch or annotated overlay).
- F. Terrain (information on roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas. Location of fords, bridges, and ferries across water barriers. Location of

all small settlements and farms in or near suspected guerrilla areas. Location and trace of streams that can provide a water supply. If an outside agency is supplying the guerrillas; location of areas suitable for drop or landing zones; boat or submarine rendezvous; and roads and trails leading into enemy-held or neutral countries supporting the guerrillas).

G. Enemy (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment).

H. Any Map Corrections.

I. Miscellaneous Information.

J. Results of Encounters with the Enemy (prisoners and disposition, identification, enemy casualties, captured documents and equipment).

K. Condition of Patrol (include disposition of any dead or wounded).

L. Conclusions and Recommendations (including to what extent the task was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics).

Signature, grade/rank and organization/unit of patrol leader

M. Additional Remarks by Interrogator.

Signature, grade/rank and organization/unit/date of debriefing

4. ATTACKING GUERRILLA HOUSES AND CAMPS

a. Attacking Houses.--In planning an attack--

(1) Secrecy is essential. Relatives, sympathizers or intimidated natives can warn the enemy of the patrol's approach.

(2) The location of the house and the nature of the terrain surrounding it are determined by ground or aerial reconnaissance, sketch, photo, or guide.

(3) The patrol normally approaches and occupies its position during darkness.

(4) The patrol is no larger than required to carry out the mission. A large patrol is hard to control, difficult to conceal, and may make too much noise.

(5) The approach is made quietly and cautiously. Barking dogs and other animals often warn the inhabitants.

(6) All available cover is used.

(7) All avenues of escape are covered either physically or by fire.

(8) If the mission is to capture the occupants, and armed resistance is not expected, surround the house and approach it from all sides.

(9) If the mission is to attack the house, and armed resistance is expected, the patrol is located so that every side of the building is covered by fire.

b. Attacking Camps.--Many of the instructions for attacking houses are applicable to attacking camps.

(1) A guide who knows the exact location of the camp is used.

(2) The guide makes a sketch of the camp and its approaches. This can be traced on the ground.

(3) The trail is left as soon as it is convenient, and the camp is approached from an unexpected direction. When in the vicinity of the camp, approach slowly and cautiously.

(4) Normally, the patrol is split into two or more groups. One group attacks the camp while others cover the main avenues of guerrilla withdrawal.

(5) After sighting the camp, the leader makes a careful reconnaissance.

(6) When the patrol is in position and prepared to open fire, the leader orders the enemy to surrender. In the event they refuse, the leader opens fire. All men direct their fire into the guerrilla camp.

c. Destroying Captured Bivouacs.--The value of a camp as a known enemy site is considered before destroying it. Guerrillas occupy camp sites they have previously found satisfactory, particularly if shelters have been constructed.

5. AMBUSHES

a. General.--An ambush is an effective means for attacking patrols, columns, and moving vehicles. They are normally executed in terrain when troops or vehicles are restricted in movement, such as trails, roads, bridges, stream crossings, and similar areas. The terrain should afford concealment to the ambushing unit. Maximum fires are placed on the target. As a rule, an effective ambush lasts only a few minutes. There are two types of ambushes, the deliberate and the immediate.

b. Deliberate Ambush.--A deliberate ambush is one which allows sufficient time for planning, preparation, briefing, and, if necessary, a rehearsal.

(1) Principles.--There are two fundamental principles for positioning troops: all possible approaches should be covered, and the ambush must have depth.

(a) Approaches.--Information may frequently give the destination of the guerrillas but will rarely give the exact route they will take. No matter how good the information, guerrillas have a flair for arriving from an unexpected direction. This factor causes a high failure rate in ambushes. It is essential that all possible approaches be covered.

(b) Depth.--At the first burst of fire, guerrillas scatter rapidly and the chances of getting a second burst from the same position are small. Therefore, withdrawal routes must be covered to provide an opportunity for subsequent fire at the fleeing guerrillas.

(2) Organization of Unit and Occupation of Position.--An ambush consists of a series of small units. The rifle squad facilitates the organization of the ambush group. One or two men are positioned where they can listen and observe, while the others rest in the ambush position. In positioning the men of the squad, the squad leader must--

(a) Consider concealment as his first priority. Movement in the area is kept to a minimum. Each man enters his position from the rear. The squad leader ensures that all traces of movement into the position are removed or concealed.

(b) Ensure that the man detailed to begin firing has a good view of the killing ground. He begins firing when the guerrillas are positioned so that a maximum number can be killed.

(3) Planning

(a) Intelligence.--Information can be obtained from maps, recent patrol reports, police, special intelligence agents, photographs, and ground and aerial reconnaissances. Numerous pieces of information such as sightings of smoke, camps, patrols, food plots, trails, and foot tracks are evaluated prior to selecting the area for the ambush. The commander obtains all the information available on guerrilla tactics and the manner in which the guerrilla will react when ambushed. Details of the enemy might include--

1. Time of movement, strength, organization of the guerrilla patrol, and type of supplies carried.
2. Details of size, routes, habits as to time or location, frequency, and arms.
3. Size of the guerrilla working parties, ration parties and similar detachments.
4. The guerrillas' technique of patrolling.
5. Interval that the guerrilla patrol maintains between men.

(b) Clearance.--The time of departure, route used, location of ambush, time of return, signs and countersigns, and friendly patrols in the area are coordinated and cleared with those forces that need to know.

(c) Time Factor.--The time for departure and establishing the ambush is based upon intelligence about the guerrilla patrol to be ambushed, the necessity for being undetected, and the route which the patrol will use.

(d) Security.--Planning should ensure that every aspect of security is maintained throughout the planning and conduct of the operation. It provides a secure place for briefings and conduct of rehearsals. Secrecy is maintained in the coordination of other operations that are to take place in

the vicinity of the ambush. Daylight aerial reconnaissances to the front, flanks, and over guerrilla trails are planned. The password, signs and countersigns, and codes for the operation are included. A secure route over which the ambush party can move to the ambush site is selected. The plan will normally provide for the patrol to move to the ambush site during darkness. A cover plan is also considered.

(e) Ground.--Terrain which affords the ambush group cover, concealment, and command of the site is selected for the ambush. All possible approaches are considered.

(4) Preparations

(a) The time available for preparation is often limited. Certain items are kept in a state of constant readiness:

1. Weapons are zeroed and tested.
2. Ammunition, magazines, and chargers are kept clean, and the magazines are frequently emptied and refilled.

(b) Preparation on receipt of intelligence includes--

1. Thorough briefing.
2. Rehearsal, when time allows.
3. Final checking of weapons.

(5) Briefing.--All members of the ambush party are fully briefed. Briefing is divided into two parts:

(a) Preliminary briefing at the base camp. This briefing may include a five paragraph order. The ambush commander briefs his command as thoroughly as possible to reduce the time spent on final orders, and as early as possible to allow maximum time for preparation and rehearsal.

(b) Final briefing in the ambush area by the ambush commander. This may be limited but must include:

1. General area of each group including direction of fire.
2. Order to begin firing.
3. Order on completion of ambush.
4. Variations from the rehearsal in regard to individual tasks.

(6) Rehearsal.--Rehearsals will increase chances for success. Rehearsals are not carried out at the ambush site. All possible and likely guerrilla action is simulated, and the ambush groups practice under a variety of circumstances. Final rehearsals for night ambushes are conducted at night. When planned for, night illumination aids are employed.

(7) Positioning

(a) The ambush commander first chooses the killing ground and the general area and directions of fire for each group. He then designates the assembly point and gives the administrative plan.

(b) The ambush party moves to a dispersal point from which groups can move by selected routes to their positions. The ambush commander may be able to position only one group in detail, leaving the remainder to be positioned by group leaders. On reaching the ambush area, the commander will--

1. Make his reconnaissance to choose a killing ground and consider the extent of his position, bearing in mind that guerrillas usually move with large intervals between one another. A killing ground of 60 to 100 meters is desirable. The ambush position should offer concealment.

2. Ensure that the man designated to begin firing has a good view of the killing ground.

(8) Lying in Ambush.--The position of an ambush party is carefully concealed. (Such minor items as the smell of hair tonic and peculiar food odors may alert a guerrilla force.) Each individual should be able to see his sector of responsibility and be prepared to fire from any position once firing begins. Once a group is in position, there must be no sound or movement. This is a real test of training and battle discipline. Men are trained to get into a comfortable position and remain still for long periods. During the wait, each man has his weapon ready for immediate action.

(9) Begin Firing.--The firing begins when all guerrillas possible are in the killing ground. There must be no premature action. All men must clearly understand the orders and methods for opening fire.

(a) Fire can be opened providing the guerrillas are moving toward someone in a better position to kill. A limited ambush can be commenced by the commander.

(b) Should any guerrilla spot the ambush, begin firing.

(c) Once firing begins, targets become difficult to engage; to cope with moving targets, men may have to stand up.

(d) A signal is arranged to stop firing so immediate followup action and search can start as soon as the guerrillas disengage.

(e) When the firing ceases, men previously detailed search the immediate area under cover of ambush weapons and by covering each other. These men will--

1. Check guerrillas in the killing area.

2. Search surrounding area for dead and wounded.

3. Collect arms, ammunition, and equipment.

c. Assembly Point.--An easily identifiable assembly point is selected at which troops collect at the end of an action. Assembly begins following execution of a prearranged signal.

d. Long Term Ambushes.--When ambushes are set for periods of more than 12 hours, administrative arrangements for relief of groups for eating and sleeping are necessary. In long term ambushes, an administrative area is set up. It should be located away from the ambush position. Trails may be cleared, and water should be available.

(1) Consideration is given to reliefs, particularly in the case of the area ambush. Normally the relief will come from the administrative area along the communication lines. Although the whole party in the ambush is relieved, only one firing position is changed at a time. The reliefs take place when no guerrilla movement is expected.

(2) One method is to divide the ambush group into three parties, one in the ambush position, one in reserve, and one at rest. On relief, the party at rest takes over the ambush position; the men in the ambush position go to the reserve; and reserve goes to the rest area. If the party has less than eight men and the duration of the ambush is long, the whole party should be withdrawn to rest during set periods. Such a party would be responsible for its own security while resting. When an ambush party is over eight men but not large enough to carry out the three group method, sufficient men for all around observation man the ambush. The others move away from the ambush position, post sentries, and rest. The party at rest does not smoke and eats pre-cooked rations.

e. Night Ambushes

(1) General.--The techniques applied in the day ambush also apply to the night ambush. In darkness, concealment is easy, but shooting less accurate. More importance falls on good positioning of weapons so killing ground is covered by fire.

(2) Factors.--The following factors apply to night ambushes:

(a) The shotgun may be the primary weapon. (These will have to be requested early.)

(b) Ambush should contain a high proportion of automatic weapons. The M14 with selector is a good weapon for this purpose.

(c) In darkness, all weapons, particularly machine guns firing down trails, may have their left and right limits of fire fixed to eliminate danger to the ambush party.

(d) The ambush party never moves about. Any movement is regarded as guerrilla movement.

(e) Clear orders, explicit fire control instructions, and clear assembly points and signals are essential.

(f) Men and groups are positioned closer together than in day. Control at night is all-important.

(g) It is difficult to take up an ambush position at night; where practical, the position is occupied during last light.

(3) Illumination.--The success of a night ambush may depend on artificial illumination. Only in open country with a bright moon and no chance of clouds is it possible to rely on an unilluminated ambush. Infrared devices such as Sniper Scopes may be used to great advantage. As a general rule, all night ambushes are provided with artificial illumination. Illumination at ground level is placed to prevent the ambush party from receiving glare. There are a variety of night illumination aids available: hand illumination grenades, trip flares, rifle grenades, hand fired illuminants, parachute flares fired by mortars, artillery, naval gun fire, and parachutes dropped from aircraft. One possible method of employing illumination is to commence firing before illumination. Illumination is then fired behind the guerrillas. The personnel who go forward to check guerrillas in the killing area and to collect arms and equipment should have illumination. This illumination is placed directly on the killing zone. Upon completion of the activities in the killing zone, there is normally no further requirement for illumination.

f. Obstacles.--The objective of the ambush is to kill all of the guerrilla force. A useful aid is an ambush obstacle which may consist of a series of anti-personnel mines, Claymore Weapons, sharpened stakes, deep ditches, barbed wire, or any device that will either delay or inflict casualties upon the guerrillas. Possible places for obstacles are--

- (1) On likely guerrilla lines of retreat from an ambush.
- (2) In dead spaces difficult to cover by the weapons of the ambush group.
- (3) In the likely halting place of the main body of guerrillas.

g. Immediate Ambush.--Little time is available for reconnaissance and occupation, and success depends on the techniques used.

(1) The immediate ambush is employed when the point or scout sees or hears a guerrilla group approaching.

(a) The scout decides that an immediate ambush is possible and gives the signal.

(b) On seeing the signal, the leading element immediately takes cover and remains still, even if it does not have a good firing position. The other men or units have time to choose good positions on the same side of the trail or road. The machineguns are carefully positioned.

(c) When the patrol leader estimates that the enemy is caught in the ambush, he opens fire himself. If the ambush is discovered before the patrol leader opens fire, fire will be opened by any member of the ambush party.

(2) There must be a prearranged signal for cease firing. An illumination rifle grenade or similar signal may be adequate.

h. Signals For the Ambush.--The following signals are planned, rehearsed, and understood by all members of the ambush party:

- (1) Enemy approaching.
- (2) Commence firing.
- (3) Cease firing.
- (4) Check the killing zone.
- (5) Withdrawal from the killing zone.
- (6) Withdrawal from the ambush position.
- (7) Abandon the position.

i. Checklist.--The following are items that may cause failures in ambushes against guerrillas:

- (1) Disclosure by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers.
- (2) Disclosure by foot prints.
- (3) Lack of fire control.
- (4) Leaders badly positioned.
- (5) Lack of all around security.

(6) Misfires and stoppages through failing to clean, inspect, and test weapons and magazines.

(7) Lack of a clearly defined procedure for opening fire.

(8) Firing prematurely.

6. COUNTERAMBUSH ACTION

a. General

(1) Planning.--In planning for defense against ambush, initially consider the available forces. The small unit leader responsible for moving a unit independently through areas where ambush is likely plans for the following:

- (a) The formation to be used.
- (b) March security.
- (c) Communication and control.
- (d) Special equipment.
- (e) Action if ambushed.
- (f) The reorganization.

(2) Formation.--A dismounted unit employs a formation that provides for all around security while en route. March interval is based on the type of terrain, limits of visibility, size of the patrol, and to a certain extent on the means of control available. The interval between individuals and units at night is closer than the interval used during daylight. The interval is also great enough to allow each succeeding element to deploy when contact with the enemy is made. However, the distances are not so great as to prevent each element from rapidly assisting the element in front of it. The patrol leader is located well forward in the formation but not so far as to restrict his moving throughout the formation as the situation demands. Units are placed in the formation so they may distribute their firepower evenly throughout the formation. If troops are to be motorized, tactical unit integrity is maintained.

(3) March Security.--Regardless of whether the unit is on foot or motorized, security to the front, rear, and flanks is necessary. A security element is placed well forward of the main body with adequate radio or pyrotechnical communications. The security element is strong enough to sustain itself until followup units can be deployed to assist in reducing the ambush. However, if the enemy is not detected, it may allow the security element to pass unmolested in order to attack the main body. If this occurs, the security element attacks the ambush position from the flanks or rear in conjunction with the main action. Flank security elements are placed out on terrain features adjacent to the route of march. They move forward either by alternate or successive bounds, if the terrain permits. This is often difficult because of ruggedness of the terrain and the lack of transportation or communications. The next best thing is moving adjacent to the column along routes paralleling the direction of march. Rear security is handled similarly to frontal security, and plans are made for the rear guard to assist in reducing the ambush either by envelopment or by furnishing supporting fire. Aircraft above the column flying reconnaissance

and surveillance missions increase security. When ambushed, fighter and attack aircraft can provide support. Communication between these elements is a must.

(4) Communication and Control.--Consistent with security, all available means of communication are used to assist in maintaining control of the small unit. March objectives and phase lines may be used to assist the commander in controlling his unit. Communication with security elements is mandatory. Detailed prior planning, briefing, and rehearsals for all units will assist in control. Alternate plans are made to prevent confusion and chaos. If ambushed, higher headquarters is notified as soon as possible to alert other units in the vicinity.

(5) Special Equipment.--It is often necessary to provide the unit with additional items of equipment and weapons, such as engineer tools, mine detectors, and demolition equipment. Ample communication equipment is always necessary, including panel sets or smoke grenades for identifying the ambush to aircraft.

(6) Action if Ambushed.--If the unit is ambushed, the most important counteraction is for all available personnel to return fire as rapidly as possible. Troops riding in trucks remain alert at all times and are trained to disembark immediately and to return fire. When trucks are required to halt, drivers halt their trucks on the road. They do not pull off onto the shoulders because they may be mined. Trucks used as lead vehicles are reinforced with sandbags to reduce the effect of mines.

(7) Method of Attack.--If the strength of the unit is adequate, envelopment is usually the most desirable method of attack. A holding element and an attacking element are designated in all plans. Each element is briefed thoroughly on its actions and alternate plans necessary to meet different situations. For example, a plan calling for the advance guard to be the holding force would not succeed if the enemy allowed this force to pass unmolested. If the strength of the ambushed unit prevents their attacking by envelopment, the plan should be to break out of the immediate area rapidly to minimize casualties. If a unit is surprised by the enemy, it tries to overcome him by returning all available fire immediately. This also allows the ambushed unit to deploy and maneuver.

(8) Alert Force.--An alert force, prepared to move by foot or helicopter, is on constant alert for employment by higher headquarters in the event a patrol is ambushed or for employment for other purposes. The alert force studies the plans of all patrols. By studying the routes, checkpoints, and designated helicopter landing sites and through means of communications, it can rapidly reinforce an ambushed unit. If ambushed, the patrol leader may request reinforcements. He designates his position by reference to checkpoints, designated helicopter landing sites, terrain features, smoke, panels, etc. If possible, he sends a guide to the place designated to guide the reinforcements into position. A system for rapid employment of alert forces, ensuring defeat for the guerrilla ambushes, makes the ambush less likely to be employed by the guerrilla.

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(9) Reorganization.--The reorganization after an ambush involves the use of assembly points and plans for security. Care is taken to minimize the possibility of the enemy pressing the attack during this period. All personnel (including wounded), equipment, and supplies are assembled. If reorganization cannot be accomplished because of guerrilla action, it is accomplished after reinforcements arrive.

b. Dismounted Units

(1) General.--Immediate action (IA) drills are taught and thoroughly practiced. The underlying principles of each drill must be simplicity, aggressiveness, and speed.

(2) Immediate Action Drills.--The IA drills used, when a unit is caught in ambush are of two kinds:

(a) Where only the foremost elements of a patrol are caught in the ambush, an immediate encircling attack is carried out by the remainder of the patrol.

(b) Where the entire patrol is ambushed in open ground, an immediate assault is launched.

(3) Encircling Attack.--The encircling attack is the correct reaction to a guerrilla ambush and is based on the normal principles of fire and maneuver taught in small unit tactics.

(a) Formations are designed so that only part of a patrol should be caught in the ambush. If these formations are practiced and the distances correctly observed, the whole patrol should not be pinned down by the opening burst of fire.

(b) As the unit advances, the patrol leader always has the terrain situation in mind. He takes control of the battle by signalling or shouting "Envelop Right (or Left)." This should be all that is necessary to initiate action. The troops will have practiced the drill and will know their positions in the attack.

(c) The leading element lays down a base of fire to cover the maneuvering element. If the leading element has smoke grenades, these are used to screen the elements caught in the killing zone.

(4) Immediate Assault.--If the guerrilla ambush extends on a wide frontage and occupies a considerable portion along the trail or road, then a different tactic is called for. A small patrol, even with correct spacing, can be caught within the ambush. Sufficient room for maneuver is often limited, requiring an immediate assault mounted directly at the guerrilla. It is seldom possible or desirable to try and take up firing positions and exchange fire with the guerrillas as long as the patrol is in the killing zone. The patrol moves as quickly as possible to a position outside the killing zone and then assaults the guerrilla position.

c. Mounted Units

(1) General.--The guerrilla will ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and organized from which he can kill by firing at point

blank range. The principle behind the IA drill is that it is incorrect to stop vehicles in the area which the guerrilla has chosen as a killing zone-unless forced to do so. The proper action is to drive on when fired upon, to stop only when through the ambush area or before running into it, and to counter-attack immediately from flank and rear.

(2) Immediate Action Technique.--When vehicles are fired upon--

- (a) Drivers drive out of the danger zone.
- (b) Vehicle guards return fire immediately.
- (c) When vehicles are clear of the danger zone, they stop to allow unloading and offensive action.
- (d) Subsequent vehicles approaching the danger zone will halt short of the area and their occupants take offensive action.
- (e) When vehicles are forced to halt in the danger zone, troops quickly unload under the covering fire of the guards whose use smoke if possible, and will make for cover from which to join the attack against the guerrilla force.

(3) Counterattack

(a) Guerrillas are always sensitive to threats to their rear or flanks. Offensive action to produce such threats can be carried out by those troops who are clear of the danger zone. If there are no such troops, then a frontal attack under cover of smoke is made.

(b) In action when no troops have entered the danger zone, the convoy commander will launch an immediate flanking attack on the guerrilla position, using supporting fire from such weapons as machineguns and mortars.

(c) In action when some troops are ahead of the danger zone and others are halted short of it, confusion may arise as to which group should initiate the attack. The group which has not yet entered the ambush should make this attack.

(d) The best way in which an armored vehicle can assist in counterambush action is by moving into the danger zone to engage the guerrillas at very short range. In this way it can give good covering fire to our flanking attack and afford protection to any of our own troops who are caught in the guerrilla killing ground.

(e) It is possible that the convoy commander may be killed or wounded by the guerrilla's initial burst of fire. It is essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a counter-attack. This is clearly stated in unit convoy orders and stressed at the briefing.

(f) The techniques outlined above are practiced repeatedly in varying situations until the natural reaction to a guerrilla ambush is the application of an IA drill.

(4) Vehicle Unloading Drill

(a) General.--In an ambush, the guerrilla first tries to stop one or more vehicles in his killing ground by the use of mines or obstacles and/or by firing at the tires and driver. He then tries to kill the troops in

the vehicle. It is essential that the troops unload instantly when a vehicle is brought to a halt in a danger zone.

(b) Vehicle Loading.--To ensure ease of unloading, all packs and cargo are piled in the center of the vehicle and/or excessive quantity of cargo is not loaded.

(c) Drill.--When the vehicle is forced to stop--

1. The vehicle commander shouts "Unload Right (or Left)" to indicate the direction in which troops will assemble.

2. Vehicle guards throw smoke grenades and open fire immediately on the guerrilla positions.

3. Troops unload over both sides and the rear of the vehicle and run in the direction indicated.

4. As soon as the troops are clear of the vehicle, guards follow to join in the attack.

5. Once the troops are clear of the vehicles, vigorous counteraction is taken. Wounded troops are cared for following counteraction.

(d) Training.--This drill must be practiced frequently by vehicle loads; e.g., infantry squads and platoons. Where miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a movement, two or three practices are held before the convoy moves out.

7. SEARCH PROCEDURES

a. General.--Misuse of police or military authority can adversely affect the ultimate outcome of operations against guerrillas. Seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other material during searches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded to be of future legal value. Seizure of guerrilla supplies alone is not as damaging to a guerrilla movement as the apprehension of the suppliers and agents along with the supplies or material. Proper use of police powers will gain respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or inconsiderate police methods may temporarily suppress the guerrilla movement but at the same time it may increase the civilian population's sympathy and/or support to the guerrillas.

b. Authority.--Authority for search operations must be carefully reviewed. Marines must be aware that they will perform searches and seizures in places and areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful in the exercise of their police authority) for purposes of apprehending a suspect or securing evidence that tends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually there will be special laws regulating the search and seizure powers of the military forces. These laws must be given wide dissemination.

c. Searching a Suspect

(1) General.--The fact that anyone can be a guerrilla or a guerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all training. It is during the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatest caution is required to prevent surprise and dangerous acts. During a search, one Marine must always

cover one making the search. However, the searcher must be tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who may be antiguerrilla.

(2) The Frisk Search.--This method is a quick search of an individual for dangerous weapons, evidence, or contraband. It is preferably conducted in the presence of an assistant and a witness. In conducting the frisk, the searcher has the suspect stand with his back to him. The searcher's assistant takes a position from which he can cover the suspect with his weapon. The suspect is required to raise his arms. The searcher then slides his hands over the individual's entire body crushing the clothing to locate any concealed objects.

(3) The Wall Search.--Based on the principle of rendering the suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward position, the wall search affords the searcher a degree of safety. It is particularly useful when two Marines must search several suspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, or a tree, may be utilized. The wall search is conducted as follows:

(a) Position of Suspect.--The suspect is required to face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned out, and as parallel to and as far away from the wall as possible. His head is kept down.

(b) Position of Searcher's Assistant.--The searcher's assistant stands on the opposite side of the suspect from the searcher and to the rear. He covers the suspect with his weapon. When the searcher moves from his original position to the opposite side of the suspect, the assistant also changes positions. The searcher walks around his assistant during this change to avoid coming between his assistant and the suspect.

(c) Position of Searcher.--The searcher approaches the suspect from the side. The searcher's weapon must not be in such a position that the suspect can grab it. He places his right foot in front of the suspect's right foot and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. From this position, if the suspect offers resistance, the suspect's right foot can be pushed back from under him. When searching from the left side of the suspect, the searcher places his left foot in front of the suspect's left foot and again maintains ankle-to-ankle contact.

(d) Searching Technique.--In taking his initial position, the searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect from suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The searcher first searches the suspect's head-gear. The searcher then checks the suspect's hands, arms, right side of the body, and right leg, in sequence. He crushes the suspect's clothing between his fingers; he does not merely pat it. He pays close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs, and tops of boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect's pocket. If the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be thrown prior to completing the search, the search is started over from the beginning.

(4) Search of More Than One Suspect.--When two or more suspects are to be searched, they must assume a position against the same wall but

far enough apart so that they can not reach one another. The searcher's assistant takes his position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search is begun with the suspect on the right of the line. Search each suspect. On completing the search of one suspect, he is moved to the left of the line and resumes the position against the wall. Thus, in approaching and searching the next suspect, the searcher is not between his assistant and a suspect.

(5) Strip Search.--This type search is usually considered necessary when the individual is suspected of being a guerrilla leader or important messenger. The search is preferably conducted in an enclosed space, such as a room or tent. Depending on the nature of the suspect, the searching technique can be varied. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while a third Marine, who is armed, stands guard outside. His clothing, including his shoes, is removed and searched carefully. A search is then made of his person, including his mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and other areas of possible concealment.

(6) Searching Women.--Marines must be reminded that the resistance movement will make maximum use of women for all types of tasks where search may be a threat.

d. Searching of Vehicles

(1) General.--It will be necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to catch wanted persons and to prevent smuggling of contraband items. This requires the use of roadblocks. Since roadblocks cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is important that the civil population understand that they are entirely a preventive and not a punitive measure.

(a) Types.--Broadly speaking, there are two types of roadblocks, deliberate and hasty.

1. Deliberate.--This type of roadblock is positioned in a town or in the open country, often on a main road. It will act as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. This type of roadblock may not achieve spectacular results.

2. Hasty.--This type of roadblock is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country, and the actual location is often related to some item of intelligence. The hasty roadblock is designed to achieve a quick success.

(b) Location.--Concealment of a roadblock is desirable, but often impossible. The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being noticed. Culverts, bridges, or deep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the roadblock in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweigh the advantages in such positions. A scarcity of good roads will increase the effect of a well placed roadblock.

(c) Troop Dispositions.--A roadblock must have adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise. An element of the roadblock should be positioned and concealed an appropriate distance (one hundred to several hundred meters) from the approach side of the roadblock to prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn around and flee upon sighting the block. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. If the roadblock is manned for any length of time, part of the troops are allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the search area so that the troops can be turned out quickly.

(d) Special Equipment Required.--For the roadblock to achieve maximum results, special equipment is required. Portable signs in the native language and English, should be available. Signs denoting the vehicle search area, vehicle parking area, male and female search area, and dismount point, speed movement. Adequate lighting is needed for the search area if the roadblock is to function efficiently at night. Communication is required between the various troop units. Barbed wire obstacles across the road and around the search area should be provided. Troops must have adequate fire power to withstand an attack or to repulse a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the roadblock.

(2) Method.--The roadblock is best established by placing two parallel lines of concertina barbed wire (each with a gap) across the road. The distance between these two parallel obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that will have to be held in the search area. The enclosure formed can then be used as the search area. If possible, there should be a place in the search area where large vehicles can be examined without delaying the flow of other traffic which can be dealt with quickly. Accommodations are required for searching women suspects and holding persons for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a military roadblock should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter and a trained woman searcher. An officer or NCO must always be on duty or close to the search area. When searching a vehicle, all occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the vehicle. The owner or driver should be made to watch the search of his vehicle. The searcher is always covered by another Marine. When searching, politeness and consideration are shown at all times. In searching vehicles, depending on the type and cargo, a careful search of likely hiding places may require a probe. The occupants of the vehicle can be searched simultaneously if sufficient searchers are available.

e. Searching a Village or Built-Up Area

(1) General.--The basic philosophy of a search of a village or built-up area is to conduct it with a measure of controlled inconvenience to the population. They should be inconvenienced to the point where they will discourage guerrillas and their sympathizers from remaining in their locale, but not to such an extent that they will be driven to collaborate with them as a result of the search. The large-scale search of a village or built-up area is normally a combined police and military operation. It is preplanned in detail and rehearsed. Secrecy is maintained in order to achieve surprise. Physical reconnaissance of the area is avoided and the information needed about the ground obtained from aerial photographs. Both vertical

and oblique photos are studied carefully. In the case of large cities, the local police may have a detailed map showing relative size and location of buildings. For success, the search plan is simple and is executed swiftly. Methods and techniques can be varied.

(2) Organization of Troops.--As villages and built-up areas vary, a force is task organized for each search. An organization consisting of troops, police, etc., is designed to accomplish the following:

- (a) To surround the area to prevent escape.
- (b) To establish roadblocks.
- (c) To prevent an attack or interference by forces outside the area.
- (d) To search houses and individuals as necessary and to identify a suspect.
- (e) To escort wanted persons to the place designated.

(3) Command and Control.--Normally, a search involving a battalion or more is best controlled by the military commander with the police in support. For a smaller search, it is often best for the police to be in control with the military in support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search is best performed by native police, when feasible.

(4) Method

(a) Approach.--An area is approached and surrounded before the inhabitants realize what is happening. Sometimes it is best to drive into the area; on other occasions it is best to disembark at a distance. The decision depends on the available approaches, exits, and the local situation.

(b) Surrounding the Area.--During darkness, troops should approach by as many different routes and as silently as possible. When close to their positions, they should double-time. After daylight, the area can be covered by a chain of observation posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, it is impossible to completely surround an area for any length of time due to the large number of troops required. If necessary, troops dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire to help maintain their line.

(c) Reserves.--If there is a chance that hostile elements from the outside could interfere, reserves are employed to prevent them from joining the inhabitants of an area under search. An air observer can assist by detecting and giving early warning of any large scale movement outside the isolated area.

(d) Search Parties.--The officer in command of the operation makes known that the area is to be searched, a house curfew is in force, and all inhabitants are to remain indoors or gather at a central point for searching.

1. Each search party should consist of at least one native policeman, protective escort, and a woman searcher.

2. When searching a building that has people in it, first action required is to get everyone into one room. The police may give the necessary orders and do the actual searching. The object of this search is to screen for suspected persons.

3. Buildings are best searched from bottom to top. Mine detectors are used to search for arms and ammunition. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary damage.

4. After a house is searched, it is marked. Persons awaiting search are not allowed to move into a searched building.

5. In the case of a vacant house or in cases of resistance, it may be necessary to force entry. After searching a house containing property but whose occupants are away, it can be nailed up and a sentry placed outside to prevent looting. Before troops depart, arrangements are made in the community to protect empty houses until the occupants return.

6. When it is decided to search inhabitants in one central area, the head of the house remains so that he can be present when the house itself is searched. If this is not done, the head of the house is in a position to deny knowledge of anything incriminating that is found.

7. A problem in searching is the accusation of theft and looting which can be made against troops. In small searches it may be possible to obtain a signed certificate from the head of the household that nothing has been stolen, but in a large search this may be impractical. In order to avoid accusations of theft, it may be necessary to search in the presence of witnesses.

(e) Escorts.--Wanted persons are evacuated as soon as possible. Troops normally undertake this task, therefore escort parties and transportation must be planned in advance.

APPENDIX B

CIVIL POPULACE CONTROL MEASURES

1. Establishment of Restricted Areas

Military and critical civil installations (police facilities, communications centers, utilities activities, supply agencies, etc.) may be designated as restricted areas to prevent guerrilla interference and limit civilian access. These installations should be fenced off; gate guards are established and warning signs conspicuously posted. Whenever possible, vegetation or obstructions are cleared at least 100 meters on both sides of the fence. Fenced areas are patrolled. Persons attempting to cross the fence or flee the cleared area are apprehended or shot. Persons entering or leaving the area are subject to search. Percentage of persons searched in detail depends on the amount of traffic, degree of security required, and degree of support the civil population in the area is suspected of rendering the guerrilla.

2. Curfews

a. Curfews are one of the simplest and most effective means of isolating the civilian from guerrilla contact and preventing civil interference with military operations.

b. Exceptions to curfew restrictions may be granted to--

- (1) The clergy.
- (2) Doctors and midwives.
- (3) The civil police.
- (4) Public officials and employees specified by civil affairs officers.
- (5) Firefighting personnel.
- (6) Emergency repair crews of water, gas and power concerns.
- (7) Private employees, providing essential services.
- (8) Individual meritorious requests when approved by civil affairs officers.

c. In all cases except in subparagraph (8), above, the power to grant exemptions may be delegated to the local police. All exemptions should be numbered serially, and the reason for the exemption, conditions of exemption, and the name of the issuing officer clearly stated. Any individual granted exemption should be deprived of it in the event of misuse.

d. Commanders should see that curfew regulations are rigidly enforced, preferably by civil police. This can be determined by checks on all persons on streets after curfew hours and by spot-checks of residences to determine that residents are at home.

e. The following is an example of a curfew notice:

NOTICE

CURFEW

Until further notice no person within _____ will be permitted to move on the streets or outside his own house between the hours of _____ and _____ without a permit from _____.

Any person found in the streets without a permit between those hours will be severely punished.

All persons are warned that military guards/civil police are instructed to shoot any person seen outside his house after hours who is attempting to hide or escape.

Exceptions to this order include _____

Signature

Name

_____, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

3. Relocation of Villages and Settlements

a. The military commander may evacuate or relocate civilians from guerrilla areas. This will assist in isolating the guerrilla by depriving him of local support as well as freeing innocent civilians from terrorism through better protection. Areas cleared of civilians provide better areas for tactical operations. Resettlement towns and villages may be fenced off; occupants of individual houses near the resettlement village may be required to move into the enclosure. Military, civil police, or civil defense units provide surveillance against guerrilla intrusion. Measures similar to those taken for restricted areas (par. 1) may be employed.

b. The Law of Land Warfare prohibits deportation of civilians from their country. However, total or partial evacuation of a given area may be undertaken for the security of the population or imperative military reasons. To the greatest practicable extent, persons evacuated must be accorded proper accommodations, satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety, and nutrition. Members of the same families should not be separated.

c. In situations where the Law of Land Warfare does not apply, treaty agreements regarding the rights of civilians must be respected.

d. Relocation/Evacuation planning should include consideration of the following:

- (1) Transportation.--Civilian transportation is used whenever possible.
- (2) Distance.--The distance of the move should be as short as possible, consistent with the requirement for adequate security of the new location.
- (3) Control.--Movement should be made by rigidly controlled convoy.
- (4) Screening.--Security screening and documentation should be accomplished as soon as possible.
- (5) Identification.--Evacuees may be provided with and required to wear a tag identifying him by name, location from which evacuated, and destination.
- (6) Briefing.--Adequate briefing to explain the purpose of the move is accomplished by leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means prior to beginning the movement.
- (7) Personal Effects.--Each person is allowed to take a predetermined allowance of personal effects.
- (8) Rations.--If available, food for the estimated period of the movement is provided at the time of departure to each person evacuated, or it may be issued at designated points en route.
- (9) Housing.--Housing in the relocation area should be such that it will not endanger the health of evacuees, nor unnecessarily increase the suffering caused by evacuation.
- (10) Medical Care.--Available civilian medical personnel are used when required, supplemented by military medical personnel. Particular attention is given to elderly persons, pregnant women, the blind, crippled, and very young children. Appropriate measures must be taken to prevent the spread of infectious diseases and to prevent epidemics.
- (11) Religious Needs.--The religious needs of evacuees are satisfied at the relocation area.

4. Control of Weapons

a. Prior to issuance of any order or decree disarming the civil population, it is necessary to analyze all features of the undertaking. Plans should include--

- (1) Measures necessary to strengthen existing civil laws in existence.
- (2) Forces necessary to enforce the order or decree.
- (3) Form and method of promulgation of the order or decree.
- (4) Designation and preparation of storage areas for arms, ammunition and explosives.
- (5) Disposition of munitions collected.
- (6) Method of accountability for such munitions, including the preparation of necessary receipts, tags, and permits to be used.
- (7) Designation of types and classes of munitions to be turned in.
- (8) Exceptions to the order or decree. These persons will be issued a special permit.

(9) Agencies (civil and/or military) who will collect, guard and transport the material.

(10) Instructions governing the manufacture and importing of munitions.

(11) Time limit for compliance and penalties assigned thereafter.

b. The problem of retaining knives, machetes and certain agricultural tools can be a source of difficulty and misunderstanding. The working machete or knife is practically the only implement found on farms or forests in many areas of the world; it is used for clearing land as well as harvesting crops. Civilians cannot be deprived of general utility tools. The disarming order (or supplementary instructions) should describe these weapons sufficiently to properly guide subordinates executing the order.

5. Food and Restricted Article Denial.--In cooperation with civil agencies, close supervision of the harvesting, distribution, and sale of food and other articles required by guerrillas can effectively reduce civilian support. The development of a food and restricted article denial plan will include the following considerations:

a. Foodstuffs must be defined and include all types of prepared or unprepared food, grain, oil, sugar, and canned goods which may conceivably be used for human or animal consumption.

b. Restricted articles are defined and usually include paper, ink, medical supplies, flashlights, clothing, and cloth.

c. Restrictions involving the sale, movement, or possession of foodstuffs and restricted articles are carefully drawn up and thoroughly publicized.

d. The procedures regarding search of houses, stores, individuals and vehicles are clearly defined.

6. Search of Individuals, Vehicles and Houses.--Searches are preferably conducted by civil police or self-defense forces. Military searches may be required when these forces are unavailable, unwilling, or inefficient.

7. Rewards, Bribes, and Inducements.--In addition to possible rewards for information leading to the killing or capture of guerrillas, bribes and inducements may be given to civilians who inform military or civil authorities of illegal actions taken by other civilians; i.e. curfew violations, possession of weapons, restricted articles, or illegal food. Rewards may take the form of local currency, additional food and clothing, or supplies in critical demand. Persons who inform should not receive additional confidence or privileges that may violate security. Inducements should be scaled to provide greater value in proportion to the value of the information received.

8. Formation of Self-Defense Units.--In addition to providing a degree of security from guerrilla attack, self-defense units, made up of the civil

population, can be used to assist in the enforcement of civil populace control measures. The military capability of these organizations will vary; however, they provide the military commander with an additional means of economy of force. Care must be exercised in arming self-defense units for they may be a relatively easy prey for local guerrillas. In some cases, weapons may be secured under military custody when not actually in use by the individual or unit.

9. Establishment of Clandestine Intelligence Nets.--Clandestine nets can be used as a means to report civil violations of control measures as well as information about the guerrilla force. This covert method should supplement the overt acts of inspection and enforcement by military and civil authorities.

10. Riot Control

a. Plans should include provisions for coping with civil disturbances. Whenever possible, local civil police or civil defense units should be employed to quell riots, strikes or disturbances. Military action is used as a last resort. See FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, for details regarding the techniques to be employed.

b. Chemical riot control munitions are very effective in dispersing riots and violent demonstrations. They are quite safe as far as permanent injury is concerned. There is much less restriction in their use than in the use of other chemical weapons. Enemy propaganda reaction must be expected, but there will be a propaganda reaction regardless of the means used to thwart the objectives of the rioters. All friendly forces including indigenous civil police will require gas masks. Expedient protection available to the rioters, such as transparent plastic film over the eyes and wet cloths covering the nose are effective.

11. Restrictions on Communications and Transportation

a. Communications.--In cooperation with civil police, telephones and telegraphs may be limited from general civilian use to avoid passing messages important to the guerrilla force. Radio transmitters may be included among the restricted articles. Censorship of mail may be imposed. Search parties should be alert for written messages. Printed matter such as books and newspapers may be coded to carry messages.

b. Transportation

(1) Gate checkpoints should be established to control traffic entering restricted areas and may be required in specified villages and settlements. The following principles should be followed:

(a) The officer or NCO in charge should be responsible for movement through the gate and should not take part in actual search.

(b) Hurdles or barricades are required to canalize movement.

(c) Strict crowd control must be exercised so that searchers are not crowded by persons waiting to move through the gate.

(d) Adequate lighting must be provided.

(e) When only a percentage of persons are being searched, no prior indication of selection should be given and search patterns should be avoided.

(f) A careful watch should be made for suspicious actions; e.g., attempts to evade search, uneasiness, etc.

(g) Younger men and women will usually be the primary carriers of illegal goods.

(2) Roadblocks and checkpoints may be established on a temporary, surprise basis or may be semipermanent in nature. Armored vehicles are especially valuable to provide mobile checkpoints. Local security against guerrilla attack must be provided. Roadblocks and checkpoints may produce relatively few tangible results; however, their value in restricting and hampering guerrilla resupply and in impressing the neutral population with a "show of force" cannot be underestimated.

12. Prevention of Illegal Political Meetings.--The political parties which support the resistance movement are outlawed; however, parties may take on new names or profess other interests in order to meet for coordination of efforts. All meetings and assemblies must be carefully observed, preferably by civil police. The military commander should be kept informed of all scheduled assemblies and meetings in order that he can be better prepared to control them if necessary. Religious services in church premises may be exempt from all restrictions. Permission may be granted to hold public entertainment, sports meetings, and other similar events having no connection with political activities, such permission should be granted only after consultation with counterintelligence personnel and investigation of the persons requesting such permission and the organization they represent to make certain that it is not a cover for prohibited activities.

13. Registration of All Civilians

a. Civil affairs units are charged with the responsibility of the screening of civilian officials, employees of the military, and/or quasi-military organizations of allied forces, by means of processing questionnaires. These units coordinate their activities with counterintelligence agencies. Responsibilities include the establishment of an office of record, and establishment of an archives center of documents pertaining to the people in the area of operations.

b. The purpose of this activity is to seek out and control all elements which are hostile to the allied operations. It also assists in counterintelligence with its responsibility for the investigation of, and the taking of proper action against, subversive individuals actively opposing the legal authority or engaged in activities prejudicial to the political objectives of the operation.

c. In the early phases of operations, the activities of this type are limited to the screening of only such important public officials as is essential to the maintenance of order and the security of persons and property.

d. The discharge of this responsibility may be achieved by the establishment of an agency with two subordinate elements as follows:

(1) The Records and Statistics Unit performs the following duties:

(a) Receives questionnaires from all sources, assigns serial numbers to them, and prepares the accompanying forms.

(b) Indexes, records, and files questionnaires and related documentary information.

(c) Prepares statistical information and reports for higher authority.

(d) Checks payrolls and personnel records to ensure that no local employee has escaped registration and screening.

(2) The Operations Unit performs the following duties:

(a) Evaluates the questionnaires and extracts pertinent information from them.

(b) Searches and evaluates civil service records, police records, and records impounded by counterintelligence.

(c) Receives and evaluates oral and written denunciations of civilians in government or civil affairs service.

(d) Conducts special investigations as required.

APPENDIX C

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

1. General.--In areas where guerrillas are known or suspected, the security of all forms of transportation is a serious problem. Good security is not simply a matter of the number of personnel involved. It is training, movement procedures, and a general awareness of the seriousness of the problem. This appendix describes certain procedures that may be used to improve the security of road, rail, and inland water movements. For counterambush techniques, see appendix A.

2. Military Classification of Roads.--The highway system may be identified according to the various categories of alert. One system, using a color code, is as follows:

a. Green Roads.--Those which lie within the city limits of major towns and such other roads designated by the responsible headquarters. Subject to restrictions, which local commanders may impose, military personnel are permitted to travel on these roads in any type of vehicle.

b. Yellow Roads.--Those where there is a very limited risk of guerrilla ambush. The following conditions apply:

(1) All personnel transported in military or civilian police vehicles will be armed.

(2) Each military vehicle will carry at least one other armed man besides the driver.

(3) Military personnel may travel alone in civilian cars but must be armed when traveling.

c. Red Roads.--Those roads which are considered to be in the combat area and subject to ambush or interference. The conditions governing movement are--

(1) All personnel will be armed and each military vehicle will have at least one other armed man besides the driver.

(2) Travel at night will be restricted to that of operational necessity.

(3) Movement of single military vehicles is not permitted and, if possible, armored vehicles should be included in convoys. Red roads may be further divided into subcategories and special precautions for certain sections of road may be stated.

3. Special Movement Measures

a. Green Roads.--There are no special measures concerning the movement of military convoys.

b. Yellow Roads

(1) An armored vehicle as escort is not considered essential.

(2) Convoys of up to ten vehicles will move at normal interval and in blocks of not more than five or six vehicles.

(3) Convoys of more than ten vehicles should be approved by the commander of the operational area concerned. All convoys of more than ten vehicles will also move in blocks of not more than five or six vehicles.

c. Red Roads

(1) Troop convoys of tactical units will provide their own protection and use will be made of armored vehicles, if available.

(2) Groups of administrative vehicles, such as a supply convoy, will be escorted by armored vehicles whenever possible. The scale of escort for such convoys should be about one armored vehicle to every five vehicles.

(3) Interval between vehicles will normally be 150 meters depending on the type of terrain; on red roads it is important that vehicles move sufficiently close to each other to render mutual assistance in case of emergency, but not so close that an ambush is likely to catch several vehicles.

(4) Convoys should always be escorted by troops.

(5) Whenever possible, helicopter or other observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance and to assist in controlling the convoy.

4. Convoy SOPs.--SOPs should be established to cover--

- a. Approval authority for convoy movements.
- b. The appointment and duties of convoy and vehicle commanders.
- c. The organization of the convoy.
- d. The weapons and ammunition to be carried.
- e. The preparation of the vehicles. (Detailed instructions regarding tarpaulins, tail gates and windshields.)
- f. Immediate action drills.
- g. Security measures.

5. Security.--Maximum precautions are taken to prevent the guerrillas gaining advance information of vehicle movement. It should be remembered that--

- a. The telephone system is seldom secure.
- b. Radio messages in the clear can be picked up easily.
- c. The loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed.

d. Information concerning the timing, route, and composition of a convoy should be furnished on a need-to-know basis. Drivers and escorts should be alerted to their jobs as late as feasible.

e. Plans should be made for alternate routes and deception measures.

6. Convoy Commander.--The convoy commander, detailed for every convoy, will position himself where he can best control the convoy. He issues the necessary orders to initiate the march and ensures that instructions contained in standing operating procedures and in march orders are followed.

7. Briefing.--All personnel traveling in the convoy will be thoroughly briefed to include--

a. Details of timing, route, speed, order of march, maintenance of contact, and action to be taken if contact is broken.

b. The distribution of men to vehicles.

c. The distribution of weapons.

d. The appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and vehicle guards.

e. The action to be taken in the event of guerrilla attack.

8. Preparation and Loading of Personnel in Vehicles.--Men traveling in a vehicle must have all-around visibility. They should be able to fire their weapons without hindrance and be able to disembark quickly. The following points should be noted:

a. Vehicles should have tarpaulins, bows, and wooden side boards removed. The tail gate should either be removed or placed in the horizontal position. The front glass windshield should be left up. "Chicken wire" should be placed over the door windows of larger trucks and sides of personnel vehicles to prevent the throwing of grenades into the cabs of trucks. Equipment on vehicles that will slow up disembarkation of troops, and that is not essential to the vehicle's safe operation, is removed.

b. Vehicles in convoys must not be overloaded with personnel. If the vehicles are fully loaded, men will be unable to use their weapons effectively.

9. Vehicle Commanders.--A commander is designated for each vehicle. His duties will be to ensure alertness and to assist in maintaining convoy formation by controlling the driver. The primary mission of the vehicle commander is to command the troops in his vehicle should the convoy be ambushed. He is located in the back of the vehicle with the troops.

10. Vehicle Guards.--In troop carrying vehicles, four men should be posted as guards. These men are posted two at the front and two at the

rear, and each is assigned an area of observation covering the 90° from the center of the road to the side in each direction. These guards should be armed with automatic weapons and smoke and fragmentation grenades. (A phosphorus smoke grenade can be particularly useful as an anti-ambush weapon.) When ambushed, guards cover the troops disembarking. They can also assist in the traffic control of the convoy by informing the vehicle commander if the vehicle following halts or drops back.

11. Use of Armored Vehicles.--When a convoy of few vehicles is escorted on red roads, the armored vehicle should be centrally placed in the convoy. An armored vehicle at the front or rear of a convoy may be prevented from moving into the ambush area by halted vehicles. The armored vehicle can be a mobile CP for the convoy commander. When large convoys move on main roads, vehicles should be divided into blocks of about five or six and, when sufficient armor is available, one should be placed with each block. For vehicle convoys, the inclusion of an armored vehicle has two important effects on ambush action:

- a. Provide covering fire for the counterattack.
- b. Provide protection to anyone caught in the ambush by driving into the danger area and engaging the enemy at point blank range.

12. Precautionary Tactics.--Troops may disembark to clear any likely ambush areas before the convoy moves through. Such tactics are unlikely to surprise guerrillas in position; they will move as soon as they see the troops. This examination of likely ambush positions will make the guerrillas less confident of their ability to execute an ambush without danger to themselves.

13. Convoy Communications.--Unit SOPs may designate the means and use of communications for convoys. The march order specifies the communication security that may be required. Communications with other forces is desirable. Methods of intracolumn communication include--

- a. Visual Signals.--Visual signals are most commonly used for column control. These may be hand-and-arm, flashlight, or flag signals. Visual signaling is easily understood, rapid in transmission, and covers all the basic column maneuvers such as starting, stopping, changing speed, and changing direction. Helicopters or other aircraft covering the column can employ smoke grenades or other such means for emergency signals. Each color is coded for a specific message such as ambush ahead, bridge out, guerrillas sighted, or road impassible. A similar system is employed for signaling from the column to aircraft.

- b. Radio Communication.--When communication security permits, radio is the principal means of communication during a march. Its use is generally specified in orders, unit SOPs, and communications operation instructions.

- c. Audio Signals.--Whistles, horns, or bugles are used to attract attention, to warn personnel of further transmission of commands, and to

spread alarms. Voice commands and verbal messages are used when the situation permits.

d. Other Methods.--A road message may be written on a board and posted along the route or displayed by an individual who stands at a vantage point where it can be plainly seen by all drivers. A message may be posted at the head of the column and picked up after the last vehicle of the column passes. Written messages, orders, and overlays are usually delivered during scheduled halts. Messages may be delivered by helicopter by selecting and designating helicopter landing sites along the route.

14. Guarding Officials

a. When moving by road, the protection of indigenous authorities or other high ranking officials may require the assignment of a troop escort. In such cases the following should be considered:

- (1) The strength of the escort required will depend on the circumstances; a platoon will be adequate in most instances.
- (2) There should be an armored vehicle available in which the official may travel if deemed necessary.
- (3) Throughout the move, the vehicle carrying the official must be closely supported by a second vehicle carrying at least one automatic weapon and "bodyguard" troops. If possible, this vehicle should be armored.
- (4) The vehicle carrying the official should not bear any special distinguishing marks.
- (5) In the event of an attack, it is the duty of the "bodyguard" troops to protect the official and to get his vehicle out of the danger area as quickly as possible.

b. Before starting the move, the escort commander should brief the official on the action he wishes him to take in the event of attack. Regardless of the seniority of the official, the escort commander is in complete command of the move.

15. Protection of Railroads and Trains

a. Operation of Railroads.--Railroads in the area may be operated in one of three ways: entirely by the civil population; by the military and civilians combined; or by the military alone. No matter how the railroads are operated, liaison and protective measures must be established.

b. Train Guards

(1) Train guards may be military police or other troops assigned to the duty. Economy of personnel will result if a unit is attached to a particular railroad organization for the specific purpose of providing security for railroad operations.

(2) The guard force on a cargo train should be concentrated in one or two positions and when possible, should have radio communication with units in the area that can provide support in the event of ambush.

c. Security Measures.--Security measures which may be taken for rail movements are listed below:

- (1) Trains should run on irregular schedules.
- (2) Security elements should precede and follow individual trains.
- (3) Flatcars loaded with sand can be pushed in front of each train to guard against derailment by mines or cuts in the track.
- (4) Automatic weapons may be mounted on cars.
- (5) A right-of-way may be cleared on each side and the cleared area declared a restricted zone where shoot-on-sight conditions may apply. If clearance of the entire right-of-way is impractical, vegetation surrounding critical locations such as defiles, tunnels, and bridges, is cleared.
- (6) Air reconnaissance may be conducted over the right-of-way.

d. Security of Tunnels, Bridges, and Stations.--Critical installations such as tunnels, bridges, and stations are guarded.

e. Troops Embarked on Trains.--Troops embarked in regular passenger cars should disembark through all exits and windows. Because disembarking rapidly from a passenger car is difficult, the technique employed is planned and rehearsed. If practical, troops are transported by flatcars so guerrilla ambushes can be quickly engaged by fire from the cars and disembarkation can be done quickly.

16. Protection of Waterways.--Critical points along rivers and waterways should be guarded. Points offering favorable ambush sites are cleared of vegetation near the banks. Other security measures include--

- a. Irregular schedules for movement.
- b. Mounting automatic weapons on all craft.
- c. Providing security on each craft moving independently and on each group of craft moving in convoys.
- d. Providing adequate communication means for each craft.
- e. Establishing waterway patrols in fast, heavily armed craft.
- f. Patrolling the waterway by air.

► GLOSSARY

civic action. See military civic action.

clandestine operation. Activities to accomplish intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

cold war. A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives.

counterespionage. A category of counterintelligence, the objective which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.

counterguerrilla warfare. Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas.

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

counterintelligence. That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.

countersabotage. Action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating, and manipulating, neutralizing, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

countersubversion. That part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversive activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

covert operations. Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

economic action. The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state; e.g., to impair the war-making potential of a hostile power, or to generate economic stability within a friendly power.

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economic warfare. Aggressive use of economic means to achieve national objectives.

evasion and escape. See unconventional warfare.

guerrilla. A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. See also unconventional warfare.

guerrilla warfare (GW). Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. See also unconventional warfare.

insurgency. A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

irregular forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces.

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

paramilitary operations. An operation undertaken by a paramilitary force.

political warfare. Aggressive use of political means to achieve national objectives.

propaganda. Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

black. Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

grey. Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source.

white. Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.

psychological activities. Those activities conducted in peacetime, or in areas outside active military theaters of war, which are planned and conducted to influence the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of foreign groups in ways favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

psychological operations. This term includes psychological warfare, and, in addition, encompasses those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

psychological warfare. The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

psychological warfare consolidation. Psychological warfare directed toward populations in friendly rear areas or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating military operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil populace.

psychological warfare objective. A military, political, economic, or other objective, the attainment of which is to be achieved or facilitated by the employment of psychological warfare.

psychological warfare task. A particular project whose accomplishment will contribute to the achievement of the psychological warfare objective.

psychological warfare theme. A subject or topic used as a means of accomplishing a psychological warfare task.

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime. See also unconventional warfare.

subversive political action. A planned series of activities designed to accomplish political objectives by influencing, dominating, or displacing individuals or groups who are so placed to affect the decisions and actions of another government.

unconventional warfare. Includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

evasion and escape (E&E). The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control

guerrilla warfare (GW). Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime.

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