Public Affairs and Information Operations

Sorting out printer problems, but in the meantime...this seems to particularly demonstrate a point that's important and very relevant to this thread:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/mumbai_handlers_in_p.php

The exchange shows they planned and executed the attack for maximum media coverage, ordered the murder of hostages, and cheered after the murders were carried out.

"Brother Abdul. The media is comparing your action to 9/11," one unidentified handler said. "One senior police official has been killed," referring to the chief of the Anti-Terrorism Squad killed in an earlier gunfight.

"We are on the10th/11th floor," Abdul Rehman responded. "We have five hostages."

"Everything is being recorded by the media," the handler identified as Kafa told Rehman. "Inflict the maximum damage. Keep fighting. Dont be taken alive."

"Kill all hostages, except the two Muslims," the other handler told Rehman and Fahadullah. "Keep your phone switched on so that we can hear the gunfire."

"We have three foreigners, including women," Fahadullah said. "From Singapore and China."

"Kill them," the handler said.

Jack, those are great links! Thanks. I think most of us (I know I certainly do) recognize the monumental scale and difficulty in gathering the reports via the process you describe. For doing so, I myself think the DoD PubAff people-particularly those in the field, but all the way up the CoC as far as I can tell-deserve great credit and thanks (greater than what is given currently).

I'll be checking out the links later today.

Thanks again,
Scott

Rats, screwed up another link. Here is the communication model if you're interested: http://www.worldtrans.org/TP/TP1/TP1-17.HTML

V3. These are the things within our control.

VELOCITY: Reporting events, distributing information, responding to queries in a timely manner. See the Principles of Information, JP 3-61: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_61.pdf
Different information has different inherent velocity as well as the speed at which an organization can respond. This is different than the speed of the VECTOR described below. This is the factor of the event in Afghanistan that got this whole discussion started.

VOLUME: A2= Amplitude and Amplification. Amplitude is the amount of information available to the publics and amplification is how loud it is. Usually greater amplitude requires less amplification; but this factor is situationally dependent. Environmental noise, distance, and a common understanding are factors. (Remember the basic communication model: Sender, Reciever, Channel, http://www.worldtrans.org/TP/TP1/TP1-17.HTML)

VECTOR: The channels available to reach the active and affected publics along with the speed of the channel (differentiated from the speed of the information above), the connections, the distance,the authority, etc.

Balancing V3 is the job of the tactician. Optimal balance is an averaging equation as communication is a dynamic endeavor. The tactician strives to decrease the our OODA Loop in order to shorten our communication loop to be inside our adversary's OODA and Communicaton loops.

Using Afghanistan as the example:
The VELOCITY of the communication is hindered by the VOLUME and VECTORS. Amplification of the communication is irrelevent (even though distance can sometimes be overcome by amplification) because there is not ample information available to the affected public in their environment (the Afghans). The amplitude is difficult to increase as there are few connections due to the lack of VECTORS. The only truly effective VECTOR in Afghanistan currently is through the Mullahs. They are the authoritative VECTOR via authority granted them by the affected public through their acceptance. The people believe and trust them.

This is no simple task.

(that last post of mine got jumbled somehow. The part about "If they did then their lies would at least hold far less legitimacy. Conversely, those members of Congress and the WH who DID send reps, and then made claims referencing DoD information would have more weight to their comments." Should be at the nd of the paragraph talking about the briefing room w 537seats for Congressional reps PLUS seats for the press in the back and sides.
-Sorry,
Scott

(again, I blame the coffee, and no...it's not high octane)

Schmedlap, I totally agree that the truth CAN be subjective, but I also think that more often than not, it is simply not-for example...

Going back to the Newsweek/flushed Koran story. It was BS. The DoD checked it out, and presented that fact. The problem imo is that the story became propaganda then, and the truth was not equally amplified, spread, disseminated, adequately-presented-to-counter-the-propaganda.

A specific counterpropaganda effort isn't really necessary if the clear truths that are out there are put out with equal or greater volume.

Here's another example (as if we don't all have an infinite number of these)...

BUSH LIED

President Bush didn't lie or 'deliberately mislead' the intel on Saddam's Iraq, and I can EASILY post links to a dozen independent, international, bi-partisan, and/or independent investigations confirming this. Even the claims that the intel was distorted by the OSP have been investigated (even investigated by the DoD's Insp Gen), and no lie or deliberate exaggeration or deliberate falsehoods were uncovered. Intel failures were the result of low quality/low quantity pre-war intel and a post-911 intel mindset. Yet, people still believe the BUSH LIED crap. Seriously, check a poll of the American people and see how many think Bush Lied/how many have been heard lies louder than truth?

Even our politicians still spew it. Why? They can, and they don't know better (they hear lies that are louder than the truth). The Wash Post revealed (quietly-pg 8 kinda stuff; low volume) that only a handful of the people in Congress ever signed in to read the classified pre-war intel briefings.

These people are presenting disinformation and misinformation based on their lack of information, and the DoD UnderSec of Def for PubAff has an obligation to inform Congress. They were not, and they still are not. DoD truth products/stories etc are available-perhaps even sent, but they are clearly ignored. As recent as last Sunday (72hrs ago) Sen Harry Reid was on MTP making BS claims that-if he had been adequately informed by the DoD-he could never make.

Now, Reid and others are playing politics, and the DoD can't/AND SHOULD NOT. However, the DoD is tasked with informing the public, Congress, and the media. Doing so does counter some politicians misinformation, disinformation, etc (for example Sen Durbin's claims that Gitmo is a gulag). If the truth is presented in greater volume; equal vigor, then people would not lie as much. If they did then their lies would at least hold far less legitimacy. Conversely, those members of Congress and the WH who DID send reps, and then made claims referencing DoD information would have more weight to their comments.

Here's an idea:
Wouldn't it be nice if the daily DoD briefings weren't held in a tiny little room used for the same briefings in peacetime? Wouldn't it be nice if they were held in a room where the press was in the back and sides, and 537 seats with names on them were put in the front and middle? The press would immediately know which members of Congress were sending reps to the briefings, and who was not. This would encourage members of Congress and the WH to get the truth from the DoD rather than just make stuff up.

Talk about an easy way to make sure the Congress was informed (this accomplishes all 3 DoD UnderSec Pub Aff objectives re informing the public, Congress, and media).

I've lots more ideas on how presenting truth can be done in greater volume so as to inform the:
public
Congress
and media

More importantly by extension, default, etc...louder presentation of truth would counter propaganda (ie disinformation, misinformation, falsehoods, lies, exaggerations, embarrassments, all aimed at degrading the legitimacy of American war effort and/or increasing the legitimacy of the enemy's cause and narrative; narrative being a word from the COIN manual).

(sorry for the lengthy post guys. I blame the coffee. FORGIVE ME!!!!!!

Excellent discussion. Now I posit this concept:
The tactician is the PAO, the IO officer, anyone entrusted with identifying channels and opportunities to engage important publics. The weapon system is the leader's communication, vision, and engagement coupled with the communication of the audience (which is part of the weapon system) in public debate. The delivery system is the public debate, (publics = the audience which includes service members, target area citizens, allied country citizens, domestic citizens in public debate), the traditional media, the new media, word-of-mouth, etc. The target is the adversary's ideology; what is his argument?

I'll use Adm. Thad Allen, USCG as an example. He blogs, usually daily, sometimes twice a day. His staff, the U.S. Coast Guard, and any interested publics can access his blog at any time and read what he's doing, his vision, what he's thinking about. That guides their thinking and how they think about the U.S. Coast Guard. He sees his leadership as a responsibility to the USCG and to the public. His communication effects these individual publics in ways that are important to them specifically. EX: his staff now knows what he is focusing on and can adjust their daily workflow to support his vision. The U.S. taxpayer sees how he thinks the USCG should be spending their money. All members of the USCG now have a clearer picture of what the Admiral expects of them. Allies know what to expect of visits not only by Adm. Allen but by anyone of authority of the USCG. And now adversaries have to work harder to justify their actions in conflict with the mission of the USCG.

It is the exercise of LEADERSHIP that provides guidance for the troops, comfort for the public, accountability to the government, and warning to the adversary.

The guy with the satellite dish in Paraguay IS a combatant base on his ability to engage the public debate. His effectiveness is dependent upon his credibility, authority, and ability to engage.

<I>"In propaganda, with today's Global Information Environment, there are no non-combatants..."</I>

I can see how that conclusion can be drawn, but it seems to be stretching the theory beyond its usefulness. Some guy with a satelite dish in Paraguay is still a non-combatant in regard to our conflict in Afghanistan, even if he receives the propaganda.

<I>"I still say that getting equal or greater dissemination of DoD truth products (stories, vids, web, media etc) serves as counterpropaganda by default..."</I>

But what is truth? For something so subjectively interpreted by the array of target audiences that will receive the message, by design or not, the word "default" suggests a degree of simplicity that simply isn't there. Even something that is objectively true and can be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt to the targeted individual can nevertheless be rejected outright. Here's a domestic example: "I voted for the bill before I voted against it." That paraphrased John Kerry quote was accurate. But it was deemed so absurd that the Bush campaign ensured it's widest possible disemination. By responding to an allegation with truth, Kerry handed a propaganda windfall to his opponent because that truth conveyed other undesirable things about his character to the target audience. If counterbattery fire is shot straight up in the air and it drops back down on your own position, is it really counterbattery fire?

For purposes of Jack's point and discussion, I think I'd take his four points re counterpropaganda and define things like this:

PROPAGANDA
tactician=insurgents
a weapon=stories
a delivery system=media; oral, written, shown in pics, video, radio, tv, web
a target=Army COIN manual describes this as HN govt, HN population, HN neighboring nations govt and populations, govt and nations in HN region, global audience, and I would add American govt and population in particular.

COUNTERPROPAGANDA
tactician=there is no one. Unorganized media entities=Congress, and people
a weapon=truth
a delivery system=media; oral, written, shown in pics, video, radio, tv, web
a target=different "tacticians" have different targets, but by and large the target remains a civilian population in one way or another

I still say that getting equal or greater dissemination of DoD truth products (stories, vids, web, media etc) serves as counterpropaganda by default, and (again, if done w equal or greater dissemination than that of any and all misinformation, disinformation, etc) reduces the need for a specific "counterpropaganda" effort to deeds (as described in Army COIN manual) rather than words, etc.

Jack, I have to say the audience is the target, AND the audience/population is a "weapon" in and of itself. If war is one nation (not necessarily nation-state) imposing its political will upon another nation and/or nation-state, then the audience to which propaganda is aimed is the target nation. That target nation's population can serve as a 'weapon system' all by itself w or without arms, and so deserves its own characterization imo.

I feel there's an obvious need and desire to make a clear distinction between enemy propaganda and non-enemy political discourse.

However, if that non-enemy political discourse is based on falsehood, misinformation, disinformation, inaccuracies, or specifically from enemy propaganda, then (by definition of the UnderSec Def PubAff listed above) there has been a DoD failure to inform accurately the (listed in order of importance and in order of the UnderSec charges):
PUBLIC
Congress
and media

Merely ensuring that (for purposes here, call it "accidental propaganda") ACCIDENTAL PROPAGANDA is at least presented in parallel to truth would reduce the propaganda ability of the enemy. For example, when Newsweek ran the story about the Koran being flushed at GITMO, the DoD countered that immediately and accurately, but the truth researched and presented by the DoD was not equally disseminated, and as a result the enemy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world (true to the description in the COIN manual I often cite) used a false report to further the legitimacy of their cause and degrade the legitimacy of the COIN cause. This story is STILL cited by people around the world, and here in the US because it was not spread w the equal or greater volume as the original, false story.

Would countering that story w the truth spread in greater or equal volume have been countering propaganda? In the end, yes, but more directly, the inability and failure to counter the story w equal or greater volume using the truth is still (irregardless of whether it was intended as counterpropaganda)...still a primary, secondary, and tertiary requirement of the DoD UnderSec Def PubAff to, "...defense department information to the public, the Congress and the media." If that much were done, then countering subsequent propaganda would haven accomplished by default.

I can literally cite and source HUNDREDS-perhaps even thousands more examples of truthful DoD information being overshadowed by misinformation and subsequently being turned into propaganda by America's enemies.

I can also think of at least 3 different ways to counter this.

I think I screwed up my link to Webster's so here it is in plain text: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Propaganda

Ok, so let's look at the <a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Propaganda/"&gt; Webster's Definition</a>. All three definitions have the basic understanding of propogating a belief, position, or viewpoint. Inherent in the word is the innate concept of combat. It is a word that describes a tactic, just as the word "terrorism" describes a tactic. Therefore, "counterpropaganda" is the countering tactic.

Bear with me, here ... we're all saying the same thing differently. I just want to see if we can bring it into focus and understanding.

For a tactic to be effective there must be a tactician, a weapon, a delivery system, and a target.

In propaganda, with today's Global Information Environment, there are no non-combatants there are only the four elements mentioned above.

So my next question, is the audience a target or part of the weapon system?

What is propaganda?

Information targeted at non-friendly and non-adversaries.

Morale-boosting message for your own Soldiers - generally not propaganda.

Disinformation targeting your adversary - generally not propaganda.

A subtle message, spoken or unspoken, that reinforces the population's belief that your adversary mistreats the women and the peasants - usually propaganda.

("stories" can be told via photos, video, radio, tv, web, even word of mouth for the purposes of my point above)

The vast scale of means and ends for which "propaganda" is/are used makes this a challenge, but I understand the need to define. Reminds me of "pornography" as a legal term-ya know what it is when you see it.

At its essence, (using only the US Army COIN manual, and not the library of other sources and descriptions), I would say that "propaganda" as we're talking about it is a variable-not a constant. It is a story either based in truth or in fact.

When it comes from those opposing operations in support of an HN, it is designed to: (1-12) "... attract high-profile media coverage or local publicity and inflate perceptions of insurgent capabilities. Resulting stories often include insurgent fabrications designed to undermine the governments legitimacy."

When it comes from COIN (1-13):
"Insurgents have an additional advantage in shaping the information environment. Counterinsurgents seeking to preserve legitimacy must stick to the truth and make sure that words are backed up by deeds; insurgents, on the other hand, can make exorbitant promises and point out government shortcomings, many caused or aggravated by the insurgency. "

There are PLENTY of very well-written reports on what "propaganda" is as defined by what it seeks to do.

Ultimately, bare bones, imo it's an enemy effort to impose political will by spreading stories which boost the legitimacy of their cause and/or degrade or destroy the legitimacy of American objectives.

We could say (and too many do) that one man's truth is another man's propaganda and vice versa. Similarly, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter (so says the terrorist). Or one person's pornography is another person's art. The word is big, and on its face perspective driven.

Often in politics, the media, etc., it's said that perception is reality.

Understanding "propaganda" as above (and as listed in the links on this thread), I still have to believe that counterpropaganda is stories that are truthful and degrade the legitimacy of the enemy's claims and subsequently their objectives.

How does Public Affairs describe "propaganda" and "counterpropaganda"?

Understood, Scott, and very good points. But it still doesn't answer the question: "What is 'counterpropaganda'?"

We need to change the way we're thinking of the problem. I'm looking to define terms so as to properly define our understanding of the problem.

A more expansive definition or perception of "propaganda" might be found here:
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/07autumn/murphy.pdf

"United States must fight using propaganda but faces internal criticism and backlash whenever it does, allows for an information environment that favors an adversary bent on exploitation with his own strategic propaganda. The historical use of information as power was primarily limited to nation-states. Today a blogger can impact an election, an Internet posting can recruit a terrorist, and an audiotape can incite fear in the strongest of nation-states, all with little capital investment and certainly without the baggage of bureaucratic rules, national values (truthful messaging), or oversight. Propaganda is the weapon of the insurgent franchised cell. It costs little, is easy to distribute, and has near-immediate worldwide impact. The improvised explosive devices that have killed and maimed so many US troops in Iraq are propaganda weapons. They are manned by two insurgents: the detonator and the videographer. Their impact is not the tactical kinetic victory but the strategic propaganda victory."
...
"Conclusion
The National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication is a positive step in permitting theUnited States to compete against propaganda and proactively tell its story. Defeating an enemy whose center of gravity is extremist ideology requires nothing less than an all-out effort in this regard."

For more:
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf

There is a VERY clear need for countering propaganda
There are multiple mandates for countering propaganda (DoD, DoS, NTC, even White House)
There is no shortage of counterpropanda matl (truth) prepared by DoD PubAff and others, BUT

..but But BUT

The delivery of counterpropaganda (truth) is not effective enough, and better, newer, stronger means of delivery are mandated, needed, but not being created.

I'm thinking more technically. We've been talking about "propaganda" and "counterpropaganda" as objects in and of themselves. "Truth" is a counter to "false" or "lies" not to "propaganda."

So what is "counterpropaganda?"

I've gotta say that "counterpropaganda" is truth.

As I mentioned in the very beginning of this discussion, we're dealing with semantics and perceptions. So, let's back up a minute.

Can we define "counterpropaganda?" Once defined then we have a basis for building a process around it.

I've been stuck on the question of PubAff as part of COIN for the past few weeks/months; ever since I read the US Army Counterinsurgency Manual (a GREAT read btw!!!!).

The manual repeats time and time again that enemy propaganda must be countered not by lies, distortions, falsehoods, exaggerations, or other inaccurate "propaganda." Rather, the manual instead says that insurgent propaganda (misinformation, disinformation, lies, etc) should be countered with the truth, and with positive acts (reconstruction, etc).

My perception (right or wrong) is that the DoD PubAff is not directly responsible for delivering or attacking enemy propaganda, but rather IS responsible for providing the ammunition-the truth-for doing so. The delivery system by which the truth is sent to counter enemy disinformation, misinformation, etc should work w PubAff, but be a seperate entity. This review describes that entity as a "geek battalion" http://comops.org/article/119.pdf

Now, having said all that, let's look back at Jack's comment:
JP 3-61, Chapt. 1, sub sec 2, pg I-3:

2. Mission
The mission of joint public affairs is to support the JFC[Joint Forces Commander] by communicating truthful and factual unclassified information about Department of Defense (DOD) activities to US, allied, national, international, and internal audiences.

....that's a lotta audiences. I submit that the UnderSec of Pub Affairs mission is even more specific:
"Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) follows the Secretary's Principles of Information in providing defense department information to the public, the Congress and the media."

NOTE THE ORDER of the audiences' importance:
PUBLIC
Congress
Media

Then we have to ask, 'Is the American public, Congress, and the media getting the truth that the PubAff produces?'

By extension:
What percent of the American public still believes "Bush Lied" or other conspiracy theories about Iraq, or 911, or Afghanistan?
What in God's name were members of Congress reading (or not more accurately reading) when-for example-Sen Dick Durbin called Gitmo a Gulag?
Do members of the American and world media report accurately on the GWOT (ask a vet returning from Iraq, and I'll bet most say the media is not).

In the end, I submit that the DoD PubAff does a great job producing ammo for counting disinformation, misinformation, "propaganda," etc., but that the problem rests w delivering that information. As final proof, I'd say that there are 40,000 stories of heroism in the GWOT from 40,000 casualties, and rather than report those 40,000 stories or the millions from veterans...the public, the Congress, and the media still believe enemy propaganda, and spread misinformation, disinformation, and "propaganda."

Cannoneer wrote: <I>"With whom does responsibility for counterpropaganda lie?"</I>
If it is counterpropaganda within Iraq or Afghanistan, then it lies with those commands. If elsewhere, it is not with those commands. That doesn't mean they ignore it, but they don't have the lead on combating it.

<I>"With whom does responsibility for assuring the domestic TA that the counterprop mission is being competently performed lie?"</I>
I don't know. Strategic communications? I know it is not appropriate for the MNF-I commander.

Ramadi - I don't think that we need to sell anyone an idea in order to get them to, in Dave's words, "do what is essential to our mission / campaign." We can accept their current interests, intentions, and motivations and adapt to them with incentives and rewards. I don't think that Iraqis who joined local security forces were sold an idea. They finally got an offer that suited their existing interests. If the girl at the bar has no interest in me at first, but suddenly is enamored of me because I tell her that I'm a movie producer, then I have not sold her an idea. She has not decided that goofy-looking dufus's are attractive. She is simply responding to the expected social and financial incentives and rewards for partaking in my mojo. (I just watched Austin Powers last night).

I also want to say that you guys are all such a breath of fresh air. If more people in this fight thought as clearly as everyone of you in this thread, I'd be getting ready to watch the playoffs at home right now, instead of kicking Afghan snow off my boots, talking to my computer about IO, of all God-forsaken topics.

@ Ken White -- you're missing the point.

"Most people, all over the world, are smart enough to know that every tissue is not a Kleenex and every swab is not a Q-Tip..."

My point is not that Americans actually believe that is the case. My point is that you reach a point of saturation with a message that people do what you want them to do without thinking about it consciously. Do you think every swab is a Q-Tip brand? No. But have you ever asked someone for a cotton swab? No. You call it a Q-Tip. That's the power of consistent, pervasive messaging, which I don't think anyone thinks we do. Maybe at the strategic level (and that's a HUGE maybe), but you'd be hard pressed to say it happens at the operational level and we all know it doesn't happen at the tactical level. We don't even use talking points tactically in any meaningful way, which everyone else who tries to sell a message does, from campaigns to computer companies. Our people who actually interface with local populations are more often than not mostly clueless as to what our strategic or operational objectives and messages are.

@Dave -- Bravo!

"What I'd like to do is influence people, and not to "love us" just do what is essential to our mission / campaign."

That's exactly the point I am trying to make.

@ Schmedlap -- I am not talking about selling our image. What I said was COIN is about selling an *idea.* That idea has nothing to do with us; as Dave rightly points out, the idea is tied to the end state of our campaign. Who cares if they like us? Where I disagree with Dave somewhat and agree with you is that in COIN, you make the maximum impact with the minimum presence. IO is the strongest tool in the kit for that.

"Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people's minds; hence, synchronizing IO with efforts along the other LLOs is critical. Every action, including uses of force, must be 'wrapped in a bodyguard of information'." -- FM 3-24

Does that say IO should be a campaign unto itself? Probably not. But considered in a COIN/SOF imperatives context, a reasonable person could argue for the primacy of IO.

You're right Dave. And the most influential force of an organization is its leader.

I wouldn't say never. In the never-ending conventional vs COIN debate, I think that Selil was right in pointing out that it is a sliding spectrum, rather than an either-or. I think that one of the characteristics of that spectrum is that as it slides more towards COIN, IO becomes more dominant. If we were to slide "all the way" along that spectrum towards COIN, I think there would be a need for a true "IO campaign" and other functions would be supporting.

Cannoneer wrote: <I>"Somebody has been asleep at the Perception Management switch, or totally ineffectual at giving me as a member of the domestic TA the warm and fuzzies I have been desperately seeking for two and a half years."</I>

That's another issue for another forum, imo. While the guys at higher echelons should be aware of the domestic TA, it should be handled by folks outside of Iraq/Afghanistan.

Ramadi Nights wrote: <I>"If we're trying to keep that a secret we're failing worse than I imagined. It's supposed to be super visible. It's the kind of IO that makes every tissue a Kleenex and every cotton swab a Q-Tip."</I>

We're not trying to sell our brand image. Take, for example, Sadr's militia. We didn't care if they liked us. We just wanted them all paranoid and distrustful of one another, to kill each other, and become less effective as an adversary. Mission accomplished, even though they still hate us. That was good IO work.

<I>"Go drive your local Afghan highway or walk through the bazaar and show me where these IO products are."</I>

When I would get the weekly rollup of PYSOP MOPs, I generally expended about 2 seconds looking at them, before pressing the delete key. There are other ways to deliver information - most of them much more effective and transparent than printed products and radio broadcasts.

I can't speak to the sort of IO Schmedlap is talking about because, as he points out, I am not usually a party to it. Probably he is referring to PSYOP mostly, which in my experience is done pretty well, and in that regard I'd probably agree with everything he says.

But what I am talking about, and what I referenced with regard to overwhelmingly popular ad campaigns, is IO that is about selling an idea to vulnerable populations. If we're trying to keep that a secret we're failing worse than I imagined. It's supposed to be *super* visible. It's the kind of IO that makes every tissue a Kleenex and every cotton swab a Q-Tip. That's where we're failing, and there really is no argument that we're not failing. Go drive your local Afghan highway or walk through the bazaar and show me where these IO products are.

We're talking about a country where 40 percent of the population is 14 years old or younger. In seven years, how much could we have influenced that population if we had simply done basic advertising and marketing work?

Once again I found Mr. Holt's post really illuminating and I couldn't agree more. Really. And I think it makes my point that the leadership in the case of IO is poorly trained and lacks creative vision. We could probably hire one mid-level PR executive from Manhattan, *Kansas* to fix it. This is basic stuff.

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Cannoneer#4 had Typepad problems (so did I, for that matter - preview a comment, you aren't going to get to post it) and he left a response to <i>Schmedlap</i> over at Argghhh! I'm posting his comment for him:

<blockquote>SWJ ate my comment with TypePad games so I'll put it here.&nbsp; The
following is in response to schmedlap's comment at SWJ.

<blockquote>
I reject the notion that the counterpropaganda element of our IO is going well. Somebody has been asleep at the Perception Management switch, or totally ineffectual at giving me as a member of the domestic TA the warm and fuzzies I have been desperately seeking for two and a half years. The leadership at echelons above DoD failed to mitigate the damage done to the national will by uncountered enemy propaganda amplified by our own Old Media, who were protected from prosecution for leaking classified information and sedition by domestic oppositional elements who spent eight years successfully undermining that leadership.

Much of the Counter Insurgent Supportive New Media becomes Former Regime Loyalists in 18 days because the cognitive dimension between the ears of the American voter was not defended.
</blockquote>

Schmedlap has the key to this whole discussion. We can talk about tools and responsibilities and doctrine but the fact of the matter is that communication is leadership and leadership is communication.

His comment: "Our IO efforts are difficult to monitor - or even identify - unless you have access to the details of what we're doing, when, and how. The number of people who proclaim that we are losing the information war far outnumbers the people who actually have timely and complete knowledge of our efforts." Who has complete knowledge? Whose communication can guide not only our military efforts but the understanding of the populace in which we work, both at home and abroad? It is not the IO team or the PAO or the PRT.

Leadership at all levels need to engage. If the issue does not rise to the level of a news story for the media, then let's find another way. This is the basis for the DoDLive Bloggers Roundtables. We saw a tremendous turnaround in the understanding of what was happening in Iraq, particularly Anbar Province, when the Colonels in charge of those operations picked up the phone and talked with the bloggers who were following the operations. With these discussions COL Simcock completely changed the perceptions of what was happening in Anbar; for the U.S. public that wanted to know, the media that was reporting on it, for the troops who were making it happen, and for the people living in the province.

The DoD Principles of Information, spelled out in JP 3-61, state that "it is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand facts about national security and defense strategy." Our traditional avenue for this has been the news media, but in todays global information environment there are other avenues to communicate important information. Finding those opportunities, tools and channels is the responsibility of the IO team and the PAO. It is a leadership responsibility to engage.

Leadership makes the communication legitimate. Without leadership engagement,it's all just talk.

I reject the notion that our IO is going so poorly. I think the negative attitude is largely due to the fact that our least effective IO efforts are the most visible to people outside the target audience, while our most effective are often transparent to US observers and most visible to the TA, even when the TA doesn't realize (or ponder) that we are influencing them. There are times when I read comments expressing frustration at our mishandling of IO and I think to myself, "Good. This amount of frustration means that our OPSEC is effective." However, this attitude is so prevalent that I am beginning to wonder if it is breeding a groupthink mentality whereby everyone will just always assume that IO really is being mishandled.

Our IO efforts are difficult to monitor - or even identify - unless you have access to the details of what we're doing, when, and how. The number of people who proclaim that we are losing the information war far outnumbers the people who actually have timely and complete knowledge of our efforts. There are, indeed, many cookie cutter products in IZ/Afghan that are marginally effective at best. That does not mean that we are not doing other things that are more effective, more tailored to specific situations, and more transparent than something like a billboard or handbill.

Ramadi Nights posted some legitimate concerns about shortcomings that he observed. But to hold up those examples as evidence that our IO efforts are severely mismanaged is a bit of an overreaction. I could likewise complain that my Bradley gunners "didn't understand gunnery" after they dumped 20 rounds of HE into a car and somehow the insurgents inside got away, leaving only a bloodtrail. But that would be a rather extreme and inaccurate extrapolation when viewed in the sum total of their engagements.

I am not implying that our IO efforts are 100% or even 80% effective. But there is a tendency for people to overestimate the numerator of our failures and shortcomings, while underestimating the denominator of total efforts. Most of the efforts in the denominator are transparent. The sky isn't falling. But if you think it is, then thank your OPSEC manager.

Intersting topic, and one with which I experience a tremendous amount of frustration as a former journalist and Manhattan PR professional.

What immediately strikes me is Mr. Holt's suggestion that there is necessarily a separation between PA and IO, which I agree with wholeheartedly. This is one of a few reasons that the insistence of the USAF upon sending PAOs to fill IO slots on PRTs (thereby making that PAO the IO voice for a province) is a mistake that needs to be corrected at once. The breadth and depth of IO is not being understood, and what happens in many cases is not IO, but a bunch of half-hearted, after-the-fact press releases.

But what has emerged in this thread is a question of semantics that doesn't really advance the understanding of the IO problem, or acknowledge the elephant sitting in the corner on the SIPR. Namely, the horrendous underperformance or outright failure of IO in the war on terror.

IO is the biggest force multiplier, especially in a conflict in which we are hamstrung by a pathetically small force. That it is misunderstood and misused apparently at all levels is unforgivable. If we can hire civilians to provide combat force, surely a phone call to the Ad Council is in order. Military public affairs/IO fails at Advertising and PR 101. It failed in Anbar when I was there and it is failing in RC East in Afghanistan now. I doubt it is any better in any part of any theater.

America is the best country in the world at selling products and ideas. Ever heard of Smokey the Bear? What's the idea he's selling? You know immediately. What's the image on the screen that's supposed to be your brain on drugs? What are the ingredients in a Big Mac?

COIN is, at its essence, about selling an idea. We're not even trying to do this in any meaningful way. What we do is tiny billboards, about one or less every grid square or more, covered with small words intended for an audience driving 100kph that is mostly illiterate. America is full of advertisers, marketers, campaign execs and PR hacks. Get them in the game. We in the military are failing badly at this.

I have to disagree with the premise of the post that CJTF-101 was aggressively ahead of the SVBIED story. Ahead of a story happens before the story breaks. What CJTF-101 did was quickly *react* to a story. It's pure reaction mode over here. There is zero creative offensive IO capacity. Or, if there is, it's all happening in conference rooms at Salerno and BAF and it's not filtering down.

But if we're not creative enough for offensive IO that works (like "Where's the Beef?". You still remember that), at least we can do the very least we can do. COIN doctrine tells us how important it is to manage expectations among the "nodes" in the "systems" with which we interact. That's not even happening. Who is making sure district subgovernors, shuras and John Q. Citizen know what's being done in their district? Their province? Their country? I know those groups don't know because I interface with them regularly and I'm always shocked. Believe it or not, in Afghanistan, TV, radio and NATO newspapers are not effective media. There's no power, radios only get to the people who live close enough to the MSRs for deliveries by our risk-averse military, and oh yeah, Afghans don't read.

If we accept the idea in another post yesterday titled, "Close Air Support and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan" that "mounting civilian casualties are alienating the Afghan populace", we have to ask: if we feel so sure that our use of force is discriminate, and that some civilian casualties are the terrible price of war, a fact Afghans, of all the Earth's people, surely understand, why are Afghan civilians being alienated in such a measurable way?

Why do Afghans in some quarters believe we feed the bodies of women to dogs? Why, in Ramadi, did a guy who lived immediately adjacent to FOB Ramadi believe we were burning detainees bodies on the trash fire? We've been around these people for years, and they have no idea who we are. That's our fault. That's IO failure to spread the word about who we are and what we intend. If they viewed our actions through the proper prism, locals might be less inclined to believe that every US CAS attack is on a wedding party. It's a lack of creativity by career servicemembers working in a field that probably should belong to Reservists or outright civilians.

IO is a 777 being piloted by a caveman. Commanders tasked with planning for it don't understand it at all. Officers taked with its impementation have no training or interest in it. IO has the capacity to reach huge numbers of people, off the MSRs, but it doesn't. It has the capacity to multiply the effects of operations a hundred fold, but it doesn't. Why? Because it's not synchronized with other operations, as COIN doctrine explicity prescribes, nor is it planned or measured in terms of effects.

(Probably the main reason for this is that almost no one planning or executing operations has read the doctrine. At a recent PRT training event where I was present, the trainers asked the assembled commanders, 2s, 3s, CA and IO officers (and others) of 12 PRTs who among them had read the 3-24. One person raised his hand. I was not that person then.)

IO really isn't hard. I tire of hearing exasperated officers complain that it's so difficult to understand. Physics is tough to historians, too. The armed forces either need to train people the very basics of PR and advertising and COIN, recruit people who already have this skillset, or get out of the business and farm it out to contractors. Seven years is much too long for the IO effort to be as stunted as it is.

According to JP 3-61, <i>Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations</i>, countering propaganda <b>IS</b> a PA mission. In addition to repeated mentions in the execsum, chapter 1, and throughout, it is explicitly listed under "Public Affairs Fundamentals" 1-b-(5) on page III-1: "(5) Counter adversary propaganda with the truth. Actively use truthful, fact-based, accurate, and timely public information products to respond to adversary inaccurate information and deception."

PSYOP doctrine also lists counterpropaganda as a PSYOP task. Im not aware of anything that gives either specialty the lead or priority, or even explicitly subdivides the effort.