Small Wars Journal

The Children of the Left

Tue, 05/13/2008 - 6:06pm
The Children of the Left

By Geoffrey C. Lambert, Major General (Ret.), US Army

From the 1960's through the 1980's, those of us in the US Army Special Forces, along with our interagency partners, successfully stunted communist-sponsored insurgencies throughout Latin America. One of our prouder moments was in 1967, when Bolivian solders, trained, equipped and guided by Green Berets and the CIA, captured and killed Che Guevara.

From Guatemala to Chile, we taught our allies to defeat insurgency by destroying key nodes and personalities in insurgent networks, countering communist propaganda, developing internal security measures and population control, sharing intelligence with regional partners, and suppressing leftist movements.

The dictators we supported grasped our instruction and went into action with total freedom of action, unfettered by moral or legal limitations. As a result, counterinsurgency turned ugly as anti-communist zeal led to the imprisonment, torture or death of innocents among the thousands that perished in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and throughout the region. Sadly, it wasn't until the Carter Administration and the War in El Salvador that human rights became a cornerstone of U.S. counterinsurgency planning and execution.

Today, we see the Children of the Left, now adults, (whose parents were disenfranchised or worse) finding their voices in Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere. As a result, Latin America is increasingly drifting towards building new economic, diplomatic and military relationships, diminishing US influence in the region.

As we continue our struggle against radical Islamic terrorism, expanding the effort to our allies and coalition partners, we need to remember the Children of the Left. Our 20,000+ prisoners in Iraq, the death of innocent civilians, the loss of face of the many men now unemployed in a culture that values the man's role as bread-winner more that we can understand, and our status as occupiers and Crusaders collectively may result in conditions far worse than the situation in Latin America today.

As we begin our exit from Iraq and begin focusing on building host nation counterinsurgency capability in Iraq and other countries, analysis of long term implications of seeking only short-term gain may provide insight to allow us to match word and deed in the upcoming decades to minimize long-term blowback -- blowback from the Children of the Crusade.

During Unified Quest 09, The US Army Title 10 war game, there was discussion of the long term effects of the US counterinsurgency effort in Latin America, which led to this commentary.

Comments

I think the larger question posed by this post, Schmedlap, is the message sent when we get involved in the periphery, determined to find some good guys to fund, regardless of whether they're engaged in some pretty unsavory actions.

I do not believe that we should have refused to cut off <a href="http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2008/05/mccain-and-char.h… support for Jonsas Savimbi. Were we wrong to leave Lebanon after the bombing of the barracks there? Or were we wrong to get involved in the first place? (The Powell Doctrine once applied to this question).

I don't see why we should refuse to admit error, continuing to support questionable regimes for little benefit to ourselves or others.

Schmedlap (not verified)

Wed, 05/14/2008 - 1:15am

<I>"As we begin our exit from Iraq... analysis of long term implications of seeking only short-term gain may provide insight to allow us to match word and deed in the upcoming decades to minimize long-term blowback..."</I>

Indeed.
We urged the Shia to rise up against Saddam and did nothing to stop their brutal suppression. Why trust our guidance in the future?
We withdrew all support for the South Vietnamese, ensuring the madness that followed. Why trust us to maintain our assistance if the battle will be long and hard?
We withdrew from Somalia in response to casualties from one raid. Why be intimidated by US power when one good punch can drive it away?

What message will it send if we stand up an ISF and local security forces, provide them with a funding lifeline, and promise to stand by them to provide training, support, and reinforcement, and then withdraw that funding and leave the country because we do not want to reach the milestone of 5,000 Soldiers KIA?