Comments
Thanks for bringing this article to my attention.
LTC Peters is, in some respects, sort of like that crazy uncle in the family who says the impolite-but-true things at family gatherings. If we didn't have him around to say those things, to think the unthinkable and say the unsayable, we'd have to invent him.
During the Cold War, there came to exist whole professions of people whose business it was to think the unthinkable and plan for the unspeakable. By and large these were decent, educated, moral people, trying to keep their countries and their families alive and free. Their moral and spiritual heirs exist today throughout the military and intelligence services.
I've linked back to you here: http://consul-at-arms2.blogspot.com/2011/02/re-wishful-thinking-and-ind…
I find the first part of the article truly interesting, and I'll quote "we are unwilling to accept that war not only is, but must be, hell".
This point is largely forgotten, and the author places this in perfect context. Indeed, if humanity's destiny is world peace, then we must all understand that war is hell, when it is carried out it should be to its full destructive power, and if we do not wish to do so, then we must find a way for peace.
The second part of the article ("The present foe") is absolutely terrible however. The author may be good with conflict analysis, he does not know the first thing about Islam, or the supposed enemy. The very fact that he believes al qaida's goal is the destruction of the West, an absurd proposition, shows that he is just as absorbed by the media coverage of the war that he so adroitly critizes in the first part. A warring faction must be rational, if it is not, it dies.
I take offense, also, that the author does not recognize an essential point : Islam is not fighting for its life, Islam is the most dynamic religion in the world today, the religion that breeds the most hope, helps its followers the most. The intellectual background necessary for a revival just hasn't occured yet. We are waiting, and hoping, that Muslim intellectuals will find the courage and the path, and perhaps the current revolutions are the first steps in that direction. Islam's civil war, started a century ago, may be coming to a close.
That article was pretty much classic post-9/11 Ralph Peters, with all the Clausewitzian Absoluter Krieg that he could muster. Bravo. Of course there is that "kinder, gentler" Clausewitz of Vom Krieg Book VIII and of Bernard Brodie, so one can argue the point both ways. What Peters is on to - is the truth that the essence of war is psychological reality as much as physical reality - and that we ignore this psychological reality to our peril. Whether we are trafficking in hard power or soft, the end we seek is to convince our friends and neutrals that we are friends indeed, and to bring our enemies to the point of despair. No doubt, the manifestation of despair can result in all sorts of side effects - but if Peters is right and the Islamic world's existential struggle is indeed a lost cause - then we need not so much concern ourselves with coercive ends so much as charitable action - assuming that our adversaries are not in fact beyond its healing power. If in fact we neither have the courage of soldiers or dedication of martyrs and saints - and the greater Middle East is littered with the bones of both - then we need to know this about ourselves.
In that article, Peters does not use history as an analytical tool to help interpret how events unfolded or how to understand the present. He cherry picks historical examples to support an argument that was clearly derived before he began his research. It is a faith-based argument that we have strayed from some apparent morally superior set of virtues that we allegedly held in the past and if we could only go back to our old ways then all would be well.
Sorry, Ralph, but our failures can be directly traced to the initial steps in the state-building process in 2002, led by the international community, that excluded large segments of the Afghan population, creating new grievances and exacerbating existing ones among a large population of people who had grown accustomed to settling disputes with the use of force. Those parties had a ready made logistical network and safe haven to support the use of force for an indefinite period of time. We utterly failed to address the problems or the enablers, not because we're morally weak, but because of our woeful misunderstanding of the situation and our incoherent approach to strategic planning.
Please tell me that Ralph Peters did not get paid to write that paper. I would expect a similar argument from any loudmouth at the local tavern whose views are likewise derived first from ideas floating around his head and justified after the fact by cherry picking whatever historical tidbits he can recall.
Anon,
This opinion piece was written for a magazine sponsored by an American Jewish organization, so we can probably assume that accounts for some of the tone in the article (to appease the audience). However, (at least on the first page) I find little to disagree with, especially his 4th point.
I don't disagree with you that we didn't understand the environment in Afghanistan and failed miserably at nation building due to that failure, but it also I also believe that our nation desires relatively bloodless wars so much that it impedes our chances to be successful when we employ military force. While rarely an advocate for war, when we decide that war is the solution, then we need to fight to win.
Too many folks in my view are drinking the CNAS Koolaid that dismisses the lethal aspects of war as a mere supporting aspect that should be minimized. That is generally true in peace enforcement and most stability operations, but assuming we're actually fighting a war, then the argument that we're not letting our troops win appears true, and our softer approach is failing. I think Peters makes an important point in poor form. I'm not sure it relates to what we're doing in Afghanistan now.
@ Anonymous,
Mr. Peters certainly touched a nerve!
However, the middle part of your remarks just makes the point of his essay more relevant. Quote:
"...but our failures can be directly traced to the initial steps in the state-building process in 2002, led by the international community, that excluded large segments of the Afghan population, creating new grievances and exacerbating existing ones among a large population of people who had grown accustomed to settling disputes with the use of force. Those parties had a ready made logistical network and safe haven to support the use of force for an indefinite period of time. We utterly failed to address the problems or the enablers, not because we're morally weak, but because of our woeful misunderstanding of the situation and our incoherent approach to strategic planning."
LTC Peters cogently points to many reasons for your above mentioned western inability to understand. I cannot find anything in his essay with which you should disagree.
As an example, when I read GEN Franks book I was appalled that he relied on a JAG officer to make the call cruise missile targets. What?
Mr. Peters' artful description of the US/Western European ruling class mindset is fresh in our minds and historical examples of such are too numerous to take the time to enumerate. It is all too recognizable.
The international community did not lead anything. Why point out the obvious, unless your point is rooted in someone else, or some other governing entity, being in control. Which given the history of previous regionally runs "solutions", said solutions served only to prompt an Assistant Sec of State convince a regional authority they would be blasted back into the stone age, which in retrospect we should have done.
Point: if we are going to employ the art of war and its tools we must do so with greater resolve than our foes. No matter how dirty or messy.
LPierson,
Not sure I agree with all your comments, but definitely most and certainly with the following:
["If" we are going to employ the art of war and its tools (and I would insert to achieve our policy objectives) we must do so with greater resolve than our foes. No matter how dirty or messy.]
Since DESERT STORM, or perhaps even JUST CAUSE, the media has created a popular myth of surgical war where only a few bad guys are killed, and then the people embrace us with open arms as we help them rebuild their economic infrastructure, and shortly thereafter a knight on a white horse rides home to a nice victory parade. Those are the exceptions to the rule, and definitely not the norm. Our nation once again needs to re-learn that war is ugly, unfair, and generally undesireable, but if it is in our interest to wage war, then it sure as hell is in our interest to win it.