Small Wars Journal

How Afghanistan Ends

Thu, 12/02/2010 - 11:22pm
How Afghanistan Ends:

A Political-Military Path to Peace

by Linda Robinson

Download the Full Article: How Afghanistan Ends

This paper presents a scenario for resolution of the Afghan conflict in a manner that achieves U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. This scenario takes the current U.S. approach as the starting point and adds 1) a more detailed theory of the conflict that highlights the political effects that must be achieved; 2) emphasis on bottom-up measures that can produce momentum in the short term, and 3) a political diplomatic strategy embraced and pursued in concert by the Afghan government, the United States and key international partners. Finally, the paper identifies requirements for a smaller follow-on military force to pave the way for a long-term advisory and assistance effort.

Download the Full Article: How Afghanistan Ends

Linda Robinson served as Senior Adviser to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at US Central Command in 2009-2010. This paper draws on open-source research and over two dozen interviews with current and former officials from Afghanistan, the United States and other countries and organizations, as well as South Asia and functional experts. Special thanks are due to Clare Lockhart, Michael Semple, Simon Shercliff, Mary Beth Long, Michael O'Hanlon, Jim Shinn, Adib Farhadi and John Nagl.

About the Author(s)

Comments

Mac,
I think humor remains within the ROE. :-) Attica made me chuckle! Keep up the fire!

"MAC" McCallister (not verified)

Sun, 12/05/2010 - 12:35pm

Dave D, Dave M, Gian... et al...

Sincere apologies to one and all...

My intent was not to express contempt or disrespect for the function or decision of the SWJ editors, the author of "how it all ends", or Gian's request for further discussion...

It appears that my comments were impertinent and exceeding the limits of propriety and good manners. How about irreverent and critical of what is generally accepted or respected? Obviously ...

I very much (always have) respect the decisions of the SWJ editors...

MAC's day in court... While I might believe that discussing how a strategic culture and its elites evolve and change over time is actually a worth while effort... (and for all our amateur psychiatrists) ... IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH IRRITATION FOR HOW THE PROCESS MIGHT WORK... I personally am interested in gaining a greater understanding for how strategic theory (to deal with complex threats) is created and defended. I thought this thread important, notwithstanding the dangers of ANY debate devolving into personal attacks and to encourage debate on this issue. We could have address the issue raised by Gian and managed the discussion by delineating clear targeting criteria and rules of engagement before hand... i.e. "MAC... before we get into the meat of this... don't hassle and call the author names"... as if hassling the author and name-calling actually adds anything positive to the discussion... I actually believe that the vast majority of us are well mannered, confident in our opinions and mature enough to refrain from play ground name-calling... but sadly this is no longer the case...

This thread has taught me not to presume the role of court jester (truth to power and all that stuff) and to be more circumspect in the consequences of my ill-advised attempts at humor or sarcasm.. take your pick. I sincerely apologize to Gian for not heeding the warnings of an African Proverb... "It is better to have an intelligent enemy than a stupid friend"... I am the stupid friend...

I apologize for acting the fool... but I can't promise that it won't happen again...

In closing... Dave D, Dave M, Gian, et al... apologies all around... but you have to admit.. the "Attica, Attica, Attica" chant was a little funny... you see? I can't help myself :-/

Humbly... mean it...

MAC

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 12/05/2010 - 12:27pm

Don't most academic journals handle the issue by using disclosure rules?

I guess I don't really have a problem with it in this instance because I recognized the name and previous work (have the book on my shelf).

The reader has responsibilities, too.

As long as there is transparency why is it a problem? A similar discussion took place on Abu Muqawama some time back about CNAS, its funding, and issues of transparency. As I recall, CNAS declares its sponsors. Again, from there on, the reader has a responsibility.

Plus, whatever you may think about working relationships, there is a <em>lot</em> in that article to discuss.

To all:

This is what makes SWJ the best place for discussion of critical issues on the net. The Editors have done a great job protecting the discourse here and preventing it from degenerating due to flamers and unprofessional drive by posters. This site will remain mission focused and influential for years to come because of the diligence of the editors to protect it.

That said, let me offer my 2 cents on this. I actually think Gian was collateral damage to the editors' counterbattery fire. I too saw the post that briefly followed Gian's and that he references in the above post. I think Gian's was a fair criticism and one worth debating as we pride ourselves in understanding the environment and context in order to develop strategy and campaigns to deal with the complex threats of the full spectrum of conflict in today's world. Gian's comment contributed to that understanding as we should try to understand motivations, positions, connections, and potential agendas of those who are influencing strategy and policy.

But the snarky comment that followed Gian's would have caused the debate to devolve into personal attacks which would have been counterproductive. I think the editor was right in removing that post but since it was connected to Gian's I think we used the radiation treatment vice the precise surgical excising of the offending cancer. But to the editor's credit and a demonstration of the strength of SWJ, the debate has been allowed to continue and all of us get a further understanding of the left and right limits to make this site effective and allow for healthy, spirited, and critical discussion and debate. Thanks to Gian and thanks to the Editors.

gian p gentile (not verified)

Sun, 12/05/2010 - 9:17am

Well sure it is their blog and they can do what they wish with it, and use their judgment when they feel the need to cut certain posts, no argument there.

But on this one, I think they launched counterbattery fire unnecessarily. To be sure there have been other times when I agreed with their judgment (last week there was an angry, personal attack against Bob Cassidy and they removed it). But this one, I still disagree.

For example, not only did SWJeds remove my first post, they also removed a post by an "anon" who brought to light the fact that Ms Robinson worked for a senior defense contractor very recently and may even have been involved with the writing of a significant piece of military doctrine on irregular war. Again, this is not personal, but is an issue that affects the public interest and should be discussed. On certain issues as much as SWJeds would like to keep in line with Michael Corleones mantra of keeping it "business and not personal," it is hard to do so because these very individuals and their work are a mix of personal and "business" interests.

I mean really, the issue of individuals who start off as journalists and claim that sobriquet, then move to think tanks or defense contractors hewing to specific policy lines and making arguments as an expert/analyst, should not this issue and the individuals involved be up for discussion (with careful and prudent oversight) on this excellent blog?

thanks

gian

carl (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 10:47pm

Publius:

On the very narrow question of deleting comments, I must disagree. At times in the past some of the comments have gotten so vicious or off the wall that I didn't want to read them. They severely detracted from the discussion and I requested SWJED remove them.

In this case, the comments all seemed to discuss the contents of the paper, then a jarring switch to credibility of the author. Perhaps that should be saved for a different place. In any case, I am content to defer to the judgment of SWJED.

Publius (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 10:16pm

< snip >

Your blog. Do whatever you want.

< snip >

<i>Edited by SWJED with a reply of okay.</i>

Brother Mac, see what I posted above to Gian. Hope all is well in your part of the world and looking forward to our next bull session at the Globe and Laurel.

Gian said <i>I understand your desire to keep personal attacks off of this blog...</i>. Yep, that is why and it is a judgment call on my part. I'll let your latest stand. You of all people should understand the tight-rope we walk at <i>SWJ</i> in attempting to sift through legitimate dialogue and personal bias. I do my best here and you know that. I've given you more than a fair share of a sounding board - even when we disagree on issues.

Dave D.

"MAC" McCallister (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 2:22pm

Dear SWJ Editors....

I concur with Gian's appeal for clarification as to the journalist - adviser relationship...

Gian, the consummate mentor is presenting us with a learning opportunity in unconventional and irregular warfare. What appears at first glance to be an ad hominem attack on a defenseless journalist turned active acolyte... is in actuality an attempt to challenge an imposed status quo.. Ladies and Gentlemen... this is irregular warfare at its finest and most sophisticated... and a learning opportunity for one and all... Applied knowledge is power (my LLCs motto)...

Gian's inquest (play on words... inquests are usually conducted to inquire into an unexpected death... such as attempts at inquiry... not funny?) actually targets the "keepers of strategic culture" and its elites... While a given strategic culture may provide useful intellectual and policy-making tools to analyze how and why the strategic culture and its elites must remain subject to a competitive marketplace of ideas... Especially since it is the strategic elites that presume (to assert that something is true without complete evidence) for themselves the role as the primary keepers of the strategic culture and purveyors of the common historical narrative...

Attica, Attica, Attica...

Seriously....

r/
MAC

gian p gentile (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 1:42pm

SWJ Ed:

Why was my post removed? It was a legitimate inquiry into the conflicts of interests presented by Ms Robinson and her work as a journalist and now with her work as an advisor to a war fighting commander? It is a fact that as a journalist Ms Robinson wrote a glowing portrayal of General Petraeus in "Tell Me How this Ends" and now she acts as an advisor to his command and writes analytical papers designed to show how the current approach in Afghanistan can work and how it will end.

I understand your desire to keep personal attacks off of this blog, but again my post raised a legitimate point of inquiry into a topic relevant to the public interest, yet you censored it. Please explain why, if you dont mind.

gian

Bill C. (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 11:35am

Anyone every read Chapter 1: The Strategic Context, of the US Army Stability Operations Field Manual (FM 3-07)?

(My copy, the University of Michigan Press Edition, 2009).

For info on the Modern Silk Road (item referenced in this paper):

http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1005Afghan.pdf

(Note endorsement by both President Karzai and General Petraeus.)

Madhu (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 11:12am

Lied about last comment.

Scratch the "not a terrible idea." It's a pretty terrible idea. Ditto the last part of what Publius said.

Jeez. Even if you are trying to be self-aware, the mission creep aspect sucks you in, doesn't it?

Madhu (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 10:53am

<em>The continuing presence of the United States and other members of the international community in Afghanistan can be framed and structured to balance Indias role and presence to allay Pakistani concerns about an Afghanistan dominated by India.</em>

Last comment in this thread, promise!

This is the second most interesting part of the paper. The United States in Afghanistan as an indirect "peace keeper" between the two nations. Wonder if that will work? Wonder what sorts of nonsense we will be drawn into?

Goodness.

Not a terrible idea, though.

Madhu (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 10:17am

The best part of the paper is on the local defense forces. I've always appreciated the links and papers around here that deal with that topic. It's the most concrete example - for me, as a layperson - of how we may leave and what we will leave in place. Theoretically.

Madhu (not verified)

Sat, 12/04/2010 - 10:08am

It's an interesting paper in that it appears to summarize the intellectual status quo - an explanatory of the current thinking of decision makers.

I found it quite useful in that sense, but perhaps I am reading too much into it? It is hard as a layperson to understand the competing public claims around such complicated issues.

A few points on the summary:

1. Mission-creep seems to perenially infest large parts of our foreign policy apparatus. We enter a system previously closed to us, introduce what we will, and then orient our responses to the irritants produced. Can't be helped, I suppose. Or can it?

Specifically, I am talking about large sums of money and the resulting complaints of corruption. What did we think would happen? It happens here in the States, too. Look at your local papers: block grants and TIFs and all that.

2. Half-way through a task, we change core assumptions. Nothing wrong with that. Reality intrudes on all planning. Specifically, I am talking about our tendency to intellectually hyphenate geographical regions of the world instead of thinking more globally.

3. Finally, we shouldn't make promises that we may not be able to keep. Making promises about lifting textile tariffs or providing new civilian nuclear deals to Pakistan is not fair to Pakistani decision-makers. We have constituencies in the States that may not care to have tariffs lifted for more than a short period of time (whatever you or I think). Regarding civilian nuclear deals, there are proliferation worries given past behaviors. Are our allies, however putative, supposed to be stupid? Can't we explain to them that we have worries and concerns and realities all of our own?

4. The left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing. I suppose that is entirely the result of too many committments and the many "cooks in the kitchen."

At any rate, I thought it a good paper for the insight it gave into how we are to "leave." However, given the mission-creep, perhaps we are not as focused on the tasks at hand as we should be?

*What's this about?

<em>The title headlining the Pentagon's announcement was sober -- "Pakistan Army General Headquarters recently approved a U.S. Office of Defense Representative (ODR) and Coalition presence at the Pakistan military's 12 Corps HQ in Quetta" -- but it's clear that the new building was designed to symbolize the recent progress in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. The city of Quetta, the capital of the province of Balochistan, has long been a bone of contention between Washington and Islamabad, and the Western intelligence community community believes that the top Taliban commanders known as the Quetta Shura have been living there with the tacit permission of the Pakistani state.</em>

Is this about fighting an insurgency, or fighting an insurgency while trying to hang on to an old strategic "asset"? As usual, I'm confused. As usual, I'm sure it's me. I don't like all the counterfactuals that are part of the foreign policy world, but what are you all supposed to do? You have to make the best of it. Good luck! Sincerely!

<a href="http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/02/the_pakistani_backlash_…;

"MAC" McCallister (not verified)

Wed, 12/08/2010 - 5:31pm

Slapout9,

I have met LTC Mark Grdovic. He is a good man.

The handbook is good stuff... it prepares the practitioner to challenge a tyrant that has consolidated his power. Explains the role of grievances, weaknesses and resistance and describes how to initially organize resistance organizations, those sub-sets of much larger social movements, by either infilling advisers or by extracting, training and reinserting appropriate personnel... and much more.

It is a highly recommended read...

v/r
MAC

Publius (not verified)

Fri, 12/03/2010 - 9:24pm

Bill C.: "Transforming the state and society of Afghanistan would, indeed, seem to be important to the regional and global economy. In this regard, consider just the benefits that might be derived by such economic powerhouses as China, India and Russia, for trade and transit purposes, being able to safely and swiftly access, and fully utilize, an efficient and friendly "Modern Silk Road."

The Robinson paper seems to be pretty much a regurgitation of material we've seen from various "experts" for some time now. I admit my eyes were glazing over and I was unable to pay attention all of the way through, so it's entirely possible that I missed some new insight. I doubt it, but it's possible.

Everybody knows the problems and it seems that everyone's solutions all involve an open-ended commitment on the part of the U.S. Unfortunately, although they may have vast knowledge of the target, none of these experts seem to give any consideration whatsoever to whether the U.S. will be actually able to achieve nirvana. I think not. We are a broke, wounded giant and we just can't afford to continue these bleeding sores. But wait! There's hope. You ask me if I think we can continue and I'll say, "You bet. Bodies are seemingly cheap to you. But money is dear. So all you have to do if you want to continue your grand adventure is cancel the Marines' EFV (should be done anyway), cut back on F35 procurement, tell the Army to live without their new Ground Combat Vehicle and tell the Navy to forgo modernization. You can fund a whole lot of "making the world safe for democracy" if you do that. Ridiculous? Hey, folks, we're fast approaching the point where defense dollars are going to be a zero-sum game.

So far as Bill C.'s input is concerned, it appears he agrees with the author that a modern "Silk Road," built on the blood and money of Americans (and Afghanis, of course), will benefit China, India and Russia. This makes everything OK, I guess. It translates into a "win" "win" "win" for Afghanistan, the region and the international community. The U.S. doesn't need to benefit just so long as those "economic powerhouses," which last I looked were in competition with the U.S., benefit from the U.S.'s sacrifices.

Modern "Silk Road." C'mon. Dayuhan says it: nobody cares about Afghanistan. Nobody ever cared about Afghanistan. That it's become a U.S. client state is the result of 9/11 and amazingly stupid U.S. policies in the years following. All of the "experts" pontificate about strategy going forward, but what they don't tell you is that the so-called strategy merely represents desperate scrambling on the part of all players to make lemonade out of lemons. And another major factor is obvious: lots and lots of people are making lots and lots of money out of this mess. And it's also unfortunately the case that they profit from prolongation of the mess.

I'm with Ken White is finding this: "Re-organize and re-configure these outlier states and societies such that become integrated into their regional/the global economy," to be dangerously wrong.

Anybody familiar with decision algorithms? Try applying one to Afghanistan using no-nonsense benefits to the U.S. as the go-no go factors, the gates that drive the decision. Make sure you include AQ and the entire issue of terrorism. Don't use Afghanistan. Don't use Pakistan. Don't use the "international community." We don't care about them as beneficiaries. Focus on the U.S., the entity paying for this. If you do that, I think you'll find that any logical decision process would have led to an entirely different approach to the problem. One seriously doubts it would lead to hundreds of thousands of Americans making friends in Afghanistan.

The problem is not Afghanistan or Pakistan. The problem is security of the United States. And a modern "Silk Road" doesn't cut it for those of us who value what we have always quaintly thought of as the "American way of life."

Would seem to be? To whom? There is no modern silk road... where would it come from, and where would it go? It makes no sense at all to move goods by land between the far east and south asia, the middle east, and europe. Shipping by sea is a thousand times more efficient.

There is no economic payoff for India, China or Russia in Afghanistan. There is no economic payoff for anyone, except possibly for the Afghans, who don't seem terribly interested in it. There are some mineral resources but they are neither rare nor unique, and the cost of exploiting them exceeds their value... maybe in a century or so it would be worth it, but not now.

What your thesis fails to recognize is that there is really very little visible appetite for intervention in outlier states, far less for transformation. Even where there are valuable resources (eg Sudan or DRC), there's not much appetite: the cost of intervention is too great.

In general, nobody really cares what happens in these outlier states, unless they actively cause a great deal of trouble. The theoretical economic benefits don't justify the cost. That's why the policy is to contain, deter, and wait for them to come around on their own. There's no need to run about transforming anyone.

Bill C. (not verified)

Fri, 12/03/2010 - 7:01pm

Dayuhan:

Transforming the state and society of Afghanistan would, indeed, seem to be important to the regional and global economy. In this regard, consider just the benefits that might be derived by such economic powerhouses as China, India and Russia, for trade and transit purposes, being able to safely and swiftly access, and fully utilize, an efficient and friendly "Modern Silk Road."

The potential benefits to the state and society of Afghanistan itself, to its neighbors and to the international community as a whole would also seem to be of enormous value (internal peace and prosperity; no adverse external spill-over).

Belief in this "win" "win" "win" concept (for Afghanistan, for the region and for the international community) would seem to be what drives this foreign policy direction described more specifically by this paper (re: Afghanistan), and more generally (re: outlier states and societies as a whole) by my comment above.

Ken White (not verified)

Fri, 12/03/2010 - 6:46pm

<b>Bill C.</b> may be correct with his assertion in sub paragraph a, above. However, I suspect that view is a minority position. I certainly hope it is as the view can lead to dangerous misapprehensions, not least trying to 'fix' something that is not broken and leading some to arrogantly interfere with what people must do for themselves -- and in their own way...

The thought expressed in sub-paragraph b, OTOH does appear to be held by a slightly larger and more influential minority -- but they're still a minority. They're also wrong. Badly so.

Bill C:

Once again, like a broken record:

Nobody, anywhere, cares about integrating Afghanistan into the global economy. Afghanistan is supremely irrelevant to the global economy. As long as they don't attack others or harbor those who do, they could stay medieval for the next 100 years and nobody would notice, care, or be in any way bothered, save the periodic twitches over the way they treat women or blow up Buddhas... but nobody goes to war over that.

How do you reconcile this thesis with the supremely evident reality that nobody, anywhere, cared about integrating Afghanistan - or having anything to do with Afghanistan - until 9/11?

Bill C. (not verified)

Fri, 12/03/2010 - 12:16pm

"While Afghanistan is now and will remain for the near term heavily dependent on international assistance to achieve its state building goals, the objective is to channel that assistance into productive investments that galvanize self-sustaining economic growth, regional commerce, infrastructure, development of natural resources and investment from China, India and Russia -- three of the world's fastest growing economies. Efforts are underway to create a detailed roadmap for Afghanistan's development and a mutually beneficial process of regional economic integration. (Note reference to Afghanistan ultimately becoming a "Modern Silk Road" at the footnotes)."

Thus, we view Afghanistan -- and the solutions proposed in this paper -- as representing a classic example of how we see (1) the world's problems generally and (2) how we hope to go about solving these problems:

a. Overall Problem: Various states and societies are not ordered or configured such that they might become integrated into their regional/the global economy.

b. Overall Solution: Re-organize and re-configure these outlier states and societies such that become integrated into their regional/the global economy.

This, we believe, will cure -- not only the internal problems of these outlier states and socieities -- but also the spill-over effects derived therefrom; which can (and in some cases have) adversely effected both their region the rest of the more-economically integrated world.

Linda Robinson (not verified)

Fri, 12/10/2010 - 2:22pm

I appreciate the robust and informative comments from the SWJ community, which is precisely why I chose to submit my paper here.

MAC, you spot an imprecision in my point that centralized security forces have never reached down to the local level in Afghanistan. True in the past, but will it be true in the future? I would hazard a guess that some local community watch or defense groups may be needed for quite some time. The current MOI-backed ALP program envisions 5 years. If these groups are tied into local legitimate structures that may be adequate "institutionalization" in the short term to prevent them from becoming rogue entities, is a legitimate concern. Over the longer term I think AFG will have to come to terms with the cost of the ANSF and how big a centralized security force it can actually afford.

I do not claim that this piece is entirely "new" thinking, but I reached three conclusions that I do not think have received sufficient attention or emphasis from the analytical community (both official and nonofficial):

1. To succeed the effort must be much clearer about what can be done in the short vice long term;

2. If one accepts that wars such as this one require political solutions, much more must be done to forge a political-diplomatic strategy and lash it up with the ISAF campaign plan;

3. It is likely to be a very complicated political solution that involves both local conflict resolution and national reforms and understandings (that inter alia address Pakistan's core security concerns).

This last point is really the heart of the paper, which intends to spark debate rather than present the exact formula of a settlement. Some deals are better than others, and some mechanisms are better than others. I do not think that the Bonn II process provides the AFG actors enough control over the outcome, but a deal brokered by Karzai alone will likely fail to generate the needed consensus. I admit to being influenced by my time covering Latin America and in particular the important roles that diplomacy played in ending the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan wars (U.N. envoy Alvaro de Soto playing an important role in the former and the regional process led by Oscar Arias in the latter).

I would invite further critiques by suggesting how difficult it will be for the US and AFG to agree on a negotiating approach and for Karzai to embrace the benefits of a neutral facilitator. Another Achilles heel is the degree to which this optimistic scenario depends on the success of the bottom up approach. The final section does not address key questions about a small COIN structure, including its span of control. The primary observation here is that we need to think about small footprint COIN (or FID for the purists) approaches in AFG and elsewhere.

My quick sketch of what the final phase would look like - a post-COIN security and assistance program is meant primarily to argue for productive develoment assistance vice the kind of perpetual self-licking ice-cream cone that Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart diagnosed so acutely in Fixing Failed States.

Let me clarify that this paper is my own research and writing; it represents no one and nothing else. I noted my advisory affilation to the AFG PAK COE in the interest of full disclosure. (I have supported the COE in its first 18 months to help build its capacity for multidisciplinary analysis, which I see as an important attempt to embody some of the best learning practices developed over the recent years.)

I understand that personal attacks on one's credibility and integrity are part and parcel of the internet era; I appreciate SWJ's efforts to strike the right balance between free speech and slander. In the very unlikely event that I would ever submit anything "official" for comment, I will most certainly identify it as such. Let the debate continue!

gian p gentile (not verified)

Fri, 12/10/2010 - 9:40pm

Ms Robinson:

There was no, NO, personal attack on you so please do not construct such a pernicious straw man. Nor was there any slander at all. I initially pointed out the possibility that there might be a conflict of interest with your work since you started off as a journalist who wrote a glowing portrayal of General Petraeus, then you worked for a major defense contractor and apparently had a hand in writing a significant piece of Coin doctrine, now you work as a senior advisor to a war fighting command. I thought that these points were important inquiry for the public interest. Other reasonable and balanced commentators on this blog (Maxwell, McCallister, Publius) thought so too.

So please, no straw men of accusations of personal attacks and slander because they did not happen.

gentile

Ms Robinson,

I dont pretend to be an expert here and certainly dont have anywhere near the experience of many of the contributors to SWJ, however, Im struggling to differentiate your arguments.

It is a sharp piece of analysis - no doubt about that. But your paper keeps jumping from local solutions to a Karzai/central command driven structure and processes. From what I saw on the ground the two are diametrically opposed to each other.

Given your influential position, I would encourage you to be even more courageous and suggest that in the West we need to accept that Afghanistan is never going to be a free and open democracy and Karzai is never going to deliver anything close to that. Go even further, and if we all take a hard look in the mirror and admit our actions and grand policies have merely protected the interests of the corrupt elite. Time and time again we have focused on protecting the people in government and not the people who elected them.

As I argued earlier, improving governance, tackling corruption, delivering security and stability is not about helping to keep the jobs of those in government it is about helping to improve the lives of those they claim to represent.

Any mandate or legitimacy was destroyed through the UN's failure to demand transparency in the 2009 Presidential vote. This is one example of where a failure on behalf of the international community sent an unequivocal message about corruption right to the village.

Previously, I raised the example of the Speluncean Explorers, to ask if the people of Afghanistan in each village, District and Province are like their own Spelucean Societies (forget the eating part - that is not the point of this fictitious legal story). Each village/District must, as they have always done in Afghansitan, devise their own way of securing stability, that shuts out foreign insurgents. Karzai should not be part of local negotiations.

The fundamental problem for Afghanistan has not necessarily been its own doing. If we are honest with ourselves and history how much of Afghanistan's problems are the consequence of external forces for hundreds of years?

Perhaps a solution is to allow local districts to run their own affairs and a national security force's sole focus is to keep out any foreign interference. Sure, the international community could help with that. On a multi-lateral level we could all sign up to a moratorium on any interference at any level, including INGOs, in Afghanistan's affairs. Zero tolerance on any foreign state or non-state actors, sticking their noses in the affairs of Afghanistan.

Ms Robinson, I only float these ideas to ask questions that try to push the boundaries and get us out of this "we must make COIN work at all costs no matter what" approach to Afghanistan. COIN may well have met its match in Afghanistan.

Bob's World

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 9:51am

For what it is worth, what is typically lost to the perspective of those on the government side of the insurgency/COIN equation is that while insurgency is typically waged among the populace, it is won or lost in the Capital.

US efforts to dates have avoided putting hard pressure on the Karzai regime to actually fix the fundamental aspects of his government that fuel the insurgency. We instead protect and enable the very governance that feeds the flames of revolution; and then surge in foreign forces for that mission, thereby feeding the flames of resistance.

It is all well to work to protect the populace from the insurgent, but who is working to protect the populace from the government??

We have picked a side, and that corrupts our efforts and blinds us to realities of what must be done to bring stability to Afghanistan and her people. This has led us to a "strategy of tactics" as we run about the countryside working our asses off to manage the symptoms of the insurgency.

It is time to shift our perspective. Insurgents do not cause insurgency. Ideology does not cause insurgency. Governmental domestic policies cause the conditions of insurgency within a populace that are then exploited by those who step up to lead change. We attack the flames rather than the source of fuel, and that is no way to fight a fire or an insurgency. It is time to focus on the fuel, and that fuel is the structure and policies of the Karzai regime.

It is growing vogue to simple put that in the proverbial "too hard box." Jim Gant declared it too hard and said focus on tribes. CNAS and the Barno/Exum team have declared it too hard and said focus on the provincial/district level government. Both are well intended approaches, but both miss the root source of causation. Until we have to moral courage to focus on fixing the Karzai regime (beginning with the constitution that ensures insurgency by its very structure) we are doomed to managing symptoms. Efforts to bypass are no answer.

Either take on the root cause head on, or go home. There really is no middle ground. Trumped up claims of "existential threats" don't hold water, and should not hold us hostage to this mission either. Identified "vital interests" of "disrupt, dismantle, defeat AQ" and a "stable Pakistan" are both better served by a smaller footprint in Afghanistan rather than a larger one.

We have a COIN doctrine that is solidly rooted in European Colonial COIN and US Banana War COIN (colored by a few years in Iraq) that was all about exerting control over a region and populace for economic reasons through the vehicle of establishing and sustaining an illegitimate government. The world has changed, the mission has changed, we must change.

It is time to move forward from debating how to do the wrong thing better, and get to how to do the right thing, even if poorly at first.

Cheers,

Bob

Bob's World

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 10:50am

Slap,

The Quetta Shura would be who I engaged to achieve such a result. Santuary rests in the people of the FATA, and once the Pashtun populace agrees to deny sanctuary AQ would have to leave.

If merely the ISI/Pak government (we don't do ourselves any favors by separating the two, it is not a matter of which controls which, they are both "Pakistan". We play the same game with LH and the Govt of Leb. as well, btw, and it cripples our approaches to holding both governments fully accountable. But that is another topic) agreed to evict AQ, AQ would simply go underground from them as they do from us. Burrow deeper into their sanctuary of the Pashtun people.

An achieveable event, but it would be tied to reconciliation efforts and would be facilitated by the Taliban, not the ISI.

slapout9 (not verified)

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 10:27am

"Second, and MAC made me think of this; what if the ISI did something completely unconventional and put OBL and every AQ person they could get their hands on into gunny sacks and then delivered them to the deck of a US carrier." by carl

Sounds good to me!

Gian,

As I commented earlier here, I made a judgment call when I removed your post. It's basically OBE now as the issues you raised have been restated in subsequent commentary.

In fairness to Linda Robinson, prior to her post above I told her that I removed two posts that I thought were personal attacks. One was yours and another by an anon. I take responsibility for that and the issues those deletions raised here. I think enough has been said concerning this. If you'd like to take it offline that is fine.

Dave D.

omarali50

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 11:37am

Robert, your description of banana republic coin is very good, but your description of the insurgency in afghanistan may be a bit off. This seems to be a popular notion (bad governance in Afghanistan creates the setting for an insurgency, people are revolting against bad government) but in my opinion (and the opinion of my afghan and pakhtun friends) this is a little off. In most of afghanistan, there is very little governance to be had, good or bad. Rural Afghanistan is not revolting against an evil government. The taliban do provide a just but bare-bones governance in terms of law and order and delivery of justice, but nothing else, they are true Republicans (without the welfare for the rich and the wholesale corruption). For most Afghans, NO govt provides any governance, they govern themselves and they agree to cooperate with whatever higher order organization seems likely to win. Its the "likely to win" that really truly matters and that is the taliban's best weapon.
Everyone who thinks a modern democratic Afghanistan is not a good medium term aim is right. But a real government can exist in the cities and can find its own way to compromise with local bosses in the rural areas and foreign intervention is not really a help in that process. Without Pakistani support, even the Taliban will have to compromise. Though there are, by now, truly extreme Islamists on the ground who will compromise with absolutely no one. They will also not compromise with each other. They will be a source of violence and chaos for years to come. They will not get to rule though. Even if the taliban win, NATO leaves, Pakistan reetablishes pax pakistania in most of Afghanistan, it will take only a few months for these nuts to get out of control and start blowing things up. From a harsh realist point of view, that may actually be the best thing to do. Leave the place, let India and Russia and Iran arm the Northern alliance, let Pakistan arm the Taliban and let the Arabs fight everyone.

slapout9 (not verified)

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 11:46am

R.C. Jones, I would get list of Bill Laden's relatives and start working my way through them with a .45 until I got the answer to the question "Where's Bill?"

carl (not verified)

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 12:20am

Omar:

I don't think you are raving. I think you're right. That's the reason I asked the question about the ISI giving up OBL and the rest of AQ in Pakistan. If they did that it would solve all their "strategic thinking", "strategic depth" problems because there would go our primary reason for being in Afghanistan. Realpolitik would demand that they do that-"Off you go Osama old buddy. Just business." But the Pak Army/ISI don't do that which, to me, is very strong supporting evidence that ideology, Islamist ideology, is the, or at least a very strong, driver in this whole thing.

There. Now there are two of us raving.

omarali50

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 8:35pm

Dayuhan,
I agree with you there. I think Robert is missing the Islamist element here. Not the low-church Islamist notions of the ordinary Afghans, but the modern, high church Islamist project in Pakistan. The project appears so ridiculous to most sane Westerners that they discount it as the ravings of a few lunatics in caves. It is not that at all. It is a very ambitious (too ambitious) but sufficiently serious project. And you dont have to send in some James Bond or Richard Sorge to ferret out this secret plan. They talk about it all the time. I have heard bankers and generals and journalists in Pakistan say (in all seriousness):
1. Western civilization is at the end of its tether.
2. China is rising and we have an alliance with China.
3. India is a hollow nation and will fall like a ripe apple into our hands once the time is right.
4. The West and China will fight a world war, destroying both parties.
5. Islam will emerge to mop up.
6. This is a long war. Temporary setbacks happen.
A slightly saner version of this animates the "modern Islamist" section of GHQ and ISI (look up brasstacks, paknationalists, daily mail or moin ansari and spend a jolly afternoon reading all about it).
Afghan taliban may have simpler ambitions, but they are also meant to serve as tools in the hands of more sophisticated people. And if they go wobbly, there is always Haqqani sahib.
No amount of "good governance" will change that....
And they are serious. I mean really serious. Having said that, I have no doubt that good people will think I am raving.

gian p gentile (not verified)

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 7:02pm

Fair enough Dave.

I just felt compelled to respond to her accusastions of personal slander against her, of which there were none.

mission complete

gian

RCJ

Re this:

<i>This is a revolutionary movement as these are the leaders from the segment of populace excluded from full participation in opportunity and governance by the current Northern Alliance based government. This is the target of Reconciliation, and if the ISSUES (not the men or groups) driving this leadership to revolution are addressed, we will turn the corner on the overall insurgency as well.</i>

What exactly are the issues that you see driving that leadership to revolution?

Do you really think they want "full participation in opportunity and governance"? Or do they just want to rule, as they did before we intervened? Do you believe that if we had installed a "better" government they would have simply participated, rather than fighting to regain the power and position they lost?

I wish I could believe that, but I don't.

slapout9 (not verified)

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 2:10pm

"Matiullah's men scrambled up the ridge, grabbed these guys and brought them to him. One carried the message out to advise others to be a bit more repectful..."
Posted by Robert C. Jones | December

Bob, thats our whole problem IMO....Rodeny Dangerfield syndrome.... we don't get no respect!

Also,good for Matiullah Khan!

Bob's World

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 12:00pm

Slap,

I didn't realize you "spoke Pashtun". You remind me of a story I was told about Matiullah Khan (who I have met, like and respect) that I believe to be true. I will not recount that story here, but let's just say it involve a handful of Taliban who thought it would be wise to get on the radio and disparage Matiullah's mother from up on a ridge overlooking route Bear. Matiullah's men scrambled up the ridge, grabbed these guys and brought them to him. One carried the message out to advise others to be a bit more repectful...

Bob's World

Sat, 12/11/2010 - 11:54am

Omar,

Excellent points that I largely agree with. I certainly agree that most of Afghanistan is what I call "self-governed space," and in these spaces the populace cares little about what happens in Kabul, and expects little in terms of governmental services. Approaches to develop our way to victory miss this point.

But I do see the insurgency as a two-tier insurgency. A Revolutionary top tier that drives the movement and is represented by the Quetta Shrua and other senior insurgent leaders in Pakistan. This is a revolutionary movement as these are the leaders from the segment of populace excluded from full participation in opportunity and governance by the current Northern Alliance based government. This is the target of Reconciliation, and if the ISSUES (not the men or groups) driving this leadership to revolution are addressed, we will turn the corner on the overall insurgency as well.

The lower tier are the rank and file, apolitical, rural Afghan people who are paid and encouraged certainly, by the upper tier leadership; but more importantly are largely a resistance movement that simply do not want foreign armies on their lands and directing their leaders. Several times last year I would see reports where SF guys would go into some region off the beaten path and the people assumed we were Russians. The point being, we berate the Russians for their abuses of the people, but for a proud people who simply want to be left alone by Kabul and all foreign interlopers, there is simply no difference.

We reduce the causation for the lower tier by reconciling with the upper tier (getting the horse in front of our current cart to use an example in Ms. Robinson's paper) and by reducing our presence.

Less is more, more is less. Currently we are applying more, and while it makes sense, it is counterproductive to an end of Afghan stability.

Cheers,

Bob

Grant Martin (not verified)

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 5:42am

I think its time the International Community (IC) stopped talking in terms of invalid assumptions. No-one I know who is looking out to 2014 seems to entertain contrarian views, but here's an attempt:

In 2014, I assume:

- Entities within the Pakistani government will continue to support the parties they support now for all the reasons everyone knows about: obsession with India, regional politics, historical ties, personal/parochial interests, etc.

- Several groups of insurgents will still operate along and across the borders of Afghanistan and contribute to instability within Afghanistan

- Insurgents cleared from areas will continue to migrate to other areas or go underground, waiting for the main effort to move and then return. Short-term success in RC-S/SW and in key terrain districts will not be sustainable after coalition forces leave and Afghan forces back-fill

- GIRoA continues to disagree with the way IJC/ISAF is prosecuting their COIN. As ISAF transitions to GIRoA-led, these differences will become very apparent and either ISAF metrics will take a dive, or the Western Press won't notice since Coalition soldiers aren't dying anymore- and then the West's politicians just won't care that metrics are worse.

- The majority of Afghan forces will continue to be non-Pashtun, making it impossible to connect with the people in those areas once Coalition forces leave. The police in those areas will do what they have to to survive- and this will result in negative metrics for ISAF.

- The Afghan government will still operate to some degree in a corrupt system (individuals will have to operate corruptly to survive), and no amount of progress towards doing away with corrupt figures will translate into less insurgency (legitimacy of the government does not equal less insurgency in Afghanistan).

- Less corruption will translate into weaker individuals and systems in the current climate, and that will not change by 2014. In essence, Western anti-corruption efforts will de-legitimize Afghan officials and cause them to lose influence in the current system and most likely be replaced by more corrupt individuals.

- In many (most?) areas of Afghanistan, the local insurgent/warlord/corrupt police chief/mullah/chief elder, etc. will continue to have more legitimacy than the central government and although that may result in bad metrics for ISAF, it won't necessarily mean more instability/insurgency perceived by those on the ground.

- Negotiating with the Taliban, while perhaps feasible in some instances, will not be a magical bullet that solves all problems and ensures Afghanistan never again becomes a safe-haven for terrorists. This negotiation, while encouraged by some, will be anathema to the Kabul government.

- The IC will continue to shy away from attempting to influence too much a sovereign national government. Any attempts to may actually backfire and cause the government to be seen as more of a puppet of the West than they are now.

- Continued military operations by forces foreign to the local areas (Coalition and Tajik-heavy forces) will only enable forces who would profit from instability. In the short-term ISAF's metrics may improve, but nothing long-term will be gained.

- There continues to be no obvious connection between anything ISAF or GIRoA does that translates into long-term stability. Stability will be a locally emergent event that small teams of outsiders with diverse skills may be able to enable in a small way, but most times it will be internally-driven and many times look like a "bad metric" to ISAF.

- Development will happen when security is established- and most likely, like in our own country, without government/international community (IC) direction.

If some or all of these assumptions are more valid than the ones we are currently tracking, then I think we have some problems if we think working towards "transition" in 2014 will work. The problem as I see it is that I don't think we are willing to question any of our assumptions- so even if some or all of these assumptions I have listed are right, we'd never be able to admit it.

I'm still not really sure why that is, although one theory is that we are so bureaucratic that we are an "irreversible momentum" unto ourselves of invalid processes and systems that cannot do anything differently once we get going (i.e.- we are the furthest thing from a "Learning Organization" as possible as defined by Senge).

Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
NTM-A/CSTC-A

The views expressed are the author's own and do not represent the position of NTM-A/CSTC-A, the US Army, ISAF, or DoD.

Bob's World

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 7:22am

Dayuhan,

From your post:

"What exactly are the issues that you see driving that leadership to revolution?

Do you really think they want "full participation in opportunity and governance"? Or do they just want to rule, as they did before we intervened? Do you believe that if we had installed a "better" government they would have simply participated, rather than fighting to regain the power and position they lost?"

Of course they want to rule again, just as in America the Republican Party wants to regain the presidency. The difference being, that in Afghanistan the regime we enabled Karzai to establish completely bans anyone from competing for participation, let alone leadership, that he chooses to ban.

What we all need to keep in mind is that what the Taliban could get away with 10 years ago when few people cared about what went on in Afghanistan and what they could get away with if allowed to legally compete for participation and even leadership in the government of Afghanistan today are two very different things.

As you know, I speak of "good governance" and have defined four key components under broad headings of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect, and Hope. COIN doctrine is more focused on "Effective Governance." Perhaps a better term for what is needed in a stable society is "Respective Governance."

That Taliban don't believe that the Northern Alliance's claim to govern is any more legitimate than their own. (Recognizing that both had external help in gaining and holding power). But so long as they are denied legal venues to compete for roles in governance; so long as they believe the Karzai regime to be illegitimate; so long as they believe there to be little justice in the rule of law and inequity in how Pashtuns are now treated (not to imply at all that they are/were better at any of these things. They are arguably worse at most), they will have causation to continue to challenge illegally through insurgency.

This is the point, the issue is not how good or bad the challenger is, the challenger didn't start this. The challenger did not create the conditions of insurgency. The issue is how good or bad the government is, as they are the ones that create the conditions of insurgency in the society.

Those who overly focus on the ideology employed by the insurgent are distracted from what is really at issue. The people of Vietnam did not challenge French colonialism because they wanted to be communists, they adopted communism to motivate a movement because they wanted liberty from foreign oppression and the illegitimate governments imposed upon them.

Similarly Muslims who embrace strict Jihadist, Islamist ideologies do not become insurgent because of their ideology; it is merely the tool to motivate the disenfranchised to act. So, Omar, I believe I appreciate the role of Islam and how Salafist versions are employed currently as insurgent ideologies as well as most non-Muslim westerners do. I also believe I understand insurgency better than most scholars on Islam do. My position as a student of both is that:

A: Conditions of insurgency grow in a populace based upon their perceptions of the domestic policies of their government.

B: Insurgent leaders and organizations will emerge from such populaces, and if denied effective legal venues, will act out illegally to challenge that governance.

C: Any such movement requires an ideology that speaks to the target populace to motivate them to cross the line from law abiding citizen to law breaking citizen to challenge this poor governance.

D: Sometimes selfless leaders and noble organizations emerge, sometimes selfish, ignoble organizations emerge. Sometimes non-violent tactics are adopted, sometimes violent tactics are adopted. All of this is a matter of who responds, not a matter of what the causation is.

C: Religion is often the basis of insurgent ideology because it works.

Bottom line is that we are just too damn threat-centric in our approaches. Look at the AFPAK COE where Ms Robinson worked at CENTCOM. Is it in their J5 and driven by strategy and policy? No, it is in the CENTCOM J2 and driven by the DIA.

We have to break some pardigms if we truly want to evolve. Various tweaking of tactics won't get us there; and neither will efforts that simply ignore the Karzai government and attempt to build good governance down at the local, District or Province level. I do not argue that Afghanistan needs a strong, central, Western-style government; I argue that the causation for the current insurgency radiates out from the national-level central government.

At the core of the problem is the Constitution. Fix that first and the rest will begin to fall in place. But it must be an Afghan fix, and it must include strong representation from that segment of the populace currently supporting the insurgency.

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 7:30am

<em>I think its time the International Community (IC) stopped talking in terms of invalid assumptions.</em> - Grant Martin

Everything in your comment makes perfect sense. Sadly.

@ Carl, Omar, others:

I've taken my comments on this thread too far off of the main points, so I will stop after this (really):

From <em>Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947</em> by Sumit Ganguly:

<strong>"It is virtually an article of faith among members of the global and, in particular, the American nuclear non-proliferation communities that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests have made the region more prone to war. Indian and Pakistani decision-makers, on the other hand, have, with almost equal force, argued that the likelihood of full-scale war in the region is now highly unlikely specifically <em>because</em> of the emergence of a crude form of nuclear deterrence.

Both propositions are open to question."</strong>

Kargil represents one "data" point to study - and a complicated messy one at that. How to interpret the event, especially given that there is a lot of fuzziness around it?

1. Outside powers intervened to prevent the thing from going further because of fears of the use of nuclear weapons. Is that deterrence?

2. The presence of weapons didn't stop an aggressive action. Is that an example of failed deterrence?

How to interpret such events?

Interesting how a conversation about a specific "small war" has morphed. Perhaps those that say "war is war" are the most correct. Every single thing is irritatingly connected (at least, it seems so to this easily confused layperson.)

Thank you to all of the commenters for the insights.

Dayuhan (not verified)

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 8:29am

RCJ:

<i>What we all need to keep in mind is that what the Taliban could get away with 10 years ago when few people cared about what went on in Afghanistan and what they could get away with if allowed to legally compete for participation and even leadership in the government of Afghanistan today are two very different things.</i>

Do you really think the Taliban have any interest at all in being allowed to "legally compete for participation for participation and even leadership"? They don't acknowledge any such legal framework in any event, or anyone's right to "allow" them to "compete". They want power, the same complete power they had before, and the only way they can get it is to seize it. Legal competition isn't really an option for them, because if they have it, so do others. That's not what they want.

<i>The challenger did not create the conditions of insurgency. The issue is how good or bad the government is, as they are the ones that create the conditions of insurgency in the society.</i>

I don't think how good or bad the government is matters at all. What matters is who the government is. The Taliban leadership will fight any government that isn't composed of them and only them, no matter how "good" it is. I doubt that they have any interest at all in peacefully or "legally" competing for power or sharing power.

<i>At the core of the problem is the Constitution. Fix that first and the rest will begin to fall in place. </i>

I wish I could believe that, but I don't. I don't think any Constitution would make a difference. A document is a good starting point, but it's only a starting point, and governance needs a whole lot more. Any system and any structure can be corrupted.

I really wish I could believe that the Taliban and all the other Afghan factions really want to have a peaceful and orderly competition for power and a nice western-style system of protections and checks and balances, and if only we could install the right system everybody would fall into line and be peaceful. I don't think that's the case, though.

We removed the Taliban, creating a power vacuum. We declared that vacuum filled by the Karzai government, but that declaration was pretty much irrelevant to those being (rather nominally) governed. Groups of people are fighting to fill that space, and they will keep fighting until one group or another wins. The winner will take all. They don't care about good governance or bad governance: all governance options are bad, the contending parties want bad governance by them and in their interest. None of these groups care about the populace. Whoever wins will proceed to squeeze the populace for all they can and stomp whoever objects. The populace doesn't see itself as the arbiter of victory, they're trying not to get shot and trying to avoid being on the wrong side of the eventual winner. No document or system of government is going to change this.

Not a pretty or orderly picture, but it's what I suspect is there.

Bob's World

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 9:10am

Dayuhan,

I appreciate your concerns, but I believe this can work. Certainly current approaches of simply seeking to defeat the enemey and please the populace while ignoring the problem of the central government are unlikely to succeed.

Also, remember we did not create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, we enabled a transition from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance. There is a significant difference.

One of my major take-aways from my time in Afghanistan is the black and white / all or nothing nature of power and patronage. If a guy is in power his tribal/family affiliates get all opportunity and roles in governance, and those from the other tribe are relegated to the sidelines of society. Good farmland is taken from one and given to the other; good jobs are taken from one and given to the other. Poppy is eradicated in fields of one, but grows unmolested in the fields of others. The rule of law is imposed agaist one, but not against the other.

It is on this "Afghan sideline" that outside forces conducting UW find ready teams to join their cause. It is where the Soviets found their team; it is where Pakistan found their team; it is where the US found its team. This is Afghanistan, and I suspect it has always been this way. Is it arrogance to think we can break this cycle? Perhaps. But the world is changing, so perhaps not.

But at least we must recognize and appreciate this cycle, and if unwilling to break it, we should get out of the middle of it. There are no existential threats to the US in Afghanistan; and the oft named vital interests of defeating AQ and a stable Pakistan can best be achieved without the anchor of "fixing" Afgahnistan around our neck, because currently the only thing "fixed" is us, physically to this hard and fascinating land.

Cheers,

Bob

Bill C. (not verified)

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 1:22pm

On April 7, 1991, in a New York Times book review of Stephen Kinzer's "Blood of Brothers," Linda Robinson noted that the book described "a graphic account of a country torn in half over the Sandinistas' effort to build a new political and economic order" in the country of Nicaragua.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE3D91F3CF934A35757C0…

Today, it is the United States that risks seeing areas of the world being "torn in half" as it seeks, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the less-integrated world, to establish a new political and economic order.

As Ms. Robinson noted in the case of the Sandinistas initiative in Nicaragua, and as might be similarly discerned in the present case of the United States in Afghanistan et al, efforts which require that a population give up central tenents of its present way-of-life -- and adopt central tenents of a foreign way-of-life -- this, by its very nature, tends to alienate the population.

This, I beleive, is what we should focus on when we discuss "the root cause of the rebellion and/or insurgency."

It would seem to be less important to discuss (1) what methods and (2) which actors might make this initiative, to fundamentally, rapidly and radically transform a society (especially against its will), more easy to achieve.

omarali50

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 1:55pm

Robert,
I think you missed my point. My point was NOT about the Islamist ideology used by Afghan insurgents against foreign troops/Northern alliance. That, to me, is the low-church end of the process. I think you are missing the higher order (more sophisticated, more ambitious, better resourced) force that supports the insurgency from outside and steps in to keep it on the straight and narrow if they go wobbly. That does not mean there are no local factors or that local factors are not more important tactically. They are. But there are ambitious people with higher order aims who will step in if local factors seem to be heading for compromise. And they will stop any such compromise because it takes less to upset the apple-cart than to pile it up in a nice looking pyramid.
I am not saying such ideologically committed people are still in charge in GHQ/ISI. It is possible, even likely, that GHQ is sincerely trying to bring them under control. But GHQ is hampered by its own blind spots (mostly, India and a highly centralized vision of Pakistani nationalism) and it does not seem to have the will or the ability to act against the Jihadist faction in a manner that will decisively break their link with state institutions. I am willing to consider that it may NOW be beyond ANY Pakistani state institution's ability to make such a total break. But whatever the reason, given that the break has not happened, I do not think the Taliban are in any position to compromise even if they wanted to (and right now, there is no reason to think that they want to). For as long as that break has not happened, they have a sanctuary and a network of supporters and a steady supply of manpower. Why would they want to compromise? Time is on their side.
Good governance in Afghanistan will certainly help the govt of Afghanistan to counter this threat, but the kind of peaceful "everyone gains" transition in which almost all the taliban join a legally constituted modern-ish state on fair terms seems out of reach even then.
About the seriousness of the jihadist scheme, ask yourself this question: During the nineties, the army trained a nationwide network of jihadists (half a million by Arif Jamal's count), helped them set up multiple front organizations, protected them from the police and civil authorities (allowing them to be, literally, above the law). Why would they do this? What was the long-term aim WITHIN Pakistan?
But of course, I am no expert. I will be the first to admit that I do have doubts about my own version and am occasionally tempted to believe the experts. And then, something like this happens: http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/12/doctor-arrested-for-blasphemy-police.html
This English language news item does not give details, but in this case the doctor was hauled up on this obviously ridiculous charge and police were about to let him go when "activists of banned organizations" showed up and surrounded the police station and forced the police to register a case and arrest him. My point in this case is that this is exactly why these "activists of banned organizations" were raised in every nook and cranny of the country. Somebody knew what he was doing....though i am sure people like Musharraf had no idea what they were going to get when they recruited these "activists"..Musharraf would be the perfect example of the kind of clueless General who did the jihadist's dirty work while imagining that he was just creating "strategic depth", "unconventional force multipliers" or balancing the "complex strategic threat from India"....such phrases work magic on army officers trained in American designed defence colleges.
And I think Americans who "understand" why the army felt the need for these unconventional force multipliers, are acting, unfortunately and unknowingly, as enablers.

Anonymous (not verified)

Sun, 12/12/2010 - 6:02pm

RCJ:

<i>Also, remember we did not create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, we enabled a transition from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance. There is a significant difference.</i>

We enabled a transition in nominal authority, not a transition in power. Not the same thing at all. We may have put the Northern Alliance in nominal authority, but power remained with us, and we will eventually leave. That leaves power up for grabs.

<i>One of my major take-aways from my time in Afghanistan is the black and white / all or nothing nature of power and patronage. This is Afghanistan, and I suspect it has always been this way. Is it arrogance to think we can break this cycle? Perhaps. But the world is changing, so perhaps not.</i>

I agree completely on that... and I don't think we can break that cycle. The Afghans can, but I'd expect it to take generations. If we see that there is internal momentum building toward that kind of change we may, at certain points, be able to help, with a very light touch (anything else would likely do more harm than good)... but to think "we" can simply break that cycle in our interest at a time of our choosing is, yes, arrogance.

<i>But at least we must recognize and appreciate this cycle, and if unwilling to break it, we should get out of the middle of it. There are no existential threats to the US in Afghanistan; and the oft named vital interests of defeating AQ and a stable Pakistan can best be achieved without the anchor of "fixing" Afgahnistan around our neck</i>

Again, agreed, except that I see it as a matter of capacity, not will. I don't believe that we should ever have tried to govern Afghanistan, directly or by proxy.

Bill C:

<i>
efforts which require that a population give up central tenents of its present way-of-life -- and adopt central tenents of a foreign way-of-life -- this, by its very nature, tends to alienate the population.

This, I beleive, is what we should focus on when we discuss "the root cause of the rebellion and/or insurgency."</i>

Where is anyone being asked to give up "central tenets of their way of life"? As long as people don't attack us or our allies or shelter those who do, nobody anywhere cares about their way of life. Even where such attacks have produced intervention, the way of life is simply not an issue... nobody is trying to shove globalization down anyone's throat.

In most of these marginal states the "traditional way of life" is in any event long gone, a casualty of war and intervention. Traditional tribal governance structures are under pressure from local warlords, foreign meddlers representing government and non-government actors. There are very few places left where populaces are fighting to hold their traditions, more often the fight is over power and the position to exploit power to gain wealth. Do you really think the populaces of Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, or the DRC are desperate to sustain their current way of life?

Ok, did it again... comment above is mine. It's early morning in my time zone, sort of an excuse!

negotiator6

Mon, 12/13/2010 - 9:33am

The below article from the front page of the New York Times referenced Karzai's quoted comments.

He apparently would select the Taliban at this juncture. IS THIS HOW AFGHANISTAN ENDS?

How can any strategy succeed under the current Afghan government...it cannot!

Put yourself in the place of Soldiers who ruck up everyday knowing full well that the Afghan government supports the enemy...FUBAR.

Monday, December 13, 2010; 12:00 AM/New York Times front page
**************************************
KABUL - Afghan President Hamid Karzai had heard enough.

THE STORY:
***********************************
For more than an hour, Gen. David H. Petraeus, U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry and other top Western officials in Kabul urged Karzai to delay implementing a ban on private security firms. Reconstruction projects worth billions of dollars would have to be shuttered, they maintained, if foreign guards were evicted.

Sitting at the head of a glass-topped, U-shaped table in his conference room, Karzai refused to budge, according to two people with direct knowledge of the late October meeting. He insisted that Afghan police and soldiers could protect the reconstruction workers, and he dismissed pleas for a delay.

As he spoke, he grew agitated, then enraged. He told them that he now has three "main enemies" - the Taliban, the United States and the international community.

"If I had to choose sides today, I'd choose the Taliban," he fumed.
**************************NOTHING FOLLOWS

Bob's World

Mon, 12/13/2010 - 11:04am

Welcome to Afghanistan. Karzai is a bit of the odd duck in the current Northern Alliance mix anyway. He may well think he can do better by bringing the Pashtun dominated team. What he may be miscalulating is if his body will end up on a stake on the road from Kabul to Jalalabad or not in the transition. I can only assume he intends to play his relationship with the US as his hole card in such a transition.

Karzai is smart. He is not noble and selfless, but he is smart. He grabbed the US bandwagon, and jumped on board to end up in the ultimate power position in the new Northern Alliance-based government. He then manipulated the development of a constitution that places him personally at the pinacle of a new centralized, national patronage system in which he controls all favors and reaps the cream of all transactions. He also holds the US and the Coalition by the nose to keep us in place to protect and resource his little ponzi scheme. Very smart.

Once the US realizes that we have no exestintial threats in Afghanistan; that the Taliban will work with us (hell, we should offer them Karzai just as he offers them us) and deny AQ sanctuary; that Pakistan returns to stability once we stop disrupting their internal dynamics to support our CT operations; all of this will settle down to "normal" Afghanistan.

We control our own destinies, we merely need to reach out and do so.