

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

FAILED INTERVENTION: THE UNITED STATES IN THE BALKANS

by

LTC Kelly F. Fisk
United States Army

LTC Raymond Millen
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Kelly F. Fisk

TITLE: Failed Intervention: The United States in the Balkans

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002

PAGES: 43

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The violence of Yugoslavia is soaked in historical injustice and nationalist tradition. Its historical mold is not unique; but the world's reaction is. The ongoing failure of Yugoslavia and its fractious cascade of regime changes are a product of flawed intervention. United States intervention failed because it opted for termination determined by strategic ways rather than resolution to meet strategic ends. The failure of Yugoslavia presents a model for flawed intervention and the instability achieved through the intrusion of sovereignty.

This analysis follows a framework of examining the failure of U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia in three parts: (1) the developmental history that create the conditions for the latest Balkan War; (2) reasons and results of US intervention; (3) strategic implications for similar interventions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
FAILED INTERVENTION: THE UNITED STATES IN THE BALKANS	1
ORIGINS OF WAR	2
DISINTEGRATION	11
INTERVENTION	14
US STRATEGIC LESSONS	19
RECOMMENDATIONS	23
ENDNOTES.....	29
BIBLIOGRAPHY	35

FAILED INTERVENTION: THE UNITED STATES IN THE BALKANS

You, oh comrades and brothers, lords and nobles, soldiers and vojvodas – great and small. You yourselves are witness and observers of the great goodness God has given us in this life.. But if the sword, if wounds, or if darkness of death comes to us, we accept them sweetly for Christ and for the goodness of our homeland. It is better to die in battle than to live in shame. Better it is for us to accept death from the sword in battle than to offer our shoulders to the enemy. We have lived a long time for the world; in the end we seek to accept the martyr's struggle and to live forever in heaven. We call ourselves Christian soldiers, martyrs for godliness to be recorded in the book of life. We do not spare our bodies in fighting in order that we may accept the holy wreaths from the One who judges all accomplishments. Suffering beget glory and labors lead to peace.¹ - King Lazar's speech made to the Serbs after Kosovo Polje.

The West intervened in the Yugoslavian conflict in the early 1990's to satisfy the interests of stability and alliances. This conflict remains unresolved in a hellish state of not-at-war and not-at-peace. No party considers the multiple peace agreements as just, an aspect that denies the enduring aspects of resolution. Truce without peace, or peace at any price defined the political logic of resolution. The West failed, its intervention first too slow and then later too brash. This occurred because the West developed a termination solution that failed to address the root causes of the war.

The break-up of Yugoslavia was not caused by ancient hatreds or virulent nationalism. Nor did one historical villain perpetuate a war. It took several villains to exploit Yugoslavia's fatal flaws. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the efficacy of US Balkan intervention against the causes of the latest Balkan war. Resolution did not occur because the incentive of war was not exhausted. Its flaws were formalized in settlements that formalized ethnic divisions. These anachronistic solutions of ethnic distinction have been proven ineffective throughout Balkan history. This end had no prospect of success.

The legacy of Yugoslavia is a requiem of injustice sustained by violent intervention. Contrary to many contemporary interpretations, the Balkan model of violent instability is neither rooted in ancient hatreds nor ethnocentrism. Instead, Balkan violence is the product of a contrived exploitation of the fears of internal and external marginalization. The potential of moderating elements has been arrested by ethno-centrist political maneuver. The unsolved questions of sovereignty, self-determination and nation further aggravate a maligned history. The region has attempted all forms of government, and none has survived. There is one commonality, until now its structures have always been the product of external intervention. Governments have been imposed but have never grown. Its history is a wound that has

allowed no stage for democracy and has forfeited the promise of self-determination and sovereignty.

ORIGINS OF WAR

The region in southeastern Europe that became 20th century Yugoslavia has been the object of conquest, the expedient of sacrifice, and a battleground of cultures. The blood spilt on her soils has not been rewarded with enduring governments and boundaries. The Balkan peoples, tired of war and subjugation, have always sought ways to resolve their seemingly irreconcilable differences. Historical contradictions were overcome by populations blended with common linguistic origin and the absence of distinctions in anthropological race. But the people's desire for peace, achievable by the development of a common Balkan identity, never reached completion. Conquerors moved or harassed populations, drove them away or attracted them, mixed or divided them, but never integrated them.²

Balkan geography has a deep cultural impact. Extreme weather, terrain, and limiting arterial lines of communication isolate villages, cities, and regions. Culture is deeply linked to village traditions. In many cases these localized areas are socio-ethnically homogeneous, with deep historical family ties and tradition forming modern tribes. Lore, history, and historical pride fuel the talk around tables smattered with Turkish coffee, slivovitz, smoked meats, and pickled vegetables. Above all, family and Balkan hospitality dominate local values, followed closely by the pride of individual prowess. These small modern tribes share successes and failures, work together during harvests, secure lost flocks, and share the same tables. Wood stoves intermingle with radios, a village television, and a rare phone with infrequent reliability. These peoples love dark humor, a joke, and any excuse for a community gathering. At the same time there is a somber tone amongst all of the ethnicities. It is deeply sad, a collective feeling of loss, and a frustration over a bleak future that are almost always accompanied by a typical Balkan shrug. The prospect of peace is generally forfeit, especially among the young. In too many instances, hope is measured in immediate needs and future plans for moving to the West or to the culturally secure centers — Belgrade, Zagreb, or Sarajevo. The preferred social interaction for young and old is deliberating or gossiping over coffee for extended hours. For the Serbs and Croats, religion is also a centerpiece of culture where the local priest serves as a trusted leader in village life. These priests are generally not apolitical; the consuming nature of Balkan politics requires them to tend to some politics as they tend their flocks. After so many despotic rulers, word of mouth from a trusted friend or local leader is the primary and only accepted form of information. It is in this environment that leaders in faraway places take on either a heroic

charm or villainous personage, a determination that is made based upon ethnicity, family, and lore.

Superficially, it is easy to accentuate ethnic differences, especially in the more populated areas. City residents perpetuate village heritage and maintain cultural links to the mountains. The village tradition of extended family also exists in the cities. In the same town, urban-ethnicities maintain separate radio stations, newspapers, schools, and leaders. They perform their own cultural dances, enforce language distinctions, and approach school, family, law, and economics differently. It is not uncommon to view a Mosque, Catholic, and Orthodox churches all within the same field of view. Within the cities, churches serve as cultural centers that seemingly are mini “fault-lines.” Instead, these demarcations reflect a culture based upon village identities and serve as witness to centuries of accommodation. Limited resources cause the practical sharing of cultural traditions and skills. This sharing is not limited to the confines of city life. Interspersed villages, although ethnically homogenous, also trade and socialize with neighboring villages. These commonalities of survival and history have always outweighed the distinctions exploited by nationalist politics. Ethnic generalizations and skills are perpetuated, and not all in a negative sense, with commonly expressed opinions like “Albanians are the best bakers,” “Croats are the best craftsmen,” “Serbs are the best fighters.” In the larger cities, these distinctions become more blurred, especially among the young people. But the realities of a culture caped in inequities, cause attribution of blame. Here judgment is passed on ethnicity and on political leaders. These politicians are selected by ethnic vote, a phenomenon that is based on ethno-nationalist fear and lack of democratic experience. It is only in the realm of politics that the fault-lines are clearly evident.

The gradual blurring of ethnicity is severed by military service, marriage, ethnic business practice, national politics, and a nationally charged educational system. Each nationality has undertaken revisionist academics to produce ethnically distinct histories and curriculums. Students attend ethnically homogenous colleges with incompatible curriculums — the Serbs to Belgrade, the Croats to Zagreb and the Bosniacs to Tuzla or Sarajevo. These colleges also sever the moderating logic of a village lifestyle that lends itself to practical accommodation. These students are exposed to the fervor of politics that is founded in exaggerated ethno-nationalist differences. The outcome is not colleges that become production lines of fervent nationalists. Instead, the experience is too contradictory and leaves students disillusioned in an environment where promise is clouded by uncompromising nationalism. The youthful dream of normalcy is dispelled by curriculums that wield history as a nationalist weapon. Almost all believe that life was better before the break-up of Yugoslavia and death of Tito, and most see

no future in their country. Instead of education becoming a means to better their country, it is seen as a means to escape.

The Balkan cultural differences were not enough to start a war. That took leaders, both external and internal, motivated by interests. Wars in the Balkans have never been people's wars. Balkan wars were fought over parochial interests and were not an inevitable clash of civilizations. People from different civilizations have met and merged in the Balkans. The apparatus of civilizations, states, and empires, has fought over Balkan labor, oil, and geography. Popular idea did not cause its wars -- Balkan kitchen fires are stoked with talks of politics, but these are shrugged off at the end of the night when the last log is burnt. Foreign armies won and lost the Balkan chattels, and the Balkan peoples of all nationalities fought against them in battles of defense and survival. The citizens of the Balkan "civilization" did not fight themselves until they were turned against each other by fear.

Balkan opportunists formed nationalist citadels of power from fear. This fear is rooted in village culture, based upon distrusts of things beyond community control, difference, and lore. When the opportunity for self-determination was presented, the Balkans contested again, but this time from within. Nationalism pitted fear against fear, in a political environment that made villages and urban ethnicities feel vulnerable. Locals adopted the Balkan method of survival and consolidated. This condition still exists. Events at national, city, or local level are measured from a village perspective. An angry dispute, even the loss of one head of stock, a house fire, the murder or arrest of a solitary man have a major threatening impact on village life. This mentality dominates Balkan people who all have their roots in the villages. Because cities are linked to villages through extended families, city calamities send shock waves throughout the country. The only acceptable explanations are offered by local, trusted leaders. This fear creates a sense of isolation, supported by an accommodating geography. The Balkan answer to alleviate this fear is a village response; join together to face a threat. These collectives are then joined by the politicized Balkan nationalisms.

The major commonality among the South Slav peoples is a history of subjection and violent oppression. Although each people, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had historically separate identities, they have been conquered and subjugated by so many conquerors that their identities were blurred through forced integration under imperialist yoke, local historical myths, and practicality.

"The Croats and Serbs as separate nations have a history whose beginnings are lost in the depths of time. Their national identities are rooted in the memories and traditions of their medieval kingdoms. Despite the fact that they are old nations, neither their national identities nor the states that they created were

continuous. Ethnically and linguistically the people were not separate, so differentiations rested primarily on historical memory, traditions, and religion. One could almost say that Croats and Serbs are ethnically almost homogeneous from the standpoint of national consciousness and loyalties."³

Before Yugoslavia, there was no history of Serb-Croat conflict. Balkan neighbors had shared common enemies. Alliances of opportunity, such as the Croats and Krajina-Serbs, resulted in a history of "cooperation in fighting joint enemies, first the Ottomans and later the Hungarians."⁴ Even though independence struggles during the period of imperialist decline were nationalist-based, there was always a common promise of autonomy and the prospect of a cooperative peace.

Ottoman occupation of the Balkans became a threat to the western world. The Ottomans conducted numerous invasions into Christian Central Europe and their geographical neighbors, the Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary. The Balkan peoples were not a threat, but the Ottoman trapdoor into fortress Europe was. Not only did this make the Balkans a battleground for the domination of Central Europe for centuries, but it also clearly defined an ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural division among empires that "cut across the heart of the Balkans from the 4th century and which continues to divide the region today."⁵ The importance of the Balkans was tantamount as a strategic buffer, a place to wage war on foreign soil without the penalties of looting armies. These wars were fought in the hollows between the empires, where the Ottomans used converted Muslims and the Romans and Habsburgs used the Krajina Serbs as skirmishers. This battle-line between empires was fiercely maintained.

"The Vojna Krajina can claim to be one of the most distinctive and disruptive fault lines in Europe. Apart from forming the borders between the empires of Islam and Christendom for three centuries, it is also the line of fissure between Rome and Constantinople, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christian faiths. Without question, the economic traditions of Slovenia and Croatia to the west of this line have developed in close harmony with western ideas in the twentieth century, whereas to the east of the divide, the corrupt barrier mentality of the Ottomans still dominates the rural economies of Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Albania."⁶

This line became the front for wars and ethnic conflict. The complexity of this turbulent and contested line between empires was felt most by the locals who struggled for survival. Resistance had its own lessons; local freedom fighters were met with barbaric vengeance. When empires were strong, accommodation and assimilation became the Balkan practice of survival; when they were weak, resistance. Balkan local leaders developed a keen sense of opportunism, motivated by survival and fear. In a land where choosing the wrong religion meant

impalement on a pike, the difficult of allegiance carried with it the consequence of life, land and family.

In Bosnia, after conquest by the Turks between 1386 and 1463, "conversion to Islam proceeded rather rapidly, especially among the land-owning families of Bosnia; with the religious conversion went a cultural transformation that made Bosnia an outpost of Ottoman civilization. Year after year, Moslem warriors answered the call of local governors to join raids into Christian lands in the north and west. Simultaneously, agents from Constantinople chose Christian peasant conscripts to replenish the ranks of the Sultan's personal household. These recruits were officially classed as slaves."⁷

Ironically, the genesis of today's Balkan nationalism is founded in the more liberal aspect of imperial subjugation. After conquering the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire established a "millet" system that "embraced no unified territory nor any homogenous ethnic group or people of the same political and legal status." This system only allowed Muslim rule and left all others "free to organize their religious, legal and education systems, but only from their own resources."⁸ The Ottomans allowed Orthodox religious and ethnic identity as a counterweight to the Roman Catholic Church – the Ottoman Empire's true enemy.⁹ The Islamist political structure allowed other religions, "people of the book," as long as they complied with the Islamic rule. Many Balkan people found the Islamic religion tolerant enough and converted for practical advantage. Many complied with the rule of totalitarian Ottoman leadership, but continued separate ethnic cultural and religious customs. These ethnicities maintained identities despite apparent costs. They developed into nationalist identities supported by a deep religious basis. For over 300 years "Christians and Muslims led separate lives" and "the division between the two communities was stark." For example in the Belgrade area "almost all of the 300,000 Serbs in the "pashalik" lived in the countryside whereas the 20,000 Muslim administrators, soldiers and tradesmen inhabited the towns."¹⁰

Balkan history is not unique. First, every nation in its history has been subject to imperial subjugation and comprised of citizens from different civilizations. The Balkans are "old nations, new states."¹¹ While the Slavic peoples have some history of living in their own states, the rule of four dynastic empires, Austrians, Prussians, Ottomans and Russians were "all hostile to the idea of a national state."¹² As a result, many did not gain independent statehood until after World War I. These states, democratically inexperienced, were challenged by bad boundaries that reflected the interests and order determined by the Entente powers.¹³ Second, all nations in the region have, recently and in the past, "seen their national identity, language, and historical culture threatened."¹⁴ Finally, the Balkans were not unique in their experience of nationalist

revolution. After the French Revolution in 1789, Ireland in 1798, Poland in 1796, Spain from 1808-1812, and Serbia from 1804-1830, all experienced nationalist revolutions from peasant societies. The Balkan distinction is that “of the four peasant rebellions in Europe at the time, it was the only one that succeeded.”¹⁵ Where it had failed elsewhere, violent nationalism had proved itself as the only viable political and military method capable of overthrowing imperial subjugation in the 19th century Balkans. This historical experience and nationalist legacy was easily exploitable in the following century.

Serbia championed three revolts against the Ottoman Turks from 1804-1806, 1814-1813 and again in 1815-1817, winning partial autonomy. Serbian village chiefs prosecuted the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 against Ottoman leaders (“dahi” who were mostly converted Slavs) over a repressive taxation system known as “citluks.”¹⁶ There are several key lessons from these uprisings. The first was that they were nationalist-based responses deeply rooted in localist traditions. Ottoman rulers organized the Serbs in extended family units known as “zadruga.” The Serbs were not allowed to own land but lived as a form of sharecropper. Groups of these families elected representatives to the district or “knezina” that in turn elected the “knez” or chieftain. These chieftains then interacted with the Ottoman landlords and rulers.¹⁷ This system was entirely ethno-nationalist in character. Extended families became the “basis of Serbian nationality. Individual interest was thus merged, as it were, in the family.”¹⁸ This form of local ethnic politics formed the structures that supported the 19th century nationalist uprisings. Similarly, this pattern emerged again in the late 1970’s when “the regime degenerated into a coalition of local oligarchies which allowed the majority ethnic group to assert itself in every constituent unit as a way of finding a new legitimation.”¹⁹ Second, the method of ethno-nationalist war employed was to be repeated: “this pattern was a central feature of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The strategy pursued by the rural Serbs of besieging towns where Bosnian Muslims were concentrated, and then expelling or murdering the population once the defences were breached, was identical to that developed by Karadjordje in the First Serbian Uprising.”²⁰ Finally, Serbian nationalist leaders revitalized the notion of the lost Kingdom in the Battle of Kosovo and developed the modern day Serbian nationalist symbol – Karadjordje’s double-headed eagle coat of arms with the ancient Serbian symbol of a cross that is surrounded by four Cyrillic Cs.²¹

The declining Ottoman Empire resulted in Great Power competitions over the spoils of the Balkans. The prospect of internal Balkan resolution was lost. Inequities in the redistribution of Balkan lands fueled virulent nationalism. Nationalist sentiments were rampant and unsettling. Organizations such as the Serbian organization Union or Death, known as the “Black Hand,”

worked towards the union of all Serbian lands to include Bosnia and Herzegovina--by whatever means were necessary.²² The dual threat of external subjugation and internal Serbianization transformed the region into a powder keg. The assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg crown, Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, (a Bosnian-born ethnic Serb terrorist who pledged to unite Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia), in Sarajevo kindled the next war. This began the Third Balkan War that dragged the rest of the European nations into World War I.

After WWI, the internal Balkan questions remained unanswered at Versailles. At the beginning of the war, Serbian Prime Minister Pasic issued the Nis Declaration stating that the Serbian war aim was the liberation and unification of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Pasic challenged that peace could only be maintained in the Balkans by creating "one national state, geographically sufficiently large, ethnographically compact, politically strong, economically independent, and in harmony with European culture and progress."²³ The Croats and Slovenes were not eager to join this compact, but when they learned of a secret treaty in London, which was to grant Slavic lands to Italy for Italy's support for the allies, the Croats and Slovenes realized that they must join the proposed union or suffer their independence.

The inter-war period, jaundiced by disputes between Serbs and Croats, resulted in "failure of parliamentary democracy."²⁴ Disputes focused on ideologies, social claims and grievances centered on the issue of Croatian representation issue. King Alexander attempted to save the vestiges of democracy by creating a "guided democracy" but lost to radical parties and practices.²⁵ On October 9, 1934, Croatian assassins killed him.

Attempts at nationalist reconciliation failed, as no one could resolve the "Croatian Question," nor could the government stem the rising number of Croatian paramilitary organizations.²⁶ By 1939 Yugoslavia's government was based upon a form of federalism. This accommodation allowed a great deal of autonomy for Croatia, even while Croatian leaders discussed plans with foreign leaders to break up Yugoslavia.²⁷ As Europe rushed into World War II, Yugoslavia was besieged by the internal violence of the Ustasha in Croatia and the territorial disputes between Serbia and Croatia.²⁸

In September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland. Both the British and the Germans pressured Yugoslavia to take sides. Yugoslavian attempts to remain neutral were negated and Yugoslavia, pressured by Hitler, joined the Tripartite Pact in March 1941. A Serbian officer revolt deposed Prince Regent Peter two days later in a vain effort to break the new allegiance. War was inevitable. The Yugoslavs were late to declare general mobilization, naively attempting to avoid provocation with Hitler. The Serbian controlled army could not form a coherent defense. "To placate the dissatisfied minorities, which charged that the Serb

dominated government would defend only Serb-inhabited areas, the Yugoslav Army became overextended by deploying all around the borders of the country."²⁹ On 6 April 1941, Hitler swiftly invaded and occupied Yugoslavia. Hitler executed this campaign to secure his southern flank in support of the proposed invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 to secure and protect the key oil resources in the Balkans from British bomber attack.³⁰ In 11 days, the German Second and Twelfth Armies had captured all major cities and forced the Yugoslav surrender.

Hitler exploited the lack of Yugoslavian unity by creating an independent Croatian state, an action that threw Yugoslavia into a savage religious, ethnic and tribal war. Hitler's Croatian executed retribution against the Serbs was without historical parallel. Ante Pavelic, who had been involved in the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934, led the Croats in a barbaric and genocidal campaign against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies in the Krajina and within the borders of the new Croatian state. He formed the Ustashi, a politico-military group similar to the Italian Black shirts, and quickly organized a politicized army. In response, the Serbian Chetniks executed their own murderous campaigns against the Nazi Allies of Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Lower clergy on both sides sanctioned this "holy war" of barbarism.³¹ Pavelic's regime applied this formula towards the Serbs: "One-third we will kill, one-third will be driven out of Croatia, and one-third we will convert to Catholicism." Estimates vary about the effectiveness of Pavelic's formula, but a generally accepted figure is 500,000 to 700,000 Serbs killed, 50,000 Jews, and 20,000 Gypsies.³² Yugoslavia was dead by its own knives, its agricultural and industrial infrastructure wrecked, and the dreams of peace destroyed.

WWII awakened the tradition of local armed opposition in the Balkans. Opposition was divided in two camps, the Chetniks under the former Col. Draja Mihailovitch and the Communist Partisans under Josip Broz, or Tito. Mihailovitch's "Chetniks," were named after the Serbian nationalist group that fought the Turks throughout World War I. The Chetniks gained popular support in 1941 and opened communications with the exiled King Peter. Mihailovitch was appointed commander of the resistance forces within Yugoslavia, and then minister of defense of the royal government-in-exile.³³ The Chetnik strategy was to develop underground forces in Serbia to fight with the Allies against German occupation. Over 35,000 Serbs had been executed for Chetnik activities in World War I, and Mihailovitch fought small-scale operations to avoid this again. Conversely, Tito led his communist irregulars in an aggressive guerrilla campaign. Tito had converted to communism while a Russian prisoner during WWII and then became Secretary General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1937. He formed the Partisan movement in Belgrade after Germany's occupation. The Partisans' communist politics were as antiroyalist as the Chetniks were anti-Communist.

Yugoslavia's internal WWII struggle was between competing nationalist and political interests. The divisions worsened because the locally-based Chetniks were more susceptible to German reprisal while the Partisans were more amorphous. The Partisans engaged in large-scale operations that caused the Germans and Italians to exact more severe reprisals. "A conflict within a conflict soon developed," resulting in a model for the latest Balkan wars.³⁴ Additionally, the Partisans developed "an almost universal disregard" "for the accepted customs and usages of war. Hospitals, ambulance convoys, and hospital trains, lacking any protection but the small arms carried by officers and enlisted orderlies, were easy targets to attack and were particularly inviting targets since the guerrillas suffered from a chronic shortage of medical supplies. The sick and wounded would be slain in their beds, the medical stores looted, and on occasion captured doctors and other medical personnel would be carried along and forced to care for sick and wounded guerrillas."³⁵ This legacy would prove to be most unfortunate.

Tito and the Partisans formed the Second Yugoslavia. Tito assuaged Italy and Britain by promising to protect individual rights and establish a coalition government with a provisional parliament. But these promises were swiftly cast aside. Tito introduced a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and began a reign of terror that eliminated all opposition. His staged elections were Soviet-style elections with only one party, the Communist Party.³⁶ Tito's formula for Yugoslavia was to eliminate the divisions within the republic. His tactic "was to throw the hatred into history's deep freeze by enforcing communal life on the three communities using repression, and if necessary, violence. Tito's tactic was flawed because when the resentments were taken out of the historical deep freeze, the memory of hatred proved to be as fresh as ever after it thawed."³⁷ Essentially, Tito suppressed all national political rights to the ideal of a new nation and its Communist ideals. He described the new government as a republic based upon federal principles. The newly formed Constitution in January 1946 was based on four equalities:

First, all Yugoslav citizens had equal rights and duties, regardless of race, nationality, or religion. Second, the six republics of the new Yugoslavia--Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia--were proclaimed to be equal in all aspects of their rights and duties. Third, the primary nations of Yugoslavia were defined to be equal. There were five of these: Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes. Fourth, all nations contributed equally to the formation and liberation of Yugoslavia.³⁸

Tito's new constitution effectively linked national recognition with territory, an act which reaffirmed Balkan nationalism and left the remaining nationalities categorized as minorities.

Tito reformed federal structures by extending self-management to the republics and the two newly proclaimed autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. These reforms were based upon Tito's flawed theory that if socialism served to unite nations, then Yugoslavian self-

management socialism would serve to unite the nations of Yugoslavia. This ideological (and optimistic) theory was regarded as a final solution to the nationalist issue in the republics. Economics eroded this ideal. In the late 1960's growing economic disparities among the ethnically segregated republics moved the country back towards nationalist antagonism and increasing demands for independence. Economics pitted the primarily Muslim urbanites against the agrarian based Serbs and Croats.

Yugoslavia began its slow disintegration once again. The party had "put into practice a policy which aimed at balancing out the nationalities--to a certain extent against each other."³⁹ As soon as social and economic conditions worsened, the historical nationalisms roared again, this time allied with the governments of the republics.

By the early 1970's, Tito held the troubled Republic of Yugoslavia together almost solely by his personage. He attempted to appease the Croat and Slovene separatists by announcing the formation of a collective Presidency comprised of representatives from each republic and province, to become effective upon his death. In 1974, he proclaimed a new constitution that granted greater autonomy to the republics, purged the party of the Croatian branch and separatist factions, and cleaned out the party leadership in Serbia. His decentralization plan did not reduce identities and promote the concept of Yugoslavism; instead, it resulted in a challenge by formalized nationalism and a loss of governmental legitimacy.

DISINTEGRATION

The first post-Tito congress met on June 26, 1982. It was divided over the issues of economic deterioration, Serbian-Albanian problems in Kosovo, growing nationalism, and the erosion of public confidence in the party. The divisions between the centralists and the nationalistic confederalists caused the primary problems in the congress. As the differences reached their peak, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences delivered its famous address that declared the Serbs to be an oppressed minority in Yugoslavia in 1986. The address focused national attention to the regional and ethno-nationalist divisions that divided the troubled state. Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic then entered the political fray with a clear nationalist platform. Milosevic gained power rapidly after his 1989 address in Kosovo that denounced ethnic suppression of minority Serbs in Kosovo, charging that the party and Serbia had abandoned them and that the Serbs had to be returned to their "rightful place."⁴⁰ He called for renewed Serbian control and authority over the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In effect he exploited a "backlash of Serbian nationalism in order to build cross-regional alliances of ethnic Serbs."⁴¹ After building great popular appeal in just two years, he gained control of the

Serbian Communist Party and gained the support of the Yugoslav Army that sought to preserve the central charter of the state. He then politically captured control of the governments of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina and eliminated the constitutional provisions allowing the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Milosevic sought to reverse the federalist/decentralizing impact of Tito's legacy by coalescing Yugoslavia into one dominant rule, led by the Serbs.

The results of Milosevic's maneuvers were disastrous. His use of the army to occupy Kosovo in 1990 established the army as a functionary for Serbian purpose. He retained the votes of Kosovo and Vojvodina in the collective Presidency, giving Serbia an overwhelming influence in the body.⁴² This made him a Serbian political hero by restoring the political balance of power to pre-1974 Constitution. Next, he sought to unify Yugoslavia after a two-decade disintegration and restore the 1960s style economic practices that had resulted in Yugoslavia's greatest period of prosperity. His "Milosevic Commission" proposed a series of constitutional revisions that were essentially centralist in nature.

The wars of Balkan secession that followed Milosevic's rise to power were not rooted in ancient hatreds. The wars were based upon three pillars. The first was a fear of Milosevic's rise to power and a Greater Serbian state, which meant yet another subjugation of the other Yugoslav nationalities. The second was exploitation of nationalist fears by leaders like Milosevic and Tudjman and Izbetgovic who used these fears as both elements and instruments of power. These fears, not hatred, stemmed from the attempted ethnic exterminations during World War II and had not been reconciled during Tito's period of ethnic manipulation. Finally, the war was fueled by external and internal psychological exploitation of a citizenry that was receptive to information operations. After "decades of brainwashing, a civil society and political ideological void caused by the collapse of Communism determined conditions for the instrumental use of the past."⁴³

In response to Milosevic's occupation of Kosovo and political moves, Slovenia instituted internal constitutional reforms that asserted its right to secede, the exclusive right to declare a state of emergency, and the exclusive right to authorize military presence within its borders. The communist Collective State Presidency (controlled by the Serbs) declared the Slovene action unconstitutional. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia then held elections that resulted in non-communist governments in their own republics.⁴⁴ Yugoslavia was effectively fractured and had disintegrated to a point of improbable peaceful reunion.

The republics scrambled for a solution. Milosevic's centrist demands and his obvious desire to create a historical "Greater Serbia," and to find a way to retain the troubled union was caught between the conflicting demands of centralization and decentralization. When Milosevic

did not budge, Slovenia and Croatia declared that if no inter-republic agreement were reached by June 26, 1991, they would secede from the federation. On June 27, 1991, "Yugoslav Army" tanks invaded Slovenia, marking the beginning of the "Ten-Day War." Slovenian recognition followed in December of the same year. The third and last Yugoslavia was finished.

Croatia's pending secession further accelerated the war. Consistent with the Balkans form of localization, the Serbian Krajina and Eastern Slavonia declared that they would remain with Yugoslavia if Croatia left. Tudjman's new "nationalist administration," irresponsibly executed discriminatory and violent actions against the Serbian minority.⁴⁵ The Serbian response in Krajina and Slavonia was to expel many Croats from the region. Tudjman's Croatian military responded in turn with a brutal campaign of retribution and ethnic subjugation by force. This tragic turn of events supported Balkan nationalist fear-mongering. No future was attributed to life as a minority in an ethnic state. Milosevic's Serbs saw the Croatian punishment of Krajina-Serbs as a precursor for the Serbs living in Bosnia and began an all-out war in Croatia to retain Croatia under the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Republic. Although the Croats retook the Krajina and ethnically cleansed it after a five-year struggle in August 1995, Milosevic's power and role as champion in the fight for the struggle of the Serbs was further reinforced.

Bosnia's referendum to leave Yugoslavia continued the momentum of the fight. The Bosnian-Serbs, comprising nearly 38% of Bosnia boycotted the referendum vote. The Bosnian-Croats, comprising 18% of the population, chose secession over Yugoslav governance. But it was more than just Yugoslav governance. Shortly thereafter, the Bosnian Croats announced an aspiration to break away from Bosnia and rejoin the territories and peoples of Herzeg-Bosnia with Croatia. The Bosnian Muslims, 44% of the population, voted for an independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnia Serbs witnessed what had happened to the Serbs in Croatia and Karadic's nationalists hyper-accentuated World War II memories of Muslim-executed Ustasha crimes. Bosnian Serbs, "fearing to be cut off from Yugoslavia, and sensing another distorted echo of the Second World War," left Bosnia and declared their own republic -- the Republika Srpska.⁴⁶ The Bosnian Serbs were geographically dispersed with no contiguous territory but controlled most of the remaining federal army in Bosnia. The Balkan model was invoked, separation by force. The Serbs began a policy of ethnic cleansing, a policy that from a Serbian perspective was to achieve ethnic separation; to the West and the Muslims this practice was described as ethnic cleansing with a goal of genocide.

The Bosnian war presented opportunity for resolution. But this was rapidly forfeited in the wake of escalating western awareness and cries to do something. All three entities committed

atrocities; the Bosnian-Serbs the most public. The nature, causes, and solutions to the war were lost through the leap to define, vilify, and destroy an enemy. Exposure of growing Croatian atrocities threatened Croatian internal legitimacy and Tudjman had to find a compromise position before he lost public support. The creation of a Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation and the Washington Agreement traded territorial integrity and the conditions for war termination for a flawed peace. Washington pressured the Croats to surrender their claim to territory in Bosnia in exchange for recognition of Croatia's territorial integrity and denial of Serbian Krajina claims in Croatia. Croatia was further pressured with the threat of sharing Serbia's fate of isolation. The Croats joined, and a seemingly convenient cause and solution were offered.

INTERVENTION

On 11 April 1994, a US Marine F-18 Fighter (flying under a NATO flag under UN authority), conducted a battlefield air interdiction mission against Serbian ground forces outside Gorazde, Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the third use of US force against Serbs in the Bosnian conflict. The immediate reaction to this action was a breakdown in the peace talks, a blockade of UN relief efforts, and strong Serbian and Russian protests. This military intervention occurred after extensive deliberation, delay, and debate over the issues of humanitarian intervention, sovereignty, and interests. UNSC Resolution 836 passed in June 1993 affirmed the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared alarm over "serious violations of international humanitarian law," declared "any taking of force" as unlawful, and authorized United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) use of force to protect the integrity of UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) within Bosnia.⁴⁷ UNSC Resolution 942 later affirmed "the territorial integrity of all the States there within their internationally recognized boundaries," while at the same time isolated and imposed sanctions upon Bosnian Serb economic and political interests within a "proposed territorial settlement" for the Bosnian parties within the same framework.⁴⁸ On November 19, 1994 the UN Security Council authorized NATO warplanes to strike targets in Croatia used by Serbs to launch air attacks against UN designated safe areas in neighboring Bosnia. After continued UN and NATO military intervention, the Serbian loss of the Krajina to the Croats in August 1995, and the tenuous advantage of unpredictable military gains at horrendous civilian costs, the Bosnian parties were coerced into agreeing to the Dayton Peace plan that effectively terminated the military conflict and split the ethnic entities along a Zone of Separation. After extensive last hour negotiations, all parties reluctantly signed at the Paris Peace Conference of the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14 December 1995. UNSC 1031 then supported the agreement and assessed that the situation "continues to constitute a

threat to international peace and stability.”⁴⁹ The military instrument of the Bosnian Serbs was officially defeated with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (FRY) recognition of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina that created a divided state viable only as a 20th century UN protectorate under international rule.

The NATO Implementation Forces, IFOR, executed the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. The agreement was a forced compromise at best, to some legitimizing the gains of an unjust war, to others further exacerbating the inequities that caused the war. The Dayton Agreement constituted a down payment for the price of the western goals of stability, order, and humanitarian ideal for the Balkans. No entity had exhausted its motive for war or achieved its political ends, leaving it to IFOR to lead the entities to an end state that was both undefined and undesired. A reserved commitment by the U.S. gave the entities a one-year investment in peace. The commitment, politically limited, was matched with the similar commitment by the entities--a waiting game of duplicity, delay, and posturing. The agreement formalized separation of forces and ethnic populations. The Bosnian-Serb, Bosnian-Croat, and Bosnian-Muslim military forces hesitatingly complied with the Dayton agreement. They transformed into militia armies with the nationalist mission of protecting ethnically isolated enclaves from potential retribution by opposing factions. Dayton offered a form of operational pause behind secure lines, as each entity worked to consolidate gains and posture for the next phase. The factions were comfortable with this arrangement that they had consolidated during Tito’s strategy of deep-freezing ethnic hatreds, and readily made the transition under NATO’s deep-freeze. With the warring factions’ military instruments of power temporarily frozen under the watchtowers of IFOR, focus shifted to political, economic and information instruments. Responsibility for implementing this change in priorities was shared by an uncomfortable international community represented by IFOR and the array of International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and media that occupied the Balkans.

The Muslim freedom fighters, mujahadeen, who had answered the call of Jihad in 1992 to support the Bosnian-Muslim cause, were still another problem. The military intervention had been decidedly directed against Serb aggression, defining the Bosnian-Muslims as a besieged underdog. The startling media portrayals led by the CNN champions, helped move a hesitant UN, US, and NATO into taking action. These reports portrayed a suffering Bosnian-Muslim population, under genocidal ethnic attack, overmatched by Serbian bullies. The depictions focused on sensationalized events and sacrificed objectivity and impartiality, effectively vilifying the Serbs and martyring the plight of the besieged Bosnian-Muslims. In the streets and villages of Bosnia, the people knew of the shared crimes and injustices. But the bias introduced into

justifications for intervention made impartiality difficult, with a greater demand for punitive retribution than crisis resolution. This bias masked the fact that the first external intervention in the war was not executed by either the UN or NATO. The first intervention was from Islamic freedom fighters answering the call of Jihad, invited through a massive propaganda campaign by Alia Izetbegovic, leader of the Bosnian-Muslims. These fighters, many of them Afghans, Pakistanis, Iranians, and Albanians, found themselves without a legitimate battlefield and without a home. Although Dayton required their departure from Bosnia, this was a politically sensitive issue. Some took on Bosniac citizenship, married local women, and moved into vacated Serb refugee houses, as disjointed spoils of war. But many others left for Albania where they helped train the rebels who became known as the Kosovo Liberation Army and then after Kosovo, to Macedonia.⁵⁰ They took with them the bloody form of Bosnian war to be played out against the Serbian method of violence in Kosovo and Macedonia. They did not leave as individual mercenaries; they developed loyalties and structure, and were serving a national cause. The region was haunted by Tito's fatal flaw, recognizing a religion as a nationality, and it was now incarnated in war as it had been in politics. Dayton did not treat these fighters as an entity; it was too difficult to recognize their irredentist identity not as allegiance to states, but instead to wider Islam. Recognition of this facet was politically sensitive internationally, an unfeasible debate on the UN floor. Additionally, recognition of this facet would have legitimized some of the Serbian justification for the war as defenders against Islamic invasion against Europe and would have certainly eroded European support for the intervention. Operation Deliberate Force was tidy, the West had named its Hitler, his picture taken by CNN, and termination was achievable. This approach neglected development of a strategy supported by all instruments of power and directed the conflict towards a termination solution and a forfeited resolution.

In 1998 the Balkan war turned back to its political origins in Kosovo. There, speaking from the altar of Serbian-nationalism, Milosevic revisited the Serbian cultural memory of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic, who led and lost Serbia to the Ottomans in 1389, choosing death over living as a vassal. The Serbians saw their objectives in Kosovo as liberation while the Albanians saw it as conquest. The Serbians had won back the source of their ethnic pride from the Ottomans in 1912 and worked to achieve ethnic majority, but then were ethnically cleansed in Kosovo, in the typically brutal Balkan fashion, by the Albanians under Italy in World War II.⁵¹ Yugoslavia regained Kosovo under Tito. Since then, the Kosovo Albanians have sought independence and inclusion within a greater Albania while the Serbs in Kosovo have complained of persecution

and a genocidal campaign carried from against 200,000 Serbs.⁵² Both sides' arguments have some legitimacy, the truth dependent upon which history is favored or legitimized.

The Kosovo conflict is a partial product of Tito's political method of suppressing all ethnicities by them against each other. At the state level this achieved a degree of effectiveness, but it was achieved at the cost of great inequities at the local and regional levels. It resulted in the dual problems of majority tyranny and political reciprocity. Kosovo as an autonomous province could vote against the Serbs on the Federal Presidency but Serbia had no vote on the interests of Serbs in Kosovo.⁵³

Settlement of the conflict between Serbian Security Forces and the ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was different from Bosnia, as some described as "now trying to make peace before the war has really broken out."⁵⁴ This view was misplaced. The 4th Balkan war simply had moved from Slovenia to Croatia and from Bosnia to Kosovo with many of the same actors. The KLA and Serbian forces traded territory, lives, and brutalities. Evidence that KLA killed Serb civilians in Kalecka was offset by the discovery of 40 bodes killed by Serb security forces. Two separate peace talks got the KLA to an agreement within which they believed the US promised the chance of independence.⁵⁵ In the middle of March 1999, Secretary Albright again attempted to reach a settlement at Rambouillet, France. The Serbs refused the agreement. Next, the US issued a demarche -- allow NATO into Serbia and Kosovo or face military penalty.⁵⁶ On 24 March 1999, NATO began an aerial bombardment campaign, Operation Allied Force, which lasted 78 days against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). NATO justified these actions with UNSC 1199, an earlier resolution that condemned "all acts of violence by any party," and warned of an "impending humanitarian catastrophe" which served as a "threat to peace and security in the region."⁵⁷ This resolution also reaffirmed a commitment to the interests of "the sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia while reaffirming a seemingly contradictory "enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration."⁵⁸ Even earlier, UNSC 1160 called upon the FRY to achieve a political solution, called upon the Kosovar Albanians to condemn terrorist action and pursue goals by "peaceful means only" and demanded a solution based upon the "territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the rights of the Kosovar Albanians and all who live in Kosovo."⁵⁹ The bombing "message" that NATO wanted to send was that NATO was serious this time and sought to force Milosevic to sign the agreement.

Milosevic and the KLA did sign, again not exhausted with war, or either having achieved their respective political goals. Milosevic tested the NATO message with a 40,000-soldier Serbian campaign against the KLA, with an imperious confidence after President Clinton's

address to the nation that stated “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”⁶⁰ In Kosovo, Serbian forces fought a conventional campaign that pursued forced expulsions, a technique that had much the same intended outcome as the ethnic war fought in Bosnia. During the NATO bombing of Kosovo “more than 80 percent of the entire population of Kosovo and 90 percent of Kosovar Albanians were displaced from their homes.”⁶¹ A documented 3,453 killings, “deliberate and unlawful killings of civilians – extra judicial executions – were a key part of the cleansing’ campaign.”⁶² The Kosovars, (or, in context, Muslim forces), employed the same strategy as did the Bosnian-Muslims—civilian lives for autonomy within a territory.

Frustrated, the US-led NATO campaign changed strategy and took the war beyond Kosovo’s boundaries and military combatants. NATO extended the bombing campaign to the Serbian citizenry by hitting bridges, critical civic communications, industrial factories, and buildings connected with Milosevic to include even a discotheque.⁶³ Milosevic was losing internal and external political support, but not until Russia withdrew its support did Milosevic capitulate. Serbia signed the principles for political resolution that served as foundation for UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June that granted authority for the UN Mission to Kosovo and the NATO Kosovo Security Force (KFOR).⁶⁴

KFOR faced many of the same challenges that IFOR faced in Bosnia, but its initial effectiveness was challenged by continued reprisals and ethnic violence, much more violent and visible than the aftermath of Dayton. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo had no legal or law enforcement infrastructure after the Serbs withdrew. KFOR had to assume that burden. The KLA did not achieve an independent state, and the Serbs’ fears in Kosovo were violently validated. KFOR lacked the legitimacy granted by international consensus and mandate, primarily relying instead on NATO commitment. The humanitarian legitimacy of the mission was undermined further by a growing realization that if the Serbs were most guilty prior to NATO intervention, then the KLA was certainly most guilty in the aftermath. The interests of stability were again realized through military force, but only during the short term without substantive continued intervention. The dual end states of conflict termination and stop-the-suffering did not meet the requirements of resolution. “The underlying problem is pervasive ethnic group-identity politics combined with a zero-sum game mentality. The Serbs were hardly alone in pursuing the goal of producing a larger, ethnically pure state.”⁶⁵

Since Kosovo, NATO has embarked upon a third Balkan mission--to disarm ethnic Albanian rebels in Macedonia. In this instance the UN and NATO have taken a more proactive approach. In August 2001, UNSC 1366 reaffirmed the UN role in the prevention of armed conflicts. This resolution described political, humanitarian, and moral imperatives as overriding

principles. While this resolution stresses that the essential responsibility for conflict prevention resides with national governments and that preventive strategy requires the consent and support of the Government concerned, it stresses the importance of international efforts in ensuring respect for humanitarian law.⁶⁶ UNSC 1371 reaffirms a commitment to the “sovereignty and territorial integrity the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and recognizes the Skopje Agreement to “consolidate a multi-ethnic society within its borders.”⁶⁷

From a purely military perspective, NATO intervened by increments in Bosnia after years of ethno-nationalist warfare; in Kosovo, NATO took part in the conflict; and in Macedonia, NATO hopes to intervene proactively to stop the war.⁶⁸ In Macedonia, the problem is again compounded by irredentist intervention. The ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo has been providing supplies, vehicles, arms, and soldiers to support the ethnic minority Albanians in Macedonia.⁶⁹ The premise of the NATO-supported disarmament is that the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) lay down its weapons and receive amnesty in exchange for greater political and social rights for the Albanian minority in Macedonia.⁷⁰

US STRATEGIC LESSONS

The US failed intervention in the Balkans reinforces the strategic verity of strategic direction. The US failed to define its objectives in the Balkans because it lacked coherent strategic direction. US do-something intervention neglected the root causes of the war causing full intervention with the improper means of misguided moral support. The intervention further ignored the nature of the war, causing a surrender of the impartiality requirement of the ways employed. But foremost, the end-ways-means equation of strategic success lacked the calculation of strategy. The predictable result, termination without resolution undermined western credibility while prolonging and exacerbating the humanitarian suffering that the interventions proposed to preclude.

Yugoslavia’s break-up and ethnic warfare was not a product of past hatreds or history. It’s break-up was the result of the political manipulation of its history that was supported by a village-based, nationalist-oriented culture. There is no doubt that the citizens from all nationalities and republics fought a war based upon the perception of survival and fear. Once the war started, these perceptions were justified. This war was in many ways a new war. Its sole claim to historical basis was in the unresolved grievances from World War II and its unique development of local nationalism. The western response of treating the war as one of ancient hatreds or as a post-Cold War violation of human rights ignored the basic conditions for the war and helped fuel its continuation.

The popular explanation for the Balkans is that the US repeated the same mistakes again, allowing the “tyrant” Milosevic to go from “strength to strength,” as the Macedonian Slavs employed Serbian nationalism to victimize one-third of the population.⁷¹ However satisfying the popular appeal of punishing the Balkan Bully, this moral euphoria should not allow the mistake of addressing the conflict with yet another Lebanonized framework solution. In all three phases of this new Balkan War, the US interventionist approach to peace operations has simply relocated the conflict, by not equally neutralizing all parties. The decision to choose conflict termination over conflict resolution and then assigning military forces the role to enforce an undefined resolution is as impossible as it is impractical.

The contemporary model of humanitarian intervention violates strategic development in that it forces a choice of ways and means prior to determining the ends. Additionally, determination of end states, when developed, tends to focus on the end that is achievable by the primary means used, the military in the latter decades of the 20th century. There are a lot of reasons for the military, serving as the instrument of choice—expediency, political viability, and the unprecedented overwhelming advantage that the US military enjoys to name a few. A more relevant interventionist model should require definition of end state for all elements of power balanced against ways and means. These end states must then be synchronized to ensure that they complement the national grand strategy. The alternative, like the current situation in the Balkans, is the present condition that results in conflict termination and not resolution. This causes the core issues then to migrate, mutate, camouflage, or endure forcible suppression until they emerge again in another form. Flawed intervention introduces a new form of instability that is the most dangerous and unpredictable.

The US military’s asymmetric advantage forced termination but not resolution in the Balkans. The threat to stability is now twofold. The first is from the dissatisfied entities, who must now find an asymmetric response to achieve or exhaust their core aims. The second threat is global, where disaffected minorities have now validated a method to achieve recognition, legitimacy and the right to bid for self-determination. Rather than following a model for democratic transformation, the minority rights model has become one where minority violence is more powerful than minority vote to achieve internationally enforced gain. Legitimizing self-determination initiatives is inherently destabilizing. This has greater regional instability potential than did the local conflicts in isolation. In example, the Macedonian NLA and Kosovar KLA are locally recognized as the same UCK entity, a condition that allows the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia the aspiration to form a combined state.⁷² Albanians in Macedonia number 600,000 out of Macedonia’s population of 2 million, a considerable political

force. Despite the political potential of these populations, the fact that the international community is recognizing violent bids for self-determination is destabilizing. The expedient of war and the delegitimization of minority status challenge regional order. Nationalist voices for a greater Albania affect Greece with its 400,000 ethnic Albanian minority as well as Turkey's ties with Muslim Albanians.⁷³ This logic is a conundrum that defies the realpolitik of stability and has the potential to replay in even more volatile regions like Israel and the West Bank, Indonesia, and the Caucasus. The current justification of NATO intervention for humanitarian reasons merely masks the larger contradiction.

Intervention that focuses on internal humanitarian conditions also tends to neglect external considerations and influences. This creates a legitimacy crisis for the intervening body. The KLA used routes and bases in Albania to sustain their war effort in Kosovo and then used a similar technique between Kosovo and Macedonia in a domino effect.⁷⁴ The Balkan conflict had long had an international dimension, but this was the most visible. FRY and KLA refusals to comply with NATO Security Council demands threatened the stability of Greece, Italy and Macedonia. This security threat could have invoked NATO's Article 5 that calls for the collective defense against threats to the security of the NATO members.⁷⁵ Instead NATO acquiesced allowing a UNSC determination for intervention for humanitarian reasons. This action prioritized Kosovo's internal human rights concerns over the interests of collective defense requirements. NATO's intervention could be justified as acting on behalf of the neighboring states in rectification, which is intervention that violates another state's territorial integrity to protect one's alleged interests and rights.⁷⁶ However, NATO did not intervene to stop the KLA territorial violations, instead it stated that its intent was to stop the humanitarian crisis and intervened against the Yugoslav forces. The outcome is telling. Instead of intervening under an Article 5 self-defense framework, NATO's intervention for humanitarian reasons placed precedence of individual rights over collective rights. Allowing minority bids precedence perpetually threatens stability.

What then is the solution? Some interventionists see the military as a politically acceptable solution to internal crises. This is a dangerous approach given the U.S. constitutional reservations concerning military intervention. Moreover, the military application seems to be increasingly used out of frustration or ignorance when political legitimacy cannot be achieved. Some believe that "soldiers in any internal conflict, whether in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) or counter-insurgency, can do more than stop the fighting and provide a shield behind which non-military peacemaking activities can occur."⁷⁷ The formula for military force serving as an extension of politics or policy is seemingly becoming reversed. The lack of

an executable national security strategy, or an information or economic strategy coupled with the absence of a defining grand strategy, creates a directionless intervention model that is capability defined rather than interest defined. The U.S. intervention in the Balkans was supported more by capability than interest. A prudent linkage between American values/goals and American power, rationally pursuing national interests, would allow development of strategic priorities that synchronize the elements of power.

Redefining humanitarian interests as national interests is fraught with risk. The suggestion that the solution is to meld “strategic, economic, and humanitarian interests into an effective foreign policy” merits discussion.⁷⁸ Absent a grand strategy, intervention that is based upon one element of strategy without a defined long term interest or end-state, ultimately leads the US into open-ended or irresolvable conflicts. “A human rights policy is not in itself a foreign policy; it is an important part of a foreign policy.”⁷⁹ If humanitarian interests drive strategy, then the role of a national security strategy is negated.

Some conflicts lack a contemporary solution. They are in essence unsolvable until aggravating conditions are changed. Israel, the Balkans, Somalia, and Haiti all serve as example. Premature intervention may even worsen the cost of the conflict, allowing a strategic pause for the competing entities or arresting the development of a country. Intervention that either maintains a status quo or a return to the conditions that existed prior to the onset of hostility has a predictable violent outcome. “Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement; because no path to peace is even visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies.”⁸⁰ An intervention that lacks the vision of a grand strategy may result in a stagnated condition of perpetual war. Intervention that disallows belligerents the privilege of executing the campaign by military means, simply means that they can transfer outward energy in the campaign to the political, economic, or informational spheres. But it is still war. A war of “endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention. Unlike the ancient problem of war, however, the compounding of its evils by disinterested interventions is a new malpractice that should be curtailed—war’s paradoxical logic and commitment to let it serve its sole useful function: to bring peace.”⁸¹

Western efforts to reach a political resolution for the Yugoslavian conflict failed. Premature recognition of Bosnia, and a UN stymied in Kosovo by the Chinese and Russian members of the UNSC resulted in the use of NATO force to coerce agreement in both instances. The unannounced introduction of Russian peacekeeping forces resulted in a peace

settlement for Bosnia, setting the conditions for a negotiated agreement among Bosnian Croats and Muslims. Russian peacekeeping forces led the way again in Kosovo. Peace occurred only after the international community, (having failed in economic, political, and diplomatic attempts), developed the resolve to define, isolate, and convict the Serbs, allowing the application of directed military power.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Peace, when accomplished in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, will have been reached through military methods. For the same reasons that afflicted conflict management under Tito, this process will ultimately prove to be perishable and destabilizing. The US and the International Community must learn from the mistakes made in the process and avoid the political pitfall of the rhetoric of success. Many hail the intervention as having rewritten peacekeeping after the failure in Somalia, revitalizing the UN, and as saving NATO. These descriptions belie the greater lessons learned and their recommendation for the future.

The US as sole superpower must lead the effort to redress intervention. First, the US must develop a National Security Strategy and supporting National Military Strategy that are based upon clearly defined interests. Definition of interests is tantamount to a declaration of pursuit of interests and effects credibility, capability, and strategic direction. These interests must be realistic, limited to those that are achievable and sustainable within US capabilities and supported by the intangibles of national will and culture. Interests require resolution to avoid contradiction and opportunistic interpretation. These interests should be limited to survival, stability, and prosperity. Humanitarian concerns should be recognized as values but not interests. Second, the US must avoid the quagmire of the defacto legitimization of self-determination. The US must establish a framework to review peaceful bids for self-determination. Statehood gained by conflict should be inherently denied. The US should lead development of a UN body that reviews petitions for statehood and proscribes an implementation plan and guidelines. The plan should be based upon consent with the unanimous support of the UNSC. This process should reverse the contemporary peace formula by negotiating peace-agreements prior to conflict. The purpose of this measure is to deny war as a valid method to achieve nationalist political ambition and the destabilizing prospect of international fragmentation. The US must recognize the conflicting azimuths of globalization and further nationalist segregation achieved through self-determination. The creation of unviable or illegitimate states should not be allowed. Post-conflict agreements are settlements of war and should be treated as such. Third, US military intervention must serve as an

extension of policy and not a reflection of capability. The trap of “do-something” intervention is that of reaction to the public mood that is an inherently and necessarily volatile element in a democracy. This type of intervention is not balanced, lacking the constrained and stabilizing inefficient processes of democracy. The media is not a new phenomena but substantive political response to the media is. This drift has induced international risk and reduced internal political legitimacies. The distinction between federalism and absolute democracy is measured between representation and reflection. To confuse the US premise of government by committing to war based upon the latter is fallacious. War is both a promiscuous ogre that escapes rational determination and a captive of the interplay between policy and military activity. Modern war must fulfill its role as a symbiotic extension of policy. Policy and war are linked but not synonymous. War can define the limits, effectiveness, and outcome of policy; policy can define the objectives of war, distribute means, and bind the ways of war. If war neglects the objectives of policy, or if policy neglects clarity, then both fail. The US policy process balances the remarkable trinity, reflecting the aspects of state, people, and military while attempting to hold captive irrational emotionalism and chance. Passion blinds recognition of the status and ambitions of other societies. The US must regain a policy based approach in order to achieve stability through consistent leadership.

Under the banner of human rights, the US, UN, and NATO opted to deny the Former Republic of Yugoslavia the sovereignty to shape its own political destiny. In Kosovo, the international community chose conflict termination at the expense of developing a lasting resolution for the Balkans as a whole. With no solution, the conflict continues in an environment where determination by force seems to be the only logic. The implications of opting for peace-making and enforcement rather than that of setting the conditions for internal transformation are precursors for future legitimacy crises, unsuitable government structures, and a citizenry fragmented along the lines of hatred associated with ethnocentrist-nationalism. "Self-determination, in fact, was given more attention than long-term survivability," leaving the fate of questionable and dependent future structures in the region predictably unstable.⁸² States that recognize challenged or failing states win an undesirable responsibility. The must maintain international welfare states to achieve the same stability that the status quo previously afforded. This is a new form of welfare imperialism.

Unfortunately, there are no obvious patterns or consistency in the application of rules and criteria established by the international community for conflict resolution, especially concerning the fundamental question of legitimacy. The rules for democracy must be universally applicable. "If you are to have a democracy, it must be based on the rule of law, not people.

Everyone must follow the same rules--rules that can only be changed or modified through the legal, governmental system."⁸³ For democracies, this means laws determined by representative government.

Democracy assumes that what unites us as human beings is more important than what divides us.... In a world of true democracies, there would be no need for national self-determination, since every human being's inalienable rights would be protected everywhere... Nationalism, on the other hand, operates on the notion that what divides us is more important than what unites us; otherwise, why is it necessary to have different states to protect different groups?⁸⁴

The conflicting goals of integration and popular sovereignty conflict at this juncture. Democracy involves a constant validation and questioning of sovereignty. If the results of this validation process are negative, then a popular transformation must occur, or else a legitimacy crisis develops. This process was not resolved in Yugoslavia. In the Bosnian instance, the international community applied pressure to conduct a premature referendum on self-determination. In Kosovo, the community granted unearned legitimacy to the KLA, subjugating the interests of the internationally recognized government. At no point, discounting international coercion and pressure, did it appear that the people of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia legitimized the ethno-nationalist groups that vied for power within the region. The bids for self-determination and recognition did not provide a popular legitimate alternative to the existing structure precisely because of the unresolved problems of borders, nationalism, and historic grievances. The new states did in fact protect different groups, but not all groups, suggesting that the proposals were still immature. International recognition provided some form of external legitimacy to the collectives, but certainly not internal legitimacy. Rather than averting war, the international community ignited a war in which the newly created minorities were forced to fight a new structure to redress their still unresolved grievances. This outcome was certainly predictable.

The lessons for the international community are many. First, no nation is willing to cede its sovereignty in favor of international dictates. Military force should be used to protect sovereignty; i.e., it should be applied to contain legitimate internal conflicts from spreading in the form of irredentist movements or to prevent external response or interference. Second, the citizenries who ultimately grant that sovereignty must achieve solutions concerning sovereignty. Third, recognition must be understood for its importance and the responsibilities that it incurs. One principle, either self-determination or sovereignty, must be accorded dominance over the other.

The current environment that allows open-ended qualifications for sovereignty is destabilizing. Too many self-proclaimed groups can pursue too many detrimental options under the current parameters. The international community cannot maintain parameters that allow the break-up of legitimate states or impede the natural internal conflict created by democratic transformation without providing adequate alternatives. "The breakup of one system without its replacement by another invariably generates indecision and possibilities for uncritical extremism."⁸⁵ The experience of the American Civil War, civil rights movements, Vietnam protests, and even the Los Angeles riots demonstrate that democracy is always contested and rarely sterile.

The international community must recognize that the subtle victories obtained through means other than war are more resilient, stabilizing, and consistent. Civil war is often a necessary evil of democratic maturation and must be allowed definition with the other-than-war category. Externally, intervention, in whatever form, must be treated as it is perceived internally, as war. Once the military element is introduced to conflict, neutrality and objectivity are sacrificed until the designated opponent is rendered ineffective. Victory in war is only accomplished by one side imposing its will on the other side. This is not a democratic concept. It does not reduce the will to survive or mitigate the primordial desire for revenge.

CONCLUSION

The tragedy of Yugoslavia continues unresolved. Bloodshed was probably inevitable due to the unresolved grievances and structural shortcomings of the Tito legacy. It certainly could have been contained, maintaining the potential for a stable end-state, once the people grew tired of the conflict and recognized the value of accommodation over civil war and prosperity over ruin. Yugoslavia has never been left to determine its own destiny and at some point must resolve its unanswered grievances.

Wars are fought primarily over interests, ideas, or insanity. These wars can be resolved only when interests are either satisfied or recognizably forfeit, the validity of ideas proven valid or invalid; or, and most demanding, insanity is exhausted and surrenders to logic. Generally states fight wars of interests, people fight wars of ideas, and both fight wars of insanity. The wars of Balkan secession were initiated by the interests of power held by only a few. Once started, the war became one of fear and an insane paranoia. The nationalist leaders were captive to their ideological basis and started a war that once initiated required resolution. The wars ended when the leaders recognized the culminating points for interest achievement based

upon international intervention. But the futility of nationalism and the ideal of ethnic separation were not proven to the people, the war had not been fought to that point of exhaustion.

WORD COUNT = 11,700

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Tim Judah, The Serbs. History, Myth & Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), 29-30.
- ² Stevan K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1988), 1.
- ³ Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country (London: Harvard University Press, 1991), 181.
- ⁴ John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), 6.
- ⁵ Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 161.
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ Ivo Andric, The Bridge on the Drina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 2.
- ⁸ Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 7.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Misha Glenny, The Balkans, (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 9.
- ¹¹ Cviic, 5.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 7.
- ¹⁵ Misha Glenny, The Balkans, XXVI.
- ¹⁶ Misha Glenny, The Balkans, 7.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, 7-9.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 9.
- ¹⁹ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "Debates-Yugoslavia: The Failure of a Success," Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 1, no. 2 (1999): 164.
- ²⁰ Misha Glenny, The Balkans, 9.
- ²¹ Ibid., 13.
- ²² Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 14.

- ²³ Dragnich, 23.
- ²⁴ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1988), 68.
- ²⁵ Dragnich, 74.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy (Summer 1993): 10.
- ²⁸ Dragnich, 17.
- ²⁹ Military History Institute, German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944), CMH Publication 104-18; available from <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/antiquer-ops/AG-BALKAN.HTM>>; Internet; accessed 02 February 2002.
- ³⁰ William T. Johnsen, Deciphering The Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 20.
- ³¹ Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," 10.
- ³² Dragnich, 103.
- ³³ Military History Institute, German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944), CMH Publication 104-18; available from <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/antiquer-ops/AG-BALKAN.HTM>>; Internet; accessed 02 February 2002.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ Dragnich, 112.
- ³⁷ Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 147.
- ³⁸ Djilas, 161-163.
- ³⁹ Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 214.
- ⁴⁰ Johnsen, 54.
- ⁴¹ Ramet, 52.
- ⁴² Johnsen, 55.
- ⁴³ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "Debates-Yugoslavia: The Failure of a Success," 164.
- ⁴⁴ Johnsen, 55.

⁴⁵ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "Debates-Yugoslavia: The Failure of a Success," 165.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁴⁷ United Nations Security Council, UNSC RES 836; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/836e.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2001.

⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, UNSC RES 942, 23 Sept 1994; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/sres9437272e.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2001.

⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council, UNSC RES 1031, 15 December 1995; Internet; available from <www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/9540526e.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2001.

⁵⁰ Marlise Simmons, "Trial Offers Look at Secretive Warriors in Bosnia," The New York Times, 02 September 2001, sec 6, p.1.

⁵¹ Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Road to War," Survival, Summer 1999; available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pgdweb?Did=0000000416811594&Fmt=3&Deli=1&mtd=1&ldx=3>>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2001.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Gabriel Schoenfeld, "Lessons of Kosovo," Commentary 112, (September 2001), 57.

⁵⁷ United Nations Security Council, UNSC RES 1199, 23 Sept 1998; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1199.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2001.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ United Nations Security Council, UNSC RES 1160, 31 March 1998; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1160.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2001.

⁶⁰ Schoenfeld, 58.

⁶¹ Kenneth Roth, Under Orders War Crimes in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), 4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 6-7.

⁶³ Schoenfeld, 58.

⁶⁴ Patrick Egan, "The Kosovo Intervention and Collective Self-Defence," International Peacekeeping, 3 (Autumn 2001): 40.

⁶⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Woodrow Wilson, R.I.P.," Reason 6, vol. 33 (Nov 2001): 57.

⁶⁶ United Nations Security Council, UNSC RES 1366, 30 August 2001; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1366e.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2001.

⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council, UNSC RES 1371, 26 September 2001; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1371e.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 10 November 2001.

⁶⁸ Peter Ford, "NATO Agrees to a Third Operation in the Balkans Yesterday, NATO Leaders Began to Dispatch 3500 Troops to Macedonia to Disarm Rebels," Christian Science Monitor, 23 August, 2001, 7.

⁶⁹ Alissa J. Rubin, "The World: Steps Towards Peace in Macedonia; U.S. Patrols Smuggling Routes to Macedonia; Balkans: American Peacekeepers in Kosovo Intercept Weapons on Way to Rebels," The Los Angeles Times, 20 August, 2001, sec. A, p.1.

⁷⁰ Ford, 7.

⁷¹ Louise Branson, "Balkan Require U.S. – European Resolve, Unity," USA Today, 16 August 2001, sec. A., p. 15.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Matthew Kaminski, "NATO Settles into the Balkan Hot Seat -- Macedonia Deal Done, Forces Must Make it Happen on the Ground," Wall Street Journal, 15 August 2001, sec. A., p. 11.

⁷⁴ Egan, 46.

⁷⁵ Egan, 51.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Alice Hills, "The Inherent Limits of Military Force in Policing Peace Operations," International Peacekeeping 3 (Autumn 2001): 94.

⁷⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Redefining the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 4, vol. 78 (Jul/Aug 1999): 35.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 31.

⁸⁰ Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," Foreign Affairs 4, Vol 78 (July/August 1999): 37.

⁸¹ Luttwak, 44.

⁸² Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy (Winter 1992-1993): 4.

⁸³ Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy (Summer 1993): 22.

⁸⁴ Stanley Kober, "Revolutions Gone Bad," Foreign Policy (Summer 1993): 72.

⁸⁵ Ivan Siber, "The Impact of Nationalism, Values, and Ideological Orientation on Multi-Party Elections in Croatia," The Tragedy of Yugoslavia, ed. Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 160.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andric, Ivo. *The Bridge on the Drina*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- Banac, Ivo. "The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise." *Daedalus* (Spring 1992): 141-174.
- Bilandzic, Dusan. *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*. by Sabrina P. Ramet. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Blank, Stephen J., William T. Johnsen, and Earl H. Tilford, Jr. *U.S. Policy in the Balkans: A Hobson's Choice*, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.
- Branson, Louise. "Balkan Require U.S. – European Resolve, Unity." *USA Today*, 16 August 2001, sec. A., p. 15.
- Carpenter, Ted Galen. "Woodrow Wilson, R.I.P." *Reason* 6, vol. 33 (November 2001): 55-58.
- Cohen, Leonard J. *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993.
- Cviic, Christopher. *Remaking the Balkans*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991.
- Djilas, Aleksa. *The Contested Country*. London: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Doder, Dusko. "How We Made the Balkans." *The Nation* (12 June 2000): 31-38.
- Doder, Dusko. "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds." *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1993): 3-23.
- Dragnich, Alex N. *Serbs and Croats*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992.
- Egan, Patrick. "The Kosovo Intervention and Collective Self-Defence." *International Peacekeeping* 3 (Autumn 2001): 39-58.
- Ford, Peter. "NATO Agrees to a Third Operation in the Balkans Yesterday, NATO Leaders Began to Dispatch 3500 Troops to Macedonia to Disarm Rebels." *Christian Science Monitor* (23 August 2001): 7.
- Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans*. New York: Penguin Books, 2000.
- Glenny, Misha. *The Fall of Yugoslavia*. New York: Penguin Books, 1992.
- Hayes, Carlton J. H. *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*. By William T. Johnsen. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.
- Helman, Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner. "Saving Failed States." *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1992-1993): 3-20.
- Hills, Alice. "The Inherent Limits of Military Force in Policing Peace Operations." *International Peacekeeping* 3 (Autumn 2001): 79-98.

- Johnsen, William T. *Deciphering The Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.
- Judah, Tim. "Kosovo's Road to War." *Survival* Summer 1999. Available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?Did=0000000416811594&Fmt=3&Deli=1&mtd=1&idx=3>>. Internet. Accessed 25 November 2001.
- Judah, Tim. *The Serbs. History, Myth & Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Kaminski, Matthew. "NATO Settles into the Balkan Hot Seat -- Macedonia Deal Done, Forces Must Make it Happen on the Ground." *Wall Street Journal*, 15 August 2001, sec. A., p. 11.
- Kober, Stanley. "Revolutions Gone Bad." *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1993): 63-83.
- Luttwak, Edward N. "Give War a Chance." *Foreign Affairs* 4, Vol. 78 (July/August 1999): 36-44.
- Military History Institute. *German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)*. CMH Publication 104-18. Available from <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/antiguerr-ops/AG-BALKAN.HTM>. Accessed 02 February 2002.
- Nye, Joseph S. "Redefining the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs* 4, Vol. 78 (Jul/Aug 1999): 22-35.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. "Debates-Yugoslavia: The Failure of a Success," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 1, no. 2 (1999): 163-170.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. *The Improbable Survivor*. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1988.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Roth, Kenneth. *Under Orders War Crimes in Kosovo*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001.
- Rubin, Alissa J. " The World: Steps Towards Peace in Macedonia; U.S. Patrols Smuggling Routes to Macedonia; Balkans: American Peacekeepers in Kosovo Intercept Weapons on Way to Rebels." *The Los Angeles Times*, 20 August 2001, sec. A, p.1.
- Schoenfeld, Gabriel. "Lessons of Kosovo," *Commentary* 112 (September 2001): 56-61.
- Siber, Ivan. "The Impact of Nationalism, Values, and Ideological Orientation on Multi-Party Elections in Croatia." In *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia*, ed. Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, 141-172. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992.
- Simmons, Marlise. "Trial Offers Look at Secretive Warriors in Bosnia." *The New York Times*, 02 September 2001, sec 6, p.1.
- United Nations Security Council. *UNSC RES 836*. Available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/836e.pdf>>. Internet. Accessed 10 November 2001.

United Nations Security Council. UNSC RES 942. 23 Sept 1994. Available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/sres9437272e.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 10 November 2001.

United Nations Security Council. UNSC RES 1031. 15 December 1995. Available from www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/9540526e.htm. Internet. Accessed 10 November 2001.

United Nations Security Council. UNSC RES 1160 31 March 1998. Available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1160.htm>. Internet. Accessed 10 November 2001.

United Nations Security Council. UNSC RES 1199. 23 Sept 1998. Available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1199.htm>. Internet. Accessed 10 November 2001.

United Nations Security Council. UNSC RES 1366. 30 August 2001. Available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1366e.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 10 November 2001.

Zametica, John. The Yugoslav Conflict. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992.