Obama's Pacific Tilt Comes Under Fire by Otto Kreisher at AOL Defense.
The Obama administration's highly touted "rebalancing" of U.S. military forces to the Asia-Pacific region attracted a barrage of flak during a briefing at an influential Washington think tank Monday.
A group of former senior defense and State Department officials criticized the Pacific tilt at the Center for Strategic and International Studies saying the U.S. lacked a coherent, understandable strategy and failed to adjust the plan in light of shrinking funding and trying to hide the strategy's aim to counter an increasingly aggressive China...
Comments
I'm not sure this model has much relevance to Asia. The only east Asian economy that is not incorporated into the global economy is that of North Korea, and North Korea is pretty much universally treated as an entity to be contained, not transformed or incorporated. China of course is fully incorporated into the global economy, the concern is not over a need to incorporate China but that China might either come to dominate that economy or that a potential Chinese economic crash could seriously disrupt the world economy.
I think it would be a huge mistake to try to treat east Asia in the terms we've grown used to using when discussing the Middle East and Africa. They are very different environments.
(I have revised this somewhat from my original entry.)
If military, police and intelligence forces -- ours and theirs -- in the near and middle term are most likely to be needed, and used, to deter and/or deal with those individuals and groups who do not wish to see their states and societies transformed and incorporated as the global economy requires, then have we -- by our pivot to the east -- acknowledged that the Asia-Pacific region is the area in the world where we believe these such difficulties will (1) most likely to take place and/or (2) most likely harm the global economy? (Herein, I believe the answer is "no.")
Or, by our pivot to the east, is what we actually saying is that we believe an inadequately addressed Chinese rise/challenge -- in East Asia and elsewhere -- more so than any of the state and societal transformation problems noted above (wherever they might occur); this, we believe, poses a far graver risk to the global economy? (Herein, due to the move to Air-Sea Battle, I believe the answer is "yes.")
Thus, what would seem to have changed is who we believe poses the gravest threat to the global economy:
a. In the recent past, we saw this as being individuals and groups who did not wish to see their states and societies transformed and incorporated as the global economy requires.
b. Today, we believe that the disruptive effects of a rising China poses a far graver risk to the overall potential for global economy health and growth.
Have I got this right?
Dayuhan,
I think you are correct. I think the real reason is that the US does not like the terrain in that area of the world. The ME supports (at lest initally) the kind of warfare (should it come to that) that the US leaders like. Most of our so called techological advantages are taken away by jungles and subsurface employment. Bottom line is that UAVs, tanks etc are of limited use in these areas, and our leaders don't like that.
I think one reason the military has a hard time articulating its place in the Asian pivot is that the military has become used to being the dominant part of US engagement in the ME and South Asia. In Asia this should not be the case, and the military will have to adopt a secondary role. That doesn't mean they have no role, but they need to be in the background with diplomatic and economic engagement in the forefront. Asia is not frica or the Middle East, if anything the model for relations with Asia should be relations with Europe. Any engagement in Asia has to be built around recognition that we are engaging with peers.
Again, this doesn't mean the military has no role, it means that the military has to be prepared to accept a subordinate role, something to which it has not been accustomed over the last decade, where US engagement in the theaters of greatest concern has been heavily dominated by the military.
I don't have an issue with a greater focus on the Asia-Pacific region, it is clearly in the national interest to do so (but not at the expense of the rest of the world). It is disappointing that the military can't articulate a narrative on what the rebalancing to Asia means and why it is important. If they need help in this regard they should leverage Secretary Clinton's article in Foreign Policy.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_centu…
More frustrating in my view were the narrowly focused comments on China throughout the article. The U.S. Pacific Command's region includes 35 countries, over half the surface of the earth, over half the world's population, five treaty allies, several nuclear powers, the world's largest militaries, and perhaps most importantly the world's largest economies. Yet our discussion on the rebalance strategy only looks at China? In my humble opinion we're missing the ball if we're only looking at strategy through a China lens. I am not downplaying China's strategic importance, but lets not forget the rest of Asia and the great opportunities its presents for U.S.'s strategic interests.
Unfortunately some of the criticism in the article was well deserved. The military needs to relearn how to develop and communicate strategy again. It has become a lost art since the end of the Cold War.
Spicykal,
I disagree with your statement,"The future of China's military depends heavily upon her ability to continue to be an economic superpower".
I believe what is holding them back is the lack of a significant Navy, particularly power projection platforms like carriers and carrier groups... As soon as they have these in strength, and the time is right, they will use them.
I further believe that they have much longer term stratgies... Like this is what we want to accomplish in the next 25,50,75 and 100 years. They have already taken to colonizing Africa and South America as well as any areas that have resourses.
They may not be a threat today... But don't discount them at any time. Nor will they trouble themselves with the foolisness that our leaders spend there time with. And they won't be picky with there methods either.
Very interesting point. I along with several of my peers tend to think that the decidedly Pacific focused tilt of our proposed future operational environment is flawed.
The future of China's military depends heavily upon her ability to continue to be an economic superpower. I would argue that the historic and increasing power distance in the country is having a severe negative effect on both China's economy and her military. A significant socio-economic gap exists between the upper and lower class in China. Additionally, people in rural China are becoming dissatisfied with the existence of an almost insurmountable wage gap.
Focusing our military on conducting future operations in the Pacific seems to me to be a dangerous misallocation of increasingly scarce diplomatic, strategic informational, military, and economic resources. The emergence of the Arab Spring and the desire of multiple Arab nations to adopt western democracies seems to me a clear indication of where we should focus our future military efforts.
I am not suggesting that we revert to the myopia associated with our Cold War doctrine that focused on the deterrence of nuclear war and nothing else. What I am suggesting is a focused effort at building lasting relationships in a region already rife with conflict and focusing our efforts on security cooperation in the region.
With sequestration on the horizon and an increasingly publicly unpopular war ongoing in Afghanistan, the current administration must focus our efforts intelligently. After a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, our military forces clearly possess the capability to execute operations in a decidedly Arab operational environment. I would argue that our ability to execute security cooperation on a grand scale in the Arab world will never exceed the level at which it exists today. I believe leveraging lessons learned in two theaters of war across the middle east and Africa would serve us better than focusing on the Pacific threat that I believe is becoming more and more hollow.
MAJ Calvin K. Hutto
Student
Command and General Staff College
Fort Gordon, GA (Satellite Campus)
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departement of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.