

CCO Moves to National Defense University Now Center for Complex Operations

David Sobyra
Acting Director, Center for Complex Operations



Hello from the CCO! It has been an extremely busy few months for the CCO. Most importantly, we have moved to the National Defense University, where we fall under the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. In conjunction with this move, we have also changed the name of the CCO from *Consortium* to *Center for Complex Operations* to better reflect the missions authorized for us by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). We are all very excited about our new home at NDU and CTNSP, which will enhance the CCO's operational role by positioning it in an academic setting, while maintaining close links to policymakers in our partner organizations at Departments of Defense and State, and USAID.

In other news, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee (R&S PCC) recently endorsed the CCO to be the Secretariat lead for a Whole-of-Government Reconstruction & Stabilization (R&S) Lessons Learned Hub, with the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization as the policy lead. The Hub will serve as the central and institutionalized proponent to coordinate, facilitate, and support the implementation of lessons learned across R&S partners. This will be a major initiative for the CCO in the future.

The CCO also recently held a workshop on preparing for a ministerial advising position. Participants, representing civilian and military institutions from across the government had all served as advisors to various foreign ministries, to include agriculture, defense, justice, trade and others. This workshop was the first of what will become a series of workshops on preparing for complex operations.

The CCO-sponsored Case Study Series developed by the Naval Postgraduate School continues apace. Following our successful workshop in December, participants continue working on their individual cases, using the CCO portal as a hub for collaboration and critique.

In this issue's *In the Spotlight*, Bing West discusses his latest book, *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq*. He answers questions on topics ranging from Moqtada al-Sadr's role in Iraq, to the future of Iraqi security forces to necessary policy techniques for counterinsurgency that are sure to prompt debate.

As members of the CCO, you are central to the success of this endeavor. I encourage you to continue to spread the word about the CCO, to contribute your information to the course database and event calendar, and, as always, I welcome your feedback at www.ccoportal.org.

Justice in Waiting: Developing the Rule of Law in Iraq

Colonel (Ret.) Daniel L. Rubini

This article includes lengthy excerpts from other articles to introduce the reader to building Rule of Law in Iraq and to introduce the branch of the U.S. Armed Forces dedicated to rebuilding foreign government services: the U.S. Army Civil Affairs branch.

Civil Affairs (CA) is one of the most complex and sensitive operations in which the U.S. Army can engage, involving the interface between our soldiers and the civilians in the area of operations. It is also one of the most misunderstood Army missions and—to some who see it as “unwarriorlike”—the most criticized. History, however, shows that successful Army CA

(See “Rule of Law” on following page)

Rule of Law (Cont'd from previous page)



operations during and after more conventional military stability and reconstruction operations are key to moving from battlefield success to final victory.

In wartime, CA prevents civilian interference with military operations and conducts humanitarian assistance. In postwar and peace operations, CA provides specialized assistance directly to foreign governments to establish essential government services and stabilize functions. Finally recognized during World War II as an inherent command responsibility, CA was initially designated as “Military Government” in the occupation of Germany, Italy, Korea and Japan. CA soldiers have deployed to every significant operation since Vietnam—Grenada, Panama, Saudi Arabia/Kuwait (Desert Shield/Storm), Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan and Iraq. In this paper veterans of CA operations describe the proper role of the military in postwar/post disaster and peace operations, showing how CA soldiers can bridge the dangerous gap between the end of war and the establishment of a stable foreign government capable of providing essential services.

Part II- Iraq is not a third-world legal system. Iraq’s law and courts are well developed and secular. The roots of its criminal and civil law courts are from European Civil Codes. At the time of the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, the courts were based on 1960’s-era law with an overlay of Saddam’s special courts for torture, summary execution and his rule by decree. The formerly independent judiciary had been placed under the control of the Minister of Justice, a political appointee. After decades of living under such centralized control, the judges had become political functionaries. In April 2003, Ba’athist rule was replaced by anarchy. Insurgency, corruption, and

organized crime remain as serious challenges in bringing justice to the Iraqi people.

The legitimacy of a justice system depends upon police, courts and prisons working together. Each must be perceived as fair, just, transparent, and a protector of human rights. The great difficulty in establishing a system of justice in Iraq was the lack of a working relationship between police, courts and prisons. There was no history of them ever working together. The Iraqi civilian population is still cautious about placing confidence in the revamped Iraqi judiciary. Progress toward the rule of law in Iraq depends upon its leaders establishing an independent judiciary, relinquishing control of the judicial budget to the judiciary, providing mechanisms to enforce Court decisions, and enacting laws against corruption, organized crime, and political interference in law enforcement.

Judges still endure significant risk to their personal safety in order to accomplish the ideal of an independent judiciary. From the beginning, Iraq’s judges wanted US advisors to mentor them on the modern techniques and technology of evidence gathering, investigation, and case management. The mentors engaged in building relationships, understanding the Iraqi system and working with Iraqis within their system. It may not be the American way (the adversarial system), but it does work. Given security from violence, independence from politics, and elimination of corrupt judges and officials, and given continued mentoring, Iraqis will find their way to the rule of law. The pieces are there, but it is still very much a work-in-progress. For now, justice is still in waiting.

Material taken from presentation given 16 March at the Symposium on Military Legitimacy and Leadership at The Citadel; Charleston, SC.

New on the CCO Portal Portal Membership Hits 950!

Portal membership currently includes educators, trainers, administrators, lessons learned professionals, doctrine writers and policy makers. CCO members in government, academia and the NGO community have used the CCO member discussion forums to reach their counterparts at other agencies and organizations to inquire about training opportunities, subject matter expertise, points of contact, and other information to prepare operators for deployment.

CCO members have also been using the member discussion boards and blog to engage in debate on a

number of pressing issues relating to complex operations. Examples of topics covered include emergency response to terrorist attacks, training the Afghan National Army, hybrid warfare, defensive economic warfare and the need for an interagency advisory corps for the US Army. To participate in these discussions, or to send a query to the CCO community regarding preparation for complex operations, visit the [discussion board](#) and the [blog](#).

Naval Postgraduate School Leads Complex Operations Case Series Development for CCO

Mass Communication Specialist Seaman John R. Fischer

The Naval Postgraduate School held an intensive complex operations case study writing workshop at the Asilomar Conference Center on the Monterey Peninsula Dec. 15 through 19, in support of the Center for Complex Operations (CCO).

The CCO, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, was established in 2008 to help the U.S. Government achieve better synergy in Stability Operations, Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare. The CCO is particularly focused on improving education and training in those areas. The engagement of David Sobyra, the CCO Director, and key members of his team, contributed to the success of the Asilomar sessions.



Participants of the inaugural CCO/NPS Case Study Series at a December 2008 workshop in Monterey, CA

The Principle Investigator for the series is Dr. Karen Guttieri, Assistant Professor in the new Global Public Policy Academic Group, a research lead for the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and a Principal in the Security and Globalization Effects Initiative at the NPS Cebrowski Institute. “Several key studies identified a critical need for high quality case studies, particularly in order to generate teaching materials in a variety of disciplines,” Dr. Guttieri remarked. “This will provide more opportunities for students to consider careers in defense, diplomacy and development studies. Some may be interested in working for the US government – whether for the DOD or the Peace Corps – or they may wish to work for an international or non-governmental organization.”

Each day of the 3-day workshop was devoted to a different step in effective case pedagogy, Guttieri explained. The teaching sessions, led by Stephen Wrage of the U.S. Naval Academy, focused on learning, teaching and writing in that order. Professor John Arquilla of Defense Analysis kicked off the meeting with a discussion of lessons from irregular wars. On the final day, Professor Don Brutzman of the MOVES Institute shared a view of future modeling applications for case study development. .

“The Asilomar workshop was the kickoff meeting for writers we identified to do the first round of case studies,” said Major Glenn Woodson of the Security and Globalization Effects Initiative.

“The idea is to empower the writers up front, to set them up for writing a case study that would pass a peer review on the model of the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Diplomacy series,” said Guttieri. This inaugural set of case studies is being made by 14 writers from variety of disciplines, from NPS and around the globe.

“You can tell anybody to write a case study,” Woodson said. “Getting someone to write an effective teaching case study is much more difficult.”


Guttieri explained she used a “Learn, teach, write” system in order to bolster the confidence and abilities of the writers. “It’s better to teach the case method at the beginning than to rely only on reviewing the cases later,” she said. “We worked through some existing case studies together, and then we did some practice – in teams the participants taught case studies to one another. The actual writing workshop was last, but easier given what had come before.”

The NPS team was pleased with the focus of the group brought together in one place, Woodson explained.

“Having the writers interact and glean ideas and experience from each other was key,” said Woodson. The writers have gone back to their homes, their families, their jobs and all of their other daily challenges, he said. But they stay connected, particularly given the availability of the CCO Portal as a forum for dialogue and review. Those interested are encouraged to visit www.ccoportal.org/about.

In the Spotlight

Bing West



The CCO recently interviewed Bing West on his new book *The Strongest Tribe: War Politics and the Endgame in Iraq*.

Your assessment of the national Iraqi security forces, including the Army and the Police, is pretty bleak. An important aspect of counterinsurgency is working with indigenous partners, but given that their inability to take control of the effort was a major part of our change in strategy in early 2007, do we need to rethink our basic assumptions as to how best to work with the host nation? Would it have been better to adopt a grass-roots approach from the beginning, putting all our effort into working with groups from each town, city and region to secure their own areas before looking to create national forces?

President Obama has declared a total pull out by Aug of 2011. So US advisers have about two years to improve the Iraqi security forces. But the leverage of advisers has been tremendously weakened – discounted – because the date certain for their departure has been agreed by the US and GOI. It's too late for significantly more strengthening by US mentoring. We will provide technical training, staff procedures and logistical support. The greatest defect in our approach is the lack of police techniques appropriate to an insurgency.

The grass-roots approach makes all the sense in the world; but it cannot be applied until a majority of the locals in the affected area support the approach and are willing to inform on the insurgents in their midst. In Iraq, that willingness on the Sunni side did not appear until late 2006; then it spread rapidly. On the Shiite side, the power of the Sadr extremists was not broken until the battles in Basra and Baghdad in April of 2007.

Similarly, do we need to revisit our assumptions for creating governance in such a situation? How can we avoid giving the impression that we're playing favorites, thereby branding someone as an American lackey, while also avoiding the negative consequences of top-down power brokering, such as groups like Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army gaining control over critical departments like the Health Ministry?

If we have to go in to remove some son of a bitch, why shouldn't we play favorites? The people understand when they are ruled by a tyrant. We should have arrested Sadr for treason in July of 2003.

After using numerous "cease-fires" since 2004 to rearm and regroup, Moqtada al-Sadr announced last summer that he was disbanding most of his militia. Is this "ceasefire" different from all the rest? If so, what do you think influenced this decision, particularly if the majority of the American effort in Baghdad in 2008 was against al Qaeda and not the Jaish al-Mahdi?

Sadr's synapses don't beat in regular rhythms. He's somewhere in Iraq playing video games. He is a diminished player. His organization is marginalized. The Iranians would like to use Sadr's henchmen as their cat's paw, to include terrorist acts. Sadr is no longer main stream because his forces lost their power status in Sadr City and Basra. Many are in hiding or in Iran.

Read the rest of the interview [here](#).

The Cebrowski Institute Naval Postgraduate School



The Cebrowski Institute for Innovation and Information Superiority sponsors cross-discipline projects leading to innovations that strengthen global security in the information age.

The Institute helps in a world dominated by distributed communication networks. Founded in 2002 as one of three inaugural institutes at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Institute operates as a network of research centers and projects serving a broad community of students and faculty. Our concentrations include:

- Hastily Formed Networks (HFN)
- Network Centric Operations (NCO)
- Security and Globalization
- Maritime Operations
- Worldwide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG)
- Autonomous Coordination
- Mobile Devices and Communications
- Information Operations
- Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare
- Information Assurance and Security

CCO Hosts Ministerial Advising Workshop

On February 10, 2009, the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) held a workshop on Ministerial Advising to capture lessons and insights from experienced advisors. Approximately forty-five attendees participated in the workshop, each with practical experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, representing DoD, DoS, USAID, USDA, the private sector, and the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The objective of the workshop was to capture the recommendations of experienced practitioners on ways to optimize the training and education of U.S. Government ministerial advisors. Participants analyzed advisor tasks, advisor training (actual and desired) and how advisors should approach their jobs in order to design options for training, education, and pre-deployment preparation that would enable advisors to be more effective in their mission.

Nadia Gerspacher, a training and education expert from USIP, led the first session, in which participants analyzed the tasks of a ministerial advisor. Ms. Gerspacher facilitated an elicitive exercise where participants recounted a short personal story of advising that reflects an element of unintended consequences. Each advisor's story reflected different tasks of advising a foreign ministry. Participants then analyzed the stories to identify the various aspects of advising, and considered the tasks involved in advising in a range of categories including: facilitating interpersonal interaction, understanding the workings of the host ministry and government, providing policy guidance, connecting advisees to essential services, and coordinating with their own agencies.

At the close of this exercise, Nasreen Barwari, former Iraqi Minister of Public Works and Ali A. Jalali, former Afghan Minister of the Interior spoke on a "counterparts" panel to address this theme. Ministers

Barwari and Jalali highlighted the need for advising to be demand-driven, and urged advisors to work with their counterparts to develop a joint plan of action.

In the afternoon session, the group considered ways to improve existing training for ministerial advisors, and identified areas in which training courses are still needed to prepare advisors for the tasks associated with their roles. In advance of the workshop, the CCO sent participants a six-question survey about the training and education they received prior to deployment. The session began with advisors rating certain courses that are currently available, after which they developed a "core curriculum" that would best prepare new advisors for their missions. A main theme of the conference was the need to develop a thorough understanding of the needs and goals of advisees, and to develop a joint strategy with advisees and host governments.

The workshop concluded with a panel focused on two previous sessions, and how to institutionalize lessons learned into policy. Captain Stephen Camacho, of OSD(P) Stability Operations, moderated the panel, and panelists included Dan French of the Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Lawrence Barbieri of the Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service and Andrew Rathmell of the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The panel members presented their various initiatives to capture the lessons and expertise provided by practitioners, including the workshop participants, in order to best inform future operations. Workshop participants gave the panelists recommendations on gathering future lessons and shared their thoughts on the lessons learned hub that will be housed at the CCO.

About the CCO

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) is a developing network of civilian and military educators, trainers, and lessons learned practitioners dedicated to improving U.S. preparation for stability operations, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare – collectively called "complex operations." Principal roles of the CCO include serving as an information clearinghouse and cultivating a civil-military community of practice for complex operations training and education. It is a

Department of Defense-led collaboration with the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development. The CCO supports separate but conceptually related Department of Defense and State stability operations, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare efforts. To join, please visit www.ccoportal.org.

Do you have a suggestion for a story?

If you have suggestions on story topics for future issues of the CCO newsletter, please send them to us at supportcenter@ccoportal.org.

Upcoming Events in the CCO Community

For these and other events, please visit the [CCO Events Calendar](#).

Security Sector Reform: The Art of Assessment

March 23-27, 2009

*Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA*

Effective policy-making and field-level programs in security sector reform are dependent upon accurate assessments of recipient country capabilities, needs, and capacity for reform. Too often, faced with the urgency of weak justice and security systems, outside agencies fail to conduct appropriate assessments before launching programs. As a consequence, short, intermediate and long-term prospects are often compromised. This workshop is designed to bring together knowledgeable practitioners of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to discuss ways to enhance assessment techniques so programs will have a better chance to hit the ground running.

Objectives include reviewing the state of the art in assessment methodologies among various practitioner organizations; discussing biases and issues outsiders bring to assessment (time and monetary constraints, industrialized country norms, a focus on institutions rather than capabilities, finding problems for our tools); discussing methods to better analyze indigenous perspectives and non-state voices (non-governmental views of what is needed, traditional justice systems, societal capacity for reform, the influence of indigenous politics on reform); and expanding professional networks among the communities involved in SSR activities.

Special Operations and General Purpose Forces: Roles and Missions for Irregular Warfare

April 1-2, 2009

*National Defense University
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC*

This continuation of the NDU seminar series on stability operations will examine joint force capabilities and capacity for irregular warfare, focusing on the unique strengths of special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF) and the increasing overlap of responsibilities between SOF and GPF. Additional details are included in the attached invitation. There is no cost to participate.

Joint Urban Warrior '09

April 20-24, 2009

Potomac, MD

Joint Urban Warrior (JUW) is a US Marine Corps (USMC) and US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) cosponsored discovery event designed to address and improve joint and combined urban operations concept development and experimentation (CD&E). JUW involves Service, Joint, Multinational, and Interagency participation throughout the Pathway. JUW is focused on: the integration of the full spectrum of advanced operational concepts and approaches, organizational innovations, technologies, and other transformational opportunities in complex urban operations necessary to enhance operational effectiveness in the context of the "Three Block War;" the critical importance of political end-state planning in shaping the nature of the joint urban campaign; and the critical importance of the stability and support aspects of urban operations. The JUW 09 lead organizations are the USMC Center for Irregular Warfare, and the USJFCOM Joint Irregular Warfare Center.

JUW '09 will focus on how the joint force, operating in the joint, interagency, and multinational environment, will contribute to a whole of government approach to prevent conflict within the context of Security Force Assistance?

Feature Your Events!

To feature your institution's events on the CCO calendar, please go to www.ccoportal.org to register. Once logged in, use the "Submit Content" feature located in the menu on the left of the screen.