Small Wars Journal

The Snake-Eaters and the Yards

Wed, 11/27/2013 - 3:43pm

The Snake-Eaters and the Yards by Rebecca Onion, Slate.

… The indigenous Montagnards, recruited into service by the American Special Forces in Vietnam’s mountain highlands, defended villages against the Viet Cong and served as rapid response forces. The Special Forces and the Montagnards—each tough, versatile, and accustomed to living in wild conditions—formed an affinity for each other. In the testimony of many veterans, their working relationship with the Montagnards, nicknamed Yards, was a bright spot in a confusing and frustrating war. The bond between America’s elite fighters and their indigenous partners has persisted into the present, but despite the best efforts of vets, the Montagnards have suffered greatly in the postwar years, at least in part because they cast their lot with the U.S. Army. In a war with more than its share of tragedies, this one is less often told but is crucial to understanding the conflict and its toll…

Read on.

Comments

Move Forward

Sun, 12/01/2013 - 11:26am

In reply to by Bill M.

Not sure I buy the "divide and conquer" argument in a U.S. conflict context. Many colonial boundaries were drawn to purposely keep any single group from being too powerful to create problems for the distant European leaders. Any current attempt to divide would be "divide and self-rule." Had we employed such a strategy, U.S. forces supporting individual armies of new nation-states likely would have faced far less insurgency. Also, current Iraq and future Afghanistan problems would have been less serious.

<blockquote>While we often agree on many points, this is one of the more illogical statements I have read from you,

"If regular forces had been available in greater numbers early on, it would have given SF and other regular forces the opportunity to train more forces faster while simultaneously providing wide area security</blockquote>

Well, not much of a guess or argument to be sure. I had to do some historical research to better inform myself about the early Vietnam war. I didn't realize the French had left so early in the mid 50s. However, suspect you exaggerate how many French forces were available compared to enemy forces if over 12,000 at a French garrison surrendered at the Battle of Dien Ben Phu. That calls into question some of this statement you made:

<blockquote>First off there were ample regular forces there when the French were there long before us playing the same game. Second, everywhere we had a large presence of U.S. regular forces participating in COIN/FID we failed, yet we had numerous successes with smaller footprints composed of both SOF and Regular forces.</blockquote>

Contrast that statement with this from Wikipedia:

<blockquote>North Vietnam invaded Laos in 1959, and used 30,000 men to build invasion routes through Laos and Cambodia by 1961.[134] About 40,000 communist soldiers infiltrated into the south from 1961–63.[128] North Vietnam sent 10,000 troops of the North Vietnamese Army to attack the south in 1964, and this figure increased to 100,000 in 1965.[135]</blockquote>

Then compare 10,000 to 100,000 NVA and 100,000 Viet Cong to the 16,500 U.S. forces available in 1964 and building in 1965 trying to train a million ARVN forces and irregulars and fend off the North. This quote is also from Wikipedia:

<blockquote>"From a strength of approximately 5,000 at the start of 1959 the Viet Cong's ranks grew to about 100,000 at the end of 1964...Between 1961 and 1964 the Army's strength rose from about 850,000 to nearly a million men."[152] The numbers for U.S. troops deployed to Vietnam during the same period were quite different; 2,000 in 1961, rising rapidly to 16,500 in 1964.[175] By early 1965, 7,559 South Vietnamese hamlets had been destroyed by the Viet Cong.[176]</blockquote>

The number of hamlets destroyed by the Viet Cong does not appear to indicate that a light U.S. footprint was working, or that the larger South Vietnamese forces were effective. However, at least the ARVN existed unlike in Iraq or Afghanistan where the coalition had to start from scratch building them.

Agreed with many of your other comments. Yeah, I've got a narrative in a forum filled with SF, Marines, COIN bashers, and US Army CF detractors in terms of Iraq/Afghanistan. However, history seems to support that narrative despite every periodic attempt to reduce U.S. Army size after every war and claim the era of ground combat is over. I'm a huge tech supporter as a secondary narrative and raison d'etre for my handle name.

However, even that narrative is tempered by the realization that no technological solution can substitute for troops on the ground. Instead that technology can help our ground forces survive and be more combat effective. The SF/SOF has more than their share of such tools which is why it appears puzzling that the Design crowd and philosophy crew seem to love to bash tech that has saved so many lives in this decade of wars.

War Eagle and Roll Tide. See it is possible for two groups to coexist in harmony.:) But if war was like the fields of friendly strife, would any coach attempt an exclusive strategy of trying to recruit walk-ons or folks in the crowd to take on the opposing team? If you prefer lots of short passes and long bombs, don't you still need a strong pocket on the ground to initiate those throws? Isn't a strong running game required with lots of muscle on the line and agility in the backfield? The one thing I don't see is how the ships on the nearby pond affect the game...:)

Bill C.

Mon, 12/02/2013 - 7:13am

In reply to by Bill M.

Bill M:

We may wish to ask ourselves whether actions, which are often more revealing as to one's deep political convictions and one's true intentions, speak louder than words.

Herein, consider, for example, our recent actions in Libya, Egypt and Syria. How should our recent actions in these countries be construed?

As being designed to insure that these countries were secure and could govern themselves? If such were the case, then one would think that we might have -- very early on -- vehemently voiced our support for and provided massive assistance to the long-time rulers of these countries.

We did not do this but, instead, voiced our support for the democratic aspirations of and provided assistance to various population segments involved in revolts against their governments and leaders. This leading, one might easily suggest, to the significant governing and security problems that we see in these three nations today.

This suggests that we have a different agenda, one which, via our actions, declares that we are prepared to (1) sacrifice governance and security in certain other nations for (2) a chance to transform these states and societies more along modern western lines.

And minus an immediate and complete withdrawal of all of our forces (governmental and non-governmental; public and private) from Afghanistan, and a denial of any and all assistance to the present government there (puts them back into more of a "self-determination" mode), then I would suggest that the transformation of this state and its societies -- more along modern western lines -- is still our long-term goal for this nation also.

Or do you believe that we will, despite our most recent actions, and much as with the "Yards" above, simply walk away and hang these folks (those in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Afghanistan) out to dry?

Bill M.

Sun, 12/01/2013 - 6:43pm

In reply to by Bill C.

Bill C.

From the recent blog post, "The Way Petraeus Saw Counterinsurgency Operations - Five quotes via RallyPoint"

http://blog.rallypoint.com/2013/11/the-way-petraeus-saw-counterinsurgen…

"President Obama has said that our aspirations should be realistic. We are not going to turn one of the poorest countries in the world, that was plunged into 30 years of war, into an advanced, industrialized, Western-style democracy. What we want to achieve is Afghanistan's capacity to secure and govern itself."

Bill C.

Sun, 12/01/2013 - 1:27am

In reply to by Bill M.

Bill M:

Consider this from President Obama, wherein, he defines self-determination -- not as you and I might do so -- but essentially in terms of the right to a western way of life and western way of governance (rule of law, freedom the press, democracy/elections, economic freedom):

"That story of self-determination began six months ago in Tunisia ..."

"In too many countries, power has been concentrated in the hands of a few. In too many countries, a citizen like that young vendor had nowhere to turn -– no honest judiciary to hear his case; no independent media to give him voice; no credible political party to represent his views; no free and fair election where he could choose his leader."

"And this lack of self-determination –- the chance to make your life what you will –- has applied to the region’s economy as well ..."

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president…

Thus, our nation sees "the oppressed" as those people who are being denied a western way of life and western way of governance. During our Cold War days, we said that it was the communists who were denying various people these rights. Today, we say that it is the Islamists and the authoritarian leaders who are denying their populations these benefits.

Also, we may wish to consider whether it actually does take an occupation force to bring about state and societal change. By operating by, with and through a "friendly" local government (or a "friendly" local population group if the local government is the resisting party) a foreign government might also, I believe, hope to bring about the state and societal changes that it desires.

Thus, the mission remains much the same as in President Bush's day. Now we are simply trying to accomplish this mission in a more doable and pragmatic manner (by, with and through others). This potentially leading to the divide and conquer tactics -- and consequences -- that will effect various population groups (such as with the Yards noted here) and in much the same way that you discuss above?

Bill M.

Sat, 11/30/2013 - 10:46pm

In reply to by Move Forward

Move Forward,

While we often agree on many points, this is one of the more illogical statements I have read from you,

"If regular forces had been available in greater numbers early on, it would have given SF and other regular forces the opportunity to train more forces faster while simultaneously providing wide area security".

First off there were ample regular forces there when the French were there long before us playing the same game. Second, everywhere we had a large presence of U.S. regular forces participating in COIN/FID we failed, yet we had numerous successes with smaller footprints composed of both SOF and Regular forces. I'll give you and Bill C. credit, you stick to your narratives. Bill C. believes our national security policy is focused on evangelistic democratization. We of course had episodes of this approach throughout our history, the latest being George W. Bush's administration. It failed, and now we're more focused on the art of the doable and being pragmatic. This is why we don't need large ground forces to provide wide area security. You only need an occupation force if you are forcing a change that the people don't desire.

To alleviate any concerns that I am calling for a drastic cut in our ground forces, I'm not. I think we may need a larger ground force than currently projected with the current cuts, but not for occupation duties, but to protect the U.S. and win our wars. Same end, different reasons for the end.

As for the Yards, they fought bravely by all accounts I have read and the SF vets I have talked with. Still, at best it was a tactical effort that the Vietnamese government didn't support. Much like Karzai is not a big fan of the VSO program. If go ahead and do it without consensus with all concerned then you're probably setting your surrogates up failure in the long run. Western powers have a long history of dividing and conquering, and for the most part it only achieves temporary success at best, and then results in long term instability which in turns leads to a lack of development, which increases the instability, etc. all for a temporary tactical advantage.

Where I suspect you'll agree with me is that I think the SF community, above all others, really needs to question the morality of UW and other operations where we use others to get to our ends (especially when they are minorities with much to lose like the Kurds, Yards, Contras, etc.) before we pursue that particular course of action. Using surrogates is relatively easy to do, and in some cases it may even be effective tactically, but what do we think the effects will be over time? This isn't simply an American way of war, the Brits were famous for their divide and conquer approach, whether it was the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Karens in Burma, or the Masai in Kenya, all of which ended badly for the minority group exploited.

SF soldiers in general (of course I can only speak for the brothers I know)truly believe in freeing the oppressed. This was definitely true during the Cold War, but I based on discussions with many of the current generation I think it is equally true today. They desire to free societies from oppressive Islamists, so this isn't something the ODAs take lightly. SF soldiers demonstrated their loyalty to the Yards after Vietnam and moved mountains to get many relocated to the U.S., and they did the same for the Kurds after Provide Comfort. In the hearts of most SF soldiers De Oppresso Liber has great meaning, and they end up despising those who set their partners up for failure.

Unfortunately our policy makers, and sometimes a few of our own SF leaders, are too quick to seek expedient tactical solutions to tactical problems without thinking about the results we'll achieve over time. This often results in the oppressed we worked with being further oppressed once their tactical utility expires. I'm pragmatic and accept there may be times when we need to do that, but I also suspect we pursue this approach for reasons that are not well thought through.

Move Forward

Sat, 11/30/2013 - 10:48am

This a fascinating article indicative of similar problems with ethnic differences and outside influences in Afghanistan. It also illustrates how State Department and host nation unwillingness to allow/force greater autonomy for some ethnicities, ends up becoming a source of continued conflict.

This first example illustrates the need for large numbers of defenders when facing equally large number of attackers be it Viet Cong or NVA. No doubt it took time to train and develop such forces, despite earlier assistance of Montagnards by the French. If regular forces had been available in greater numbers early on, it would have given SF and other regular forces the opportunity to train more forces faster while simultaneously providing wide area security.

<blockquote>By December 1963, 43,000 Montagnard defenders guarded the area around the first camp, Buon Enao, from the Viet Cong, while 18,000 Montagnards were enlisted in mobile strike forces, which were deployed by air to spots where conflict broke out.</blockquote>

You would think if an SF only approach was working, there would have been no need to add increasing numbers of regular forces. It also is interesting that the slow speed of dismounted forces in such terrain forced the advent of greater air mobility and the first use of Fire Bases that today are FOBs and COPs.

The 18,000 Montagnards used as mobile strike forces illustrate that despite a much smaller South Vietnam and narrow land mass close to the sea, air mobility remained essential. In countries the size of Iraq and Afghanistan, air mobility and large coalition land forces were essential.

The next example illustrates that even when small SF units have trained large irregular forces, external support remains a necessity. We all recall Puff the Magic Dragon showing up to save the day in the end in the movie “Green Beret.”

<blockquote>On July 6, 1964, in a stellar example of collaboration between the Special Forces and indigenous troops, Capt. Roger H.C. Donlon, his group of 12 Green Berets, 60 Nung, 311 CIDG troops, and an Australian adviser, fended off a late-night attack on their isolated camp near Nam Dong village, repelling 900 North Vietnamese in a five-hour battle.</blockquote>

Likewise, a greatly outnumbered SF and ANSF force in Maiwand at Sperwan Ghar as told in "Lions of Kandahar" only survived with assistance from 70+ air resupply and attack sorties. In land masses the size of Afghanistan and Iraq, this air support is not rapidly forthcoming unless multiple FOBs and airfields are available in relative proximity to dispersed regular forces and SF/SOF.

This example paralleled the problem of the Bonn Agreement and a premature rush to institute host nation rule when that leader and U.S./NATO supporters are not prepared to honor the need for greater autonomy of different ethnicities (or religious groups in the case of Iraq and Syria). The FULRO group named was attempting to gain such autonomy. Interestingly, we have SF groups defending and trying to assist Montagnards in gaining greater autonomy while the South Vietnamese and U.S. government had no such interest…as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Note the two quotes from the article that illustrate how greater autonomy or lack thereof can lead to continued conflict.

<blockquote>In September 1964, FULRO-allied Montagnards in five Special Forces camps rebelled, killing 80 South Vietnamese troops and taking 20 Americans hostage. Eventually, Special Forces personnel in the camps managed to talk the rebels into laying down their arms.</blockquote>

<blockquote>After the uprisings, Saigon made some concessions to Montagnard demands but refused to allow tribal autonomy. Saigon also made a formal protest to the United States, alleging that the arming of the Montagnards had proceeded without the regime’s knowledge or consent and that the U.S. had assisted the highlanders in their rebellion.</blockquote>

Note how despite the yeoman’s efforts of small SF groups, 12 men is simply not enough:

<blockquote>“We are trying to help them, but there are only 12 of us here and 8,000 of them,”</blockquote>

The final quote at the end of the article kind of says it all about how the U.S. military attempted to help not only the South Vietnamese and Montagnards, but also the Iraqis and Afghans. Only the National Command Authority’s and State Department insistence on keeping one nation under poorly drawn Colonial boundaries hampered the potential success of coalition forces helping separate ethnicities and religious groups achieve separate self-rule.

<blockquote>As Ksor acknowledges, the Special Forces couldn’t set American policy or dictate Vietnamese attitudes toward the tribes, so their good intentions had limitations. No matter how hard some Green Berets wished for and worked for better lives for the Montagnards, the end result of the war, for the tribes, was disaster.</blockquote>

Outlaw 09

Fri, 11/29/2013 - 2:31pm

The article brings back old memories for those CIDG troops that we worked with in III Corp 69/70---while the article indicates that the Montagnards were a mountainous group we had in III Corp some who were termed low land Montagnards who had been brought by the French to work the Michelin rubber planation's that were north of Saigon and ran deep into Cambodia. The Loc Ninh, Mhin Than, the B Team in An Loc and Tong le Chon camps had at least one if not two Montagnard companies combined usually with one or two Cambodian companies and some camps had one Vietnamese companies.

They were a tough group of fighters as were the Cambodians who never had to be nudged into a fight---the Vietnamese tended to hold back on engagements and had to be nudged to engage.

My longest lasting memory was on a particular recon into Cambodia with two Montagnard recon platoons--- we ran head long into a NVA BN coming south on the HCM trail as we were going north---nothing like a full head on encounter---usually the side that engaged the fastest and pushed flankers immediately won the engagement.

The Montagnards had an affinity for flanking it was almost a second nature instinct---anyway the two platoons were in fact pushing the entire NVA BN back north and had successfully started a flanking action which was also confusing the NVA.

We ran into a small stream that to be waded across---and in typical Montagnard fashion everything came to a sudden halt even with the bullets flying---we did not cross until the "water gods" were appeased which took about ten minutes---by the way the longest ten minutes when one is engaged with a BN and basically outnumbered and winning on bravado.

We appeased the water gods and continued to rout the NVA BN.

Our CIDG troops got extra pay for captured weapons and on that day even the advisor ie me had to carry as many AKs and RPKs I could in order to drive up the bounty money---being a SF advisor had it's moments.

They could fight all day and still in the evening smile, joke, and act like young kids among themselves.

The sad thing was we the advisors were in the fight for one year ---they had been fighting for 10 or more years---my point man was 15 and had been a point man for 2 full years---I staked my life on his abilities a number of times and he taught me how to track with the best of the Montagnards.

davidbfpo

Wed, 11/27/2013 - 4:45pm

An interesting 'Slate' article on the "Yards", who paid a huge price for their alliance with the US SOF a long time ago.

What is interesting is that in post-1945 history there are a number of similar experiences for such allies, although not always from such a distinctive community. The French in Indo-China, mainly in Laos, left behind allies; the Harkis in Algeria are better known.

I have read more on the wars in Southern Africa, where Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa easily recruited local allies (there were other factors, e.g. the high pay of the Selous Scouts).