Think Again: Counterinsurgency and Piracy

Your not "the brute" Herschel, you're just being relistic. Your logic is absolutely in sync with the M.E. / African / Asian philosophy on such matters. Used to be our philosophy also.

However, too many here have forgotten that much of our earlier power structure left Europe because they didn't like the neighbors and have instead decided to adopt Euro Social Democratic precepts and thinking. That is unfortunately diametrically opposed to<blockquote>"...our lack of will to kill Sadr had the same consequences as our refusal to kill the pirates will in the coming months and years. People will die; they will be less safe; it will cost us money; and the U.S. will lose credibility as a nation whose demands must be met and whose threats can be trusted.

If brutishness is based on consequences rather than methods, I'll easily win that argument every time."</blockquote>All probably true and you may win the verbal argument but I strongly doubt the reality will change...

Gian, Schmedlap, others,

Permit we to weigh in on how I see the campaign in the South. Any discussion of Sadr and the difficulty of dealing with his actions (and of the JAM) in 2005 - 2006 shouldn't first be launched from the platform of difficulties of COIN in general, or even of the problematic nature of OIF II or III specifically. Nor should the discussion focus first (or maybe even at all) on how Sadr saved the day with his agreements.

As I have discussed at GREAT length on my own blog, Sadr was a problem of our own creation - our own creation because we listened to the British who wanted him released. We made the problem. We created the monster.

In 2004 he was actually in the custody - not surrounded, not simply defeated, not cordoned, but in the custody - of the 3/2 Marines (I cannot discuss sources over this comment but would respond to e-mail). For a discussion (although incomplete) of why the British wanted him released and how this came about, see the following Charlie Rose interview of John Burns, beginning at approximately 17:20 into the interview.

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4986491654806405622

I am not saying that COIN in the South would have been easy; nor am I making a case for nation-building in the future (I think, Gian, that this is one fear you have, and well justified, that if we don't see Iraq for what it was and understand the narrative properly, we are doomed to have the wrong perspectives on what happened and why, and to believe that it can be duplicated in the future). But I am saying that just as one could claim that the so-called stand down of Sadr contributed to the evolution towards stability in Iraq, one can also claim (more correctly, I think) that Sadr would never have been a problem to begin with if we had done what we should have and ignored the British.

Forgive my brutishness, but let the residents of Sadr City and Najaf know that you've killed Sadr without remorse, parade his coffin around the city, and lives are saved. Sons of America who died in 2005 - 2006, many of them, would not have. Iraqis who died in 2005 - 2006, many of them, would not have. If Sadr and the JAM have blood on their hands, both U.S. and Iraqi, then so does the decision to leave Sadr alive. If there wasn't a court in Iraq who would have held him accountable, then he should have been killed and not taken into custody. The point I am making is that whatever revulsion you might have to my brutishness, you can compare that to what you might feel at the deaths of sons of America in 2005 - 2006 who had to fight the battle we created for them by leaving Sadr alive.

As for the piece on piracy, my antenna senses hand-wringing and lawfare. I, Ralph Peters and Lt. Col. P at OpFor have all weighed in on what to do with pirates. The counsel sounds similar (I won't provide links here unless requested to do so). Permit me?

HPS

<blockquote>This is easy. We tell the LOAC and ROE lawyers that theyre special and that they should go to their rooms and write high-sounding platitudes about compassion in war so that theyre out of the way, we land the Marines on the ship, and we kill every last pirate. Then we hunt down his domiciles in Somali and destroy them, and then we find his financiers and buyers and kill them. Regardless of the unfortunate potential loss of Ukrainian or Russian civilian life upon assaulting the ship, this weaponry and ordnance should never have been shipped in this part of the world without escort (and perhaps it shouldnt have been shipped even with escort). Negotiations will only serve to confirm the pirates in their methods. Its killing time. Its time to turn the United States Marines loose.</blockquote>

Ralph Peters:

<blockquote>Piracy must be exterminated. Pirates arent folk heroes or champions of the oppressed. Theyre terrorists and violent criminals whose ransom demands start at a million bucks. And theyre not impressed by the prospect of trials in a velvet-gloved Western court. The response to piracy must be the same as it was when the British brought an end to the professions "golden age:" Sink them or board them, kill them or hang them.</blockquote>

Lt. Col. P

<blockquote>Kill all of the pirates.

Seriously. Why do we allow a handful of khat-addled assholes to dominate one of the worlds most important sea lanes? We, the western powers, have sufficient naval units in the area to take care of the problem in very quick order. What we lack is the will. We apply an idiotically high standard of judicial due process to a situation that doesnt lend itself well to a judicial solution. Anyone who has dealt with Somalis can tell you that they laugh at western legalisms, and what they perceive as western weaknesses. And then they redouble their violent efforts to take what they want from you. They do react very well to a boot on their necks, and a gun to their heads. Then they tend to wise up quickly.

Heres how it needs to be done. Oil tanker sends distress call, takes evasive actions insofar as it is capable. (Or better yet, armed men aboard oil tanker defend by fire.) Coalition forces despatch (sic) vessels and boarding parties. Pirates who survive ensuing gun battle are lined up by the rail and shot in the head, then dumped overboard. Pirate boats are burned. If their bases or villages on the coast can be identified, said bases are raided and destroyed. No fuss no muss, no ransom, no hostages, no skyrocketing costs.</blockquote>

As for the argument that we can't really find them and it would take too many resources, sorry, but "that dog won't hunt." I may be a country boy, but I'm still a little too smart for that one. The 26th MEU is there right now. We have the resources, we have the time, we have the aircraft, we have the communications, we have the radar, etc. What we also have is law of the sea lawyers and confused ROE, and a lack of will.

Again, you may think me brutish. I'm okay with that. But honesty demands that we be man enough to admit the truth in public. Piracy is a problem only because we have decided that it should be so. Pirates exist in the Gulf of Aden because we want them to. We haven't the will to address the problem, so we turn the lawyers loose on it, pay ransoms, and then write high sounding platitudes about how the problem isn't really as bad as we think it is and how it has always been with us. It really looks pitiful by the time it's all over, and the pirates keep being pirates while the lawyers keep studying it and we keep talking about it.

My brutishness notwithstanding, our lack of will to kill Sadr had the same consequences as our refusal to kill the pirates will in the coming months and years. People will die; they will be less safe; it will cost us money; and the U.S. will lose credibility as a nation whose demands must be met and whose threats can be trusted.

If brutishness is based on consequences rather than methods, I'll easily win that argument every time.

Best, HPS (aka "the brute")

Schmedlap:

I dont discount their hard work, courage, and commitment and I have stated that before in other published writings. One can be critical of the Surge Narrative as it is presently constructed while at the same time deeply appreciating the sacrifices of the men and women who were a part of it, as I do.

It is ironic that those who continue to criticize the efforts of the men and women who were in Iraq in 2006 (and before) dont get your basic and correct point. One still sees the hurtful terms and metaphors like "hunkered down on comfortable fobs," and "commuting to the fight" used when trying to show difference between Surge forces and what came before.

thanks for the note.

<I>"It depends how you define 'surge.' If the surge is defined as follows, then yes, it worked... 2) Shiite militia leader Moqtada al-Sadr's decision to stand down in summer 2007... It was those conditions, followed by the additional troops, that led to the reduction in violence, not the other way around."</I>

Ass backwards.

Mullah Atari "stood down" his militia (meaning he went into refit and recovery mode while claiming that his special groups were "rogue elements" that he was attempting to get under control) because US and Iraqi SOF were going into Sadr City on a routine basis and killing or capturing leadership of his militia and inflicting losses that he was struggling to replenish. Combined with deliberate actions taken to instill paranoia and confusion within his ranks and to associate him with Iran, he was forced to choose between losing fighters faster than he could replenish them, risking more of his lieutenants turning against him, and losing popular support due to his Iranian ties being exposed -OR- to save face by "standing down" in a gesture that would make him appear merciful rather than weak.

It is true that cracking down on Sadr's militia was not an example of "new" COIN methods. It was old-school, hard raids with new technology mixed in. But it is false to assert that Sadr standing down his militia was a precondition, rather than the result of over a year of continuous kinetic operations and some skillful non-lethal work. A simple calendar check also clarifies this: the 5 surge brigades deployed from Jan thru May. Sadr stood down in August. Precondition?

For someone who has, in the past, seemed to assume that successes in 2007/2008 somehow detract from the sacrifices of his own men in 2006, I think it takes a surprising degree of nerve to discount some extremely dangerous work done by others in 2006/2007, dismissing it as a precondition (in numerous articles).