Volume I - American Perspectives, edited by Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler.
Volume II: Iraqi Perspectives, edited by Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams.
Comments
COL Walker on page 70 said this:
"So these guys [Fallujah delegation], they were totally convinced they were going to beat us again, which they dont realize they lost
the first time.[ey won because of politics.[ey won because the Iraqi governing council at that time, which was the advisers under the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority], said that they were going to resign, four of the council were going to resign if we didnt stop operations. So [Ambassador L.Paul] Bremer had said,"Look, stop it.""
Also see page 248
I really liked the portions about BG (then COL) Sean McFarland and Marine LTC Jurney who is probably a Colonel by now and seemed really sharp.
Wish they had capitalized "Soldier" the way did Marine. Great document, but at times it seems kind of defensive. Almost had the impression they don't think they get sufficient credit for successes in Iraq. You did well Marines.
<blockquote><em>So you know,it gets back to this whole idea of overreaction,and the fact that we should have taken the deaths of the four contractors much more in stride,realizing that ...our reaction was exactly what they wanted it to be.</em></blockquote>
<blockquote><em>But now were tied up in this terrible fight in Fallujah, and the same guys who ordered us to attack now order us to quit, so they stopped the fighting...</em></blockquote>
Obviously, these professional officers aren't dropping names to blame to keep the discussion oriented around Anbar and not internal military-political squabbles. But does anyone know the players who were issuing orders to attack Fallujah? One of the interviewees (I think it was General Conway) mentioned CJTF-7, but again, no names.