Small Wars Journal

SWJ SNQ # 4

Sat, 08/07/2010 - 9:22pm
Here's the fourth edition of Small Wars Journal's Saturday Night Quote (SWJ SNQ). Kudos to Colonel Phil Ridderhof. In the commentary section of SWJ Blog entry Marine Corps says, 'Damn the G-RAMM, full speed ahead!' Col Ridderhof had this to say:

"I think one of the hardest nuts to crack is that we have traditionally depended on suppressive fires to enable our maneuver. Will we have the ability to conduct suppression on suspected adversary positions, or will ROE demand clearly identifiable targets? Against a foe using a Hizbollah style defense, suppression would be the best way to get dispersed maneuver forces close enough to uncover the small enemy elements, especially those that will use the population as cover. Absent active suppression, we have to "lead with our chin" and allow them the first shot (basically an ambush) before going in. If the adversary has the advantage of choosing to initiate combat, it will be tough going, especially during initial assault/insertion phases. This is especially true if he is armed with a fair number of simple G-RAMMs, or coastal anti-ship missiles."

Comments

Robert Haddick (not verified)

Mon, 08/09/2010 - 5:01pm

Phil,

Kelly and Brennan wrote an excellent report - I recommend reading it.

In their report, the authors note the failure of overhead ISR during the Kosovo, Anaconda, and Lebanon 2006 battles. They conclude. "On this basis, the problem of the distributed
defence is unlikely to be resolved by simply investing more in stand-off surveillance or
reconnaissance. The challenge is a tactical, rather than a technical one."

The battle for Sadr City in 2008 presents a contrasting case. I heard a presentation on this engagement delivered by Gen Petraeus. By Petraeus's account, overhead ISR (combined with all other battlefield intel techniques) was very effective in unlocking the enemy's order of battle and identifying targets for direct and indirect fire.

Sadr City 2008 was the type of most-challenging scenario Kelly and Brennan described, yet the U.S. was able to prevail. Why? ISR quantity (contra the authors) helped. Tactical patience was a virtue. And ground assets - agents, recon, and snipers - were a part of the effort.

My point? Analysts examining the potential of distributed ops in the offense should study Sadr City 2008.

Service Space Professional, I'm all for cheaper, smaller and better PGMs. However, I don't think this really solves the problem. A better PGM allows you to hit what you are aiming at. However, it doesn't improve capability in finding and correctly identifying targets in the first place. On todays battlefield, while technical improvements in ISR and analysis are great, the challenge is the adversary hiding with small, yet capable, G-RAMM in urban/complex and populated terrain. Any approach that singularly relies on finding/identifying these weapons, then attacking them from a distance (ISR +strike) will not succeed. It will be necessary to place maneuver forces in harms way to "flush them out." I think that the best bet is in dispersed/distributed operations concepts. While the US Marine Corps has advanced distributed concepts for a few years, one of the best descriptions I have found is in this Australian Land Warfare Studies Working Paper "Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics" by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan (2009): http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/WP134.asp.

I think the future amphibious "assault" will have to lead with dispersed maneuver units in order to find and flush small enemy forces to create a generally cleared area for at sea and air forces to more safely move in and support larger landing forces. The key of dispersal, however, is understanding that 1) you will lose some of these units and 2) the challenge will be being able to concentrate/re-disperse rapidly enough to beat the threat and to ensure some organic protection and fires capabilities (measured in survival time versus a certain-sized threat) for these smaller units in case the "network" fails them.

opsupporter

Sun, 08/08/2010 - 12:56am

This is a excellent example of the future importance of precision guided munitions in the smallest of calibers. GPS guidance (or some other system) packages must be a part of any developmental fires program. Increasing the accuracy of ammunition in the UBL generates economies of scale that will reduce the logistics requirements and enable commanders to fire for effect with the first round. Recent discussions by Senior Leaders lead us to believe the cost of these systems is prohibitive. IMHO, PGMs are not as expensive as forcing an Infantryman to "lead with his chin."

See your nearest Service Space Professional for details on this highly successful capability.