The Power to Coerce: Countering Adversaries Without Going to War by David C. Gompert and Hans Binnendijk, RAND Corporation
Mounting costs, risks, and public misgivings of waging war are raising the importance of U.S. power to coerce (P2C). Meanwhile, globalization of trade, investment, finance, information, and energy give the United States promising coercive options, especially against adversaries that depend on access to such markets and systems.
The Power to Coerce: Countering Adversaries Without Going to War documents the most interesting of U.S. P2C options: financial sanctions, support for nonviolent political opposition to hostile regimes, and offensive cyber operations. Cutting off access to the global interbanking system can visit severe and radiating economic pain and be calibrated according to the target's response. Support for prodemocracy opposition can be very threatening and offer strong leverage, but this option can be high risk and calls for judicious use.
Offensive cyber operations are also a high-return, high-risk option. Skillfully targeted, they can disturb the functioning and confidence of states and markets and thus have coercive value. However, the risks and costs of collateral damage, retaliation, and escalation are considerable, especially if the target country is itself a cyber-war power. Given its own vulnerabilities, the United States might wish to raise, not lower, the threshold for cyber war.
The state against which coercion is most difficult and risky is China, which also happens to pose the strongest challenge to U.S. military options in a vital region. Russia, Iran, and other states less robust than China are more-inviting targets for coercive power.
The United States should hone its ability to monitor financial assets and flows and to isolate recalcitrant states and banks that do business with them. The U.S. State Department and intelligence community should refine their methods to support nonviolent democratic opponents in hostile and repressive states and assess the risks and benefits of using those methods. More generally, the U.S. government should prepare for the use of P2C as it does for military warfare, including assessment of options, requirements and capabilities, conducting war games to refine these capabilities, and planning with allies. Just as authorities, responsibilities, and command chains are delineated for hard power, so should they be for P2C.
Key Findings
U.S. Power to Coerce Is increasing Even as the Utility of U.S. Offensive Military Force Is Diminishing.
- The state against which coercion is most difficult and risky is China, which also happens to be the United States' strongest anti-access/area denial (A2AD) rival and aims to reduce U.S. hard power options in a particularly vital region.
- Russia, Iran, and other states that are less powerful and prominent than China are more-susceptible targets for coercive power.
The Three Potentially Most Cost-Effective P2C Instruments Available to the United States Are Financial Sanctions, Support for Nonviolent Political Opposition, and Offensive Cyber Operations.
- Financial sanctions can deliver calibrated economic pain with precision, from targeting individuals, to hurting targeted sectors, to slowing economic activity as a whole. Financial sanctions on China would be more complex, difficult to implement and maintain, and perilous for the world economy than are such sanctions on Russia or Iran.
- Support for prodemocracy opposition can be very threatening and therefore high leverage. This method of coercion is most likely to work against Iran and least likely to work against China.
- Offensive cyber operations are a high-return, high-risk coercive option. They may be regarded as a nonphysical form of warfare, thus as much hard power as P2C. Still, if skillfully targeted and calibrated, with collateral damage avoided, they could be very effective. The risks and costs of retaliation and escalation are considerable if the target country is a "cyber power," as China and Russia are. Iran is more susceptible to cyber coercion.
Recommendations
- The United States and its friends should redouble their efforts and refine their ability to monitor financial assets and flows, and when necessary effect the isolation of recalcitrant states and banks that might do business with them. The G7 (plus Switzerland) could endorse and enable the cooperation of its leading banks.
- The U.S. State Department and intelligence community should hone their capabilities to influence political developments in hostile states. But the United States should tread carefully and not assume that it can control the dynamics or result of political opposition.
- Offensive cyber operations may be the most powerful but also the riskiest P2C option. More work is needed on how to deal with the dangers of retaliation and escalation. It may be that U.S. reliance on computer systems and the vulnerabilities that stem from this reliance will make cyber operations a tool of coercion that the United States wishes to discourage, not use.
- The U.S. government ought to prepare for the use of coercive power as it does military warfare. This includes analysis of options, assessing requirements and capabilities, and conducting war games and other exercises to refine these capabilities.
- Just as authorities, lines of command and control, and support responsibilities are delineated for the use of hard power, so should they be for coercive power.
- Given the critical importance of allies to the effectiveness of P2C, consultations and joint planning should be conducted.
Comments
If one really rereads the RAND article it is apparent they feel that economic pressure in the form of sanctions etc....are enough to force a change in the thinking of say a China and or Russia...or an Iran.
But is it?.....If we look at the tight sanctions applied to Iran just how many years did they actually hold out and did they really cave on their agreement to the Iran Deal?...the same for Russia which estimates say their economy has taken a 600B USD hit since sanctions....with the actual sanctions related damage being really only an estimated 200B the rest is oil price drop related....
AND Russia certainly has not changed it aggressiveness for a single minute.
WHEN the US had the opportunity to actually test just how the disconnecting of a country in this case Russia from say SWIFT could be used to achieve results....SWIFT which is the economical nuclear stick....Obama and company blinked.
Again if you are not willing to match cyber and info war efforts with say the use of disconnecting SWIFT the concept P2C is just another grab bag of words with no meaning.
BTW...when the use of SWIFT was brought up as a potential Russian pressure point what was in fact the response by the Obama WH....they quietly allowed the approval of two Russians to join the SWIFT board thus effectively blocking any and all future threat of the use of SWIFT as a P2C possibility....
If a country is not willing to both use and "win" at cyber warfare and information warfare then do not even get into the fight....just take one's toys and go home.
Right now the US under the Obama WH is unwilling to use both...and thus they wonder why Russia just keeps on pushing.
One of the core failures of this administration has been it's strange reluctance to even define a strategic strategy on anything and that strategy must define exactly what a "win" must look like.
The Russian "Syrian reconciliation center" is randomly making stuff up and promulgating it; The US releases no information on anything...absolutely nothing just as they released nothing on the actual Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine....remember their word gymnastics with the word "incursion" vs. "invasion".
Remember that "information warfare" thing? This is why we lose.
The issue with terminology is somewhat troubling, but I could buy that P2C equates to means and coercive diplomacy equates to ways. The bigger issue IMO, is I didn’t see any new ideas in presented in this study. In fact, everything the authors suggest has been in play for decades. A more valuable study would focus on historical analysis of what has actually worked to compel desired behavior changes. Many countries can endure years of coercive diplomacy (Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc.). It is too often seen as a preferred course of action, even when it results in a humanitarian crisis as it did in Iraq post DESERT STORM that only serves to strengthen the regime we’re targeting, while undermining our reputation globally. How do we assess if these efforts are working? Is the effect to compel change, or convince the American people that we’re doing something? I can recall that this type of coercion worked when the U.S. used it against France and England when they put troops in the Middle East against our desires in the 1950s. The only other truly successful example that I recall championed by those promoting coercive diplomacy was South Africa. Is this form of coercive diplomacy more effective against democracies than autocracies? Are we once again falling into the trap of mirror analysis?