

# Soundtrack of Dora

Gunfights a constant din in Baghdad neighborhood that U.S. troops see teetering between stable and dangerous

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## "A Neighborhood Reborn"

*An Inside Look at the Surge  
Baghdad, Iraq*

*FEB 07 – MAR 08*

*1-4 CAV, 4<sup>th</sup> IBCT, 1<sup>st</sup> IN DIV*

**LTC Jim Crider**

September 12, 2008

**ZEKE MINAYA**/Stars and Stripes

Staff Sgt. Jeremiah Enfield, 25, of Wisconsin, returns fire during a gunfight Saturday in the southern Baghdad district of Dora. Enfield's unit, the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, will assume patrol duty of the sector in the upcoming month.

# Security: First 30 Days in AO Raider

- There were more than 52 enemy initiated events within the muhallahs in the first 30 days (over 70% were IED attacks)
- Buried IEDs were the most dangerous threat, with 100% effectiveness in AO Raider during seven attacks in the first 30 days
- There were only 16 detainees taken within the first 30 days; 1-4 CAV inherited a source pool of ZERO (there were 36 sources by June 30)
- Accumulated trash in the muhallahs enabled ACF to emplace IEDs at their leisure; freedom of movement was completely unrestricted



# We soon realized that...

1. The enemy was hiding in plain sight
2. We could not detain / kill our way to victory



“As long as the population remains under his control, the insurgent retains his liberty to refuse battle except on his own terms.”

– David Galula

# Objectives

Adopted from Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, Chpt. 7  
by David Galula

- Re-establish authority over the population
- Physically isolate the population from the insurgents
- Establish a robust intelligence network

## Strategy


1. **Make contact with the population**
2. **Protect the population**
3. **Control the population**
4. **Collect intelligence**
5. **Win the support of the population**
6. Purge the insurgents from the population
7. Involve the population in the long term solution
  - a. Establish and legitimize local security efforts
  - b. Local elections



Relationships  $\longrightarrow$  Alliance

# DETAINEES MARCH 2007 – March 2008


TOTAL: 264



\*15 cases were prosecuted in the ICC with 5 more pending upon our redeployment.

# Security over time

Enemy Initiated Events in the Muhallahs v. Detentions



24/7 Coverage  
OPN Close Encounters

The last effective attack  
on CF was on 09 SEP 07.

The last event targeting  
CF was on 27 SEP 07.

# Lessons Learned


## What worked

- Constant Presence
- OPN Close Encounters
- Secure the Population
- Barriers
- Photograph Everyone
- Create Jobs
- Sons of Iraq



## What did not work

- Blind Loyalty
- False Psyops Products
- Large Meetings
- Cordon & Search
- Wanted Posters
- Warning Shots
- Unsupervised ISF activities



**“The unit has come to know the neighborhood in a way that would have been unthinkable just after the war, or even into 2004 and 2005. In fact, the U.S. military has never secured Iraq or controlled it so completely as it has today, and never before has their wealth of intelligence and ability to analyze it been better. ”**

**-Daniel Pepper, Time Magazine  
January 13, 2008**

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*Prepared and Loyal*

