The scrimmage should be as hard as the game.
By General Martin E. Dempsey, US Army
"This compilation of writings by General Dempsey—six articles published in ARMY magazine from October 2010 to March 2011, plus the speech he delivered at AUSA's 2011 Winter Symposium in February—captures the mutual focus of the Chief and his TRADOC commander on what our Army must do to shape itself for the future. There is recognition that our Army is always a force in transition, that it will expand and contract, train and deploy, and perpetually modify its Tables of Organization and Equipment. But the primary imperative for our leaders must be to care for the Soldiers and families who have endured so much for the country they love."
"That said, the Army and its leadership must win, learn, focus, adapt and win again—win the conflicts they face, learn better and faster than their enemies, focus on the fundamentals, adapt as an institutional imperative and, when called upon, win again."
General Gordon R. Sullivan, US Army Retired
President, Association of the United States Army
Comments
"In our Army rank is more important than expertise. That is the way it has always been. Hopefully they're still teaching this in the Q-Course, because it is still important and we need a body of monks that can carry the flame forward."posted by Bill M
BillM,
I have not read any of Ralph"s books but I have read many of his articles, so I guess I will now read a couple of his books.
Posted by In the Know,
"Some would contend that SF, since becoming a branch, has outdone the Army in the one thing that SF shouldn't have: institutionalization and thus becoming a bureaucratic leviathan."
Brother, I would be one of those critics. I think the Regiment (or more appropriately many of its leaders) is determined to destroy the unconventional intellectual spirit that SF was founded on by pushing an unprecedented level of comformity (the right way to think about things, the right way to do things, etc.) throughout the force.
Too many of its leaders see a conspiracy against SF behind every tree, so they respond by isolating the force, which in turn does more harm than good. SF leaders too paranoid to play well with others will not be effective.
Some the conspiracies are founded in fact, and SF will always have its distractors in the Army and elsewhere, but Congress will always always protect us as long as we demonstrate value. Added value should be our focus, not hiding our cards. We could add more value by coming out of our shell and working better with others.
Not all is bad though, SF command and USASOC both do a good job at providing resources to the warfighters, and a great job of taking care of its Soldiers and families (it is much better to be a wounded warrior in the SF Regt than most conventional units). We need to maintain this, but we also need to shed the mass conformity mindset that has held us back from reaching our full potential. How we organize and operate needs to needs to be determined by the mission planners, not by the force providers. In short the Regt needs to take more risk and allow the Groups to experiment with new operational concepts and organizational structures (within reason, but get rid of the a SF Group is a SF Group mentality).
Slap wrote:
<em>That is why I posted the clip called "More Deadly Than War" it is not something we should strive to become good at.</em>
Bill wrote:
<em>Hopefully they're still teaching this in the Q-Course, because it is still important and we need a body of monks that can carry the flame forward.</em>
I'm no expert, but I have had several conversations with folks overseas who, going by what they said, <em>are</em> striving to be good at it and <em>do</em> feel that they are carrying the flame forward. Literally. The irony is, US military guys themselves, active and retired, in SEAsia used to warn us that this was going to become a problem, starting in the mid-Seventies. I doubt even they would have imagined where it was going to end up by the 21st Century.
From <em>The Integration And Theory Of Practice</em>:
<blockquote>"We will be results-oriented rather than good intentions-oriented. Making a good-faith effort and being ideologically sound will be less important than advancing the goals of the movement..."
"We will use guerrilla tactics to undermine the legitimacy of the dominant regime. We will take advantage of every available opportunity to spread the idea that there is something fundamentally wrong with the existing state of affairs. ... contribute to a vague sense of uneasiness and dissatisfaction with existing society. ... We need to break down before we can build up. We must first clear away the flotsam of a decayed culture."</blockquote>
The Integration Of Theory And Practice (Wikipedia): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Integration_of_Theory_and_Practice
The Integration Of Theory And Practice: A Program For The New Traditionalist Movement (Yurica Report): http://www.yuricareport.com/Dominionism/FreeCongressEssay.html
<blockquote>I have paraphrased the four immoral principles of the Dominionist movement as the following:
1) Falsehoods are not only acceptable, they are a necessity. The corollary is: The masses will accept any lie if it is spoken with vigor, energy and dedication.
2) It is necessary to be cast under the cloak of "goodness" whereas all opponents and their ideas must be cast as "evil."
3) Complete destruction of every opponent must be accomplished through unrelenting personal attacks.
4) The creation of the appearance of overwhelming power and brutality is necessary in order to destroy the will of opponents to launch opposition of any kind.</blockquote>
Conquering By Stealth And Deception (Yurica Report): http://www.yuricareport.com/Dominionism/TheSwiftAdvanceOfaPlannedCoup.h…
<b>Bill M.:</b>
Two minor points.<blockquote>"A lot of the most critical fighting is largely invisible to our soldiers because they're not trained to see it. They're very much aware when a guerrilla group attacks them, but generally have little appreciation for enemy propaganda, subversion, etc. We been in areas that we "thought" we controlled, but the reality is the insurgents much like termites were invisibly destroying the infrastructure and establishing shadow governments."</blockquote>Quite true. That's a function of two things. Inadequate initial entry (primarily)and follow-on (secondarily)training.
The second factor is the use of the GPF in roles for which they were not designed (and should not be) and the misuse of SF in these conflicts. The missions have effectively been swapped to the benefit of no one. SF by design works with local forces; The broader Army kills people. We've employed folks exactly backwards.
The proverbial handwriting on the wall -- in the form of the new designee -- isn't totally reassuring in this regard...
Another thing:<blockquote>"This is why SF rightfully felt slighted when they weren't given the lead for developed the COIN doctrine. They understand UW, and that understanding allows one to develop more effective COIN strategies"</blockquote>I understand that and agree but my spies tell me that issue was decided in Tampa for internal DoD political and budget, not sound military, reasons. That's second hand and may not be correct but the multiple sources have been pretty reliable in the past... :(
Slap,
I suspect you already do, but if not ensure you read some of Ralph Peter's books. He addresses this to some extent, but not as well as the link you provided.
A couple of things jumped out at me while listening to the videos besides reminding me of old classes I received throughout my SF career.
First, how effectively the speaker communicated without slides and other visual aids. I think we lost the art of the narrative due to modern communications technology.
Second, if you want to learn what shaping means (what we call phase 0 now) then listen to these videos, it describes very well how the USSR was shaping us for the potential confrontation.
I think our COIN efforts are less effective than they could be because we don't understand the nature of insurgency or unconventional warfare (outside sponsor supporting an insurgency and other activities). A lot of the most critical fighting is largely invisible to our soldiers because they're not trained to see it. They're very much aware when a guerrilla group attacks them, but generally have little appreciation for enemy propaganda, subversion, etc. We been in areas that we "thought" we controlled, but the reality is the insurgents much like termites were invisibly destroying the infrastructure and establishing shadow governments.
This is why SF rightfully felt slighted when they weren't given the lead for developed the COIN doctrine. They understand UW, and that understanding allows one to develop more effective COIN strategies.
In our Army rank is more important than expertise. That is the way it has always been. Hopefully they're still teaching this in the Q-Course, because it is still important and we need a body of monks that can carry the flame forward.
- As Bill M. noted, we are not ruthless enough to do it even passably well. That is a good thing...
Yes,UW,COIN,Gang warfare or whatever we want to call it is the most personal and vicious type of warfare there is. That is why I posted the clip called "More Deadly Than War" it is not something we should strive to become good at. It is so vicious that it contains the seeds for it's own destruction, better for us to stand back and just let it burn itself out IMO.
Bill M and Ken White:
Should we say that Ken's Washington Post article confirms my point:
a. That we do not seem to have very good reasons/evidence for suggesting that we are in, about and after these so-called "failed states" (bad term) because they represent the most pressing danger to our national security, but, rather,
b. That we are in, about and after these "outlier states" (much better term -- much more consistent with the true picture) because we desire to transform them and incorporate them into our system; so as to better provide for our new world order.
Thus, writ large, my microcosm argument re: "Defining Our Interests in Afghanistan," to wit: Not such good evidence that this is only about Al Qaeda, per se. Better evidence that this is really about not allowing any entity to govern (Afghan Taliban) who would deny us our overarching objective [see "b." above]).
Concur with you guys: We need to reconsider all this and ask: (1) Is transforming and incorporating outlier states and societies -- so as to better provide for our new world -- our most pressing concern and, if so, (2) is the way we are currently going about this work really make the best of sense.
Best, Bill C.
<b>Bill C.:</b><blockquote>"Enemies are only described and offered as those that, by their nature or configuration, would stand in the way of our ideas and ambitions."</blockquote>I'm unsure who is represented by that "our" but I acknowledge many agree with you. Many -- I among them --do not. I believe our ambitions could and should be reined in for several reasons.<blockquote>Rather, my overall emphasis, I hope, has been on the rather consistent ideas/ambitions/beliefs of the United States and how these translate today to our (continuing) drive to transform outlier states and societies...</blockquote>It has. I simply disagree that's at all necessary and I know we do not do it well. To keep trying to do the same thing in the face of consistently poor results is an indicator that one should seek alternatives.<blockquote>...would not seem to be a novel concept or ambition of great and powerful nations/empires; who would often, like us, define "enemies" more in terms of those entities (states and societies) that got in their way...</blockquote>True. The reasons that's a poor idea are that:
- We do not do it well, as stated.
- As Bill M. noted, we are not ruthless enough to do it even passably well. That is a good thing...
- We are not an empire and the majority of this nation's population, I think, does not want us to be one. There are those who believe we are and / or should be something along that line. I believe they are dangerously mistaken and trying to do so will play into the hands of those who do not wish us well -- and they are many...
- Most importantly, We do not need to and should not play by the opponents rules.
We have almost 60 years of recent history that tells us this is not a good idea. Surely that fact will sink in before long.
Ken,
Good article and one that adds to the debate that we need to challenge our underlying assumptions. I particularly liked this paragraph:
""Unfortunately, misperceptions about the dangers of failed states have transformed budgets and bureaucracies. U.S. intelligence agencies are mapping the worlds "ungoverned spaces." The Pentagon has turned its regional Combatant Commands into platforms to head off state failure and address its spillover effects. The new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review completed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development depicts fragile and conflict-riddled states as epicenters of terrorism, proliferation, crime and disease.""
We're throwing money away in pursuit of the impossible dream. I also agree with the author's point that we should provide humanitarian and development aid to help gradually lift the standard of living of the people in these areas, but that is siginficantly different than engaging in major stability operations to prevent a failed state (Somalia for example). Some states need to fail, there are reasons they are failing and yet we feel compiled to spend billions if not trillions of tax dollars to try to prevent it? In the meantime real threats to our interests are looming and those nations that present potential future threats must be getting a good laugh at our hubris as they quietly focus on activities that strengthen their real national interests.
Bill C., I think I understand where you're coming from, but when you look at the super powers that were overly focused on ideology (Turkey, USSR, and now the U.S. as examples) they didn't last long.
As a SF soldier I desire to free the oppressed, but the oppressed must desire to fight their own fight, we can't "make them fight". Most of our so called UW efforts in recent years had nothing to do freeing the oppressed, but simply using surrogates to achieve our objectives (pragmatic, but not De Oppresso Liber). UW efforts to help resistance forces against the Japanese, German and Iraqi (Kuwait) occupation forces were both pragmatic and in line with our national morals. In my view we need to lay our Crusader Crosses (in our case this represents our desire to push Judeo-Christian values, democracy and capitalism) down and re-think our national strategy. We'll have better luck transforming the world by being the shinny city on the hill than by trying to force transformation and integration by deploying our general purpose forces. Save the GPF for defending America against "threats", that is what the tax payers are paying for. Admittedly there are a lot of gray areas, so my view are not intended to be black and white, but we have managed to cross the line of ridiculous with our current policies.
Bill M. and Ken White:
If you look at my Apr 13, 11:22 AM comment above, then I believe you will see that I emphasize, first and foremost, US ideas/ambitions/beliefs as the basis for what goes on -- yesterday and today (to wit: our desire to transform and incorporate outlier states and societies). Enemies are only described and offered as those that, by their nature or configuration, would stand in the way of our ideas and ambitions.
Likewise, in my comment over at the current thread "Defining US Interests in Afghanistan," I have tried to offer a somewhat similar explanation, to wit: That the problem that the United States really has with the Afghan Taliban would not seem to be so much their support of Al Qaeda but, rather (as the article seems to suggest), the insular/anti-modern nature and philosophy of the Taliban which, should they again govern, would tend to get in the way of or preclude US ambitions and objectives for this region (transformation and incorporation).
So I do not believe that I preach or use terms such as "threats," nor do you see me using terms such as "terrorism," etc.
Rather, my overall emphasis, I hope, has been on the rather consistent ideas/ambitions/beliefs of the United States and how these translate today to our (continuing) drive to transform outlier states and societies; now, so as to adequately provide for the new world order we have created (all great powers of the world now somewhat transformed and incorporated into our system).
This, as Bill M. seems to suggest, would not seem to be a novel concept or ambition of great and powerful nations/empires; who would often, like us, define "enemies" more in terms of those entities (states and societies) that got in their way -- or who they felt needed to transform and incorporat for other reasons -- so as to complete and/or provide for the world order that they, in their turn, had created.
<b>Bill M.:</b>
Good Post, Bill. Here's an excellent article that complements it:
<a href=http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-failed-states-shouldnt-be-ou… failed States shouldn't be our biggest national security fear</i></a>
Bill C.,
I know Thomas Barnett and others have been preaching that all threats come from the areas that are not integrated into the modern world's global economic system. However, I haven't seen any indication that this is true. Iraq (under Saddam), Iran, Venezuela, Russia, China, Cuba, the old USSR, were all (or remain) threats to some degree and they're integrated into the global economy (regardless of our lame sanctions). Numerous countries in Africa, Southeast Asia (Burma, Laos), etc. are not integrated and they don't pose a direct threat. This argument has been taken to the extreme and people blindly drink the KoolAid without even thinking about it. I heard a senior officer recently said we need to go to dark places because that is where the danger is. Really? How did you reach that conclusion. The only country that I can think of that isn't integrated into the global economy that is a potential threat is North Korea, but the reality is they're very dependent upon China (which is fully integrated in the global economy), so their behavior is actually constrained and quite rational by their standards.
On the other hand when we invade dark places that aren't integrated we definitely create a backlash that isn't in our interests. We also bleed out resources that are helping to drive our country further in debt and distracting us from greater threats, instead of self imposed threats.
Furthermore we are now in the beginning of a commodity crisis, oil, food, industrial materials, etc. These are critical to maintaining stability in the modern countries, so if we ever succeed in pulling millions more people into our economic system is it really in our national interest?
Finally, as stated previously we don't do this well. We're not strong enough to it right, so we try to do it by sticking one toe in water, and yet we still want to make fundamental changes. In actuality all we need to do is have enough control to ensure our interests are addressed, and that is what the previous great Empires did. They didn't try to transform the societies of the countries they conquered (except the communists and they collapsed rather quickly).
Bill M:
What is the relevance of pushing our ideology to the level of national security? One might suggest, as you seem to have, that many successful nations have done this. Modifying and requiring the modification of outlier states and societies -- such that the great power and those within its system might trade and prosper even more -- and consider themselves even more secure; this would not seem to be an irrational pursuit (unless attempted on too large a scale). Certainly each of the great powers/empires you mention found resistance along the way and had to deal with it. SOP in such a wrenching task as this (forced state and societal change).
Madhu:
I agree we seem to be able to do this only badly. Possibly because we do not wish to confront the fact that this is a wrenching task, requiring a significant commitment and, unless one enjoys watching themselves and others suffer ("stalemate"/"backsliding"), the ruthlessness to simply "rip the bandage off," (to wit: more Gentile, less Nagl?)"
Grant Martin:
You address the critical issue of time, seeming to suggest that given a reasonable amount of time, the transformation and incorporation we desire might well come about naturally. I agree. Unfortunately, we do not seem to have the luxury of time, having just put into the "demand" side of the system/equation 3 billion plus new people (Russia, China, India, et al). To accommodate such a system, which almost overnight has been been so massively enlarged, requires that the less-integrated world -- sooner rather than later -- be transformed and incorporated to meet its needs.
In sum: I would agree with each of you, to wit: That we are presently -- for the reasons both you and I have articulated -- unsuited to the task. It is not something that we would otherwise desire to do, or wish to do in the manner that we are required to do it. The problem described above, however, requires that we rise to the occassion (win, learn, focus, adapt, and win again.)
To do this, however, I think we have to, first and foremost, step back and acknowledge (1) who were are (2) who the enemy is, (3) what must be done and (4) why.
Not since the 19th Century have we seen so many new great powers and their populations -- connected by such a common system -- come onto the scene together almost at the same time -- and with such needs and demands as these. It would be great if we were able to do the work required to accommodate this new world order in a very humanitarian way. But I am not sure that this is possible; given the lack of time and the substantial amount of work that must be done.
Whew !
Grant, we need to study the technique of revolution because it is "More Deadly Than War." I saw this as a teenager at a hunting and fishing club owned by a local Defense Contractor(1969 0r 1970). Series stuff back in the day, but the techniques are the same, instead of Communism it is Radical Islam today, could be something else tomorrow(the economy or oil most likley) but the technique is the same. Link to part one below, you can click on the other 7 parts once you get there. Warning this is a pull no punches video especially the explanation of the guerrilla techniques that were to be used.
I wonder, upon re-reading the original post, is it right for us in the Army to declare we are winning and must "continue to win"? Is our record in Afghanistan something to feel good about, or should we be looking to change? Are we like the Army in 1972: thinking we won every battle and that was all that was required of us?
I wonder if we will we soon turn to the example of GEN Abrams who couldn't preach we had "won", but instead led a revitilization of the Army in the 70s and 80s that led to Desert Storm success? Will we get a decades long effort now to re-shape our Army to make us successful in whatever challenge we will face in fifteen or so years... or will we instead think we should build upon our current "success"?
If one thinks about the changes the Army went through between 1975 and 1988, and what the same change would like like today- I think that if we could pull it off it would mean no less than the overhaul everyone is talking about us needing in terms of our personnel systems, culture, building learning organizations, empowering subordinates, etc.
I do think there is a cultural hubris within our government- and especially our military- that holds that one can bring a nation (whether it is a "nation" in name only or not) to an economic and governmental level that we understand and are familiar with almost overnight. We seem to have little appreciation for how long it took us to build our own institutions and infrastructure to support our system and how much of it "emerged" and would have been impossible to predict and centrally control. This "emergence" concept would hold that Afghan- or any other system- institutions and infrastructure would necessarily turn out much differently if allowed to mature over time and at a sustainable pace. Democracy doesn't look the same everywhere- and some functioning societies don't even look democratic to many of us.
While I think our democracy functions very well in some areas, one of the areas I think we are not suited well for performing is "nation-building". If you buy-off on the concept as a possibility (someone performing nation-building well), then I would argue that our nation isn't built to do it for several reasons: but the biggest one in my opinion is that we are so divorced from the realities of most of the rest of the world that we don't understand what is required to affect change. We have so little empathy with others- not because we don't try- but because we can't. We have big hearts but ineffective heads.
@ Bill C -
I tend to agree with <strong>Bill M.</strong>.
Or rather, I think you have do have a point but I don't think that there is any kind of official one-world conspiracy. <strong>Eisenhower</strong> stated in his famous "military-industrial" speech that we had to be wary of a "technocratic-scientific elite" and its idea-making. Official bureaucratic Washington has its ideological assumptions regardless the elected officials - that's my outsider read of it. So we have Grand Strategy by default: "helping allies" modernize or democratize or whatever the latest big idea.
I've linked the following extract in the comments section at <strong>Abu Muqawama</strong> and I want to stress that I don't endorse all of it - mainly because I'm too badly educated on the subjects to know what I am talking about. And yet, I insist on commenting. Hubris!
<blockquote>I've asked my readers several times to study Nils Gilman's Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America. The history details how a small group of American academics who found favor in official Washington sowed havoc on a horrific scale because they understood nothing about peoples in parts of the world they were trying to modernize. Nothing. They understood nothing.
These lunatics were replaced by economists such as Jeffrey Sachs, who understood even less than nothing about peoples in parts of the world that Washington felt could be helped by Thatcherite Economic Shock Therapy. And thus, the economists gave capitalism such a bad name that several countries that had been traumatized by the therapy took a sharp turn to the Left.</blockquote>
- from Pundita blog
I know the language is a bit rougher than the SWJED care for, but I hope you keep this up for discussion purposes.
Bill C.
It appears that you look at the U.S. as a leader of a coalition united in ideology, and leading the charge to transform the undeveloped world (integrate them in our economic system and value system). While this may be true, we sure as heck are not the only nation to engage in this type of activity.
Islam has historically been an aggressive religion/political system that imposed change with the sword first, then forcefully converting those they conquered to Islam, which in turn greatly transformed the existing indigious culture. This was a bad idea that went viral on horseback and camel back.
Communism as an ideology may have been a response to capitalism; however, it is hard to see the subsequent worldwide communist subversive movement led by the USSR and a lesser extent PRC as "defensive" in nature. It was very aggressive and relatively ruthless. Where they did win they implemented much deeper political and social reforms than any non-communism Western country did. It was basically submit or die. Go to the re-education camps, if you fail go to one of the many mass graves with your buddies. Admittedly the Catholic Church was guilty of similiar behavior at times, but not to the extent of the communists, and definitely not in the modern era.
Of course Greece, Rome, and France (under Napolean) all conquered territories and implemented reforms to various degrees. I don't think this is unique to the U.S., but it is simply the nature of man. What we need to ask ourselves is the relevance of pushing our ideology to national security.
Would I be wrong to suggest, in light of my "know oneself and one's enemies" comment above, that if one really wanted to understand Western involvement in Malaysia and Vietnam back-in-the-day -- and present-day Western involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, etc. -- then one need only look to the Western "transformation/incorporation" agenda that I have outlined in my comment above? The thing would seem to have an easily seen and understood pedigree. (To wit: Great Britain, France, et al, simply having lateraled this transformation/incorporation mission-football off to us when they made the mistake of fighting among and nearly destroying themselves in the first half of the 20th Century.)
Likewise, could radical Islam and its lure presently, much like Communism and its appeal back-in-the-day, be better understood in light of this continuing Western "transformation/incorporation of outlier states and societies" agenda? (To wit: radical Islam presently, much like Communism back-in-the-day, is/was a desparate attempt to defend against/avoid transformation and incorporation into the Western world; in both cases, by suggesting a completely opposed/opposite state and societal order and sending out fighters in this opposed order's behalf?)
The major difference between those who fight against us today and those we opposed us back-in-the-day: Today's enemies would seem to have no great power champion with nuclear weapons. (Thus, the problem and emphasis re: Iran?)
BillM, is right what have we learned or rather my point what have we forgotten and don't seem to want to remember. If you watch the clip I posted the start point was the Government in exile! In other words SF soldiers used to know and be taught that the end was the installation of a legitimate Government. Fighing better, Winning better, Learning how to do that better is not going to get us anywhere, it is always remembering that what follows the War is what really matters. Like I keep we seem to have forgotten that.
In order to win, learn, focus, adapt, and win again, I believe that we must first come to better know ourselves and our enemy:
a. Ourselves: We seem exist for -- and are actually in the business of -- doing outlier (not like us) state and societal change (to make more like us and to incorporate into our system). Believing that we have, in the past 60 or so years, successfully transformed such great powers as Germany, Japan, Russia and China, we now believe that we must move on to transform the rest of the world; so as to adequately provide for this new world order (all great powers substantially transformed and incorporated) which we have created. Thus, we must acknowledge our role as the aggressors; who seek to complete the job of state and societal change and incorporation into our system; which we intend to do by exploiting insurgencies, natural disasters, humanitarian crises, other state and societal difficulties, and declaring that these as reasons to intervene/reason to protect -- so as to adequately deal with these "root cause" problems (state and society not like us and not part of our system).
b. Our enemy: Our enemy is anyone or anything that would tend stand in our way re: this agenda to bring about and complete the job of achieving universal state and societal change. Thus, anyone who is not like us -- and who would wish to remain so -- or who, in order to defend their present way of life, might become radicalized or seek to achieve their own, distinctly different order/system; these entites are our sworn enemy.
<EM>Publius: Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again</EM>
I agree with your sentiment. I submit many think we've "won" already ("win" and "win again"- and are "winning"; kind of hard to "learn" if you start in a biased and arguably invalid mode. I wonder if this is mainly describing what we do at the tactical level?
Reminds me of something Bob says a lot: "doesn't matter how much you "win" at the tactical and operational level if your strategy is all wrong."
<EM>Bill M: What lessons have we learned? I'm not confident I have seen any critical thinking addressing what works and what doesn't</EM>
Great point. While I don't necessarily agree with you that Vietnam was "more" complex than Afghanistan is (I think you could argue the opposite and I also think you could make the case it is just "different" as opposed to more or less complex), I wholeheartedly agree with your conclusions.
I submit that the lessons we've learned in Afghanistan have been short-term lessons at the tactical level that are unsustainable and non-transferable, and at the operational and strategic lessons we've learned nada. I am working on a paper that argues just that with examples at all levels- but suffice it to say that your comment on critical thinking is spot-on IMO.
Posted by Gian,
"And to make qualitative comparisons between the two and draw straight lines between them saying that the British got it and the US didnt is really quite unrealistic. The two wars were not really even comparable in scope and context.""
Sir we are in complete agreement on this, and I have posted many times throughout SWJ questioning the relevance of John's comparison between the two conflicts. Although I still enjoyed the book, I disagree with many of his findings. His focus was on the U.S. military failing to learn, which isn't true, but I agree we could have and should have learned quicker.
Vietnam was more complex than either Afghanistan or Iraq. We were fighting a hybrid war there, where both we and the enemy were waging both conventional and unconventional fights simultaneously for an extended period (no phase III decisive actions, than phase IV stability operations). While some don't like the phrase and its definition, it definitely fell into the category of a "wicked problem". When we applied adequate fire power to deal with the NVA we created a lot of unintended consequences that isolated us from the populace, but if we focused solely on COIN efforts we would set ourselves up for a decisive defeat by NVA conventional forces. None the less, we eventually managed to defeat to both the communist conventional and unconventional forces by adapting from the tactical (village security) to the strategic (Nixon's expansion of the war into Cambodia), even if it took longer than it should have.
S. Vietnam only fell after we left and only when North Vietnamese conventional forces rolled into Saigan on their tanks. They didn't fall due to poor governance. That argument is taken to the extreme too many times.
Furthermore, while some historians dismiss the domino theory, lets not forget there were successful communist insurgencies in both Laos and Cambodia and a robust communist insurgency in Thailand that was eventually defeated, so it sure as heck looked like dominos falling if one wanted to use that analogy.
My original point is we have been Afghanistan longer than we were in Vietnam, and in Afghanistan we have adapted less and have been less successful than we were in Vietnam for a lot reasons.
What lessons have we learned? I'm not confident I have seen any critical thinking addressing what works and what doesn't, instead there are simply two prevailing schools of thought. One school promotes the FM 31-20 approach to COIN, and the other school claims we can't and shouldn't do COIN/nation building period (instead we should do CT only). Neither school in my view has the answer, they are both simply schools based on faith, not learning.
Nice thread going here, folks, and I don't think anyone here is a con man. I do, however, lean in the Jones direction: yes, I think this nation and its military has been conning itself for some years now. Our national mythology just won't quit. Result: we're broke and we're discredited in much of the world.
Marty Dempsey says Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again. We win little and we learn nothing. We adapt--we are forever adapting--but we learn nothing. COIN is not about the client nation. COIN is about us. And we just never learn that lesson about not putting our willies into the grinder. If he could somehow come back, a guy who actually survived that war that began 150 years ago today would be amazed at how little we learned from that war and all of the others.
As a result, here we are fighting over the entrails of a once-great nation.
An attempt to address the critical issue of "change:"
The perception of many potential insurgents -- yesterday and today -- is that the programs/policies being pushed on the population by the local government are designed by "outside" powers, and are being implemented with the assistance of same, to bring about certain unwanted state, societal and/or governing changes.
Specifically, these potential insurgents perceive that these unwanted changes are being made so as to better accommodate and provide for -- not the local population -- but, rather the "outside" power, its society and its way of life.
As in the case of the American Revolution, when such unwanted "change" policies are implemented by the outside power -- through the local government -- and when significant security forces are brought in/developed by the outside power to hold the population at bay, then this only reinforces these perceptions (to wit: that the changes are designed with outside power, not the local population, in mind).
Same-Same today.
Bottom line:
a. Whereas, the outside power, its host government and certain of the more-liberal elements of the population might want, welcome and/or be more-tolerant of significant and fundamental change,
b. The more-conservative elements of the population, and the guardians of the present order, these elements are very likely to believe that it is their duty -- and a matter of their honor -- to fight and die so as to preclude/prevent such unwanted (and in their view unjust or unhealty) change.
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b>
I know you aren't trying to con anyone, I'm merely pointing out that you appear to be occasionally careless with your words and can thus inadvertently give some the impression that what you say is unimportant or incorrect. I provide that only FWIW, obviously you can ignore it totally...<blockquote>"Our COIN Doctrine is made of such magical cloth, and few dare to challenge that "fact." to avoid being labled in such a way. I've never worried about such labels so sometimes make uncomfortable observations."</blockquote>While I agree the COIN doctrine is flawed, I do not agree that it is a con as somewhat implied or that few challenge it, rather I think that few challenge it as vehemently and as often as do you. Nor do I think your opinions are uncomfortable observations or that many would see them as such.
Opinions forthrightly expressed as such, nothing wrong and many things right with that approach. I have no problem with it at all, encourage it in fact in all I meet though I do think that if one has an important message, it is quite critical that the message not be polluted or skewed either purposely or carelessly. YMMV.
Ken,
Certainly not the con man here, though you raise an excellent point. In many ways we have been conning ourselves in regard to the nature of our engagement and the conflicts it has drawn us into over the years.
My intended role is much more that of voice from the crowd that points out the indelicate observation: "But he hasn't got anything on."
The con had been perpertrated by others. It is also well to remember the selling point of those mythical con men selling magical cloth:
"the most magnificent cloth that one could imagine; cloth of most beautiful colours and elaborate patterns. Not only was the material so beautiful, but the clothes made from it had the special power of being invisible to everyone who was stupid or not fit. for his post."
Our COIN Doctrine is made of such magical cloth, and few dare to challenge that "fact." to avoid being labled in such a way. I've never worried about such labels so sometimes make uncomfortable observations.
cheers,
Bob
For BillM, RCJones, Ken White, Gian Gentile and Grant Martin:
Slap's One Minute Guerrilla Warfare Course. I new this film existed and have been looking for it a couple of years. In 1973 I participated in a similar exercise and is pretty much the basis of whatever knowledge of what Special Warfare is. Although because of how course turned out I ended being in the AO for an extra few days after the problem and got to receive a lot of up close and personal attention of the SF types. And to think it all started when I went from SF HQ's to SF HQ's looking for the Billy Jack Green Beret Karate stuff manual. If you watch the film you will see why I believe we already know how to fight these kinds of wars we just seem to have forgotten. And yes in 1973 there was a very real concern that the USA could be taken over internally by a foreign communist or some type of terrorist guerrilla organization. And now without further delay Guerrilla,USA courtesy of the US Army Big Picture Series.
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b><blockquote>"I use American examples often as I am attempting to help an American audience understand this."</blockquote><i>Selected</i> American examples? ;)<blockquote>"Governments too often confuse "legal" with "proper"; and "right" with "righteous". Being within ones legal rights means very little when a significant segment of the populace perceives ones governance to be improper and unrighteous."</blockquote>Or too corrupt, not corrupt enough, ideologically incorrect, not controlled by the proper 'party' or family, supportive of laws that impede the making of profits by some -- any of dozens of other reasons (many of which played in the American Revolution which, as you know, was far from being only about issues of governance, respect, justice and liberty...).
The insurgents in that case were indeed a minority group as is often the case. You often seem to gloss over the fact that minority 'won' not by swaying the majority to join them, not by a more powerful message but mostly due to the overall military ineptitude of the nominal counterinsurgent and his other problems and expenses elsewhere to include at home. A troubling and regrettable factual counterpart to our experience in Viet Nam among other places BTW.
I hear you Bob -- and I agree with many of your conclusions and your main point that COIN is a poor idea and should be avoided. We simply have a minor contretemps on the causes of insurgency in some cases and a major disagreement on the degree of meddling in other nations in which the US should in future participate.
You end with:<blockquote>"Again, law and facts are interesting, but perception is everything, and the perception of the counterinsurgent is largely immaterial."</blockquote>That may be correct -- is certainly in some cases, perhaps not in others but in telling tales or establishing a position for consideration, eliding facts and / or modifying them and misusing words can potentially get one perceived as a Con artist -- the perceptions of such an artist are accorded little respect and thus can become immaterial.
Your main point -- that we need to change our policies and strenuously avoid the heavy COIN bit -- is too important to be badly made and thus possibly ill considered...
In insurgency, the perception of the insurgent populace is everything. That is an unavoidable reality, and throughout history the counterinsurgent has argued "facts" and "law" and "rationality"; and all have been frustrated that none of that really matters.
I use American examples often as I am attempting to help an American audience understand this. We see our engagement in the world from our own perspective; that is natural. We must expect that even those who largely appreciate our engagement would see it from a different perspective; and that those who do not appreciate it see it from another perspective still. When a UW actor travels to, or a nationalist insurgent rises from, a dissatisfied populace and begins putting their own "radical" spin on the situation, those perspectives diverge even more.
Sam Adams was a nationalist insurgent who put a "radical" spin on the situation in Massachusetts Colony. Arguably the majority of the populace was largely satisfied with British governance. We don't talk about them much, and our history labels loyal citizens as "Tories" and relegates them to the shadows of our history. They were the silent majority.
The government agents in the colony, and certainly the government in England was confused, shocked, and angered by the words, and then actions of that dissatisfied minority rallied to action by the strong words and leadership of men such as Adams. From their perspective it was completely irrational, and an affront to the legitimate government in England and forward in the colony. It was certainly illegal. So the crown logically set out to enforce the rule of law and to defeat the insurgent.
Now we know how history played out, but who among us believe this issue would have gone away if the military had successfully suppressed the rebellion in Massachusetts, while leaving the issues of governance, respect, justice and liberty unresolved??
Similarly, who among us believes that the government could not have made small, but important changes along those lines of operation and never had to suppress the insurgents at all. Such changes would have robbed the rebels of much of their base of support, swelling the ranks of the Tories (those loyal to their legitimate government and controlled by the rule of law) and left Sam Adams blustering in a tavern to a handful of malcontents.
Governments too often confuse "legal" with "proper"; and "right" with "righteous". Being within ones legal rights means very little when a significant segment of the populace perceives ones governance to be improper and unrighteous. This is the very essence of insurgency. A strategic framework that ignores this essence and instead employs bold tactical actions at the symptoms of the problem has never (that I am aware of) produced more than a temporary suppression of the current insurgent, as such engagement does nothing to address the underlying conditions of insurgency upon which the insurgent feeds.
I agree that Malaya and Vietnam and Afghanistan are all wildly different in hundreds of ways. But insurgency is ruled by human nature, and human nature has a common thread running through it that gives us a basis to build upon.
In Malaya, the Brits had to learn new tactics for that environment, that populace, that threat. But strategically they had been evolving for nearly 200 years, from Yorktown to Cape Town, to Delhi to Kuala Lumpur. We do well to elevate our sights from the study of battles, campaigns and wars from time to time to think about the strategic context in which they occur.
In court it may be all about the facts and the law, but the only opinion on those topics that matters is that of the jury. The same is true of insurgency, except that it is the insurgent segment of the populace that is the jury. Counterinsurgents tend to ignore that jury. We can argue rule of law, facts, and how we were in the right to the court and get up and down nods from everyone all day long. But it only takes a minority on the jury to disagree lose the case. If there is a Sam Adams in that jury pool who disagrees, there may be no amount of law and fact that can help you.
Again, law and facts are interesting, but perception is everything, and the perception of the counterinsurgent is largely immaterial.
Uh, just wanna apologise for the tone of my last post; it was by no means directed at anyone here. Ken White, thanks for expressing that sentiment. The point I was trying to make is that people from the same family don't even listen to each other at times. I think the US makes a greater effort than it is sometimes given credit for, especially on the individual level. Thanks.
Ken wrote:
<em>...in noting that discounting and denigrating of 'native' views is indeed generally endemic in the west.</em>
In my limited experience, professional soldiers seem barely able to stand listening to their own civilians, let alone a bunch of filthy heathens. But as far as going to distant lands and heeding the ignorant babblings of the unsaved, the US military is probably ahead of the curve. At some point, however, the effort probably seems like a thankless and counterproductive charade, especially if you're losing friends while doing it. F***king humans.
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b>
Lawyers are fascinating. Lewis Carroll must be proud. "When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.' ;)<blockquote>"When I use "legitimate government" in speaking or writing on insurgency, I mean a defacto recognition in the eyes of the segement of the populace most supportive of the insurgency of the right of the government to govern. You correctly speak of the "de jure" or legal recognition of a government by outside parties. For purpose of insurgency, such proclamations (typically established by the very colonial or neo-colonial power intervening to sustain said government in power) are moot. It is a legal fiction."</blockquote>Um, no, it is a legal <u>fact</u>. Whatever the de facto recognition of the disaffected, minority or majority, is, it remains broadly irrelevant to that fact. That fact, however, is similarly irrelevant to the desire of that segment of the populace which is not fictional -- and often, not legal. ;)<br><br>
My point in bringing that up at all, Bob, is that it is one of the many ways you undercut your own message. Words are important and misused they can provoke erroneous beliefs and perceptions.<blockquote>"No, I stand by my assessment. The big strategic lesson we ignored from Great Britain's experience from folding up its tent all around the globe as we rolled our own out in the name of Containment, was that governments that do not draw their legitimacy from souces the governed populace recognizes, or just as bad, governments that grow to treat their populaces with impunity under the protection of a strong external power, fuel internal subversion and insurgency."</blockquote>You are certainly entitled to your assessment -- others differ. There is no arbiter or right or wrong; we all just have opinions, not de facto or de jure positions which can be certified as gospel. While what you wrote there is often correct, those two rationales are not the only things that fuel insurgencies. No sense in breaking out the other causes here, been done elsewhere. I'd merely suggest that target fixation can be deadly...<br><br>
However, we can as always agree on this:<blockquote>"and our colonial-derived model of governmetnal manipulation is a failed strategic framework.
This is the elephant in the room."</blockquote>Not sure it's an elephant but I strongly agree that ANY model of governmental manipulation is a failed strategic framework -- including the Jones Model. It's meddling. It's unnecessary -- there are better ways to achieve the aims.
George Friedman is a smart guy but he's no more infallible or authoritative than you or I. I've read excerpts of <i>"The Next Decade"</i> and have a copy enroute to read completely. I understand where you and he -- plus many others -- get the Empire idea. It's a valid premise. I just happen to believe you're all wrong for one simple reason: Running an Empire, with or without subservient nations, colonies or dependencies requires ruthlessness. Barring extreme provocation, we are not ruthless.
Anyone with delusions of the American Empire (sans Satrapies) should really give that quite dangerous fact a lot of thought. IOW, there are imperial attributes, no question -- but they should be suppressed and other models sought because we have not and will not do the Empire thing at all well. Why set ourselves up for failure?
<b>gian p. gentile:</b>
I very much agree that the British did really "learn and adapt" in Malaya. A bit. Having talked to a number of Australian, British and New Zealand officers and men who were there, the British Army just did its thing with few changes. The adaptations, as you say, were in the civil area -- and they took time.
I also agree that the US Army and Marines did pretty well in adapting in Viet Nam. The problem was, again as in Malaya, on the civil side exacerbated significantly by our indirect, not the local government, role -- one we will always have in such operations. Note the same problems in Iraq and Afghanistan to this day -- ten and eight-plus years later...
As you say, lacking Viet Nam, Malaya would have been another Konfrontasi, barely recalled by many who were not involved.
<b>Bill M:</b><blockquote>"What is ironic in all this is I think an argument could be made now that John's think tank CNAS is promoting old ideas that supported the surge (because it sort of worked in Iraq) although there is no indication it is working in Afghanistan we continue to surge and blindly this "hearts and minds" doctrine regardless of the results. Does this really differ from the argument made his book?"</blockquote>It is ironic, isn't it? What's that line; "Physician, heal thyself..." :D
Interesting what happens to hard held contrarian theories and 'known truths' when one becomes <i>part</i> of the establishment.
Bill M:
Just as an aside (and in agreement with RCJ that this is an excellent discussion which is why SWJ rules)at least from my reading of the operational record on Vietnam and Malaya through archival research none of it supports Nagl's conclusion that in Malaya the Brits did learn and adapt (but only after the arrival of Templer) and in Vietnam the US Army did not. Shoot the archives are full of examples of the US Army learning and adapting in Vietnam. And in Malaya the British field army pretty much got it from the start, nobody really had any worries about them, it was the Malayan police where concern rested.
And to make qualitative comparisons between the two and draw straight lines between them saying that the British got it and the US didnt is really quite unrealistic. The two wars were not really even comparable in scope and context. In Vietnam the Americans had 58,000 killed and in Malaya the British had no more than 270 regular soldiers killed (from the British iles, and another 200 from common wealth countries). The British could not have lost the war, it was simply a problem of how long it would take them to defeat the insurgency. If it had not been for America's loss in the Vietnam War the British Coin campaign in Malaya would have been an unrecognized blip on the radar screen and cast into the dustbin of the past, never making it into the pages of prominent history.
gian
Oh, and I realize "Empire" is a 4-letter word to many Americans, so to clarify, I largely agree with the perspective on this topic that George Friedman lays on the American Empire beginning on page 14 of "the Next Decade." Not one of conquest or design, more one of accident, but one all the same.
And I agree with Ken that we have quietly but diligently clung to most of the critical ports we stole from a fading Spain. I can't imagine a sitaution where we would give them up unless forced to, but then people smarter than me thought the same about Clark and our naval facilities in Luzon, or the Panama canal. Pragmatically we should probably take those back as well, but treat them much as we do Gitmo in Cuba, and stay out of the governance manipulation business. Sometimes being rude may well be less disruptive than being nice in such matters. Still consequences, but ones that are more easily managed in the short term.
My 11:40 comment above re-done:
A COIN doctrine suited to a great power with no classical imperial ambitions would seem to have to be one that abandoned:
a. The classic premise of imperialism, to wit: that the "root cause" of insurgencies -- and other outlier state and societal difficulties generally -- is that the problem countries have different political and economic foundations/underpinnings/connections than that of the subject great power.
b. The classic "fix" of imperialism, to wit: to require that the problem countries adopt some variation of the political and economic order of the subject great power and, thereafter, connect to its system.
If, however, this classically imperial "root cause" concept was abandoned, then this might present certain severe difficulties for the great power concerned, such as:
a. The great power might then have to acknowledge that there are other reasons for these lesser state/societal difficulties (such as: great power interference and need).
b. Lastly, abandonment of the "root cause" concept might significantly reduce the great power's justification for and freedom of action -- and its ability to profit from same -- which today, as in the past, would seem to largely be derived from novel explanations and representations of this "not like us = problems that we must fix -- by making like us and connecting to our system" classic imperial theme.
Ken,
When I use "legitimate government" in speaking or writing on insurgency, I mean a defacto recognition in the eyes of the segement of the populace most supportive of the insurgency of the right of the government to govern. You correctly speak of the "de jure" or legal recognition of a government by outside parties. For purpose of insurgency, such proclamations (typically established by the very colonial or neo-colonial power intervening to sustain said government in power) are moot. It is a legal fiction.
I understand why the US rationalized our position in Vietnam, but that does not change the nature of our position in Vietnam. We threw the Vietnamese people under a French bus following WWII; and then following Korea we felt that it was our vital national interest to run over them once again in our own US bus. I'm not judging those decisions, but nor will I sugar coat them or take them out of context in some sense of "my country right or wrong, my country."
There are consequences for such actions, and the consequence was a long war protecting a series of illegitimate governments against a nationalist insurgency operating out of the formal sanctuary of North Vietnam that we graciously helped create upon the defeat of France. Just because two states were created by Western governments in mid stream it did not change the nature of the conflict to one of State Vs. State. That is a fiction we wrote and then bought into.
No, I stand by my assessment. The big strategic lesson we ignored from Great Britain's experience from folding up its tent all around the globe as we rolled our own out in the name of Containment, was that governments that do not draw their legitimacy from souces the governed populace recognizes, or just as bad, governments that grow to treat their populaces with impunity under the protection of a strong external power, fuel internal subversion and insurgency. We created an unsustainable framework in Vietnam, and true to form it failed. We are doing the same thing today in Afghanistan, because as I mentioned to Gian, we still refuse to recognize the strategic lessons of these conflicts.
We can argue tactics of threat centric vs population centric until the cows come home, it really does not much matter. What matters is the strategic framework, and our colonial-derived model of governmetnal manipulation is a failed strategic framework.
This is the elephant in the room.
Cheers,
Bob
It is somewhat ironic that John Nagle's book "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife", which influenced the new COIN crowd actually focused on our inability to learn and adapt during the Vietnam Conflict.
Of course Vietnam was much more than an insurgency, something many historical reviews of the Vietnam conflict fail to mention, and we finally did learn and adapt, but it was too late for the American audience.
What is ironic in all this is I think an argument could be made now that John's think tank CNAS is promoting old ideas that supported the surge (because it sort of worked in Iraq) although there is no indication it is working in Afghanistan we continue to surge and blindly this "hearts and minds" doctrine regardless of the results. Does this really differ from the argument made his book?
<b>Backwards Observer:</b>
Very astute observations. Gian and Bob both have things for sale and couch their statements accordingly. The truth, as you note, is likely between the two and they are not at all mutually exclusive.
You are also regrettably -- even embarrassingly -- correct in noting that discounting and denigrating of 'native' views is indeed generally endemic in the west.
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b><blockquote>"...the big difference is that Great Britain liberated the Malayan people from their illegitimate foreign control of their governance and ensured the insurgent segment of the populace was included in the new independent country of Malaysia."</blockquote>That wasn't the big difference, it was one of many. Anyone comparing Viet Nam to Malaya is simply eliding facts -- the real "big difference" was that the British were the government; they were doing COIN in Malaya. Our attempt to transport that methodology to Viet Nam was as flawed as you say but the issue was far more than not capturing the nuances of the UK approach. We could not have done that had we wished to do so. We were meddling where we didn't need to do so.
Also note that your use of the word "illegitimate" is not correct, Counselor. It may have been morally wrong to you and others, it may have been undesirable in the eyes of many -- but it wasn't illegitimate; it was in accordance with law, accepted standards of the day and thus your sales tag has deceptive advertising. :)
You are IMO also mistaken in saying the US is an Imperial Power without Colonies (not least because many Puerto Ricans and some others in the Caribbean and Pacific would vehemently disagree :D); we are in fact merely a major power with <i>assumed</i> (unnecessarily so, I might add...) worldwide responsibilities. That does not an empire make and those foolish souls who wish to think we are that create a number of problems around the world to no good end -- an that remains true regardless of their sensings and methodology; meddling is meddling.
<b>James Harris, Jr and Grant Martin:</b><blockquote>"We need a COIN doctrine suited to a "great-power" with no CLASSICAL imperial ambitions...Such a doctrine must account for the anomalies of the local government and culture..." (James Harris, Jr.)
"Great point! Our COIN doctrine doesn't take into account our strengths, weaknesses, or limitations. Instead of trying to fit our unbending structure/SOPs into this generic out-of-context doctrine, maybe we need to write the doctrine to fit our unbending structure and SOPs! Much more pragmatic-sounding IMO." (Grant Martin)</blockquote>I agree we need a different 'doctrine' (though I'd rather go after the <i>policy</i> folks that think we <i>have</i> to fix 'broken states' -- they're the real problem...), I agree that we need to make that doctrine fit or adapt to our sadly bureaucratic tendencies but I'm not at all sure we should contemplate having to account for the anomalies of the local government and culture other than tangentially.
Quick in, wreak havoc, depart. That can be done and is far preferable to the inevitable bog down entailed with lengthy stays. Fewer casualties of all sorts and less damage accrue from horrific but quick, sharp actions than do from low key, long term engagements...
Such a policy and doctrine to support it would make many unhappy but most of those folks, in the US and elsewhere are unhappy with us anyway.
That saving humanity foolishness gets us in much trouble, worldwide and we do not do it at all well.
To paraphrase what you say, Grant, we are <u>really</u> foolish to keep playing our weaknesses to the opponents strengths...
Sixty years of it and we've learned nothing...
Gian wrote:
<blockquote>Physical control over the Malayan Chinese population and destruction of the links between them and the insurgents in the jungle was what produced the defeat of the insurgency there.</blockquote>
Bob wrote:
<blockquote>Great Britain liberated the Malayan people from their illegitimate foreign control of their governance and ensured the insurgent segment of the populace was included in the new independent country of Malaysia.</blockquote>
I'm certainly no expert on the Malayan Emergency, but it feels like there is something missing from both of these statements, neither of which seems incorrect or mutually exclusive. The apparent oversimplification may, however, be both necessary and to some extent desirable.
Lee Kuan Yew's new book offers his view on some of the local contexts. I haven't read "Malaysian Maverick" by Barry Wain about Mahathir Mohamed, but even more context is likely available therein.
The general trend in Classic, Diet or New COIN, however, seems to be either to discount or denigrate the views of the native (or 'gone native') market when they diverge or disagree with the overall Mission. Not a criticism, just an impression.
For what it is worth, I believe a couple of things that are material to this conversation:
1. That America is very much an imperial power. The historic difference, and it is a significant one, is that we are an "Empire without Colonies." Sometimes that leads to a muddy bit of mixed measures and expectations; and sadly we are applying the tactics developed by empires WITH colonies, which we have learned very well. On the other hand, we have not done so well on accepting that we too are an empire, or on grasping the strategic nuances that Great Britain learned as she backed off (under popular pressure) from her own colonial ambitions. My take is that countries learn tactics on the way up, but they only truly learn strategy on the way back down... Humble students are better listeners, and failure is a superior teacher to success.
But yes, we do need to address this unique role in this unique information fueled age of globalization and come to grips with both our colonial past and how to best proceed in a non-colonial way as an empire without colonies.
2. I strongly disagree with Gains assessment of both Malaya and Vietnam. Both applied similar tactics, yet Vietnam failed miserably. Other than the geography of Malaya being a peninsula; and the fact that we jumped into a liberation insurgency that was only half complete (both significant facts); the big difference is that Great Britain liberated the Malayan people from their illegitimate foreign control of their governance and ensured the insurgent segment of the populace was included in the new independent country of Malaysia. In Vietnam the US did the opposite, and blocked nationalist efforts to unify peacefully in '56 and then dedicated ourselves to the creation and preservation of a series of puppet regimes designed to answer to US national interests rather than to those of the nation-state of Vietnam. Again, we applied the tactics, but missed the strategic lesson of Great Britain's approach.
I believe, Gian, that you and many of our peers continue to miss this critical lesson. I may be wrong, of course, but even if I am it is a critical point I would love to discuss with you some day. I think it is a lynchpin to a breakthrough in our strategic understanding that helps take us to the next level of effectiveness in this post-Cold War world.
Cheers!
Bob
Carl:
I agree again with your characterization of The Village and Galula's essay on Algeria, and i think common to both is the idea of control of a civilian population rather than trying to win hearts and minds through persuasion. Too, after just re-reading Galula's book last week I think it too was essentially about establishing physical control over a population which then, as he argues, can allow for the subsequent winning of hearts and minds (yet Galula's problem like so many other Coin tacticians is the elevation of the coin tactical principle of long term occupation over strategy and policy).
Phsyical control over the Malayan Chinese population and destruction of the links between them and the insurgents in the jungle was what produced the defeat of the insurgency there.
And in Vietnam, whatever success there was in the countryside after Tet was produced through physical control of the population as a result of mass population relocation into government controlled areas caused by the fighting between the two sides.
But the idea that a population can be controlled through turning them away from the insurgents and to the government by the provision of state sponsored services--thus their hearts and minds are won--is what i am saying doesnt work, and has not in the past.
But this is the theory and practice that underpins current coin operations in Afghanistan. Why else would we have left the Pech River Valley in order to create more forces to live in and amongst the people in populated areas? Like I said the operationalized hearts and minds coin idea in Afghanistan is not primarily to kill the enemy (that is secondary) but to turn the population away from the Taliban enemy. This is why on nearly every power point briefing slide that has to do with operations, the people are the "center of gravity" or the "prize".
gian
A COIN doctrine suited to a "great power" with no CLASSICAL imperial ambitions would have to be one that abandoned the central, underlying premise that the "root cause" of insurgencies -- and other outlier state and societal difficulties generally -- were countries having political and economic foundations/underpinnings which were dissimilar from their (the great power's) own.
If such a concept (to wit: political and economic order of other societies IS NOT the central underlying cause of difficulties) then:
a. There would be no constant and compelling need for the great power to intervene -- so as to address and fix these problems worldwide and
b. One could then move on to consider other reasons and fixes as to various state and societal difficulties.
Signficant problem with this approach: It would seem to drastically reduce the great power's justification for/freedom of action.
<EM>We need a COIN doctrine suited to a "great-power" with no CLASSICAL imperial ambitions, and therefore has no desire to stay where they are at, but who wants to leave as soon as possible -- meaning (hopefully) as soon as appropriate objectives have been accomplished. Such a doctrine must account for the anomalies of the local government and culture. That means that we may have to push aside the preferred approach of the State Dept. and empower local villages, tribes, or whatever (when central governments aren't up to the task). Funding made available to Battalion commanders for use in their area for projects important to local leaders would go much further than the centralized chaos currently in practice.</EM>
Great point! Our COIN doctrine doesn't take into account our strengths, weaknesses, or limitations. Instead of trying to fit our unbending structure/SOPs into this generic out-of-context doctrine, maybe we need to write the doctrine to fit our unbending structure and SOPs! Much more pragmatic-sounding IMO.
Continuing my Apr 10, 8:39 PM comment above.
Thus, a possible explanation as to the central and most critical problem with the "hearts and minds approach" -- and why it consistently fails:
What the conservative elements, and much of the population generally, are rebelling against are modernization policies radiating out from the government which are significantly focused on adapting the state and society -- and opening these up -- to foreigners and their government, business and other interests. (Thus, the omnipresent and essential assistance provided by interested foreign powers.)
THIS, is what the population is rebelling against -- with their hearts, minds and their bodies.
Herein, a massive security force is needed to try to hold the population at bay while this bitter pill of modernization/foreignerization is shoved down the societies throat.
Accordingly, how can one expect, under the circumstances described above, to win hearts and minds -- and to secure the trust of the population -- when the security forces enlargements, the state/nation-building initiatives and the other projects that are undertaken by the government (with enormous assistance from interested foreign powers) are -- in all actuality -- seen by the population as being designed to bring about a specific form of state and societal transformation (modernization/foreignization) that the population does not desire and is willing to fight against?