Small Wars Journal

US Considers Sending Special Ops to Afghanistan

Sun, 10/26/2008 - 7:27am
US Considers Sending Special Ops to Afghanistan - Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times

In a sign that the US military is scaling back its goals in Afghanistan, senior Pentagon officials are weighing controversial proposals to send additional teams of highly trained special operations forces to narrowly target the most violent insurgent bands in the country.

The proposals are part of an acknowledgment among senior brass that a large-scale influx of conventional forces is unlikely in the near future because of troop commitments in Iraq. It also reflects the urgency to take some action to reverse recent setbacks in Afghanistan.

The idea of sending more special forces has intensified the debate over the best way to fight the war in Afghanistan. As security worsens in the country, many military leaders are increasingly arguing that an Iraq-style troop "surge" and counterinsurgency plan would not work because of the country's rugged geography and a history of resistance to rule from Kabul.

Unlike Iraq, where large portions of the population are urbanized in the wide, flat plains of the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys, much of Afghanistan is mountainous and dotted with remote villages that are hard to reach with large bodies of conventional forces, several Pentagon officials involved in the Afghanistan strategy review said.

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Comments

CA-SOF (not verified)

Wed, 10/29/2008 - 4:02pm

I think a mix of an influx (I refuse to call it a "surge" as I do not want to equate the effort to that which occured in Iraq) of conventional forces - perhaps 2 BCTs - and a larger % influx of SOF teams is the best approach for Afghanistan.

I served on on the border in Paktika for most of 2007. The border region is where the SOF elements need to be. The south and urban centers is where the conventional units need to be.

Upon my return I was asked to brief the SWA desk in OSD policy as to the security situation and partnership initiatives in the east. I also briefed the professional staff of the Senate Armed Svcs Cmte and the folks at USAID in regards to how they could increase development in the more hostile eastern border region.

My answers then are the same as they are now. More SOF team (no less than 25) dotting the entire border region along the frontier with Pakistan. Inbetween each of those SOF teams - which must be focused on FID and co-located with an assigned Afghan National Army company - should be an active component CA team out of Bragg that understands SOF imperatives and how to integrate with SOF forces. And while i hate to say it becuase my friends in the groups and the CA Bde out of Bragg will bear the brunt of this, the tours for SOF in Afghanistan need to be extended from 6 months to a full year - this will allow for greater continuity of operations and a greater long-term sustainability of effort! Switching teams in and out every 6 months with the first and last month of that tour dedicated to familiarizationa dn close out just isn't going ot cut it if we really want to defeat the beast. We need to have our SOF operators ont he ground for a longer duration to further develop the trust and partnership that is required to gain a long-term trust from teh local populace as well as the trust and camradere of the ANA. Without this, our forces will continue to be a revolvng door that gets lip service form the locals without any real trust forcing the locals to play both sides - and I cannot begrudge them that when one of those sides slithers into their villages nightly and slits a throat or two just to keep them all in check - if we can't commit to them, how can we believe they will commit to us?

This approach will allow for maximum infusion of small scale development from the CA teams as well as increased presence of SOF elements capable of conducting DA (when required, but not primary purpose) based off of passive information gathered from opertions along the border region. Having CA teams inbetween each of the SOF locations allows for joint initiatives - each CA team can support two SOF teams.

It is imperative that the SOF elements co-locate with an indigenous company of ANA to get the face of the governemnt out there and to train up a still-fledgling military force. Theis Security Forces Assistance is the only way to build capacity within the ANA.

Read Seth Jones' work (Rand) - the only way to defeat an insurgency is to ensure that the insurgency has no state sponsorship - currently I beleive there is still approval, tacit or hidden, for the insurgency in Afghanistan by the Gov't of Pakistan. They are getting a bit more serious now with the arrival of US SOF into country to train their frontier forces and security apparatus to deal with the militants, but that support is still there for the TB, etc.

The only way things change in A-stan is if GEN Petraeus increases SOF presence along the borders by a large amount, to include bumping SOF teams from the current number of ODA and CAT-A to a more robust package and have the entire CJSOTF focus on the border region.

The conventional guys can handle Helmand, Herat, Mez and elsewhere, including the urban areas - but totally agree with the post above that the "surge" will not work if replicated like they did things in Iraq.

Just my $.02.

Ken White

Sun, 10/26/2008 - 3:09pm

One would hope so.

Adding an excessive number of conventional units in Afghanistan is almost certain to be counterproductive. GEN McKiernan's call for four more Brigades is, IMO, the absolute maximum that should be sent and far less is probably better.

If the rumor that much of that increase is to be placed in Helmand is correct, aside from sending a really bad message to the British, I'm unsure what is to be accomplished. Clear and hold; then move to another Province? Whack a Mole 2.5?

We do not have enough troops to 'clear and hold' in Afghanistan, we could not do that if we had a Draft and an Army of two million. Nor is NATO going to be much help, they don't have the troops either.

Afghanistan is too large and the terrain is too inhospitable for such an effort. That is not going to change nor is the population -- who are emphatically not Iraqis or Arabs (too many forget that...) -- going to become less warlike, more educated or more supportive of a central government. Disregarding the basics and METT-TC because the Politicians want to do so is, as always, an invitation to disaster...

The points Spiegel cites in the article raised by some at DoD as being not conducive to a 'surge' are totally correct.

We need to realize and acknowledge that the nominal goal -- a poppy free, moderately democratic, decently governed coherent state and west-leaning Afghanistan -- is a highly unlikely result.