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From the Desk of the Director

David Sobyra

Welcome! These are exciting times for the CCO, and I want to bring to your attention a couple of the key features of this edition of the Consortium for Complex Operations newsletter.



First, we are pleased that Dr. Steven Metz agreed to

be the subject of our first-ever “Ten Questions” series. This series is intended to feature new thinking from the pre-eminent thought leaders on the subject of complex operations. Dr. Metz discusses his recent paper on the value of high value targeting as an element of a counter-insurgency campaign. We hope our questions and his answers will stimulate debate among our members on this interesting and provocative subject.

The second item I would like to bring to your attention is the feature on the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) and Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). The CCO Support Center and JKO are exploring ways to leverage the power of our complementary portals and I encourage CCO members to visit the Joint Knowledge Online portal at <http://jko.cmil.org>

In addition to our Ten Questions series and JKO, I would like to touch on a couple of additional CCO activities. The CCO is pleased to be a participant in the NSPD-44 Best Practices

Working Group Lessons Learned Task Force (LLTF).

The CCO hopes to enable this activity through continued collaboration as the work of the LLTF matures, and we welcome advice and input from CCO members. Another exciting initiative is the CCO’s recent sponsorship of a Complex Operations Case Study Series to be developed under the guidance of Dr. Karen Guttieri of the Cebrowski Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Expect to hear more about this initiative in our next newsletter and on the CCO portal.

As members of the CCO, you are central to the success of this endeavor. I am pleased to note that membership in the CCO has been growing steadily since the CCO kick-off conference in April, with almost 700 users registered on the CCO Portal. I encourage you to spread the word about the CCO and sponsor eligible colleagues to join our Community of Practice.

I look forward to seeing many of you at the Integrated Training and Education Workshop in Gettysburg in a few short weeks – and I hope to see all of you on the portal!

Integrated Training and Education Workshop 2008



PKSOI, in conjunction with CCO, S/CRS, USIP, CAC, and NPS

will host the 2008 Integrated Training and Education Workshop on Stability and Reconstruction. The workshop will be held at the Wyndham Gettysburg from 22-25 September.

This year’s workshop is a natural progression of the ongoing efforts from years past. The August 2006 Integrated Education Workshop, hosted at GMU with PKSOI, NPS, NDU, USIP, and SCRS, provided a forum to examine processes for creating synergies among current education efforts, identify best practices, and provide recommendations to improve peace, stability, and reconstruction operation education programs.

In 2007, the Education and Training Workshop sponsored by the same stakeholders provided valuable insights and inputs for the NSPD implementation plan. It developed the following: an education packet for our Senior Leaders to assist them in understanding the types and capabilities of organizations involved in R&S operations, a comprehensive outreach strategy to engage civilian universities and legislative branch of the USG; and suggested that S/CRS review the possible addition of education as a component of the sub-PCC under the R&S PCC.

(See “Workshop” on Next Page)

About the CCO

The Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) is a developing network of civilian and military educators, trainers, and lessons learned practitioners dedicated to improving U.S. preparation for stability operations, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare – collectively called “complex operations.” Principal roles of the CCO include serving as an information clearinghouse and cultivating a civil-military community of practice

Workshop (cont'd from Page 1)

This year's workshop will bring together trainers and educators from the U.S. Government, international and non-governmental organizations, and select private and military educational institutions to present current core curriculum content, concepts, and tools to understand approaches and determine gaps. This comparative analysis will enhance the curriculum throughout the larger community dealing with professional leader training and education programs. There are four objectives for the workshop:

- 1 Understand the commonalities and differences among the various approaches toward training and educating on Stability and Reconstruction.
- 2 Identify and share best practices pedagogical tools.
- 3 Identify gaps in curriculum, content, and methodology, and develop solutions.
- 4 Establish strategic partnerships to share content and ideas.

The 2008 workshop will provide an opportunity for practitioners to share and assist one another as they develop and refine curriculum and content to train and educate their employees. The basis for discussions will be doctrine and policies that are emerging as a result of the publication of the US Army's FM 3-07 Stability Operations, decisions from the Policy Coordinating Committee on training and educating the CSI and the whole of government, and various academic initiatives. Those interested in more about the workshop can contact COL Morgan Lamb or Ms Marcy Robey at 717 254-6392 or 4828.

for complex operations training and education. It is a Department of Defense-led collaboration with the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development. The CCO supports separate but conceptually related Department of Defense and State stability operations, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare efforts. To join, please visit www.ccoportal.org.

New on the CCO Portal Portal Membership Hits 650!

Portal membership has increased by more than 200 since the last newsletter. Current CCO membership includes 650 educators, trainers, administrators, lessons learned professionals, doctrine writers and policy makers. CCO members in government, academia and the NGO community have used the CCO member discussion forums to reach their counterparts at other agencies and organizations to inquire about training opportunities, subject matter expertise, points of contact, and other information to prepare operators for deployment.

CCO members have also been using the member discussion boards and blog to engage in debate on a number of pressing issues relating to complex operations. Examples of topics covered on the discussion board include the role of the Air Force in stability operations and counterinsurgency, American national interests in Iraq, the role of the diplomat in counterinsurgency and achieving civil-military balance in complex operations. The blog has covered such topics as applying lessons learned from Iraq in creating a strategy for Afghanistan, the usefulness of leadership targeting in counterinsurgency, applying Hobbes to counterinsurgency and the effects of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan on coalition partners. To participate in these discussions, or to send a query to the CCO community regarding preparation for complex operations, visit the [discussion board](#) and the [blog](#).

Do you have a suggestion for a story?

If you have suggestions on story topics for future issues of the CCO newsletter, please send them to us at supportcenter@ccoportal.org.

Developing an Interagency Stabilization and Reconstruction Lessons Learned Process

By Chris Wendell, S/CRS, and Amon Killeen, OSD/STB, Lessons Learned Task Force Facilitators



Photo: USAID File Photo

Agency-specific lessons learned processes and multi-agency knowledge sharing solutions exist at the operational and tactical levels. However, developing an integrated, interagency process at the strategic level will help to ensure that the U.S. Government, as a whole, is further empowered to prepare, plan for, and respond to contingencies in the future.

The Best Practices Working Group (BPWG), formed under National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, is exploring options for developing an interagency Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) Lessons Learned process.

The BPWG has established an interagency Lessons Learned Task Force to flesh-out specific options for how an interagency stabilization and reconstruction lessons learned process could collect, vet, distribute, and, most importantly, implement lessons in a timely fashion. In addition to examining advantages and disadvantages for each option, the task force is identifying potential bureaucratic obstacles, resource implications and mitigation strategies.

The Lessons Learned Task Force builds on the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Lessons Learned Workshop, which was hosted by the BPWG, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) on March 11-12, 2008 in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. More than 80 participants took part, representing a broad cross-section of practitioners, trainers, policy-makers, and lessons

learned experts. The workshop examined PRTs holistically, noting fundamental differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. The event helped to identify recommendations for improving the effectiveness of PRTs and future models, and to start the process to conceptualize a U.S. government lessons learned system for S&R.

The task force's methodology includes an informal survey of the experience and best business practices of lessons learned approaches across the federal government. For example, members of the task force have interviewed experts at a range of organizations from NASA to the Internal Revenue Service to the Department of Homeland Security. In addition, the task force has interviewed potential customers of an S&R lessons learned process to better understand requirements from the strategic to tactical levels.

Common themes of the interviews include effective approaches to promote a non-reprisal culture of learning and trust, which is critical for success. In addition, having senior level champions and a protected budget and mandate are enablers that ensure an unimpeded and meaningful process. Finally, ensuring accessibility from the field and that the process is responsive to customer requirements are essential.

The task force comprises representatives from civilian and military organizations including: Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities (OSD/STB); USAID Chief Operating Officer; USAID Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance; U.S. Department of Agriculture; Joint Staff J-7; Joint Center for Operational Analysis; Headquarters United States Air Force A9L; Center for Army Lessons Learned; PKSOI; and the CCO.

From the CCO community especially, the Lessons Learned Task Force would welcome advice, inputs, and experience in developing this process. For further information or comments, please start a member discussion in the CCO portal (preferable) or feel free to contact the facilitators: Chris Wendell, S/CRS, WendellGC@state.gov, 202-663-0846; or Amon Killeen, OSD/STB, amon.killeen.ctr@osd.mil, 703-697-5543.

In the Spotlight

Dr. Steven Metz



The CCO Support Center recently interviewed Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College on his paper "Strategic Decapitation: The Dynamics of High Value Targeting in Counterinsurgency," presented on 17 July at the RAND

Insurgency Board in Arlington, VA. The [paper](#), [PowerPoint presentation](#), and [full interview](#) can be found on the portal.

You make the argument that high value targeting is most likely to work in the early stages of an insurgency, but that counterinsurgents usually use this approach when it is least effective: when an insurgency is at its strength. How can a counterinsurgent recognize an emerging insurgency early enough to apply high value targeting? Has there been a case where a counterinsurgent recognized an insurgency in its early stages and had success through high value targeting?

I suspect there have been many instances where counterinsurgents had early recognition and used high value targeting, but they simply don't receive the same publicity as an insurgency which is allowed to fester and coalesce. The killing or capture of a dozen or so "bandits" in some remote part of the world doesn't get much media play. But we never know how many of these could have grown to major threats if not addressed early. There is the same epistemological problem as with deterrence--we never know whether it really worked, or whether there was no real threat in the first place.

You argue that in Chechnya, insurgent leader Shamil Basayev was able to take control of the insurgency after previous leaders had been killed and, as a result of his leadership, the organization of insurgent operations improved. Is this a common "blowback" effect of high value targeting – that the counterinsurgent targets the leadership, only to find that the remaining leaders are actually worse than the previous ones?

I think you're spot on. High value targeting can have a "Darwinian" effect of removing less effective or less ruthless leaders because they are easier targets, thus making the insurgency more effective, at least in the short term. What Edward Luttwak calls the "paradoxical logic" of strategy applies--what appears to be the best action, in this case killing or capturing

insurgent leaders, often is not.

Read the [rest of the interview](#), including Dr. Metz's recommendations for how the military should do with Osama bin Laden after capturing him.

Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC)



Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability is the Department of

Defense's (DOD) Training Transformation (T2) sponsored program responsible for ensuring that joint training of individuals evolves to remain relevant and effective in meeting the dynamic challenges of national security today. JKDDC develops joint training products and services in response to stakeholder-identified requirements, and delivers global access to its Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) training portal providing training necessary to prepare in advance for joint training exercises and integrated operations.

Joint/integrated operations may be Combined Joint Task Force operations involving members of the different branches of military service, but can also span humanitarian efforts, first responder operations, disaster relief, etc. involving a variety of DOD and non-DOD organizations. For this reason, JKO's training audience includes joint operators, multinational, intergovernmental and interagency individuals that may be involved in integrated operations.

Joint Knowledge Online is the JKDDC portal providing access to web-based training courses and resources via three networks: military unclassified [NIPRnet](#), military classified [SIPRnet](#) and [public access](#) via Internet. All portal channels provide access to the JKDDC tailored learning management system (LMS) that tracks, documents and reports student progress

[Joint Knowledge Online-Internet Public](#) site (JKO-IP) is the JKO public access portal for non-DOD users via the Internet. JKO-IP provides an online source for relevant operationally focused joint training, knowledge services and products specifically tailored for access by the general public, multinational partners, interagency and intergovernmental partners.

The Civilian Response Corps

The Civilian Response Corps is a group of civilian federal employees and, eventually, volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments, who will be trained and equipped



to deploy rapidly to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict, in order to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. They are diplomats, development specialists, public health officials, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers, public administrators, agronomists and others – offering the full range of skills needed to help fragile states restore stability and the rule of law, and achieve economic recovery and sustainable growth as quickly as possible.

America’s federal civilian workforce has a long and distinguished history of service in difficult environments abroad. Yet the challenges of the 21st century require a significant increase in our capacity to respond quickly and effectively to emerging threats to the security of the United States and our friends and allies. The Civilian Response Corps is intended to provide this capability.

The President has empowered the Secretary of State to coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities, and to coordinate with the Secretary of Defense to harmonize civilian and military activities.

Because no single government entity has all of the relevant expertise, the Civilian Response Corps is a partnership of eight departments and agencies: the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of the Treasury.

President Bush has requested \$248.6 million in Fiscal Year 2009 budget for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), which includes the Civilian Response Corps. If fully funded, CSI will:

- Create 250 full-time positions for members of the Active component of the Civilian Response Corps across the eight participating U.S. departments and agencies. These “first responders” are experts who can deploy to a crisis with as little as 48 hours’ notice.
- Train 2,000 “Standby” members of the Civilian Response Corps in the same eight departments and agencies. These are current federal

employees who volunteer to undertake additional training and to be available to serve in stabilization missions in case of need. Standby Members are deployable within 30 days for up to 180 days.

- Recruit and train 2,000 “Reserve” members of the Civilian Response Corps: volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments who will bring additional skills and capabilities that do not exist in sufficient quantities in the federal government, such as police officers, city administrators, and port operators.

In the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (PL 110-252) Congress provided up to \$75 million in initial funding for the Active and Standby components of the Civilian Response Corps.

Already, the pilot Active and Standby components of the Civilian Response Corps within the Department of State have deployed members to Sudan, Chad, Haiti, Lebanon, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan to assist with conflict prevention and mitigation. By launching the Civilian Response Corps as an interagency capability, the funding provided by Congress this year will strengthen our ability to conduct integrated operations advancing America’s interests by helping states avoid or recover from conflict.

Army G-3/5/7 Stability Operations Division (DAMO-SSO)



The mission of the Stability Operations Division is to focus and integrate Army Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction activities in order to improve the Army’s capability and capacity to

conduct Stability Operations in a Joint, Interagency and Multinational environment; and oversee development and shaping of Army policy and stability related efforts. The office has four branches:

- The *Strategy, Policy & Integration Branch* is responsible for developing, integrating, monitoring, assessing and reporting all aspects related to Stability, Security, Transition & Reconstruction Operations strategy and planning.
- The *Security Sector Branch* is responsible for developing and integrating the key mechanisms that foster and provide for a secure environment to promote legitimate governance and provide for viable peace.
- The *Reconstruction Branch* is responsible for rebuilding degraded, damaged or destroyed political, socio-economic and physical infrastructure in a region of interest

- to provide for viable peace.
- The *Civ-Mil Integration Branch* is responsible for integrating efforts of all organizations outside U.S. Government Military Services.

The Stability Operations Division is closely integrated with the Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) which serves as the US Army Center of Excellence in mastering peace, stability and

reconstruction operations at the strategic and operational levels by:

- Shaping military and interagency policy, concept and doctrine development.
- Conducting senior leader education.
- Facilitating the integration of effort among the US military, the interagency, international organizations, coalition partners and NGOs.

Upcoming Events in the CCO Community

For these and other events, please visit the [CCO Calendar](#)

The US Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives

*September 16-18, 2008
Fort Leavenworth, KS*

The Combat Studies Institute will host a symposium entitled "The US Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives." The symposium will include a variety of guest speakers, panel sessions, and general discussions. This symposium will explore the partnership between the US Army and government agencies in attaining national goals and objectives in peace and war within a historical context. Separate international topics may be presented. The symposium will also examine current issues, dilemmas, problems, trends, and practices associated with US Army operations requiring close interagency cooperation.

Working in the Same Space

*September 21-24, 2008
Monterey, CA*

This workshop, hosted by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, will explore how practitioners from the various communities (armed forces, government civilian agencies, NGOs and IGOs) involved in post-conflict reconstruction interact in the field. It will include panels, plenary discussions,

role-playing exercises and networking opportunities to examine the different motivations, capacities, strengths and weaknesses of the organizations working in complex environments.

New Security Challenges: Policy Issues and Analytic Approaches

*October 6-10, 2008
Arlington, VA*

Since its inception in 2000, "New Security Challenges," an intensive weeklong program offered by the Pardee RAND Graduate School, has equipped participants with both an understanding of the most critical current policy challenges and the most up-to-date analytical techniques for addressing them. Through the program, participants will be exposed to the latest analytic approaches to key defense challenges, gain a better understanding of select security topics of importance to the United States and other nations, develop a better understanding of many of the most pressing issues that confront security planners in the U.S. and other nations and participate in a hands-on exercise in strategic planning, examining the demands on U.S. military capabilities in a new strategic landscape.

Feature Your Events!

To feature your institution's events on the CCO calendar, please go to www.ccoportal.org to register. Once logged in, use the "Submit Content" feature located in the menu on the left of the screen.