Small Wars Journal

Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War

Mon, 11/24/2008 - 1:16am
Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War - Colonel Ian Hope, Strategic Studies Institute

This Carlisle Paper discusses the traditional importance of unity of command in American doctrine and practice from World War I until now, and how this principle has been forsaken in the evolution of military command for Afghanistan. It examines the unprecedented departure from the principle of unity of command in Afghanistan in 2006, when Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan passed control of the ground fight to the International Security Assistance Force, and operations became split between several unified or "supreme" commanders in charge of US Central Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and US Special Operations Command. It argues for a renewal of understanding of the importance of unity of command, and recommends that the United States revert to the application of this principle by amending the Unified Command Plan to invest one "supreme commander" with responsibility for the current Operation Enduring Freedom Joint Operations Area.

Much more at the Strategic Studies Institute.

Comments

Concur with the author wholeheartedly.

COIN operations (OIF/OEF/SFOR) have stimulated enhancements in Command and Control (C2) by the use of such innovations as the Blue Flag Tracker (BFT), C2PC, and EPLRS to oversee the battlefield at the lowest levels. Our Small Unit Leaders (SUL) have benefited immensely from the technological advancements, stated, by being able to wield a tremendous amount of coordinated support (firepower, MEDEVAC, supply, services) within the grasp of a simple handset/laptop. However, with such advancements in C2 technology, we still are doomed to repeat history every time we forget or ignore some of the basic principles of war. One fundamental principle of war-Unity of Command-increases accountability, prevents freelancing, improves the flow of information, helps with the coordination of operational efforts, and enhances operational safety-seems to be all but ignored in Afghanistan despite the technological advancements in C2.

Presently, Afghanistan serves as the home for several major, but independent commands. Two major commands, the NATO-sponsored International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-Afghanistan (made up of regional commands (RC) and supplementary commands in the order of; CJTF-North, CJTF-South, CJTF-East, CJTF-West, CJSOTF and IAICC) and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan or (CSTC-A) (with oversight of TF Phoenix to develop the capabilities of the ANA and ANSF) have demonstrated a proclivity to work in a stovepipe mentality. Due to a lack of unity of command AND effort, failures on the battlefield have been experienced. Operation ANACONDA is an excellent recent example of what can go wrong when dealing with the complexities of multi-command planning and execution.

With all this being said, why do we continue to forget or ignore one of the basic principles of war by maintaining a parallel (split) command relationship in Afghanistan?

The views expressed in this comment are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government