In a recent essay, I discussed why a containment and deterrence strategy is the path of least resistance in response to Iran's future nuclear weapons capability. I also explained why executing such a policy won't be easy.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has hoped that Iran's leaders would figure out that their nuclear program is reducing, not increasing, Iran's security. The U.S. government's massive sale of offensive armament to Saudi Arabia is designed to be as clear a signal to Tehran as is possible.
No one should expect Iran's leaders to change course at this point. The question is whether Saudi Arabian F-15s armed with JDAMs and HARMs can by themselves provide effective deterrence against Iranian nuclear-armed surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. If not, U.S. leaders will face difficult questions about what additional measures might be necessary to create strategic balance around the Persian Gulf.
Comments
Well Dayuhan, I think we both know that much of the military hardware that the Kingdom purchases from the U.S has to do with payback for services rendered, etc., and I'll leave my opinion about northern Yemen as conjecture.
Additionally, I gather that Egypt and the Saudis just finished-up a joint exercise, that also included not only defending against an attack by Iran, but also projecting force onto Iranian territory.
So I'll agree, the Saudis are certainly no longer passive actors, and leave the discussion on that note - thank you.
The first deliveries were in 2005, production is ongoing I believe, and there are still purchases of associated weaponry and other systems on the table. Don't think the Saudis have taken F16s.
Iran could possibly stir up problems in Yemen, though there are more than enough there already, but still the likelihood of conventional military threat from that side is slim.
M y original point, though, was that the structure of the article's title appears to reflect a fairly common American perception: that the Saudis are passive actors, puppets of a sort, and that the US decides what capacities they can and should have. That view is not widely shared in the Gulf, and I'm not convinced that it's entirely accurate.
Dayhuhan, the block 60 F-16E/F acquisition you are referring to was purchased from the U.S. in 2000, by the UAE and delivered to them in 2005. Perhaps you are confusing the block 60 deal with something else, or, maybe I am?
Additionally, I will grant you the principle issue is between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but the Saudis may have the perception that the geo/politics of the situation based on the inroads Iran has made in Syria, Lebanon, and now Iraq, may also face them in the very southern part of the Kingdom and northern Yemen as well, if not presently, in the future?
The Saudis are taking new F15s and upgrades to their existing fleet; the block 60 F16s, around 80 I think, are going to the UAE. Certainly there is concern over Yemen, but Iran is the main issue; it's difficult to see how the Saudis would need more than they already have to contain any threat coming out of Yemen, which would be more likely unconventional than conventional.
The variant of the F-16's being sold, along with the Apaches, gives me a sense that the House of Saud may have been thinking more about its southern neighbor Yemen, as the acquisition doesn't appear to alter any strategic balance in the Gulf?
Perhaps more than anecdotal, some might be surprised to learn the Saudis have two operational medium ballistic missile sites, one each at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, which orignally housed the Chinese DF-3A, but may have been upgraded through Pakistan since first acquired.
This would give the Kingdom a possible first strike, and/or retaliatory response capability, and is sometimes a little overlooked factor in the Gulf.
Interesting semantics in the headline... is the US expanding the Saudi strike capability, or are the Saudis expanding their strike capability by purchasing weapons from the US? The rendering we choose reveals a great deal about our preconceptions.
If you look at the Gulf press, there's considerable discussion of this deal, and of the other $60 billion being spent on US weaponry by the other Gulf states. There's little dispute over the need for more effective military capacity, but there is considerable dispute over the value for money offered by the US hardware as opposed to that available elsewhere. The deals are widely seen, with some reason, as charity: a gift to the US for support against Saddam. They also undoubtedly provide some leverage, as they provide lare numbers of high paying jobs and will do a great deal to keep the US defense industry viable.
We should bear in mind that arms sales are business, not aid, and business has two sides. It's not our decision to build their capacity; they are invlved in the process as well... and they can take their money elsewhere.