Small Wars Journal

Small Wars vs Big Wars

Mon, 02/02/2009 - 12:48am
Erin Simpson, at Abu Muqawama, has more on Tom Ricks's WaPo piece.

... I think we've systematically underestimated the impact of our flat-footedness in confronting a variety of irregular threats. This goes back at least to the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut and runs through Mogadishu, Nairobi, the USS Cole, to the Trade Towers. MajGen Taylor is concerned that we might not be able to deter nations states in the future. I think we should be concerned that we have already demonstrated inability to deter non-state actors. In fact, we have provided the opposite: a clear and compelling invitation to attack us in an irregular manner. And perhaps when these efforts focused on mere embassies and barracks, you could say that these were tragic, but isolated attacks that could be dealt with locally or tactically (ie, force protection, local counter-terrorism, etc.).

But we now know that's utter folly. These aren't Lilliuputian pin-pricks. We now know that our stumbling in Lebanon and clumsiness in Somalia provided very clear lessons learned to al Qaeda and their fellow travelers... Our ham-fistedness not only failed to deter our enemies, but provided them with a clear strategy for confronting us. Today we are experiencing the long-term, strategic effects of our myopia.

Like the general, I am unsure of the nature of all our future threats. And like the general, I worry that focusing on COIN could leave us somewhat more vulnerable to conventional attack. I just wish the general would worry more about the impact of our already demonstrated vulnerability to irregular assaults.

Small Wars vs Big Wars

Comments

Ken White

Tue, 02/03/2009 - 4:28pm

You're correct and I certainly misstated.

What the dummy (me) really meant was: "All that not withstanding, you seem to apportion excessive blame to the Intel community even though you acknowledge their flaws were caused by other factors. They were only part of the problem..."

Sorry for the shorthand...

zenpundit

Tue, 02/03/2009 - 2:39pm

Ken White wrote:

<b>"All that not withstanding, you seem to apportion blame to the Intel community even if any errors were the fault of others. Don't think so."</b>

Que?

I wrote:

<b>"The blame lies with the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations that placed very stringent restrictions on the CIA..."</b>

Where am I blaming the IC ? Or giving anybody in a political position pass ? Was your comment directed at somebody else?

As I read your post otherwise Ken we seem to be in general agreement

Ken White

Tue, 02/03/2009 - 1:44am

Having served in Iran while the Shah was still around, I acknowledge that Ford did that; Nixon did not in totality though he did mumble about it. What Nixon / Schlesinger and Carter / Turner did was emasculate the DO for their own reasons and with the aid of the Rockefeller and Church fiascos. That's the Agency's problem. DIA's problem in that time period was that it was feeling its way.

I can assure you that in 1969-70, the CIA <b><i>station</b></i> in Iran dealt mostly with SAVAK. I can also assure you that other people in Iran dealt with a host of unsavory characters and organizations not allied with the Shah or SAVAK and sent home worthwhile product.

Our 'analysis' of the Iranian Revolution was ignored by the WH which had another agenda.

All that not withstanding, you seem to apportion blame to the Intel community even if any errors were the fault of others. Don't think so.

You also talk purely of Iran; Lebanon did not significantly involve Iran at the time of the Marine Barracks and Embassy bombings, the WTC bombing crowd were multi national in origin and were highly unlikely to have had any Iranian links, Mogadishu was a Clinton screwup and the bombings (including Khobar Towers IMO) are unlikely to have much if any Iranian involvement.

You are giving Carter, Reagan, Bush 43 and Clinton -- the deciders -- and their respective National Security adviser all a pass and you are giving DoD and the JCS /CJCS (respectively before and after Goldwater Nichols) a pass. We don't know -- but I highly doubt they're blame free in failure to properly <u>respond</u> to the provocations.

Note the word respond...

zenpundit

Tue, 02/03/2009 - 12:44am

Ken wrote:

<b>"My question is: Who is at fault there? Did the Intel community fail to properly analyze those probes -- for, practically speaking, that's what they were; classic Middle Eastern warfare -- probe until a weak spot is found then build the pressure. So, did the Intel guys and gals get it wrong"</b>

The blame lies with the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations that placed very stringent restrictions on the CIA ( presumably the DIA as well) in regard to Iranian affairs at the behest of the Shah. Essentially, our IC was forbidden to have contacts with any Iranians, inside Iran or out, who were not SAVAK.

How that specifically effected our analysis of the Iranian Revolution I have never researched but logic indicates that it could hardly have helped matters.

Ken W., agree with your last, and no the politicians clearly have not learned that there are unknowables in the future, and we must have a robust conventional capability in addition to COIN knowledge. They have not learned the lesson that reckless, deep defense cuts result in unacceptable long-term security vulnerabilities. They seem to think even in the midst of two wars, and growing requirements for a larger force, DoD can do it all with 10 to 25% budget cuts. In a time of $900 billion dollar spending increases elsewhere throughout government, DoD isn't the place to look for savings.

Ken White

Mon, 02/02/2009 - 1:54am

Erin says<blockquote>"...I think we've systematically underestimated the impact of our flat-footedness in confronting a variety of irregular threats. This goes back at least to the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut and runs through Mogadishu, Nairobi, the USS Cole, to the Trade Towers."</blockquote>Couldn't agree more and I'd add, more dangerously, we also significantly under responded. Further, I'd add the Embassy seizure in Tehran and say that we had 22 years under four Administrations of failure to properly read the Middle East.

My question is: Who is at fault there? Did the Intel community fail to properly analyze those probes -- for, practically speaking, that's what they were; classic Middle Eastern warfare -- probe until a weak spot is found then build the pressure. So, did the Intel guys and gals get it wrong? Did the Policy makers fail to react to the intel? Did DoD -- as some say -- do everything in its power to avoid any commitment of forces that might even hint at becoming decisively engaged or a potential embarrassment, in part because full spectrum capability had been deliberately disavowed?

I truly do not know the answer to those questions -- but with long experience in the green world, my strong suspicion is that all of them are partly correct and that they intertwine in odd ways. What I do know is that, thus no <b>one</b> is responsible for the shortfalls and failure to respond before 2001 and 2003.

Erin's later statement:<blockquote>"Our ham-fistedness not only failed to deter our enemies, but provided them with a clear strategy for confronting us. Today we are experiencing the long-term, strategic effects of our myopia."</blockquote>is also correct.

I suggest that a part of that myopia again goes back to 1979. Among other lessons then learned, it was quite obvious that we needed a long range covert insertion capability and stronger SOF DA elements. We did part of that but lacked the political will to do it right. That lack of political will played a large part in our tepid responses to attacks on our interests emanating from the Middle East.

We also learned we were becoming unduly bureaucratic, inflexible and risk averse and yet no political or military will was exerted to reduce the pernicious effects of that creeping sclerotic malaise.

Long way of getting to the point. No one can accurately predict what the future threats will be. We do know that an existential threat from a peer competitor -- or a group of near peers -- can be fatal. We do know from Korea, Viet Nam and today that losses or inconclusive results in several small wars are probably not fatal. We should know that to fail to properly respond -- by that I mean with disproportionate effect in our favor -- to probes is an incitement to further attacks.

We also should know that a force trained for HIC can downshift to do COIN and that a COIN trained force can upshift to do HIC -- but it will probably take longer and more effort to upshift than to down shift. I use those directions purposely because COIN is easier than HIC -- it is tedious, dirty, and can be psychologically and behaviorally more challenging but technically, it is easier. The upshift involves shedding adherence to restrictive ROE and the stasis of COIN to far less restrictive ROE and mobile warfare -- that takes training time while the down shift from HIC to COIN only requires strong leadership.

We must be able to do both HIC and COIN and all between. We did years ago train (and fairly successfully) to do that. We can do so again. The lesson of trying to avoid the tedious, dirty COIN fight by having a Doctrine that tries to steer us away from it did some damage, no question. I think DoD, particularly the Army and Marines, now know better and we have significantly improved SOF capability and our training, everything points to doing total spectrum.

So -- it seems the purple machine has learned Erin's lesson <i><b>and</b></i> heeded General Taylor's warning. I wonder if the Intel Community and, more importantly, the Politicians have...