Small Wars Journal

U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan

Sat, 11/13/2010 - 7:07pm
U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan - The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)-sponsored Independent Task Force report on U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan finds that the current approach to the region is at a critical point. The Task Force, chaired by former deputy secretary of state Richard L. Armitage and former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger, and directed by CFR Senior Fellow Daniel S. Markey, notes that nine years into the Afghan war, the outcome of the struggles in the region are still uncertain and the stakes are high. "What happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan matters to Americans," affirms the report. It warns that "militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan pose a direct threat to the United States and its allies. They jeopardize the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear power that lives in an uneasy peace with its rival, India."

The report's recommendations include:

Pakistan

* "To further enhance Pakistan's stability, the United States should maintain current levels of economic and technical assistance to help military and civilian leaders reconstruct and establish control over areas hard-hit by the flood, including those contested by militant forces." The Task Force recommends "continued and expanded training, equipment, and facilities for police, paramilitaries, and the army."

* "To reinforce U.S.-Pakistan ties and contribute to Pakistan's economic stability in the aftermath of an overwhelming natural disaster, the Obama administration should prioritize—and the Congress should enact—an agreement that would grant preferential market access to Pakistani textiles."

* "As it cultivates a closer partnership with Islamabad...the United States still needs to seek a shift in Pakistani strategic calculations about the use of militancy as a foreign policy tool. Washington should continue to make clear to Islamabad that at a basic level, U.S. partnership and assistance depend upon action against LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba], the Afghan Taliban, especially the Haqqani network, and related international terror groups."

Afghanistan

* "In Afghanistan, core American security aims can best be achieved at a lower cost if the United States manages to shift a greater burden to Afghan partners," explains the Task Force. "The United States should encourage an initiative with three complementary elements: political reform, national reconciliation, and regional diplomacy."

* "Political reforms should aim to grant a greater voice to a broader range of Afghan interests," states the Task Force. "Rather than leaving the reconciliation process to [Afghan] President Karzai and his narrow support base, Washington should participate fully in guiding a broad-based, inclusive process, bearing in mind that a rapid breakthrough at the negotiating table is unlikely. Afghan reform and reconciliation should then be supported by a regional diplomatic accord brokered by the United States."

* "To foster Afghanistan's viability as a security partner, the United States must continue to build cost-effective Afghan security forces appropriate to the capabilities necessary to protect the population. This will require more army and police trainers, as well as an expansion of community-based stabilization forces."

* "Afghanistan needs a self-sustaining foundation for generating jobs and revenue that will reduce dependence on international assistance. To meet this need, the United States should encourage private sector investment in Afghanistan's considerable mineral and energy resources, its agricultural sector, and in the infrastructure needed to expand trans-Afghan trade."

U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Comments

omarali50

Sat, 11/20/2010 - 1:00pm

I dont know. I think if the place really blows up then no sane power would want to be in the middle of that mess. And the current dogma seems to be that the Chinese are incredibly sane and far-sighted. We will see. Somehow, I doubt that any military, even the PLA, can remain too sane if not kept under adult supervision. Nobody seems to know how the Chinese "system" really works. But given the prominence of the PLA, its old relationship with Pakistan and its tendency (I say this based on nothing more than the notion that all armies think like that) to think in "strategic" terms about India and central asia, a disastrous intervention cannot be ruled out at some point in the future...But all this is idle speculation. I really dont take my own speculation about the distant future (10 years plus) very seriously. Who knows? If I slow down and take a deep breath, I have to admit that rumors of US policy's imminent demise may also be exaggerated. They probably know more and do more than an outsider like me can see or even imagine. Still, its possible to be too clever and "big powers" have been strung along by minor players in the past, mostly because they were not paying too much attention...

carl (not verified)

Sat, 11/20/2010 - 12:04pm

Omar:

"I get the impression that most US policymakers just cannot imagine that little brown people in Pindi could be taking the almighty advanced sophisticated US empire for such a ride..."

That is great line and I think there is much truth in it. After all, nobody can fool an Ivy League man...er, person.

Can the Chinese really pick up the pieces? They haven't been south of those mountains, ever. Would the people south of the mountains stand for it? I don't know which is why I ask.

omarali50

Sat, 11/20/2010 - 11:12am

Carl, It is a failure of imagination and it has something to do with arrogance as well. I get the impression that most US policymakers just cannot imagine that little brown people in Pindi could be taking the almighty advanced sophisticated US empire for such a ride...
But of course, this is not to say that the jihadists are home free. The US may subsidize them for a few years, hand them some more weapons and then pull out, but locally it is still a recipe for disaster. Sadly, it will take many more reasonable local alternatives down with it. The Chinese will have to pick up the toxic pieces someday.
I exaggerate. But there is some truth hidden in there somewhere.

carl (not verified)

Sat, 11/20/2010 - 1:30am

I read the portions of the report dealing with Pakistan and what they said was a bit of a puzzlement to me. On the one hand they said it was critical that Pakistan has to change its' mind about supporting the Taliban and their allies in Afghanistan. It said that we must continue as we have been in trying to encourage them to do so, only try harder. But is also says we can only do this for so long without seeing some kind of progress in that area, though they never say what kind of progress we should see.

Then they say if we don't see progress we should reconsider our approach to Pakistan, and give some examples of what might be done. They next point out how badly that might turn out. But they also say that if a successful act of terrorism originating in Pakistan occurs in the US it is likely that all bets are off and Pakistan will be the enemy and that will turn out badly.

The authors don't seem willing to squarely face the problem of what do we do if the Pak Army/ISI won't change its mind about supporting the takfiri killers. It is as if the problem is too hard and disturbing so they just won't think about it and advise taking the easy way, doing what we have been doing, and hoping.

Madju: I can't think of anything dealing with proxy wars specifically. I would recommend Walter Laquer's book "Guerrilla" because it really stress's the importance of terrain, sanctuaries and external sources of supply which seem to have a lot of application to Afghanistan.

Madhu (not verified)

Tue, 11/16/2010 - 9:03am

<em>The United States had inadequate procedures for checking how Pakistan spent the funds. U.S. Embassy staff in Pakistan were not required to check how the Pakistani military actually spent U.S. funds, the Pakistani army insisted that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)--where much of the money was to be spent--were too dangerous to visit, making sustained oversight there impossible; the United States has not been able to check Pakistani army records on how the money was being spent; the procedures in place to check how Pakistan spent the money were inadequate, and the decision to give Pakistan funds in the form of reimbursements made adequate oversight impossible.
U.S. funds disincentivized democratization by giving the military a disincentive to submit to civilian control, increasing its independence from government, and ignoring evidence of profiteering from military budgets.</em>

Whoops, forgot to include the "following." (Excerpt from the same source.)

I wonder if our aid should be partially conditioned on bilateral police-police or CT training between India and Pakistan? How does one peacefully and legally work with dissidents in a nuclear armed deep state? The dissidents (prodemocracy civilians and the like) are our natural allies. I have a feeling we need to think about this a lot more - and not just in relation to South Asia.

Why are we talking about Galula all the time when we are dealing with a world of proxy wars? Are proxy wars specific types of COIN? Any links to help me understand the topic would be appreciated.

Madhu (not verified)

Tue, 11/16/2010 - 8:57am

<em>Since 1951, the United States has given significant funding to Pakistan. Since September 11, 2001, U.S. funding has been intended for the following five purposes: to cover the extra cost to Pakistans military of fighting terrorism; provide Pakistan with military equipment to fight terrorism; to provide development and humanitarian assistance; covert funds (such as bounties or prize money); and cash transfers directly to the Pakistani governments budget.

Pakistan one of only four countries to receive direct cash transfers. Between 2002 and 2008, this "thank you" to Pakistan for help in fighting terrorism cost the U.S. taxpayer $2,374,000,000. <strong>By its nature, these cash transfers became Pakistani sovereign funds, precluding U.S. oversight.</strong></em>

<a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19490/us_aid_to_pakista… Center</a>

I suppose I will have to read the entire report to see how the above is addressed. Any proposal that does not take the following into account shows a lack of due diligence. I'm sorry, but there is no other way to put it.

Lawrence Chickering

Mon, 11/15/2010 - 9:26am

This report is a picture book illustration of the limitations of current mainstream foreign policy dialogue, focused entirely on governments and states while substantially ignoring the challenges of nation building in the weak, tribal states that became the new priorities for foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, and especially after 9/11. The central challenges in these "weak states" are low social trust and strong sub-group loyalties that fuel significant antagonism against "outsiders", including, in Afghanistan, both the coalition forces and the central government.

Encouraging the central government to promote "national reconciliation" shows no understanding of these deep cultural challenges, which can only be addressed by strong recruitment of civil society organizations (CSOs) that can engage these societies where their social and cultural energy is. This is at the level of communities and by promoting communication across loyalties, which is almost non-existent in these societies. Greg Mortenson (Three Cups of Tea) emphasizes where that recruitment has to begin -- with lots of tea.

The weakness of dialogue on foreign policy toward these tribal states -- definitely including this report -- is that it assumes that governments are strong enough (in the model of our old adversaries before 9/11) to accomplish the range of tasks, especially promotion of social trust -- between tribes and communities and also between communities and the government. The Council's report focuses on what the foreign policy community knows, which is states. It knows everything about people in striped pants but knows nothing about tea. So its recommendations focus on asking weak states to do things they have no capacity to do.

We will continue to struggle in our relations with these tribal societies until we start to open up the foreign policy conversation to include experts on those tribal societies and on strategies for recruiting civil society organizations to empower and engage people beyond family and tribe. One would hope that when it sees how small is the relevance of reports like this, even reflecting the views of dozens of "experts", the Council will expand the range of experts it includes in projects like this and will take leadership in refocusing both the debate and policy toward these new challenges, rather than simply recycling proposals from another, much simpler era, when strong states were our principal concerns and we could direct policies exclusively toward them.