Peacekeeping Training in the Army National Guard

A Monograph
by
MAJ Angela D. Ewing
U.S. Army Reserve
18 March 2004

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
AY 03-04

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
Title of Monograph: Peacekeeping Training in the Army National Guard

Approved by:

_____________________________  Monograph Director
John M. Metz, LTC, IN

_____________________________  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

_____________________________  Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Abstract

PEACEKEEPING TRAINING IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD by MAJ Angela D. Ewing, U.S. Army Reserve (AGR), 60 pages.

Should all of the Army National Guard’s divisions include peacekeeping tasks in their Mission Essential Task Lists (METL)? Most ARNG units focus their training efforts on traditional combat arms tasks, and only after they receive a peacekeeping mission do they execute pre-deployment PKO proficiency training. Following the model of alert-train-deploy rather than train-alert-deploy places additional stress not only on the deploying unit, but also on external units that are assisting with the mobilization process. FM 7-0, Training the Force, dictates that Army units use the train-alert-deploy model.

Arguments against the research question include issues related to lack of training time, a required change in culture to deal with a more restrictive set of rules of engagement (ROE), and little information on which theater of operations the unit should focus. Arguments supporting peacekeeping METL tasks in the Guard are many. The ARNG mission statement and posture statement address peace operations. The QDR requires all units to operate in a full-spectrum environment. Guard units that routinely train in PKO may alleviate the four to six week train-up requirement at the mobilization station. Evidence shows that the likelihood of the ARNG continuing to participate in smaller-scale contingency operations is very high. Several lessons learned documents from PKO missions state that units’ METL should include peacekeeping tasks. The arguments do not address retention, equipment, or force structure.

This study evaluates the arguments for and against the research question by using the criteria of readiness, compliance with Federal directives, and legitimacy. Divisions that regularly train on PKO tasks will sustain the unit’s PKO support. Increased proficiency at home station improves readiness. If readiness is better, then the primary research question is supported. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) dictates that the Army maintain the ability of operating in a full-spectrum environment (from smaller-scale contingencies, or SSCs, to large-scale combat operations); consequently, peacekeeping training in the ARNG should help satisfy this requirement. If units comply with Federal directives, then the primary research question is supported. FM 3-0, Operations, states that in order to achieve objectives, Army forces conducting PKO rely on legitimacy. The legitimacy envisioned by the sponsoring state, nations or international organization is critical to operational success. If legitimacy is better, then the primary research question is supported.

The study concludes that ARNG divisions should include peacekeeping tasks in their METL. Recommendations include updating Army peace operations doctrine with new FMs, MTPs and POIs. The new PKSOI at the Army War College may also play a larger role in PKO training. The ARNG conducts annual required briefings such as equal opportunity and sexual harassment awareness. If the Army were to reduce this requirement, the ARNG would have additional time for operational training. ARNG divisions should be required to include an overarching peacekeeping task in their METL, so that their subordinate units may plan their METL and battle tasks around that. Over time, when the doctrine is updated, and the divisions include peacekeeping tasks in their METL, the units will receive the funding, equipment and infrastructure necessary in order to properly train for PKO. In terms of peacekeeping missions, ARNG units are then able to practice the train-alert-deploy model, in accordance with FM 7-0.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................................. 6
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 6
Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 8

Criteria ............................................................................................................................... 10
Scope and Limitations ....................................................................................................... 13

Arguments Against the Research Question ................................................................. 14
Arguments Supporting the Research Question .............................................................. 14
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 15

CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................................. 17
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL SETTING ................................................................. 17
Definition of Peacekeeping and the U.S. Role in PKO Missions ........................................ 18

Bosnia-Stabilization Force (SFOR) ................................................................................... 20
Multinational Force Observers (MFO) # 43 – The Sinai Peninsula .................................. 24

PKO Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) ......................................................... 25
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 26

CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................................. 28
TRAINING DOCTRINE VERSUS REALITY ................................................................. 28

What Does the Doctrine Say? ............................................................................................ 30

How ARNG Divisions Conduct PKO Training Today ....................................................... 35

29th Infantry Division (Light) (Virginia ARNG) ............................................................. 35

38th Infantry Division (M) (Indiana ARNG) ................................................................. 36

34th Infantry Division (M) (Minnesota ARNG) ............................................................. 36

40th Infantry Division (M) (California ARNG) ............................................................. 37

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 38

CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................... 40
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................. 40

Arguments Against the Research Question ................................................................. 42
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Should all of the Army National Guard’s (ARNG) divisions include peacekeeping tasks in their mission essential task list (METL)? The purpose of this study is to answer this primary research question by analyzing arguments for and against it, using three criteria: readiness, compliance with federal directives, and legitimacy.

Why is this question relevant today? Based on current mission requirements, it looks like the U.S. government will continue to task the Army National Guard to perform peacekeeping operations (PKO). Recent examples include military peacekeeping missions to Mozambique, Somalia, Guatemala, Haiti, East Timor, and Croatia. Currently, U.S. personnel are participating in PKO in Kosovo, Bosnia, Jerusalem, the Sinai, Georgia, and Ethiopia. As some of these missions have no foreseeable end, the ARNG can reasonably expect that the requirement for providing soldiers that are trained in peacekeeping to continue, or even to increase. One problem facing the ARNG divisions is development of a systemic manner to approach PKO preparation. Adding PKO tasks to the ARNG METL, would mitigate the current model whereby PKO preparation is executed in an ad hoc fashion, immediately prior to the deployment.

---

1 A typical ARNG division is comprised of three light, mechanized and/or armored brigades, an aviation brigade, a DIVARTY, DISCOM, an engineer brigade, and other various combat support assets, including intelligence, air defense, signal, military police, chemical, and a band.

The question is relevant, because currently, the ARNG divisions’ PKO training system potentially violates Army doctrine as assessed by the previously stated three criteria.

This study explores the potential inconsistencies existing in the current U.S. Army doctrine associated with Reserve Component\(^3\) training and peacekeeping operations. For example, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, \textit{Operations}, states that all units will prepare to perform in a full-spectrum environment.\(^4\) Likewise, FM 7-0, \textit{Training the Force}, states that inputs to METL development include wartime operational plans, enduring combat capabilities, operational environment, directed mission, and external guidance.\(^5\) When a unit commander faces a directed peacekeeping mission, for example, he must perform a mission analysis, and change his METL to reflect the new tasks.\(^6\) Conversely, FM 100-23, \textit{Peace Operations}, an older field manual, states that units not add peacekeeping tasks to their METL.\(^7\) Outdated Mission Training Plans (MTPs) also continue to focus on tasks other than peacekeeping, making it difficult to assess a unit in PKO tasks. An example is the MTP for the FBCB2-Equipped Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company.\(^8\) The next section on methodology addresses in greater detail how the three criteria are used to analyze the arguments.

---

\(^3\) The term “Reserve Component” in this study refers to both the Reserves and the National Guard.
\(^5\) FM 7-0, \textit{Training the Force}, Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2002, para. 3-3.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) FM 100-23, \textit{Peace Operations}, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994, p. 86.
\(^8\) Mission Training Plan for the FBCB2-Equipped Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company/Team Post Limited User Test #1, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1998, page 5-1.
Methodology

At first glance, answering the research question with a “yes” or “no” seems simple. However, the answer is likely based upon one’s individual experience alone. To expand upon this, answers to several secondary questions provide a common framework for discussion. Intellectual arguments, which support and oppose the idea of adding PKO tasks to ARNG mission essential task lists, include various issues which experience may not. The criteria of readiness, compliance with Federal directives, and legitimacy, offer a method for comparing arguments, and determining what the answers are, and why. The scope and limitations section focuses the study on specific, established questions, and outlines what areas are not addressed.

Should all ARNG divisions add PKO tasks to their METL? Before hastily attempting to answer this question, one must understand the definition of peacekeeping. The understanding of this definition helps focus the study, and prevents it from addressing unrelated, albeit similar tasks, such as peace enforcement operations (PEO). The first section of Chapter Two discusses the definition of peacekeeping as written in U.S. Army doctrine.

If the ARNG continues to perform PKO worldwide, perhaps consistent PKO training deserves greater attention. Conversely, if the role of the U.S. in PKO were negligible, there would exist no need for PKO training in ARNG divisions. The role of the U.S. in PKO changes, depending upon the priority that the current U.S. administration gives it. Chapter One discusses issues related to the role of the U.S. in PKO, and why this is important to the question of adding PKO tasks to the ARNG divisions’ METL.

Chapter Two provides a common basis for discussion by providing a definition of peacekeeping. The chapter then alludes to how units performed PKO in Bosnia and in the Sinai Peninsula, and how PKO impacted unit readiness in terms of their traditional combat arms roles. Because the Army does not have MTPs, which specifically offer PKO tasks, one unit published
its own set of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for PKO in Bosnia. Chapter Two reveals how doctrine, training and readiness in terms of PKO are not in congruence.

Mission statements broadly determine how the unit conducts training. Some ARNG division mission statements include PKO, but most do not. Consequently, most ARNG division commanders are not required to train on PKO tasks, until they receive a PKO mission. If ARNG mission statements do not specifically include PKO, then it is unlikely that the unit’s METL includes PKO tasks. Chapter Three examines the current mission statements for the ARNG divisions.

Are ARNG units permitted, by Army doctrine, to add PKO tasks to their METL? If so, what types of tasks are involved, and what is the level of difficulty? If not, why not? Should something change? Chapter Three also addresses the doctrinal framework for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping doctrine provides guidance on the types of tasks that units must master in a PKO environment. However, as this study illustrates, the doctrine is lacking in detail. For example, few MTPs on PKO exist. This means that units have little impetus to train on PKO tasks, because little standardized guidance exists on specific PKO tasks. However, this changes when the unit receives a PKO mission. Suddenly, the unit is training for a PKO at a mobilization station for perhaps six weeks prior to deployment. This and other doctrinal problems are addressed in Chapter Three.

9 U.S. Army Field Manuals (FMs) provide broad guidance on PKO tasks. Mission training plans (MTPs), which provide task, condition and standards, do not exist for PKO. Units are evaluated based upon the appropriate MTPs, which support their METL. Even if the METL includes a PKO task, it may be difficult to train and evaluate it, because the MTP does not exist.
An understanding of the ARNG training process is crucial before attempting to determine whether or not to add PKO tasks to the METL. Chapter Three outlines the doctrinal framework for ARNG training. The doctrine explains how the METL development process impacts an ARNG unit, which is preparing for a PKO. The training doctrine also exposes the time constraints endured in the ARNG. As with peacekeeping doctrine, it is possible that ARNG training doctrine requires modifications, in order to accommodate PKO training.

If ARNG units are successfully deploying on PKO missions after receiving some form of PKO training, then perhaps adding PKO tasks to the METL is unnecessary. How do ARNG units currently train and mobilize for PKO missions? Chapter Three examines this question, and compares current practices with doctrine and projected mission requirements.

Criteria

Three criteria assess the degree of validity of the supporting and opposing arguments concerning PKO METL tasks in the ARNG’s divisions. The criteria are doctrinal concepts from Army FM 7-0 (*Training the Force*), FM 100-23 (*Peace Operations*), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Readiness

Most ARNG units continue to focus their training efforts on traditional combat arms tasks; once they receive a peacekeeping mission, only then do they attempt to train on PKO tasks. FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, dictates that Army units use the train-alert-deploy model.  

---

10 Interviews with MAJ Mark Elam, MAJ George Minde, and MAJ Charles Lawhorn, officers in the ARNG.
Following the model of alert-train-deploy rather than train-alert-deploy places additional stress not only on the deploying unit, but also on external units that are assisting with the mobilization process. Including peacekeeping METL tasks may help to reduce the mobilization time, and maintain a more ready force.

Divisions that regularly train on PKO tasks will increase the unit’s proficiency in PKO tasks all the time, not simply when alerted to perform a peacekeeping operation. Increased proficiency at home station improves readiness. If readiness is better, then the primary research question is supported. Evidence to support this criterion is primarily subjective, because most units do not yet have formal means of measuring success in PKO training, such as related METL or MTP tasks. Information on readiness comes from interviews from various personnel who have been involved in ARNG PKO training, and after action reviews.

Compliance with Federal Directives

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) dictates that the Army maintain the ability of operating in a full-spectrum environment (from smaller-scale contingencies, or SSCs, to large-scale combat operations); consistent peacekeeping training in the ARNG should help satisfy this requirement. Although ARNG units are already operating in a full-spectrum environment, PKO training remains relatively weak. Currently, the ARNG’s eight divisions are capable of

11 FM 7-0, Training the Force, Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2002, para. 3-3.
13 Interview with LTC David Sutherland. See Appendix for LTC Sutherland’s biography.
14 Interviews with officers in the ARNG are presented in subsequent chapters. Biographies are listed in the Appendix. After action reviews from the MFO and SFOR/IFOR are used to help illustrate the points. AARs are addressed in Chapter Two.
16 Ibid.
conducted the SSCs, but only after specialized training upon alert. The benchmark is yes. If compliance with Federal directives is yes, then the primary research question is supported. 

Legitimacy

According to FM 100-23, Peace Operations, legitimacy is a peacekeeping principle.\textsuperscript{17} The benchmark is yes. If legitimacy is better, then the primary research question is supported. The arguments for and against the research question are compared and analyzed using these criteria. Gaps that appear in the comparisons may be filled by changes in doctrine, training, or other areas of DTLOMS-PF (doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, soldier, personnel, facilities). The QDR carries the heaviest weight, because as a written, Federal directive, it is unlikely to significantly change soon. It also provides an overall framework in which the military services must focus their training efforts.

\textsuperscript{17} FM 100-23, Peace Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{18} FM 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 2001, para. 9-21.
\textsuperscript{19} FM 100-23, Peace Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994, p. 18.
Scope and Limitations

The research question focuses on the training ramifications for the ARNG’s divisions in terms of doctrine, directives, and resource constraints. The ARNG has eight divisions. Due to the limitations involved with obtaining robust information from all of the divisions, the study focuses primarily on the 29th ID (L) in Virginia, the 35th ID (M) in Kansas, and the 40th ID (M) in California. Information from other divisions and separate brigades is included as appropriate.

Routine PKO training at home station impacts other areas, including force structure, retention and recruiting, competing state missions, and equipment requirements. This study does not address force structure in depth, although it does mention on-going initiatives, which may impact peacekeeping training, such as the ARNG’s Redesign Study. Retention and recruiting are popular topics in terms of the U.S. Army’s role in peacekeeping. The study briefly addresses this regarding the impact that a PKO focus has on retention in the ARNG, but does not go into depth. Since 9/11, the ARNG’s role in homeland security has significantly increased. The study does not analyze the ARNG’s other missions, such as homeland security and other state missions in depth. However, it does account for the additional time that is required to accomplish competing requirements. Finally, equipment requirements differ slightly for peacekeeping operations, both in terms of home station training aids, and MTOE equipment. A new MTOE requires several years for approval. The study only briefly discusses equipment.

Interviews with MAJ Mark Elam, MAJ George Minde, and LTC Dave Sutherland. See biographies in the Appendix.

2004 National Guard Posture Statement.
Arguments Against the Research Question

Arguments against the research question address several ARNG PKO support operations. First, training a combat arms force to also be prepared to conduct PKO tasks requires a cultural shift. It may prove challenging to train combat arms soldiers to comply with a more restrictive ROE. Second, extensive PKO training may degrade a unit’s combat effectiveness. Third, time significantly impacts resourcing ARNG training. Thirty-nine days of training per year is barely sufficient to complete the plethora of tasks that the ARNG must accomplish. Fourth, most ARNG units do not have the infrastructure at home station for conducting certain peacekeeping training tasks, causing the unit to continue to employ the alert-train-deploy model. Units have little or no access to civilian role players, mock-up cities, or simulated mine fields. Finally, it may not be appropriate to add PKO tasks to a unit’s METL, when that unit does not know to which country they will deploy to perform PKO.

Arguments Supporting the Research Question

Studies, Federal directives, and lessons learned provide arguments, which support the research question. Studies reveal that training and peacekeeping doctrine should allow units officially to add PKO tasks to their METL. Written Federal directives which significantly

22 Interviews with MAJ Elam, MAJ Minde and LTC Sutherland.
24 Interviews with MAJ Minde, MAJ Elam and MAJ Lawhorn.
25 Interview with LTC Sutherland.
26 Interview with MAJ Minde.
27 Studies include two monographs written by Cabrey and Flynn, a Rand Corp study, an analysis by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, and a DoD project. Details are in Chapter 4.
impact whether or not ARNG divisions should add PKO tasks to their METL include the National Guard’s Federal mission statement, the ARNG 2004 Posture Statement, the ARNG Restructuring Initiative, and the QDR.  

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the research question, "Should all ARNG divisions add peacekeeping tasks to their METL?" The methodology used to answer this question is to compare arguments, which support and oppose the question, using three criteria: readiness, compliance with Federal directives, and legitimacy. To assist with explaining the depth of the research question, the study addresses related questions, as well. These additional areas of interest include the role of the U.S. in peacekeeping operations, PKO and training doctrine, the definition of peacekeeping, and current ARNG training practices in terms of PKO.

The five arguments opposed to the question focus on people, time, and resources available. First, training a combat arms force to also be prepared to conduct PKO tasks requires a cultural shift. Second, extensive PKO training may degrade a unit’s combat effectiveness. Third, training time significantly impacts what the ARNG does. Fourth, most ARNG units do not have the resources or infrastructure at home station for conducting certain peacekeeping tasks.


training tasks, causing the unit to continue to employ the alert-train-deploy model. Finally, it may not be appropriate to add PKO tasks to a unit’s METL, when that unit does not know to which country they will deploy to perform PKO. Chapter Four further analyzes these arguments, using the aforementioned three criteria. The next chapter discusses the definition of peacekeeping, and the U.S. role in PKO missions, based upon historical vignettes in Bosnia and the Sinai Peninsula.

---

30 Interviews with MAJ Minde, MAJ Elam and MAJ Lawhorn.
31 Interview with LTC Sutherland.
Chapter One introduced the primary research question, the methodology for the study, and the arguments for and against the research question. The strategic and operational setting in which the ARNG operates is a crucial factor in determining and prioritizing training tasks. Should the ARNG add peacekeeping tasks to the divisions’ METL? In order to gain a better understanding of the research question, the study analyzes it in parts. What is the definition of peacekeeping? Chapter Two addresses the definition of peacekeeping, to form a common basis of understanding. What is the role of the U.S. in PKO? The role of the U.S. in PKO helps to determine whether or not it is worthwhile to add PKO tasks to units' METL. Each U.S. administration has its own policy regarding U.S. involvement in PKO. Although the current administration is split on the issue, PKO remains relevant. An increased role in PKO requires that units maintain proficiency in peacekeeping tasks. What have units experienced in the past, in terms of PKO missions? Do lessons learned imply that units should add PKO tasks to the METL? After action reports and unit TTPs from PKO missions illustrate how current training practices and a lack of detailed PKO doctrine negatively impacted the level of readiness of units in Bosnia and in the Sinai. The combination of recent experience and the policy of the administration regarding PKO, implies that the role of the U.S. in PKO continues to be a priority. Because the ARNG plays a major role in PKO, it follows that, based upon the history and the U.S. policy, the ARNG’ divisions likely should add PKO tasks to their METL.

32 Interview with MAJ Minde.
Definition of Peacekeeping and the U.S. Role in PKO Missions

Establishing a common definition of peacekeeping prevents confusion and provides a common framework for discussion. The definitions of peacekeeping assist planners in determining associated requirements for PKO, including METL tasks such as setting up an observation post, basic foreign language skills, and monitoring checkpoints. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, defines peacekeeping thus:

Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.  

Armed with this definition, should the United States continue to participate in peacekeeping missions? This is, initially, a political question. As a presidential candidate, George W. Bush said, "U.S. troops should be used to fight and win wars, and peacekeeping in places like the Balkans should be left to others." One of the greatest critics of the Bosnia mission, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld considered dedicating a certain portion of America’s armed forces specifically to peacekeeping activities. However, Secretary of State Colin Powell, discussing the Balkans, reassured his NATO colleagues that “we went into this together, and we’ll come out together.”

Jack Spencer, a defense analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington, said that although this administration is split on this issue, he sees

---

33 Ibid., p. 112.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
agreement on one underlying principle. That principle recognizes the dangers of “mission-
creep” – a 16-fold increase in the number of peacekeeping missions in the past ten years, and a
resulting decrease in overall combat readiness.  

The Department of Defense made its statement about peacekeeping when it made the
decision in January of 2003 to close the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute at the Army War
College, then reopened it under a new name in the fall. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) has an expanded mission. It will study the strategic
implications of stability operations; support senior Army leaders in understanding the
implications of dealing with stability operations; and study the impact of international
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the Army’s conduct of
peacekeeping and stability operations. The PKSOI is required to understand foreign militaries’
objectives and doctrine on stability operations, and it will have increased jointness and
interagency focus. 

The President ultimately determines the role of the U.S. in PKO missions. Federal
directives, such as the QDR, reflect his vision. Although the current administration is split on this
issue, ARNG units continue to deploy on PKO missions, and written directives supporting PKO
have not yet changed. Therefore, in terms of politics, PKO remains a relevant topic. The U.S.

37 According to Mr. Spencer, currently, on any given day, about ten percent of our armed forces
are involved in peacekeeping worldwide. Mr. Spencer adds that while the President’s national security
team continues to wrestle with this issue, it is unlikely that Mr. Bush will take on new peacekeeping
missions. 

38 Ibid. 

39 “Army to Retain and Expand Peacekeeping Institute,” Army Public Affairs web site, October 28,
Army’s definition of peacekeeping provides a common ground from which to conduct
discussions. The U.S. administration’s perspective on peacekeeping determines the relevance of
adding PKO tasks to a unit’s METL. The next section outlines lessons learned from Bosnia and
the Sinai, which provide additional support for adding PKO tasks to ARNG divisions METL.

**Bosnia-Stabilization Force (SFOR) 7**

Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia seemed to portend the nature of future ARNG
missions. After the peaceful conduct of the September 1996 elections in Bosnia, IFOR
successfully completed its mission of implementing the military annexes of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). However, it was clear that much remained to be
accomplished on the civil side and that the political environment would continue to be potentially
unstable and insecure. On 25-26 September, one week after the Bosnian elections, at an informal
meeting in Bergen, Norway, NATO Defense Ministers concluded that the Alliance needed to re-
assess how it might continue to provide support for the establishment of a secure environment
after the end of IFOR's mandate in December. One month later, the North Atlantic Council
approved detailed political guidance for a study to be undertaken by the NATO Military
Authorities of post-IFOR security options.

In November and December 1996, a two-year consolidation plan was established in Paris

---

40 Ibid.
41 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (GFAP), initiated in Dayton, Ohio, was
signed in Paris, Dec. 14, 1995. The constitution was included into the GFAP, as its Annex 4. The three
representatives of the belligerents, Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic, signed the
whole GFAP, thus approving its whole content. The European Union, France, Germany, United Kingdom
and United States "only" witnessed the agreement.

42 "History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,”
http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm
and elaborated in London under the auspices of the Peace Implementation Conference. On the basis of this plan and the Alliance’s own study of security options, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers concluded that a reduced military presence was needed to provide the stability necessary for consolidating the peace. They agreed that NATO should organize a Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was subsequently activated on 20 December 1996, the date the IFOR mandate expired.43

The role of IFOR (Operation Joint Endeavor) was to implement the peace, the role of SFOR (Operation Joint Guard/Operation Joint Forge) is to stabilize the peace. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1088 of 12 December 1996, SFOR was authorized to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement as the legal successor to IFOR. Like IFOR, SFOR operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement). SFOR has the same robust rules of engagement for the use of force, should it be necessary to accomplish its mission and to protect itself. The primary mission of SFOR is to contribute to the safe and secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace. Its specific tasks include preventing a resumption of hostilities, promoting a climate in which the peace process can continue to move forward, and providing selective support to civilian organizations within its capabilities. Initially, SFOR’s size was around 32,000 troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina - approximately half that of IFOR. Building on the general compliance with the terms of the Peace Agreement, the smaller-sized SFOR was able to concentrate on the implementation of all the provisions of Annex 1A of the Peace Agreement. One provision is the stabilization of the current secure environment in which local and national authorities and other international organizations can work. A second provision is to

43 Ibid.
provide support to other agencies (on a selective and targeted basis, in view of the reduced size of the forces available).  

The 49th Armored Division (AD) was notified in September 1998 that it would conduct SFOR 7 as the TF Eagle Headquarters element along with ground squadrons of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Staff officers from III Corps and the 49th AD wrote an article, which provides the Army with pertinent lessons from the 49th AD train-up for the SFOR 7 mission. One lesson was to provide early notification to build the team. It is critical to identify key leader and staff positions as soon as possible, so that they may participate in the complete training program. Due to the unique nature of PKO, the unit must ensure that they involve the Public Affairs Officer (PAO), the G5 (Civil Affairs Officer), Information Operations (IO) Officer, and the Judge Advocate General (JAG). Second, training events must be repetitious and focused on doing, not receiving briefings. The unit must identify and begin training METL-related collective skills early. Third, given the 270-day mobilization window and the training required to properly prepare for this type of mission, a train-mobilize-deploy model may be necessary, because a mobilize-train-deploy simply may not work. Fourth, the unit should establish officer and NCO development programs focused on increasing the base knowledge of peace operations, which may include a reading program. Fifth, no MTPs existed. The tasks and conditions varied from the METL. Other tasks that would have been helpful, had they been included early in the training plan, include the targeting process/IO, identification of weapons caches, the incorporation of

________________________________________________________________________________________

44 Ibid.
local/regional/national officials, human intelligence (HUMINT), and civil-military operations (CMO).  

The United States Army War College was directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army to assist in the lessons learned process from operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the period 20-23 May 1996, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) hosted a conference at Carlisle Barracks entitled Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I). The conference concept was to examine strategic-level issues for the planning, deployment/entry, and initial operations phases (to D+60) of Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE). The purpose was to make recommendations to the Chief of Staff of the Army as to how best to prepare for joint, multi-organization, and multinational peace operations in the 21st Century.

Among many other observations, the conference members noted, that peace operations were not included in unit METL. They also pointed out that FM 100-23, Peace Operations, specifically mentions that peace operations tasks are not to be added to METL. Adding peace operations tasks to at least some unit METL will ensure that the Army is better prepared to conduct these types of operations in the future. This would enable at least some units to deploy in a crisis, rather than receive the four to six weeks of specialized training prior to deployment. Generic peace operations METL with supporting tasks, conditions and standards would be helpful to units, which could potentially deploy for peace operations. Exportable training programs, with associated programs of instruction (POIs), would also be invaluable. According

46 MAJ Lee Schnell, 49th AD G-3 Plans, e-mail “49th AD/SFOR Lessons Learned”, 6 Nov 03.
to the report, adding peace operations to the METL of selected units would not create specialized peace operations units, but units with the appropriate peace operations skills.\(^{48}\)

It is obviously nearly impossible to predict the number and types of future PKO missions reserved for the ARNG. However, based upon past experience in Bosnia, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. role in PKO missions will continue. Most of the AAR points that the 49\(^{th}\) AD made were related to the lack of peacekeeping tasks in the METL. Changing the doctrine to allow for this would significantly help alleviate similar problems in the future.

**Multinational Force Observers (MFO) # 43 – The Sinai Peninsula**

Experience in the Sinai is similar to that in Bosnia, in terms of peacekeeping training and preparation. Again, the lack of peacekeeping MTPs negatively impacted the performance of troops in the Sinai. The studies and AARs further illustrate the gaps, which exist in peacekeeping doctrine.

The United States has participated in the MFO since 1982. During 2002, the Department of Defense sought very sizeable reductions in U.S. Army participation in the MFO to help meet increased worldwide challenges. The U.S. has accepted a proposal developed by the governments of Egypt and Israel, which will provide substantial relief to the U.S. Army. After full implementation of this arrangement, the U.S. will remain the MFO’s strongest supporter. U.S. support involves four elements: financial support, personnel for the Force Commander’s staff, a light infantry battalion, and a support battalion. The first two components are not affected by the arrangement. The others remain with reduced numbers: a U.S. infantry battalion of around

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 13.
375 soldiers and around 90 uniformed personnel in medical, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), administrative and logistical support functions. U.S. Army total participation should total a little fewer than 500.49

The 41st Separate Infantry Brigade Enhanced (SIB e) submitted its after action review (AAR) as of 26 June 2002 after redeploying Task Force (TF) 1-186 IN from the Sinai Peninsula. The AAR addressed several training-related issues, which require improvement. First, acquire Sinai Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) early, for use in training. Second, establish roles, responsibilities, and standards for key personnel, e.g., the 7th ID G-3, the Training Support Brigade (TSB) S-3, the Training Support Battalion Commander, and the Task Force Commander. Third, the unit did not have tasks, conditions and standards for MFO tasks. Finally, the 41st SIB (e) should have conducted their simulations exercise (SIMEX) earlier in the training plan.50 The 4th Brigade, 91st Division (Training Support) also wrote an AAR, which covered the TF 1-186 IN MFO post-mobilization training at Fort Carson from 3 May to 26 Jun 2002. The comments were similar to those made by the task force.51

PKO Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

Because U.S. Army PKO doctrine is somewhat lacking and vague, many units that deploy on PKO missions rely upon TTPs written by other units, and/or write their own upon return. The Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned contains a plethora of lessons learned

50 41st SIB (e) MFO AAR Input Package briefing, as of 26 Jun 2002.
51 LTC Jon Sullenberger, Deputy Brigade Commander, 4th Bde, 91st Div (TS), AAR for TF 1-186 IN MFO Post mobilization training at Fort Carson 3 May – 26 Jun, dtd 26 Jun 2002.
articles related to PKO TTPs. Most articles recommend similar training advice. For example, units should receive notification of a PKO mission as far in advance as possible, so that they may take advantage of the maximum amount of time available for preparation. Situational training exercises (STXs) at home station may consist of such tasks as personnel and vehicle search procedures, mine awareness training, patrols, media relations, and checkpoint operations. Almost every article stresses the importance of force protection and rules of engagement (ROE). Combat arms soldiers must learn how to restrain themselves in a PKO environment, while they are accustomed to more aggressive actions.

**Conclusion**

This chapter introduced a definition of peacekeeping, in order to provide a common framework. It then discussed the complexities of the involvement of the U.S. administration in determining the role of U.S. forces in PKO missions. The President ultimately decides what that role is, and Federal directives reflect his vision. Although the current administration is split on the role of the U.S., Federal directives such as the QDR continue to address the importance of PKO. The lessons learned section outlines similar training issues in Bosnia and the MFO. Written after action reports explain that units must have sufficient notification of a PKO mission, in order to properly prepare for it. Additionally, adding PKO tasks to the METL and exportable training programs would help units to follow the train-alert-deploy model, which is what U.S. doctrine requires. Currently, most units that receive a PKO mission follow the alert-train-deploy model. This causes confusion and other negative secondary effects. Because the role of the U.S. in PKO missions seems to be stable, even increasing, units should train on PKO tasks, as well as on their other tasks. Experience in the SFOR and MFO shows that units are not, in fact, as ready to perform PKO missions as some commanders may think. The fact that units are publishing
their own TTPs for PKO missions illustrates what units must do in the absence of peacekeeping doctrine. This chapter addressed the definition of PKO, the U.S. role in PKO, and lessons learned and TTPs from Bosnia and the Sinai. Thus far, the evidence supports adding PKO tasks to the ARNG divisions' METL. The next chapter compares U.S. Army training doctrine with how ARNG units actually train for PKO missions, to illustrate additional potential problems related to adding PKO tasks to the METL.
Chapter Two introduced a definition of peacekeeping, in order to provide a common framework. It then discussed the complexities of the involvement of the U.S. administration in determining the role of U.S. forces in PKO missions. The lessons learned section outlined similar training issues in Bosnia and the MFO. Written after action reports exposed gaps between PKO doctrine, and how units still accomplished their mission. The AARs and TTPs also helped to support the usefulness of the readiness criterion.

What is the current peacekeeping and training doctrine? Understanding training and peacekeeping doctrine and comparing it to how ARNG divisions actually train for PKO missions is important, because it will expose gaps. These gaps will form the basis for the recommended doctrinal changes in Chapter Five. The first section of the chapter defines the term METL, and discusses the METL development process. According to doctrine, when a unit commander is directed to perform a mission that is significantly different than his normal mission, he must revise his unit’s METL and train on the appropriate tasks. Because most ARNG divisions do not normally train in PKO, they often find themselves in this time-constrained situation when they receive such a directed mission. The first section also discusses peacekeeping as addressed in three Army field manuals, two joint publications, and one unit’s TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) from their experience in Bosnia. After reviewing only these six publications, it is apparent that peacekeeping doctrine is inconsistent. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, stipulates
that separate peacekeeping tasks should not be part of a unit’s METL. Other publications offer broad lists of PKO tasks for units to consider. However, because too few publications exist which contain specific PKO tasks and associated training standards, some units created their own PKO training programs based upon experience. The 49th Armored Division wrote its own TTP, and the joint community published the JTF Commander’s Handbook.

How do ARNG units conduct PKO training today? What are their current mission statements? Gaps exposed between training practices and doctrine present problems with adding PKO METL tasks. If the doctrine is unclear, and the mission statements do not reflect PKO, then units are unlikely to add PKO tasks to their METL, nor train on them. Examining current mission statements, training practices and doctrine in this chapter also support the idea of adding PKO tasks to the METL. If the peacekeeping and training doctrine were to require the addition of PKO tasks, units would be inclined to do so. More mission statements would include PKO verbage, and ultimately, the unit’s training program would reflect an increased focus on PKO tasks. The lack of consistency within the doctrine hinders units’ desire and ability to focus on PKO tasks.

The chapter’s second section illustrates the missions and tasks on which four ARNG divisions focus their efforts. Of these four divisions, two have no PKO training included in their mission statements or METL. One division has two subordinate infantry units that have a PKO METL, and the last division regularly includes PKO in its training program. What the various divisions are doing compared to what the doctrine stipulates is usually not the same. ARNG division commanders still generally prefer to train their combat arms units on primarily combat arms tasks. This does not imply that those commanders are wrong. Various reasons explain their

52 FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 1994, p. 86.
logic. Commanders may believe that if and when they receive a PKO mission, the six weeks of pre-mobilization training is sufficient. They may believe that they will not ever conduct a PKO mission. Most likely, they think that they have no time for additional tasks, and prefer to focus on the “comfortable” tasks related to combat arms. Regardless of the case, a gap exists between what ARNG divisions are training, and what the doctrine requires—as unclear as it is. Adding peacekeeping tasks to the ARNG divisions’ METL would bring doctrine and training into congruence.

What Does the Doctrine Say?

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training the Force, provides the training and leader development methodology that forms the foundation for developing competent and confident soldiers and units that will win decisively in any environment.\(^{53}\) FM 7-1, currently in draft form, will update FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training. Chapter 3 discusses the METL development process for both the active and reserve components. A mission essential task is a collective task in which an organization must be proficient to accomplish an appropriate portion of its wartime operational mission. Given that the ARNG divisions’ operational missions are increasingly related to stability and support, it is reasonable to say that their METL should include PKO tasks.

How do commanders identify and select mission essential tasks? METL development is the catalyst that keeps Army training focused on operational missions.\(^{54}\) There are five primary inputs to METL development. The most critical inputs are the organization’s operational and

\(^{53}\) FM 7-0, Training the Force, [http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-0/fm7-0.htm](http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-0/fm7-0.htm).

\(^{54}\) Ibid.
contingency plans. The remaining four contributors to the METL development process include enduring combat capabilities, the operational environment, directed missions, and external guidance. The commander reviews the operational mission and other primary inputs to the METL, and identifies all of the training tasks. The primary source of tasks is doctrinal manuals, such as FM 17-97 for a regimental armored cavalry troop or FM 33-1 for a psychological operations unit. Together, these five sources provide the total list of possible training tasks. The commander then narrows down the list to those tasks critical for mission accomplishment, which becomes the unit’s METL.

Army National Guard divisions usually receive directed PKO missions. According to FM 7-0, when an organization is directed to conduct a mission other than its assigned operational mission, the training management cycle still applies. Directed missions could range from major combat operations to providing humanitarian assistance. Commanders who are directed to change their mission conduct a mission analysis, identify METL tasks, and assess training proficiency for the directed mission. The mission analysis of the newly assigned mission could change the unit’s METL. If time permits, the unit should execute a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) prior to deployment. Upon redeployment from a directed mission, commanders must reestablish proficiency in the unit’s operational METL. Again, because ARNG divisions continue to focus primarily on combat arms tasks, it is difficult for them to train for directed missions such as PKO within their time constraints. Integrating PKO tasks into their METL and shifting some of the focus away from major combat to PKO would help mitigate this.

As mentioned earlier, however, ARNG commanders may argue that no time exists for additional PKO training. Combat arms units have other unique training requirements, which they must fulfill, thus taking time away from other endeavors. For example, infantry, armor and cavalry pre-mobilization objectives must focus on platoon maneuver and gunnery training.

STRAC (Standards in Training Commission) XXI reflects mandatory standards and strategies for weapons qualification. The STRAC XXI standard for Training Readiness Code (TRC) B units is annual gunnery table VIII. The standard for TRC C units is biennial gunnery table VIII.

STRAC XXI provides maneuver battalion commanders guidance on how to qualify and validate tank and Bradley crews using a mixture of live and virtual environments. STRAC requirements easily use at least 12-14 of the available 39 days of training per year.

A counter-argument to this, is that doctrine still requires that all units prepare for operations from peacekeeping to full combat. FM 3-0, *Operations*, establishes the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability and support operations. FM 3-0 provides a foundation for the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures. So the question is, if doctrine stipulates that all units must prepare for any type of an operation, why do some commanders choose not to include peacekeeping in their METL?

One reason is the confusion within the doctrine itself. Appendix C of FM 100-23 (*Peace Operations*) specifically states that peace operations “should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit’s METL,” because the primary requirement for success in peace operations is

the successful application of warfighting skills.\(^5^8\) For planning purposes, units require from four to six weeks of specialized training for peace operations. To be effective, the unit has to tailor its entire training methodology toward the tasks required. FM 100-23 lists key subjects such as ROE and negotiation skills that should be included in unit training for peacekeeping missions.

Other manuals, however, acknowledge PKO, even in combat arms units. FM 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*, includes a section on peacekeeping, and how to train for it. It states that peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task added to a unit’s METL. The first requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills learned through normal military training. Units selected for a peace operations mission normally require 4-6 weeks of specialized training. The key subjects that this manual recommends for inclusion in training for peace operations is similar to those found in FM 100-23.\(^5^9\)

The 49\(^{th}\) Armored Division apparently had little success with sorting out the gaps within peacekeeping and training doctrine. Therefore, they published the *Mission Training Plan for the Platoon and Company in Conducting Stability and Support Operations in Bosnia (Peace Support)* in June 2000. It was specifically designed for the 49\(^{th}\) Armored Division (ARNG) Headquarters during its deployment to Bosnia. However, it is applicable to all active and reserve component Army division headquarters participating as part of a multinational force in Bosnia. Some of the tasks include Conduct Negotiations, Control Checkpoints, Operate a SASO Observation Post, Operate a Checkpoint, and Search a Building.

Peacekeeping is not only important for U.S. Army forces. The joint community deemed it important enough to publish Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping*, which addresses the issue of PKO mission support. Credible warfighting skills are the foundation for successful performance in peace operations. Readying forces to successfully conduct peace operations requires a two-pronged approach. The first prong is the professional military education (PME) of all officers and noncommissioned officers. Formal peace operations training begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the highest appropriate PME level. The second prong is the training of individuals, units, and staffs. Adaptive leaders will think through and develop an effective training strategy for the time available.

According to JP 3-07.3, members of a deploying force require knowledge or proficiency in myriad areas (Figure 6), tailored to the specific mission. Such tasks include negotiation skills, understanding non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ROE, and riot control measures. JP 3-07.3 also stipulates that collective tasks should include observation post (OP) operations and patrolling. Ideally, units selected for peacekeeping duty should have several weeks of pre-deployment training. The unit’s training program includes subjects such as establishing a buffer zone, supervising a truce or cease-fire, and escorting belligerent parties. Commanders that seek additional information beyond the peacekeeping doctrine may find the *Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations* useful. Though it is consistent with doctrine, it is

---


61 Ibid.


63 Ibid., p. IV-4.
not a doctrinal publication. It is designed for senior commanders designated or about to be
to be named as joint task force commanders for peace operations.

Current peacekeeping and training doctrine provides broad, general guidance. Some of
the guidance, however, is inconsistent. The example cited here is that FM 100-23 and some
MTPs stipulate that units are not to add peacekeeping tasks to the METL. The overarching
document, however, FM 3-0, directs that all units be ready to perform missions in a full-spectrum
environment. How does a unit accomplish this, without regularly training on all of the tasks
within a full-spectrum environment, including PKO tasks? The next section describes how
ARNG divisions are actually focusing their training efforts today.

**How ARNG Divisions Conduct PKO Training Today**

Why is it important to examine how ARNG divisions train today? If all of the divisions
are already training on PKO tasks, this study is irrelevant. Luckily, this is not the case.
Furthermore, comparing how they train today with the doctrine exposes additional gaps. Filling
these gaps likely supports the idea of adding PKO tasks to all of the ARNG divisions’ METL.
The remainder of this chapter covers what several ARNG units have published regarding
training.

**29th Infantry Division (Light) (Virginia ARNG)**

The 29th ID’s (L) Federal mission focuses on light combat operations, while its State
mission covers tasks on the other end of the spectrum of operations, such as humanitarian relief
and military support to civil authority. The METL is deploy, attack, defend, sustain, and protect
the force. The Division Commander’s Command Training Guidance (CTG) 2004-2005 does not
specifically address peace operations training or missions. It stipulates that the primary focus of
annual training is METL-focused collective training. Units must emphasize mobilization and
collective tasks that support the METL task of Protect the Force. The annual training expectation is that staffs focus on the military decision making process (MDMP) and seek opportunities to command and control combined arms operations. The Commander’s training philosophy centers around multi-functional squads, which must possess enhanced capabilities of marksmanship, combat lifesaver, call for fire, countermine, and communications.  

38th Infantry Division (M) (Indiana ARNG)

Two subordinate infantry units have a PKO METL. Three other units within the 38th ID (M) use a very different METL for PKO for SFOR. This METL is, in essence, USAREUR Annex T. Annex T’s coordinating draft, dated 10 March 2003, contains training requirements and guidance to OPLAN 4247-98 (Change 1). It provides a train-up strategy, prescribes pre-deployment training requirements for units and individuals, and identifies available deployed training assets. It assists commanders by providing the minimum competencies necessary to conduct stability operations. Outside of these mandated competencies, it is the commander’s decision at each level on what tasks their unit must train.

34th Infantry Division (M) (Minnesota ARNG)

In his Training Year 2001 Yearly Training Guidance (YTG), the Division Commander’s

-------------------------

64 MAJ William Coffin, G3 Plans and Training Officer, 29th ID (L), e-mail dtd 7 Oct 2003. The published mission statements are as follows. Federal. At M-day/H-hour, 29th ID (L) mobilizes, deploys by air and surface to an intermediate staging base, assembles, moves to a U.S. Army Corps area of operations and conducts light combined arms operations. State. When directed by State authority, provide units organized, equipped, and trained to function efficiently in the protection of life and property, and the preservation of peace, order and public safety in military support to civil authority for disaster response, humanitarian relief, civil disturbance, counter-drug operations and combating terrorism.
primary training focus for that year included two METL tasks: Conduct a Deliberate Attack, and Conduct an Area Defense. The reason for this was to successfully complete an upcoming Division Warfighter scenario based around these two tasks. The Divisions METL tasks include 1) Mobilize the Division, 2) Deploy/Redeploy, 3) Conduct a Forward Passage of Lines, 4) Conduct a Deliberate Attack, 5) Conduct a Movement to Contact, 6) Conduct an Area Defense, and 7) Sustain the Division. The Commander’s philosophy was to maintain “warfighting” proficiency, which is their ability to plan and conduct combat operations in a field environment for sustained periods of time. The 2001 YTG did not mention peace operations or full-spectrum operations.  

40th Infantry Division (M) (California ARNG)  

The Division mission is:  

40th ID (M) conducts essential pre-mobilization training; on order, mobilizes, conducts post-mobilization training, deploys to a theater of operations, conducts military operations and re-deploys. On order, provides support in preservation and protection of life, property, peace, public order and safety within the State of California.  

The 40th ID (M) is heavily involved in peace operations worldwide. The Division’s METL is Mobilize, Conduct Decisive Operations, Protect the Force, and Sustain the Force. One of the battle tasks is Conduct Stability and Support Operations, which includes peacekeeping. The primary training focus is individual soldier readiness, including weapons qualification and gunnery. The Division recognizes that they must revise their METL to fit each scheduled mission (GTMO, KFOR, SFOR, MFO, etc.). They have also addressed the requirement for theater

67 MAJ Greg Palizza, 40th ID (M) Plans Officer, e-mail dtd 19 Dec 03.
specific leader competencies, such as using an interpreter, performing negotiations, and understanding the culture. 68

**Conclusion**

Chapter Three defined METL and described the METL development process, to provide background information. It discussed how peacekeeping doctrine and other doctrine are inconsistent. FM 3-0, *Operations*, stipulates that all units must be ready for myriad types of operations. According to FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, units are not to add peacekeeping tasks to their METL. The question then becomes, should an ARNG combat arms division focus its training efforts on PKO, or not? If so, how does it obtain “credit” for the training, when the doctrine is still deficient? Finally, how does the unit find the time for these additional METL tasks? Based upon the previous chapter, combat arms divisions should focus their efforts on PKO. Recent experience and U.S. policy dictate this. Units earn credit for PKO training, when the doctrine is complete with MTPs, which are evaluation tools. Until the doctrine is updated, most units continue to focus on combat arms tasks, until they are alerted for a PKO mission.

Finding time for PKO training is not as difficult as it may seem at first glance. Many PKO tasks are similar to HLS tasks, which the ARNG performs to meet State mission requirements. Additionally, many PKO tasks may be incorporated into combat arms training, instead of treated as a separate entity.

The second section of this chapter offered examples of how four ARNG divisions focus

---

68 Ibid.
their mission statements and their training. Oftentimes, what the divisions are actually doing does not match what the somewhat confusing doctrine requires. It is apparent now that adding PKO tasks to a unit’s METL may be a complex process, and that an easy “yes” or “no” answer to the research question does not exist.

What is the current peacekeeping and training doctrine? How does it compare with actual PKO training practices and mission statements? FM 100-23 (*Peace Operations*) states that units must not add PKO tasks to their METL. On the other hand, FM 3-0 (*Operations*) states that units prepare for the full spectrum of operations. Units are evaluated on METL tasks. Therefore, they generally train strictly on those tasks. If PKO tasks are not on the METL, the unit likely will not be evaluated on them. Consequently, they do not train for it, either. This chapter showed that, in order to answer the primary research question positively, the Army must make the doctrine consistent and thorough in terms of peacekeeping operations and tasks. Doctrine must require that PKO is included in the METL, and MTPs must provide detailed evaluation criteria by which units train. Chapter Four compares the arguments using the three criteria, and provides conclusions and recommendations.

---

69 *Peace Operations*, p. 86.
70 *Operations*, p. vii.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Should all ARNG divisions add PKO tasks to their METL? Up to this point, the study dissected this question and examined its sub-parts. Chapter One provided the problem background and the methodology. It briefly presented arguments for and against the research question, which form the pinnacle of the research. Chapter Two defined peacekeeping, the role of the U.S. in PKO, and lessons learned in Bosnia and the Sinai. It showed that PKO missions will not disappear soon, and that units should focus more of their training on PKO. Chapter Three proved that gaps between doctrine and actual training practices currently make adding PKO tasks to the METL more difficult, but not impossible. Given the scope and limitations of this study and related research questions, this chapter analyzes the pros and cons of each argument, using the three stated criteria of readiness, compliance with Federal directives, and legitimacy. It then provides conclusions and recommendations based upon this analysis.

The first section details the arguments against the research question, and means by which they may be mitigated. None of the arguments is strong enough to justify not adding PKO tasks to the METL. Failing to add such tasks violates each criterion test. The unit would not be complying with Federal directives. Readiness would remain focused upon combat arms and other tasks, rather than on PKO. Legitimacy with the host nation government and populace would not improve, because the unit is not thoroughly trained on PKO tasks. The arguments against adding PKO tasks to the Guard divisions' METL create an example of Peter Senge's idea of a "learning
organization," or rather, what a learning organization is not.\textsuperscript{71} Senge describes a learning organization as one that is "continually expanding its capacity to create its future…it is not enough merely to survive."\textsuperscript{72} Arguing that a combat arms unit is incapable of enforcing stricter ROE implies that the unit is not able to expand its capacity. The other arguments opposing the research question imply that ARNG divisions do only what is necessary to survive, due to a shortage of time, resources, and doctrinal guidance. On the other hand, Cabrey, Flynn and Rand show how learning organizations were able to temporarily overcome the shortfalls in PKO doctrine.

The second section of the chapter analyzes the arguments supporting the research question, using the three criteria. Studies, Federal directives and lessons learned support the research question. Answers to the related questions also support it, with the exception of doctrine. Four studies on peacekeeping are examined. Both Cabrey and Flynn recommended that peacekeeping tasks not be restricted from a unit's METL. Rand Corporation and the former U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute also conducted studies, which recommended including PKO tasks in the METL. The Federal directives in this study support the research question. Together, they comprise one of the criteria. Complying with the Federal directives means that units are focusing their training on PKO, in addition to other types of missions along the spectrum of operations. Lessons learned from the Ft. Carson mobilization station, Bosnia, the Sinai and Macedonia support the idea that ARNG divisions should focus on PKO tasks. Each lesson learned addressed problems with training time, resources, and doctrine. Given that the doctrinal problem is

corrected, the arguments supporting the research question are more valid than those that do not. Units would experience a higher level of readiness, compliance with Federal directives in terms of full-spectrum operations, and enhanced legitimacy among the host population.

The final section of the chapter concludes that, based upon the research and the criteria used to analyze the arguments, the ARNG divisions should add PKO tasks to their METL. Five recommendations support adding PKO tasks to the METL. The Army must update its peacekeeping doctrine so that, unit commanders have thorough guidelines. The PKSOI at the Army War College may actively assist the ARNG divisions with PKO training. The ARNG must determine its true training priorities. For example, reducing or eliminating required annual briefings would allow units to focus on METL training. Clarification of the ARNG's role within DoD is crucial, in order to help determine how units must train. Finally, divisions should add at least one overarching peacekeeping task to their METL, so that subordinate units officially have a reason to train on PKO.

**Arguments Against the Research Question**

Enforcing rules of engagement (ROE) which change from combat operations to PKO may prove difficult for some soldiers, as they must suddenly restrain themselves. Do soldiers have the ability to make this cultural shift? Based upon the Army’s recent experience, they do. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), for example, combat arms units such as the 3rd ID (M) routinely switched back and forth from combat operations to PKO with few problems. Overall, the young, intelligent combat arms soldiers in Iraq proved quite capable of performing all tasks assigned to them, including PKO. This argument has little merit.

---

72 Ibid., p. 14.
Possible degradation of a unit’s combat effectiveness due to a PKO focus, the second argument, may be problematic. How does an armored division maintain its warfighting skills while performing peacekeeping operations? Four soldiers working for the 1st Armored Division (AD) as part of Task Force Eagle (TFE) from October 1995 to October 1996 in the former Yugoslavia, developed a strategy for training while enforcing the peace, and submitted their recommendations to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). The TFE Commander published his training guidance, which provided the framework for the conduct of training while executing peace operations. The guidance concentrated on sustaining basic combat skills and on mission-essential tasks, while ensuring successful completion of the mission. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) trained individual and crew skills at the checkpoints and in the base camps. Units conducted platoon collective training when possible during the daily operations. Based upon the 1st AD’s recommendations, it seems feasible for a combat division to add PKO tasks to its METL, while maintaining its close combat related skills while on a PKO mission.

The third argument concerning unit training time at home station is likely the most difficult to resolve. With only 39 days a year available for training, how does an ARNG mechanized infantry unit find time to train on additional peacekeeping tasks? Most ARNG units are required to train on a five-year cycle, focusing on five METL tasks (one per year), and a deployment to the National Training Center (NTC). The METL tasks are deploy, attack, defend, sustain, and protect the force. However, because peace operations and major theater war tasks overlap, peace operations call for a different training emphasis, rather than training on different

---

75 Ibid.
tasks.\textsuperscript{77} This is true, because it is nearly impossible for an ARNG unit to be proficient in every METL task, due to time constraints and competing requirements from higher headquarters.

Consequently, Army National Guard commanders choose the METL tasks that they wish to train on during a particular year. Perhaps the most unique PKO training requirement is for education and exercises that address the tension that neutrality and restraint can engender in combat-trained soldiers placed in volatile and dangerous situations.\textsuperscript{78}

The fourth argument against adding PKO tasks to the METL pertains to infrastructure. The lack of home station infrastructure and resourcing for PKO training exists, because units are not yet required to focus on PKO tasks. If a unit’s approved METL includes PKO tasks, that particular command is responsible for ensuring that the unit has the appropriate equipment, facilities, organization, and doctrinal changes in order to train effectively on those tasks. Guard units that add PKO tasks to their METL will eventually receive the required resources. Those that do not will continue to employ the alert-train-deploy model, because there is no reason to do otherwise. The argument based upon a lack of home station infrastructure is also weak. Many PKO tasks are similar to traditional combat arms tasks and homeland security tasks (i.e., patrolling and military support to civil authorities). Other tasks, such as negotiation, observing and reporting, may be trained at home station using vignettes. The lack of the availability of a mock-up city or minefield in which to practice certain PKO tasks does not justify ignoring PKO training.

The last counter argument related to specific countries may seem problematic at first. If a unit does not know where they will perform PKO, which METL tasks should they train?

\textsuperscript{76} Interviews with MAJ Lawhorn, MAJ Minde and MAJ Elam.
Different theaters of operation have different training requirements pertaining to language and culture, for example. One way to mitigate this is to assign areas of responsibility (AORs) to ARNG divisions, like the Army does to Special Operations units, such as Civil Affairs and Special Forces. Units would be able to focus on one AOR. Another mitigating factor is scheduling ARNG units for PKO missions at least five years in advance, so that units have time to prepare for a specific region. This argument also has little merit.

**Arguments Supporting the Research Question**

**Studies**

Rand Corporation and DoD studies support the idea of adding PKO tasks to units' METL. Rand Corporation conducted a study on the ability of the Army to maintain warfighting readiness, while also meeting peace operations’ obligations. The Army’s approach thus far, consistent with its emphasis on combat training, is to offer “just-in-time” preparation for units designated to deploy to peace operations. This “last-minute” policy only works, of course, if sufficient time is available prior to deployment for the units to take advantage of the training packages and exercise opportunities. However, training may continue to be underemphasized. A June 1995 CALL report found that units designated to deploy to peace operations spend most of their time executing their standard operating procedures (SOPs) for deployment and little time on specialty training for the mission. Two conferences that the Army’s Peacekeeping Institute (now the Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, or PKSOI) held to review participation in the Bosnia peace operation recommended that peace-operations tasks in general—and planning

---

78 Ibid.
79 Taw, p. 40.
80 Ibid.
and coordinating with civilian organizations in particular—be included in unit training. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) also recommended that units assigned to peace operations train in a variety of specific tasks before deployment.\textsuperscript{81}

The DoD conducted a study examining RC employment in support of the defense strategy across the full range of employment options. These included homeland defense, SSCs, and MTWs.\textsuperscript{82} The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 recommends new ways for the RC to provide additional high-demand, low-density capabilities for SSCs, and assume a greater role in sustained operations like the one being conducted in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{83} While U.S. participation in smaller-scale contingency operations will continue to be selective, according to the study, the demand for SSC operations is likely to remain high over the next 15-20 years.\textsuperscript{84}

Both the Rand and the DoD studies imply that by adding PKO tasks to a unit's METL, the unit would experience a higher level of readiness for ever-increasing PKO missions. They obviously would comply with Federal directives, and enhance U.S. legitimacy in the host nation, due to increased knowledge and skills in PKO tasks.

\textbf{Federal Directives}

The National Guard’s stated Federal mission includes operations in a full-spectrum

\textsuperscript{81} “How Well Prepared are the Army and Marine Corps for Peace Operations?” December 1999, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index+1809&sequence=3, p. 7. This article published by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) states that a growing number of military and nonmilitary officials are suggesting that some training in skills particular to peace missions be incorporated into standard unit training for the forces likely to perform those missions.


\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
environment. Its last paragraph reads:

The Army National Guard is a partner with the Active Army and the Army Reserves in fulfilling the country’s military needs. In fiscal year 2001, Army Guard soldiers pulled duty in more than 80 countries in a wide variety of operations including peacekeeping, stabilization, security, nation building, etc.\(^85\)

The Quadrennial Defense Review report of 30 September 2001 outlines the President’s vision for the use of U.S. forces. It states that for planning purposes, U.S. forces shall remain capable of swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes.\(^86\) It also discusses the new planning approach in terms of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs).\(^87\) DoD will ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized forces and capabilities that it does not overstress elements of the force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingency operations.\(^88\)

The 2004 National Guard Posture Statement outlines readiness, mobilization issues, current operations, and infrastructure and facilities as its four critical components by which it measures success.\(^89\) The introductory statement highlights the Guard’s commitment to full-spectrum operations.\(^90\) It recognizes that the ARNG assumed the lead as the stabilizing force in the Balkans and in Southwest Asia.\(^91\) The ARNG is scheduled to provide Division Headquarters and maneuver units to four of the next six rotations in Bosnia.\(^92\) Because the Posture Statement

\(^87\) Ibid.
\(^88\) Ibid.
\(^89\) 2004 National Guard Posture Statement.
\(^90\) Ibid.
\(^91\) Ibid.
\(^92\) Ibid.
supports peacekeeping missions, and the ARNG continues to be tasked to perform PKO, it makes sense for the divisions to add peacekeeping tasks to their METL. Although the Posture Statement meets the criterion of Federal directives, few units incorporate PKO training for the aforementioned reasons. The Posture Statement does promote U.S. legitimacy overseas by including peacekeeping operations. It meets the readiness criterion by requiring that units be prepared to operate in a full-spectrum environment, at any time.

Lessons Learned at a Mobilization Station

LTC Sutherland witnessed and helped prepare U.S. Army National Guard units for deployment to several theaters of operation. National Guard divisional units mobilizing at Ft. Carson, Colorado, had few problems preparing individual soldiers for Operation Enduring Freedom. The reason for this is that most of the individual tasks did not change. Soldiers already knew how to conduct peace enforcement operations and had experience with peacekeeping in the MFO. Most tasks were similar to their security missions in the continental United States (CONUS). Other individual tasks common to all Army soldiers also did not change, such as common tasks (CTT), soldier readiness processing (SRP), and weapons qualification. Problems arose at the squad and higher levels. The units’ leadership frequently experienced difficulty controlling the unit when they attempted to switch from a combat mindset to peacekeeping. Collectively, they were proficient in neither combat nor stability and support operations (SASO) tasks, such as checkpoint monitoring, patrolling, and inventorying weapons.

93 Interview with LTC Sutherland, 2 October 2003. LTC Sutherland is a Fellow and Seminar Leader at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Ft. Leavenworth, KS.
storage sites. The leadership became confused, mixing tasks and improperly enforcing rules of engagement (ROE). The result was an extension of the mobilization process at Ft. Carson to allow for additional training time. This additional required training reduced the time that the unit’s soldiers would have had with their families and employers. It also placed stress on the Ft. Carson mobilization site’s capability to provide service to myriad units according to a schedule.  

The 40th Infantry Division (California ARNG) had to extend their training time by two weeks, due to lack of proper equipment, training, and a poor SRP conducted at home station. Although many state adjutants general (TAGs) hoped to minimize mobilization time at Ft. Carson, most were unable to do so. According to extensive experience with the ARNG at Ft. Carson, most Guard units waited until they were alerted for a PKO mission before they began to train in PKO tasks; usually, the units would not focus on these tasks until they arrived at the mobilization station. Although it is known that most Guard units do not have the luxury of having PKO lanes and MOUT sites at home station, they may still integrate myriad tasks there into their typical combat training. It appears from experience that the Guard’s leadership must endure a cultural shift first, and accept that the U.S. Army will continue to commit the Guard to PKO missions. Furthermore, adding PKO tasks to their METL would improve their readiness by reducing time at the mobilization station; ensure that they comply with the requirement of full spectrum operations capabilities; and, enhance U.S. legitimacy in the host country by exhibiting professionalism and experience in PKO.

---

94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid.
Conclusion

It is important to remember that this study does not fully address issues of retention, ARNG restructuring, and funding. However, in terms of doctrine, Federal directives, the role of the U.S., and experience, should the ARNG divisions include peacekeeping tasks in their METL? Yes. Analyzing the arguments with the three criteria (readiness, compliance with Federal directives, and legitimacy in the host country) reveals that including peacekeeping tasks in ARNG divisions’ METL exceeds the benchmark for each. Arguments against the research question do not impact the criteria to the same degree as the others do. It is easy to justify the use of compliance and legitimacy as criteria, because they are from doctrine or Federal directives. Readiness, however, is more difficult to analyze, because there is no standard Army doctrine, which measures peacekeeping readiness.

The arguments supporting the idea of adding PKO tasks to ARNG divisions' METL meet the criteria to a greater degree than those that oppose it. Federal directives require that ARNG units be prepared to conduct peacekeeping tasks. Readiness reduces the amount of time required at the mobilization station prior to deployment. It also means that the unit is trained and ready to deploy on any type of mission at any time, rather than only combat arms missions all of the time. Adding PKO tasks to the METL increases a Guard unit's overall readiness in PKO. The ability of U.S. combat troops to quickly enforce a more restrictive ROE during PKO helps to gain the support and confidence of the local population. If the local population does not view a U.S. presence as legitimate during a PKO, the mission is unlikely to succeed. PKO tasks on the METL, which are related to ROE, would ensure that the unit is able to foster the desired atmosphere of support in the theater of operations. The following section offers recommendations for how the ARNG and the Army should approach adding PKO tasks to the divisions' METL.
Recommendations

The U.S. Army National Guard is tasked with many types of missions, ranging from peacekeeping in the Balkans, to homeland security, to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To help ensure that Guard units are as prepared for peacekeeping missions as they are for combat missions, four recommendations are offered.

First, the Army must update its peacekeeping doctrine. Chapter Three provides examples of discrepancies and gaps in doctrinal manuals. FM 100-23, for example, discourages commanders from adding PKO tasks to their METL. Yet FM 7-0 states that all units train for a full spectrum environment. It is true that unit commanders ultimately determine what tasks comprise their METL. However, this task is much easier to accomplish when the doctrine is available, and consistent. As a minimum, FM 100-23 must be updated, encouraging units to add PKO tasks to their METL, if they wish to do so. More importantly, mission training plans (MTPs) must be published with tasks, conditions, and standards. Commanders are then able to use MTPs to effectively evaluate their units in peacekeeping tasks. Chapters Two, Three and Four provide examples of tasks in various CALL documents and TTP articles. A list of sample PKO tasks is also in the Appendix. Units may also use MTP tasks while building their PKO METL. Finally, the Army should publish exportable POIs, which cover peacekeeping operations in different theaters. These POIs would include basic language phrases and cultural awareness, to name a few.

Evidence in Chapter Three illustrates that PKO training is not consistent among ARNG divisions. Some divisions focus on PKO training, others do not. A few divisions mention peace operations in their mission statements; most do not. A unit whose mission statement does not include PKO is unlikely to train for PKO. The divisions that do not focus on PKO training tend to perform poorly at the mobilization station. Not only does this place additional stress on the
deploying unit, but also upon the cadre at the mobilization station. Divisions are not inclined to train for PKO, unless doctrine specifies that they must do so. Studies and after action reports in Chapters Two and Four suggest that ARNG divisions should add PKO tasks to their METL. Units should not have to write their own PKO TTPs after they have completed a PKO mission, as Chapter Two points out. Army doctrine must be available and sufficiently thorough to support this type of operation. Moreover, Chapter Two suggests that the U.S. role in PKO continues, and is unlikely to decrease any time soon. Empowering ARNG divisions with proper PKO training based upon doctrine also enhances the legitimacy of the U.S. in the host nation. Soldiers earn individual and unit credibility by performing PKO functions in a professional manner; meanwhile, the U.S. benefits as a whole, as the host nation casts us in a more positive light. Unfortunately, most ARNG divisions have learned how to perform PKO at the mobilization station, from lessons learned from other units, and by writing their own TTPs. This “band-aid” method is a temporary fix; a more permanent fix, however, includes a change in peacekeeping and training doctrine.

Second, the Army should expand the role of the newly reinstated PKSOI at the Army War College. This chapter mentioned that the PKSOI supports the idea of adding PKO tasks to unit training programs. Based upon experience in Bosnia and the Sinai, mentioned in Chapter Two, units need additional assistance in PKO training prior to deployment. The PKSOI must actively assist with training the Army National Guard in peacekeeping operations on a routine basis. The PKSOI web site offers a plethora of useful literature regarding peacekeeping, including doctrinal publications and after action reports. According to their web site, the PKSOI
is the Army's "preeminent authority on peacekeeping" at the operational and strategic levels.\textsuperscript{98} This institute would be invaluable to ARNG division commanders. Because the PKSOI does not focus on the tactical level, they may not have the time or the resources to give in-depth guidance regarding PKO tasks. The Institute provides guidance primarily to combatant commanders and other senior leaders. The Army should provide the PKSOI with the funds and personnel required, in order to allow them to become actively involved with ARNG division commanders, as well. Finally, although the PKSOI "contributes to evolving peacekeeping doctrine,"\textsuperscript{99} they must play a more pivotal role in doctrinal development. Other Army and joint institutions must be able to rely upon the PKSOI as the experts in PKO. The PKSOI may act as a "clearinghouse" for doctrine, by ensuring that peacekeeping doctrine is updated, and in congruence with other types of doctrine, such as training manuals. They must help ensure that the total Army is prepared to perform PKO missions. Expanding the PKSOI's role this way would help ARNG divisions to better prepare themselves for PKO missions. This again helps to improve ARNG readiness, improves U.S. legitimacy, and complies with the QDR.

Third, the Army National Guard must determine its true training priorities. Chapter Four illustrated that a lack of time is the main argument against adding PKO tasks to ARNG divisions' METL. Most ARNG divisions, as combat arms units, spend the majority of their training time on tank tables, weapons qualification, soldier's readiness processing (SRP), common task training (CTT), and required briefings. Having only 39 days per year for training is a serious issue for most Guard units. It is difficult for them to focus on operational training, because they are

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
hampered by a plethora of other requirements. Are annual equal opportunity briefings, for example, really necessary? In most Guard units, about one drill weekend every training year is consumed with required briefings that most soldiers have heard repeatedly. The reasons for the required training are outside the scope of this monograph. The point is that perhaps the Army's culture still is not strong enough to forego such briefings, such as equal opportunity and sexual harassment. Perhaps units should place the requirement of such training on junior leaders, and let them do their jobs. Another option is to summarize the information on paper, and have soldiers periodically read and sign them. Units which are not tied down to time-wasting annual briefings and endless tank tables are able to focus more on operational issues, including PKO. Freeing up ARNG units to train for a full spectrum of operations gives the peacekeeping soldier credibility and the U.S. legitimacy in the host nation. It complies with the QDR. And, it improves the unit's readiness in terms of PKO tasks, shortening the amount of time required to train at the mobilization station.

Fourth, the Guard must re-visit its role in the Army and within DoD. Chapter Four illustrated that the role of the U.S. in PKO missions continues to increase. Chapter Two reiterated the importance of the ARNG in PKO missions, as the Guard increasingly comprises the majority of the troops in Bosnia and in the Sinai Peninsula. Should the ARNG be an expeditionary force in support of the active component? Perhaps they should provide DoD with a constabulary force, and perform the majority of the PKO missions? Answers to these questions drive the unit's training focus. Answers also drive other areas within DOTLMS, which are outside the scope of this monograph. Until the ARNG's role is clear, it is difficult to justify significant changes to peacekeeping doctrine. If DoD decides to make the ARNG a constabulary force, for example, major equipment changes must take place. Military Occupational Specialties and other personnel issues would be impacted, as the ARNG may require new skill sets. It is
important to note, though, that the ARNG already performs PKO-like tasks within CONUS, while performing homeland security and military support to civil authorities. As a constabulary force, the ARNG would likely rid itself of most of its heavy equipment, and become similar to a police force in both domestic and international operations. As an expeditionary force, they will be expected to perform all types of operations; this option seems to be more realistic, based upon history and the QDR. Focusing mainly on combat heavy operations with outdated tanks may become a thing of the past. Although force structure is a topic for another monograph, it is important to note that changing the METL of eight ARNG divisions may impact force structure. The point is that the role of the ARNG in DoD and in PKO missions drives the training priorities. The training priorities, in turn, drive requirements for equipment, personnel, and funding. Until the ARNG is able to clarify this role for both their divisions and their separate brigades, it is challenging to properly prioritize training within the time constraints.

Once again, the primary research question is, "Should all ARNG divisions add PKO tasks to their METL?" This study concludes that they should, and makes four recommendations. The recommendations generally do not address issues of force structure, retention and recruiting, or other resource concerns. However, adding PKO tasks to the METL impacts each of these areas, as well. First, the Army must update its doctrine, so that peacekeeping and training doctrine are congruent with one another. The doctrine must include MTPs, which provide specific tasks, conditions, and standards for PKO, so units may be evaluated on PKO. Second, the PKSOI should expand its role by actively assisting ARNG division commanders with PKO planning and training. Third, because the ARNG has only 39 days of training time per year, training requirements must be re-evaluated. Certain annual briefings, for example, may be excluded, or given in other forums or formats. Finally, DoD must clearly determine what the ARNG's role is. If DoD wants the ARNG to be a constabulary force, then the Guard must make major changes in
equipment and personnel. If the DoD wishes the ARNG to be able to operate full spectrum, they must provide proper resources, including time. If DoD wants the ARNG to continue to primarily support the Active Component with heavy forces, then they must exclude the ARNG from the full-spectrum requirement. The training requirements in heavy ARNG divisions prevent units from having sufficient time available to train on other types of tasks. The Army Transformation and ARNG restructuring initiatives to make the force lighter hopefully will help pacify this issue.
APPENDIX

Biographical sketch of Conrad C. Crane, “Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s”

Dr. Conrad C. Crane joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in September 2000 after 26 years of military service that concluded with nine years as Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.100

Biographical sketch of MAJ Mark Elam

MAJ Elam, an ARNG infantry officer, is a student in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Academic Year 2003-2004. He has over thirteen years of experience in the U.S. Army, including over three years in the ARNG. For almost two years, MAJ Elam was the military intelligence organizational integrator and systems integrator at the National Guard Bureau (NGB). He also worked on force structure/management issues there. He was a member of the MI Advisory Council, elevating intelligence issues to assist units preparing for deployments to Bosnia. Other prior assignments include S-2 of the 48th Bde (M), the S3 of the 221st MI (TEB) under III Corps, and a mechanized infantry company commander in the 48th Brigade, 2/121 Infantry.


MAJ Kimberly Field was assigned to Headquarters, Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia. She graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1987 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1997. She has served as a Military Police platoon leader in Operation Desert Storm, an MP company commander in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, an Assistant Professor of international relations at the Military Academy, and as the Strategic Planner (J5) of the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.101

100 Crane, p. v.
101 Field and Perito, Parameters, p. 78.

Dr. Kelly (LTC, USA Retired) is a Senior Researcher with RAND, where he does homeland and national security research. Before joining RAND, he served as the Senior National Security Officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. He also served in the State and Commerce Departments, with the Army Staff and Secretariat, and in the 82d Airborne and 8th Infantry Divisions. He is a 1982 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, was a White House Fellow, and holds a Ph.D. in mathematics and an M.S. in computer and systems engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the Army War College.102

Biographical sketch of MAJ Charles Lawhorn

MAJ Lawhorn is the Chief of Plans for the 35th ID (M) in Leavenworth, Kansas. He is also a 2001 graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).

Biographical sketch of Dennis J. Quinn, Editor, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military

COL Quinn, U.S. Army, had been a Senior Military Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, since 1990. His areas of concentration were U.S. defense policies and strategies and strategic developments in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. COL Quinn was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1966, and had served primarily as a military intelligence officer and as a Russian Area Officer. Overseas assignments included two tours in Vietnam and three tours in Europe. Stateside assignments included tours as a Current Intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, an Intelligence Officer on the Department of the Army Staff, the Chief of Intelligence Production for the Army Intelligence Agency, and the Chief of the Strategy Department at the Army’s Command and General Staff College. He has a B.A. in Political Science and an M.A. in Slavic Studies.103


Robert Perito was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., where he was working on a study of the role of constabulary forces and the rule of law in peace operations. Mr. Perito is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer with the State Department and Deputy Director of ICITAP, the international law enforcement development program of the

103 Quinn, p. 235.
Department of Justice. He has worked on peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. He was also an Adjunct Professor in the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and the author of *The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations* (Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002).

**Biographical sketch of LTC(P) David P. Sutherland**

LTC(P) Sutherland is currently a Fellow and a Seminar Leader at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. His prior assignments and experience lend arguments, which support peacekeeping training in the ARNG. As the G-3 for the 7th Infantry Division in Colorado, LTC(P) Sutherland planned the pre, post and demobilization training for the first ARNG units ever to deploy to the MFO in the Sinai. Also at Ft. Carson, Colorado, LTC(P) Sutherland acted as the Validation Team Chief for Operation Enduring Freedom, for all Guard and Reserve units deploying to Afghanistan. He supervised the implementation of the training plans for Guard units deploying on SFOR rotations from Michigan, Ohio and Indiana. Additionally, he had “peer mentorship” responsibility from III Corps. Finally, as the 7th ID G-3, LTC(P) Sutherland also acted as the G-3 for the 5th Army’s Deputy Commanding General-West, covering all states west of the Mississippi River.

**JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping-Members of a Deploying Force Require Knowledge in the Following Areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. objectives and the implications of military activities</th>
<th>NBC identification, detection, protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional orientation</td>
<td>Driver education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs and basic language phrases</td>
<td>Land navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation and mediation skills</td>
<td>Marksmanship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding NGOs</td>
<td>Survival skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization, mission, background of the sponsoring body</td>
<td>First aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Field sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information gathering</td>
<td>Physical security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evacuation procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convoy operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

104 Ibid., p. 78.
Vehicle, aircraft, etc., identification   Airmobile operations
Media interaction   Checkpoint construction
Detainee handling   Stress management
Individual, vehicle, building searches   Identification of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO)

Riot control measures   Reaction to hostage situations
Use of nonlethal technology   Sniper recognition and countermeasures
Antiterrorism measures

Counterintelligence measures

**JP 3-07.3 Collective Tasks Should Include the Following**

- Observation Post (OP) operations
- Patrolling
- Command post operations
- Convoy operations
- Preparations for Overseas Movement (POM)

**JP 3-07.3 The Unit Training Program Should Ideally Include These PKO Subjects**

- The nature of peacekeeping
- Checkpoint operations
- Investigating procedures
- Collecting information
- Patrolling
- Monitoring boundaries
- Establishing a buffer zone
- Supervising a truce or cease fire
- Contributing to maintenance of law and order
- Escorting and securing a very important person and/or belligerent parties
- Establishing and securing a truce and/or negotiation site
- Convoy security
- Route and area reconnaissance

---

106 **Ibid.**, p. IV-4.
107 **Ibid.**, p. IV-5.
Cordon and search

**FM 100-23 (Peace Operations) Key PKO Tasks**

- The nature of peacekeeping (PK)
- The establishment of lodgments
- The performance of relief in place
- Regional orientation
- Establishment of a buffer zone
- Supervision of a truce or cease-fire
- The monitoring of boundaries
- Contributions to maintenance of law and order
- Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas in a permissive environment
- Mine and booby trap awareness
- Checkpoint operations
- Investigation and reporting
- Information collection
- Patrolling
- Media interrelationships
- Staff training
- ROE
- Negotiating skills
- Assistance in rebuilding of infrastructure

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Annex T (Training Requirements and Guidance) to OPLAN 4247-98 (Change 1). HQ USAREUR & 7th Army, 10 March 2003.


Coffin, William, Major. G3 Plans and Training Officer, 29th ID (L), VAARNG. E-mail dtd 7 Oct 2003 including METL and 2004-2005 CTG.


“40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) ‘Sunburst’.” n.d.  

“42nd Infantry Division (Mechanized) ‘Rainbow’.” n.d.  

“49th Armored Division ‘Lone Star’.” n.d.  


“Guard Training.” The Army National Guard web page, n.d.  

Minnesota Army National Guard web page, 1 October 1999.  

Hort, John, CPT. “Logistics in Peacekeeping Operations.” Center for Army Lessons Learned web page,  

“How Well Prepared Are the Army and Marine Corps for Peace Operations?”  


Lawhorn, Charles, Major. Chief of Plans, 35th ID (Mech), Kansas Army National Guard.


Palizza, Gregory, Major. 40th ID (M) Plans Officer. E-mail including 40th ID’s Commander’s Training Guidance and Battle Update Briefs for MFO and SFOR missions, dated 19 Dec 03.


Pryor, Mike, MAJ. “Fighting the IDT Tank Table VIII: A National Guard Unit’s Solution.” Center for Army Lessons Learned web page, Jan/Feb 2001. 


Schnell, Lee, Major. G-3 Plans Officer, 49th Armored Division, Ft. Hood, TX. E-mailed “49th AD/SFOR 7 Lessons Learned” on 6 Nov 03.


7th ID (Lt). GlobalSecurity.org web page, n.d. 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/7id.htm> (31 August 2003).


“SFOR 13.” 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized) web page, n.d. 


“Special Study: The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness.” Center for Army Lessons
Learned web page, 8 June 1998.


Sutherland, David, LTC(P). Faculty member, School of Advanced Military Studies. Interview by Angela Ewing, U.S. Army, 2 October 2003.


“T3BL.” The Army National Guard web page, n.d.


“34th Infantry Division ‘Red Bull’.” n.d.

“35th Infantry Division (Mechanized) ‘The Santa Fe Division’.” n.d.


“Units Participating in the Integrated Bosnia Task Forces Through 2003.” GAO/NSIAD-00-162 Force Structure, Appendix IV.


