This Week at War: The Domino Theory returns

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy.

Why is the United States fighting a war in Afghanistan? According to the Obama administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the goal of the campaign is to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens." But according to Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a new member of the Defense Policy Board, the more important reason to is to prevent the Taliban from taking over Pakistan. Does this 21st century version of the domino theory make any more sense than its 1960s incarnation?

Writing in The American Interest, Biddle asserted:

If the Taliban regained control of the Afghan state, their ability to use the state's resources to destabilize the secular government in Pakistan would increase the risk of state collapse there. Analysts have made much of the threat that Pakistani Taliban base camps pose to the stability of the government in Kabul, but the danger works both ways: Instability in Afghanistan also poses a serious threat to the secular civilian government in Pakistan. This is the single greatest U.S. interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan's internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear-armed sanctuary there.

Inside this otherwise excellent essay, Biddle seems to have forgotten the 1990s. From 1996 to 2001 the Taliban controlled virtually all of Afghanistan and did so with the support of the Pakistani government. During this time, Pakistan suffered its usual episodes of political infighting, high-level corruption, and another military coup. But even with an aggressive theocracy right next door, the takeover of Islamabad by Islamic radicals was never a threat.

Contrary to Biddle's assertion, it seems equally reasonable to argue that Taliban-controlled Afghanistan provided a relief valve of sorts for Islamist pressure that might have otherwise formed inside Pakistan during the 1990s. And although the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban are two distinct movements, the U.S.--led operation in Afghanistan may be inciting and pressurizing Taliban activity inside Pakistan. Contrary to Biddle, the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan may be increasing rather than decreasing the risk to Pakistan.

Pakistan's powerful Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence seems to see it this way. The ISI recently invited reporters from the New York Times to its offices for a two-hour briefing. During the briefing, ISI officials objected to the U.S. Marine Corps offensive in Afghanistan's southern Helmand province. They feared that the offensive would push Taliban fighters into Pakistan's Baluchistan area, destabilizing it.

This is not an argument to abandon NATO's effort in Afghanistan. In spite of the slim odds, it may be worth fighting for the stable self-governance for Afghanistan. As Biddle points out in his essay, Pakistan may collapse for any number of reasons, regardless of what actions the United States takes in the region. A long-term military presence in Afghanistan may be necessary in order to monitor the region and contain terrorist personnel and assets.

As Biddle points out, the Obama administration will have a hard enough time maintaining public support for the Afghan campaign. They should leave the domino theory out of it.

Thank you, Rafael Correa

Last year, President Rafael Correa of Ecuador refused to renew a lease that permitted the U.S. military to operate up to eight surveillance aircraft from an Ecuadorian airbase. Correa's decision forced the U.S. government to scramble for a new base in the region. The result is an agreement with Colombia that will greatly improve the U.S. military's position in the region. The agreement will also boost Colombia's leverage and strategic position. If Correa thought he was punishing the United States by ejecting it, his decision has backfired.

From Ecuador's Manta airport, U.S. aircraft patrolled the Pacific Ocean side of Latin America mainly to track smuggling activity. Under the basing agreement with Colombia, U.S. intelligence-gathering aircraft are expected to obtain access to three of the Colombian military's air bases. From these bases, U.S. long-range surveillance aircraft will have access to the Pacific Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean. In addition, the Colombians are expected to agree to more frequent visits by U.S. Navy warships to ports on both its Pacific and Caribbean coasts, presumably to step up naval cooperation between the two countries.

In exchange, Colombia will likely receive preferential access to U.S. military technology. They also gain greater leverage to lobby the Obama administration to support the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement, not previously a priority for the White House. Perhaps most important for Colombia, it will lock in a long-term strategic relationship with the United States. As a presidential candidate, Obama appeared unlikely to show Colombia the affection that it enjoyed during the Bush years. But Correa's decision to throw the U.S. out of Ecuador has compelled the Obama team to extend the U.S.-Colombia security relationship far beyond what was achieved during the Bush years.

From their new home in Colombia, U.S. surveillance aircraft will continue long-standing counter-narcotics patrolling. But the new location is also centrally located to enable electronic monitoring of military and political developments in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Recent political trends in those countries may be more troubling to Colombia than they are to the United States. But the new basing deal greatly improves the ability of both countries to respond to whatever may develop in the region.

0
Your rating: None

Comments