What follows are several examples (many more can be found in the SWJ Reference Library) recently received by the SWJ to include papers written by students at the Marine Corps University, Naval Post Graduate School and Kings College in London. The last paper was submitted by a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel now working irregular warfare issues for the US Department of Defense.
Other works posted or linked to in the SWJ library include papers by students and faculty at the National Defense University, Army War College, Marine Corps War College, Air War College, Army Command and General Staff College, Army School of Advanced Military Studies and the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfare.
At the SWJ there is a standing 'call for papers' -- especially from students at our Professional Military Education institutions.
Enough said, on to our recent acquisitions...
Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept (CACC): A Proposed Framework for Future Counterinsurgency Operations -- US Marine Corps Command and Staff College Master of Military Studies thesis by Major Daniel Greenwood, USMC.
As recent events in Iraq portend, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will increasingly diverge from conventional warfare. Terrorists dispersed throughout the world will continue refining and employing guerilla tactics using civilian populations as their base of operations. This transnational enemy, maximizing modern technology, weaponry, and media, is highly indiscernible, imbedded in the local culture from which it operates. It is proficient at undermining the interests and credibility of the United States on all levels. It is questionable that conventional military doctrine, tactics, and weaponry can achieve decisive results against this evolving threat. This problem requires a new operational concept of counterinsurgency designed to connect tactical level success with the achievement of strategic objectives. Several historical precedents including the Combined Action Program (CAP) and Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) of Vietnam, the recent CAP application in Iraq, and Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, provide a starting point for innovative adaptation to an insurgent enemy threat. However, they do not reflect the holistic approach required of such a complex operating environment. This study analyzes the characteristics of modern insurgency and historical counterinsurgency methods to propose an adaptable Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept (CACC) to provide a conceptual framework for the problem of insurgency. This concept is designed to generate thought, development, experimentation, and training on the execution of COIN operations...
Reexamining the Operational Relevance of Chapter IV -- Small Wars Manual 1940 - US Marine Corps Command and Staff College Master of Military Studies thesis by Major Adam Strickland, USMC.
The purpose of this document is to expand upon the basic tenets of small wars training as originally detailed in Chapter IV of the Small Wars Manual, in order to provide an additional and updated guide to the current conduct and design of small wars training. Above all, this document seeks to provide Marines with a new way of thinking about preparing for and executing irregular warfare, and a framework for clear and rapid analysis that will generate tempo and temporal advantage. All training for small wars must begin with a solid understanding of maneuver warfare as articulated in MCDP 1- Warfighting. Small wars demand that we infuse subordinates with the ability to rapidly maneuver temporally by enabling them to use initiative to make decisions faster than adversaries. Due to our continued emphasis on temporal maneuver, influence operations, and ability to achieve asymmetric effects, we must include psychological training as an essential component of small wars instruction. Cultural training and planning should attempt to identify ways to use the three most common forces of popular influence in a culturally specific context: nationalism and national policies, religion and customs, and material well-being and progress. All training evolutions should begin with a review or discussion of the commander's intent, followed by an operational center of gravity analysis. In small wars, intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination are arguably the most essential tasks...
Progressive Reconstruction: A Methodology for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations -- Naval Postgraduate School thesis by Major Karl Rohr, USMC.
The intent of the author is to establish a methodology for future forcible interventions in the affairs of failed, failing or rogue and terrorist sponsoring states in order to stabilize and democratize these nations in accordance with stated United States goals. The argument follows closely current and developing United States military doctrine on stabilization, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations. Further the author reviews several past interventions from 1844 to the present. Conducting a survey of colonial, imperialist as well as pre and post WWII, Cold War, post Cold War and post September 11th interventions to determine the techniques and procedures that proved most successful, the author proposes a program of intervention and reconstruction called Progressive Reconstruction that incorporates many of the successful activities of these past and present doctrines. The cornerstone of the methodology is the combination of rapid decisive combat and stabilization operations leading to a series of governmental transitions from foreign direct and indirect to indigenous independent rule...
Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from Malaya 1948-1960 -- Journal of Strategic Studies (link) by David Ucko, Department of War Studies, King's College London.
This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of 'Distributed Operations' (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralized units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralized small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the 'Long War'...
The Basics of Counterinsurgency -- Lieutenant Colonel Scott Moore, USMC (ret.).
This study examines the basic characteristics of insurgencies and counterinsurgency campaigns conducted over the past century, striping away many of the prevailing assumptions. Based on detailed analysis of nearly sixty counterinsurgency campaigns, successful and unsuccessful, as well as the lessons learned by American and Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001, the conclusions offer a historically grounded framework for thinking about counterinsurgency. While every conflict exhibited its own unique causes and conditions requiring tailored solutions, as a whole the many counterinsurgency campaigns exhibited fundamental characteristics that remained constant. If there were no immutable laws or empirical formulas for counterinsurgency, there existed certain basic principles and traits that marked and will continue to mark successful, and unsuccessful, outcomes...