Small Wars Journal

U.S. Military Runs into Afghan Tribal Politics

Mon, 05/10/2010 - 4:24am
U.S. Military Runs into Afghan Tribal Politics after Deal with Pashtuns - Joshua Partlow and Greg Jaffe, Washington Post.

U.S. military officials in eastern Afghanistan thought they had come up with a novel way to stem the anger and disillusionment about government corruption that fuels the Taliban insurgency here. Instead, their plan to empower a large Pashtun tribe angered a local power broker, provoked a backlash from the Afghan government and was disavowed by the U.S. Embassy.

The struggling U.S. military effort to give the Shinwari tribe more voice in its affairs shows the massive challenges the United States will face this summer in Kandahar province, as it prepares to launch what is being touted as one of the largest and most important military campaigns of the nine-year-old war. One of the main U.S. goals in Kandahar is to reduce the influence of local power brokers, widely seen as corrupt, and to give tribal alliances a stake in how the province is governed and how development contracts are parceled out...

More at The Washington Post.

Comments

Ken White (not verified)

Tue, 05/11/2010 - 2:35pm

<b>Yadernye:</b>

Absolutely correct.<blockquote>"It's long past time to revisit and revise the institutional framework established by the National Security Act of 1947. The U.S. simply can no longer afford to muddle through."</blockquote>That <i>and</i> Goldwater-Nichols. Sometimes you just gotta break a Rice Bowl -- or several.

We have been lucky and faced even less competent opponents. I suspect we'd best not rely on that good fortune to continue...

"It has been my personal experience, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, that every single day the soldiers and marines on the ground that I have worked with - PERFORM MIRACLES."

And all the people say, "Amen." I suspect this will remain the case until the artificial timeline runs out and the policy-makers and think tanks declare victory.

At that point, the quiet professionals and NGO caregivers can continue to work behind the scenes discretely advising and assisting in the hopes of making long-term, hard-won progress.

v/r

Mike

Jim Gant (not verified)

Tue, 05/11/2010 - 11:51am

Mr. White,

I totally concur with your post.

"That the Army succeeds more often than not is a credit to the people and not the process which inadvertently trends toward failure."

That statment is as true as it gets.

It has been my personal experience, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, that every single day the soldiers and marines on the ground that I have worked with - PERFORM MIRACLES. Often times under very difficult constraints and limitations. In alot of cases, the mission itself is not clear, not because of a lack of knowledge or planning by higher, but because the sitaution is so fluid, so unknown.

We do succeed far more than we fail.

And that will continue to be the case.

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim Gant

Yadernye

Tue, 05/11/2010 - 11:48am

Arguments over the merits of local engagement aside, the effort is almost guaranteed to fail unless it is integrated into an overall strategic-level Afghanistan policy, executed through interagency unity of effort.

Structural weaknesses in the U.S. government national security and foreign policy infrastructure are magnifying the liabilities deriving from the traditional American inability to think and plan strategically.

I fear that heroic efforts by the boots on the ground to maximize tactical capabilities will prove unable to rescue a war effort "muddling through" interagency gridlock, incoherent policymaking, and a lack of strategic guidance.

It's long past time to revisit and revise the institutional framework established by the National Security Act of 1947. The U.S. simply can no longer afford to muddle through.

Ken White (not verified)

Tue, 05/11/2010 - 10:57am

Penalty of a 'system' that <u>demands</u> one accomplish <i>something</i> of note in an 18 to 24 month tenure...

That and the default position of having a supposedly apolitical organization do political things for which it is neither designed, educated, trained or equipped...

In fairness to the 'system,' those factors are foisted and directed in large part by a Congress that demands 'fairness' and total versatility in a system that is developed to operate in a functional area as inherently unfair and complex as anything man has devised. That direction and interference do NOT make it right. That the Army succeeds more often than not is a credit to the people and not the process which inadvertently trends toward failure.

spartan16

Tue, 05/11/2010 - 10:56am

What's really depressing is that we don't have US soldiers on the ground with the Shinwari tribe 24/7 to alleviate the problems going on there.

What's really depressing is that the move was not supported by the State Department or the Afghan "Governement." Wow. It's like no one saw that coming.

I agree. This is not a suprise.

The Pashtun tribes do not want a plan or a process. They want people.

Boots on the ground not only alleviate most of the problems there, but turn the situation into a huge positive...

I agree. Tribal engagement must be done right, with the right people.

"Silver Bullet"...no? Never said it was.

However, if we do not get the Pashtun tribes engaged and give them a voice in the government, whatever else we do will fail.

Without the support of the Pashtun tribes - there will be a civil war.

There may be one anyway.

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim Gant

MAJ Maroukis,

Agreed in full. I was being a little tongue-in-cheek. It's just baffling to me that so many within the military recognize the serious problems these sorts of plans pose, but then no one managed to plan for them. Seeing such terrible consequence management is a bit depressing.

Maj Nick Maroukis (not verified)

Tue, 05/11/2010 - 8:56am

I think some of us did see the problem:

"LCol Malevich sent me Maj Gant's doc a few weeks ago and before I was half way through, I emailed him back with some concerns; "sounds like he's taking part in green-on-green engagements", "how does he know he picked the right clan to support?" and "the Tribes First strategy he proposes is totally at odds with the policy to create a strong central govt".

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2010/02/03/t…