

In Search of a New Type of Army: Nation Building and Occupation

A Monograph

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ABSTRACT

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The United States of America today exerts unprecedented influence over international events as the world's only remaining superpower. Since the end of the Cold War, the frequency of American foreign intervention and operational tempo of American military forces has increased greatly. The size of the United States military and of the Army in particular during this same period has dramatically decreased. Political leaders in the United States have used military force with increasing frequency to achieve policy objectives during the past decade. The majority of these operations fall into the category of military operations other than war, or stability and support operations. This monograph explores theory, history, and doctrine in order to determine if past experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United States more recent experience in Iraq offer insights and lessons applicable to the future Army and its involvement in nation building and occupation. The monograph proposes recommendations as to how the United States Army can best shape its forces for the future.

This report includes two case studies, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995 until present) and Iraq (2003 until present). The case studies examine the events leading up to the conflicts, the introduction of the American military forces, and the major lessons learned about stability and support operations. The research revealed that there are reoccurring themes and lessons of nation building and occupation. First, that nation building and occupation are protracted operations. Second, that a secure environment is of utmost importance. Third, that unity of effort is vital for success in these types of operations. Lastly, that the level of national commitment on the part of the United States is usually the determining factor of success.

There are several requirements for the future force that can be derived from these lessons: the active engagement of the population, native speaking language specialists, trained cultural and area specialists, infrastructure and reconstruction specialists, the need for forward basing of area commands, the ability to distribute resources in a timely manner. It seems clear that involvement in future nation building and occupation missions is unavoidable for the United States Army given the current and future strategic environment. The Army needs to accept some degree of stability and support operations as a vital part of its mission and adjust force structure, training and planning accordingly. This adaptation is essential if Army efforts at transformation are going to be successful in the long term.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of a liberal civil society.

*Robert D. Kaplan – Supremacy by Stealth*¹

With great power comes great responsibility. The United States of America in 2004 exerts unprecedented influence over international events as the world's only remaining superpower. This influence, in conjunction with its preeminent military power, inevitably leads to foreign intervention and consequently to nation building and occupation.² As the transformation of the United States Army begins, many important questions about the future remain. This monograph explores the question of whether or not the United States Army requires a new force structure and different capabilities in order to be successful in future nation building and occupation operations.

The emerging strategic and operational environment of the twenty-first century is uncertain and mercurial. Since the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the end of the Cold War, the frequency of United States foreign intervention and operational tempo of American military forces has increased greatly.³ The size of the United States military during the 1990's has dramatically decreased, stretching American military forces to their limits. It is apparent following the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, that the United States faces opponents who seek to attack its citizens, homes and government institutions in a campaign of protracted terrorist operations.

¹ Robert D. Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth," *Atlantic Monthly*, August 2003, 40.

² James Dobbins, *Nation-Building: the Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower*. Available online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/nation.html>, accessed 01 Oct 03. Nation building is defined as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy."

³ Conrad C. Crane, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller Scale Contingencies during the 1990s* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 1.

The President of the United States summed up the current terrorist threat in his 2003 State of the Union Address:

Our greatest responsibility is the active defense of the American people. Twenty-eight months have passed since September 11, 2001 – over two years without an attack on American soil. And it is tempting to believe that the danger is behind us. That hope is understandable, comforting – and false.⁴

The challenges of the emerging strategic environment are legion. Opponents of America hegemony seek to limit U.S. military intervention abroad by degrading American political resolve, attacking selected vulnerable civilian and military targets, inflicting high numbers of casualties and prolonging and increasing the costs of American military operations and diplomatic efforts.⁵

The Current Strategic Environment

The current strategic environment is far more ambiguous and complex than it was before the end of the Cold War. Transnational crime, international terrorism, reprobate dictators, failed states, urban military operations, and rising tribal, ethnic and cultural tensions all challenge the world order today. In his seminal work titled *The Coming Anarchy*, Robert Kaplan summarized the bleak outlook of future global security:

...Worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real “strategic” danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are [the issues]... that will soon confront our civilization...[as we witness] the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease and the growing pervasiveness of war.⁶

⁴ United States President. *State of the Union Address, 2004*. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/200040120-7.html>, accessed 20 January 2004.

⁵ Many military analysts, including retired General Anthony Zinni, have concluded that because foreign governments, militaries, and terrorists realize they cannot compete with America conventionally, they have turned to asymmetric capabilities to combat American hegemony.

⁶ Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, 44-76.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which include nuclear, chemical and biological agents, as well as the rise of globalization and information technology only complicate the dangers faced by established nation-states. The realities of an active defense against these twenty-first century security threats challenges even the most preeminent military force and warrant a reexamination of the mission of the United States Army.⁷

The primary mission of the United States Army as stated in *Field Manual 1 – the Army*, remains “to fight and win the nation’s wars.”⁸ It appears that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) may require a shift in the Army’s training focus in order to meet new mission requirements over the course of the next two decades. General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, has called for the Army to become “more joint, expeditionary and modular” in order to meet current threats at a time when the Army is stretched thin.⁹ In order to accomplish its mission, the Army must remain a viable tool of the foreign policy of the United States.

The National Security Strategy signed by President Bush in 2002 clearly states that the long-term goal of American foreign policy is to “actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world.”¹⁰ The assumption is that democratic nations are peaceful nations—that democratic nations will pose no threat to the United States of America directly. This statement of foreign policy is reminiscent of the work of T.R. Fehrenbach who stated in 1964:

⁷ Following his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker called for the United States Army to become “more joint, expeditionary and modular.” In addition, he and the Secretary of Defense have stated publicly of the need for regular Army units to become more “SOF” like.

⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1—The Army*. (Washington, D.C.: 2001), 1.

⁹ Sean D. Naylor, “Overhauling the U.S. Army,” *Defense News*, Available online at <http://www.ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20030929220115.html>, accessed September 29, 2003.

¹⁰ United States President. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>, accessed 17 September 2002.

You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do so on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.¹¹

The United States Army will remain the primary means to promote this goal of democratic enlargement since the Army provides the nation the long-term staying power on the ground, the ability to actively engage foreign populations across a wide spectrum of operations, and the means to rapidly escalate to high intensity combat if required by a changing world situation. Some military analysts and critics of the current Iraq intervention have argued that in order to win not only the war but to also to win the peace, the Army must expand beyond its Cold War military roles.¹² B.H. Liddell Hart states that “if you concentrate exclusively on [military] victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.”¹³

There has been a marked increase in the use of American military forces for stability and support operations (SASO) that include both nation building and occupation following the conclusion the Persian Gulf War in 1991.¹⁴ Since the end of 1993 alone, the United States has participated in 170 small-scale contingencies ranging from humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement.¹⁵

¹¹ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness*, (New York: Pocket Books, 1964), 454.

¹² The debate over what are traditional military missions continues. From a wholly historical perspective, the two world wars were aberrations in American military history. The United States Army has conducted far more military operations other than war (MOOTW missions) over the last 228 years than it has major wars. These missions have included occupation, nation building, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

¹³ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 366.

¹⁴ The characterization of current American military involvement in Iraq has also sparked great debate. The United States became an occupying power, much like post World War II Germany, by deposing the former regime of Saddam Hussein. The United States is currently conducting nation-building activities within Iraq. Doctrinally speaking, American forces are conducting stability and support operations, of which nation assistance, foreign internal defense and counter-insurgency are subsets.

¹⁵ Crane, 2.




Figure 1: Spectrum of MOOTW and the Army Role in Theater Engagement, *FM 3-0*¹⁶

The United States Army training philosophy concerning these types of operations does not seem to support the increase in stability and support operations.¹⁷ The Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, states in the most recent Combat Training Center (CTC) Vision Statement:

¹⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3—Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: 2001), 9-2.

¹⁷ Types of stability operations include: peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control and show of force operations.

The CTC focus remains combat operations and the close fight. The end state will be CTC program that is relevant to the training audience, focuses on leader development, and provides the finest possible warfighting experience—short of combat—across the full spectrum of conflict.¹⁸

The current training philosophy concentrates on high-intensity/combat-focused operations, with stability and support mission-specific training conducted only as required.

Both the United States intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina that began in 1995 and the current occupation mission in Iraq that followed the United States invasion of 2003, required combat units, combat support units, and combat service support units to conduct stability and support and civil-military operations that they were never trained nor specifically equipped for. At the same time, the United States has made major investments in the improvement of military technology to ensure technological superiority and increased lethality to the point that many pundits profess that American military forces have no peer military competitor in the world today.¹⁹ There has been, however, no comparable increase or sizable investment in the capacity of the Army to conduct post-conflict nation-building and occupation operations.

The United States Army will face the problems of combating terrorism, failed states, competition over scarce natural resources, and ethnic/cultural/religious violence for decades to come.²⁰ In the latest revision of the National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush characterized the current strategic environment as such:

The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to

¹⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Chief of Staff Combat Training Center Future Vision*. Available online at <http://ctc.army.mil/csavision.htm>, accessed January 15, 2004.

¹⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *the United States Army 2004 Posture Statement*. Available online at <http://www.army.mil/aps/04/download.html>, accessed January 15, 2004.

²⁰ Dobbins, *Nation-Building: the Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower*, xxix.

account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists – because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.²¹

Because of the unknown duration of the Global War on Terror, and the fact that the future security environment will invariably include nation building and occupation missions, the future of the United States Army may lie with soldiers that are educated in the disciplines of economics, political structure, infrastructure repair, and information management in order to ensure that the United States wins the peace. Clearly, the American historical experience in small-scale contingencies and MOOTW operations offers lessons for the future of Army transformation.

This monograph examines lessons learned from stability and support operations conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq. Specifically, this work will examine operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from December 1995 until present, and operations conducted in Iraq from March 2003 until present. By focusing on both history and current doctrine, this monograph identifies shortfalls in the capabilities required for future nation building and proposes changes to the current force structure that provide new capabilities.²² In particular, this monograph addresses the diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) areas of national power that are not traditionally associated with military response. The significance of these shortfalls bears directly upon the requirements for the United States Army's program of transformation. This monograph proposes a variety of capabilities that the United States Army can implement in the Global War on Terror both now and in the future.²³

²¹ United States President. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>, accessed 17 September 2002.

²² A new capability set is defined as a body of institutional knowledge, formal education, specific job skills and specialized equipment.

²³ The majority of the work focuses on the capabilities necessary at the brigade and division level during stability and support operations. At times, this includes a discussion of individual level training and special skills required during foreign interventions. This monograph, however, does not discuss in detail the issue of the United States Army's force cap, as mandated by the United States Congress, nor does it address the issues of mandatory military service or the reserve force structure.

Conclusion

In summary, the preceding chapter conveys four main points. First, since the end of the Cold War, the United States of America exerts unprecedented influence over international events as the world's only remaining superpower. Second, the current strategic environment is far more ambiguous and complex than during the Cold War and now includes the threat of international terrorism, failed states, competition over scarce natural resources, and ethnic/cultural/religious violence.²⁴ These threats will remain a part of the strategic environment for decades to come. Third, the operational tempo and employment in stability and support operations of the American military forces has increased dramatically with no sizable investment in the capacity of the Army to conduct post-conflict nation building and occupation operations despite the large investment in technology to increase the lethality of military units. Fourth, the American military interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq both required combat units, combat support units, and combat service support units to conduct stability and support and civil-military operations that they were never trained nor specifically equipped for.

²⁴ An example of competition over scarce natural resources would be Turkey's efforts to build substantial hydrological projects to regulate the flow of water in the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which will directly affect neighboring states such as Iraq.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT

Lessons and insights from past low-intensity wars deserve revisiting. They provide perspective as well as context for what may be a defining period for the American war on terrorism.

*Robert R. Tomes – Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare*²⁵

American foreign involvement and intervention is not a new phenomenon. Past nation building and occupation missions include interventions in Cuba, Haiti, the Philippines, Germany, and Japan conducted during the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. America's history of nation building includes the replacement, or the creation of a government that is acceptable to the political leadership of the United States, and is invariably the most officious embodiment of American military intervention and foreign policy.

The United States of America has conducted two major stability and support operations during the last decade that included both nation building and occupation.²⁶ The first major operation began with deployment of the First Armored Division, designated Task Force Eagle, during OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina beginning in 1995. The second major operation, known as OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, begins following the cessation of major combat operations in Iraq in 2003. The stability and support operations phase of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM followed the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, and is currently ongoing.

²⁵ Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare." *Parameters*, Available online at http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/volumes/volume2/march_2004/3_04_1.html, accessed 29 Mar 2004, 16.

²⁶ Gary T. Dempsey and Roger W. Fontaine. *Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation-building* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2001), 3. This monograph does not include American military interventions in Haiti, Kosovo, and the failed mission in Somalia that also occurred during the 1990's.

United States Involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Road to War

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1990 to 1994 was the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the end of World War II.²⁷ The United Nations estimated the bloodshed in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina at 200,000 casualties (both military and civilian) and over 2 million people displaced as either international refugees or internally displaced persons.²⁸ The United States was a reluctant participant in the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the disintegration of the Yugoslavian state, a state created out of the remains of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The origins of the disintegration of the Yugoslavian state date back to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic as the prime minister of Serbia after the 1980 death of Yugoslavian President Josip Broz.²⁹

Slobodan Milosevic fueled Serbian nationalism, leading eventually to armed conflict and ethnic cleansing throughout the former Yugoslavian republics. The rising ethnic tensions set the stage for Slovenia and Croatia to declare their independence from the Yugoslavian federation. The reaction of Serbia to these declarations of independence was to seize major cities in eastern Croatia inhabited by Serbs, such as in the conflict over the Krajina section of Croatia.³⁰ In the period from 1990 to 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia all seceded from what was once Yugoslavia.

²⁷ Dempsey and Fontaine, 85.

²⁸ Jolene Kay Jesse, *Humanitarian Relief in the Midst of Conflict: The UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the Former Yugoslavia* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, 1996), 1.

²⁹ Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 44.

³⁰ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, RAND, 2003), 88.



Figure 2: Yugoslavian Republics and Regions 1945-91, *Military Review*³¹

The European community formally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina following its declaration of independence in 1992. This international recognition sparked a bitter civil war among the former Yugoslavian republics. Unlike the other republics of the former Yugoslavian federation, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a multiethnic state.³² Radical nationalist leaders of all factions created a strategy of “ethnic cleansing” in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in an attempt to consolidate their war gains. During this period, the United Nations Security Council voted to deploy a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in an attempt to separate Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian military forces. Before this action in 1991, the United Nations voted for an arms embargo on all of the former Yugoslavian republics. The Serbs seized almost seventy percent of Bosnia by 1992; the fighting followed the

³¹ George W. Gawrych, “Roots of Bosnian Realities.” *Military Review*, Available online at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/julaug97/Gawrych.htm>, accessed 29 Mar 2004, 86.

³² Dobbins, *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, 87.

Serbian boycott of the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections.³³ The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina reached a deadlock by the end of 1994, and was only broken when Croatian military forces counterattacked in 1995 after receiving Western military equipment and training.³⁴ The Bosnian-Muslims and Croats launched a combined offensive on Serbian positions in August of 1995 and regained large portions of lost territory in western and central Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁵ Had it not been for the inability of the United Nations and the European Union to control the escalation of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is doubtful that the United States would have entangled itself in Bosnian affairs.³⁶

Introduction of Forces

American involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina fell under the Clinton policy of “democratic enlargement.” In a 1993 speech delivered before the United Nations General Assembly President Clinton declared:

Our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market based democracies. During the Cold War, we fought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.³⁷

The United States became committed to intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the failure of UNPROFOR to secure agreed upon safe havens and of the United Nations and the European Union to facilitate a workable peace agreement. The United Nations classified the UNPROFOR mission as

³³ In order to consolidate their military gains, the Serbs cleared captured territory by either killing the Croats and Muslims who lived there, or displacing them and seizing their property. They were not, however, the only faction guilty of this offense.

³⁴ Dobbins, *America’s Role in Nation Building*, 88.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, 287.

³⁷ Gary T. Dempsey, “Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation-building to Combat Terrorism.” *Policy Analysis*, March 21, 2002, 5.

peacekeeping when there was in fact, no peace agreement or cease-fire to enforce.³⁸ The United Nations reluctance to use force against the warring factions of Bosnia-Herzegovina when they attacked aid convoys, violated established no-fly zones and heavy weapon zones was the precursor to direct military intervention by the United States. President Clinton eventually committed the United States to brokering a peace agreement following dramatic media coverage of atrocities occurring daily in the former Yugoslavian republic. United States involvement in Bosnian peace negotiations resulted in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes against Serbian military forces in an effort to coerce them to accept a negotiated settlement. NATO air strikes would continue unabated until all three factions met to complete a peace agreement; the factions signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, in Paris in December of 1995.³⁹ Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke served as the lead American negotiator between the Serbian, Muslim and Croatian factions.

The United States deployed 20,000 American soldiers from the First Armored Division stationed in Germany as part of the larger NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). The American division would become part of the Multi-National Division North, also known as Task Force Eagle. Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie recalled the Task Force Eagle mission statement during OPERATION IRON ENDEAVOR in his 1997 article on Bosnia lessons learned that appeared in *Military Review*:

The Task Force Eagle mission statement's language was specific: "On order Task Force Eagle deploys to SECTOR TUZLA, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and conducts peace enforcement operations to compel compliance with the peace accord; ensures force protection." We wanted to compel the factions to comply so that over a short time, it would almost become rote on their part.⁴⁰

³⁸ R. Craig Nation, *War in the Balkans, 1991-2002*. (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 204.

³⁹ Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building*, 88.

⁴⁰ Stanley F. Cherrie, "Task Force Eagle." *Military Review*, Available online at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/julaug97/Cherrie.htm>, accessed 29 Mar 2004, 63.

American forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not alone in their nation building efforts. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Office of the High Representative (OHR), and the European Union (EU) were vital to the organization of elections, the resettlement of internally displaced persons, and institution creation within the Bosnian government. In addition to the OSCE and the EU, there were numerous non-governmental organizations and private organizations working to improve the conditions within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States replaced the IFOR forces with the Stabilization Force (SFOR) following the expiration of the IFOR mandate at the one-year mark.




Figure 3: Task Force Eagle Predeployment Training, *Military Review* ⁴¹

By 1997, it became apparent that there existed a “GFAP Gap” between the ability of military forces to implement their assigned tasks of the General Framework Agreement for Peace and that of their

⁴¹ Stanley F. Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle.” *Military Review*, Available online at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/julaug97/Cherrie.htm>, accessed 29 Mar 2004, 64. As shown in this figure, only one day of political-military training is denoted for the division, and only three weeks of field exercises to prepare the battalions and brigades of the First Armored Division for employment in OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

civilian counterparts to meet their requirements.⁴² Consequently, American military forces expanded their mission to “assist international organizations to set the conditions for civilian implementation of the GFAP in order to transition the area of operations to a stable environment.”⁴³ This was a clear indication that American military leaders were accepting the responsibility for the tasks of their civilian counterparts in nation building in order to set the conditions for the eventual withdrawal or reduction of United States forces in support of the SFOR commitment.




Figure 4: Task Force Eagle Task Organization, *Military Review*⁴⁴

⁴² Crane, 23.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Cherrie, 66. As this chart shows, the First Armored Division was employed in a traditional manner, without major modifications made to its task organization for stability and support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Task Force Eagle also included a Russian Brigade, the Nordic/Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade, and a Turkish Brigade.

Conclusion

The examination of the United States involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina makes several important points. First, that American foreign intervention in nation building and occupation is not a new phenomenon. Second, that nation building and occupation historically involve the replacement or creation of a foreign government that is acceptable to the political leadership of the United States, and that this type of intervention is the most intrusive embodiment of foreign policy. Third, the American military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoyed widespread international support to include the United Nations (to include the Office of the High Representative), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and various other non-governmental international organizations (NGOs). Fourth, American military efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina were largely uncontested by the former warring factions. Lastly, as the duration of the military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina progressed, it became apparent that a gap existed between the ability of the military forces to implement their assigned tasks of the General Framework Agreement for Peace and that of the ability of their civilian counterparts to meet their requirements. This “GFAP Gap” occurred due to a myriad of reasons.⁴⁵ Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, remains to this day a nation divided along cultural and religious lines. The flaws in the General Framework for Peace, which allowed for a “de facto” partitioning of the country, have stymied the outlook for the future progress of a “unified” nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁶ The United States government is currently seeking to withdrawal/downsize American military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to facilitate their use in other regions of the world as part of the Global War on Terror.

⁴⁵ Many observers attribute the gap between the ability of the military and civilian agencies to accomplish nation-building tasks is due primarily to the military’s level of resources, the ability to organize, and the ability to adapt to a changing environment.

⁴⁶ The General Framework Agreement for Peace failed to settle the most important issue of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the identity of the Bosnian state. The result of the General Framework Agreement for Peace was a Bosnia consisting of a weak central government and powerful entity governments, who chose what portions of the framework to enforce and comply with.

United States Involvement in Iraq

The fact was that the United States was not going to be in a position to put down a guerrilla war without allies: it had neither the manpower nor the intimate knowledge of the country and society needed to defeat even a small guerilla movement that was operating on its own, well-known terrain.
*George Friedman – The Unnoticed Alignment*⁴⁷

Road to War

The nation of Iraq is part of a region of the world rich in history, but divided by religious, ethnic and cultural differences.⁴⁸ The modern state of Iraq, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, emerged out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain occupied these remains during the First World War, and consolidated three Ottoman provinces into the state now recognized as Iraq. The three Ottoman provinces were centered historical centers of power in the region, on the towns of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. In this area of diverse ethnic and tribal groupings, the Kurds living in the northern regions of the Iraq, adjacent to the country of Turkey, are among the oldest tribal groupings in the nation.⁴⁹ Because of the artificial borders imposed on it by Great Britain, Iraq would later suffer from tribal, religious and ethnic conflict both within itself and with its neighbors.

The League of Nations declared Iraq a British mandate by the end of 1920. It was not until 1932 that Iraq won its independence from Great Britain to become the Kingdom of Iraq.⁵⁰ A string of military dictators ruled Iraq following its declaration as a republic in 1958. Saddam Hussein is but the latest in that succession. Since its creation, Iraq has numerous territorial disputes with its neighboring nations. The longest dispute resulted in the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 until 1988.

⁴⁷ George Friedman, “The Unnoticed Alignment: Iran and the United States in Iraq.” *Stratfor Weekly*, 19 November 2003, 3.

⁴⁸ Iraq occupies the land historically known as Mesopotamia. The first inhabitants were thought to be people of Turkish and Iranian origin, which included the civilizations of Sumer, Babylonia and Assyria.

⁴⁹ United States Central Intelligence Agency, “World Fact Book: Iraq.” Available online at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>, accessed January 15, 2004.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*



Figure 5: Republic of Iraq, *CIA World Fact Book*⁵¹

American involvement in the affairs of Iraq began after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, its southern neighbor, in 1990. The United States strategic interest in the Middle East was the uninterrupted access to the oil fields of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and regional stability. Following a long build up of military forces from the continental United States and American bases in Germany, American military forces quickly destroyed the Iraqi Army in Kuwait and repelled the remaining Iraqi forces away from the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders and back into Iraq proper in February of 1991.

Saddam Hussein was subject to years of economic sanctions and the enforcement of a “no-fly” zone in the north of his country following the end of the Persian Gulf War. This effort on the part of the United Nations and America was an attempt to protect Kurdish forces following their revolt

⁵¹ United States Central Intelligence Agency, “World Fact Book: Iraq.” Available online at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>, accessed January 15, 2004. With the exception of Turkey, Iraq is surrounded by autocratic Arab states. The establishment of a free and democratic Iraq is seen as a threat to other Arab nations.

against the Iraqi government in March of 1991, and to enforce Iraq's compliance with the terms of peace agreement signed with the United States. The United States attempted to incite ethnic and tribal groups hostile to Saddam Hussein's regime to revolt during the Persian Gulf War.

In addition to economic sanctions and the "no-fly" zone, the United Nations Security Council required Iraq to destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction and long range delivery systems following the end of the Persian Gulf War. Moreover, the United Nations Security Council required Iraq to allow United Nations weapons of mass destruction inspection teams unfettered access to all suspected Iraqi weapons storage sites. Saddam Hussein's twelve years of "on-again, off-again" compliance with American and United Nations Security Council demands concerning the inspection of his suspected WMD storage sites would become the precursor to the United States led invasion in March of 2003.⁵²

Introduction of Forces

Rather than imposing 'shock and awe,' the inability to suppress the guerrillas has confirmed to Islamists their core perception – that the United States can defeat conventional forces but cannot deal with paramilitary and guerrilla forces. Therefore, the United States can be defeated over time if Islamists are prepared to be patient and absorb casualties.

Dr. George Friedman – The Iraq Dilemma⁵³

The America invasion intended to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein from power, thereby preventing Iraq from supporting terrorist organizations and allowing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁵⁴ The specific issue of a first strike against the nation of Iraq by American military forces fell within the policy of preemption as outlined in the latest National Security Strategy published in 2002:

⁵² United States President, *State of the Union Address 2004*, 3.

⁵³ George Friedman, "The Iraq Dilemma: Frying Pan or Fire." *Stratfor Weekly*, 12 November 2003, 2.

⁵⁴ United States President, *State of the Union Address 2004*, 2.

While the United States of America will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country....⁵⁵

President George W. Bush reiterated his policy of preemption in the 2004 State of the Union Address. He stated simply “America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country.”⁵⁶ General Tommy Franks, commander of the United States Central Command (USCENCOM), headed the military efforts of the United States and its coalition partners.⁵⁷ The operation to remove Saddam Hussein from power became OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

American President George W. Bush declared OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM as part of the continuing Global War on Terror. Because of his noncompliance with United Nations weapons inspectors, Saddam Hussein caused the Bush administration to view his government as a viable threat following the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.⁵⁸ Inside of the American military, the plan for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM was touted to be transformational, and not merely a replay of OPERATION DESERT STORM. The CENTCOM commander directed his planners to maximize the combination of speed, precision, surprise and flexibility.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ United States President, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 6.

⁵⁶ United States President, *State of the Union Address 2004*, 3.

⁵⁷ Iraq falls under CENTCOM’s geographical area of responsibility as designated by the United States Unified Command Plan (UCP). The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions and geographic responsibilities for all combatant commanders; in the latest revision of the Unified Command Plan, the United States Northern Command was created and assigned the mission of defending the United States and supporting the full range of military assistance to civil authorities following in the wake of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Refer to <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/020417-D-6570-003.jpg> for a map showing the geographic areas of responsibility.

⁵⁸ United States President, *State of the Union Address 2004*, 2.

⁵⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 1.

Many expected OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM to begin in much the same way as OPERATION DESERT STORM. Saddam Hussein and military pundits alike expected the war to begin with a sustained air campaign, but instead General Franks began ground operations before the start of air campaign. The employment of a large contingent of special operating forces working in the western portions of the Iraqi desert marked the beginning of ground operations. Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) wanted to avoid a protracted march of the main effort north from Kuwait into Iraq. They hoped to avoid costly urban battles along the way. By driving for the city of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, CJTF-7 planners expected to topple the regime in weeks rather than months.⁶⁰ Indeed, CENTCOM planners identified Baghdad as the Iraqi center of gravity. Control of Baghdad was essential to defeating Saddam Hussein's regime since it was the center of the Iraqi government's control mechanisms.⁶¹ Because of the speed of the Iraqi defeat, the transition of operations from combat to post-war conditions occurred faster than most pundits and military planners alike predicted. It was difficult to determine where Phase III ended and Phase IV began.

The current mission of the Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) is to:

...Conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining noncompliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in the area of operation to create a secure environment in direct support of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Concurrently, conduct stability operations which support the establishment of government and economic development to set the condition for a transfer of operation to designated follow on military or civilian authorities.⁶²

The nature of CJTF-7's mission statement acknowledges that a safe and secure environment does not currently exist in Iraq today. This was not, however, due to a failure to plan for the post conflict environment.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Steven W. Peterson, *Central but Inadequate: the Applications of Theory in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Available online at <http://www.ndu.edu/library/n4/n0456021.pdf>, accessed 01 Feb 04.

⁶² William Reeder, "SAMS Reference Study", *Center for Army Lessons Learned Homepage*, Available online at https://call2.army.mil/oif/Docs/briefing/SAMS_Ref_study_files/, accessed 22 April 2004.

The difficulty for CENTCOM planners in constructing the Phase IV operational plans might be attributable to the military bias towards military operations other than war and small-scale contingencies. Dr. Roger Spiller notes, “While modern orthodox warfare has given rise to a vast professional literature to guide every facet of strategic planning, campaign design and operational execution, the same cannot be said of more limited operations.”⁶³ The problems encountered in the transition might also be the result of over optimistic assumptions on the part of the Department of Defense concerning the amount of assistance the United States military would receive from the Iraqi population. In *Transforming for Stability and Reconstruction Operations* by Hans Binnendijk, the author notes:

United States forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi military. This has set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the reins to a representative Iraqi government. Moreover, the failure to establish security concurrently with the defeat of the Iraqi military may well have emboldened those who oppose the United States, United Kingdom, and even the United Nations presence.⁶⁴

During the prewar period, CENTCOM planners identified six lines of operation for Phase IV (post war phase) planning. The lines of operation included:

1. Security
2. Rule of Law
3. Governance and Administration
4. Infrastructure Recovery
5. Perception

⁶³ Roger Spiller, *The Small Change of Soldiering and American Military Experience* (presented at the Combat Studies Institute conference on Armed Diplomacy: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 2003), Available online at <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/CSI/research/Conference/Spillers%20presentation.asp>, accessed 18 Feb 2004, 4.

⁶⁴ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, *Transforming for Stability and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, D.C. Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2003), 5.

6. Humanitarian Relief and Assistance⁶⁵

The need to create a secure environment in order for nation building efforts to progress continues to challenge American forces inside Iraq. It appears that faulty assumptions concerning the Iraqi population, a lack of guidance for the establishment of security, and an inadequate number of forces on the ground are all to blame for the difficulties encountered in Iraq immediately following the cessation of combat operations.

The United States Army has not only to secure Iraq from threats from outside its borders; it must create government institutions to replace the regime it destroyed. This amounts to a moral obligation for a democratic society such as the United States. Despite the lack of widespread international support for the American intervention in Iraq, the United States military is not the only organization working to reestablish an Iraqi government. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is assisting CJTF-7 in the current nation building operations in Iraq, as are other non-governmental international organizations.⁶⁶

USAID and the Coalition Provisional authority are currently working to reestablish government institutions within Iraq. Continued attacks throughout the country hamper their efforts however; many of their efforts have been ineffective. As a result, the United States Army has found itself responsible for many aspects of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic policy in Iraq. When describing the civil-military operations conducted by Major John Nagl, a battalion operations officer in the First Infantry Division, Peter Maass of the *New York Times* observed:

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) remains isolated and rather inept at implementation. Its presence is minimal outside Baghdad, and even in the capital the CPA's

⁶⁵ From personal notes on Phase IV planning discussion with COL Kevin Benson, Director of the School for Advanced Military Studies.

⁶⁶ While other non-governmental organizations are conducting operations within Iraq, they are of a much more limited nature than in previous American interventions due to the current security environment there. USAID is currently responsible in part for reconstruction, local governance, economic governance, contracts and community action programs.

thousands-strong staff spends much of its time in the so-called Green Zone...Given the weakness of the CPA [Major] Nagl and other soldiers are effectively in charge of not only the military aspects of the counterinsurgency but also of the reconstruction work and political development.⁶⁷

Local military commanders, in the absence of other viable entities, are now responsible for security, reconstruction, and local governance in Iraq. The problem of conducting nation-building operations in an unsecured environment remains in Iraq.

The growing counterinsurgency in Iraq complicates the rebuilding of Iraqi institutions and infrastructure. Countering the counterinsurgency requires a dedicated effort on the part of Coalition forces. Early on in the operation, American national intelligence lacked a clear “strategic” sense of who the enemy is in Iraq. This realization is compounded by the American lack of cultural understanding of the Arab and Middle Eastern culture, especially within the military establishment that is carrying United States policy out at the lowest leadership levels.⁶⁸ In order to defeat the insurgents in Iraq, the United States military must deny their external support, separate the insurgents from popular support inside the country, and coordinate the counterinsurgency effort throughout the nation to ensure unity of effort.⁶⁹ This effort requires an intelligence effort empowered with robust human intelligence (HUMINT) and a deep knowledge of the indigenous society. This monograph derives several priorities for the United States strategy in Iraq:

1. Identification of insurgent and anti-coalition cells

⁶⁷ Peter Maass, “Professor Nagl’s War,” *New York Times*, January 11, 2004, 4.

⁶⁸ The concept of the “strategic corporal” is self-evident in light of recent release of information concerning the abuse of Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison. This incident demonstrates how the actions of a few soldiers, at the lowest level, can affect the military efforts of the nation and adversely affect the perception of American goals for a free and democratic Iraq.

⁶⁹ Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 1990). Bard O’Neill establishes a framework for insurgency that classifies insurgencies into types, strategic designs, environments, external support and forms of war. According to O’Neill, insurgencies seek to change the aspects of the political system. Utilizing this framework, Iraq is a combination of a traditionalist and preservationist type insurgency that is utilizing urban warfare, terrorism and guerilla tactics to combat American efforts there.

2. Control of borders and immigration
3. Seizure and destruction of excess military equipment
4. Countering the anti-coalition propaganda campaign
5. Perceived success in civil-military rebuilding

The Iraqi insurgents strategic aim is to destroy the legitimacy of the Coalition forces and the interim Iraqi government. Accordingly, United States foreign policy must sway the pool of politically uncommitted Iraqis and neighboring Arabs in order to secure success in rebuilding Iraq into a free and democratic state.

Conclusion

The examination of the United States military involvement in Iraq denotes several key points. The most obvious of these is that the United States military victory in Iraq has yet to produce a safe and secure environment within the nation. Second, the United States entered into its endeavor in Iraq in direct opposition to other member nations of the United Nations Security Council, to include Germany, France and Russia. The United States does not currently enjoy the broad level of support from the international community as it did in 1995 with OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Third, other Arab nations view the American military intervention as the actions of an imperial hegemony, and not as those of a liberator seeking to provide a new representative government. The American goal of producing a democratic and representative government in Iraq appears as a threat to other Arab nations in the region, especially those with autocratic forms of government. Fourth, the CENTCOM planning efforts to set the conditions for success in the post war period seem to have failed, and future efforts of the United States to succeed in Iraq may be in jeopardy. Clearly, nation building and occupation planning never took on the same importance as

warfighting considerations.⁷⁰ Lastly, there remains a bias in American military thought and doctrine toward theories of combat versus a theory of complete war. A complete theory of war does not separate combat operations and follow-on operations; they are part of a complete campaign.⁷¹

⁷⁰ This is not to say that CENTCOM planners did not address post war issues that had strategic implications, such as key infrastructure protection, border control, criminal activity, and the tracking of weapons of mass destruction.

⁷¹ Peterson, 6.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The American experience with occupation operations is so extensive that one can easily discern recurring themes—temporary government, population control in general, suppression of residual resistance, resettlement of displaced noncombatants, rejuvenation of supply and distribution systems, infrastructure repair and institutional reform.

Dr. Roger Spiller, the Small Change of Soldiering⁷²

The United States intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq offer various lessons about stability and support operations that are consistent with past American experience in nation building and occupation. There are, however, key differences between the two operations.

Differences between Bosnian and Iraqi Involvement

The military interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq have key differences. The first key difference is that foreign military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina began as a United Nations Protection Force mission, which later transitioned to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission. In contrast, the Iraqi intervention began with an American unilateral decision. Coalition partners joined the United States before the beginning of military operations, but the decision to invade Iraq was clearly an American one. The second difference is that American involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoyed wide international support. This included the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and others international non-governmental organizations. In contrast, key members of the United Nations Security Council, to include Germany, France and Russia, all opposed the United States military intervention in Iraq for various reasons. Thirdly, the United States only began nation-building operations in Iraq after the conclusion of combat operations. American military forces never participated in combat operations

⁷² Spiller, 7-8.

against the former warring factions of the Yugoslavian republics after December of 1995. At no point in either the initial IFOR, or subsequent SFOR rotations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did the United States Army ever face violent insurgent opposition. This is clearly not the case with the current American military operation in Iraq. Figure six depicts a comparison between the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq interventions. Despite these differences however, the two operations lead to many of the same lessons learned.

	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Iraq
U.S. Goal	Stability/Reconstruction	Regime change Stability/Reconstruction
Existing Government	Nonfunctional	Autocratic
Level of violence	Low-Medium	High
Operational Duration	9+ years	1 year
Ration of U.S. force to Population	Medium	Low
Multi-national Involvement	High	Low-Medium
Foreign Monetary Aid	High	Low

Figure 6: Comparison of Bosnia and Iraq interventions

Lessons Learned

Based on the United States involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq, this section presents four major lessons learned concerning nation building and occupation. These lessons learned are consistent with other United States military interventions in the past.

1. A secure environment is the first and most important step in nation building and occupation.
2. Nation building and occupation are protracted operations.
3. Unity of effort is vital for success.
4. The level of commitment of the United States is the determining factor of success.

A secure environment is the first and most important step in SASO/MOOTW. The importance of security seems obvious given the history of American forces in occupation and nation building. SASO force structures should include military forces with a policing capability. This could include American military police, or military forces with constabulary training. This would necessitate including constabulary tasks on unit mission essential task lists (METLs). This would provide for a trained force ready for immediate deployment. In the case of Iraq, the insurgents may win over the populace if the United States is unable to guarantee security to the average person over time.

Nation building and occupation are protracted operations. Nation building is an immensely resource intensive and time-consuming effort. Historical evidence suggests that an average of seven years is necessary for a successful operation.⁷³ Artificial timelines, as the one initially set for the first Implementation Force (IFOR) rotation in Bosnia-Herzegovina are counter-productive and may actually hamper American efforts to conduct nation building or to keep the peace. The United States remains in Bosnia-Herzegovina to this day; there is every indication that American soldiers will remain in Iraq for years to come. American soldiers remain in Korea, Germany and Japan fifty years

⁷³ Dobbins, Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower, 2.

after the termination of hostilities there. Army soldiers still serve as peacekeepers in the Sinai and Honduras over a decade after the missions began.⁷⁴

Cultural factors also affect nation building and occupation timelines. A thorough cultural understanding of the target society serves as a caveat against unrealistic end states and mission timelines. From a cultural perspective, nation building is easiest in homogenous societies that are economically developed and have viable governmental institutions.⁷⁵ United States forces should enter nation building and occupation missions with a historical understanding of the selected geographic region.

Unity of effort is vital for success. Efficient integration of military and civilian resources is key to nation building efforts. It is important to show discernable and early progress in nation building operations. Achievements must be measurable and highly visible; the establishment of elections during stability and support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of measurable success. American military units must also possess the necessary assets to interact with civilian agencies. This might require civil affairs units becoming an organic part of “SASO capable” units in order to facilitate SASO training and rapid deployment. The inability of the United States to cooperate with the United Nations, organize humanitarian relief and NGO efforts, organize an international police force and establish an acceptable interim government stymied early American efforts in Iraq. Additionally, nation building efforts must also address underlying socio-economic problems in order to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Often, addressing these larger issues requires close civil-military interaction.

The level of commitment of the United States is the determining factor of success. The level of commitment of the occupier (in terms of total personnel deployed, time and monetary support)

⁷⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement*. (Washington, D.C.: 2004), 9.

⁷⁵ Dobbins, *Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only Superpower*, 3.

appears the determining factor of nation building. In Iraq, the United States did not possess the capabilities to begin reconstruction immediately following the collapse of the Iraqi regime. The lag in reconstruction, coupled with the inability to provide security to the population, damaged United States credibility. There are many elements of the SASO environment over which the United States has little or no control. Examples of uncontrollable factors are the status of the indigenous infrastructure, the level of internal violence (either political, tribal, ethnic or religious) before intervention, the level of economic development, the level of international support, and the homogeneity of the society.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For a limited period the United States has the power to write the terms for international society, in hopes that when the country's imperial hour has passed, new international institutions and stable regional powers will have begun to flourish, creating a kind of civil society for the world.

*Robert D. Kaplan – Supremacy by Stealth*⁷⁶

Requirements for the Future Force

Future nation building and occupation missions require changes to the current force structure based on the analysis of the lessons learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq. In discussions of the future force, both General Schoomaker and the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, have stated publicly that the Army needs to become “more joint, expeditionary and modular” and more “SOF-like.”⁷⁷ Figure seven depicts the SOF characteristics that are applicable to small-scale contingencies and stability and support operations. The 2004 United States Special Operations Command *SOF Posture Statement* highlights these characteristics as clearly distinguishable from the “regular” Army soldier. Consequently, these characteristics must be incorporated in some way into the future “regular” force if the Army is going to become more “SOF-like.”

⁷⁶ Robert D. Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth.” *Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2003, 40. In his article, “Supremacy by Stealth” Robert Kaplan argues that the United States now possesses a global empire and attempts to answer the question of how America should operate on the tactical level to manage global conflict.

⁷⁷ Naylor, 1.

Characteristics of the SOF War Fighter

- Specialized skills, equipment and tactics
- Regional focus
- Language skills
- Political and cultural sensitivity
- Small flexible, joint-force

Figure 7: Making the Army more "SOF-like", *USSOC 2004 Posture Statement*⁷⁸

This monograph derived six requirements that serve as enablers for nation building and occupation missions. The requirements for the future force gleaned from American experiences in both Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina are:

1. Ability to conduct active engagement of the population at the individual level
2. Native speaking language specialists
3. Trained area and cultural specialists
4. Ability to conduct the timely distribution of resources
5. Infrastructure and reconstruction specialists
6. Forward basing of area/unit commands.

Active engagement of the population at the individual level. Intelligence is critical in nation building and occupation operations. Understanding the indigenous culture and the ability to speak the language are critical enablers to this effort. In his latest work titled *Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare*, Robert Tomes states, “Despite unparalleled improvements in military intelligence, the United

⁷⁸ Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, *the Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2004*. (Tampa, Florida: 2004), 35.

States does not seem to have the depth and breadth required in human intelligence (HUMINT) and cultural intelligence areas [in Iraq]. Arabic linguists are lacking.”⁷⁹ HUMINT can only be gained through an active engagement of the local population.

Native speaking language specialists – Language skills must be resident in the units committed to a regional area of operations. American forces are currently dependent on host nation translators, who in many cases, are not up to the task of conducting complicated negotiations in the host nation language and English. The reliance on host nation translators also hampers the analysis of classified intelligence since the large majority of host nation translators could not receive clearance for classified material. Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, states in the second chapter “Linguists and interpreters are critical to a JTF. They can support most activities across the range of military operations and are particularly important in peace operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations.... Historically, the timely and complete sourcing of linguists and interpreters has been a problem that significantly impacted both personnel tempo and JTF operations.”

Trained area and cultural specialists – Cultural specialists must be resident in units to facilitate timely analysis and preparation for military intervention. The Department of Defense can accomplish this by assigning units to geographical regions in the same way that Special Forces groups are geographically oriented. Training for units must expand to include cultural skills necessary for nation building and occupation missions. The Army must identify and track area and cultural specialists in order to utilize their special skills during operations occurring in their area of expertise.⁸⁰ Roger Trinquier theorizes in his work *Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency* that the counterinsurgent’s greatest advantage when fighting against intervention are “his perfect knowledge of

⁷⁹ Tomes, 19.

⁸⁰ These specialists may possess Army training in their subject areas or may possess their skills because of their cultural or ethnic background.

an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants.⁸¹

The reasons for cultural and linguistic experts is clear from this statement of an operations officer currently serving in Iraq:

There are lots of reasons why Iraqis are going to be better at this than we are. [conducting security and nation building operations] They know who is supposed to be where and what they are supposed to be doing. They can see patterns of behavior that are irregular in a way that our [American] untrained eye cannot. They can talk to everybody in a way we cannot.⁸²

Only American forces trained as cultural and linguistic experts can counter this “perfect knowledge” of the insurgents.

Timely distribution of resources. Solving humanitarian problems appears most critical in the initial stages of most occupations. American forces required for stability and support operations must prevent humanitarian crises. Military commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq have continually drained all available monies in working on humanitarian projects; the demand for resources will be great for reestablishing the infrastructure and institutions of post-conflict nations. American experience in the Balkans and the Middle East demonstrates that the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations have not always been successful in rapid reconstruction and distribution of resources. SASO forces must have this capability inherent in their structure. The timely distribution of resources shows American “good will” and “wins hearts and minds.”

Infrastructure and reconstruction specialists. Infrastructure repair and reconstruction matter because they are the visible signs of change taking place. They provide in many cases for basic human needs (clean water, sewage disposal etc.). Planners require the ability to estimate the time and resources needed prior to the start of operations required to repair a nation’s infrastructure; this can only be done by an expert. Experience has shown in Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina that the military

⁸¹ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee; (New York: Praeger, 1964), 6.

⁸² Maass, 8.

cannot depend on civilian agencies in this area due to their lead-time and ability to operate in an unsecured environment. Organic infrastructure and reconstruction specialists provide rapid response.

Forward basing of area commands. Forward basing is a strategy currently employed by the special operating force (SOF) community to encourage cultural/area expertise and language skills. In their 2004 *SOF Posture Statement*, USSOC acknowledges that there is no substitute for immersion in a targeted region in order to build linguistic and intercultural skills.⁸³ Historical examples of western officers accepted in foreign cultures include Robert Warburton, who established the Khyber Rifles in India in 1879, and T.E. Lawrence; instrumental in securing Arab resistance to Ottoman forces in World War I.⁸⁴ Lawrence and Warburton were fluent in native languages and held in high esteem by their respective indigenous populations. The United States military needs to avoid creating a cognitive distance between themselves and the indigenous population. Psychologically, living separate or in conditions vastly different from the local population and prohibiting interaction between civilians and American military forces leads to an “us versus them” mentality. The United States must make every effort to avoid the perception of being “foreign invaders.” Legitimacy remains an important tenet of military operations other than war.⁸⁵

⁸³ Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, *the Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2004*. (Tampa, Florida: 2004), 33

⁸⁴ Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth,” 47.

⁸⁵ In the previous version of Army doctrine on military operations other than war, FM 100-5, the fundamentals of military operations other than war were: legitimacy, objective, unity of effort, perseverance, restraint and security. The most current manual, FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, lists the fundamentals of peace operations of which, only legitimacy and restraint have remained. Legitimacy is still defined as the sustainment of the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern, or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

Conclusions

Across this divide they are looking at us, we're looking at them from behind barbed wire, and they're trying to understand why we're here, what we want from them. Almost inconceivable to a lot of them, I think, that what we want for them is the right to make their own decisions, to live free lives...and it's hard to convey that message given the fact that few of us speak Arabic.

Major John Nagl in Iraq⁸⁶

Success in the current counter insurgency mission in Iraq will be determined by the perceived legitimacy of the United States and the Coalition Provisional Authority, a clear unity of effort between the same, continuous and sufficient support to Iraqi authorities, diligent intelligence efforts, and the ability of America and Iraqi authorities to eradicate foreign aid to the insurgents. Given these factors, the military mission essential tasks for future nation building and occupation include:

1. Provide a secure environment
2. Facilitate basic human services
3. Repair civilian and military infrastructure
4. Ensure institution creation

These mission essential tasks come from the analysis of historical operations conducted by the United States Army. Dr. Roger Spiller states "...the American experience with occupation operations is so extensive that one can easily discern recurring themes – temporary government, population control in general, suppression of residual resistance, resettlement of displaced noncombatants, rejuvenation of supply and distribution systems, infrastructure repair and institutional reform."⁸⁷ Figure eight, a proposed nation building framework, shows the interrelation of nation building and occupation factors. The intervention framework depicts the derivation of nation building and occupation enablers from past American historical experience. These enablers support the mission essential tasks of nation

⁸⁶ Maass, 6.

⁸⁷ Spiller, 6.

building and occupation: institution creation, secure environment, infrastructure repair and basic human services. These tasks are required in the new strategic environment of failed states, international terrorism, ethnic/tribal/cultural conflict and transnational crime.

The United States Army of the future does not need new technology or a revolution in military affairs to be successful in nation building and occupation missions. Rather, Army leadership needs to apply common sense and attention to the past historical lessons of military operations other than war.

BG David L. Grange described the mindset needed by future warriors:

A transformed mindset is one that can handle the chaotic and uncertain situations created by the collapse of political, economic and security systems. Leaders must be able to operate in countries that have no effective governments, where the enemy and front lines are not easily identifiable and the rules of engagement are conflicting. Our forces are expected to deal with terrorists, drug traffickers, warlords, militant fundamentalists and paramilitary units—and still be able to overcome large maneuver formations and formidable defenses.⁸⁸

When the Army acknowledges that nation building and occupations will predominate in the future strategic environment, then there can be serious discussions concerning the adaptation of doctrine and force structure appropriately. There is little to be gained by increasing lethality with new technology concerning these types of missions. The cognitive bias towards these types of limited operations is clear from CENTCOM pre-war planning in Iraq.

As the world's only remaining superpower, American involvement in these types of conflicts is almost certain. If the United States is committed to reshaping foreign governments in the quest to win the Global War on Terror, it must reshape the force for intervention and nation-building. Combat operations may precede or follow American military intervention. In either case, American military leaders will have to transition rapidly from one operation to the other, often in an ambiguous environment. The tasks their soldiers maybe required to perform will vary greatly, from distributing

⁸⁸ David L. Grange, "Transforming Isn't Chanting Slogans," United States Naval Institute, *Proceedings* (August 2002), 2.

humanitarian aid, serving as a police force, conducting the civil administration of cities, negotiating with local civilian leaders, to rebuilding civilian infrastructure. Soldiers must realize that the conventional warrior mindset may in fact be counter productive in this type of environment.

The ability of military leaders to operate in the gray area between black and white ethical decisions is a key to success, with soldiers at the lowest level having to make decisions that may have strategic ramifications. It is time for the creation of an American military force tailored for military operations other than war and stability and support operations. This would provide the United States Army the ability to rapidly deploy a small core of units that would not require additional “specialized” training.⁸⁹

The units conducting nation building and occupation operations will require organic linguists, cultural experts, reconstruction/infrastructure specialists and personnel capable of conducting constabulary operations.

⁸⁹ Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, “Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice.” *Parameters*, Vol XXXII, No. 4, Winter 2003. For further discussion on this topic, refer to “Creating a Force for Peace Operations” by Kimberly Field and Robert Perito in the winter 2003 edition of *Parameters*.




Figure 8: Proposed Nation Building Framework

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