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The Picture Awaits: The Birth of Modern Counterinsurgency - Anne Marlowe, World Affairs.
At the time of the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, counterinsurgency theory was about as popular in American military circles as tank warfare is today. An early study by the chief war planner for the 101st Airborne Division during its first deployment to Iraq reported "a collective cognitive dissonance on the part of the US Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people's war, even when they were fighting it." There was a reason for this. Eager to forget the most painful experience in its history, the army had all but banished counterinsurgency from the lexicon of American military affairs after Vietnam. As a result, the army relied on a flawed strategy in Iraq for a period that lasted, according to author Thomas Ricks, at least "twenty months or more.
As US Army Colonel Gian Gentile has summarized this line of argument, there was a "bad war" in Iraq fought by officers who ignored the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, followed by a "good war" fought by its champions. In Vietnam, however, even the "bad" war was fought by commanders deeply versed in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of counterinsurgency (COIN)—much more, in any case, than their counterparts were on September 11, 2001. The United States may have gone, in James Fallows's memorable phrase, "Blind into Baghdad." It did not march blindly into Vietnam. On the contrary, counterinsurgency theory enjoyed a special vogue in the 1960s: it was certainly more fashionable and better understood by an educated public than it is today. Especially among military officers, COIN was more roundly known during this era than at any time up until the release of Field Manual 3-24 in December 2006...